EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.12.2021
C(2021) 8838 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
EN EN
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
The Commission has approved the content of a draft for a Communication from the
Commission – Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements
regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons on 9 December 2021.
The draft for a Communication – Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to
collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons, is
attached as an Annex to this Communication. The draft for a Communication is open to
public consultation at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/open.html.
1
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.12.2021
C(2021) 8838 final
ANNEX
ANNEX
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
EN EN
ANNEX
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
DRAFT
1. INTRODUCTION
(1) These Guidelines set out the principles for assessing under Article 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“Article 101 TFEU”) agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices (collectively referred to as “agreements”) concluded as a result of collective
negotiations between solo self-employed persons1 and other undertaking(s) (“the
counterparty/-ies”2), concerning the working conditions of the solo self-employed
persons.
(2) Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict
competition within the internal market, notably if they directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions. The EU competition rules
are based on Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), which provides
that the Union shall establish an internal market, including a system ensuring that
competition is not distorted.3
(3) Article 3(3) TEU also provides that the Union shall promote “a highly competitive
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress”. To that end,
the Union recognizes the important role of social dialogue and collective bargaining
and commits, under Article 152 TFEU, to “facilitate dialogue between the social
partners, respecting their autonomy”. Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union further recognizes the right of collective bargaining
and action. Improved working conditions and proper social protection also constitute
core principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, under which “social partners
shall be consulted on the design and implementation of economic, employment and
social policies according to national practices” and “shall be encouraged to negotiate
and conclude collective agreements in matters relevant to them”.4
(4) The Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) took the EU’s social policy
objectives into account when it ruled, in the context of collective bargaining between
management and labour, that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in
1
For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term “solo self-employed persons” refers to persons who do not
have an employment contract or who are not in an employment relationship and who rely primarily on
their own personal labour for the provision of the services concerned.
2
For the purpose of these Guidelines, the term “counterparties” refers to undertakings with which the solo
self-employed persons contract (i.e. their professional customers), including associations of such
undertakings.
3
Title VII, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the TFEU and Protocol No 27 of the TEU and TFEU.
4
European Pillar of Social Rights, point 8; https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-
2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-
social-rights-20-principles_en .
EN 1 EN
collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers
and necessary for the improvement of working conditions. 5 Hence, agreements
entered into within the framework of collective bargaining between employers and
workers and intended, by their nature and purpose, to improve working conditions
(including pay), fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU and therefore do not
infringe EU competition law.6
(5) The Court has further clarified that this exclusion from the scope of
Article 101 TFEU also covers collective agreements concluded between employers
and workers’ organisations negotiating in the name, and on behalf of their false self-
employed7 members, namely service providers in a situation comparable to that of
workers.8 In this context the Court has considered an individual to be a false self-
employed person if: (i) he/she acts under the direction of his/her employer as regards,
in particular, his/her freedom to choose the time, place and content of his/her work;
(ii) does not share the employer’s commercial risks and (iii) for the duration of the
relationship, forms an integral part of the employer’s undertaking. Such criteria apply
irrespective of whether that person is labelled as self-employed under national law
for tax, administrative or organisational reasons and require a case by case
assessment in light of the facts of the individual case.9
(6) In recent years, the labour market has undergone fundamental changes, influenced by
the trend towards subcontracting and outsourcing business and personal service
activities as well as by the digitalisation of production processes and the rise of the
online platform economy. Self-employment in the EU is relatively high and has
grown substantially in recent years, mainly in the online platform economy.
(7) While these developments have increased the flexibility and accessibility of the
labour market, in some cases they have also led to difficult working conditions in the
online platform economy and beyond. Even if they are not fully integrated into the
business of their principal in the same way as workers, certain self-employed persons
may still not be entirely independent of their principal or they may lack sufficient
5
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 22; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 59; Judgment of 11
December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraph 49; Judgment of 9 July 2009, 3F v
Commission of the European Communities, C‑319/07, EU:C:2009:435, paragraph 50.
6
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 23; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 60; Judgment of 21
September 1999, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel
in Bouwmaterialen, C-115/97, EU:C:1999:434, paragraph 57; Judgment of 21 September 1999,
Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, C-
219/97, EU:C:1999:437, paragraph 47; Judgment of 12 September 2000, Pavel Pavlov and Others v
Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, C-180/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 67; Judgment of 21
September 2000, Hendrik van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord, C-222/98, EU:C:2000:475, paragraph
22; Judgment of 3 March 2011, AG2R Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, C-437/09,
EU:C:2011:112, paragraph 29.
7
As opposed to genuine self-employed persons, who can choose their activity, place, time and manner of
work freely and carry it out at their own risk.
8
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraphs 30-31.
9
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraphs 36-37.
EN 2 EN
bargaining power to influence their working conditions. Moreover, the COVID-19
crisis has made many self-employed persons even more vulnerable as their loss of
earnings has been exacerbated by weak or non-existent national social security
schemes and dedicated support measures.10
(8) When self-employed persons are overall in a situation comparable to that of workers,
they may, in individual cases, be considered as false self-employed persons and be
reclassified as workers by national authorities/courts. Certain groups may also be
considered as workers by virtue of a legal presumption. However, in cases where
they have not been reclassified as workers, access to collective bargaining may still
allow them to improve their working conditions.
(9) The prohibition of Article 101 TFEU applies to “undertakings”, which is a wide
concept that covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal
status, and the way in which it is financed.11 Hence, genuine self-employed persons,
even if they are individuals working on their own, are, in principle, undertakings
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, since they offer their services for
remuneration on a given market and perform their activities as independent economic
operators.12 A service provider can lose the status of undertaking not only when, in
practice, he/she is in a situation of subordination, but also in cases of economic
dependence, based on an assessment of the facts of a specific case.13 Current labour
market developments, and in particular the emergence of the online platform
economy, reinforce the uncertainty as regards the circumstances under which
collective agreements concluded by or on behalf of self-employed persons can be
deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
(10) Against this background, these Guidelines clarify i) that certain categories of
collective agreements fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU; and ii) that the
Commission will not intervene against certain other categories of collective
agreements.
(11) These Guidelines explain how the Commission will apply EU competition law,
without prejudice to the application of other rules or principles of EU law. These
Guidelines do not affect the prerogatives of the Member States in social policy or the
autonomy of the social partners. They are also without prejudice to the definitions of
10
European Parliament, Report of 13 October 2021 on the situation of artists and the cultural recovery in
the EU (2020/2261(INI)), Committee on Culture and Education,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0283_EN.html#title1.
11
Judgment of 23 April 1991, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90,
EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21; Judgment of 16 November 1995, Fédération Française des Sociétés
d'Assurance, Société Paternelle-Vie, Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d'Assurance et de
Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche, Case C-244/94,
EU:C:1995:392, paragraph 14; Judgment of 11 December 1997, Job Centre coop. arl., Case C-55/96,
EU:C:1997:603, paragraph 21.
12
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 27; Judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas
v Autoridade da Concorrência, C‑1/12, EU:C:2013:127, paragraphs 36-37; Judgment of 14 December
2006, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de
Petróleos SA, C‑217/05, EU:C:2006:784, paragraph 45.
13
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 33; Judgment of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C‑217/05,
EU:C:2006:784, paragraphs 43-44.
EN 3 EN
the terms “worker” or “self-employed person” under national law.14 They do not
affect the competences of the Member States or social partners as regards the
organisation of collective negotiations in the framework of labour law, or the
possibility of the contracting parties to seek re-classification of their employment
status (or the competent authorities/courts to assess such cases) under EU or national
law.
(12) These Guidelines are also without prejudice to the Court’s further interpretation of
Article 101 TFEU in relation to collective bargaining agreements. They do not affect
the application of EU competition law, as prescribed by Article 42 TFEU and the
relevant EU legislation15 in relation to the agricultural and fisheries sectors.
Furthermore, they apply without prejudice to the application of Article 101(3) TFEU,
which exempts from Article 101(1) TFEU agreements that (i) contribute to
improving the production/distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress; (ii) pass on a fair share of their benefits to consumers (iii)
contain only indispensable restrictions of competition and (iv) do not afford the
parties the possibility to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products or services in question.16
(13) For the avoidance of doubt, collective agreements concluded by self-employed
persons that are not covered by these Guidelines do not automatically infringe
Article 101 TFEU, but require an individual assessment.
2. GENERAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THESE GUIDELINES
(a) Types of agreements covered by these Guidelines
(14) These Guidelines apply to all agreements negotiated and/or concluded collectively
between certain categories of solo self-employed persons on the one hand and their
counterparty/-ies on the other hand (referred to here as “collective agreements”), to
the extent that by their nature and purpose they concern the working conditions of
such solo self-employed persons.
(15) Without prejudice to Member States’ discretion as regards the scope and form of
collective representation channels for self-employed persons, these Guidelines apply
to all forms of collective negotiations, ranging from negotiations through social
14
According to the settled case law of the Court, the essential feature of the employment relationship is that
“for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction of another person in
return for which he receives remuneration”. It should be noted that the classification of a person as a
“worker” or as “self-employed” is to be determined primarily on a case by case basis under national law,
taking into consideration the case law of the Court. Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten
Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 34; Judgment of 21
February 2013, L. N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte, C-46/12,
EU:C:2013:97, paragraph 40; Judgment of 10 September 2014, Iraklis Haralambidis v Calogero Casilli,
C‑270/13, EU:C:2014:2185, paragraph 28.
15
Articles 206-210 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing
Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007,
OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671-854. Articles 40 and 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the common organisation of the markets in
fishery and aquaculture products, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1184/2006 and (EC) No
1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 1-21.
16
Communication from the Commission — Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97–118, paragraph 34.
EN 4 EN
partners or other associations to direct bargaining by a group of solo self-employed
persons with their counterparties or associations of those counterparties. They also
cover cases where solo self-employed persons wish to be covered by an existing
collective agreement concluded between the counterparty they work for and a group
of workers/solo self-employed persons.
(16) The working conditions of solo self-employed persons include matters such as
remuneration, working time and working patterns, holiday, leave, physical spaces
where work takes place, health and safety, insurance and social security, and
conditions under which the solo self-employed person is entitled to cease providing
his/her services, for example, in response to breaches of the agreement relating to
working conditions. However, agreements under which solo self-employed persons
collectively decide not to provide services to particular counterparties, for example
because the counterparty is not willing to enter into an agreement on working
conditions require an individual assessment. Such agreements restrict the supply of
labour and may therefore raise competition concerns. To the extent that it can be
shown that such a coordinated refusal to supply labour is necessary and proportionate
for the negotiation or conclusion of the collective agreement, it will be treated for the
purposes of these Guidelines in the same way as the collective agreement to which it
is linked (or would have been linked in the case of unsuccessful negotiations).
(17) The conclusion of collective agreements presupposes a certain degree of
coordination between the multiple parties on each negotiating side prior to the
conclusion of the collective agreement. Such coordination may take the form of an
agreement or information exchange or communication between the parties on each
negotiating side in order to decide a common approach to the subject matter and the
form of negotiation (e.g. multilateral or through the appointment of representatives).
Again, to the extent that such coordination is necessary and proportionate for the
negotiation or conclusion of the collective agreement, it will be treated for the
purposes of these Guidelines in the same way as the collective agreement to which it
is linked.
(18) These Guidelines do not cover decisions by associations or agreements between solo
self-employed persons outside the context of negotiations (or preparations for
negotiations) with a counterparty to improve the self-employed persons’ working
conditions. In particular, they do not cover agreements which go beyond the
regulation of working conditions by determining the conditions (in particular, the
prices) under which services are offered by the solo self-employed persons or by the
counterparty to consumers17, or which limit the freedom of employers to hire the
labour providers that they need.
Example 1
Situation: Solo self-employed riders provide their services to the three delivery
platforms active in city B. A collective agreement is in place between the delivery
platforms and the riders, laying down the fees that the platforms must pay to riders for
17
Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64–88.
EN 5 EN
their services, as well as the minimum health and safety obligations of the platforms
towards the riders. The collective agreement provides for the riders to limit their services
to a specific area of the city. For that purpose, the agreement divides the city in three
separate areas, one for the riders of each platform. Separately, the solo self-employed
riders in city B agree among themselves not to perform more than twenty deliveries per
four hours within a working day.
Analysis: The example contains two agreements between undertakings within the
meaning of Article 101 TFEU: (i) the collective agreement between the platforms and
the solo self-employed riders; (ii) the separate agreement between the solo self-
employed riders on the maximum number of deliveries. The collective agreement is
covered by these Guidelines, as it is the result of collective negotiations and regulates the
working conditions (fees, health and safety conditions) under which the solo self-
employed riders provide their services to the platforms. However, the part of the
collective agreement which divides the territory of the city between the three platforms
does not relate to their working conditions but constitutes a market-sharing agreement,
which as such is likely to restrict competition by object under Article 101 TFEU.18
By contrast, the separate agreement between the solo self-employed riders on the
number of deliveries per working day is not the result of collective negotiations between
the solo self-employed persons and their counterparty/-ies and is therefore not covered
by these Guidelines but should be analysed separately.
Example 2
Situation: The sports clubs in Member State X agree among themselves not to hire
athletes from each other, for the duration of their contracts with the respective sports
club. The clubs also coordinate on the remuneration levels of the athletes over 35 years
old.
Analysis: The arrangements between the sports clubs constitute agreements between
undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. These arrangements are not
covered by these Guidelines, as they are not negotiated between solo self-employed
persons and their counterparties and are therefore not collective agreements. The first
18
The same conclusion would apply if the collective agreement included a clause regulating other matters
going beyond working conditions, such as the business hours during which the three platforms would
provide their services.
EN 6 EN
arrangement is likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object, as it restricts competition
between the sports clubs to hire the best athletes in the marketplace. The second (wage-
fixing) arrangement, is also likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object, since it is in
essence an agreement between competitors (the clubs) to reduce their input costs.
Overall, the present example illustrates practices of undertakings in the labour markets
which clearly fall outside the scope of these Guidelines and are likely to infringe Article
101 TFEU. In particular, the agreements of the example between sport clubs are likely to
infringe Article 101 TFEU irrespectively of whether they are related to self-employed
persons or workers.
(b) The persons covered by these Guidelines
(19) These Guidelines cover collective agreements relating to the working conditions of
solo self-employed persons (see Sections III and IV of these Guidelines). For the
purposes of these Guidelines, the term “solo self-employed persons” refers to
persons who do not have an employment contract or who are not in an employment
relationship and who rely primarily on their own personal labour for the provision of
the services concerned. Solo self-employed persons may use certain goods or assets
in order to provide their services. For example, a cleaner uses cleaning accessories
and a musician plays a musical instrument. In these instances, the goods are used as
an ancillary means to provide the final service, and the solo self-employed persons
would hence be considered to rely on their personal labour. By contrast, these
Guidelines do not apply to situations, where the economic activity of the solo self-
employed person consists merely in the sharing or exploitation of goods or assets, or
the resale of goods/services. For example, where a solo self-employed person rents
out accommodation or resells automotive parts, these activities relate to asset
exploitation and the resale of goods, rather than the provision of personal labour.
(20) Section III of these Guidelines sets out the categories of collective agreements
involving solo self-employed persons which the Commission considers to fall
outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU and Section IV sets out the categories of
collective agreements against which the Commission will not intervene. The
categories of solo self-employed persons and/or collective agreements identified in
Section III and IV of these Guidelines should respect and fully comply with the
general principles defining the scope of these Guidelines set out in this Section II.
3. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS BY SOLO SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS
COMPARABLE TO WORKERS FALLING OUTSIDE ARTICLE 101 TFEU
(21) In instances where solo self-employed persons are considered to be in a situation
comparable to that of workers, their collective agreements should be considered to
fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU regardless of whether they would fulfil
EN 7 EN
the criteria for being false self-employed persons (see paragraph (5) of these
Guidelines).19
(22) The Court has ruled that a collective agreement which covers self-employed service
providers can be regarded as the result of dialogue between management and labour
if the service providers are in a situation comparable to that of workers20 and has
confirmed that “in today’s economy it is not always easy to establish the status of
some self-employed contractors as “undertakings”.21 The Court has also ruled that “a
service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence of an
undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own conduct on the market,
but is entirely dependent on his principal, because he does not bear any of the
financial or commercial risks arising out of the latter’s activity and operates as an
auxiliary organ within the principal’s undertaking”.22
(23) On the basis of these criteria and taking into account developments in the EU labour
market and at national level (in terms of legislation and jurisprudence), for the
purposes of these Guidelines, the Commission considers that the following categories
of solo self-employed persons are in a situation comparable to that of workers and
that collective agreements concluded by them therefore fall outside the scope of
Article 101 TFEU:23
(a) Economically dependent solo self-employed persons
(24) Solo self-employed persons who provide their services exclusively or predominantly
to one counterparty are likely to be in a situation of economic dependence vis-à-vis
that counterparty. In general such solo self-employed persons do not determine their
conduct independently on the market and are largely dependent on their
counterparty, forming an integral part of its business. In addition, they are more
likely to receive directions on how their work should be carried out. The issue of
economically dependent self-employed persons has been recognised by a number of
national laws that grant such solo self-employed persons the right to bargain
collectively, provided they fulfil the criteria set out by the respective national
measures.24
19
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430.
20
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 31.
21
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 32.
22
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 33; Judgment of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C‑217/05,
EU:C:2006:784, paragraphs 43-44.
23
Some solo self-employed persons might fall under several of the categories in these Guidelines.
24
For instance, Germany under Section 12a of the Collective Agreements Act in the version published on
25 August 1969 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1323), last amended by Article 8 of the Act of 20 May 2020
(Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1055); or Spain under Article 11 of Law 20/2007, of 11 July, on the status of
self-employed work, Official State Gazette No 166 of 12 July 2007, pages 29964 to 29978 have both
relied on a criterion of economic dependence. Some solo self-employed persons might fall under several
of the categories in these Guidelines.
EN 8 EN
(25) The Commission considers that a solo self-employed person is in a situation of
economic dependence where he/she earns at least 50 % of his/her total annual work-
related income from a single counterparty. Hence, collective agreements relating to
the improvement of working conditions concluded between solo self-employed
persons that are in a situation of economic dependence and their counterparty on
which they are economically dependent fall outside Article 101 TFEU, even if the
self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers by national
authorities/courts.
Example 3
Situation: Company X is a firm of architects which contracts a large number of (self-
employed) architects for the completion of its projects. The architects earn 90% of their
income from Company X. They collectively negotiate and conclude an agreement with
Company X which provides for a maximum of 45 hours working time per week, annual
leave of 26 calendar days and specified remuneration rates based on the architect’s level
of experience.
Analysis: Self-employed architects, like other independent contractors, are generally
considered as undertakings for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU and that provision
therefore applies to agreements between them. However, the agreement concluded
between the self-employed architects and Company X would fall outside the scope of
Article 101 TFEU, as it is a collective agreement relating to working conditions between
Company X and individuals who can be considered to be in a situation comparable to
that of workers (in terms of their economic dependence). In this example, the architects
are economically dependent on their counterparty (Company X), since they earn 90% of
their income from that company. They can therefore be regarded as forming an integral
part of Company X.
(b) Solo self-employed persons working “side-by-side” with workers
(26) Solo self-employed persons who perform the same or similar tasks “side-by-side”
with workers for the same counterparty, are in a situation comparable to that of
workers, as they provide their services under the direction of their counterparty and
do not bear the commercial risks of the counterparty’s activity or enjoy any
independence as regards the performance of the economic activity concerned. It is
for the competent national authorities/courts, to decide whether the contractual
relationship of self-employed persons who work side-by-side with workers should be
reclassified as an employment relationship. However, in cases where the solo self-
employed persons have not been reclassified as workers, they may still benefit from
collective bargaining. This reality has been recognised by the practice in several
EN 9 EN
Member States where collective agreements cover workers and self-employed
persons active in the same sectors.25
(27) Hence, collective agreements relating to working conditions between a counterparty
and solo self-employed persons who perform the same or similar tasks “side-by-side”
with workers for the same counterparty fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU,
even if the self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers
by national authorities/courts. The same applies to collective agreements which in
accordance with social dialogue systems cover both workers and solo self-employed
persons.
Example 4
Situation: Company X organises orchestra concerts and other classical music events.
Multiple musicians work for Company X either as workers or as self-employed persons,
on the basis of annual contracts. These musicians, independently of their status, are
instructed by the cultural director of Company X as to the works they must perform, the
timing and place of rehearsals and the events in which they must participate. Company X
has concluded a collective agreement with all the musicians. This establishes a
maximum cap of 45 working hours per week and grants the musicians a special leave of
1 day after the performance of 3 concerts within the same week.
Analysis: The solo self-employed musicians are in a situation comparable to that of
Company X’s workers in terms of subordination and similarity of tasks. They perform
the same tasks as the employed musicians (i.e. performing music for events), they are
subject to the same instructions of Company X regarding the content, place and timing
of the performances and they are engaged for a similar duration as the employed
musicians. Under these circumstances, the collective agreement regulating the
musicians’ working conditions falls outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
(c) Solo self-employed persons working through digital labour platforms
(28) The emergence of the online platform economy and the provision of labour through
digital labour platforms has created a new reality for certain solo self-employed
persons, who find themselves in a situation comparable to that of workers vis-à-vis
25
See for example Article 14 of the Collective Agreement in the Theatre and Dance sector in the
Netherlands concluded between the Kunstenbond (Artist Union) and the Nederlandse Associatie voor
Podiumkunsten (Dutch Association for Podium Arts) for the period 1 Jaunary 2020 – 31 December 2021,
available at https://www.napk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Cao-TD-2020-2021.pdf; or Article 2 of the
Collective Agreement for professional journalists, concluded by the Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia), the Svet RTV Slovenija (Council of RTV Slovenia)
and the Združenje radijskih postaj Slovenije ter (Slovenian Radio Station Association) and the Sindikat
novinarjev Slovenije (the Trade Union of Slovenian Journalists), available at
http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=KOLP49.
EN 10 EN
the digital labour platforms through or to which they provide their labour. Solo self-
employed persons may be dependent on digital platforms, especially in terms of their
customer outreach, and may often face “take it or leave it” work offers, with little or
no scope to negotiate their working conditions, including their remuneration. Digital
labour platforms are usually able to unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of
their relationship, without prior information or consultation of the solo self-employed
persons.
(29) Recent jurisprudence and legislative developments at national level provide further
indications of the comparability of such self-employed persons with workers. In the
context of reclassification cases, national courts are increasingly recognizing the
dependence of service providers on certain types of platforms, or even the existence
of an employment relationship.26 In the same vein, some Member States have
adopted legislation27 establishing a presumption of employment relationship or the
right to collective bargaining for service providers to or through digital platforms.
(30) For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term digital labour platform means any
natural or legal person providing a commercial service which meets all of the
following requirements: (i) it is provided, at least in part, at a distance through
electronic means, such as a website or a mobile application; (ii) it is provided at the
request of a recipient of the service; and (iii) it involves, as a necessary and essential
component, the organisation of work performed by individuals, irrespective of
whether that work is performed online or in a certain location. Platforms which do
not organise the work of individuals but simply provide a means through which the
solo self-employed persons can reach end-users do not constitute digital labour
platforms. For example, a platform that merely aggregates and displays the available
service providers (e.g. plumbers) in a specific area, thereby allowing customers to
use their services on demand is not considered a digital labour platform, as it does
not organise the work of the service providers.
(31) In light of these considerations, collective agreements between solo self-employed
persons and digital labour platforms that by their nature and purpose aim at
improving working conditions fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, even if the
self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers by national
authorities/courts.
26
For a detailed overview of the case law in nine EU Member States, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
see Hießl, C., ‘Case Law on the Classification of Platform Workers: Cross-European Comparative
Analysis and Tentative Conclusions’, Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 02.05.2021,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839603.
27
See for instance Spain, with the Royal Decree-Law 9/2021, of 11 May, amending the recast text of the
Workers’ Statute, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 2/2015, of 23 October, to guarantee the labour
rights of persons engaged in distribution in the field of digital platforms, Official State Gazette No 113 of
12 May 2021, pages 56733 to 56738; or Greece with the Hellenic Republic, Law 4808/2021 for the
Protection of Labour – Establishment of an Independent Authority "Labour Inspection" – Ratification of
Convention no 190 of the International Labour Organization to eliminate violence and harassment in the
world of work – Ratification of Convention no 187 of the International Labour Organization for the
Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health at Work – Implementation of the Directive
(EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance,
and other provisions of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and other urgent arrangements, Official
Gazette Α' 101/19-06-2021.
EN 11 EN
Example 5
Situation: A group of drivers working for ride-hailing platforms enters into negotiations
with the regional association bringing together as members the ride-hailing platforms in
order to conclude a collective agreement to improve the drivers’ working conditions.
Before entering into negotiations with the drivers, the ride-hailing platforms (members
of the association) coordinate their negotiating strategy. Ultimately, the negotiations fail
and no collective agreement is concluded. Subsequently, the association of ride-hailing
platforms adopts a decision which sets a minimum price of EUR 5 per ride for
consumers. The platforms also discussed the possibility of fixing a minimum price per
ride as part of their coordination before entering into the negotiations with the drivers.
Analysis: Through their association, the ride-hailing platforms attempt to negotiate a
collective agreement with the drivers, aimed at improving the drivers’ working
conditions. Despite the fact that ultimately no agreement is concluded, the negotiations
between the solo self-employed drivers and the platforms’ association would fall outside
the scope of Article 101 TFEU. The same applies to the coordination between the
platforms preceding the negotiations with the drivers, provided such coordination is
necessary and proportionate for the negotiation of a collective agreement covered by
these Guidelines.
However, the discussions between the platforms relating to the minimum price per ride
to be charged to consumers do not relate to working conditions. Such coordination on
pricing between competitors is likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object. In any
case, the decision adopted by the association of ride-hailing platforms would fall outside
the scope of these Guidelines because it is not the result of collective negotiations
between solo self-employed persons and their counterparties. It is the result of an
agreement between the members of the association, i.e. the platforms (counterparties).
Conversely, if the solo self-employed drivers and the platforms’ association had
collectively agreed on a minimum fee of EUR 5 per ride for the drivers (irrespective of
how that cost is passed on to consumers), such agreement would have been considered
as relating to working conditions and thus falling outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
EN 12 EN
4. ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE COMMISSION
(32) In some cases, solo self-employed persons who are not in a situation comparable to
that of workers may nevertheless be in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their
counterparties and therefore may be unable to significantly influence their working
conditions. Therefore, even if it cannot be assumed that their collective agreements
fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, these solo self-employed persons may in
fact face issues that are similar to those faced by solo self-employed persons in the
categories described above. For this reason, to the extent that collective agreements
aim to correct a clear imbalance in the bargaining power of solo self-employed
persons relative to their counterparties and are intended, by their nature and purpose,
to improve working conditions, the Commission will not intervene against them.
(33) The following categories of collective agreements will be considered to fulfil the
above criteria:
(a) Collective agreements concluded by solo self-employed persons with
counterparties of a certain economic strength
(34) Solo self-employed persons who deal with counterparties that have a certain level of
economic strength, and hence buyer power, may have insufficient bargaining power
to influence their working conditions. In that case, collective agreements can be a
legitimate means to correct the imbalance in bargaining power between the two
sides.
(35) Accordingly, the Commission will not intervene against collective agreements
between solo self-employed persons and their counterparties in cases where there is a
clear imbalance in bargaining power.28 Such an imbalance in bargaining power will
be considered to exist at least:
where solo self-employed persons negotiate or conclude collective agreements
with one or more counterparties which represent the whole sector or industry ;
and
where solo self-employed persons negotiate or conclude collective agreements
with a counterparty whose annual aggregate turnover exceeds EUR 2 million or
whose staff headcount is equal or more than 10 persons or with several
counterparties which jointly exceed one of these thresholds.29
28
These Guidelines should not be interpreted as establishing a (positive) enforcement priority of the
Commission as regards collective negotiations and agreements between solo self-employed persons and
undertakings below these thresholds.
29
Calculated in accordance with Title 1 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number
C(2003) 1422), OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36–41.
EN 13 EN
Example 6
Situation: Companies X, Y and Z provide automotive maintenance and repair services.
The total turnover of Company X is EUR 700,000, that of Company Y is EUR 1 million
and that of Company Z is EUR 500,000. Solo self-employed technicians working for
these companies as independent service providers are dissatisfied with their low
remuneration and poor safety conditions, and decide to negotiate jointly with Companies
X, Y and Z in order to improve their working conditions. The three companies refuse to
negotiate, claiming that any collective agreement with the solo self-employed
technicians would infringe Article 101 TFEU.
Analysis: Both the solo self-employed technicians and the three automotive services
companies are undertakings for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU. The presumption of
an imbalance of bargaining power would not apply if Companies X, Y or Z were to
negotiate independently, as none of them meets the EUR 2 million turnover threshold
specified in paragraph (35) of these Guidelines. However, in this case the presumption
does apply, because the three companies negotiate collectively and it is therefore their
aggregate turnover that is taken into account. The Commission would therefore not
intervene against collective agreements relating to working conditions of the solo self-
employed persons in this case.
(b) Collective agreements concluded by self-employed persons pursuant to
national or EU legislation
(36) In some instances, the national legislator, in pursuit of social objectives, has acted to
address the imbalance in bargaining power of certain categories of solo self-
employed persons, either (i) by explicitly granting such persons the right to collective
bargaining or (ii) by excluding from the scope of national competition law collective
agreements concluded by self-employed persons in certain professions. Thus, when
such national measures are adopted in consideration of social objectives, the
Commission will not intervene against collective agreements involving categories of
solo self-employed persons to which such national legislation applies.
EN 14 EN
Example 7
Situation: The national law of Member State A excludes from the scope of national
competition law agreements concluded by certain self-employed persons in the cultural
sector.
Analysis: Member State A has established a sectoral exemption from national
competition law in consideration of social objectives. Even if the scope of the measure
may go beyond the situation of solo self-employed persons as addressed in Section III of
these Guidelines, the Commission will not intervene against collective agreements
entered into by solo self-employed persons pursuant to the national measure.
Example 8
Situation: The labour law of Member State B establishes a right for solo self-employed
journalists to bargain collectively with the companies to which they provide their
services.
Analysis: Member State B has specifically granted the right of collective bargaining to a
particular category of self-employed persons, namely the journalists. This means that
collective agreements concluded between journalists and the companies to which they
provide their services are not considered to be anticompetitive under the national
competition law. Hence, in this instance the Commission would not intervene against
collective agreements concluded by solo self-employed journalists.
(37) In the same vein, the Copyright Directive30 has set the principle that authors and
performers31 shall be entitled to receive appropriate and proportionate remuneration
when they license or transfer their exclusive rights for the exploitation of their works
and any other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights. 32 Authors and
30
Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright
and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC,
PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
31
All authors and performers are covered by Article 18 of the Copyright Directive with the exception of
authors of a computer programme within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2009/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs,
OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16–22. Article 23(2), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
32
Article 18(1) and Recital 72, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125. See also Recital 73 of the
same Directive, according to which the remuneration of authors and performers should be “appropriate
and proportionate to the actual or potential economic value of the licensed or transferred rights, taking
EN 15 EN
performers tend to be in a weaker contractual position than their counterparties33 and
the Directive foresees the possibility to strengthen their contractual position in order
to ensure fair remuneration in their exploitation contracts. 34 The Copyright Directive
grants flexibility to Member States for implementing this principle using different
mechanisms (including collective bargaining), as long as they are in compliance with
EU law.35
(38) In line with these provisions and without prejudice to any other provisions of the
Copyright Directive, the Commission will not intervene against collective
agreements concluded by solo self-employed authors or performers with their
counterparties in pursuance to this Directive.
(39) Paragraph (38) of these Guidelines does not apply to collective negotiations
concluded in the context of collective management organizations or independent
management entities.36 These Guidelines should not be interpreted as excluding from
the application of the EU competition law the practices of these organizations or
entities.37
into account the author's or performer's contribution to the overall work or other subject matter and all
other circumstances of the case, such as market practices or the actual exploitation of the work”.
33
Recital 72, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
34
Collective bargaining may also be used in the instances provided under Articles 19(5), 20(1) and 22(5) of
the Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
35
Article 18(2) and recital 73, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
36
‘Collective management organisation’ means any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of
assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to
copyright on behalf of more than one right-holder, for the collective benefit of those right-holders, as its
sole or main purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria: (i) it is owned or controlled
by its members; (ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis. ‘Independent management entity’ means any
organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual
arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder,
for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which is: (i) neither owned
nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by rightholders; and (ii) organised on a for-profit
basis; Article 3(a) and (b), Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of
rights in musical works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98.
37
Recital 56, Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical
works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98.
EN 16 EN
Example 9
Situation: Company Y is a publisher of newspapers and magazines. Several journalists
who work as freelancers, contribute with articles to Company Y’s publications.
Company Y remunerates the journalists, based on the articles published in each
newspaper or magazine. The journalists are not satisfied with the level of remuneration
they receive from Company Y and they negotiate and agree collectively with
Company Y an increase of the royalties (remuneration) paid by Company Y by 20%.
Analysis: In accordance with these Guidelines, the Commission will not intervene
against the collective agreement concluded by the solo self-employed (freelancer)
journalists and Company Y as the agreement is concluded pursuant to the Copyright
Directive.
EN 17 EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.12.2021
C(2021) 8838 final
ANNEX
ANNEX
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
EN EN
ANNEX
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
DRAFT
1. INTRODUCTION
(1) These Guidelines set out the principles for assessing under Article 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“Article 101 TFEU”) agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices (collectively referred to as “agreements”) concluded as a result of collective
negotiations between solo self-employed persons1 and other undertaking(s) (“the
counterparty/-ies”2), concerning the working conditions of the solo self-employed
persons.
(2) Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict
competition within the internal market, notably if they directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions. The EU competition rules
are based on Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), which provides
that the Union shall establish an internal market, including a system ensuring that
competition is not distorted.3
(3) Article 3(3) TEU also provides that the Union shall promote “a highly competitive
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress”. To that end,
the Union recognizes the important role of social dialogue and collective bargaining
and commits, under Article 152 TFEU, to “facilitate dialogue between the social
partners, respecting their autonomy”. Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union further recognizes the right of collective bargaining
and action. Improved working conditions and proper social protection also constitute
core principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, under which “social partners
shall be consulted on the design and implementation of economic, employment and
social policies according to national practices” and “shall be encouraged to negotiate
and conclude collective agreements in matters relevant to them”.4
(4) The Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) took the EU’s social policy
objectives into account when it ruled, in the context of collective bargaining between
management and labour, that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in
1
For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term “solo self-employed persons” refers to persons who do not
have an employment contract or who are not in an employment relationship and who rely primarily on
their own personal labour for the provision of the services concerned.
2
For the purpose of these Guidelines, the term “counterparties” refers to undertakings with which the solo
self-employed persons contract (i.e. their professional customers), including associations of such
undertakings.
3
Title VII, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the TFEU and Protocol No 27 of the TEU and TFEU.
4
European Pillar of Social Rights, point 8; https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-
2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-
social-rights-20-principles_en .
EN 1 EN
collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers
and necessary for the improvement of working conditions. 5 Hence, agreements
entered into within the framework of collective bargaining between employers and
workers and intended, by their nature and purpose, to improve working conditions
(including pay), fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU and therefore do not
infringe EU competition law.6
(5) The Court has further clarified that this exclusion from the scope of
Article 101 TFEU also covers collective agreements concluded between employers
and workers’ organisations negotiating in the name, and on behalf of their false self-
employed7 members, namely service providers in a situation comparable to that of
workers.8 In this context the Court has considered an individual to be a false self-
employed person if: (i) he/she acts under the direction of his/her employer as regards,
in particular, his/her freedom to choose the time, place and content of his/her work;
(ii) does not share the employer’s commercial risks and (iii) for the duration of the
relationship, forms an integral part of the employer’s undertaking. Such criteria apply
irrespective of whether that person is labelled as self-employed under national law
for tax, administrative or organisational reasons and require a case by case
assessment in light of the facts of the individual case.9
(6) In recent years, the labour market has undergone fundamental changes, influenced by
the trend towards subcontracting and outsourcing business and personal service
activities as well as by the digitalisation of production processes and the rise of the
online platform economy. Self-employment in the EU is relatively high and has
grown substantially in recent years, mainly in the online platform economy.
(7) While these developments have increased the flexibility and accessibility of the
labour market, in some cases they have also led to difficult working conditions in the
online platform economy and beyond. Even if they are not fully integrated into the
business of their principal in the same way as workers, certain self-employed persons
may still not be entirely independent of their principal or they may lack sufficient
5
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 22; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 59; Judgment of 11
December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraph 49; Judgment of 9 July 2009, 3F v
Commission of the European Communities, C‑319/07, EU:C:2009:435, paragraph 50.
6
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 23; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 60; Judgment of 21
September 1999, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel
in Bouwmaterialen, C-115/97, EU:C:1999:434, paragraph 57; Judgment of 21 September 1999,
Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, C-
219/97, EU:C:1999:437, paragraph 47; Judgment of 12 September 2000, Pavel Pavlov and Others v
Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, C-180/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 67; Judgment of 21
September 2000, Hendrik van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord, C-222/98, EU:C:2000:475, paragraph
22; Judgment of 3 March 2011, AG2R Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, C-437/09,
EU:C:2011:112, paragraph 29.
7
As opposed to genuine self-employed persons, who can choose their activity, place, time and manner of
work freely and carry it out at their own risk.
8
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraphs 30-31.
9
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraphs 36-37.
EN 2 EN
bargaining power to influence their working conditions. Moreover, the COVID-19
crisis has made many self-employed persons even more vulnerable as their loss of
earnings has been exacerbated by weak or non-existent national social security
schemes and dedicated support measures.10
(8) When self-employed persons are overall in a situation comparable to that of workers,
they may, in individual cases, be considered as false self-employed persons and be
reclassified as workers by national authorities/courts. Certain groups may also be
considered as workers by virtue of a legal presumption. However, in cases where
they have not been reclassified as workers, access to collective bargaining may still
allow them to improve their working conditions.
(9) The prohibition of Article 101 TFEU applies to “undertakings”, which is a wide
concept that covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal
status, and the way in which it is financed.11 Hence, genuine self-employed persons,
even if they are individuals working on their own, are, in principle, undertakings
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, since they offer their services for
remuneration on a given market and perform their activities as independent economic
operators.12 A service provider can lose the status of undertaking not only when, in
practice, he/she is in a situation of subordination, but also in cases of economic
dependence, based on an assessment of the facts of a specific case.13 Current labour
market developments, and in particular the emergence of the online platform
economy, reinforce the uncertainty as regards the circumstances under which
collective agreements concluded by or on behalf of self-employed persons can be
deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
(10) Against this background, these Guidelines clarify i) that certain categories of
collective agreements fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU; and ii) that the
Commission will not intervene against certain other categories of collective
agreements.
(11) These Guidelines explain how the Commission will apply EU competition law,
without prejudice to the application of other rules or principles of EU law. These
Guidelines do not affect the prerogatives of the Member States in social policy or the
autonomy of the social partners. They are also without prejudice to the definitions of
10
European Parliament, Report of 13 October 2021 on the situation of artists and the cultural recovery in
the EU (2020/2261(INI)), Committee on Culture and Education,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0283_EN.html#title1.
11
Judgment of 23 April 1991, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90,
EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21; Judgment of 16 November 1995, Fédération Française des Sociétés
d'Assurance, Société Paternelle-Vie, Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d'Assurance et de
Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche, Case C-244/94,
EU:C:1995:392, paragraph 14; Judgment of 11 December 1997, Job Centre coop. arl., Case C-55/96,
EU:C:1997:603, paragraph 21.
12
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 27; Judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas
v Autoridade da Concorrência, C‑1/12, EU:C:2013:127, paragraphs 36-37; Judgment of 14 December
2006, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de
Petróleos SA, C‑217/05, EU:C:2006:784, paragraph 45.
13
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 33; Judgment of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C‑217/05,
EU:C:2006:784, paragraphs 43-44.
EN 3 EN
the terms “worker” or “self-employed person” under national law.14 They do not
affect the competences of the Member States or social partners as regards the
organisation of collective negotiations in the framework of labour law, or the
possibility of the contracting parties to seek re-classification of their employment
status (or the competent authorities/courts to assess such cases) under EU or national
law.
(12) These Guidelines are also without prejudice to the Court’s further interpretation of
Article 101 TFEU in relation to collective bargaining agreements. They do not affect
the application of EU competition law, as prescribed by Article 42 TFEU and the
relevant EU legislation15 in relation to the agricultural and fisheries sectors.
Furthermore, they apply without prejudice to the application of Article 101(3) TFEU,
which exempts from Article 101(1) TFEU agreements that (i) contribute to
improving the production/distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress; (ii) pass on a fair share of their benefits to consumers (iii)
contain only indispensable restrictions of competition and (iv) do not afford the
parties the possibility to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products or services in question.16
(13) For the avoidance of doubt, collective agreements concluded by self-employed
persons that are not covered by these Guidelines do not automatically infringe
Article 101 TFEU, but require an individual assessment.
2. GENERAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THESE GUIDELINES
(a) Types of agreements covered by these Guidelines
(14) These Guidelines apply to all agreements negotiated and/or concluded collectively
between certain categories of solo self-employed persons on the one hand and their
counterparty/-ies on the other hand (referred to here as “collective agreements”), to
the extent that by their nature and purpose they concern the working conditions of
such solo self-employed persons.
(15) Without prejudice to Member States’ discretion as regards the scope and form of
collective representation channels for self-employed persons, these Guidelines apply
to all forms of collective negotiations, ranging from negotiations through social
14
According to the settled case law of the Court, the essential feature of the employment relationship is that
“for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction of another person in
return for which he receives remuneration”. It should be noted that the classification of a person as a
“worker” or as “self-employed” is to be determined primarily on a case by case basis under national law,
taking into consideration the case law of the Court. Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten
Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 34; Judgment of 21
February 2013, L. N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte, C-46/12,
EU:C:2013:97, paragraph 40; Judgment of 10 September 2014, Iraklis Haralambidis v Calogero Casilli,
C‑270/13, EU:C:2014:2185, paragraph 28.
15
Articles 206-210 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing
Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007,
OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671-854. Articles 40 and 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the common organisation of the markets in
fishery and aquaculture products, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1184/2006 and (EC) No
1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 1-21.
16
Communication from the Commission — Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97–118, paragraph 34.
EN 4 EN
partners or other associations to direct bargaining by a group of solo self-employed
persons with their counterparties or associations of those counterparties. They also
cover cases where solo self-employed persons wish to be covered by an existing
collective agreement concluded between the counterparty they work for and a group
of workers/solo self-employed persons.
(16) The working conditions of solo self-employed persons include matters such as
remuneration, working time and working patterns, holiday, leave, physical spaces
where work takes place, health and safety, insurance and social security, and
conditions under which the solo self-employed person is entitled to cease providing
his/her services, for example, in response to breaches of the agreement relating to
working conditions. However, agreements under which solo self-employed persons
collectively decide not to provide services to particular counterparties, for example
because the counterparty is not willing to enter into an agreement on working
conditions require an individual assessment. Such agreements restrict the supply of
labour and may therefore raise competition concerns. To the extent that it can be
shown that such a coordinated refusal to supply labour is necessary and proportionate
for the negotiation or conclusion of the collective agreement, it will be treated for the
purposes of these Guidelines in the same way as the collective agreement to which it
is linked (or would have been linked in the case of unsuccessful negotiations).
(17) The conclusion of collective agreements presupposes a certain degree of
coordination between the multiple parties on each negotiating side prior to the
conclusion of the collective agreement. Such coordination may take the form of an
agreement or information exchange or communication between the parties on each
negotiating side in order to decide a common approach to the subject matter and the
form of negotiation (e.g. multilateral or through the appointment of representatives).
Again, to the extent that such coordination is necessary and proportionate for the
negotiation or conclusion of the collective agreement, it will be treated for the
purposes of these Guidelines in the same way as the collective agreement to which it
is linked.
(18) These Guidelines do not cover decisions by associations or agreements between solo
self-employed persons outside the context of negotiations (or preparations for
negotiations) with a counterparty to improve the self-employed persons’ working
conditions. In particular, they do not cover agreements which go beyond the
regulation of working conditions by determining the conditions (in particular, the
prices) under which services are offered by the solo self-employed persons or by the
counterparty to consumers17, or which limit the freedom of employers to hire the
labour providers that they need.
Example 1
Situation: Solo self-employed riders provide their services to the three delivery
platforms active in city B. A collective agreement is in place between the delivery
platforms and the riders, laying down the fees that the platforms must pay to riders for
17
Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64–88.
EN 5 EN
their services, as well as the minimum health and safety obligations of the platforms
towards the riders. The collective agreement provides for the riders to limit their services
to a specific area of the city. For that purpose, the agreement divides the city in three
separate areas, one for the riders of each platform. Separately, the solo self-employed
riders in city B agree among themselves not to perform more than twenty deliveries per
four hours within a working day.
Analysis: The example contains two agreements between undertakings within the
meaning of Article 101 TFEU: (i) the collective agreement between the platforms and
the solo self-employed riders; (ii) the separate agreement between the solo self-
employed riders on the maximum number of deliveries. The collective agreement is
covered by these Guidelines, as it is the result of collective negotiations and regulates the
working conditions (fees, health and safety conditions) under which the solo self-
employed riders provide their services to the platforms. However, the part of the
collective agreement which divides the territory of the city between the three platforms
does not relate to their working conditions but constitutes a market-sharing agreement,
which as such is likely to restrict competition by object under Article 101 TFEU.18
By contrast, the separate agreement between the solo self-employed riders on the
number of deliveries per working day is not the result of collective negotiations between
the solo self-employed persons and their counterparty/-ies and is therefore not covered
by these Guidelines but should be analysed separately.
Example 2
Situation: The sports clubs in Member State X agree among themselves not to hire
athletes from each other, for the duration of their contracts with the respective sports
club. The clubs also coordinate on the remuneration levels of the athletes over 35 years
old.
Analysis: The arrangements between the sports clubs constitute agreements between
undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. These arrangements are not
covered by these Guidelines, as they are not negotiated between solo self-employed
persons and their counterparties and are therefore not collective agreements. The first
18
The same conclusion would apply if the collective agreement included a clause regulating other matters
going beyond working conditions, such as the business hours during which the three platforms would
provide their services.
EN 6 EN
arrangement is likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object, as it restricts competition
between the sports clubs to hire the best athletes in the marketplace. The second (wage-
fixing) arrangement, is also likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object, since it is in
essence an agreement between competitors (the clubs) to reduce their input costs.
Overall, the present example illustrates practices of undertakings in the labour markets
which clearly fall outside the scope of these Guidelines and are likely to infringe Article
101 TFEU. In particular, the agreements of the example between sport clubs are likely to
infringe Article 101 TFEU irrespectively of whether they are related to self-employed
persons or workers.
(b) The persons covered by these Guidelines
(19) These Guidelines cover collective agreements relating to the working conditions of
solo self-employed persons (see Sections III and IV of these Guidelines). For the
purposes of these Guidelines, the term “solo self-employed persons” refers to
persons who do not have an employment contract or who are not in an employment
relationship and who rely primarily on their own personal labour for the provision of
the services concerned. Solo self-employed persons may use certain goods or assets
in order to provide their services. For example, a cleaner uses cleaning accessories
and a musician plays a musical instrument. In these instances, the goods are used as
an ancillary means to provide the final service, and the solo self-employed persons
would hence be considered to rely on their personal labour. By contrast, these
Guidelines do not apply to situations, where the economic activity of the solo self-
employed person consists merely in the sharing or exploitation of goods or assets, or
the resale of goods/services. For example, where a solo self-employed person rents
out accommodation or resells automotive parts, these activities relate to asset
exploitation and the resale of goods, rather than the provision of personal labour.
(20) Section III of these Guidelines sets out the categories of collective agreements
involving solo self-employed persons which the Commission considers to fall
outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU and Section IV sets out the categories of
collective agreements against which the Commission will not intervene. The
categories of solo self-employed persons and/or collective agreements identified in
Section III and IV of these Guidelines should respect and fully comply with the
general principles defining the scope of these Guidelines set out in this Section II.
3. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS BY SOLO SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS
COMPARABLE TO WORKERS FALLING OUTSIDE ARTICLE 101 TFEU
(21) In instances where solo self-employed persons are considered to be in a situation
comparable to that of workers, their collective agreements should be considered to
fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU regardless of whether they would fulfil
EN 7 EN
the criteria for being false self-employed persons (see paragraph (5) of these
Guidelines).19
(22) The Court has ruled that a collective agreement which covers self-employed service
providers can be regarded as the result of dialogue between management and labour
if the service providers are in a situation comparable to that of workers20 and has
confirmed that “in today’s economy it is not always easy to establish the status of
some self-employed contractors as “undertakings”.21 The Court has also ruled that “a
service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence of an
undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own conduct on the market,
but is entirely dependent on his principal, because he does not bear any of the
financial or commercial risks arising out of the latter’s activity and operates as an
auxiliary organ within the principal’s undertaking”.22
(23) On the basis of these criteria and taking into account developments in the EU labour
market and at national level (in terms of legislation and jurisprudence), for the
purposes of these Guidelines, the Commission considers that the following categories
of solo self-employed persons are in a situation comparable to that of workers and
that collective agreements concluded by them therefore fall outside the scope of
Article 101 TFEU:23
(a) Economically dependent solo self-employed persons
(24) Solo self-employed persons who provide their services exclusively or predominantly
to one counterparty are likely to be in a situation of economic dependence vis-à-vis
that counterparty. In general such solo self-employed persons do not determine their
conduct independently on the market and are largely dependent on their
counterparty, forming an integral part of its business. In addition, they are more
likely to receive directions on how their work should be carried out. The issue of
economically dependent self-employed persons has been recognised by a number of
national laws that grant such solo self-employed persons the right to bargain
collectively, provided they fulfil the criteria set out by the respective national
measures.24
19
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV v Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430.
20
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 31.
21
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 32.
22
Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13,
EU:C:2014:2411, paragraph 33; Judgment of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C‑217/05,
EU:C:2006:784, paragraphs 43-44.
23
Some solo self-employed persons might fall under several of the categories in these Guidelines.
24
For instance, Germany under Section 12a of the Collective Agreements Act in the version published on
25 August 1969 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1323), last amended by Article 8 of the Act of 20 May 2020
(Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1055); or Spain under Article 11 of Law 20/2007, of 11 July, on the status of
self-employed work, Official State Gazette No 166 of 12 July 2007, pages 29964 to 29978 have both
relied on a criterion of economic dependence. Some solo self-employed persons might fall under several
of the categories in these Guidelines.
EN 8 EN
(25) The Commission considers that a solo self-employed person is in a situation of
economic dependence where he/she earns at least 50 % of his/her total annual work-
related income from a single counterparty. Hence, collective agreements relating to
the improvement of working conditions concluded between solo self-employed
persons that are in a situation of economic dependence and their counterparty on
which they are economically dependent fall outside Article 101 TFEU, even if the
self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers by national
authorities/courts.
Example 3
Situation: Company X is a firm of architects which contracts a large number of (self-
employed) architects for the completion of its projects. The architects earn 90% of their
income from Company X. They collectively negotiate and conclude an agreement with
Company X which provides for a maximum of 45 hours working time per week, annual
leave of 26 calendar days and specified remuneration rates based on the architect’s level
of experience.
Analysis: Self-employed architects, like other independent contractors, are generally
considered as undertakings for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU and that provision
therefore applies to agreements between them. However, the agreement concluded
between the self-employed architects and Company X would fall outside the scope of
Article 101 TFEU, as it is a collective agreement relating to working conditions between
Company X and individuals who can be considered to be in a situation comparable to
that of workers (in terms of their economic dependence). In this example, the architects
are economically dependent on their counterparty (Company X), since they earn 90% of
their income from that company. They can therefore be regarded as forming an integral
part of Company X.
(b) Solo self-employed persons working “side-by-side” with workers
(26) Solo self-employed persons who perform the same or similar tasks “side-by-side”
with workers for the same counterparty, are in a situation comparable to that of
workers, as they provide their services under the direction of their counterparty and
do not bear the commercial risks of the counterparty’s activity or enjoy any
independence as regards the performance of the economic activity concerned. It is
for the competent national authorities/courts, to decide whether the contractual
relationship of self-employed persons who work side-by-side with workers should be
reclassified as an employment relationship. However, in cases where the solo self-
employed persons have not been reclassified as workers, they may still benefit from
collective bargaining. This reality has been recognised by the practice in several
EN 9 EN
Member States where collective agreements cover workers and self-employed
persons active in the same sectors.25
(27) Hence, collective agreements relating to working conditions between a counterparty
and solo self-employed persons who perform the same or similar tasks “side-by-side”
with workers for the same counterparty fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU,
even if the self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers
by national authorities/courts. The same applies to collective agreements which in
accordance with social dialogue systems cover both workers and solo self-employed
persons.
Example 4
Situation: Company X organises orchestra concerts and other classical music events.
Multiple musicians work for Company X either as workers or as self-employed persons,
on the basis of annual contracts. These musicians, independently of their status, are
instructed by the cultural director of Company X as to the works they must perform, the
timing and place of rehearsals and the events in which they must participate. Company X
has concluded a collective agreement with all the musicians. This establishes a
maximum cap of 45 working hours per week and grants the musicians a special leave of
1 day after the performance of 3 concerts within the same week.
Analysis: The solo self-employed musicians are in a situation comparable to that of
Company X’s workers in terms of subordination and similarity of tasks. They perform
the same tasks as the employed musicians (i.e. performing music for events), they are
subject to the same instructions of Company X regarding the content, place and timing
of the performances and they are engaged for a similar duration as the employed
musicians. Under these circumstances, the collective agreement regulating the
musicians’ working conditions falls outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
(c) Solo self-employed persons working through digital labour platforms
(28) The emergence of the online platform economy and the provision of labour through
digital labour platforms has created a new reality for certain solo self-employed
persons, who find themselves in a situation comparable to that of workers vis-à-vis
25
See for example Article 14 of the Collective Agreement in the Theatre and Dance sector in the
Netherlands concluded between the Kunstenbond (Artist Union) and the Nederlandse Associatie voor
Podiumkunsten (Dutch Association for Podium Arts) for the period 1 Jaunary 2020 – 31 December 2021,
available at https://www.napk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Cao-TD-2020-2021.pdf; or Article 2 of the
Collective Agreement for professional journalists, concluded by the Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia), the Svet RTV Slovenija (Council of RTV Slovenia)
and the Združenje radijskih postaj Slovenije ter (Slovenian Radio Station Association) and the Sindikat
novinarjev Slovenije (the Trade Union of Slovenian Journalists), available at
http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=KOLP49.
EN 10 EN
the digital labour platforms through or to which they provide their labour. Solo self-
employed persons may be dependent on digital platforms, especially in terms of their
customer outreach, and may often face “take it or leave it” work offers, with little or
no scope to negotiate their working conditions, including their remuneration. Digital
labour platforms are usually able to unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of
their relationship, without prior information or consultation of the solo self-employed
persons.
(29) Recent jurisprudence and legislative developments at national level provide further
indications of the comparability of such self-employed persons with workers. In the
context of reclassification cases, national courts are increasingly recognizing the
dependence of service providers on certain types of platforms, or even the existence
of an employment relationship.26 In the same vein, some Member States have
adopted legislation27 establishing a presumption of employment relationship or the
right to collective bargaining for service providers to or through digital platforms.
(30) For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term digital labour platform means any
natural or legal person providing a commercial service which meets all of the
following requirements: (i) it is provided, at least in part, at a distance through
electronic means, such as a website or a mobile application; (ii) it is provided at the
request of a recipient of the service; and (iii) it involves, as a necessary and essential
component, the organisation of work performed by individuals, irrespective of
whether that work is performed online or in a certain location. Platforms which do
not organise the work of individuals but simply provide a means through which the
solo self-employed persons can reach end-users do not constitute digital labour
platforms. For example, a platform that merely aggregates and displays the available
service providers (e.g. plumbers) in a specific area, thereby allowing customers to
use their services on demand is not considered a digital labour platform, as it does
not organise the work of the service providers.
(31) In light of these considerations, collective agreements between solo self-employed
persons and digital labour platforms that by their nature and purpose aim at
improving working conditions fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, even if the
self-employed persons in question have not been reclassified as workers by national
authorities/courts.
26
For a detailed overview of the case law in nine EU Member States, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
see Hießl, C., ‘Case Law on the Classification of Platform Workers: Cross-European Comparative
Analysis and Tentative Conclusions’, Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 02.05.2021,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839603.
27
See for instance Spain, with the Royal Decree-Law 9/2021, of 11 May, amending the recast text of the
Workers’ Statute, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 2/2015, of 23 October, to guarantee the labour
rights of persons engaged in distribution in the field of digital platforms, Official State Gazette No 113 of
12 May 2021, pages 56733 to 56738; or Greece with the Hellenic Republic, Law 4808/2021 for the
Protection of Labour – Establishment of an Independent Authority "Labour Inspection" – Ratification of
Convention no 190 of the International Labour Organization to eliminate violence and harassment in the
world of work – Ratification of Convention no 187 of the International Labour Organization for the
Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health at Work – Implementation of the Directive
(EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance,
and other provisions of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and other urgent arrangements, Official
Gazette Α' 101/19-06-2021.
EN 11 EN
Example 5
Situation: A group of drivers working for ride-hailing platforms enters into negotiations
with the regional association bringing together as members the ride-hailing platforms in
order to conclude a collective agreement to improve the drivers’ working conditions.
Before entering into negotiations with the drivers, the ride-hailing platforms (members
of the association) coordinate their negotiating strategy. Ultimately, the negotiations fail
and no collective agreement is concluded. Subsequently, the association of ride-hailing
platforms adopts a decision which sets a minimum price of EUR 5 per ride for
consumers. The platforms also discussed the possibility of fixing a minimum price per
ride as part of their coordination before entering into the negotiations with the drivers.
Analysis: Through their association, the ride-hailing platforms attempt to negotiate a
collective agreement with the drivers, aimed at improving the drivers’ working
conditions. Despite the fact that ultimately no agreement is concluded, the negotiations
between the solo self-employed drivers and the platforms’ association would fall outside
the scope of Article 101 TFEU. The same applies to the coordination between the
platforms preceding the negotiations with the drivers, provided such coordination is
necessary and proportionate for the negotiation of a collective agreement covered by
these Guidelines.
However, the discussions between the platforms relating to the minimum price per ride
to be charged to consumers do not relate to working conditions. Such coordination on
pricing between competitors is likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU by object. In any
case, the decision adopted by the association of ride-hailing platforms would fall outside
the scope of these Guidelines because it is not the result of collective negotiations
between solo self-employed persons and their counterparties. It is the result of an
agreement between the members of the association, i.e. the platforms (counterparties).
Conversely, if the solo self-employed drivers and the platforms’ association had
collectively agreed on a minimum fee of EUR 5 per ride for the drivers (irrespective of
how that cost is passed on to consumers), such agreement would have been considered
as relating to working conditions and thus falling outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
EN 12 EN
4. ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE COMMISSION
(32) In some cases, solo self-employed persons who are not in a situation comparable to
that of workers may nevertheless be in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their
counterparties and therefore may be unable to significantly influence their working
conditions. Therefore, even if it cannot be assumed that their collective agreements
fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, these solo self-employed persons may in
fact face issues that are similar to those faced by solo self-employed persons in the
categories described above. For this reason, to the extent that collective agreements
aim to correct a clear imbalance in the bargaining power of solo self-employed
persons relative to their counterparties and are intended, by their nature and purpose,
to improve working conditions, the Commission will not intervene against them.
(33) The following categories of collective agreements will be considered to fulfil the
above criteria:
(a) Collective agreements concluded by solo self-employed persons with
counterparties of a certain economic strength
(34) Solo self-employed persons who deal with counterparties that have a certain level of
economic strength, and hence buyer power, may have insufficient bargaining power
to influence their working conditions. In that case, collective agreements can be a
legitimate means to correct the imbalance in bargaining power between the two
sides.
(35) Accordingly, the Commission will not intervene against collective agreements
between solo self-employed persons and their counterparties in cases where there is a
clear imbalance in bargaining power.28 Such an imbalance in bargaining power will
be considered to exist at least:
where solo self-employed persons negotiate or conclude collective agreements
with one or more counterparties which represent the whole sector or industry ;
and
where solo self-employed persons negotiate or conclude collective agreements
with a counterparty whose annual aggregate turnover exceeds EUR 2 million or
whose staff headcount is equal or more than 10 persons or with several
counterparties which jointly exceed one of these thresholds.29
28
These Guidelines should not be interpreted as establishing a (positive) enforcement priority of the
Commission as regards collective negotiations and agreements between solo self-employed persons and
undertakings below these thresholds.
29
Calculated in accordance with Title 1 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number
C(2003) 1422), OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36–41.
EN 13 EN
Example 6
Situation: Companies X, Y and Z provide automotive maintenance and repair services.
The total turnover of Company X is EUR 700,000, that of Company Y is EUR 1 million
and that of Company Z is EUR 500,000. Solo self-employed technicians working for
these companies as independent service providers are dissatisfied with their low
remuneration and poor safety conditions, and decide to negotiate jointly with Companies
X, Y and Z in order to improve their working conditions. The three companies refuse to
negotiate, claiming that any collective agreement with the solo self-employed
technicians would infringe Article 101 TFEU.
Analysis: Both the solo self-employed technicians and the three automotive services
companies are undertakings for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU. The presumption of
an imbalance of bargaining power would not apply if Companies X, Y or Z were to
negotiate independently, as none of them meets the EUR 2 million turnover threshold
specified in paragraph (35) of these Guidelines. However, in this case the presumption
does apply, because the three companies negotiate collectively and it is therefore their
aggregate turnover that is taken into account. The Commission would therefore not
intervene against collective agreements relating to working conditions of the solo self-
employed persons in this case.
(b) Collective agreements concluded by self-employed persons pursuant to
national or EU legislation
(36) In some instances, the national legislator, in pursuit of social objectives, has acted to
address the imbalance in bargaining power of certain categories of solo self-
employed persons, either (i) by explicitly granting such persons the right to collective
bargaining or (ii) by excluding from the scope of national competition law collective
agreements concluded by self-employed persons in certain professions. Thus, when
such national measures are adopted in consideration of social objectives, the
Commission will not intervene against collective agreements involving categories of
solo self-employed persons to which such national legislation applies.
EN 14 EN
Example 7
Situation: The national law of Member State A excludes from the scope of national
competition law agreements concluded by certain self-employed persons in the cultural
sector.
Analysis: Member State A has established a sectoral exemption from national
competition law in consideration of social objectives. Even if the scope of the measure
may go beyond the situation of solo self-employed persons as addressed in Section III of
these Guidelines, the Commission will not intervene against collective agreements
entered into by solo self-employed persons pursuant to the national measure.
Example 8
Situation: The labour law of Member State B establishes a right for solo self-employed
journalists to bargain collectively with the companies to which they provide their
services.
Analysis: Member State B has specifically granted the right of collective bargaining to a
particular category of self-employed persons, namely the journalists. This means that
collective agreements concluded between journalists and the companies to which they
provide their services are not considered to be anticompetitive under the national
competition law. Hence, in this instance the Commission would not intervene against
collective agreements concluded by solo self-employed journalists.
(37) In the same vein, the Copyright Directive30 has set the principle that authors and
performers31 shall be entitled to receive appropriate and proportionate remuneration
when they license or transfer their exclusive rights for the exploitation of their works
and any other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights. 32 Authors and
30
Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright
and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC,
PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
31
All authors and performers are covered by Article 18 of the Copyright Directive with the exception of
authors of a computer programme within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2009/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs,
OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16–22. Article 23(2), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
32
Article 18(1) and Recital 72, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125. See also Recital 73 of the
same Directive, according to which the remuneration of authors and performers should be “appropriate
and proportionate to the actual or potential economic value of the licensed or transferred rights, taking
EN 15 EN
performers tend to be in a weaker contractual position than their counterparties33 and
the Directive foresees the possibility to strengthen their contractual position in order
to ensure fair remuneration in their exploitation contracts. 34 The Copyright Directive
grants flexibility to Member States for implementing this principle using different
mechanisms (including collective bargaining), as long as they are in compliance with
EU law.35
(38) In line with these provisions and without prejudice to any other provisions of the
Copyright Directive, the Commission will not intervene against collective
agreements concluded by solo self-employed authors or performers with their
counterparties in pursuance to this Directive.
(39) Paragraph (38) of these Guidelines does not apply to collective negotiations
concluded in the context of collective management organizations or independent
management entities.36 These Guidelines should not be interpreted as excluding from
the application of the EU competition law the practices of these organizations or
entities.37
into account the author's or performer's contribution to the overall work or other subject matter and all
other circumstances of the case, such as market practices or the actual exploitation of the work”.
33
Recital 72, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
34
Collective bargaining may also be used in the instances provided under Articles 19(5), 20(1) and 22(5) of
the Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
35
Article 18(2) and recital 73, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/51/2019/REV/1 OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125.
36
‘Collective management organisation’ means any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of
assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to
copyright on behalf of more than one right-holder, for the collective benefit of those right-holders, as its
sole or main purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria: (i) it is owned or controlled
by its members; (ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis. ‘Independent management entity’ means any
organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual
arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder,
for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which is: (i) neither owned
nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by rightholders; and (ii) organised on a for-profit
basis; Article 3(a) and (b), Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of
rights in musical works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98.
37
Recital 56, Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical
works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98.
EN 16 EN
Example 9
Situation: Company Y is a publisher of newspapers and magazines. Several journalists
who work as freelancers, contribute with articles to Company Y’s publications.
Company Y remunerates the journalists, based on the articles published in each
newspaper or magazine. The journalists are not satisfied with the level of remuneration
they receive from Company Y and they negotiate and agree collectively with
Company Y an increase of the royalties (remuneration) paid by Company Y by 20%.
Analysis: In accordance with these Guidelines, the Commission will not intervene
against the collective agreement concluded by the solo self-employed (freelancer)
journalists and Company Y as the agreement is concluded pursuant to the Copyright
Directive.
EN 17 EN
Andmed algatuse kohta Nimetus COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Approval of the content of a draft for a COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons ( public consultation ) Eelnõu nr C(2021) 8838 Esitamise kuupäev: 0 9 .12 .2021 Menetluskord EL-is: SEISUKOHA Valitsusse toomise alus 1. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 1 p1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist 2. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 1 p2 - algatuse/ vastuvõtmisega või teatises toodud meetmete rakendamisega kaasneb oluline majanduslik , sotsiaalne või muu mõju 3. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 2 - Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjoni või väliskomisjoni nõue 4. FORMCHECKBOX VVS § 20 1 lg 1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab VV pädevusse kuuluva otsuse vastuvõtmist (määruse vastuvõtmine, muutmine, tühistamine) 5. FORMCHECKBOX VVS § 20 1 lg 2 - seisukoha võtmist algatuse/teatise osas peab oluliseks peaminister või minister (on poliitiliselt oluline või tundlik (Eestis või EL-is)) Valitsusele esitamine Kuupäev 0 2 .02 KOK 1 0 .02 VV EL menetluse ajakava Konsultatsioon on avatud kuni 24.02.2022. Siseriiklik menetlus Vastutav min J M Kaasatud ministeeriumid S O M, MKM (sisendi andmise tähtaeg: 14.01) Sotsiaalpartnerid, huvigrupid Kaasata kõik asjasse puutuvad partnerid ja huvigrupid EELNÕU ÜLEVAADE kokkuvõte eelõu sisust ja eesmärkidest Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu (edaspidi "ELi toimimise leping") artikkel 101 keelab ettevõtjate vahelised konkurentsi piiravad kokkulepped. Euroopa Kohus on selgitanud , et töötajate – sealhulgas „liba - FIEde “ – ja tööandjate vahelised kollektiivläbirääkimised jäävad ELi konkurentsieeskirjade kohaldamisalast välja. Tõelisi füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjaid peetakse ELi konkurentsiõiguse kohaselt ettevõtjateks ja nende poolt sõlmitavad lepingud (nt kollektiivläbirääkimiste lepingud) võivad rikkuda kujutada endast EL konkurentsiõiguse rikkumist . Euroopa Komisjon plaanib anda suunised, mille eesmärk on tagada, et konkurentsiõigus ei takistaks kollektiivlepinguid, mille eesmärk on parandada teatud enesehõivatute töötingimusi, ku ivõrd neil võib olla vähe mõju töötingimustele, tagades samal ajal, et tarbijad ja VKEd saa ksid jätkuvalt kasu konkurentsivõimelis t e st hin d ad est ja digitaalmajanduse uuenduslik est ärimudeli test . Suunise d selgitaksid ELi konkurentsiõiguse kohaldatavust enesehõivatute kollektiivläbirääkimiste le . Käesoleva ga on Euroopa Komisjon avanud avaliku konsultatsiooni, küsides avaliku sektori ja sidusrühmade seisukohti suuniste eelnõu kohta. Link konsultatsioonile: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-collective-bargaining-2_en Võimalikud sots-maj. mõjud võimalikud õiguslikud muudatused Mõju eelarvele Kommentaarid SEISUKOHAD Eesti seisukoht Teiste riikide seisukohad Kommentaarid
Eelnõude infosüsteemis (EIS) on antud täitmiseks ülesanne.
Eelnõu toimik: 12.2.1/21-1386 - C(2021) 8838 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Approval of the content of a draft for a COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
Arvamuse andmine eelnõu kohta Justiitsministeeriumile vastavalt Riigikantselei 28.12.2021 resolutsioonile.
Osapooled: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium; Sotsiaalministeerium
Tähtaeg: 14.01.2022 23:59
Link eelnõu toimiku vaatele: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a315c887-9260-4c04-8f34-704f61d72033
Link menetlusetapile: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a315c887-9260-4c04-8f34-704f61d72033?activity=2
Eelnõude infosüsteem (EIS)
https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main
Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon
Viide: Justiitsministeerium / / ; Riigikantselei / / 2-5/21-02940
Resolutsiooni teema: Enesehõivatute kollektiivlepingud
Adressaat: Justiitsministeerium
Ülesanne: Tulenevalt 22.12.2021 EL koordinatsioonikogu otsusest palun esitada seisukohad
Euroopa Komisjoni poolt avaldatud avaliku konsultatsiooni kohta:
Draft Guidelines on collective bargaining of self-employed
EISi toimiku nr: 21-1386
Viide avalikule konsultatsioonile: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-
collective-bargaining-2_et
Tähtaeg: 31.01.2022
Adressaat: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium
Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Justiitsministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud
avaliku konsultatsiooni kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu).
Tähtaeg: 14.01.2022
Lisainfo: Avalikku konsultatsiooni on kavas arutada valitsuse 10.02.2022 istungil ja Vabariigi
Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (02.02.2022) EL
koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt
31.01.2022.
Kinnitaja: Klen Jäärats, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktor
Kinnitamise kuupäev: 28.12.2021
Resolutsiooni koostaja: Ann Saks
[email protected], 693 5201
Andmed algatuse kohta Nimetus COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Approval of the content of a draft for a COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons ( public consultation ) Eelnõu nr C(2021) 8838 Esitamise kuupäev: 0 9 .12 .2021 Menetluskord EL-is: SEISUKOHA Valitsusse toomise alus 1. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 1 p1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist 2. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 1 p2 - algatuse/ vastuvõtmisega või teatises toodud meetmete rakendamisega kaasneb oluline majanduslik , sotsiaalne või muu mõju 3. FORMCHECKBOX RK KT S § 152 1 lg 2 - Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjoni või väliskomisjoni nõue 4. FORMCHECKBOX VVS § 20 1 lg 1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab VV pädevusse kuuluva otsuse vastuvõtmist (määruse vastuvõtmine, muutmine, tühistamine) 5. FORMCHECKBOX VVS § 20 1 lg 2 - seisukoha võtmist algatuse/teatise osas peab oluliseks peaminister või minister (on poliitiliselt oluline või tundlik (Eestis või EL-is)) Valitsusele esitamine Kuupäev 0 2 .02 KOK 1 0 .02 VV EL menetluse ajakava Konsultatsioon on avatud kuni 24.02.2022. Siseriiklik menetlus Vastutav min J M Kaasatud ministeeriumid S O M, MKM (sisendi andmise tähtaeg: 14.01) Sotsiaalpartnerid, huvigrupid Kaasata kõik asjasse puutuvad partnerid ja huvigrupid EELNÕU ÜLEVAADE kokkuvõte eelõu sisust ja eesmärkidest Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu (edaspidi "ELi toimimise leping") artikkel 101 keelab ettevõtjate vahelised konkurentsi piiravad kokkulepped. Euroopa Kohus on selgitanud , et töötajate – sealhulgas „liba - FIEde “ – ja tööandjate vahelised kollektiivläbirääkimised jäävad ELi konkurentsieeskirjade kohaldamisalast välja. Tõelisi füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjaid peetakse ELi konkurentsiõiguse kohaselt ettevõtjateks ja nende poolt sõlmitavad lepingud (nt kollektiivläbirääkimiste lepingud) võivad rikkuda kujutada endast EL konkurentsiõiguse rikkumist . Euroopa Komisjon plaanib anda suunised, mille eesmärk on tagada, et konkurentsiõigus ei takistaks kollektiivlepinguid, mille eesmärk on parandada teatud enesehõivatute töötingimusi, ku ivõrd neil võib olla vähe mõju töötingimustele, tagades samal ajal, et tarbijad ja VKEd saa ksid jätkuvalt kasu konkurentsivõimelis t e st hin d ad est ja digitaalmajanduse uuenduslik est ärimudeli test . Suunise d selgitaksid ELi konkurentsiõiguse kohaldatavust enesehõivatute kollektiivläbirääkimiste le . Käesoleva ga on Euroopa Komisjon avanud avaliku konsultatsiooni, küsides avaliku sektori ja sidusrühmade seisukohti suuniste eelnõu kohta. Link konsultatsioonile: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-collective-bargaining-2_en Võimalikud sots-maj. mõjud võimalikud õiguslikud muudatused Mõju eelarvele Kommentaarid SEISUKOHAD Eesti seisukoht Teiste riikide seisukohad Kommentaarid
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.12.2021
C(2021) 8838 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
EN EN
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Approval of the content of a draft for a
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding
the working conditions of solo self-employed persons
The Commission has approved the content of a draft for a Communication from the
Commission – Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements
regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons on 9 December 2021.
The draft for a Communication – Guidelines on the application of EU competition law to
collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons, is
attached as an Annex to this Communication. The draft for a Communication is open to
public consultation at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/open.html.
1
Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon
Viide: Justiitsministeerium / / ; Riigikantselei / / 2-5/21-02940
Resolutsiooni teema: Enesehõivatute kollektiivlepingud
Adressaat: Justiitsministeerium
Ülesanne: Tulenevalt 22.12.2021 EL koordinatsioonikogu otsusest palun esitada seisukohad
Euroopa Komisjoni poolt avaldatud avaliku konsultatsiooni kohta:
Draft Guidelines on collective bargaining of self-employed
EISi toimiku nr: 21-1386
Viide avalikule konsultatsioonile: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-
collective-bargaining-2_et
Tähtaeg: 31.01.2022
Adressaat: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium
Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Justiitsministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud
avaliku konsultatsiooni kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu).
Tähtaeg: 14.01.2022
Lisainfo: Avalikku konsultatsiooni on kavas arutada valitsuse 10.02.2022 istungil ja Vabariigi
Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (02.02.2022) EL
koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt
31.01.2022.
Kinnitaja: Klen Jäärats, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktor
Kinnitamise kuupäev: 28.12.2021
Resolutsiooni koostaja: Ann Saks
[email protected], 693 5201