Thierry Breton
European Commission Our ref. 05.12.2023 No 12.2-2/7272-1
Rue de la Loi / Wetstraat 200,
1049 Brussels,
Belgium
Addressing the issues regarding
national security risks in public
procurement
Dear Mr Breton,
We would like to draw DG GROW’s attention to the observations of Estonian Government
and contracting authorities regarding some new aspects in the field of public procurement
aggravated by the complex geopolitical situation in Europe and worldwide. These trends
affect member states’ national security and consequently have an effect on the conduct of
public procurement.
We believe that there are national security risks involved if, as a result of a public procurement
procedure, contracts are concluded, or technologies are procured from economic operators
that have connections with third countries with questionable governance and policy goals. We
have already identified such risks on several occasions, first and foremost in procuring various
supplies and technology but also in procuring software. As you can appreciate, national
security is in the competence of a member state, and therefore a member state should be able
to exclude access to sensitive data, prevent espionage and refrain from possible political
pressure from countries that do not share democratic values and could use economic operators,
acting in their interests, as a tool or a weapon for these purposes. Current EU public
procurement regulation, especially in the classical directive procedures, limits us or makes it
extremely complicated, to act upon the risk assessment on resilience and national security.
Nevertheless, there are certain provisions in the public procurement directives of the defense
and security sector and to some extent of the utilities sector that make it possible to take into
account aspects related to national security enabling decisions not to conclude a public
procurement contract with an economic operator whose activities or offered technology could
pose a threat to national security. However, contracting authorities have experienced that the
nature of these provisions is currently too narrowly focused. Considering present hybrid
threats, we have all experienced that national security is much broader concept than military
defense and internal security. Given today's geopolitical situation we feel that the current
provisions are no longer sufficient as security risks may also lie in strategic goals or covert
activities of unfriendly governments. All Member States need a clearer competence norm on
the basis of which they could adequately protect their independence and security interests.
Suur-Ameerika 1 / 10122 Tallinn / Estonia / +372 611 3558 /
[email protected]
www.rahandusministeerium.ee / Reg. code: 70000272
As you are well aware, the same problem has been observed by our colleagues from other
member states who have raised the issue in the public procurement expert working groups and
other fora.
Considering the above we invite DG GROW to quickly initiate a policy discussion on this
topic and to seek for additional legal solutions that would allow, especially in the case of
contracting authorities in the public sector procedures, to exclude (as and if necessary) the
goods and services provided by economic operators from third countries that do not share
democratic values or to exclude the goods and services provided by companies operating in
the European Union but still related to before-mentioned countries.
In conclusion, we consider this topic to be extremely relevant and time sensitive. Therefore,
we see an urgent need for collaboration. As a first step, a discussion could be initiated in expert
working groups in the nearest future, followed by a legal proposal of amendments of current
public procurement directives or special provisons in delegated acts . We are open for further
clarifications and propose to schedule a meeting at your convenience.
Yours sincerely,
Mart Võrklaev
Minister of Finance
Madina Talu +372 5885 1418
[email protected]
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