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Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium · 5. aprill 2022
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24.5-6/22-0002/2478
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5. aprill 2022
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Väljaminev kiri
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Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
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25 Transpordi arengu korraldamine
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25-4 Raudteetransporditaristu arendamise projektide toimikud
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25-4/2022
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Kristjan Kaunissaare (Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Kantsleri valdkond, Transpordi valdkond)

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  • 📎2016_PSA_EE.pdf48 KB
  • 📎RB analysis (2021) en-GB.pdf1424 KB
  • 📎Submission of Final Report _ 2016-PSA-EE _...pdf398 KB
  • 📎technical and financial report_signed_050422.pdf2545 KB

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Dependence of Rail Baltica's long-term freight volumes on different geo-economic contexts: scenario analysis In the framework of the study on the interoperability of the Rail Baltica corridor with other logistics channels. Report from Contract No. 24.5- 6/190095/7484 Responsible person for the contract: Professor Emeritus Erik Terk Preparers of the report: Erik Terk, Indrek Saar, Kristo Tamm. Tallinn, December 2021 Table of contents ..................................................................................................................................................... Int roduction4 1. International relations as a factor influencing the use of transport corridors and different development scenarios 1.1. A globalisation-centred, geopolitical and geoeconomic approach6....................... 1.2. Dynamics and prospects for the development of relations between key countries10 ............................................ 1.2.1. The dynamics of US-China relations11 .................................................................................... 1.2.2. The dynamics of US-EU relations18 ......................................................................................... 1.2.3. Dynamics of China-Russia relations25 .............................................................................. 1.3. Geo-economic development scenarios and their implications for the Rail Baltica long-distance logistics perspective. ................................................. 35 1.3.1. Geopolitical competition scenario37 .............................................................. 1.3.2. Geo-economic competition scenario40 ......................................................... 1.3.3. A world scenario with a dispersed power structure44 ............................................................... 1.3.4. Impacts of different scenarios on the use of international corridors, including on the development of ................................................................................. a potential Rail Baltica corridor47 .................................................................... 2. Rail Baltica route connecting corridors and competing corridors 2.1. A complete system of transport corridors linked to Rail Baltic53 ........................................................... 2.2. Recent developments in some transport corridors58 ......................................... 2.2.1. Adriatic transport links: the Baltic-Adriatic corridor and the so-called "Maritime Corridor "58 .................................................................................................. 2.2.2. Transcarpathia project72 .............................................................................. 2.2.3. Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor74 ....................................................... 3. Rail Baltica long-distance logistics flows projections and conclusions on its potential as a whole 2 3.1. The complexity of the task and the approach78 ................................................. 3.2. Methodology80 ................................................................................................... 3.2.1. Starting points for projections80 ................................................................... 3.2.2. Linking baseline projections to scenarios: taking into account scenario-specific factors influencing the magnitude of trade and the use of transport corridors90. ................................................................................... 3.3. Projections of potential volumes of key long-distance logistics flows on Rail Baltica91 ............................................................................................................. 3.4. The potential of Rail Baltica long-distance logistics flows as a whole and the main risks associated with its individual components110. ................................................. ................................................................................................................................................. Add enda115 3 Introduction This report is a follow-up to the analyses carried out earlier in the framework of the study "Interoperability of the Rail Baltica corridor with other logistics channels" in order to identify the determinants of the long-distance freight transport potential of Rail Baltica, to explain the mechanism of its development and to roughly define its size. The time horizon chosen was 2045. The work carried out at this stage was mainly focused on the possible foreign policy influences, the terminology of the work, the possible geopolitical and geo-economic shifts that could affect the volume of Rail Baltica long- distance freight transport. It built on the work already carried out in earlier phases of the study on the potential areas of potential Rail Baltica corridors and on the results of the comparative competitiveness study of the different modes of transport carried out last year1. 2. The report is structured as follows. First, we present our approach to addressing the international relations drivers that determine the volume of transport (global, geopolitical and geo-economic different perspectives), then we provide an overview of the trends in the relations between the main foreign policy actors (key countries), and then, based on our conceptual framework and the information contained in the trend descriptions, we draw up three possible scenarios of how the external economic and political environment could evolve over the next decades. For each scenario, we have suggested the likely impacts of how this scenario could affect the behaviour of key countries in relation to the transport channels most relevant for Rail Baltica. In the second chapter, we present an overview of the main transport channels considered and describe some recent developments in these. The main results of the work are presented in chapter three, where an analytical scheme is presented, through which we linked the assumptions describing the possible evolution of the external environment to the concrete calculations through which we arrived at the possible long-distance logistics volumes of Rail Baltica. The volume estimates are scenario-based and indicative. We do not know which of these scenarios or their 1 Terk E., Saar I., Keskpaik A., Hunt T. Interoperability of the Rail Baltica corridor with other 4 logistics channels. Report of Contract No 16-00154/17-9237. Tallinn 2019. 5 combination could materialise, and furthermore it is such a long period that we do not know what the changes in the physical pattern of trade flows will be. Thus, numerical estimates can be very tentative. What is more important, in our view, is that the reader of the report can perhaps get a better idea of what factors and what combinations of factors we might be talking about in terms of flows of some size. We have provided a calculation algorithm that we use, so that the reader can also look at it and see what numerical results he or she might arrive at by entering his or her own expert judgments or by modifying the calculation algorithm somewhat. In the course of its completion, the manuscripts of its various parts were read and valuable comments were made by a number of experts: professor Eiki Berg (geopolitics), ambassadors Harri Tiido and Mati Vaarmann (geopolitics), Raivo Vare (geopolitics, transport, general economic trends). Our sincere thanks to them! 6 1. International relations as a factor influencing the use of transport corridors and different development scenarios 1.1. A globalisation-centred, geopolitical and geoeconomic approach How and on the basis of which basic categories to address the issue of international trade flows and transport corridors? The economic and political environment in which goods and trucks move can be approached in different ways, with different approaches highlighting different important features of this environment and providing different indications of the directions in which it might evolve. Three main paradigms can be distinguished on the basis of which this can be done: globalisation-centred, geopolitical and geoeconomic2. Globalisation is not simply the geographical expansion of market areas, transport corridors, business networks, etc., and in extreme cases the expansion to cover the whole globe, but the specific concept of globalisation, which began to take off in the 1990s and flourished in the 'noughties' years of the 21st century, was based on a set of interconnected understandings of the changing business and operating environment. Central among these is the postulate of economic openness. Not just in terms of low tariffs on exports and imports, but in terms of openness, of access in its broadest sense. There is an inherent emphasis on the benefits of liberalism, proclaiming protectionism as a disappearing phenomenon. The globalisationist approach is accompanied by an emphasis on reducing the role of states, on deregulation. Firms, especially multinationals and financial capital, are elevated to the role of central actors. As Helleiner and Pickel3 have put it figuratively, it was imagined that if the emerging world economy, at least if we are to believe I. Wallerstein's theory, gave birth to modern states and national economies, it is now re-transforming them into a (single) world economy with transnational economic agents, regions and networks. 2 For a more detailed description of these approaches, see Terk, E. (2018) Geo-economic shifts and the changing playing field for Estonia. Riigikogu Proceedings No. 37, pp. 91-104. 3 Helleiner, E., Pickel, A. (2005) Economic nationalism in a globalising world. 7 The globalisation paradigm was, of course, a very general abstraction, and tended to be overly normative, but for about a quarter of a century it corresponded to a general trend that worked well enough. Increasing liberalisation produced economic efficiency, and globalisation theory had credible predictive value until it became clear that politics and the state had not really left the stage and universal access remained a dream. The paradigms of geopolitics and geoeconomics deal with issues of state and politics in geographical space. It could be argued that before the great upheaval of the 1980s and 1990s, we lived in a geopolitical world. It was a bipolar world dominated by two groups of states with different dominant ideologies, at the top two superpowers: the US and the USSR. China had already broken away from the unified communist camp, but it was not yet a major player. Economies functioned within the framework of this global power struggle and had to take account of it. With the end of the Cold War, the old view of a policy-centred world moved into the background and the globalisation paradigm came to the fore. This was the dominant school of thought, but it was not the only one that tried to make sense of what was happening. There was also another approach, which was based on the notion that ideological and militaristic policies were no longer relevant, but that the role of the state was not yet weakened by them. The political battlefield had simply become an economic one. Edward Luttwak4 , one of the best-known geo-economic paradigms, is often quoted as saying: 'States as spatial entities, structured to resist the shrinking of the territories under their control, do not disappear, but reorient themselves towards geo-economic objectives. Instead of increasing firepower, they increase capital investment, instead of modern military equipment, they innovate in the civilian sector, instead of military bases, they occupy markets, etc.'. Initially, however, the actual dynamics of things did not seem to justify Luttwak's vision. In the following decades, however, the role of states as a whole declined in comparison with that of firms. The importance of national borders for the economy weakened, the world seemed to be 'flat'. But, to a greater or lesser extent, geo-economic wrestling was indeed going on. Countries 4 Luttwak E. N. (1990) From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logics of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce. 8 The National Interest, No. 20, Summer, 17-23. 9 supported their companies in strengthening and expanding their competitive positions. Trade policy and innovation policy were very important policies. This was very characteristic of the US. As the period of globalisation began to wind down, countries' geo-economic aspirations became stronger and less hidden. This was largely due to the moods of those sections of the population that had been caught in the globalisation process. The trend towards the emergence of geo-economic aspirations can be variously named and takes different forms: neo-Mercantilism, guarded globalisation, protectionist tendencies, the strengthening of elements of state capitalism in the economy. International regimes of economic cooperation are operating with a vengeance, with trade wars breaking out over import tariffs. There are growing attempts by countries to strengthen their economic positions, and competitor countries are viewed with suspicion. indirect non-tariff barriers to competitor imports, currency manipulation, etc. are the subject of discussion. There are concerns about trading currencies and reserve currencies. Firms are being forced to take greater account of the policies of the countries in which they organise their production on the one hand, and the policies of their home countries on the other. The reverse process is taking place. Whereas, in the heyday of globalisation, outsourcing and offshoring were the watchwords, with firms seeking to disperse the various functions of a value chain to different countries in order to achieve economies, the opposite process is now taking place - reshoring, bringing production back to the home country or to neighbouring areas where the business environment is more controllable and there is no fear of disruption to transport channels. Globalisation is viewed with mistrust as a process that is uncontrollable or difficult to control by countries. The emergence of new growing economies, especially China, provides a potential breeding ground for increased tensions between countries. In the relations between the main world economic powers, geo-economic competition is being transformed into geopolitical competition. Competitive rivalries may involve the introduction of purely administrative constraints, including the restriction of transport channels that are vital for a competitor's economy. Or, if not yet taken, such threats are in the air; escalation on these issues could even lead to armed conflict. Geo-economic motives are often 10 intertwined with geopolitical ones and can reinforce each other. Tensions can arise from countries' attempts to control energy sources, 11 raw material supplies and transport channels, or better access to them, but also, on the other hand, purely political contradictions and conflicts with no or only weakly related motives can be transferred to economic policy (imposition of economic sanctions and counter-sanctions in the case of political conflicts.). It has been worryingly argued that the current situation in the world, unlike that of, say, 10 or 20 years ago, is already a rather explosive mix of geo-economics and geopolitics. While trade-offs are possible at both the geo-economic and geopolitical levels, geopolitics is more of a 'zero-sum game' than geo-economics. It is often based on the notion that power is finite, that if one party gains, the other loses, and vice versa. In the case of a competition not just to improve one's position, but to become the world's leading economic power, this adds an additional, symbolic dimension to the situation, which contributes to the politicisation of issues of economic competition. In an attempt to anticipate the direction in which the international economic environment will develop in the coming decades, we started from the understanding that, in principle, both a development option is possible in which the logic of geopolitical competition in the (key) countries is strengthened, and one in which continued competition in the future remains geoeconomic competition. within the paradigm of "nudging". An as- liberalisation of the economic environment is not entirely ruled out after a certain period ,but a return to heyday of globalisation is unlikely. This period was largely characterised by a system of supranational institutions for regulating the international economy and trade, created and controlled by the dominant Western powers. In a situation in which the number of countries seeking a voice and pursuing their own interests has increased at the expense of the 'new emerging economies', it is unlikely that the 'new entrants' will be willing to continue. On the contrary, there is likely to be a rather long period of 'locking- in' of structures, during which they will not work very effectively and international trade will suffer considerable 'frictional losses'." In the following analysis of transport flows, we will try to consider all three options. 12 1.2. Dynamics of the development of relations between key countries and perspectives As already indicated in the previous sub-chapter, the US and China are now at the centre of the main geopolitical and geo-economic competition that sets the power lines around the world. Nor do we foresee this situation changing in the near future. We will therefore take a closer look at the dynamics of the US-China relationship and, in addition, at the relationship between the US and its close ally in world politics, the European Union. We consider the EU's relations with China to be important, but still secondary to the first two. As the third pair of key relationships, we will look at the relationship between China and Russia. In the context of the US-China confrontation, Russia positions itself as a partner, if not an ally, of China and opposes US foreign policy as a whole and towards China. It is also in a confrontation with the European Union, but this confrontation is somewhat softer, largely because of economic interests. We assume that the positions of China and the US on the development and use of international transport corridors, and this is already directly related to the Rail Baltica (RB) perspective on long-distance logistics, are not only reflected in their own actions, but also in those of Russia, given the current state of international relations. We did not prepare separate analyses of other major countries, such as India and Japan, which are also of interest to Estonia from the point of view of the use of transport corridors, but we have made references to their possible behaviour in the subsections on relations with other countries. 13 1.2.1. Dynamics of US-China relations The For the purposes economic of our relationship study, ittheis US between important and thetorising analyse developments economic in the has power China beenrelationship a key growthbetween enginetheforUS theand China, global not from economy sincetheat perspective of 20th least the late servicing century. Until transport 10 to 15flows yearsbetween these countries themselves, but because the political and ago, despite minor disagreements (relatively routine disputes over economic relationship between these two superpowers could redefine the pattern of the Chinese currency exchange rate, protection of intellectual property, etc.), it was international trade flows in much of the world, significantly altering global value seen as a symbiotic relationship, and even during the last global financial crisis China creation and transport chains. Moreover, the extent to which the two economic poles behaved in a fairly responsible manner. The model of bringing the US and Chinese do or do not get their balance right will also largely determine the pace of growth of economies together, which enabled both to strengthen their economic position, was the global economy and the capacity of supranational institutions regulating eveninternational given a special term: economic chimerica.Any cooperation. The situationor has escalation now easing fundamentally of the changed. Sino-US stand-off The isgrowing competition likely to have between an impact the United on the behaviour States of both and the EU andChina has moved from a Russia. distrust of a rapidly growing China, already deepening under President Barack Obama, to a situation, initiated by former US President Donald Trump, of trade wars in which China is seen as a 'systemic competitor' and almost as an old foe. The rhetoric of a systemic competitor has been continued by President Biden, but it is not yet clear to what extent this rhetoric will be followed by a rigid policy. As already indicated in the previous sub-chapter, the foreign policy environment has changed significantly over the last decade. Instead of the so-called globalisation-era view of the world, where the role of states was undervalued and free trade overrated, the focus in the international system has shifted back to the role of the great powers. From this point of view, as Jones points out 14 The US and China are the only two countries with such a significant population, military power and economic capacity5. There were a number of factors that transformed the US-China relationship from a dominantly cooperative to a dominantly competitive one:  In the context of economic globalisation, China has been able to cope somewhat better than the US with restructuring its economy, including cushioning the negative consequences of economic development. Both China and the US benefited from economic cooperation between the two countries, but the problem was that the pros and cons of economic cooperation with China were asymmetrically distributed in the US. Some sectors of the economy, population categories, states, etc. won, others lost (the division of the 'blue and red states' on the US political map). Workers in the traditional sectors of the US economy who lost their jobs could not find new and suitable jobs, and public opinion interpreted this as a robbery of their jobs by the Chinese6. This was an important background to the turn of US economic policy towards protectionism and the launch of the so-called trade wars by President Trump.  The US and the rest of the West expected an economically growing China to rapidly become liberal and democratic in its domestic life too, i.e. to adopt the Western model of development. That this did not happen was a great disappointment. On the contrary, the new leader, Xi, adopted a rhetoric that was more in line with the ambitions of the superpower and defending China's own path.  China's economic growth was consistent and so robust that the question of the US losing its position as world economic leader was brought to the fore. This is not, however, an issue that can only be dealt with rationally by countries and people, but it carries great symbolic weight and is therefore a very strong irritant. In geopolitics, there is also a fairly firmly entrenched assumption that a superpower that has become economically stronger will also increase its military power, and that the struggle for leadership will therefore come to an end. 5 Jones, B. (2020) China and the Return of Great Power Strategic Competition. Brookings. 15 6 One of the paradoxes of globalisation is that, as a result of successful cooperation, countries with lower levels of development benefit most in terms of job creation, while more developed countries benefit most financially. Employment in the latter falls because people in traditional sectors find it difficult to find suitable jobs in the 'new economy', and are often not interested in them. This is one of the reasons why the idea of a 'citizens' wage' has been relegated to the realm of ideas that are being discussed in the developed countries. 16 a war and a takeover of the world with a fairly high probability. True, this has not always been the case, the previous change of leadership, from Britain to the US, took place peacefully, without any threat of war. China, too, has increased its military potential as its economy has grown, although it does not initially come close to that of the US. With the announcement of the Belt and Road programme by China, which is undoubtedly an expansionist programme, but more of an economic expansionist programme, there has been a real panic, particularly in the US, about the prospect of a Chinese military threat.  A serious distraction for the US was the rapid rise of China to the forefront of high-tech countries: digital platforms, artificial intelligence, the so-called Internet of Things, etc. This sector is set to become the foundation for future economic growth7 - it is estimated that the US and China will account for 70% of the $15.7 trillion that AI will add to the global economy by 20308. Firstly, it was precisely the nuclear hand in which the US had a clear leadership role, and secondly, the vision that in the future global digital world, companies from an authoritarian state could rule over many people is a horrifying and probably justified reaction.  China's economic development-centred and economy-building policies proved more successful than the US's more ideology-centred and defence-oriented policies. China was also able to turn countries that are clearly US allies into economic partners. This has been seen by several authors as a sign of the convergence towards the end of the US-directed international order. Many of the traditional allies of the United States are forging stronger economic and diplomatic relations with China, whose 'offer' is superior to that of the United States, for fear of missing out on a profitable train. As Schweller9 points out, if rebalancing is the result of a desire to avoid losses, then going with the trend is the opportunity to win. The external threat that is necessary for rebalancing is not necessary for trending 7 Hass (2021) notes that the high-tech competitiveness of both the US and China is based on innovation ecosystems, with cluster effects from large technology hubs at their core, as well as access to capital. Half of the world's 4500 companies developing artificial intelligence are based in the US, a third in China. 8 PwC (2017). Sizing the prize. What's the real value of AI for your business and how can you capitalise? 17 9 Cladi, L., Locatelli, A. (2015). International Relations Theory and European Security: We Thought We Knew. 18 to go along. In other words, China does not need to pose a threat for other countries to come along. The economic situation carries as much weight as geopolitical considerations in multilateral alliances, which is why countries do not go along with the US, even though they have great military capabilities. The dynamics of US-China relations often underestimate the shift that has taken place as a result of a fundamental shift in China's economic development model from an export-led to a largely domestic market-driven one. Debt servicing costs for the country are rising, and whereas in the past the country was able to allocate large amounts of the financial resources generated by the savings of the population to US bonds, which was beneficial for both China and the US, there is now much less of this free money to allocate to US Treasury instruments. Chinese household spending is rising and savings are falling. The US will have to find other sources of cheap credit. China's supply of cheap consumer goods to the US market is also declining, not only because of rising input prices in China, but also because of China's own growing domestic demand for such goods. Therefore, China's attractiveness as an economic partner for the US has declined in several respects compared to the past. To some extent, the same can be said for the US in relation to China10 . In 2019, US President Trump increased tariffs on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods by 25%. To counterbalance this, China allowed its currency to weaken against the dollar and imposed counter-tariffs on the US. Many economists argue that instead of imposing tariffs, the US should have focused on its own export-led growth while improving trade relations with China. However, after the US-China trade deal of January 2020, the trend continued with Washington imposing new tariffs on $300 billion worth of Chinese imports. Issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the curtailment of Hong Kong's freedoms, events in Xinjiang and the outflow of jobs to China have also influenced Americans' attitudes towards the United States' biggest rival during this period, giving it a distinctly negative image.11 Hass. 10 Maszka, J. (2021). The Ties that Widen. Academia Letters, Article 3115. 19 11 Pew Research Center (2021). Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China on Human Rights, Economic Issues. 20 points out that while competition has led to tariff increases and heightened rhetoric, the rivalry still masks the large-scale economic ties between the two sides and interdependence is here to stay. However, the positions of the rest of the world's regions in this economic race against the US and China are beginning to weaken.12 In 2020, China remained the United States' largest trading partner - the third largest export market and the largest import market - and cooperation with China supported 1.2 million jobs in the US in 2019. Admittedly, in recent years, Chinese FDI into the US has declined significantly13 due to the Chinese government's tighter control over its companies' foreign investment and capital flows, as well as closer monitoring of security concerns by the US. There are no particular signs at the moment of a resumption of the warming of US- China relations, but what would it mean if it did? Much depends on the context in which this hypothetical process could take place: would it simply mean an agreement on a certain balance of interests between the two superpowers, or would it mean a more general trend towards more general liberalisation and multilateral cooperation regimes. Among the countries/alliances considered in this analysis, a relaxation of tensions in Washington-Beijing relations would be bad news for Russia, which would be playing into a partnership with China, and its position as a stronger partner would be significantly weakened. Its ability to influence China with the supply of valuable resources is not terribly great, especially if one also considers the possibility that, with the easing of geopolitical tensions, China could develop closer cooperation with the United States' strategic partners Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have large oil and gas reserves respectively, in the sourcing of resources.14 For the European Union, this easing of tensions would be appropriate because it would allow it to develop relations with both Washington and Beijing without having to choose sides, and Russia would also have to become somewhat more accommodating in its relations with the EU. At the same time, however, it is possible that an agreement between the US and China on the limits of their influence and the principles on which they will act will give them a negotiating leverage over each other. 12 Hass, R. (2021). The "new normal" in US-China relations: hardening competition and deep interdependence. Brookings. 21 13 In 2016, China invested $48.48 billion in FDI in the US, compared to $7.2 billion in 2020 (The US-China Investment Hub (2021)). 14 Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter, and Qatar is the world's second largest gas exporter after Russia, with 75% of Qatar's gas supplies already going to Northeast and South Asia (South Korea, Japan, India). 22 partners such as the EU and India, thus widening the gap between the two superpowers and the rest of the world. For the EU, which is strong as a trading region but by its very nature is unable to act as a superpower, it would be more fitting if the détente between Washington and Beijing were to come in an overall liberal context. The question is whether a multipolar world can establish rules of the game that are respected in its relations with each other. The most negative option for the future prospects of US-China relations would be the close intertwining of economic-commercial competition with (security) politics, leading to so-called economic decoupling. Hu, Tian, Wu and Yang point out that, in the case of decoupling, China would be the most affected of the world's two largest economies, with 3.65% of GDP hit, while the less export-dependent US would be affected by 1.04% of GDP15. However, it is unlikely that this decoupling would bring China to its knees and in fact would still be a major setback for both economies - and the above figures do not take into account the spill-over effects on investment, finance, technology, science and other growth drivers. The real damage from decoupling would therefore be even greater. In an era of global supply chains, third countries would also suffer significantly from a sharp fall in demand, especially in Asia - for example, Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN would be the biggest losers after China and the US; the impact on the EU would be smaller (ibid. ). However, Joseph Nye points out that while the US may impose restrictions and sanctions against China in some areas for security reasons, such as the 5G network against Huawei, a full economic disengagement from China would be too costly, if not impossible, for the US16. What is happening in US-China economic relations is a 'selective disengagement', not a full one. However, it is not clear what the limits of this selective disengagement will be. 15 Hu, Y., Tian K., Wu, K., Yang, C. (2021). The Lose-Lose Consequence: Assessing US-China Trade Decoupling through the Lens of Global Value Chains. Management and Organization Review, 17(2), 429- 446. 16 Nye, J. S. Jr. (2021). America's New Great-Power Strategy. project syndicate. 23 Assuming that, faced with a situation of necessity, the EU would have to make a clear choice in favour of the US in a situation of escalating conflict between the two superpowers, Europe's dependence on US technological support would increase further. The question of whether and what Europe can do to achieve some form of technological autonomy in such a situation is a painful one17. The emergence of a bipolar system in the world would exacerbate divisions between EU member states. Attitudes on the extent to which, in the event of conflict, there is still a willingness to trade with and expect investment from China vary considerably among EU members. Mainstream countries such as Germany and Spain are trying to combine following the US course with increasing the EU's strategic autonomy and economic independence, although this is unlikely to work very well. France is close to them, but somewhat more critical of America. The Baltic states close to the Russian border, and probably also Poland, perceive themselves as being in a forced position because of the Russian threat and are therefore developing a much more pro-US and anti-China stance. Portugal, Greece and Italy are keen to see themselves as a bridge and not to abandon business opportunities with China. Hungary is trying to play on the different positions of the various countries, etc. As shown in source18, finding compromises in the attitudes of individual countries and blocs of countries is difficult and also impairs the functioning of the EU as a whole. Since very large-scale decoupling would severely damage the global economy and also increase the risk of geopolitical head-on clashes that could lead to military conflicts, it is likely that the pattern of economic interdependence will not be broken in the period ahead, but both the US and China will continue to seek to reduce the dependence of their supply chains on their rivals in strategically and security critical areas. This is also closely linked to the issue of transport corridors. The confrontation between the US and China, the associated attempts to exert pressure, the recruitment of partners into their networks of cooperation for political rather than economic motives, etc., will continue. To the extent that such wrestling remains predominantly on economic grounds and political means are used primarily as a tool to achieve economic ends; 17 Schüller, M., Schüler-Zhou, Y. (2020). United States-China Decoupling: Time for European Tech Sovereignty. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). 24 18 European Think-tank Network on China (2020). Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry. 25 to what extent political actions will become an end in themselves and may start to take on a life of their own and provide shortcuts, for example in relation to Taiwan, is impossible to predict. Several authors tend to think that even in the case of a less radical disengagement policy, the slow developmental ideological divergence between the US and China will continue. The question is whether this divergence automatically implies the emergence of a kind of bipolar world. 1.2.2. The dynamics of US-EU relations This issue is not relevant to our study because of the potential for Rail Baltica to serve freight transit between the US and EU countries, which is minimal due to geographical factors. However, the relationship between the US and the EU, and the more or less coherent behaviour of these two coalition partners vis-à-vis the other major economic powers, define a context that is quite strongly determinant of the overall pattern of trade flows in the world. If the US is able to persuade the EU to go along with its policy of disengagement from and confrontation with China, which is at least currently in the air, one geo-economic reality will emerge; if the EU does not go along with this policy to the same extent, or if confrontation with China as a whole diminishes over time, different realities will emerge. This is true both in terms of the volumes of trade flows between the EU and China and the routes along which that trade can move. How much, for example, along the so-called Adriatic corridor, how much along the Arctic Ocean, how much by rail across Russia. All of this increases or decreases Rail Baltica's chances of being included in the EU's transcontinental freight flows. The strength of the coalition between the US and the EU and the way it operates will have implications for the EU's trade flows with China as well as, for example, with Russia, Turkey and India. The US can influence its ally the EU's policy towards Russia, with implications for Estonia's trade with Russia and the transit of Russian exports and imports through Estonia, as well as for the routes taken by third country transit cargo, which may prefer or avoid Russia on their way, or in some cases use both Russian and Baltic infrastructure. 26 The prevailing global security policy and economic relations have beenshaped primarily by the West, i.e. the US and the coalition of Western European countries, together with the. 27 with their ally Japan. Western countries have also been the main architects and dominant policy makers of the supranational institutions that shape the international economy, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, in the 21st century, the situation has changed dramatically: The rise of China, the exit of the UK from the EU as one of the most proponents of transatlantic cooperation (Brexit), the intensification of contradictions between the US and some key EU countries. However, the scale of the US-EU economy and economic relations remains impressive. Together, their economies account for more than 40% of global GDP and also more than 40% of global trade in goods.19 While China will overtake the US as the EU's import partner in 2021, the United States remains the EU's largest economic partner in the overall pattern of economic relations - for example, US investment in the EU is three times greater than in Asia as a whole, while EU investment in the United States is eight times greater than in India and China combined (ibid.). Today's relations between the US and the EU are still to some extent influenced by the policies of former US President Donald Trump, which significantly damaged the transatlantic partnership. Trump, who has pursued a protectionist economic policy, has defined the European Union as a trade competitor that exploits the United States' contribution to world politics to its own advantage, but does not contribute enough to it. In particular, Trump criticised the lack of contribution of EU Member States, especially Germany, to NATO and Berlin's policy of being too accommodating to Russian interests in the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline20 . The sharp deterioration in US-EU relations during the Trump administration resulted in Washington sanctions and tariff policy moves against the EU: sanctions on companies involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, import tariffs on steel and aluminium from the EU, import tariffs on EU aircraft (Airbus- Boeing state aid dispute). Under US President Joe Biden, who took office in January 2021, relations between the United States and the European Union have improved, with analysts calling the process of normalisation. The bickering of the last four years has been replaced by a renewed sense of calm. 28 19 European Commission (2021). United States - Trade. 20 BBC (2018). Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on trade. 29 constructive negotiations21. As a sign of the orientation towards improving relations, the US representative (Secretary of State Anthony Blinken) participated in the European Council in March this year for the first time since 2001, and the first EU-US summit since 2014 took place in June. The US rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organisation and the COVAX vaccine sharing mechanism (ibid.). It can also be speculated that the EU-China investment agreement, signed by the EU before the US presidential election, but now frozen by the European Parliament, accelerated US moves to improve relations. Goodwill had to be shown in a hurry. While experts believe that the United States' desire to normalise transatlantic relations is sincere, there is still not enough overlap between words and deeds. In trade relations, the parties' agreement in June this year on the The Airbus-Boeing state aid dispute, which lasted 17 years and initially annulled a number of tariffs for five years. A special council was also set up to monitor state aid to airlines. The continuation of a partial stand-off in the parties' trade relations has been noted22. On the EU side, there is some scepticism about further US developments, arguing rightly that a strategy of cooperation cannot be based solely on the goodwill of one or other US president. The US is in a rather fragile state as a society and domestically in the current period, and Trumpian sentiments in the US have not gone away. It is difficult to predict how the US will change course after the next presidential election or the one after that. A return to an 'America First' centrist and protectionist policy cannot be ruled out. Consequently, it is seen as important to hedge against the uncertainties and risks inherent in US leadership and to avoid getting too unequivocally into the US boat.23 Hence, to a large extent, the idea of the EU's strategic autonomy. However, there is no great consensus on this idea in the EU. While the big EU countries, Germany and especially France, tend to be in favour of it, the Baltic States and Poland, for example, have a priority over the US because of their border with Russia, 21 Brattberg, E. (2021). Transatlantic Relations After Biden's First 100 Days, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 22 Rettman, A. (2021). EU and US make peace on trade before Russia summit. EUobserver. 23 Brattberg, E. (2021). Transatlantic Relations After Biden's First 100 Days, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30 as a key NATO ally, to maintain good relations. Opposing developments are seen as a threat to our security, with economic considerations taking a back seat. In the broader geopolitical context, the EU and the US see each other as critical partners with a common interest in minimising the challenges that Russia and China may pose in the global arena. At the same time, however, there are important differences in the US and EU stance on how forcefully and what methods to use vis-à- vis these two problematic powers. Biden's position, which builds on conventional US attitudes, is to seek to bring US allies and partners together in an international system that can negotiate with authoritarian powers from a position of strength. Compared to the EU, the US tends to view the multilateral system more as a playing field for strategic competition with China (ibid.). For example, the US request to restrict China's various courses of action within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reforms is seen by the US as self-serving and inconsistent with WTO principles.24 Without going into the specific arguments of the parties here, we will simply note that the West, even with combined forces, is having great difficulty in resisting the desire of China and other emerging economies to change the current balance of power and rules of the game in the organisations regulating international trade and the economy, which they see as favouring the 'global West'. While agreeing on common rules of the game and achieving a rebalancing of the economic environment could ultimately be in everyone's interest, the prospect of achieving this through the pursuit of a position of strength is highly unlikely given the changed economic balance of power. Among the geo-economic priorities of the United States itself, trade competition with China remains at the top of the list, and the change of presidency has not brought about any significant change. The warming of relations with the European Union has also been seen as Washington's attempt to win Brussels' support for strengthening such a coalition. At the same time, the EU would prefer to have good trade relations with both China and the United States, and would seek to avoid a situation in which it could become overly dependent on one or the other, or even both at the same time, including the consequences of a confrontation that could cross the border. Does Brussels regard China as its 'systemic rival'? Values-wise, probably yes, the EU has appeared to 31 24 Baschuk, B., Nardelli, A. (2021). Biden Lines Up EU Help to Toughen Terms of Trade for China. Forbes. 32 as a critic of a number of Chinese practices. However, it does not treat its relationship with China in the same way as the US, for whom competition with the latter is clearly a matter of a fundamental struggle to maintain its leading position in the world. The extent to which the EU is willing to reduce its interaction, especially economic interaction, with China at the request of the US is still a very open question. The US concessions on its position on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which have caused consternation in Eastern Europe, can be seen from several angles.In May 2021, the US lifted sanctions against companies involved in its construction, and in July Washington reached a bilateral agreement with Berlin to allow the project to go ahead. This is seen not so much as a US concession to Russia, but as an attempt to strengthen the coalition with Germany as the economic engine of the European Union. The US consideration of Germany's economic interests is seen as a counter-reaction to Germany's greater consideration of US interests in relation to China, but also as an attempt to increase Germany's role in intra-European security, which has so far rested overwhelmingly on the shoulders of the United States25 , including on Ukraine. With the hope that if Moscow were to continue to undermine its neighbours, Russia's gas- dependent relationship with Germany as one of its main energy partners would be jeopardised and could hold it back. In a context where Trump's presidency and the accompanying political developments in the US have brought the question of Europe's strategic autonomy within the EU to the fore, it comes as no surprise that Washington is seeking to avoid a diminished role. An important step to avoid this is the creation of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC) as a joint US-EU action. The creation of the TTC was agreed at the EU- US summit in June 2021, with the first meeting of the Council taking place on 29 September in Pittsburgh, USA. This initiative can be interpreted both in the context of directly confronting China, by allowing for coordination of cooperation in the field of high technology in competition with Beijing, but also in a somewhat broader context. One of the central themes will be the harmonisation of technology regulations. This issue was already high on the agenda under President Obama, but has been stalled. 33 25 Stelzenmüller, C. (2021). America Is Back, but... Europe and Especially Germany Need To Do Much More for European Security. Lennart Meri Conference. 34 left over from TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, simplified as the EU-US Free Trade Agreement), the issue is now moving to the TTC agenda. Continuing with TTIP as it was once formulated during the Obama presidency is not considered realistic, at least for the time being26,27. A continuation of the status quo ante is hindered by the global trend towards regionalisation, which has since taken off. While hopes were expressed in Brussels after Biden's election that transatlantic relations would be restored as they were under Obama, this is not borne out by recent developments. The US has not lifted many of the tariffs imposed under Trump, and Europe was seriously disappointed and offended by the recent US-Australian submarine deal that pushed France away. The strong integration of the US and the EU, and the hope that a united Western world will regain lost ground through it, is also undermined by tensions within the EU itself, which make it difficult to take big decisions28. In the context of the concept of European strategic autonomy, one of the hot topics is European digital autonomy. The current decade has even been proclaimed the "Digital Decade of the European Union". However, many commentators are negative about the call for digital autonomy. On the one hand, the criticism is based on the fear that old- fashioned Europe is going down the wrong road altogether, relying too much on regulation in an area where innovation and the removal of market barriers will be crucial. There may be no justification for the exuberant techno-optimism and belief in the US as the leader of the value-based digital revolution, but the problem is simply that the US is so far ahead of Europe in the digital field that it would be unrealistic to expect Europe to create competitive platforms. Therefore, there is no choice but to look to the US as the technological leader in this field, the only country capable of competing with China in this area. Transatlantic digital technology needs to combine innovation and competitiveness with democratic norms, and if Europe wants such an approach to triumph in the world, it must work not against but with the US as a leader in digital innovation. By shaping the digital innovation agenda together, we could 26 Moens, B., Scott, M. (2021). Transatlantic trade deal rises from the grave to fight China. Politico. 27 Bildt, C. (2021). Biden Is Back, but America Isn't. Project Syndicate. 28 Haddad, B. (2021). Europe must wean itself off US defence to reset transatlantic relations. Financial Times. 35 they will then, by finding other allies in the world, be able to meet the challenges posed by China, both on the technological and norm-setting fronts29. One of the ways to increase Europe's strategic autonomy is to secure itself in the face of the escalating confrontation between the US and China by strengthening ties with the so-called "next players" in the global economy. India, which excels both in terms of the size of its economy and, more importantly, its high growth potential, is certainly a key player here. In May this year, after a break of eight years, negotiations resumed on an EU-India free trade agreement.30 The EU will have to make up for lost time: India's exports to the EU are currently small, having been stagnating for a long time, even for a couple of decades. Last year, imports from India accounted for just 0.9% of total EU imports - at a time when India's overall export volumes have been growing at a remarkable pace31. The EU and India are planning an infrastructure partnership agreement that would see the European Investment Bank participating in projects in India, as well as cooperating in the medical field. However, common positions on a trade agreement will not be reached quickly, with India demanding immediate tariff elimination on Indian exports, while the EU is offering its own investment as a 'launch pad'. However, the additional trade volume, if the negotiations are successful, promises to be large. Deepening economic cooperation between the EU and India is not substantially at odds with US interests. Even if the US's own trade with India loses nothing from the increase in trade between India and the EU, what matters for the US is the geopolitical effect, which is to bind India more closely to the West and thereby distance it from China's economic sphere of influence. Rather, the problem is that India, together with South Asia as a whole, has by now become quite firmly entangled in the emerging trans-Asian economic cooperation links32 and given the volume and scale of this network of economic cooperation, "shifting" India away from it towards Europe is far from an easy task. 29 Polyakova, A. (2020). A Transatlantic Effort to Take on China Starts with Technology, The Center for European Policy Analysis. 30 Emmott, R., Strupczewski, J. (2021). EU and India agree to resume trade talks at virtual summit. Reuters. 31 India Times (2021). India's exports to EU declined in the last 20 years, accounts for mere 36 0.9% of total imports of EU. 32 Fremont, P. A. (2021). Le transport maritime au risque de la démondialisation? Futuribles, 2021/6, 445, 63-86. 37 1.2.3. Dynamics of Russia-China relations Although Rail Baltica has no potential to serve China-Russia trade, the new railway has considerable potential to become a transport and logistics hub for trade between China and the northern European region. Goods related to China can in principle reach the RB, through a number of logistical schemes, some of which will involve goods moving either through Russia or through the Russian maritime zone in the Arctic. The reasons for the choice of corridor may depend not only on China, the EU and Russia, but also on the wider global political context (China-US relations). Russia's behaviour can influence China's trade patterns both directly (the motive for excluding the Baltic States) and indirectly, for broader motives (Russia's policy towards China-related trade corridors as a whole). The modernisation of transport corridors on Russia's own territory may also have an impact, which could increase their economic competitiveness in transit with Rail Baltica as one of the possible corridors. We assume that China-EU trade and thus the related issue of transit of goods through the EU "periphery" will remain topical in most geopolitical and geo-economic scenarios. This is also the case if the world 'blocs' in such a way that the bloc of China and Russia comes into sharp confrontation with the U.S. Admittedly, in the context of a very sharp confrontation between the East and the West, China-EU trade will be lower. However, it can be expected that a more important factor than the reduction in the overall mass of this trade will be a change in the configuration of transport corridors. In today's geopolitical context, the relationship between China and Russia should be seen as secondary in its mechanism of emergence, stemming from the dynamics of power in the wider international system. Both China's and Russia's relations with the West - in particular with the United States - have deteriorated significantly in recent periods: The Sino-US trade war and the intensifying overall confrontation between the two countries, Russia's actions in Ukraine and the related Western sanctions. The intensification of relations between Beijing and Moscow can be understood in the context of a rebalancing of the balance of power, an attempt to strengthen positions in 38 the confrontation with the West. In June 2021, the two sides renewed their 39 A five-year friendship agreement signed between the two sides back in 2001 will continue to provide for broad economic and military cooperation33. Although the then Soviet Union normalised its relations with China already in the 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, a Russia in transition from communism was initially seen as a potential part of the Western world. As a major power aspiring to join the West, but one whose size, backwardness and certain difficulties in adopting Western patterns of behaviour somewhat hindered this accession. The importance of Russia's relations with China has taken a back seat. While relations between Russia and the US were shaped in a geopolitical context, with both good times and strong setbacks, relations between the EU and Russia were dominated by economic expectations on both sides. In a nutshell, the hope of a grand bargain called natural resources for technology. The EU was interested in Russia as a neighbouring source of natural resources, including energy, and Russia hoped to receive investment and technology from EU countries for its development. China was not yet competitive as an exporter of (high) technology and an investor in its production, but was still in the process of modernising its own economy. Russia's cooperation with Japan was hampered by an unresolved dispute over the ownership of the South Kuril Islands. As Russia's cooperation with the West began to show more and more signs of failure, an offended Russia found that, since it was not being recognised as a sufficiently dignified and equal partner, it did not want to become a European periphery. In addition to the idea of Russia's self-worth and developmental specificity, a different geopolitical construction was also attempted, whereby an alternative political and economic space from 'Shanghai to Minsk' was introduced in place of the earlier slogan of 'Wider Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok', which had been the slogan at the time of the rapprochement with the West. The extent to which such a declaration reflects reality is of course questionable. In reality, Russia's geopolitical and geo-economic position is, and is likely to remain for the foreseeable future, rather ambivalent. But the reality is certainly that with the rise of China and the possibility of a 33 Under the terms of the friendship agreement, Russia will assist China, inter alia, with the modernisation of armaments and the supply of mineral resources (especially oil). China pledges to support Russia mainly through economic measures, through broad-based investment. A mandatory addition to the 40 document is, of course, the declaration that Russia sees US-backed Taiwan as an integral part of China. 41 to establish joint positions with him, Russia's room for manoeuvre was greatly expanded. Less in economics, more in politics. In the overlapping area of political and economic problems, rather closer to the political side, Russia's accession to a number of new institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS association and its New Development Bank, which were largely created at China's instigation and are in opposition to the existing Western-oriented supranational organisations, can be placed. Russia's contribution to the running of these new structures is not very large, but its participation gives them a broader image, and too much China-centricity could upset some members or aspirants. The existence of such broader interaction platforms allows, for example, China and India, whose relations are rather complicated, to discuss some issues of common interest and reach compromises, which could be more difficult in direct bilateral negotiations. China and Russia have a long border. As both countries have, especially recently, also started to engage in power games, which include concentrating military capabilities to put pressure on some of their neighbours in their vicinity, China for example on the opposite bank of Taiwan, Russia close to its western border, both countries have an interest in not having to spend too much on securing their border. To this end, political relations need to remain at least within the bounds of positive neutrality. While politically China and Russia can offer each other serious support, including at the level of the UN Security Council, economically the chances are not so great. The geographic location of the countries' economic hubs is not the most conducive to economic cooperation - Beijing is not far from the Russian border, but Russia's economic centre is far from Europe and Russia's Far East and Eastern Siberia, bordering China, are sparsely populated. The asymmetry in the size of the two countries' populations and, more importantly, economies, is immediately striking. China has now become an economic superpower, while Russia is at best only in the upper- middle range of the world economy. In this economic partnership, Russia can only play the role of the smaller brother, and is now much more dependent on China than China is on Russia. For the last ten years, China has been Russia's largest trading partner (although it is still below the EU as a whole), while Russia is only ranked 12th in the list of China's trading partners. 42 For Russia, Chinese imports are very important as a substitute for Western imports, which are hampered by the economic sanctions. The volume of trade between China and Russia lags far behind China's trade with its main economic partners in Asia (such as Vietnam, South Korea, etc., as well as India), so the overall volume of trade between China and Russia is not of such a magnitude that, even if it were to pick up rapidly, it could be a strategically important factor for China to offset to any significant extent the possible decline in China's trade relations with the West. However, China is certainly interested in exploiting Russia's natural resources in the Asian part of the continent, such as energy resources, forests and metals. The overall trade balance between China and Russia is fairly well balanced, usually with a small plus in China's favour, but the structure of the goods they sell to each other is radically different. While China's exports to Russia are dominated by electrical equipment, electronics, and various machinery and vehicles, with a much more modest share for miscellaneous consumer goods, Russia's exports to China are unambiguously dominated by energy commodities (oil, oil products, gas), followed by timber, wood products and pulp, also some metals (copper). Russia has declared that it does not want to be a Western raw material powerhouse, but its export structure to China shows that it is also becoming primarily a raw material powerhouse for China. There have also been efforts to launch some joint high-tech manufacturing projects at national level. The West is quite concerned about these, as a large number of them are of a nature that could be used in the military sector. In this sector, Russia's capabilities are quite high and it can offer China technology and the possibility of joint R&D35. Such projects have so far been relatively slow to develop and the results have generally not yet reached commercial exploitation. It has been predicted - even at the turn of the last century - that at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia will shift the main focus of its natural resource exports from the West to the East, precisely at the expense of exploiting the vast resources of eastern Siberia. A very sharp turn 43 34 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018) 35 Weitz, R. (2017). Russia-China Relations. Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines. NBR Special Report 66. 44 However, this has not happened so far, for several reasons. The construction of new reservoirs and deposits of natural resources, and the communications needed to exploit them, is expensive and labour-intensive. While the problem of money might be solvable, with the Chinese willing to cover the costs, the issue of manpower is more complicated. Russia fears the use of Chinese labour on its territory, an issue that is also very sensitive for Russian public opinion36 , and its own labour force is scarce in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In the past, the sale of natural gas to the West was much more profitable for Russia than to the East, with Europe willing to pay a higher price. This is not the case at present, and there is even talk of building a second gas pipeline to China (Sila Sibiri-2). However, the prices for SS1 have been pushed very low by the Chinese and they do not want to repeat this mistake with the new pipeline. However, it is not only about the current prices. There may also be an additional reason for Russia to delay signing long-term energy supply contracts with China, as another potential buyer, Japan, is on the horizon and could be expected to offer more favourable terms in the future. To sum up, joint Russian-Chinese energy projects, the construction of gas and oil pipelines, have moved forward, but slowly and with problems. Russia is trying to avoid allowing China to gain a majority stake in its energy projects and has also been rather cautious about Beijing's infrastructure investments37 , while there is a sense that China is not budging much either. Its dependence on Russian resources and energy is not so great that it will go for quick no-win deals. Since 2012, Russia's official rhetoric has begun to emphasise more and more that the future of the global economy will inevitably be dominated by the following 36 Fears often expressed in the Russian mass media that "the Chinese will come and flood the Far East with their masses of people" are probably exaggerated. The threat is often justified by comparisons between the population density of Russia's border regions and China's, without noting that there is also an immeasurable difference between the population density of China's border regions along the Russian border and that of central and eastern China. There is no sign of any Chinese push to move to the more sparsely populated northern regions with harsher climates, so there is no reason to believe that the Russian Far East and Siberia would be particularly attractive as a place to live, and China's rapid population growth has long since ceased. Although polls conducted throughout Russia as a whole show that public opinion is positive towards China and the Chinese, ethnic relations in the Far East are far from cloudy - as evidenced by the fact that Chinese trading companies prefer to organise the extensive retail trade that the Chinese carry out in Russian areas through their Russian subsidiaries. The presence of Chinese merchants is seen as an irritant to the Russian people. 37 Kaczmarski, M. (2020). The Sino-Russian Relationship and the West, Survival, 62:6, 199-212. 45 Pacific region as a growth pole, and Russia is therefore seen as pursuing the privileged development of its Far East region as an important strategic objective. In this context, the importance of cooperation with Asian countries is stressed, but commentators have noted that Japanese companies are the most talked about in terms of investment. This attitude - we would like your money or goods, but not you and your property on our territory - cannot fail to displease the Chinese. Nationalist sentiment has been on the rise in China lately, which is why there was a rather painful reaction to Russia's celebration of the anniversary of the city of Vladivostok in 2020 (160 years since the port was founded and 140 years since the city was founded). After all, it was a territory conquered from China at the time. However, in the overall context of stressing Russian- Chinese friendship and cooperation, these sentiments did not boil over. On the Far East, Russia tries to refrain from making all its bets on official big friend China, and also to emphasise the potential opportunities that lie in developing Russian- Japanese economic cooperation. Also, in Vladimir Putin's speech at the Vladivostok Economic Forum this summer, it was his reintroduction of the idea, previously rejected by Japan, of the possible conversion of the Kuril Islands into a free economic zone that commentators most highlighted as a way of regulating Russian-Japanese relations. There is no particular prospect of an improvement in Russian-Japanese relations in the near future, and one can speculate that the main aim of such rhetoric is to make China more accommodating in economic negotiations. The second emphasis in Putin's speech, highlighting the great potential of the future Arctic Sea Route for trade between Asia and Europe and Russia's more favourable attitude towards it, should appeal to both China and Japan. In his address to the Eastern Economic Forum in September, also in Vladivostok, Chinese leader Xi did not seem particularly bothered by such Russian manoeuvring, but praised the great potential for Russian-Chinese economic cooperation in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, declaring that the necessary political and legislative preconditions, as well as a range of necessary infrastructure, are now in place to take this cooperation to a new level and that it can begin to develop in a powerful way38. At the same time, however, he stressed that it is not only cooperation with Russia that is important for China, but with the Eurasian Union as a whole. If you wish, you can read here 46 38 Daye, C., Wang, W. (2021). Chinese investments could unlock potential of Russia's Far East, boost trade. Global Times. 47 a hint that China can also meet its energy needs in cooperation with, for example, Kazakhstan, not just Russia. In the areas close to the Chinese border, there are some signs of economic cooperation, with Chinese companies active in the production of building materials, many small sawmills built (the export of unprocessed timber is restricted by Russia), and Chinese pig farms producing pork. In areas suitable for this purpose, though not numerous, soy and rice farming are being developed using Chinese technologies. Aquaculture enterprises have been set up (including shellfish and sea cucumbers). Such production is mainly marketed in China. As a rule, Russian nationals are employed, with Chinese managing the projects. As a rule, however, large Chinese companies do not operate in these areas, and such activities in border areas are not considered 'big business' on the Chinese side. The big companies are not very interested in this, because in Africa or other developing countries it is possible to develop a much broader business, and the countries there impose fewer restrictions on Chinese companies than Russia does. Neither China nor Russia is particularly happy with the way their neighbours treat each other's companies, complaining of various kinds of restrictions and harassment. China's policy of protecting its domestic market against Russian firms is allegedly more protectionist than the Russian authorities' treatment of Chinese firms. A major step forward in China's policy towards Russia was the acquisition of a stake in the Yamal peninsula in the Arctic Ocean for the production of natural gas and the investment in an LNG plant there. Compared with projects in Russia's Far East, this is not only a project of greater scale, but one that is already aimed at a global market, not China's own. Russia has never been particularly enthusiastic about China's ambitions to participate in the exploitation of the Arctic region's natural resources, and is seeking to impose its exclusive rights over the exploitation of most of the Arctic Ocean. Allowing large-scale Chinese business in the region sends the signal that, in this case, Chinese money and technology were going to be indispensable for Russia to get the project off the ground. A separate issue is the organisation of trade between China and the countries of the European Union through Russian territory or, as a recent big idea, along the Arctic 48 Ocean. 49 Russian coast. In the first case, it is linked to the modernisation of the Russian east- west rail network and increasing its capacity. Chinese investment can also be used for this purpose, the best known example being the Kazan-Moscow railway modernisation project with Chinese funding and know-how. The diversification of freight routes is an objective of strategic importance for China, which is also largely linked to security risks. The lion's share of China's current trade is by sea, much of it through the narrow Strait of Malacca. This is seen as a security risk in Beijing39. The Taiwan Strait is also seen as a potential source of danger, as Beijing sees the "rebel province" as being assisted by the US. In this context, the use of the Northern Sea Route would be a very attractive option for China, as it is also a much shorter route compared to the Southern Sea Route. Although ships are already able to navigate this route during the ice-free navigation period, mass deployment of large container ships will take time. Higher ice- class vessels, Russian icebreakers, etc. will be needed. Russia is interested in the sea route from the point of view of the export of natural resources produced on its own territory or in its coastal waters, and also from the point of view of a better link between the Far East and the European part of Russia, while it has been rather ambivalent, sometimes with positive signals, about the emergence of an international sea route near its coast. In view of the increasing militarisation of the Russian Arctic in recent times, it is not interested in opening it up to international visitation or in developing a sea route in international cooperation. China, on the other hand, is interested in a better and more secure trade channel with the EU. Western views on the issue are also contradictory. On the one hand, there is a readiness to accept that China is more of a stabilising factor in solving this problem. On the other hand, in a context of sharp antagonism between the US and China, the US has no interest in allowing China to open up additional transport corridors that the US is unlikely to be able to control. There are also military considerations: China, operating in the Arctic Ocean and its ports, may also be able to use its presence for military purposes (intelligence, maritime deterrence towards the US). These considerations apply 39 Mobley, T. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: Insights from China's Backyard. Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3, Air University Press, 2019, pp. 52-72. 50 of course, if the US sees China, not Russia, as its potential military opponent. On the one hand, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia can be seen as an area of competition between Russia and China. On the other hand, as Gabujev40 points out, Moscow and Beijing have achieved a certain fairly stable balance of interests in the region. In a region historically under Russian influence, Moscow focuses on military presence, while China focuses on investment in industry and infrastructure41. China has also been able to capture their markets with its exports. Both sides are trying to avoid stepping on each other's toes in pursuing their interests in the region. Only time will tell if this balance is sustainable. Will Russia settle for maintaining military control, which is a costly exercise, and leave the fruits of economic capture to China? At the same time, both countries have an interest in controlling the 'Islamic factor' in the region, and economic motives seem to take a back seat to this. The Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan and the events unfolding there could lead to a strengthening of cooperation between Russia and China, but could also possibly cause a rift between them. Incidentally, Russia has now already come to terms with two Chinese military bases in the high Pamir Mountains in the territory of their traditional client state Tajikistan, bordering Afghanistan. On the whole, it can be argued that cooperation between China and Russia has developed in recent years and shows no signs of weakening or disintegration in the coming years. Domestically, Russia's alliance with China is supported by the fact that Russia's autocratic regime does not see any threat to its political regime from China, which is also autocratic and still the centre of power of one party. This is in contrast to the pressures of Western democracies, which presuppose the evolution of electoral autocracy towards a more democratic state. This is an additional argument for the current Russian regime to swallow some of the negatives in the name of maintaining friendship with China. However, in the longer term, the continuation of this trend is not automatically guaranteed. On a number of issues, interests are not really 40 Gabujev, A. (2019). Unwanted but Inevitable: Russia's Deepening Partnership with China Post-Ukraine. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Springer International Publishing. 41 Scepanovic, J. (2020). Institutions, cooperation, and hegemony: a comparative analysis of Russia's cooperative hegemonic strategy in Central Asia's key institutional frameworks, Asian Security, 17:2, 236- 261. 51 capped. While both sides stress the importance of a multipolar world order, each has a different approach due to its position in the international system. For example, China, which depends on continued economic growth, is more interested in stability than Russia, which has benefited from challenging the West (conflicts in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine)42. China has adopted a rather pragmatic attitude in its support for Russia in an attempt not to overstretch relations with the EU and the United States, which are much more important partners from an economic point of view. Chinese companies have turned down potentially profitable investments in Russia in order to avoid sanctions, and the Chinese government has maintained the same line43. China is very sensitive to its own interests on issues of territorial integrity, Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where it cannot support Russia. In turn, Russia has refrained from interfering on China's side in the latter's disputes with Japan, India, Vietnam and other Chinese border states, considering it necessary to maintain friendly relations with them. It is also concerned about the rapid growth of China's military sector, fearing that in the distant future, a friend that is becoming too strong may also start to make territorial claims on former Chinese territories. As Trenin44 points out, the Sino-Russian partnership, despite some convergence of political interests in the period, is not necessarily a permanent and cemented alliance, trade ties have not developed into deeper economic integration, and grassroots people- to-people relations are difficult to develop due to the civilisational barrier. It is also not a value-based alliance like the US-EU, but a partnership driven by the prevailing geopolitical situation, seeking to avoid US hegemony and growing Western influence in its own region. Each side views the other with some scepticism. While China sees Russia as an unpredictable partner because of its bellicosity, Russia sees Beijing's economic capacity as problematic, which Moscow does not have the means to deal with. 42 Kaczmarski, M. (2019: 218). Convergence or divergence? Visions of world order and the Russian- Chinese relationship, European Politics and Society, 20:2, 207-224. 43 Kaczmarski, M. (2020: 202). The Sino-Russian Relationship and the West, Survival, 62:6, 199-212. 44 Trenin, D. (2021). Russia and Europe: the Current Impasse and the Way Out. Carnegie Moscow Center. 52 be able to compete. US geopolitical guru Mearsheimer45 believes that in such a situation, a warming of US-Russia relations would not be impossible. This neo-realist argues that the asymmetric nature of Sino-Russian relations could lead Moscow, fearful of being overshadowed by Beijing, to seek to build a common front with Washington against the world's largest economy as China's influence grows. Perhaps this hypothesis is too bold, but there is certainly no reason to consider the opposite, that is, to regard the current period as one in which the central issue is the intensifying struggle between the camps of autocracies and democracies in the world, and in which further intensification of cooperation between China and Russia is fatally predetermined. There is no reason to claim that democracy is on such a powerful triumphal march in today's world that the authoritarian states are in a situation of necessity, in which they have only two options: either to launch an aggressive attack on the democracies or to perish. Or, on the contrary, that the democratic West now has a last chance to suppress the autocratic powers and the whole world will then turn back on the right track. The world is not just an arena of struggle between different ideologies, but rather one can expect different superpowers to try to realise their ambitions in different ways, bearing in mind geopolitical and geo-economic realities. There do not seem to be any strong internal reasons for an improvement/worsening of Russia-China relations in the near term, but rather if external pressures emerge. External pressure to break up this partnership is unlikely to be successful, but rather one might think, as Korolev and Portjakov46 do, that attempts by the United States and its allies to limit Beijing's growing influence would push China towards closer cooperation with Russia. 1.3. Geo-economic scenarios and their implications for the long- distance logistics perspective of Rail Baltica transport services To get an idea of what the political environment for long-distance Rail Baltica logistics transport might look like in a context of intersecting interests between key countries 53 45 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2020). Joe Biden Must Embrace Liberal Nationalism to Lead America Forward. The National Interest. 46 Korolev, A., Portjakov, V. (2019). Reluctant allies: system-unit dynamics and China-Russia relations. International Relations. 33 (1) : 40-66. 54 for the development of the EU, especially in terms of the possibilities of interlocking in transcontinental transport chains, it is not enough to have information on the positions of the various key countries in world politics and how they might change. It is reasonable to try to construct different, internally logically coherent scenarios, looking at possible combinations of how this international political and economic environment might behave. In the present case, this has been done on the basis of the approach outlined in section 1.1 and, within this framework, by attempting to operate with hypotheses about how the trends outlined in section 1.2 might evolve. It is understood that the current competition between the superpowers and the blocs, with the US and China at the centre of the confrontation, can continue in two different ways, either more geopolitical or more geoeconomic. However, a third option cannot be ruled out, in which the current competition between a limited number of major powers is replaced by the action of a larger number of players, making the international economic system more decentralised but also more chaotic. Although we will try to address both political and economic factors in their interrelationship, calling the following scenarios geo-economic, the analysis is still primarily oriented towards explaining the possible economic consequences of the scenarios. Of these scenarios, we have excluded the more extreme ones, where competition could escalate into a serious military conflict, which would, among other things, completely disrupt the current system of economic relations. The scenarios have been developed with 2045 as a possible horizon. The following provides an overview of the assumptions for each of the scenarios outlined above and the main features of how they work. It then looks at the likely relationships of the major powers and country blocs under each scenario. Finally, the implications of each scenario for the main transport corridors of interest to us in terms of Rail Baltica's long-distance logistics potential are outlined. This section of conclusions is not given for each scenario separately, but as a separate concluding chapter for better comparison. 55 1.3.1. Geopolitical competition scenario Assumptions and general developments The scenario assumes that the recent trend of US-China rivalries in the race for global economic leadership will continue and even deepen. "have started to push over the edge of purely economic competitiveness." The US has declared China both a systemic competitor and an outright potential enemy. 'Roads and belts' are taken by the US and other opponents not only as an economic policy expansion, but as a quasi-Chinese attempt at world domination and world domination. The main emphasis in dealing with competition has been shifted from economics to ideology and values: authoritarian countries like China are trying to destroy our Western way of life. Playing on these cards is an attempt to rally the broadest possible coalition of countries in the world (whether a coalition of democracies, that is a question in itself) against China and to force President Xi and the Chinese state either to change course, which does not seem very likely, or simply to stop the continued rise of the Chinese economy in the world with a united front and a blockade. In essence: an attempt to pressure and isolate China. So far, China, in expanding its influence in other countries, has not tried to bind them very closely and formally, has not been in a hurry to give them any clear guarantees, has not signed any binding treaties of a political nature. Rather, it has preferred 'soft' economic ties, often in the context of individual development projects. As geopolitical competition continues, the situation may change. China may begin to consolidate and consolidate the group of countries it dominates. With its neighbours such as Vietnam and South Korea, this may not be easy, hampered by cumbersome historical legacies, but it may be possible with more distant countries and regions - Africa, Latin America - which may be no less troublesome for the US. In South Asia, the coalition of China and Pakistan retains its importance. As the scenario continues, China is likely to increasingly perceive the US blockade of its southern sea routes (the so-called "Malacca dilemma") as a real threat. On the one hand, it is trying to avoid this by establishing military bases in the South China Sea, including military bases on the artificial islands and in the Indian Ocean (Pakistan, Sri 56 Lanka), and on the other hand, it is vigorously developing alternative transport corridors for the various transport routes. 57 directions. These actions, in turn, alarm other countries in the region and reinforce the risk of conflict. For the US, the critical moment would be if China could, with enough allies, break the US dollar's position as the world reserve currency of the international economy. It would also be if China were able to emerge as a world leader in the application of artificial intelligence and to exploit that position internationally. Against the realisation of both these threats, the US will do all it can. It may have some success in defending its interests here, but it is unlikely to be able to dominate the world economy as a whole. How serious it is to talk of a common global economy once the two confronting camps have been drawn up is, of course, a question of its own. It is extremely difficult for the supranational institutions that seek to regulate the functioning of the global economy (WB, IMF, WTO) to perform their functions in such a situation. China is trying to rely on new international structures (including development banks) created on its own initiative and oriented in opposition to the West. Of course, it is also trying to breathe new life into the so-called Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (NB, Iran recently joined). The geopolitically dominated confrontation scenario can take more or less acute forms. The version of the scenario presented here deals with a possible situation where such a geopolitical confrontation does not lead to a large-scale military confrontation after all, and where such a confrontation is tried to be avoided (so called minor armed conflicts, so called proxy wars may occur here and there in the world), but where such a confrontation persists. China's economic ascendancy may be contained, but China's change of course is unlikely to be. The explosive issue is of course Taiwan. It is politically and psychologically extremely difficult for China to renege on its promise to take Taiwan back by 2049 at the latest; for the US (and the West as a whole), Taiwan's subjugation to China would be a political, psychological and (given Taiwan's share of the world chip industry) technological blow. As for the economic decoupling from China that the US is proposing to its Western allies and others, of the major economic powers, only the US itself is likely to succeed in a radical form, and even then some trade, albeit on a smaller scale than at present, is still 58 likely to be maintained between the US and China. Other countries allied to the US will continue to trade with China, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent. 59 lowered level. However, their deeper cooperation with China (investment, R&D cooperation) is slowing down. Scenario effects by region:  The likelihood of a stronger Sino-Russian alliance in world politics is increasing. China needs an ally in a sharp geopolitical confrontation with a nuclear state to counter the West, and is likely to be willing to make tactical concessions to Russia to this end. Russia's geopolitical position will be strengthened, and it will have a number of additional opportunities to exert pressure and manipulate the West. At the same time, in alliance with China, it will clearly remain the lesser brother, if clear conflicts between its interests and those of China arise, the latter will prevail.  The US finds itself in a less than enviable role with Russia. On the one hand, it could do with one enemy, China, but on the other hand, by putting pressure on China and by putting forward value-based and ideological arguments (the fight for democracy, against autocracies), it has itself contributed to a situation in which China is moving closer to Russia. It is not impossible that the need to moderate its main ally will force the US to make some concessions in its relations with Russia.  While China used to be quite successful in economically linking up with Asian countries that were part of the group of allies of the US in terms of security policy (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), these opportunities are now diminishing. The US can put its Asian allies (plus Australia and New Zealand) to the test: either with us or with China. Different countries may then react differently.  The EU, saddled with two difficult tasks at the same time, the relaunch of the economic agenda and the "green turn", certainly does not need to be drawn into a sharp geopolitical conflict, neither with the US nor with China. It feels ambivalent and uncomfortable in the situation, and is trying to find compromise solutions. The EU also has to take account of its dependence on some Chinese raw materials, for which the possibilities of obtaining supplies elsewhere, on its own territory as well as nearby, are very limited. 60 (rare earth metals)47. For the EU, this means securing inputs and access to certain product groups, developing production largely on or near its own territory, before pushing relations with China too far.  The EU doesn't like strong pressure from the US48 , and the US is also an economic competitor. If the US tries to bring back to the table the draft US-EU trade deal (TTIP) that was there before, it will be very difficult to reach a compromise on this. US appeals to its alliance relations with the UK, which recently left the EU, could further complicate the situation. In addition to economic differences, (defence) political stances are also an obstacle. The EU could be torn between the US anti-China policy: on the one hand, the contradiction between the so-called strategic autonomists and the transatlanticists, and on the other, the position of some of the EU's smaller China-friendly countries, such as Hungary, which are hoping to reap the extra benefits of being in the vanguard of engagement with China. Full economic relations with China will certainly not be buried, but an EU-China investment agreement is unlikely to be concluded.  China's specific form of interaction with the former post-socialist countries of Europe is not expected to survive in this scenario. It is not only in the interests of the US, the EU itself has an interest in speaking to China with one voice.  It strengthens US and Western cooperation with India, which has taken a rather anti-China stance. India is trying to take advantage of the opportunities this brings, including in the economic sphere , while also trying to retain sufficient autonomy in this. The same applies to Japan. 1.3.2. Geo-economic competition scenario Assumptions and general developments 47 Africa could be the source of their supply, but Russia is also making inroads for the same purposes, in addition to China. 48 A recent example: the conclusion of an arms treaty against China with Britain and Australia behind the EU's back. 61 As in the previous scenario, the main decisive competitive axis is the competition between the US and China for leadership in the global economy. In this scenario, however, the political ideological rhetoric has somewhat receded compared to today. Both sides have perceived that a further escalation of relations could make the international situation too explosive, leading to military conflicts in one or other region of the world, and have sought to avoid escalating tensions, using the term 'competitor' rather than 'enemy'. The US has accepted China's rise to at least the status of an economic superpower that cannot quite be derailed and negotiated with from above, but whose entrenchment can be limited. In the economic sphere, fierce competition is still going on, but it is understood that keeping tensions between the two superpowers under control and continuing to communicate in spheres such as ecology, pandemics, etc., but also in the economic sphere, is more beneficial to both sides than a complete break in relations. Both in politics and in economic competition, there is a certain crossing "red lines" (most difficult in relation to Taiwan, as the reduced threat of direct military confrontation with the US could make the Taiwan grab more apethetic for China. In the event that the supremacy of the Party in China is threatened, achieving a 'crunch nash' effect to achieve national consensus may become a viable option, despite the inevitable economic setback). As to what the international economic world of the future might look like, however, the superpowers are strongly divided. Failure to agree on the role of the supranational economic regulatory institutions will reduce their role, but China in particular will continue to develop the institutions it controls. The situation could change if China is given a strong presence and a say in the development of different standards to shape them to China's vision. Whether the West will go along with this is uncertain. Each side will seek to create its own geographical economic zones, with preferential terms for participants. In the case of China, this concerns Asia and Africa in particular, but also seeks to penetrate elsewhere (South-East Europe, Latin America). Some countries, however, are trying to balance the two blocs or, while belonging to one bloc, are trying to behave more liberally than in the other zone. a "host state" would want to. The last statement applies to Japan, which is from Asia. 62 although a US ally in military policy, does not consider it possible to isolate itself too much from China-centred Asia in economic terms. This could also apply to India. "The treatment of 'spheres of influence' is softer than in the first scenario, the reprimands for attempts to sit on two chairs are not very severe. A single world economy can be spoken of in rather tentative terms, as if it exists in some spheres but not in others. Instead of multilateral regimes, the focus will be on long-term agreements between economic blocs and, above all, between the leading countries. While there continues to be a degree of controlled trade between the US and China itself, the complete "decoupling" is not being sought, but attempts are being made to sideline a competitor in certain sensitive spheres such as high technology (especially AI) and investment by the other side is not welcomed. Scenario effects by region:  The EU will remain an ally of the US (also in economic terms), but will not go along with full-blown anti-China actions. US-EU ties are likely to be a little better than in the previous scenario, and a TTIP-like trade agreement is not ruled out. The EU is trying to combine a transatlantic relationship with so-called strategic autonomy. The EU's starting point is that it has its own economic interests, which it will try to resist if China infringes, while the US struggle to be the world's number one economic power is not an EU struggle, it has its own economic interests, which do not always coincide with US interests. In general, it is interested in fostering business links with China. As with Russia. He does not see China as a military threat, if anyone it is Russia. To the extent that it depends on Russia's aggressiveness on and near the EU's borders. In the area of high technology, there is a generally coordinated policy with the US, largely anti-China. There is also considerable reluctance to invest in China, under pressure from the US. In particular, European countries are interested in infrastructure investment, such as transport infrastructure, for example ports and railways. There is also no particular sensitivity to high technology. There is, however, a cautious attitude towards loans from poorer countries, the terms of 63 which are 64 could foresee in the event of a default on the loans, the possibility of the property subsequently being taken over by China, as well as the terms of use of the infrastructure. In ordinary trade with China, people try to toe their own line and not be too prescriptive. The possibility of an investment agreement between China and the EU is not entirely ruled out.  Russia, whose economic weight in the world is somewhat diminishing (including under the influence of the "green revolution"), its chances of engaging in a spectacular game of political blackmail between the West and China, in a situation in which military tensions between the major powers are not escalating, are somewhat weakened (its trump card in this game would be its armaments potential, which increases in times of tension and decreases in times of calm). Russia fears an economically stronger China (because of Central Asia). It also has a conflict of interest with China over the Arctic, where China is showing what Russia considers inappropriate activity. At the same time, the threat of Islamic terrorism keeps them from moving too far apart, and the (sale or sharing of) natural resources (not only oil and gas, but also other things, including forests) in Siberia and the Far East is a factor of common interest. Admittedly, here Russia can also play into the competition with China and Japan, with improved relations also making Japan an important buyer and cooperation partner. The economic cooperation relationship between Russia and the EU is also better than it is today. In competing with other global players in global markets, for the EU its eastern neighbour Russia is an important market; economic cooperation can go beyond pure trade and be anchored in long-term agreements between Russia and the EU's core countries. The latter issue is, of course, quite a sensitive one, as it could also mean, in the worst case, a split in the EU's common policy. As a whole: Russia's economic relations with both the EU, China and the US, in this scenario, are more constructive than today's and are also more based on long- term agreements. As an economic partner, Russia is not particularly important for the US. But for the US, whose main concern is to compete economically with China and whose ambitions to hold its own on the globe are weakened, it is not as troublesome a rival as it is now. The continuing area of competition between 65 the EU and Russia is Ukraine. The latter, despite no particular improvement in its economic situation, is being drawn into its own camp (Russia towards the Eurasian Union). 66  The assumptions for global economic growth in this scenario are a little better than in the first scenario, but the difference may not be large, as the militarisation of the previous scenario also increases the size of the economy. The chances of a global green shoots reversal are a little better than in the first scenario, although not great. Economic blocking has two effects. Closure within blocks makes it more difficult; on the other hand, compared with managing competition at the country and/or firm level, there is perhaps more to be done within large blocks. It strengthens the identity within the big blocks ("We, Europeans!"). 1.3.3. diffused power structure(s) world scenario ( the world economy of the leader(s)) Assumptions and general developments The role of the US-China confrontation as a major source of tension is diminishing. It is perceived that a sharp geopolitical confrontation is too dangerous and that the US will over time overcome the complexity created by the prospect of losing its status as the world's largest economy and No. 1 economic power. It is realised that it will probably not be able to maintain it indefinitely, given the differences in the size of its populations. That a certain containment of China is possible, but that game may not be worth the candle. In fact, the average US resident is in any case inherently richer than the average 'Red China' resident and this will clearly be the case for a very long time. The decoupling of its own economy from China's, and the risk that China will inevitably, as a result, seek to carve out a share of the geo-economic space loyal to it, is too high a price to pay in the struggle for prestige. The emergence of such perceptions is, of course, conceivable if China does not blow the whistle and prevails on credible signals that it would prefer to pursue some form of economic cooperation with the US rather than simply seek to oust the US. The scenario is more easily triggered in a situation where both superpowers are not exactly on good terms, there are many problems to solve, and it takes ambition away. The US is abandoning a series of ambitions it has grown accustomed to in the world, 67 notably as a 'world policeman' and a 'leader of the free world', and is focusing on standing up for its more tangible interests. In a sense, it can even be seen as a new version of Trump's 'America First' without the accompanying Trumpist policies. 68 without primitivism and sloth. However, to call it an isolationist US model is perhaps an understatement, as the US is too closely linked to the global world economy. The US seeks to fix its primary economic and political interests. These include, in particular, access to a wide range of natural and mineral resources, with new priorities such as lithium, magnesium or some other raw materials that will become important in the future coming to the fore, alongside or replacing traditionally important things such as fuels. Obviously, it will be necessary to reach some kind of accommodation with China on the new high-tech sectors and the 'playing field' for key companies there, where too much is at stake. It is also likely that there will be an attempt to come to an agreement with China on limiting its ambitions in Latin America, and it is not only economic issues that are at stake here: for the US, bringing Latin America under Chinese influence would also be a clear sign of losing face (this is not the case, for example, in Africa.) Otherwise, there will be an attempt to make a contribution to restoring the influence of supranational economic institutions (which seems preferable to China setting up parallel structures that it can control) and multilateralism. To some extent this is succeeding, but not entirely. Restoring Western-centred governance of international institutions (so that they function as controlled by the West) is no longer possible. It is not only China, but also other rising powers, that are demanding their say and the posts to ensure it. Multilateral regimes only work with a crunch and great friction. There is no longer a superpower that can regulate many things either formally or informally. For example, there is a massive attempt to circumvent the agreed WTO rules of the game if they do not seem to be useful in certain situations, and protests about this take years to process and in many cases come to nothing. A cacophony of voices and interests prevails; getting something to work relatively quickly and smoothly is the exception rather than the rule. However, this is better for the development of global trade than the protectionism that tends to dominate under the previous two scenarios. Cooperation between countries is dominated by ad hoc coalitions, rather than fixed blocs. On some issues one kind, on others another. International trade is functioning, but the urge for long and complex value creation and supply chains that characterised the earlier stage of globalisation is no longer there. General instability, including that associated with, for example, Islamist terrorism, tends to gravitate towards shorter, more complex and more complex supply chains. 69 value chains and, in the case of the major countries, domestic production, especially for vital products and services. Economic security is an argument, but not so much because of the geopolitical struggles of the superpowers as because of a broader spectrum of risks. This includes the uncontrolled nature of the environment, pandemics, epidemics, etc.. One could even hypothesise that economic efficiency as an objective will be somewhat reduced compared with the past. Nor is it the power of the 'markets'. The role of the state will not diminish, but it will tend to be more concerned with other things (risk reduction of various kinds, regulation of social contradictions, etc.). Scenario effects by region:  The EU will continue to seek to realise its position as a single economic bloc, which it is largely succeeding in doing, while the potential for other major joint actions, including large infrastructure projects, is weakening. Unless the world's other regions go along with the ambitious green revolution ideology, the EU will have to retreat here, with member states making it clear to Brussels that they are not prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of this policy. At the same time, a range of more operational risk mitigation measures are being implemented, both at EU and national level.  For the US, the issue is differentiated from the struggle for global positions of dominant high-tech firms (NB, AI), where inevitably there will have to be some kind of deal with China. Otherwise, the US would rather rely on the logic of the free market. Of course, in the latter respect, there may be some setbacks, for example if Chinese capital starts buying up US ports too intensively.  For China, this scenario is a bit more appropriate than for the US.  Russia wins to some extent in the military-political realm, the US is unable or unwilling to limit its ambitions much (NB, border states). The extent to which it uses these opportunities depends on how important it considers economic relations with the EU to be. This scenario is, however, disadvantageous for Russia, as its weight in the world as a potential military ally is reduced. Economically, it is rather a dwarf on the world stage, with its not particularly well- developed economy. 70  Sino-Russian relations may be more likely to deteriorate as geopolitical tensions ease. This could be fuelled by intensifying competition for Central Asian markets. 1.3.4. Impacts of different scenarios on the use of international corridors including the development of the Rail Baltica potential corridor area Scenario 1 (geopolitically dominated development) China assumes that, in the context of tense international relations, its southern sea routes could be blocked (Suez Canal, Strait of Malacca). It is therefore directing its efforts towards the development of alternative corridors: both land transport links (in particular railways via Kazakhstan and Russia) and the Arctic Sea Route. Russia's trade with the EU via Estonia is low, and the use of Rail Baltica to transport Russian goods southwards is also low (lower than in the latest RB project calculations). For Rail Baltica, the possibilities for transporting goods from China across Russia are quite peripheral. A series of parallel east-west rail corridors across Russia will be commissioned. Goods destined for central Europe along these corridors will pass south of Estonia (and to a large extent the Baltics). However, Lithuania could be one of the winners. To develop the Arctic Sea Route, China is using its influence over Russia to ensure that the Arctic Sea Route is used to ship its goods to Europe. It is possible that it will also offer its own investment, but Russia is reluctant to accept the latter. If this sea route is launched (for container traffic), it is likely to be used by Japan and South Korea. The development of the port of Kirkenes and a railway linking it to South Finland, the construction of a railway from Kirkenes to Helsinki (the Lappi railway), as well as the construction of a Tallinn-Helsinki railway tunnel, are likely under this scenario. The EU and the 71 strategic considerations of a broader Western nature: the creation of north-south transport links is a logical step in the unification of Europe, and a transport corridor along the Russian border also has a certain strategic defence significance. True, the US may be putting pressure on its NATO ally Norway not to open the port of Kirkenes to Chinese trade flows, but using the Arctic Sea route to serve the flow of goods to China is in the EU's interests. China would also be interested in investing in these facilities (port, rail, tunnel), but is unlikely to be given the opportunity due to the general attitude of the West. If it turns out that diverting the flow of goods southwards along the North Arctic railways is a good enough business, Russia is likely to modernise the railway line from Murmansk southwards (to Petrozavodsk and beyond) to handle the onward transport itself. This will reduce somewhat the volume of goods that could be moved south from Kirkenes via Finland and Estonia (via the tunnel at some point). It is not excluded that Russia would offer Finland a deal to block transit south from Kirkenes, a branch line from Murmansk to Finland, which Finland could use to service its own trade with Asia via the Arctic Ocean. Of course, as long as the southern sea lanes are open to China (their closure in this scenario is a potential threat, but unlikely to materialise), China will send its goods to Europe via this sea route, both through the transport corridor linked to the so-called Adriatic ports and around Europe to the Baltic Sea. It is simply that the development of other transport routes means that the share of goods going by this route is somewhat smaller. Chinese investment in the Adriatic ports and in the rail network in south-eastern Europe is also likely to be hampered. Under this scenario, however, freight traffic to and from the Adriatic ports of India, a strategic ally of the West, will increase. The EU and the US will invest in the development of ports on India's west coast. The EU is also likely to make some additional efforts to ensure that the countries of South-Eastern Europe and Hungary do not fall too much under the influence of Russia and China, and such efforts should include investment in infrastructure to make the Adriatic corridor more efficient. The servicing of trade between Turkey and the European Union (NB, the construction of a tunnel under the Bosphorus) is an additional factor. It can be assumed, 72 that the West is interested in Turkey's economic integration with itself. In view of the above, the importance of the Adriatic Canal for Rail Baltica may not be very much less than in the first scenario (slightly less for China and slightly more for India in percentage terms). The role of Rail Baltica will be strengthened in relation to transports of a national defence nature. It is difficult to say whether, in this scenario, Rail Baltica has more or less chance of taking over the transport of goods related to Germany (especially between Finland and Germany), which are currently transported predominantly by sea. However, assuming that the motive for making long-term strategic investments is strong enough in this scenario, and that there is less confidence in market-driven reallocations of infrastructure, perhaps there is. If Rail Baltica is a high-priority project, there may also be a greater effort to shift freight from sea to rail. Particularly if this is accompanied by a desire to reduce the environmental pressures of shipping in the Baltic Sea (and partly also in the North Sea) and to improve the safety of freight transport. However, as a general background, in a situation of global international tension, supply chains are being shortened and made more local in order to avoid risks (with the exception of transatlantic trade, which is being specifically encouraged). However, it can therefore be assumed that the share of intra-European traffic compared to transcontinental traffic will be higher for Rail Baltica in this scenario. Second scenario (geo-economic dominated development) Three main features: (a) China will continue to build alternative trade routes to the southern sea route, but the motivation to do so is not as strong as in the first scenario, as the risk of its trade being blocked by the US on this sea route is lower; (b) the prospects for EU-Russia trade and economic cooperation are better, and hence the Baltic and Rail Baltica are somewhat (but only somewhat) better placed to serve trade flows with Russia; (c) although longer supply chains are ventured with less strained international relations, the work of the 73 the central ideology of economic blocs, however, is to keep them within the economic bloc wherever possible. Thus, transcontinental trade and related trade flows cannot become very large. The opposite will happen if there is a perceived major economic gain (for the block as a whole). The Adriatic corridor will probably develop gradually. The possibility of continued Chinese investment in Adriatic ports and infrastructure in south-east Europe cannot be excluded. The EU does not see any great reason to prevent this, as it will help to get these infrastructures up and running more quickly and more vigorously. The US will try to block these investments, but it may not be enough. The Northern Sea Route and the new transport route south of Kirkenes - as the climate continues to warm, the flow of traffic along this route will gradually increase: including containers. Russia's desire to take control of the Arctic is holding back this flow (there are also conflicts of interest between Russia and China), but it is likely that, with some effort, the issue of Arctic mineral exploitation and the issue of transport access can be decoupled so that international transport can work. In a less tense international environment, the main obstacle will probably not be so much Russia's attempt to militarise the Arctic as its desire to squeeze more economic benefits out of the use of the waterway (e.g. the requirement to use only Russian icebreakers, etc.). The build-up of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel under this scenario is over 50%. Finland should be able to show that this is a logical step in the context of the EU as an economic union that continues to integrate (as opposed to Finland as a kind of island). Will there be a rail link between Kirkenes and Helsinki? Some of the reasons for building it are weaker than in the first scenario, but if the flow of Asian freight across the Arctic Ocean seems large enough (primary motive) and Rail Baltica is completed (secondary motive), it is likely to happen. In the context of increasing economic relations between the EU and Russia, there will probably be some opportunities to send some Russian goods or Russian reprocessed goods (this may also apply in part to Kazakh goods) going to Tallinn by rail southwards along Rail Baltica. For example, from storage terminals in Muuga. However, this possibility should not be overestimated, there must be some additional reasons 74 (advantages) for this southbound flow of goods to pass through Estonia. Otherwise there is no point in having a southbound 75 goods to be transported westwards first. The Russians are also likely to be renovating the St Petersburg-Pskov-Minsk railway line by then, which means that Tallinn-Muuga will be competing with the likes of Rezekne and Daugavpils in Latvia for business ideas, or with some locations in Belarus, which is economically integrated with Russia. In these cases, the goods will not end up on Rail Baltic. Among the intra-European transports, the Rail Baltica scenario will actualise freight flows for parts of Germany (in particular the industrial south-west of Germany, northern Germany is too close to the sea for a rail link to compete with maritime transport) and the central European countries along the Adriatic corridor and the north-east of Italy, possibly also Hungary). Particularly to or from Finland. If the EU is able to economically integrate the Balkans and Turkey more and their trade with the Baltic countries increases, so will they. Scenario 3 (a world of leader(s) with a diffuse power structure) As geopolitical tensions ease, the alternative of international freight routes will increase. Shipping from where it is (more profitable in the short term). Assuming that critical nodes on international trade routes, such as the Suez Canal, can be secured against potential terrorism. There is no rush to build longer-term expensive infrastructure projects unless they promise to deliver very large benefits. Strategy is in the background. The Rail Baltica is very likely to be completed, but the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel and the so-called Lapland railway, for example, are more complicated. The EU is not rushing to invest in them. They would be built if China put its capital into them. It would do so if the flow of goods to Europe became very large and the other canals could not cope in their entirety. Or if the southern trade route (Suez, etc.) is threatened by terrorism. The Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel is likely to be treated by China as a continuation of the Northern Sea Route, as in the first scenario. However, it should be borne in mind that if relations between China and Russia deteriorate, Russia could make this sea route insecure or too expensive for China by blackmailing it. 76 The West may not make much of a special effort to increase trade with India if geopolitical motives are lost. However, trade from China, Japan and South Korea to Europe may increase. In this scenario, the so-called Adriatic direction is a very promising route for Rail Baltic to get goods from Asia. However, there is no reason to have high hopes for freight from south-east Europe. The EU's motivation to integrate the Balkans (and Turkey) economically with the EU is likely to be low. There are other things to do, and there is no desire to import further trouble from the troubled Balkans. The prospects for serving trade between Germany and Finland do not differ much between scenarios. Perhaps in this scenario, the direction is somewhat more promising, as intra-EU trade with prosperous and stable countries is expected to increase. Competition from Polish ports is a separate issue. Whether Russian goods should come to RB under this scenario depends on Russia's behaviour. If geopolitical obstacles are reduced, its trade with the EU should increase, but Russia's motives (following the decline in US activity) to put pressure on border countries may increase, which of course will reduce the transit possibilities or make it riskier. 77 2. Connecting corridors and competing corridors for the Rail Baltica route 2.1. Rail Baltic corridor network overall system For the Estonian public, the Rail Baltica project was initially about a railway linking the Baltic States, i.e. a north-south traffic and freight project. Very quickly, the connection between the project and the idea of a possible Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel was brought up, and questions about the new railway's improved connections with Warsaw or Berlin remained abstract, for example, "Berlin is clearly too far away for me to ever take the train there.". For the European Union, Rail Baltica is first and foremost a west-east project, linking the countries of the EU's so-called Eastern periphery much better with the core countries of the Union. However, the focus on freight and the cost- effectiveness of the railways means that the new railway and its links need to be seen in a much wider geographical context. First of all, the advantages of rail over road transport are particularly evident over long distances. Secondly, because rail today operates in the context of multimodal transport. It is not, for example, a freight train travelling 1 000 kilometres that competes with a car or a ship travelling the same distance or a slightly longer or shorter distance, but different multimodal transport chains that compete with each other to transport goods from point A to point B. It is possible, and even typical, for all three modes of transport, rail, road and maritime, to be used in different parts of a single complete chain. Some of the multimodal transport chains relevant for Rail Baltica freight transport are within the European borders, while others are transcontinental, running both in Europe and Asia (see Figure 2.1). Rail Baltica may compete with another mode of transport within a multimodal chain running essentially in the same geography, for example by taking freight away from road transport or losing it to maritime transport along a certain stretch, but in more complex cases it is a question of competition between complete multimodal chains. Rail Baltica can enter some of these chains if the service parameters it offers are competitive, but it cannot enter others for geographical reasons alone. It is therefore of the utmost importance to perceive the potential of both connecting corridors and competing corridors. The transport process is changing transport technology 78 increasingly complex, intertwined: the expansion of containerisation, the placing of trailers on certain sections of railway line, etc. Figure 2.1 Rail Baltica, its organic extensions, connecting corridors and competing corridors. 79 RB main route RB organic extensions RB connecting corridors RB Competing corridors Ports in Page-Jemeria North Norway Finland Esto nia East North Sea Germany/Polan Latvia Venemaa Asian ports d Ports Lithu countri ania Polan d es WCA Germany countries Adriatic ports Malacca Turkey India Suez Canal Aafrika As a recent study by French transport economists49 has shown, Asia continues to account for an increasing share of the world economy. Container turnover in Asian ports serving the economies of Asian countries has increased dramatically. A significant part of this is related to intra-Asian transport, but despite some setbacks in globalisation, transport between Asian countries and Europe is also very important. There are also certain opportunities here for Rail Baltica. As the authors of the article show, all possible transport links between Europe and East and South Asia are topical, as are maritime shipping routes through the Suez Canal, the opening of the North Arctic Sea Route (Figure 2.2) to more massive shipping traffic, transcontinental east-west rail transport and even a shipping route around Africa. However, in the view of the authors, the possibilities for transcontinental rail traffic across Russia are rather limited. The Arctic Sea Route is of great interest, according to the literature, but it will be some time before a more massive container shipping traffic is opened up. A new trend is the possible emergence of 'direct routes' on the Arctic Sea Route, where ships would not sail close to the Russian coast, but much further north. As the climate continues to warm, which in itself is of course a very negative process, the possibility of direct routes seems increasingly realistic. 49 Fremont, P. A. (2021). Le transport maritime au risque de la démondialisation? Futuribles, 2021/6, 445, 63-86. Figure 2.2: Existing route (southern route) and potential future route (northern route) of the Arctic Ocean. 57 We dealt with the issue of Adriatic corridors in the previous phase of this study50. Therefore, in this phase of the study, we focused primarily on more recent information on alternative corridors and related developments. We also provide a brief overview of the Transcarpathia project initiated by Poland, which we consider as a possible Rail Baltica link, and of the Scan-Med corridor, in particular in relation to the Fehmarn link, which we try to understand whether and to what extent it is a competing route to Rail Baltica. 2.2. Recent developments in some transport corridors 2.2.1. Adriatic transport links: the Baltic-Adriatic corridor and the so-called Maritime Corridor. Connections with the Adriatic ports are of great interest to Rail Baltica, precisely because of the possibilities of serving trade with Asian countries, not only with the Baltic States, but also with Finland. In a situation where Estonia will have a fast and frequent rail connection with Poland (Warsaw) and Warsaw with the Adriatic ports, Rail Baltica will represent one of the potential opportunities for serving this transcontinental freight traffic, one of the links in a multimodal transport corridor. In the context of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), the two transport corridors to be developed - the Baltic-Adriatic Corridor (RFC 5) and the so-called Maritime Corridor (RFC 11) - are important logistics channels for Estonia. The present sub-chapter deals with the current situation and future of these corridors, with a special focus on the Adriatic ports and the (Asian) transit through them. In addition, these corridors are also of interest to us from the perspective of their contribution to the intra- European South-Eastern Europe-Northern Europe trade. 50 Terk E., Saar I., Keskpaik A., Hunt T. Interoperability of the Rail Baltica corridor with other logistics channels. Report of Contract No 16-00154/17-9237. Tallinn 2019. Connectivity and overlap between the Baltic Sea-Adriatic Sea and the Baltic Sea-High Seas corridors The two corridors mentioned above together run through the territory of eight countries - Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, with additional transport links to be developed along the Polish borders (Figure 2.3). In essence, these are two largely parallel, but to some extent overlapping, transport corridors linking ports on the Adriatic and various destinations in Poland. Looking at these corridors from the perspective of Estonia and Rail Baltica, it can be simplified to say that the difference is that one, i.e. the western one (RFC 5) runs via Vienna, the other, the eastern one (RFC 11) via Bratislava. In terms of the map, the distance between them is not great, Vienna and Bratislava being less than 60 kilometres apart. Between Bratislava and Katowice the corridors coincide. The Amber Corridor (RFC 11) also has an eastern branch through Budapest, and from Krakow it includes a branch to Terespol on the Polish-Belarusian border, opposite which on the other side of the border is the important Belarusian railway hub of Brest. The fact that there are two corridors instead of one is important because, by diverting trains from the Adriatic ports northwards, it is possible to build more flexible trainsets, including additional wagons from different routes. 59 Figure 2.3: Simplified diagram of the Baltic-Adriatic Sea and the Maritime Corridors. ⚓ Gdynia, Gdansk (PL) ⚓ Tallinn (EE) ⚓ Swinoujscie (PL) Terespol (PL) Warsaw (PL) Katowice (PL)Krakow(PL) Baltic-Adriatic Sea Corridor (RFC 5) Maritime Corridor (RFC 11) Ostrava (CZ) Žilina (SK) Planned connections Continuing connections Presov (SK) Vienna (AT) Bratislava (SK) Budapest (HU) Gratz (AT) Csorna (HU) ⚓ Trieste (IT) ⚓ Koper (SI) Ljubljana (SI) Zalaszentivan (HU) Kelebia (HU) ⚓ Venice (IT) ⚓ Ravenna (IT) ⚓ Piraeus (GR) If the two rail corridors are considered together, as a single system, it can be imagined as a funnel extending from south to north, connecting the Adriatic ports with the Polish ports on the Baltic Sea, as well as its land connections with neighbouring Germany, Lithuania and Belarus. It is clear that the proper development of such a system would significantly improve Poland's logistical position in the south, especially in the Adriatic. 60 international (transit) flows of goods to and from sea ports, it allows these goods to be routed through a wide variety of channels. For Estonia, the Warsaw-Poland-Lithuania border - Tallinn/Muuga is an important route. It should be borne in mind, however, that this route is at least partly in competition with the one from Warsaw to Gdansk/Gdynia and from there by sea. In the northern Adriatic, five commercial ports compete closely with each other. On the eastern shore of the sea, the ports of Trieste (Italy), Koper (Slovenia) and Rijeka (Croatia) are located in close proximity, while on the western shore, the ports of Venice (Italy) and Ravenna (Italy) are located (Figure 2.4). While there has been much talk about the transport of Chinese goods to Europe via the Balkans in the light of the transfer of the Greek port of Piraeus to Chinese hands and its high growth, the volumes of Asian goods handled in the North Adriatic ports are significant. A striking example of this is the port of Koper, where the volume of goods handled in 2020 was 14.5% lower than in 2018 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but still reached nearly 20 million tonnes. The port is increasingly being used by China, but also by other Asian countries such as South Korea, to transport their goods to Europe. Figure 2.4: Adriatic ports (Koper, Ravenna, Rijeka, Trieste, Venice). 61 The volume of goods passing through the port of Koper grew steadily until 2018, when a record 24 million tonnes of goods were handled. In the following year, volumes decreased by five percent, but in 2019, the volumes handled returned to 2014 levels, falling to 19.5 million tonnes (Table 2.1). Table 2.1. Trade volumes in tonnes for the port of Koper. 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 22 010 652 23 366 959 24 048 618 22 792 646 19 523 133 Although the overall volume of goods handled in Koper has declined somewhat in recent years, trade with China and Asia has increased. For example, logistics company Cargo's partner expanded its LCL51 network between Asia and Koper in summer 2019 to include India, Thailand and Vietnam. Parcel services via Koper are estimated to save significantly more time than transporting goods via northern European ports. From Nhava Sheva (India) to Koper takes 18 days, from Lat Krabang (Thailand) around 25 days and from Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) around 25-28 days. Container lines to China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were already in operation. It is also worth noting that in October 2019, the ambassadors of the Visegrad Group visited Copenhagen. According to the Chairman of the Port's Board of Directors, their aim is to become the main sea gateway between Central Europe and the Mediterranean and the Far East. Koper is served by three weekly ferry services to different Asian countries. Monday's container service to Slovenia passes through China (Xingang, Dalian, Ningbo, Shanghai, Shekou), South Korea (Busan) and Singapore. Additional stops will be made in Egypt (Port Said) and Israel (Haifa). The second container train, which will be shipped out on Friday and in on Saturday, will also stop in Shanghai, Ningbo, Busan, Shekou and Singapore, as well as Malaysia (Port Kelang) and Saudi Arabia (Jeddah). The third route will stop in Hong Kong and Japan (Toyohashi), in addition to Singapore and China. There are also eight other ferry lines passing through Koper, for which the stopover depends on 62 51 LCL - Less-than-Container-Load, sub-container transport 63 volumes to be loaded/unloaded. In addition to the aforementioned Asian countries, three of these routes include India, with Turkey and Taiwan also included. Port of Rijeka in Croatia The port of Rijeka, 84 kilometres from Koper and owned by International Container Terminal Services (ICTSI) of the Philippines, is also looking to forge stronger links with India. While the volume of cargo passing through Rijeka is more than a third less than Koper, reaching a record 13.6 million tonnes last year, the port has big ambitions for Asia. In March 2019, the President of India, Ram Nath Kovind, visited Croatia, and during his visit, the President of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, invited India to join the Rijeka port project as a gateway to Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union's free trade area. The Croatian Head of State also invited Indian companies to set up a goods distribution centre in Rijeka. Rijeka, Croatia's largest cargo port, is planning to build a new deep-sea container terminal in the near future. According to the project description, the estimated cost of the terminal expansion is €350 million. It will involve the construction of a 400-metre terminal in the first phase, which will later be extended to 680 metres in the second phase. The 20-metre water depth will allow the port to accommodate the latest generation of container ships. The port of Rijeka is aiming to become the first port in the northern Adriatic capable of accommodating ships up to 20 000 TEU. The port aims to capitalise on its strategic location in a potential crossroads of the Mediterranean and Baltic-Adriatic corridors, to address current bottlenecks and to modernise infrastructure assets previously identified by the European Union. The port is also exploring options for further expansion - the construction of a container terminal on the nearby island of Krk and the building of the necessary infrastructure to accommodate large cruise ships. 64 Port of Trieste in Italy The port of Trieste, 75 km from Rijeka and just 23 km from Koper, is Italy's largest port on the Adriatic in terms of tonnage handled (more than double that of the nearby port of Venice). What makes the port of Trieste unique compared with its neighbours is its free port status, as well as the history of the city, which together place certain constraints on the Italian government in its development. When Italy joined the China Belt and Road Initiative in 2019, the Port of Trieste also played a major role, as it was to become one of the main focal points for trade with China and Asia in the context of the Adriatic trade routes. However, this objective proved problematic for two reasons: firstly, the port does not belong to the Italian State, which means that the government cannot take any arbitrary steps regarding the future of the port, and secondly, and partly as a result of the above, Italy itself favoured the port of Genoa, on the opposite side of the Apennine peninsula, which was already well developed and had an existing, decent trade network. While Beijing's interest in the Port of Trieste and the Baltic-Adriatic trade corridor from there is ongoing, and the Chinese company CCCC has expressed its willingness to develop the infrastructure around the port, relations between China and Italy over the Port of Trieste have been somewhat strained by recent developments. In June 2020, Italy's National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANAC) revoked the appointment of Zeno D'Agostino as President of the Trieste Port Authority, finding him guilty of a conflict of interest. Following the ANAC's decision, the plans, transactions and contracts drawn up over the last five years, including cooperation agreements with Chinese companies, were declared null and void. D'Agostino appealed the decision and was later acquitted, allowing him to return to his post as President. Furthermore, the second government of Giuseppe Conte, which took office in September 2019, is no longer as optimistic towards China as the first Conte coalition before it. The incumbent government has criticised China for its lack of progress on promised investment. In January 2021, the Hamburger Hafen und Logistik (HHLA) Group acquired a controlling stake in the Port of Trieste, and since 2018, the same group also owns the Port of Tallinn Muuga. 65 container terminal in the port. This will of course significantly increase Rail Baltica's interest in using Trieste as a Mediterranean hub for the Adriatic corridor. At present, the port, which is owned by the HHLA Group, handles general cargo, while the company handles containers in the southern part of its territory and carries out the works necessary for the RoRo transport. Comparison of ports in the North Adriatic Table 1.2: North Adriatic ports' cargo volumes in tonnes. 2017 2018 2019 2020 Koper 23 366 959 24 048 618 22 792 646 19 523 133 Rijeka 12 615 066 13 404 784 11 488 542 13 588 904 Trieste 61 947 454 62 676 502 60 687 424 54 459 180 Table 2.3. TEUs of goods handled in North Adriatic ports. 2017 2018 2019 2020 Koper 911 528 988 501 959 354 945 041 Rijeka 249 975 260 375 305 049 344 091 Trieste52 546 660 625 767 688 649 687 921 Comparison of ports Strengths weaknesses Opportunities threats Koper broad-based the current room for from bottleneck; expansion; major connecting railway Rail falling behind; investments; staying in eh. under dependence on construction rail large TEUs head from completion. volume. connections. 52 Trieste accounts for about 2/3 of the volumes of crude oil, which makes its position in terms of total 66 volumes (in tonnes) significantly stronger than that of Koper in terms of TEUs. 67 Rijeka planned Poor land connection in the absence investment; connections; Low s with of rapid expansion; freight flows. Asia; the development as Chinese Balkan sea a commercial interest. gateway; port, the tourism overshadowed sector. by others. staying. Trieste Freeport; additional Port of Missing out on existing competition from Hamburg Asian trade infrastructur other Italian ports; investment; flows. e; largest mixed status. Adriatic trade corridor one volume source points. tonnes. Although all three ports are members of the North Adriatic Ports Association (NAPA), which, together with Ravenna and Venice, emphasises cooperation, it is clear that they are competitors in the context of the Baltic-Adriatic corridor and Asian trade. Although initially the Italian port of Trieste seemed to be in the best position to cooperate with China, the interest of Chinese companies has declined in the light of the deterioration of relations between Italy and China on infrastructure investment, the reduction in major investment by Beijing due to the pandemic and the transfer of the Trieste port terminal to the Port of Hamburg (HHLA). Copper is already an attractive option for transports between Asia, and the completion of the new railway would significantly improve the possibilities in the context of the Adriatic corridor. The port is served weekly by three shipping lines with different Asian countries (China, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore) and eight shipping lines, with stops depending on the volumes loaded/unloaded. In addition to the above- mentioned countries, these routes also include Turkey, India and Taiwan. While the new railway serving the port would further enhance the potential of Koper, it is also, in a sense, its weakness at the moment, as its complex nature and high price tag make it 68 unclear whether, and in what form, it will be completed on time. The ambitions of the port of Rijeka are great and, although the distances to Trieste and Koper are non-existent in a global context, it is theoretically the first port of call in the North Adriatic. 69 with a harbour on the eastern shore of the sea. Rijeka also has good contacts with Asia, as one of its strategic partners for almost a decade has been a Philippine company. The offer made by the Chinese consortium to develop and manage Rijeka's new container terminal for the next 50 years is a significant one, and the completion of the port's second development phase would give Croatia a good starting position in the race between ports. The future of RFC 5 and RFC 11 transit corridors Bottlenecks to be solved As the Adriatic ports play a growing role in Europe's trade with Asia, and as the ports themselves are planning to expand and increase their capacity in the future, their role in the wider EU transport network (including future links with the Baltic and Northern Europe) will be significant. However, one of the biggest challenges in ensuring optimal transit is to remove the many bottlenecks that would allow speeds to be increased, axle loads to be increased and overall capacity to be improved. With this in mind, EU Regulation 1315/2013 sets a number of requirements for the TEN-T transit corridor infrastructure, for example, requiring rail freight trains to be able to run at speeds of at least 100 km/h and lengths of 740 m. This will help to reduce the number of freight trains on the TEN-T corridors. Divaca-Koper poodle Due to the rapid growth of the port of Koper, the 50-kilometre section between the Divaca node and the port, which currently connects to it and was built in 1968, is no longer able to efficiently serve the traffic passing through it, so one of the most expensive projects of the RFC 5 and RFC 11 corridors foresees the construction of a new, 27.1-kilometre-long second link. The new thread, which will be built with the possibility of being upgraded at a later stage with a second pair of tracks, would provide a critical efficient rail link in the wider context. The €1.2 billion Divaca-Koper second line will have 75% of its length in eight different 70 tunnels, due to difficult terrain, a 400-metre difference in height and environmental constraints. The maximum speed of freight trains on the new line will be 120 km/h, and that of passenger trains 160 km/h. The two lines would be able to handle up to 231 trains. 71 per day, or 43.4 million net tonnes of goods per year. The facility is scheduled to be completed in 2025 and commissioned in 2026. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has so far committed €250 million to the Divaca- Koper second line project. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) has so far contributed €153.36 million and the European Union Cohesion Fund €80 million. In May 2020, the Slovenian company 2TDK, which is in charge of the project, signed a contract with the development bank NLB, securing an additional investment of €112.5 million. The Slovenian state will pay the largest part of the total cost of the project, i.e. €522 million, in annual instalments. The Baltic-Adriatic corridor (RFC 5) and its current challenges The Baltic-Adriatic transit corridor project, launched in 2014, involves six countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia and Italy. The corridor consists of 4227 km of railways and 3600 km of roads. In six years, nearly 180 projects have been implemented to improve the corridor, with around 340 projects still under way. Of the completed projects, railways have received the largest investment (€5.851 billion), while road construction has been financed to the tune of €4.651 billion. Narrow places The Baltic-Adriatic corridor rail infrastructure continues to face a number of bottlenecks. As regards bottlenecks, the six critical cross-border sections still awaiting modernisation are highlighted first: • Opole - Ostrava (Poland - Czech Republic) • Katowice - Ostrava (Poland - Czech Republic) • Katowice - Žilina (Poland - Slovakia) • Bratislava - Vienna (Slovakia - Austria) • Gratz - Maribor (Austria - Slovenia) • Trieste - Divaca (Italy - Slovenia) 72 In addition, two Alpine sections in Austria are missing from the corridor: the Semmering tunnel and the Koralm railway and tunnel. Both sections are currently under construction and are expected to be completed in 2027 and 2025 respectively, i.e. before the start of Rail Baltica, significantly improving the current functionality of the corridor. The European Commission analyses the whole picture of the Baltic-Adriatic corridor on the basis of three parameters: axle load, line speed and train length. Among the requirements of the EU regulation, the most problematic is the provision of trains 740 m long (Table 2.4) - 51.5% of the entire corridor does not meet this parameter, with the most problematic sections being those through Austria and Slovenia. Currently, 71% of the corridor meets the 100 km/h or more requirement, with around 750 km of Polish and 270 km of Slovenian lines in need of upgrading. Axle-loading is the least problematic, with only 6.1% of the corridor not meeting the axle-loading requirement, and only Poland and Slovenia affected. Table 2.4: Percentage of non-compliant rail infrastructure in the Baltic-Adriatic corridor as of June 2020. All Poland Czech Slovakia Austria Italy Slovenia from Republi c corridor Full load 6,1% 11,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,9% (>= 22,5 t) Line 29,0% 41,1% 0,0% 13,2% 1,0% 5,0% 75,5% speed (>=1 00 km/h) Train length 51,5% 53,6% 100,0% 29,0% 0,0% 100,0% 9,4% (740 m) The Maritime Corridor (RFC 11) and its shortcomings The Amber Corridor, with Terespol on the Polish-Belarusian border as its easternmost 73 end, passes through industrial centres in south-eastern and southern Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. Through Hungary, the corridor will also provide a strong link to the Balkans, as one part of the route will be used for the widely discussed Chinese-led modernisation of the railway line. 74 Between Budapest and the Serbian border (Budapest-Kelebia). While in the Balkans, the Maritime Corridor will open up favourable freight routes to Asia via the port of Piraeus in Greece, which is being developed by Chinese companies, in Eastern Europe a profitable rail link to Asia will be established via Belarus. The total length of the offshore corridor is 3358.45 km. In the future, the route will be extended by 198.5 km when Poland builds the Nowy Sacz-Krakow and Radoma- Varsaw lines. In Slovenia, the Amber Corridor will be complemented by the construction of a second 27-kilometre Koper-Divaca line. The total length of the corridor's main lines is currently 2853.47 km, and in the future it will be 3051.96 km. Table 2.5. Maritime corridor railways by country. Country Main Byways Connected to Total (km) routes/Routing (km) (km) main roads (km) Poland 912,9/198,5 156,8 - 1069,8/1268,2 Slovakia 563,8 63,1 92 718,9 Hungary 978,4 79,1 - 1057,5 Slovenia 398,3 - 114 512,3/539,4 On different sections of Slovenia's main roads, the maximum speed varies between 25 km/h. The lowest maximum speed is on the current single-track Divaca-Koper line (75 km/h), followed by Divaca-Ljubljana, Ljubljana-Zidani Most and Zidani Most-Pragersko lines, where the maximum speed is 80 km/h. On the single-track Pragersko-Hodoš section (110 km), which ends at the Hungarian border, the maximum speed is 100 km/h. Slovenia invests €200-300 million a year in upgrading and developing its rail infrastructure, and currently has six major and ten smaller projects underway. One of the most ambitious projects is the upgrading of the Zidane Most-Sentilj-Austria border section, covering the RFC 5 (Baltic-Adriatic Sea) and RFC 6 (Mediterranean Sea) corridors, to provide an axle load of up to 22.5 tonnes, which in turn will allow an annual throughput of up to four million tonnes and reduce the current transport time by several hours. 75 Reconstruction work is also underway in Pragersko, an important node in the context of all three rail freight corridors mentioned above. As part of the modernisation, the railway there will be upgraded to category D4, which means higher axle loads, i.e. better capacity and higher speeds. The Pragersko node will be connected to the recently upgraded Pragersko-Ormož section, which will link Slovenia to Hungary. Narrow places The Maritime Corridor has identified 117 infrastructure bottlenecks to be addressed. Hungary has by far the largest number of these - 79. They are followed by Poland (28), Slovenia (6) and Slovakia (4). In the case of Slovenia, the three bottlenecks relate to the Divaca-Koper section, which is criticised for low capacity, insufficient station capacity, low traction and the state of the signalling system. The Ljubljana station is also problematic, with the lack of capacity and the signalling system highlighted. The problems on the Divaca-Koper section are expected to be solved by 2026, while the Ljubljana station is expected to be solved a year earlier. The other bottlenecks in Slovenia are expected to be solved in 2022 and 2023. Among the many problems of the Hungarian railways, the low axle loads (less than 22.5 tonnes), low maximum speed (less than 100 km/h), frequent use of sections by passenger trains and the lack of GSM-R radio communication are the most highlighted. For about half of the bottlenecks in Hungary, no project has been launched to tackle them and no deadline has been set. For others, the latest target date is 2024, while most of the bottlenecks are expected to be resolved by now (January 2021). The infrastructure problems in Poland are similar to those in Hungary. The current problems are the low maximum length of trains, low axle load and low speed. Most of the problems will be solved by 2023 at the latest. The longest timeframe for resolving bottlenecks is observed in Slovakia, where there is a single pair of tracks and a large number of passenger trains on the section between Bratislava and the Slovak-Hungarian border. The second pair of tracks and the 76 electrification project are not expected to be completed before 2030. 77 A project to solve the low speed problem on the Kosice-Plavec line to the Slovak-Polish border has not yet been launched. The Adriatic freight ports along the Baltic-Adriatic corridor are already important origins and destinations for trade between Europe and Asia, but the modernisation of the transit corridors, through increased speeds and capacities, will further improve the capacity of these ports. A good example of the growth in throughput to Asia is the Slovenian port of Koper - due to the increase in cargo volumes, the current rail link to the port is no longer able to optimally serve the volumes passing through it. Of course, this is not the only bottleneck in transport corridors covering thousands of kilometres - there are also problems with increasing border crossings and train lengths, for example - but with a number of bottlenecks already resolved in the last six years, the European Commission's target of completing the RFC 5 corridor by 2030 seems realistic. The Maritime Corridor, which will only be launched in 2019, understandably has more concerns, but most of them already have an action plan in place and benefit from a partial overlap with the Baltic-Adriatic corridor. Although there is a significant amount of planned investment to widen the bottlenecks in the corridors under consideration, most of this is planned to be completed by the time Rail Baltica is launched. Train convoys between Tallinn, as the northern point of Rail Baltica, and the Adriatic ports could be routed via different branch corridors, allowing the same container trains to carry transcontinental freight as well as freight serving somewhat shorter distances, with additional wagons coupling and uncoupling along the central European width. 2.2.2. Transcarpathia project The planned Transcarpathia transit corridor (Via Carpathia) is a road route linking the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, passing through Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. The corridor is seen as a promising link between northern and southern Europe, with Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey and the Balkan Peninsula (including the Adriatic Sea and transit through it) as additional catchment areas. See 78 The Visegrad countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have jointly expressed their wish to the European Commission that the Transcarpathian road route be fully integrated into the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) core network, thereby ensuring more broad-based financing for the corridor. The Transcarpathian trunk road has a length of 718 km, of which 78 km are completed, 289 km under construction and 351 km under preparation. Rail corridor In the Transcarpathian corridor concept, its full development as a railway canal is still a developing concept. At an advanced stage, however, is Rail-2-Sea, one of the projects of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which aims to modernise and develop a European rail network of track gauge linking the ports of Gdansk and Constanta, passing through Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, thus connecting the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The total length of the route is 2 342 km and the railway would be used for both civil and military purposes (all participating countries are NATO members as well as EU members). The most extensive work is currently underway in Romania, where three branches are planned: northern branch A (between the Hungarian border and Cluj Napoca; 880 km, 11 hours), northern branch B (between the Hungarian border and Curtici; 860 km, 10 hours and 40 minutes), southern branch (between the Hungarian border and Arad; 815 km, 10 hours and 15 minutes). Speeds vary between 50 km/h and 160 km/h. The Romanian sections are part of the TEN-T. The routes through Hungary, Slovakia and Poland are also parallel parts of the Maritime Corridor (RFC 11), which is already being upgraded. Both Rail-2-Sea and Via Carpathia are also of interest to Lithuania, which hopes to benefit from north-south trade flows through new and high- speed connections when Rail Baltica is completed. Rail-2-Sea is planned to be completed at the same time as Rail Baltica, with a target completion date of 2029. In our opinion, the development of the Transcarpathian corridor can be seen as a concept that should help to extend the potential corridor area of Rail Baltica, extending it somewhat eastwards from the Adriatic corridor. Some of the goods arriving by rail from the Romanian port of Constanta to Warsaw can already be transported northwards 79 along Rail Baltica. This is suitable, for example, for freight flows to Turkey. Goods arriving from Bialystok will arrive in Kaunas, which also means onward transport 80 the possibility of bypassing the Rail Baltic. It is true that the Rail-2-Sea line, which is to be modernised, is planned to extend to Gdansk, which means there is a potential risk that goods will be sent from Poland to Finland, for example, by sea rather than by rail. However, Rail Baltica will in any case have to deal with competition with the maritime route from Gdansk, which is a much wider issue than the Transcarpathian corridor. 2.2.3. Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor The Scandinavian-Mediterranean Figure 2.5 Scandinavia - Mediterranean corridor (rail and road). Corridor (Scan-Med, TEN-T 5) is the longest of the core Trans- European Transport Network (TEN-T), covering 9277 km of railways and 6279 km of roads. It passes through 25 core ports, 19 core airports, 45 core intermodal terminals and 19 core urban nodes. The corridor is critical for freight flowsfrom northern Europe - the border between Russia and Finland. and to divert them to southern Europe (out of Italy and Malta). The corridor passes through urban hubs in Austria, Germany and Scandinavia, with fully developed rail and road connections to Oslo. 81 Rail corridor The Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor is Figure 2.6 Rail corridor serving the Scandinavia- served by corridor 5 (RFC 3), which connects Mediterranean (TEN-T 5) southern Italy with Stockholm and Oslo (Figure 2.6). corridor 3. (RFC 3). In the case of the Scan-Med corridor, it is the development of rail infrastructure that is by far the most funded, with 87% of theCEF ( ConnectingEurope Facility)funding allocated toimproving the competitiveness of rail transport. Major modernisation work is underway on the rail corridor to improve the interoperability of the network,for example by deploying the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) along the whole corridor to reduce bottlenecks and high speeds, which are the most problematic at borders. In total, the RFC 3 development package includes 21 items with a total cost of €2 billion. Mixed wagons account for 36% and single wagons for 38% of RFC 3 rail transport. The average speed of a freight train on the corridor from Hallsberg (Sweden) to Verona (Italy) in 2019 was between 75 and 89 km/h, and the journey took 25-35 hours. For TEN-T up to 740 m only the Danish part of the corridor and parts of the Norwegian, Swedish and Austrian sections are currently fully able to cope with freight trains, but by 2030 most of the route should be able to accommodate freight trains of up to 740 metres. 82 Improved RFC 3 railways as of May 2020): • European track gauge upgraded railways - 228 km • ERTMS deployment - 558 km 83 • Electrification of main and secondary roads - 254 km • Upgrading of freight lines - 237 km Major railway infrastructure objects: • Brenner Tunnel - a 55-kilometre rail tunnel through the eastern Alps between Italy and Austria, which started construction in 2008 and is expected to open to traffic in 2032. The tunnel will be equipped with an electrified double-track railway, which freight trains will be able to use at speeds of up to 120 km/hour. The new road will link Innsbruck (Austria) and Fortezza (Italy), solving a major bottleneck. • Fehmarn Strait Tunnel - An 18-kilometre undersea tunnel linking Lolland in Denmark and the German island of Fehmarn, construction of which started in 2021 and is expected to be completed in 2029. The tunnel, which will provide an important link between Central Europe and Scandinavia, will significantly reduce the time taken: while a ferry takes 45 minutes to travel between the islands, the new tunnel will take 10 minutes by car and seven minutes by train. • Connecting railways are under construction from Lübeck in Germany (with a maximum speed of 200 km/h) and between Ringsted and Rodby in Denmark, where 46 out of 52 bridges have been completed, also with a maximum speed of 200 km/h. • In 2016, the Kattwijk Bridge was completed in the port of Hamburg to serve rail transit. • In Finland, the construction of a multi-modal logistics platform at the railway station in Kouvola, near the Russian border, started in 2019. • In Sweden, connections to the port of Gothenburg, where a rail tunnel is planned, will be improved. For the purpose of this study, the construction of the Fehmarn Strait Tunnel is of particular relevance to this corridor, as it will improve the possibility of diverting some of the more expensive and faster and more punctual freight flows between Germany and Finland to Sweden, either by rail or by road. The idea is that this is the same flow of goods that the Rail freight rail link between Germany and Finland also claims to serve 84 as a transit. 85 Baltica. However, this competition to Rail Baltica should not be very serious, as the route via Sweden would require the goods to cross the sea corridor between Sweden and Finland, which would take considerably longer and should be more expensive than the Tallinn-Helsinki route of Rail Baltica. In addition, there is the cost of crossing the Fehmarn Tunnel, and it is logical to believe that in the future it will cost more per kilometre of rail or road in Sweden than in Poland and the Baltic States. All this should more than compensate for the advantage of a somewhat shorter distance to cover. It is possible that a transport via Sweden could make sense if the point of departure or arrival of the goods is located directly in the area of a port on the west coast of Finland, so that the internal Finnish leg of the journey would be practically omitted from the route and the speed of the onward journey would not allow the goods to be sent directly by sea, without passing through Sweden, to a German port. However, in itself, the existence of a competitive option in principle is important, it puts some control on Rail Baltica's tariff policy and reinforces the perception that the crossing of the Gulf of Finland must be fast and not expensive for freight. Servicing Russian transit may be an important issue for Estonian Railways interested in east-west freight flows, but in our view it is unlikely to be one of Rail Baltica's core business ideas. Therefore, the improvement of the possibilities for Russian transit via Finland and Sweden, which will occur after the completion of the Fehmarn tunnel, should not be an important issue for Rail Baltica. It is not excluded that Rail Baltica will benefit from the upgrading of the southern European sections of the RFC3 corridor, from where, for example, Italian goods can reach Rail Baltica via German and Polish railways. 86 3. Rail Baltica long-distance logistics flows projections and conclusions on its potential as a whole 3.1. The complexity of the task and the approach to it Calculating the potential volumes of trade flows is complicated by the need to integrate different types of influencing factors into a single integrated logic. Firstly, a set of economic factors. Starting with the broadest one: the growth of the international economy and its type. Whether economic growth is geographically oriented towards broad international exports and imports, or more regional (in the sense of the 'large economic areas') cooperation, or whether it is based on growing domestic consumption in one's own country. Next: assumptions on the growth potential of individual economies and their interlinkages. Even leaving aside possible political reasons for the time being, we must determine whether we assume that the external trade links between partner countries will continue to exist at the same form and pace as in the past, or whether the changing macroeconomic environment or national processes could lead to significant changes in patterns. The question then arises of the extent to which an increase in the trade of goods measured in monetary terms could mean an increase in the volume of goods transported in tonnes or containers; the question of the 'dematerialisation' of the flow of goods. Dematerialisation is already partly an issue that goes beyond economic considerations, and is influenced by various factors (consumption, technological, ecological). Compared with products, services are consumed more, fewer raw materials and materials are used per final unit of consumption at the various stages of the production cycle, and product weights and gauges are reduced. The literature on the subject offers relatively few forecasts of the future pace of dematerialisation and the forecasts that do emerge are relatively scattered. The next issue is logistical change. Which flows of goods prefer which mode of transport - or, more broadly, which combination of modes - to reach their destination. This may strongly depend on the changes over time. 87 changes in the competitiveness of different modes of transport53. The latter is largely influenced by technological progress, which may not be equally rapid across modes, but also by various constraints on transport and its taxation, often due to environmental considerations. Possible changes in the physical structure of freight flows must also be taken into account. The changing structure of the flow of goods may impose different requirements on the parameters of the transport service (combination of tariff and speed, etc.), which in turn may affect the share of goods suitable for rail transport in the trade between individual countries. It is not possible to foresee in principle for a period of 25 years which specific goods will be transported between specific countries, so it is only possible to make very rough estimates of the importance of which modes of transport could play on which routes or sections of which freight flows. Such estimates should certainly be adjusted as time goes by and new information becomes available. Of course, the current logistical picture could be significantly altered by the construction of new ports, railways, undersea tunnels and other elements of transport infrastructure, or by the substantial reconstruction of existing ones. The choice of specific trading partners and the preference for transport corridors are not only decisions based on the purely economic considerations of business partners, but also strongly depend on the relations between countries. Therefore, the main focus of this paper is namely to try to foresee, as far as possible, how different geopolitical scenarios that could dominate the world in the next decades could affect the transport corridors, including the new Rail Baltica. It should be stressed that this chapter of the report is not a forecast, but rather a projection, which attempts to estimate possible volumes based on a combination of assumptions. It is not possible to make projections in the strict sense over such a long time horizon, there are too many uncertainties. However, it will enable users of the results of the work to get a better idea of the combinations of factors that can be used to produce the possible volumes and what the quantitative results could be for one or another combination. We have tried to present 53 The results of the comparative competitiveness forecast of different modes of transport are presented in Terk E., Saar I., Keskpaik A., Hunt T. Interoperability of the Rail Baltica corridor with other logistics channels. Report of Contract No 16-00154/17-9237. Tallinn 2019. 88 the calculation algorithm in as clear a form as possible, so that the user of the work can, if he wishes, modify the possible underlying assumptions or impact coefficients of the algorithm, experiment with them and see what results would be obtained in terms of the volumes of traffic concerned. 3.2. Methodology 3.2.1. Starting points for projections In order to calculate the potential long-distance logistic freight volumes for Rail Baltica, we designed a special procedure based on the principles described in Chapters 1 and 2 and consisting of the following steps:  Identification of countries and groups of countries between which current and prospective trade in goods should be analysed. What should be the set of regions, broadly speaking, and, more narrowly, of specific countries, for which it could be expected that serving the trade between them could in the future provide the bulk of Rail Baltica's long-distance logistical traffic? In answering this question, we drew on the geography of the corridors, the volumes of freight exchanged between countries to date, as well as on existing forecasts of the growth of national economies in the coming decades. Based on the geography of the corridors, we assumed that the potential long-distance logistical catchment area of Rail Baltica consists of the so-called "FennoBaltic" (i.e. Finland, Estonia and Latvia - see chapter 1) trade with (1) Germany, (2) the countries south and south-east of the Baltic States - using the terminology of the Rail Baltica Cost- Benefit Analysis Report54 , the WCA-1 region55 : Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Italy (North-East Italy), Croatia and Hungary; and (3) Asian countries with a high economic growth and/or volume, such as Turkey, India, China and Japan. Poland and Russia's trade with the Fenno-Baltic region was treated as trade with neighbouring countries in the Rail Baltica Direct Catchment Area (in the terms used in the previous report: Direct Catchment Area), and therefore not placed in the context of the Rail Baltica Direct Catchment Area. 89 54 Rail Baltica (2017). Rail Baltica Global Project Cost-Benefit Analyses 55 Wider Catchment Area No. 1 (from Rail Baltica point of view) 90 related freight flows under the concept of the long-distance logistics potential of the new railway. The long-distance logistical potential of Rail Baltica is only considered to a limited extent in relation to Lithuanian trade. The concept of long- distance logistical potential used in our approach does not include Lithuania's trade with Estonia and Latvia, which we consider as transport within the immediate Rail Baltica catchment area, nor Lithuania's import and export goods arriving in or departing from Kaunas along the southern and eastern transport corridors. The reason for excluding the latter is that in this case the goods will only move on the Rail Baltica on the short section between the Polish-Lithuanian border and Kaunas or on the section between Kaunas and the Belarusian border, which cannot be considered as the main Rail Baltica route. However, we have taken into account the long-distance logistics potential of the railway for possible future Asian freight arriving via Finland via the Arctic Ocean, destined for or departing from Lithuania, as this freight would pass through practically the entire length of the Rail Baltica. Export-import traffic between Lithuania and Finland is considered as a service for trade with neighbouring countries in the Rail Baltica region. The calculations of potential volumes presented below have been made on a country-pair basis, for example, the volumes that could be generated for Rail Baltica by Finnish exports to Austria and Austrian exports to Finland. However, for the sake of completeness, in the presentation of the results, the estimates for the transport capacities of a number of countries have been given in an integrated form, interpreted as transport capacities for wider regions (groups of countries). For example, we are talking in a generalised way about what the Rail Baltica freight volumes could be, under a certain combination of assumptions, between the FennoBaltic region, of which Finland is a member, and the WCA-1 region, of which Austria is a member. However, since the Finnish-related traffic is very important from a Rail Baltica perspective, the results for the Finnish-related traffic are also presented separately in the textual part of the report; the results for Austria, as well as for many other individual countries, are not. With regard to the list of countries included in the calculation scheme, the 91 question of border delimitation is, of course, always debatable, and it is of course possible to suggest additional countries that could be included. We based our choice of countries to be included in the scheme on two criteria 92 principle. On the one hand, the empirical Pareto principle, which states that typically about 20% of the agents produce about 80% of the outcome, so that beyond a certain limit, adding additional agents to the analysis is no longer meaningful. The second principle was that it makes sense to include countries with smaller potential shares in the analysis if they are part of a set of countries that are expected to behave relatively homogeneously. We consider the set of countries in the WCA-1 region as such, and therefore included some countries with smaller volumes, as we considered it important to obtain an assessment of the potential of the region as a whole for Rail Baltica long-distance logistics. The countries on the North Sea shores (the Netherlands and Belgium) and, from Asia, Indonesia and South Korea were also discussed. The North Sea littoral countries were left out of the discussion on the grounds that, since the major ports in these countries will certainly continue to have close maritime connections with ports in Latvia, Estonia and Finland, it will be difficult for new railways, even very well-functioning ones, to compete with maritime transport in a situation where rail transport is more likely to become competitive with maritime transport. Some experts have a different opinion, arguing that the importance of these countries for Rail Baltic is due, among other things, to the recent congestion and disruption in the ports along the North Sea, which points to the possibility of rail freight transport in the future. While we do not deny that a certain amount of goods related to Belgium and the Netherlands may also find their way to Rail Baltic, we prefer to remain conservative in our estimates here and do not consider this volume to be large enough to include the volumes related to the Netherlands and Belgium in our calculation. It cannot be ruled out that in the future the volumes of goods related to Indonesia and South Korea may also become important for Rail Baltica, assuming that these countries' economies continue to prosper and grow. At present, however, the trade of these countries with the FennoBaltic countries is still rather small in terms of tonnes. Assuming that these volumes will increase in rough proportion to the projected growth rates of these countries, we will not yet reach volumes that can be seriously considered for Rail Baltica in the coming decades. Of 93 course, we cannot exclude the possibility of 94 trends: for example, new industrial cooperation opportunities may emerge, or it may turn out that a country's goods may become relevant for a particular destination country under specific conditions, but making such predictions and "playing through" them would be beyond the scope of this study. It is logical that the analysis that dealt with the forecasting of revenues and costs of the new railway as a whole and the present work, which focuses on the potential for long-distance logistics transport by rail, have somewhat different focuses and therefore somewhat different ways of grouping the countries under consideration. These differences are illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 95 Figures 3.1 and 3.2: Grouping of countries in the Rail Baltica 2017 feasibility study and in this study on long-distance logistics potential. 96  Selecting basic source data for economic calculations. Such basic data for our calculations are data on the volumes of trade between countries in the period before the survey, not only in monetary terms, but also in terms of weight, in tonnes, and forecasts of economic growth in different countries in the period ahead. For the former, we rely on the Eurostat database56 and for the latter on the long-term projections of national economies recently published by the OECD (annual GDP growth rates (%) calculated on the basis of OECD real GDP projections57). These, as well as data on the volumes of exports and imports between selected countries in tonnes (as of 2018), are presented in the annexes to the report). Compared with the high growth rates of previous periods, the OECD's projections for economic growth rates should be considered relatively modest. For the 2030s, advanced economies such as Germany, Italy and Japan are expected to grow at average rates of less than 1%, while Finland and Austria are expected to grow at slightly higher rates, but still only just above 1%. Among the new EU Member States, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are projected to grow at slightly higher rates, but still at between 1% and 2% a year, with a slowdown expected in the second half of the decade. China's economic growth in the 2030s is projected to be significantly lower than in the previous period, but the projected 2.5-3% per year is still significantly higher than in Europe. India is expected to be the growth champion in this period (4-5% annual growth), while Turkey is expected to continue to grow at a fairly solid pace (average 3% annual growth). Growth forecasts for the first half of the 2040s are even more pessimistic, with India the only country with annual growth above 3%. 56 Eurostat (2021). International trade in goods. 57 OECD (2021). Real GDP long-term forecast. 97 Source assumptions for the implementation of the calculation scheme  Baseline projection assumption on the evolution of trade volume dynamics In the first stage of the calculations, we assumed that, all other things being equal, for all pairs of countries exchanging goods, the volume of trade in tonnes within each pair of countries could increase in line with the growth rate of the importing country's economy. This means that if, for example, we assumed that the Chinese economy would continue to grow rapidly, Chinese exports to Finland would not increase in proportion to the high growth rate of the Chinese economy, but in proportion to the much lower growth rate of the Finnish economy. However, Finland would then have very good export opportunities to China as a growing market. Our approach is based on the view that a country's import demand is related to its size (population size, economy size, etc.) more than its ability to produce exports. With a high degree of mechanization-roboticization, etc., the constraints on the ability to produce exports are quite soft in the presence of external market demand. These are, in particular, the availability of raw materials and the accessibility of physical inputs. The approach we have used in this phase of our work is, of course, a very simplistic one, the volumes of goods resulting from such calculations can be taken not as forecasts but as projections based on certain underlying assumptions. It is debatable to what extent the future growth of trade between two countries will depend on the initial state of trade, whether there might be some qualitative break in the flow of trade in the next period, etc. The question is, however, not always clear. After all, it is possible that completely different goods will be exchanged. The work of economic historians shows, however, that inertia and 'path dependence' are quite strong in trade between countries. In order to make the calculations more realistic, we will introduce a number of additional factors, including (geo)political ones, that influence trade and transport flows in the following stages of the analysis. In doing so, however, we do not change the basic logic of the development of trade volumes between countries as described here, but build on it, so to speak, different hypotheses that could reflect more accurately the concrete development of trade and transport volumes in the hypothetical external environments already foreseen in the different scenarios. 98  Application of the dispersion corridor technique Estimates of the growth potential of trade, whether based on direct forecasts of this indicator or on derivations from other factors, as we described in the previous section, are usually based on some kind of 'average' forecast of what the more global or local business environment will allow. This business environment may, however, turn out to be somewhat different from the forecast, more or less favourable for trade. Some of the factors that make the situation softer and different from the average forecast are predictable, others are not and can be taken as random. They can affect trade directly, for example through moves to make the trade regime more liberal or protectionist, but also indirectly, through factors affecting the economic growth of the countries exchanging goods. Regardless of the specific reasons, when developing transport infrastructure, it may be prudent to base transport demand forecasts not on an average forecast of trade and the resulting transport demand, but on a 'corridor' of demand variability. In our study, we therefore decided to base our estimate of prospective transport volumes between pairs of countries not on an average forecast, which could be derived from current trade volumes and "increased" on the basis of the OECD's projections of national economic growth, but on a "corridor of variability" of transport demand. The "corridor walls", or "floor and ceiling" if you wish, are the potential trade volumes in the case where trade between the two countries in question is 20% higher than the average forecast, and the transport volumes in the case where trade is 10% lower than the average forecast. A certain asymmetry in the construction of the "corridor" is due to our hypothesis that the initial level of trade from which the central projection is derived reflects the state of the global economy, where international trade volumes are somewhat suppressed for non-economic reasons. Such a corridor, ranging from 0.9 to 1.2, was established as a universal one, reflecting the possibility of variation of the same magnitude for all the observed land pairs. These universal coefficients of variation should be distinguished from our general variation coefficients. 99 the scenario-based coefficients used in the later stages of the analytical procedure, through which we expressed our understanding that trade flows involving some countries could, in a given scenario environment, be expected to either crowd out or favour the foreign trade activity of these countries by key players in the global policy field. These scenario-specific coefficients, in contrast to the coefficients used in the construction of the dispersion corridor, should already be interpreted as the result of deliberate political influence.  Accounting for the dematerialisation of trade flows when switching from monetary terms to tonnes of goods It is well known that the world has been experiencing a trend of dematerialisation of trade flows for a long time, with the number of tonnes transported for every $1,000 of trade in goods gradually decreasing. We considered this trend to be significant and used coefficients to account for the effect of dematerialisation on the conversion of trade flows from financial indicators to tonnes. Adjustments were made to the results of the trade flow projections according to the different possible rates of dematerialisation of the trade flows. On the assumption that we cannot predict dematerialisation rates more accurately, we performed the calculations with two possible dematerialisation rates, the "high" rate, which we considered to be 1% per year, and the "low" rate, which we considered to be 1% per year. with a "low" of 0.5% per year. We applied these two possible dematerialisation coefficients linearly (from 2025 onwards) and uniformly to all trade flows. This approach is of course a very strong simplification, and in the future it will be possible to apply more sophisticated methodologies here, to use different dematerialisation coefficients for different trade flows and to experiment with different possible overall rates of dematerialisation, including accelerating rates over time. However, the current experiment should at least provide a preliminary sense of what happens to the size of trade flows under conditions of continued dematerialisation.  Fixing Rail Baltica's "access coefficients" (base coefficients) for trade flows between different pairs of countries. 100 The formulation of the coefficients took into account geographic factors and the results of our previous study on the likely change in the comparative competitiveness of different modes of transport, as well as insights refined in expert discussions during the current study. Table 3.1. Coefficients to characterise the potential capacity of Rail Baltica to absorb trade flows from the Fenno-Baltic region and other countries (without taking into account the effects of the possible launch of a trade flow through Finland using the Northern Arctic Sea Route). The country with which the transport volumes Odds (Rail Baltica to the available transport corridors) is about China* 10%/15% India 40% Germany** 20% Turkey 20% Italy 20% Slovakia 33% Slovenia 60% Czech 40% Croatia 60% Hungary 33% Austria 45% Japan*** 20%/25% * Percentages were applied to Finland/Estonia-Latvia China trade flows respectively. ** The coefficient related to Germany is derived on the basis of two sub-components: south-western German trade with the FennoBaltic region as more accessible by RB and the rest of Germany trade with FennoBaltic as less accessible by RB. *** Percentages were applied for Finland/Estonia-Latvia-Japan trade flows respectively. 101 3.2.2. Linking baseline projections to scenarios: taking into account scenario- specific factors affecting the extent of trade and the use of transport corridors. In Chapter 1 of the report, we have drawn up three possible scenarios for the future development of the international situation and formulated for each scenario the expected patterns of cooperation between country blocs and countries and the resulting facilitating or impeding effects on trade and transport relations between the country blocs. We distinguished three possible scenarios: a) a geopolitical struggle scenario; b) a geoeconomic competition scenario; c) a leaderless world scenario. For each scenario, we fixed the implications of the conditions that would emerge. First, the effects on the prospects for trade development of some key countries and blocks of key countries, whether relative to the average international trade intensity, the scenario worsens or improves it. The assumptions made on this are presented in the table below. Table 3.2: Scenario-specific coefficients reflecting the conditions for trade expansion for some countries and groups of countries. Geopolitical Geo-economic Leaders China-related flows 0.8 1.1 1.1 India-related flows 1.3 1.0 1.0 Intra-European and Turkey 1.0 1.0 1.1 trade flows Second, we developed hypotheses about the hypothetical behaviour of the countries central to our study with respect to specific trade corridors (which they tend to prefer in a given scenario, which they tend to avoid). By having hypotheses about the freight corridors in which, in one or another scenario, trade between certain countries or groups of countries is likely to move to a greater or lesser extent in a given scenario, it was possible to derive scenario-specific modifications to the potential for Rail Baltica to capture different flows of freight. 102 In some scenarios, for example, trade between China and FennoBaltic may move more to Russian railways (for (geo)political reasons). A partial shift of East Asian countries' trade with Europe to the Arctic Sea Route is strongly influenced by geopolitical factors. The calculation of the likely impact of this shift is presented in the annex to this report. From this, it was possible to arrive at the growth in trade between a given pair of countries in the period ahead (favourable, unfavourable or neutral) and the main existing or potential transport corridors (worsening or improving a country's access to a given corridor, reducing or increasing its importance). 3.3. Projections of potential volumes of key long-distance logistics flows Rail Baltical. a) Germany-related cargo Freight to Germany is one of the most important, and also most tangible, opportunities for Rail Baltic to gain additional traffic. This includes, firstly, export-import traffic from Estonia and Latvia to Germany and, secondly, the possibility to offer Rail Baltic as a transit corridor for freight between Finland and Germany. At present, freight between the two countries is mainly transported by sea. On the basis of the assumptions used in our calculations, the volume of transit traffic between Germany and Finland that could potentially move to Rail Baltic is more than two and a half times the volume of export-import traffic that could move along Rail Baltic. Therefore, in the following text, we will focus primarily on the former. The issue of freight transit between Germany and Finland is more clearly understood by Estonian businesses than most of the other long-distance logistics options currently being developed with Rail Baltic. This issue has also been developed in the context of the use of the existing railway line, which initially crosses Tartu and is hampered by the many difficulties of crossing national borders, but which has not yet been able to offer conditions for freight traffic comparable in terms of its advantages to those of a sea route. It should become clear in the near future whether this can be achieved. 103 the so-called "Sea Train" project currently being planned on the initiative of the Lithuanians, which the Estonian side has also shown motivation to join. Once Rail Baltica is up and running, however, the situation here will change dramatically in favour of the railways: the new freight train will move much faster and the problem of border crossings should be eliminated as an obstacle within the framework of the existence of a single railway administration and agreements between the countries. Another reason for optimism is that Finland is home to a number of subsidiaries and representative offices of German companies, which are interested in creating opportunities for closer cooperation between German and Finnish companies. The emergence of a fast and accurately functioning rail link could contribute to this. Table 3.3: Freight projections between the FennoBaltic region (Finland + Estonia + Latvia) and Germany by Rail Baltica 2035. and 2045 (million tonnes per year). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario Year Slow Slow Fast demater. Fast demater. demater. demater. 2035 2,48 2,61 2,37 2,49 Geopolitical 2045 2,49 2,76 2,32 2,57 2035 2,48 2,61 2,37 2,49 Geo-economic 2045 2,50 2,76 2,32 2,57 2035 2,53 2,66 2,40 2,53 Leaders 2045 2,57 2,84 2,37 2,67 Germany is Finland's biggest export and import partner. In monetary terms, its exports to Germany and imports from Germany are more or less in balance, but in tonnage terms, Finland's exports are much "heavier". On average over the last five years, Finland imported just under 3 million tonnes of goods from Germany, but exported around 5.7 million tonnes of goods a year. In 2018, which is taken as the starting point for our projections, the corresponding volumes were 3.08 and 5.23 million tonnes. In terms of tonnes, Finland's exports to Germany are dominated by paper, cardboard and 104 pulp. In monetary terms 105 cars are the biggest export item (both re-exports of East Asian cars and cars assembled by the Finnish company Valmet for Volkswagen). Other groups of export products with a higher monetary value include miscellaneous machinery and electrical and electronic equipment. Steel, iron and copper also feature prominently in both figures. German exports to Finland are dominated in monetary terms by transport equipment, machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, with medical equipment also important. Chemicals are also among the largest groups in terms of weight. For both Estonia and Latvia, their export volumes to Germany in tonnes are significantly higher than their import volumes. In 2018, Estonia and Latvia together exported 2.28 million tonnes to Germany and imported 0.84 million tonnes from Germany. Trade between the FennoBaltic region and Germany is characterised by large volumes. Although our projections do not foresee a very rapid increase in these volumes in the coming decades, due to the relatively low growth rates forecast for the German and Finnish economies, there are great opportunities for Rail Baltica, if it is able to switch to serving this freight traffic. At the same time, if the regions of origin or transit of the freight are located in Germany near the Baltic Sea, it will be very difficult for Rail Baltica to get freight from there due to the competition from maritime transport, which is a much cheaper mode of transport than rail, and such freight will probably continue to prefer to move between Germany and Finland using Germany's own ports, possibly also those of Poland. In our calculations, we have assumed that the competitive advantages of Rail Baltica as a transport channel will be felt in the case of transport here only in the case of transport flows to the south and south-west of Germany, and also there, of course, in the case of more expensive goods requiring rapid onward transport. If the point of origin or destination is well connected to the rail terminal in Berlin, this would also be the case in Berlin, as the transport costs to the port, which would be higher for maritime transport, would be reduced. In the case of north-western Germany, there is already competition for rail from Dutch ports. We do not consider the competitive impact of the emerging Scan-Med corridor (see in more detail chapter 2 of the report) to be strong in terms of competition for transport from Germany, as in this case the goods would still have to transit the part of 106 the route between Sweden and Finland by sea, 107 which is less advantageous in terms of distance and cost than the crossing of the Gulf of Finland between Tallinn and Helsinki. Nor would it change the situation if the goods were to be transported by road between Germany and Finland via Sweden. This would be more expensive and we expect that the competitiveness of road transport would be further reduced with such a distance between destination and origin and with a green policy that strongly affects road transport. Particularly in view of the sensitivity of Swedish policy to ecological issues. An exception to this assessment of the use of Scan-Med could be a situation where the point of origin or destination of the goods in Finland is located in the Turku area and the point of origin or destination in Germany is located in the vicinity of the Fehmarn connection (somewhere near Lübeck or Bremen). In this case, however, it would not be a question of competition with Rail Baltic, but of a choice between sending the goods by ship or using the land transport via Sweden. In any case, the north-east coast of Germany is not part of the potential Rail Baltica corridor in Germany. The construction of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel, which we do not expect to be built by 2035, but which could in principle be ready by 2035, would of course significantly increase Rail Baltica's competitiveness in serving the freight flow between Germany and Finland. Competitiveness could also be boosted by the launching of a rail barge. According to our calculations, in which we do not yet foresee a Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel, the amount of trade potentially affected by Rail Baltica could be in the range of 1.8-2.5 million tonnes per annum for Germany and Finland around 2045, and 2.3-2.8 million tonnes per annum for Germany with FennoBaltic (Finland + Estonia + Latvia). In the latter case, a lower threshold would also mean that there would be enough freight between Finland and Germany for at least one pair of trains per day on the Rail Baltic. Both Finland-Germany and Germany-FennoBaltic trade should not be particularly subject to potential global geopolitical distortions, with the amplitude of fluctuations between the "floor and ceiling" of the dispersion corridor being relatively moderate, depending on the growth rates of the economies of these countries, the evolution of patterns of economic cooperation between Germany and Finland and the speed of dematerialisation of trade flows. The economic cooperation links between Germany and 108 Finland can develop in a relatively stable way, as both countries belong to the European Union. This is 109 countries with a very low probability of leaving the Union compared to other member states. Compared to the other scenarios, we assume that the capacity available for Rail Baltica for this flow will be higher in the third scenario, i.e. in the driverless world scenario. Due to the somewhat hectic state of international trade in this scenario (a less structured global business environment), intra-EU integration is somewhat more valued here than in the other scenarios. We can also expect that under this scenario, not just exchanges of goods, but 'intra-industry trade' will develop relatively strongly between the countries of interest. In the case of intra-industry trade, we can also expect the emergence of a steady flow of goods, not so much cheap bulk goods suitable for sea transport, but more expensive and requiring very precise delivery times. This, however, is water under the railway bridge. In addition to export-import transports, the possible launch of freight transport between Europe and East Asian countries via the Arctic Ocean and transit via Finland is also of interest for our analysis. However, we assume that the future of Finnish-German trade will not be significantly affected by the emergence or absence of this transport corridor. Germany is, after all, so far south that, even with a properly functioning Arctic sea route and a north-south Finnish rail link, Chinese goods (for example) destined for Germany would land not at Kirkenes but at a southern European port (in addition to the Dutch or German ports, one of the Norwegian ports in the southern part of the country or Gothenburg, from where goods could be transported to Germany by land (NB: Fehmarn link), are candidates). As stated in the scenario descriptions, in scenario 3 there may not be a rail link from Kirkenes to southern Finland, so there will also be no north-south transit of Asian- related goods via Finland. As we have shown above, this may not have a direct impact on German-China transport flows. However, there may be some indirect effects: The cancellation of the Kirkenes-Helsinki railway line could significantly slow down the construction of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel. After all, the arrival of goods moving across the Arctic Ocean, for example to the Baltic States and Asian countries moving to Poland, in the Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel has been one of the arguments justifying the need to start building the tunnel as soon as possible. However, the creation of a tunnel would 110 undoubtedly also important from the point of view of serving the trade between Finland and Germany, which uses Rail Baltic. In this case, Rail Baltica would become more competitive to serve this flow compared to a competing channel where this freight would move between Germany and Finland by sea. b) Freight related to the countries of the Adriatic corridor, i.e. the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. This region includes the Czech Republic, Austria (eastern part of the country), Slovakia, Slovenia, north-east Italy, Hungary and Croatia. The distinction is based on the fact that these countries are crossed by or in the vicinity of the Baltic-Adriatic railway line connecting the Adriatic ports with Warsaw. It is interesting to note that, historically, practically the entire region was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In addition to the Adriatic Railway, several other rail corridors connecting to Rail Baltic are being built or restored in this area (see more details in Chapter 2 of the report). In terms of potential freight volumes for Rail Baltic, the most important of these countries are Italy and the Czech Republic, as well as Austria. Together, these three countries should, according to our calculations, account for about three quarters of the total freight potential for Rail Baltica in the area under consideration. If we consider Finland, Estonia and Latvia as a whole, the so-called Fenno-Baltic region, it dominates exports over imports in terms of tonnes traded with the Adriatic corridor. This is thanks to Estonia and Latvia, which receive significantly fewer tonnes of goods from this region than they send to it. The opposite is true for Finland, which exports less by weight than it receives. Finland's imports from the Adriatic region are quite diversified: chemicals, machinery, iron and steel, also foodstuffs. Finland's exports by weight to the region are dominated by 'material' products, the largest sub-group being paper and cardboard. The potential volumes of the Rail Baltica to Adriatic Europe are estimated to be between 1.2 and 1.6 million tonnes per year. 111 Table 3.4: Projections of freight traffic on Rail Baltica in 2035 and 2045 for the FennoBaltic region (Finland, Estonia and Latvia) and the European countries along and near the Adriatic transport channel (in million tonnes). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario Year Slow Slow Fast demater. Fast demater. demater. demater. 2035 1,37 1,44 1,28 1,35 Geopolitical 2045 1,37 1,52 1,25 1,39 2035 1,37 1,44 1,28 1,3 Geo-economic 2045 1,37 1,52 1,25 1,39 2035 1,41 1,48 1,31 1,38 Leaders 2045 1,42 1,57 1,30 1,42 There is not much variation across geopolitically differentiated scenarios, with EU countries being less affected by geopolitical factors than a number of other countries more heavily involved in such conflicts. In the 'leaderless world' scenario, transport volumes are up to 10% higher. This is also logical, since the main feature of the third scenario, the lack of order in the global trade regime, tends to favour the trade flows at stake here rather than those within the EU. Poor orderliness in the non-European world is conducive to intra-EU economic cooperation. The volumes shown in the table are not very high, but it must be borne in mind that the potential of the Adriatic corridor for Rail Baltica is far from being limited to export and import traffic between these countries, and that it can also be used as a transit corridor for transcontinental freight (movement of goods, including goods related to Asia, between Adriatic ports and Poland and, from the Adriatic Sea, the countries of the Baltic Sea). If a single transport corridor can be used to serve both intra-continental and transcontinental freight flows, this will create synergies, can be used to densify train services, reduce tariffs, etc. However, the issue of transit traffic that may pass through the area under consideration because of the scale effect will be dealt with later. 112 c) Cargoes related to Turkey As a matter of principle, cargoes related to Turkey should also have been considered in the previous section, together with the Central and South-Eastern European countries discussed there. Geographically speaking, it is the same direction, the Istanbul region is formally in Europe and, moreover, the tunnels to be built will connect the Asian part of Turkey more closely with the Balkans. However, the justification for the separate treatment is that Turkey is not part of the European Union and will not become a member in the foreseeable future. The risks associated with it are greater and different from those of EU countries, and the predictability of its behaviour in general quite difficult. Turkey's trade with the FennoBaltic region (Finland, Estonia, Latvia) is not very large, but it is already significant given its geographical distance from us. Currently, around one and a half million tonnes of goods move between Turkey and FennoBaltic every year. Turkey's economy is growing rapidly and is expected to continue to do so in the coming decades, which means that, at least as an export partner, its importance for our region should increase. Therefore, the volumes of goods related to it are certainly important for Rail Baltica. The improvement of transport connections in Turkey is also of great importance here: the construction of a railway tunnel under the Bosphorus, the modernisation of Rail Adriatica, which will form an integrated system with Rail Baltica, etc.. This is expected to increase Turkey's trade with the Fenno-Baltic region. As things stand, all three FennoBaltic countries export more goods to Turkey than they import from it. Among importers, Finland is the only one with significant volumes, and also Finland's exports in tonnes (in particular paper, cardboard and wood pulp) are significantly higher than its imports. Estonia's main exports to Turkey are metal products and metals, including live animals. In monetary terms, Turkey is among Estonia's top 20 export partners. As an export partner for Estonia, Turkey outperforms all the countries of the Adriatic corridor region discussed above, except the Czech Republic, in terms of tonnes traded. The capacity of the Rail Adriatica and Rail Baltic corridor to absorb flows to Turkey is 113 lower than that of the Central and Eastern Europe corridor discussed in the previous section. 114 trade flows. The main alternative route is the sea route, with connections between the various Turkish ports, in particular those in the Aegean, and those in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Moving to the Adriatic or, more broadly, anywhere in the Rail Adriatica belt, whether by sea or by land, is possible, but it still means attempting to move in a corner on the map: if you want to move north, you start by moving north-west. In terms of land connections, this option should not be in strong competition, as the distance is already too long for road transport. It is possible to move from the Turkish ports on the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports (Odessa, Illichevsk) and from there northwards via Belarus or Russia, but political relations could be an obstacle. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the rail link between Odessa and St Petersburg will work very well. In the longer term, however, competition from this route is possible, especially if we consider the connection not with Latvia or Estonia, but with Finland. The completion of Rail Carpatica could have a certain positive impact on Rail Baltica's prospects (see section 2.). Then, the route via the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta could become a promising route for freight to Turkey. The branch of Rail Carpatica that will reach there will exit via Bielostok to Kaunas, from where it is possible to connect to Rail Baltica. In view of the above, the calculations reflected in the table below are based on the assumption that Rail Baltica could be able to capture 20% of the trade between Turkey and FennoBaltic. Table 3.5: Projections of Rail Baltica traffic between FennoBaltic (the region comprising Finland, Estonia and Latvia) and Turkey in 2035 and 2045 (million tonnes). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario Year Slow Slow Fast demater. Fast demater. demater. demater. 2035 0,62 0,65 0,52 0,55 Geopolitical 2045 0,73 0,81 0,58 0,64 2035 0,62 0,65 0,52 0,55 Geo-economic 115 2045 0,73 0,81 0,58 0,64 2035 0,69 0,69 0,55 0,58 Leaders 2045 0,81 0,89 0,62 0,66 As can be seen from the table, trade growth is the main player here: with high trade growth, the speed of dematerialisation, assuming it stays within our assumptions, does not affect the final results very much. In the case of Turkey, the interpretation of the geopolitical factor is quite difficult. There is a very high probability that there are major risks, both local and those that can be interpreted as geopolitical, on the path of Turkey's future development. At the same time, however, Turkey's behaviour and the pressures on Turkey are not necessarily the basis on which our three scenarios have been constructed. The confrontation between China and the US, with the resulting repercussions, may not be felt in the same way as, for example, for the EU, Japan or India. In the face of the confrontation of global interests, Turkey may take different positions both in its general policy and in its economic policy. The EU's attitude towards Turkey and its economic relations with it may also start to be influenced by different factors than its positions in the geopolitical "Great Game". Therefore, in our calculations, we decided not to differentiate the coefficients for Turkey that characterise the conditions in the first two scenarios, the geopolitical and the geo-economic confrontation scenarios. It does not follow that trade with Turkey remains independent of geopolitical situations. This dependency could become very high and the volumes of goods and transport linked to Turkey very unstable, simply because the factors that could cause these fluctuations have not been included in the calculation algorithm we have used. A separate issue, which is also not reflected in the table above, is the possible transit of goods from both the Middle East and the so-called Great Silk Road via Turkey to Europe. With regard to the construction of the Bosphorus Canal, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has suggested that this additional flow of goods could be several million TEUs. Our table reflects only export-import flows with Turkey, not transit flows that may cross Turkey. 116 d) India-related cargoes Trade between the FennoBaltic countries and India is still at a relatively early stage, with total trade between the two regions of less than half a million tonnes per year. The lion's share of trade is by sea, and geographical conditions are a major obstacle to the establishment of direct land corridors. Significant volumes of trade between FennoBaltic and India can only be said for Finnish exports and Estonian exports. Import figures are low in both cases. Latvia's trade with India is minimal in terms of both imports and exports. Finland's exports to India are currently dominated by paper, paperboard and wood pulp and some other raw materials. The share of engineering exports is still very low. Estonia has exported ash wood pulp (Estonian Cell), lifting and installation equipment, also sawn timber to India in the last period. In monetary terms, Estonia's exports to India have fluctuated between USD 55-70 million per year. Whether Rail Baltica will be able to capture any significant share of the future trade flows with India will depend, first and foremost, on whether the northbound corridor from the Adriatic coast can compete with maritime freight transport, metaphorically speaking, around Europe. The time advantage in using rail transport would come not so much from the higher speed of rail transport over the same distance as from the length of the route to be covered58. At the same time, maritime transport will remain cheaper than rail transport in the future, for example for cheap goods such as wood pulp, the time cost may not be terribly important. On the route between the Adriatic Sea and, for example, Estonia or Finland, competition from road transport should not be feared by the rail option, as rail transport should become both cheaper and slightly faster. The possibility that freight arriving in Poland via the Rail Adriatica would be diverted northwards via Polish ports, such as Gdansk, rather than via Rail Baltica, is not particularly likely. If the goods were to be put on a train in Trieste, for example, and then taken to Muuga, it would be highly illogical to transfer them in the meantime to another, slower-moving train. 58 Experts have argued that the speed with which new ports are built on India's western coast, close to 117 which a significant part of India's industrial potential is located, and the speed with which regular frequent shipping routes are established between these and Adriatic ports, will also be important. If this process drags on, the old existing shipping routes and the long sea route will be used. 118 move to transport. Of course, for goods moving to Finland, it is also important how cheaply and conveniently the goods get from Muuga across the bay to Finland. There is no reason to assume that goods related to India could start entering our region, including Finland, via the Arctic Ocean, as India is geographically too far south. All in all, the prospects of using Rail Baltica to serve the freight flows under consideration are good, but the uncertainty is that it is difficult to predict whether or how quickly the share of more expensive freight requiring faster and more punctual delivery will increase in this flow. We have assessed Rail Baltica's access to this freight flow with a coefficient of 0.4, meaning that 40% of the freight flow could be captured by the new railway. According to our scenario-based calculations, the amount of freight flow potentially affected by Rail Baltica from this flow could be between 0.8 and 1.9 million tonnes per year around 2045. The potential variation amplitude for this flow is quite high, more than double. This is due to the fact that the upper limit of the flow is quite strongly dependent on the geopolitical situation in the world. This upper limit is achievable in a situation in which the West is beginning to pay increased attention to economic relations with India, treating it as a largely 'substitute product' for China, from which it is seeking to isolate itself. Table 3.6: Projected trade between FennoBaltic (Finland-Estonia-Latvia region) and India on Rail Baltica in 2035 and 2045 (million tonnes). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario Year Slow Slow Fast demater. Fast demater. demater. demater. 2035 0,74 0,77 0,55 0,57 Geopolitical 2045 1,09 1,20 0,71 0,78 2035 0,56 0,59 0,44 0,47 Geo-economic 2045 0,74 0,81 0,53 0,58 119 Leaders 2035 0,56 0,59 0,44 0,47 2045 0,73 0,81 0,53 0,58 Rail Baltica can also provide a service for some of the trade between India and Sweden, or between India and north-west Russia. In the first case, this could be via the port of Riga, for example, in the second case via Tallinn. We have not included such flows in our calculations at this stage. e) China-related cargoes Compared to other trade flows, the potential volume of trade flows with China that Rail Baltica could aspire to capture in the future is quite complex. There are several reasons. Firstly, there are a number of alternatives for the movement of goods arriving in our region from China or going from us to China: from China directly by sea to ports in our region, by sea to Dutch or German ports and from there either by smaller vessels or by using some other mode of transport, by sea, for example from China to an Adriatic port and from there by some form of land transport, along the so-called transcontinental land bridge, usually by rail via Russia (possibly also using the route through Kazakhstan). There are also some less likely options and, of course, air transport. In the future, the use of the Northern Arctic Sea Route will also be an option, which will of course require the development of the port of Kirkenes in northern Norway, or some other nearby port, to accommodate larger vessels, and the development of transport links between Kirkenes and southern Finland, presumably by rail. Secondly, the question of the pace of China's continued economic growth, on which the scale of China's external economic ambitions should depend. Third, the geopolitical situation in the world. As a strong confrontation between China and the United States has now developed, which seems to be continuing and may extend to some extent to China-West relations as a whole, it will extend to some extent - it is difficult to say to what extent - to trade relations between China and the Fenno-Baltic region. Moreover, as this confrontation strengthens or weakens, and in whatever form, China's options and preferences for favouring or 120 avoiding certain transport corridors may change. Some 121 of these changes may give Rail Baltica a chance to serve China-related freight traffic, others may not. As of 2018, the total trade volume of the FennoBaltic region with China was just over 4 million tonnes, according to Eurostat. For all three countries in the region, the volume of exports in tonnes exceeded the volume of imports by a very large margin. Since 3 million of this close to 4 million tonnes was accounted for by China-Finland trade, we will dwell on this in a little more detail. An important feature of the movement of goods between Finland and China is that describing it in terms of monetary volumes and in terms of the weight of the cargo gives a very different picture. In monetary terms, Finland's imports from China are larger than Finland's exports to China (USD 6.14 billion and USD 4.3 billion respectively in 2020), but the opposite is true in terms of tonnes, with Finland's total exports in tonnes exceeding Finland's total imports by a factor of around six. Finland's exports to China have averaged around 2.7 million tonnes over the last five years, while Chinese exports to Finland have been 'lighter', below the half million tonne mark. The reason is the difference in the products traded. Finland's imports from China are led by electrical and electronic equipment (USD 1.8 billion), machinery and equipment (USD 1.3 billion), and textiles and sewing (a total of USD 0.6-0.7 billion). Finland's exports to China are currently ranked in order of monetary importance of the commodity groups: 1. timber and wood products, 2. paper and paperboard, 3. machinery and equipment, 4. apparatus. In terms of tonnes, the statistical group 'non- edible raw materials other than fuels' is the largest, with wood pulp accounting for more than half. Finland's exports to China are, on the whole, quite wood-based. The dynamics of wood-based export items over the last period are shown in Figure 3.3. 122 Figure 3.3. Finnish exports to China. Finnish exports to China 3000 180 160 2500 140 2000 120 100 1500 80 1000 60 40 500 20 0 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Puit Wood pulp, paper and cardboard waste Paper and cardboard (right) (right) The delivery of China-related freight flows to Rail Baltic is very much dependent on the evolution of the geopolitical situation in the world. If scenario 1, characterised by strong geopolitical competition, materialises, it means that, in addition to the general slowdown in world trade, Chinese trade flows will be slowed down by the deterioration of political relations with our region. However, to a limited extent, trade will continue, but there will be changes in the corridors of trade. Two shifts are very likely. Firstly, China will seek to channel more of its trade through Russia, as an ally, via land corridors running through its territory, and thus this traffic will not reach Rail Baltica59. Of course, this shift will have its limits, and probably even more freight will continue to move by sea. As China is concerned about the safety of its southern sea routes under this scenario, it will make a major effort to develop the Northern Sea Route and divert at least some of its maritime transport to the Baltic Sea. 59 Or a very small part of it gets there. For example, if a freight train containing goods also for Estonia were to arrive in Kaunas and it is found expedient to tranship the goods from the Russian-wide railway to the European-wide Rail Baltica for onward shipment. Or if the east-west railways in the north of Russia are so rough that it makes sense to divert Chinese goods destined for Finland, using the transcontinental link through Russia, first to Germany, for example, and only then on to Finland, using the dense and probably somewhat lower tariff freight train traffic. However, we tend to classify such cases as exceptions. 123 the flow of goods there. It is also likely to put pressure on Russia to agree to provide the necessary conditions for container ships to navigate this sea route. We have assumed that, in the third scenario, large-scale container shipping on the Arctic Sea Route will proceed slowly and that no rail link will be built from the North to the South via Finland. As the degree of risk associated with political conflict on the southern sea routes is not particularly high, the incentive to invest in diversion is relatively weak. In the second scenario, the so called geo-economic competition scenario, we consider both scenarios, if the northern corridor starts and if it does not. In the first scenario, i.e. geopolitical competition, we assume that it is likely to be triggered60 . The impact of the launch of the Northern Sea Route, if accompanied by the development of a rail link from northern Norway to southern Finland, will have two distinct effects on Rail Baltica's ability to engage with China (and other North-East Asian countries) in freight transport. On the one hand, it will cut off opportunities to serve freight that would otherwise have reached our railways from the Adriatic to the south. This may not significantly affect the servicing of the China-Latvia trade, Rail Baltica can service this freight regardless of whether it enters Latvia from the south or the north (we exclude here the slightly different length of the route it will take on this line). The difference, however, arises in terms of serving China-Finland and, to a large extent, China-Estonia trade. Chinese goods arriving in or leaving Finland from the north simply cannot reach Rail Baltica. The Chinese-Estonian freight flow using this route is likely to reach the port of Muuga, but not Rail Baltica, because even if the destination (or point of origin) is not Tallinn, it will be transported by road rather than rail in Estonia due to the short distances and the dispersed nature of the destinations or points of origin. However, the Northern Sea Route will provide Rail Baltica with a certain volume of freight traffic in cases where the route is used for trade with Lithuania and Poland. The advantage of this option is that the goods will pass through the whole length of the Rail Baltica (Polish option), or 60 Of course, there are still ways in which this triggering can be blocked. One of the reasons could be that, as a NATO member, pressure is being exerted on Norway through NATO not to open the port of Kirkenes 124 to Chinese-European trade flows. 125 almost all of it (Lithuanian variant). However, as a whole, as our calculations show, the launch of this sea route is rather detrimental to Rail Baltica: the addition of a certain part of China's trade with Poland and Lithuania will not compensate for the reduction of transit traffic to Finland. As can be seen from the table below, the variability of Rail Baltica's volumes to China is very high, ranging from projections for 2045 of 0.5 million tonnes in the worst case to 1.23 million tonnes in the best case. Table 3.7: Trade projections between the FennoBaltic region (Finland-Estonia- Latvia) and China on Rail Baltica in 2035 and 2045 (million tonnes). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario* Year Urgent Slow Slow Fast demater. demater. demater. demater. 2035 0,57 0,60 0,48 0,50 Geopolitical A 2045 0,64 0,70 0,50 0,56 2035 0,78 0,82 0,67 0,71 Geopolitical B 2045 0,83 0,92 0,90 0,76 Geo-economic 2035 0,76 0,80 0,62 0,65 A 2045 0,87 0,96 0,67 0,74 Geo-economic 2035 0,97 1,02 0,79 0,83 B 2045 1,11 1,23 0,86 0,94 2035 0,97 1,02 0,80 0,83 Leaders 2045 1,11 1,23 0,86 0,94 *A-North Arctic trade flow via Finland will start (not before 2035) B-North Arctic trade flow via Finland will not start. According to our scenario-based calculations, the amount of freight potentially affected by Rail Baltica from this flow could be between 0.5 million and 1.23 million tonnes around 2045. 126 f) Cargoes related to Japan As of 2018, the volume of trade between the FennoBaltic region and Japan was just under 1.2 million tonnes in tonnes. This is mainly the FennoBaltic region's export production, not only Estonia and Latvia, but also Finland's imports from Japan are small in tonnes. Finland's exports to Japan have fluctuated between €1 billion and €1.3 billion in recent years (2017-2020), with slightly less than 1 million tonnes in tonnes. Exports include timber and timber products (the largest group of commodities in monetary terms), paper and paperboard, machinery and equipment, and appliances. Latvia's exports to Japan are already below the 0.1 million tonnes threshold in terms of weight, while Estonia's figure is even lower. In our calculations, we assumed that Rail Baltica, combined with Rail Adriatica, would be able to capture 20% of the trade between Finland and Japan, while in the case of Estonia and Latvia the figure could be a few percentage points higher, as the route does not need to cross the Gulf of Finland. The rest of the trade would be transported either via the ports of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, possibly with a small part crossing the Russian "transcontinental bridge", i.e. the railway. In addition, air transport for lighter goods. We have assumed that Japan's trade with the Fenno-Baltic region is not particularly sensitive to the political factors that distinguish the scenarios we have formulated, that Japan is not in a hurry to strengthen or weaken its trade links with the countries of the Fenno-Baltic region due to geopolitical changes, and that it does not change transport corridors for political reasons. However, its economy, and hence the intensity of its trade, will be affected by a deterioration or improvement in the overall economic and trade climate under one scenario or another. It can be expected that, once the Northern Sea Route opens up to decent shipping traffic, Japan will certainly be interested in using this transport corridor for its trade with Europe61. This is already determined by its geographical position on the world map. Since we assume that the launch of the Arctic Sea Route has different probabilities in different scenarios, it can be argued that, in a broader sense, even implicit 61 How far Japan will go in actively resisting the introduction of this sea route is a more complex question, 127 and may be influenced by its political relations with Russia. 128 However, given all the other factors, the issue of Japanese cargoes is still quite scenario-sensitive. In our calculations, we have assumed that if, together with the opening of the Arctic Sea Route to container traffic, a rail link between North Norway and South Finland is completed, Japan could divert up to 50% of its trade with the Fenno-Baltic region to the Arctic. This would result in a loss of capacity for routes using the North Sea and Baltic ports, as well as for the Rail Baltica, which will co-operate with the Adriatic corridor. By analogy with the case of China's trade flows discussed in the previous sub-chapter, Rail Baltica would gain some additional flow from Japan's trade with Lithuania and Poland, which will use the Arctic Corridor, but this gain would not compensate for the volume loss. The projections of transport volumes in the table below are not very impressive for two reasons. Firstly, the initial volume of trade, i.e. 2018, which was the starting point for developing the projections, is quite low. Second, the underlying OECD long-term growth projections are not optimistic about the long-term growth rates of Japan, Finland and Latvia. It is not particularly plausible that Japan, with its declining population and low economic growth, could become a very large volume destination market for the countries of our region, even if we were able to produce goods to the requirements of the highly developed Japanese market. Another important point: as the OECD's projections for Japan's economic growth rates remain lower than the rate of dematerialisation of trade flows, this could lead to a situation where the volume of trade flows in 2045 could be lower than in 2035. Table 3.8: FennoBaltic (Finland-Estonia-Latvia) and Japan Rail Baltica trade projections for 2035 and 2045 (thousand tonnes). Rapid trade growth Slow trade growth Scenario Year Urgent Slow Slow Fast demater. demater. demater. demater. 2035 245.6 258.2 239.8 252.0 Geopolitical A 129 2045 130.3 143.8 125.7 138.9 2035 245.6 258.2 239.8 252.0 Geopolitical B 2045 232.1 256.6 224.1 247.8 Geo-economic 2035 245.6 258.2 239.8 252.0 A 2045 130.3 143.8 125.7 138.9 Geo-economic 2035 245.6 258.2 239.8 252.0 B 2045 232.1 256.6 224.1 247.8 2035 248.0 260.7 241.4 253.8 Leaders 2045 235.5 260.2 226.5 250.4 3.4. The potential of Rail Baltica long-distance logistics flows as a whole and the main risks associated with its individual components . Our projections suggest that Rail Baltica's 'long-distance logistics potential' is significant compared to the transport in the main rail area. As already shown in a study62 carried out in 2017, the volume of Rail Baltica's 'core area' transport, i.e. transport between the Baltic States plus export and import transport between the Baltic States and their immediate neighbours, will represent only a fraction of the total transport potential of the new railway. Export, import and transit traffic with more distant countries will play an important role, and the new railway will be able to take on these services. It is therefore essential to determine where, outside the "core area" of Rail Baltica, additional transport flows could be found to be served and what the indicative volumes could be. According to our projections, the potential for Rail Baltica's 'long-distance' logistics traffic amounts to approximately 5.3-7.5 million tonnes per year (2045 perspective), and this without including possible traffic related to Russia. In an effort to be conservative in our calculations, we have not yet included the transport associated with the North Sea ports and some others that we were not particularly sure were realistic or for which we considered the additional capacity to be relatively small. 62 Rail Baltica (2017). Global Project Cost-Benefit Analyses. 130 Long-distance logistical traffic can land on Rail Baltic either via the so-called Western Corridor, i.e. the transport corridor through Poland to Germany, or via the Adriatic Corridor (the transport corridor from Poland to the Adriatic ports). The Adriatic corridor covers countries in central and south-eastern Europe as well as Asian countries, which trade with countries in northern Europe via ports on the Adriatic and the corridor to the north. The Northern Arctic Sea Route connecting East Asian countries with Europe could also be important for Rail Baltica, if a rail link is built from northern Norway, presumably from the port of Kirkenes to southern Finland. While the Western Corridor and the Adriatic Corridor do not compete with each other, the Adriatic Corridor and the Arctic Corridor compete partly for the same East Asia-related goods. The volume of freight that could come to Rail Baltic via the Western Corridor is, according to our calculations, 2.3-2.8 million tonnes per year (as of 2045), a large part of which will be generated by the possibility of Rail Baltic taking part of the trade between Finland and Germany. However, if we consider the entire Adriatic Corridor catchment area as a whole, its potential for Rail Baltica is somewhat higher: 3 million tonnes to 4.8 million tonnes per year (as of 2045). More than half of this potential is provided by the trade of Asian countries (for our purposes, we also count Turkey as an Asian country) with the Fenno-Baltic region (the region consisting of Finland, Estonia and Latvia), in particular Finland. The share of goods to and from Asia via the Adriatic corridor to Rail Baltica should, if the OECD's long-term economic growth projections are to be believed, start to rise over time. To a certain extent, the development of the Arctic Sea Route could work against this trend. In this case, the losses of Rail Baltica are, according to our calculations, greater than the gains. That part of the trade of Asian countries with Finland that will use the Arctic Sea Route instead of the Adriatic Corridor will not reach Rail Baltica, and practically the same can be said for the trade between Estonia and East Asian countries, because the part of this trade that will go to the Arctic Sea Route will add to the turnover of the port of Muuga, but not to that of Rail Baltica. The vast majority of the movement of such freight in Estonia will not then be by rail, at least not on Rail Baltica. The fact that the part of the Polish and Lithuanian trade with Asian countries that will use the Arctic route will now also use Rail Baltica as a transit route is unlikely to compensate for this loss in volume. 131 While the Western corridor is relatively insensitive to (geo)political risks, the risks for Rail Baltica in this corridor are mainly related to economic factors, in particular to the extent (for which goods) the new railway can cope with competition from maritime transport, transporting goods from German or Polish ports to, for example, Finnish ports, the Adriatic corridor, especially as far as it relates to the servicing of trade with Asian countries, is highly sensitive to changes in the geopolitical situation. As the confrontation between the US and the People's Republic of China is nowadays becoming the focus of both geopolitical and geo-economic competition, the risk factors are primarily related to the trade flows between China and the FennoBaltic, which may, firstly, decrease in overall volume and, secondly, shift to routes where Rail Baltica cannot compete. The volume of freight flows to China within the Rail Baltica's reach varies, according to our calculations, between 0.50 and 1.23 million tonnes per year (2045 perspective), a difference of almost 2.5 times. In a situation of global geopolitical competition, where the importance of Chinese trade flows for Rail Baltica could decrease, the servicing of trade between India and FennoBaltic may become more topical. India is likely to continue to be a growing economy and, if the China-Western conflict intensifies, the West, including Europe, should see a warming of economic relations with India. Under certain optimistic assumptions, the reduction in potential Chinese trade flows to Rail Baltica in such a scenario could be compensated to a fairly significant extent by increased trade flows to India. As a whole, the situation for Rail Baltic in scenario 1, i.e. the geopolitical competition scenario, is negative for long-distance logistics transport. This means not only that some Chinese freight will be diverted to the Arctic Sea route, which is not beneficial for Rail Baltica, but also that China is likely to divert more of its European-related freight flows over the territory of its strategic ally Russia, which may significantly reduce Rail Baltica's access to serve this flow. 132 For practically all freight flows, one of the key issues on which Rail Baltica's ability to integrate into their transport services depends is the question of how the structure of that flow changes over time. For example, Chinese exports are steadily increasing in terms of more complex and expensive products that require faster and more accurate delivery. This fundamentally raises the advantages of rail over maritime transport to take over these shipments. At the same time, Rail Baltica does not compete for long- distance logistics on its own as a railroad, nor even with its link to another railroad (Rail Adriatica), but competes for some shipments as part of a common logistical chain, which must also include maritime operators (who take care of the transport from Shanghai to Trieste or Koper on the Adriatic, for example). It cannot be ruled out that some of the more complex and costly goods will not be able to cope with such a long and slow sea leg in the logistical chain and will instead move to the transcontinental railways through Russia, thus losing out to Rail Baltic. Provided that the rate of dematerialisation of freight flows is not higher than the rates used in our calculations (0.5% to 1% per annum), they are not expected to have a major impact on transport volumes. Compared, for example, with the effects of economic growth or the spill-over effects of geopolitical competition. The reason for this is probably that if the projected economic growth of a strong (in tonnes) exporting country may be low, the model takes into account the evolution of the rate of trade between it and the country of export destination, based on the projected economic growth of the host country, rather than the source country. If the recipient country is a fast-growing economy, this economic growth projection outweighs the negative effect of its size on the size of the trade flow in tonnes due to continued dematerialisation. However, our calculations of Japan-related volumes gave some warning signals: due to Japan's declining economic growth, which was no longer able to offset the pace of dematerialisation, our calculations of Japan-related volumes started to decline over the last 10 years of the reference period. A serious competitor to Rail Baltica in the provision of transport services are the Polish ports, which can offer an alternative transport service for goods arriving from both Germany (the so-called Western Corridor) and the Adriatic Corridor south of Poland for onward transport to Finland. Such competition puts strong pressure on the Rail Baltica 133 transport tariff. 134 The construction of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel would certainly increase the competitiveness of Rail Baltica in attracting such traffic, while rail freight could also be considered as a temporary intermediate. Paradoxically, however, one of the main accelerating factors for the construction of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel would be the opening of the port of Kirkenes for container traffic between Asia and Europe, which in itself would be rather detrimental to Rail Baltica in its competition for East Asian freight traffic by shifting part of this flow from the Adriatic corridor to the corridor along the Arctic Ocean. The outlook for long-distance logistics volumes on Rail Baltica depends very much on what happens with exports and imports from our northern neighbour Finland. Although Finland's own economic growth rate is not very high, and not very low compared to other developed countries, it generates large volumes for hauliers through its exports, which it also sells to fast-growing markets. Finland's imports do not generate very high volumes and there is no clear reason why the volumes involved should increase. However, Finland is characterised by the fact that the lion's share of its exports, measured in tonnes, is wood-based. There is little reason to fear that demand for wood- based products will fall, but the possibility that the structure of Finnish wood-based exports will modernise must be borne in mind. In the case of a higher degree of processing, the likely outcome is probably an increase in the competitiveness of rail transport compared to maritime transport for the transport of higher value-added products, but this would also mean a reduction in the tonnes transported. 135 Annex 1: Annual growth rates of national economies (%) calculated from OECD long- term real GDP projections. Year EN EE LV LT PL EN AT CZ EN IT SK SI TR CN IN JP 2019 1.3 4.7% 2.0% 4.3% 4.7 0.6% 1.4% 2.2% 4.6% 0.3% 2.5% 3.2% 0.9% 6.0% 4.7 0.0% 2020 -2.8 -2.7 -3.6 -0.9 -2.7 -5.1 -6.7 -5.6 -5.1 -8.9 -4.8 -5.5 1.8 2.3 -7.1 -4.7 2021 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.3 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.5 5.7 8.5 8.0 2.6 2022 2.7 5.0 5.6 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.0 4.4 5.2 4.6 3.4 5.8 9.5 2.0 2023 1.6 4.5 3.3 3.1 3.1 1.9 2.0 3.6 3.9 1.7 2.3 4.2 5.4 4.9 8.6 1.1 2024 1.2 3.8 2.3 2.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 2.8 3.2 1.0 1.7 3.3 5.5 4.5 7.6 0.7 2025 1.2 3.2 1.8 1.8 2.3 0.8 1.1 2.4 2.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 5.0 4.2 7.0 0.6 2026 1.2 2.8 1.5 1.4 2.2 0.7 1.0 2.2 2.4 0.8 1.7 1.9 4.5 4.0 6.6 0.5 2027 1.2 2.6 1.2 1.1 2.0 0.7 1.0 2.1 2.1 0.8 1.7 1.6 4.0 3.9 6.2 0.5 2028 1.2 2.3 1.1 0.9 1.9 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 3.7 3.7 5.9 0.6 2029 1.2 2.2 0.9 0.8 1.8 0.6 1.0 1.9 1.7 0.8 1.7 1.4 3.5 3.5 5.6 0.6 2030 1.2 2.0 0.8 0.7 1.7 0.6 1.1 1.8 1.6 0.8 1.7 1.3 3.3 3.4 5.3 0.6 2031 1.2 1.8 0.7 0.6 1.6 0.6 1.1 1.7 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.2 3.1 3.2 5.1 0.6 2032 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.5 1.2 3.0 3.0 4.9 0.6 2033 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.5 1.1 2.9 2.9 4.7 0.6 2034 1.1 1.4 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.0 2.8 2.7 4.5 0.5 2035 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.7 2.5 4.3 0.5 2036 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.9 2.6 2.4 4.1 0.5 2037 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.9 2.6 2.2 3.9 0.4 2038 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.8 2.5 2.1 3.7 0.4 2039 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.8 2.5 2.0 3.6 0.4 2040 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.7 2.4 1.9 3.5 0.4 2041 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 2.4 1.8 3.3 0.3 2042 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 2.3 1.7 3.2 0.3 2043 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 2.3 1.6 3.1 0.3 2044 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 2.3 1.5 3.0 0.3 2045 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 2.2 1.5 2.9 0.2 Source: OECD (2021). Real GDP long-term forecast. https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real- gdp- long-term-forecast.htm Long-term GDP projections are based on assessments of the economic climate in both individual countries and the global economy. A combination of model-based analysis and expert judgement is used. The projections have been made in constant prices for GDP in US dollars on the basis of purchasing power parity. In our calculations, annual GDP growth rates are calculated on the basis of GDP projections. 136 Annex 2: Trade in goods between Finland, Estonia and Latvia in 2018 (thousand tonnes). Finland Estonia Latvia Poland/Lithuania Country IMP EXP IMP EXP IMP EXP IMP EXP Germany 3079 5225 348 989 489 1286 3971 1179 Poland 1037 1338 - - - - - - China 446 2631 110 257 96 653 - - India 67 283 14 138 58 51 - - Japan 27 993 4 66 4 94 128 109 Turkey 149 711 32 420 51 373 - - Italy 401 980 87 154 139 479 - - Austria 150 167 29 33 39 84 - - Czech 148 134 49 570 68 131 - - Republic Croatia 15 11 0,8 2 3 5 - - Hungary 49 128 19 28 28 63 - - Slovenia 12 15 2 4,8 5 9 - - Slovakia 39 122 16 53 28 52 - - Source: Eurostat(2021).Internationaltradeingoods. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/international-trade-in-goods 137 Annex 3: Coefficients applicable in a situation where, in a later period (2045), part of the Chinese and Japanese trade flows previously in the RB potential corridor could be diverted, in a geopolitical and geo-economic scenario, to the Arctic-Russian transport channel and where, in parallel, a further shift of Chinese trade flows towards the Russian transcontinental rail channel could occur. Country pairs Odds Explanation Proportion of the volume of traffic between countries that would pass through the Arctic corridor and would therefore not be served by the RB (under separate 30%/40%; China-Finland geo-economic and geopolitical scenarios); Proportion 7%/5,4% of the respective flow to be served by the RB (with the additional assumption that in the geopolitical scenario 10% of the total flow is additionally shifted around Russia). railways). Proportion of the volume of traffic between these countries that would pass through the Arctic corridor and would therefore not be served by the RB (under 20%/30%; China- separate geo-economic and geopolitical scenarios; the Estonia* 12%/10,7% proportion of the respective flows that would remain to be served by the RB (with the additional assumption that under the geopolitical scenario 10% of the total flows would be additionally shifted to Russia). railways). The share of the respective flow to be served by the RB under the geo-economic and geopolitical scenario. Neutral; It is assumed that the China-Latvia transport flow is China-Latvia* 15%/13.5% neutral with respect to the transfer to the Arctic Ocean, but in the geopolitical scenario 10% of the total flow would be increased to the Baltic Sea. further relocated to the Russian railways. 138 Share of potential trade flows to the RB via the Arctic China- Ocean in total trade flows between Lithuania/Poland 5%/15% Lithuania and China. A lower estimate (5%) is and Poland in an adapted geopolitical scenario. Share of potential trade flows to the RB via the Arctic Japan- Ocean in total trade between Finland and Japan/RB 50%/10% Finland catchment area in this case. trade between Finland and Japan. The share of the total Estonian-Japanese trade that Japan - could enter the RB via the Arctic Ocean/RB's 35%/16 % Estonia* catchment area in this case. * trade flows. Share of potential trade flows to the RB via the Arctic Japan- Ocean in the total trade flows between Latvia and 35%/25% Latvia** Japan /RB's catchment area in this case share of trade flows between Latvia and Japan trade flows. *The assumption is that in the later period (2045), 60% of the Estonian-Chinese trade flows that used to use the Adriatic corridor will continue to enter Estonia and Latvia via the Adriatic corridor, while 40% of the current flows will go via the Arctic Ocean. For Estonian-Chinese trade, this means that 40% of the current flow will disappear from the RB corridor, for Latvian-Chinese trade, we assume that half of this 40% will continue to come to the RB. **Japan-Estonia flow share derivation: if we assumed that the RB would otherwise take 25% of the Japan-Estonia flow (via the Adriatic channel), then if the Arctic channel is launched, 35% will go via the Arctic Ocean (which will be lost to the RB), leaving the RB with 65% of this 25%, or 65% x 25% = 16.25%. In the case of Latvia, we assume that the flow of goods between Latvia and Japan is neutral with respect to whether the goods move through the Adriatic or the Arctic channels. 139 Innovation and Networks Executive Agency 05.04.2022 No 25-4/22-17-1 W910, Avenue du Bourget, 1 B-1140 Brussels Belgium Submission of Final Report – 2016-PSA-EE “Participation of the Republic of Estonia in the Core Network Corridors and the implementation of the Rail Baltic railway project, phase II“ Dear, In accordance with Article II.23.2 of the Grant Agreement, I hereby submit the Final Report of our Programme Support Action n° 2016-PSA-EE, composed of the following annexes: - Final report for Member State Programme Support Action - (MS PSA) - Financial statement - final report for Member State Programme Support Action - (MS PSA) I hereby certify that: 1) the information provided in the request of payment is complete, reliable and true (Article II.23.2); 2) the costs declared are real and eligible in accordance with the Grant Agreement (Article II.19) and that the request for payment is substantiated by adequate supporting documents that can be produced in the context of the checks or audits described in Article II.27; 3) Any receipts referred to in Article II.25.3.2 have been declared. The total consolidated amount of receipts is 289 633,24; 4) A certificate of the financial statements is not applicable pursuant to GA II.23.2.2 (e) With best regards, Ando Leppiman Secretary General Kristjan Kaunissaare +372 6397682 [email protected] Suur-Ameerika 1 / 10122 Tallinn / ESTONIA Phone: +372 625 6342 / Fax: +372 631 3660 / E-mail: [email protected] / http://www.mkm.ee 2 (2)
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