NPA 2018-06

European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-06(C) All-weather operations RMT.0379 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of rulemaking task (RMT).0379 is to modernise the European Union (EU) aviation regulatory framework applicable to all-weather operations (AWOs) so it ensures the highest level of safety while enabling efficiency gains based on the latest technological advancements. It addresses in a coordinated manner all relevant disciplines: initial airworthiness, air operations, flight crew licensing and aerodromes. It proposes performance- and risk-based approach, as much as feasible, considering also the appropriate balance between performance-based and prescriptive principles (depending on the type of air operations (CAT, NCC, NCO, and SPO). This NPA proposes to update the AWO-relevant rules in many aviation domains such as airworthiness (CS-AWO), air operations (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012), aircrew (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011) and aerodromes (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR.DSN). The main aim has been to allow for a better integration of the regulatory requirements related to the operational use of new, advanced technology — either developed already or to be developed in the future — such as, for example, enhanced flight vision system (EFVS), as well as the application of some advanced new operational procedures, which may support AWOs. Significant focus has been invested in developing resilient rules, which are not technology-dependent. A particular attention was paid to the development of requirements enabling the use of EFVS to the maximum extent possible (e.g. use of EFVS for landing). A new concept of ‘light operational credits’ for EFVS 200 operations, not requiring the use of specific low-visibility procedures, has also been introduced. The proposed changes are expected to maintain safety, reduce the regulatory burden, increase cost-effectiveness, improve harmonisation (e.g. with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)), and achieve as much as feasible alignment with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). NPA 2018-06 is divided in four parts. The present sub-NPA(C) includes: — the procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; and — the proposed amendments to air operations (OPS) and flight crew licensing (FCL). The other sub-NPAs are organised as follows: — sub-NPA(A) – procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; presentation of the issue under discussion; impact assessment as well as the hazard identification and risk assessment; and proposed actions to support implementation; — sub- NPA(B) – initial airworthiness (CS-AWO); and — sub-NPA(D) – aerodromes. Action area: Airlines, air operators other than airlines Affected rules: AMC/GM to the Air OPS Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012); AMC/GM to the Aircrew Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) Νο 1178/2011); AMC/GM to the aerodromes rules (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR-DSN); and CS-AWO Affected stakeholders: manufacturers, maintenance organisations (MOs), air operators, approved training organisations (ATOs), aerodrome operators, ATM/ANS; Member States Driver: Level playing field Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: Light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard 9.12.2015 13.7.2018 2019/Q2 2020/Q2 2020/Q4 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA .................................................................................................................................. 3 1.1. How this NPA was developed .................................................................................................................3 1.2. How to comment on this NPA.................................................................................................................3 1.3. The next steps .........................................................................................................................................3 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail ................................................................................... 5 2.1. Proposed changes to AMC & GM to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on air operations (Draft EASA decision) — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs ........................................5 Annex I ‘Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII’ and related AMC & GM.........................5 Annex II ‘Authority requirements for air operations’ (Part-ARO) and related AMC & GM ..........10 Annex III ‘Organisation requirements for air operations’ (Part-ORO) and related AMC & GM ...10 Annex IV ‘Commercial air transport operations’ (Part-CAT) and related AMC & GM ..................11 Annex V ‘Specific approvals’ (Part-SPA) and related AMC & GM .................................................23 Annex VI ‘Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft’ (Part-NCC) and related AMC & GM........................................................................................................................38 Annex VII ‘Non-commercial operations with other-than complex motor-powered aircraft’ (Part- NCO) and related AMC & GM .......................................................................................................40 Annex VIII ‘Specialised operations’ (Part-SPO) and related AMC & GM ......................................40 Helicopter issues in Annexes IV (Part-CAT) – VIII (Part-SPO) and related AMC & GM .................41 2.2. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 (Draft EASA decision) — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs ...........................................................................41 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law ....................................................................... 42 3.1. Proposed changes — air operations .....................................................................................................43 Article 5 Air operations ...........................................................................................................................43 Annex I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII ........................................................................43 Annex II Authority requirements for air operations (Part-ARO) ...........................................................52 Annex III Organisation requirements for air operations (Part-ORO) ....................................................56 Annex IV Commercial air transport operations (Part-CAT) ...................................................................59 Annex V Specific approvals (Part-SPA) ................................................................................................103 Annex VI Non-commercial air operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC) .........155 Annex VII Non-commercial air operations with other-than complex motor-powered aircraft (Part- NCO) ............................................................................................................................................188 Annex VIII Specialised operations (Part-SPO).....................................................................................189 3.2. Proposed changes — aircrew..............................................................................................................190 Annex I Flight Crew Licensing ..............................................................................................................190 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme3 under RMT.0379. RMT.0379 was initiated with the publication of the related Terms of Reference (ToR) and Concept Paper RMT.0379 Issue 14 on 9 December 2015. For the development of the implementing rules (IRs), the accelerated procedure5 is applied; for the development of the acceptable means of compliance (AMC), guidance material (GM) and certification specifications (CSs), the standard rulemaking procedure is followed. As part of the accelerated procedure, EASA has already consulted its Advisory Bodies (ABs) on the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and the description of operations (DoOs). In the context of the second consultation phase (focused consultation), EASA consulted on the proposed amendments to the IRs only. In addition, EASA provided responses to the comments received during the AB consultation and presented the subsequent amendments to the RIA and the DoOs. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of the Experts’ Task Force Groups (air operations, airworthiness, and aerodromes). It is hereby submitted to all interested parties6 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/7. The deadline for submission of comments is 15 October 2018. 1.3. The next steps Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments. Based on the comments received EASA will: — update the proposed text of the affected AMC & GM; and 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management- board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php 4 https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20and%20Concept%20Paper%20RMT.0379%20Issue%201.pdf 5 In accordance with Article 16 of MB Decision No 18-2015. 6 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure. 7 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 1. About this NPA — issue an opinion (developed on the basis of the focused consultation and taking into account the comments received to the AWO NPA) containing the proposed amendments to Regulations (EU) Nos 965/2012, 1178/2011 and 139/2014; the opinion will be submitted to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to prepare an EU regulation; and — for sub-NPA(B) issue a decision containing CS-AWO to which the related comment-response document (CRD) will be annexed. Following the adoption of the regulation, EASA will issue the associated decisions containing the related AMC & GM. The comments received and the EASA responses for sub-NPAs (A), (C) and (D) will be reflected in CRDs. The CRDs will be annexed to the opinion. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail This chapter provides the explanatory note for the proposed amendments to the AWO-related regulatory material presented in Chapter 3 of this NPA. Note: The regulatory material at IR level presented in Chapter 3 of this NPA is not intended to be again subject to the formal public consultation of this NPA, as the consultation should be focused on the relevant AWO-related soft law changes (AMC & GM). Nevertheless, should it be deemed necessary, commenters may also communicate issues related to the IRs. 2.1. Proposed changes to AMC & GM to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on air operations (Draft EASA decision) — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs Regulation (EU) No 965/20128 will be hereinafter referred to as the Air OPS Regulation. Considering the comments received, EASA has changed the proposal initially presented during the focused consultation. The updated version of the IRs is published in this document, in Section 8.2. Annex I ‘Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII’ and related AMC & GM New terms in Annex I The latest edition of ICAO Annex 6 Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes (Tenth Edition, July 2016) introduced some new definitions. These terms are proposed to be added in Annex I to the Air OPS Regulation. Additional new definitions have also been introduced during the development of the new rules. The following new definitions are proposed to be incorporated in Annex I: ‘aerodrome operating minima’: the source of this term is ICAO Annex 6. ICAO has modified this term through the work on the new ICAO approach classification. The term is transposed with one minor difference, in that ‘circling approach’ has been included. ‘circling approach operation’: the existing definition of ‘circling’ is split into one definition of the term ‘circling’ and one definition of the term ‘circling approach operation’. The amendment provides for better consistency and clarity of the rule text. ‘decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH)’: the definition has been transposed from ICAO Annex 6. ‘enhanced flight vision system (EFVS)’: this definition has been introduced in the European regulatory system in the Air Ops Regulation and in the new CS-AWO, where specific CSs have been developed for EFVS. The definition is aligned with the term used within the FAA regulatory system9. The certification of the EFVS allows for operations with operational credits. Contrary to the EFVS, the ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’ does not have specifications in CS-AWO and therefore does not benefit from any operational credits. This is reflected in the definitions introduced in this NPA. 8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1494235623593&uri=CELEX:32012R0965). 9 CFR 14 Chapter 1, Part 1, 1.1 general definitions TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail ‘EFVS operations’: this new term has been introduced to describe operations where EFVS is used for approach or landing and which allows an operational credit (e.g. lower minima), rather than just to improve situational awareness. The EFVS may be used in the future during other phases of flight. The definition is aligned with the one used in recently adopted FAA regulations10. ‘EFVS 200 operations’: this definition is added because, subject to compliance with certain requirements, operators will be permitted to conduct certain EFVS operations without needing a specific approval (SPA) from the competent authority. Such operations may be conducted only in CAT I or better meteorological conditions (i.e. not LVOs) and down to a height of 200 ft above the runway threshold (the approach may only be continued below 200 ft if the pilots have ‘natural’ visual reference). EFVS 200 operations are a subset of EFVS operations. ‘final approach segment (FAS)’: the definition has been transposed from ICAO Annex 6. ‘go-around’: this definition has been developed in the context of the activities of RMT.0379 in order to promote clarity and ensure consistency in the rules. ‘head-up display landing system (HUDLS)’: this new definition replaces the existing definition of ‘head- up guidance landing system (HUDLS)’. It has been amended in alignment with the one in CS-AWO. ‘instrument approach operations’: the definition has been transposed from ICAO Annex 6. ICAO has modified this term through the work on the new ICAO approach classification. Under the new approach classification, it is important to distinguish between instrument approach operations and instrument approach procedures (IAPs). Operations are activities performed by pilots, whereas procedures are the predetermined, published series of manoeuvres that are used for those operations. Instrument approach operations may be conducted using different methods, depending on whether vertical guidance is available (2D or 3D), and are classified according to the minimum DA/H as ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’ (see below). New GM explains the type of guidance that may be used for instrument approach operations and clarifies which operations should be considered 3D operations. Further guidance on the classification of an instrument approach operation based on the designed lowest operating minima is contained in Appendix J to ICAO Doc 9365 Manual of All-Weather Operations, Fourth Edition, July 2016. ‘instrument approach procedure’: the definition is based on revised definitions in ICAO Annex 6 and has been added for clarity. ‘low-visibility operations (LVOs)’: this definition, developed through RMT.0379, will be included in the regulations for the different domains (air operations, aircrew, aerodromes, etc.) in order to promote a consistent understanding across said domains. This term is currently not defined in ICAO standards; however, there is a comparable definition in the ICAO AWO Manual. ‘minimum descent altitude (MDA) or minimum descent height (MDH)’: the definition has been transposed from ICAO Annex 6. ‘obstacle clearance altitude (OCA) or obstacle clearance height (OCH)’: the definition has been transposed from ICAO Annex 6. 10 CFR 14 Chapter I, Part 1, 1.1 General definitions TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail ‘operation with operational credits’: ICAO standards (specifically 4.2.8.1.1 in ICAO Annex 6 Part I) allow the State of the operator to approve operational credits for operations with aeroplanes with certain equipment, and describe operational credits as allowing operation to lower aerodrome operating minima, reducing or satisfying visibility requirements or requiring fewer ground facilities. Operations with operational credits are operations using specific aircraft or ground equipment or a combination of aircraft and ground equipment, such that lower-than-standard aerodrome operating minima can be applied for a particular classification of operation, using as reference the standard aerodrome operating minima as stipulated in ICAO Doc 9365 ‘Manual of All-Weather Operations’, Appendix F. In that vein, SA CAT I allows a DH as low as 150 ft and an RVR as low as 400 m, but it is still a CAT I operation, albeit some additional requirements will apply. This definition of ‘operation with operational credits’ has been developed in the context of the activities of RMT.0379 based on ICAO standards and it was considered necessary in developing the rules and to ensure consistency throughout the rule text. Operational credits represent a concept approved by ICAO, so these operations will not necessitate any notification of differences with the ICAO standards. ‘Type A instrument approach operation’ and ‘Type B instrument approach operation’: these definitions are derived from the standard 4.2.8.3 of ICAO Annex 6. This is a classification of an instrument approach operation based on the designed lowest operating minima below which an approach operation may only be continued with the required visual reference. ICAO introduced this term as a result of the work on the new ICAO approach classification. The definition of ‘Type B instrument approach operation’ contains an important difference from the ICAO standard in that CAT III is not subcategorised into CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB and CAT IIIC. The experts involved in the development of this NPA took the view that the subcategorisation was not helpful. The FAA have also initiated a process to delete these subcategories from their definition. ‘visibility’: neither the existing European rules nor ICAO Annex 6 have a definition of visibility. The experts of RMT.0379 considered that it would be valuable to include a definition of visibility to avoid ambiguity, particularly when specifying aerodrome operating minima. This term refers to the visibility measured and reported by an observer on the ground and not simply to visibility in general or in-flight visibility; visibility for aeronautical purposes refers to the meteorological visibility; therefore, it is understood as meteorological visibility (ref. ICAO Annex 3 ‘Meteorological service for international air navigation’). The definition from ICAO Annex 3 has been used to ensure that the meaning of ‘visibility’ used by pilots is the same as that used by meteorological services, aerodromes and air traffic services. The term ‘meteorological visibility’ is replaced with ‘VIS’ in the Air Ops rules, following the ICAO definition. Terms amended in Annex I ‘continuous descent final approach (CDFA) operation’: the existing text is amended by adding a reference to circling approach operations. This is in order to clarify that circling approaches are outside the scope of CAT.OP.MPA.115, which requires approval for approaches flown without the CDFA technique. ‘low-visibility take-off (LVTO)’: this term has been amended in order to be aligned with the term ‘LVOs’. The two subcategories, LVTO I and LVTO II, which are distinguished at ICAO level are not included in the European rules, therefore they are not included among definitions. A specific approval is required TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail only for the ICAO LVTO II; however, in the European rules the limits of RVR are specifically included in the rules of specific approvals (Part-SPA) and therefore the term ‘LVTO II’ is not needed. The definition LVTO no longer contains a lower limit of 75 m to enable operations with lower-visibility minima. ‘visual approach operation’: the existing definition of ‘visual approach’ has been updated in accordance with the distinction between approach ‘operations’ and approach ‘procedures’ (see ‘instrument approach operation’). Minor amendments, mostly editorial, are made to the following definitions: — ‘continuous descent final approach (CDFA)’; — ‘visual approach’ and — ‘weather-permissible aerodrome’ – the term ‘weather reports’ has been replaced with ‘meteorological reports’. Terms deleted from Annex I ‘approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) operation’: this term is no longer used in the new ICAO approach classification. It is, therefore, deleted and replaced with the new definitions for Type A and Type B instrument approach operations (the definition of an APV remains within the definition of IAPs). ‘CAT I’, ‘CAT II’, ‘CAT IIIA’, ‘CAT IIIB’ approach operations: in accordance with the new ICAO approach classification, these terms are replaced with the new definition of Type B instrument approach operations. ‘head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS)’: the definition has been deleted. Its content has been incorporated into the new definition of head-up display landing system (HUDLS) and thus aligned with the one developed within the scope of CS-AWO. ‘lower-than-standard category I’ (LTS CAT I) is deleted, since this approach classification has been removed from the rules (see SPA.LVO.100). ‘non-precision approach (NPA) operation’: this term is no longer used in the new ICAO approach classification. It is, therefore, deleted and replaced with the new definitions for instrument approach operations and procedures; however, the definition of NPA remains as part of the definition of IAPs. Terms transferred to GM level The following terms are not used anymore in the IRs but only in the AMC and GM, and have been therefore moved at GM level: ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’; ‘head-up display (HUD)’ (this definition will also include ‘equivalent displays’); ‘low-visibility procedures (LVPs)’; and ‘other-than-standard category II (OTS CAT II) operation’. New terms in GM to Annex I Definitions Most definitions related to aircraft systems used for operations with operational credits have been removed from the IRs in Annex I and now appear in GM to Annex I. This is because the new performance-based IRs do not make reference to specific technologies, only to the performance required of the system. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail GM16 to Annex I: All-weather operations The new GM16 to Annex I contains the definitions of the following terms relating to LVOs and operations with operational credits used in the AMC and GM to Part-SPA: ‘EFVS-Approach (EFVS-A)’: this definition is the same as the one proposed in CS-AWO and describes an EFVS that can be certified for operations using EFVS but not for use below 100 ft above the threshold without ‘natural’ visual reference, i.e. not suitable for EFVS to touchdown. ‘EFVS-Landing (EFVS-L)’: this definition is the same as the one proposed in CS-AWO and describes an EFVS that can be certified for EFVS operations to touchdown. A landing system using EFVS will have additional functionality compared to an approach system using EFVS. ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’: the definition of EVS is moved from IR and amended to ensure consistency with the FAA and to clarify that an EVS may not be used for operations with operational credits unless it is certificated as an EFVS. ‘head-up display (HUD) or equivalent display system’: this definition is moved from the IR and amended. It is now the same as the definition proposed for CS-AWO and takes into account the possibility that future technological developments may result in systems that achieve the same performance as a HUD without meeting the previous definition. One example of a possible system could be a head-mounted device. GM17 to Annex I: Enhanced vision systems (EVS) This GM contains some content transferred from GM1 SPA.LVO.100(f) and provides explanation of EVS and EFVS. It has been developed to explain the distinction between EVS and EFVS, especially since the proposal introduces a new definition of EVS, and also to provide guidance for the use of EVS, for which there are no requirements in the Air OPS Regulation. It was assumed that many stakeholders would not be familiar with regulations and certification standards for other domains (e.g. airworthiness certification) and that a summary of such requirements would therefore be of value. The GM details the technologies that are currently available for EVS sensors. These are not included in the definition as future technological developments could result in the use of other technologies. The GM also includes a limited explanation of the functionality required for an EFVS, based on the proposed CS-AWO and some information about the limitations of such systems. Some of this is based on information published by the FAA11. GM18 to Annex I: Instrument approach operations This new GM clarifies the criteria for an operation to be considered a 3D approach operation. It reflects the notes to the definitions of ‘instrument approach operations’ and ‘instrument approach procedures’ in ICAO Annex 6. ICAO Annex 6 uses the term ‘advisory VNAV’. The experts consulted during the development of this NPA considered this terminology unhelpful since it is not defined. The need for cross-checking or 11 FAA Advisory Circular 90-106A: ‘Enhanced Flight Vision Systems’ TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail alternate sources of information in order to use vertical guidance will depend on the technology and equipment in use and operators should decide themselves on the need for this based on the aircraft flight manual (AFM) and other considerations. The GM also emphasises the importance of compliance with specified minimum altitudes/heights during the approach, as obstacle clearance is based on the assumption that such restrictions will be respected. GM19 to Annex I: Decision altitude or decision height This GM is added to clarify the relationship between DA and DH. It also expands on the use of DH based on the use of a radio altimeter. GM20 to Annex I: Minimum descent altitude (MDA) or minimum descent height (MDH) This new GM reproduces the notes to the definitions of ‘minimum descent altitude (MDA) or minimum descent height (MDH)’ in ICAO Annex 6. Annex II ‘Authority requirements for air operations’ (Part-ARO) and related AMC & GM Appendix II — Operations specifications (EASA Form 139) The template for operations specifications (ref. EASA Form 139 — Issue 4 foreseen to replace the existing Issue 3) of Appendix II has been redesigned. A new line addressing operational credits in addition to already existing take-off and approach and landing has been included in the cell pertaining to LVOs. Further modifications of the form have been applied: — for take-off (ref. (11) in the table), an approved minimum take-off RVR in metres is foreseen (one line per approval), — for approach and landing (ref. (12) in the table) for CAT II and CAT III (LTS CAT I, OTS CAT II, CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB and CAT IIIC have been deleted), the minimum RVR in metres and DH in feet have to be inserted (one line per listed approach category). For the newly introduced operational credits line (ref. (13) in the table), an applicable operational credit has to be inserted as LTS CAT I, SA CAT I, SA CAT II, EFVS, etc.; the minimum RVR in metres and DH in feet have to be specified (one line to be used per listed operational credit). The new AMC5 ARO.OPS.200 ‘Specific approval procedure | Procedures for the approval of low-visibility operations’ is added with the intent to provide a checklist to assist the authorities in granting the LVO approval. Annex III ‘Organisation requirements for air operations’ (Part-ORO) and related AMC & GM ORO.GEN There are no amendments proposed to Annex III at the IR level. AMC and GM to ORO.GEN In GM1 ORO.GEN.130(b) ‘Changes related to an AOC holder | Changes requiring prior approval’ the non-exhaustive list of changes requiring prior approval is increased to include the method used to TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail establish aerodrome operating minima, which will need to be approved in accordance with the revised CAT.OP.MPA.115. Appendix I to Part-ORO — Declaration The declaration has been amended to include a line where the operator includes the name of the operations with operational credits conducted. This addition will ensure that the competent authority can take into account the risks presented by operations with operational credits when determining the appropriate oversight programme for declared operators. Annex IV ‘Commercial air transport operations’ (Part-CAT) and related AMC & GM Helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. Hence, the amendments proposed to the IR, AMC and GM related to helicopters and the associated explanatory notes are not included in this NPA. CAT.OP.MPA.101 ‘Altimeter check and settings’ As currently neither the Air OPS Regulation nor Regulation (EU) No 923/201212 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘standardised European rules of the air (SERA) Regulation’) covers the requirement to establish procedures for altimeter check and settings which are essential for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations, a new requirement, CAT.OP.MPA.101 ‘Altimeter check and settings’ has been introduced for this purpose. AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.101 ‘Altimeter check and setting’ GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.101 ‘Altimeter setting procedures’ provides technical operational instructions referring to the applicable ICAO material (PANS-OPS, Volume I (ICAO Doc 8168, Volume I), paragraph 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’, paragraph 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’ and paragraph 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’). CAT.OP.MPA.107 ‘Adequate aerodrome’ This IR has been slightly amended to replace the term ‘weather’ with ‘meteorological’, for more accuracy. This change has been applied throughout all Annexes to the Air OPS Regulation. CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima’ The requirements for aerodrome operating minima have been fully deleted and new provisions have been developed. A safety objective has been added to point (a), i.e. ‘to ensure separation of the aircraft from terrain and obstacles and to mitigate the risk of loss of visual references during the visual flight segment of instrument operation operations’. The list of items that must be taken into account in determining the aerodrome operating minima is updated in the new point (b) to ensure closer 12 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 255/2010 (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1494236221362&uri=CELEX:32012R0923). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail alignment with ICAO Annex 6 and ICAO Doc 9365 ‘Manual of All-Weather Operations’ (para 6.2.6). The existing point (b), which allows for lower minima based on the use of HUD or EVS, is not kept in the new text, as such credits are now dealt with by means of an operational credit as described in Part- SPA. The second sentence of the existing point (a), as well as the existing point (b) have been moved to AMC level. The non-exhaustive and descriptive list of items to be considered for the establishment of aerodrome operating minima is now replaced with a more general list of items. Finally, the content of the existing point (e) has been moved to CAT.OP.MPA.300 ‘Approach and landing conditions’ addressed to the flight crew and also to CAT.OP.MPA.265 ‘Take-off conditions’ (although the existing text only refers to approach operations). The requirement for the method of determining aerodrome operating minima is added (new item (c)) to ensure compliance with ICAO standards (4.2.8.1 of Annex 6). AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima’ The amendments to the AMC and GM to the aerodrome operating minima in CAT.OP.MPA.110 address common elements for aerodrome operating minima and provide provisions for standard take-off and standard approach operations for which no specific approval is required. Operations which require a specific approval — LVOs as well as operations with operational credits — are addressed in the AMC to SPA.LVO.105. In addition, consistency between the AMC and GM structure of CAT.OP.MPA.110 and SPA.LVO.105 is ensured. All the table references have been updated in the AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.110. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Take-off operations – aeroplanes’ is amended to remove the take-off minima for LVTO; these are now in Part-SPA; the references to converted meteorological visibility (CMV) are removed as these duplicated the requirement in AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 (i.e. that CMV is not to be used for take-off). A requirement is added that the commander should not commence take-off in an RVR of less than 550 m unless LVPs are in effect. This has been transposed from Part-SPA as it is applicable both to operators that do not have an approval for LVTO below 400 m as well as those that do. Some editorial changes have been made. AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘NPA, APV, CAT I operations’ has a new title: ‘Determination of DH/MDH for instrument approach operations’. The new title reflects the new terminology for approach operations; the reference to ‘the minimum height to which the approach aid can be used without the required visual reference’ is removed as this is superfluous since system minima are specified in the tables; the explanations of the abbreviations for different facilities in the system minima table are deleted as these are already presented in GM1 to Annex I; an additional provision is added to take account of the possibility to conduct instrument approach operations on non-instrument runways, or to conduct 3D operations on non-precision runways; Table 4.A shows the applicable runway type minima; the lowest DH to be used will be the higher of the minima for the approach type or for the runway; the lowest DH to be used on a non-precision runway will be 250 ft and the lowest DH for a non-instrument runway will be the same as the lowest circling minima for the aeroplane category. An additional provision is added in point (c) to ensure that the DA/H is corrected for low temperatures as required by PANS-OPS. Guidance on the correction to be applied is provided in the new GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The notes containing the spelled-out abbreviations have been removed throughout the revised AMC and GM where these are duplicated in Annex I. AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Determination of RVR or VIS for instrument approach operations — aeroplanes’: the fully revised AMC combines and amends the content of the former AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Criteria for establishing RVR/CMV’ and AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV, CAT I — aeroplanes’; parts of the old content of AMC4 and AMC5 have been moved to GM level. Stakeholder feedback indicated that the existing AMC was not easy to interpret. In order to simplify the presentation, the description of how the values of RVR are determined is provided in the tables. The formula from which these values are derived has been moved to the new GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 and the presentation of the tables has been changed to remove the maximum and minimum values and to adopt the new terminology for approach operations (2D or 3D). The description of how the missed approach should be flown following a CDFA has been removed from this AMC (this appears in AMC2). The new AMC4 now provides for the applicable RVR to be determined depending on the type of runway used, i.e. where a precision approach is flown to a non-precision runway or an instrument approach to a non-instrument runway. The lowest applicable RVR may be limited by either the type of runway, the DH/MDH and the class of lighting or the ground facilities and the type of approach so the AMC specifies that the RVR to be used should be not less than the greatest of these three as determined by the applicable tables. An upper cut-off value of 1 500 m RVR (category A, B) and 2 400 m RVR (category C, D) is applied. Bearing in mind the definition of RVR, the experts took the view that an ‘RVR’ requirement was not meaningful where the value was likely to be longer than a typical runway and that no additional safety benefit was achieved by requiring higher values of converted meteorological visibility in order to continue an approach. Point (a)(6) of the existing AMC5 has not been transposed in the redrafted AMC4. In situations where this is required, an operator could apply an AltMoC. The provision for lower values of RVR to be applied for autoland operations and use of HUDLS have been removed as these are not relevant to Part-CAT; the criteria for LVOs and operations with operational credits now appear in Part-SPA. The existing AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 contains a provision for approaches where the final approach fix is not defined or where the missed approach point is defined by timing. If such approaches are flown using the CDFA technique, then the normal minima may be applied; if they are flown non-CDFA (with the appropriate approval), then the increment for non-CDFAs applies (point (c)). Note that such operations would require an approval in accordance with the proposed CAT.OP.MPA.115(b). The existing AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for instrument approach operations — aeroplanes’ has been deleted. Most of its content has been transposed into the new AMC4 and further amended. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The proposed AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for instrument approach operations — helicopters’ is the former AMC6 renumbered. Helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. AMC6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Circling operations — aeroplanes’ is the former AMC7. In determining the minimum visibility requirement for circling operations, the requirement to take into account the minimum RVR for the preceding approach procedure is removed, as this will always be less than the visibility prescribed for circling in this AMC. AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Onshore circling operations — helicopters’ is the former AMC8. Helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. AMC8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 is the former AMC9, ‘Visual approach operations’, with no changes. AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Conversion of reported meteorological visibility (CMV)’, which is the former AMC10, is changed to replace ‘meteorological visibility’ with ‘VIS’. AMC10 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Effect on landing minima of temporarily failed or downgraded ground equipment’ is the former AMC11. Some stakeholders reported that the restrictions on night operations with runway lighting inoperative were unclear and could be unduly restrictive in the case where some elements of a lighting group were inoperative (just a limited number of lights). A new Table 13 has been added to aid operators to determine whether a limited unserviceability should lead to the entire lighting group to be considered inoperative. The content of the table is based on ICAO Annex 14. AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 is the former AMC12 ‘VFR operations with other-than-complex motor- powered aircraft’ with no changes. The existing GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Approach lighting systems — ICAO, FAA’ is corrected (the high- intensity approach lighting system (HIALS) value for CAT I lighting system provided by ICAO). The abbreviations, which can be found in GM2 Annex I ‘Definitions | Abbreviations and acronyms’, have been removed. The existing GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘SBAS operations’ is not affected by this RMT. The new GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Means to determine the required RVR based on DH and lighting facilities’ is added. Its content originates from the former AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV, CAT I — aeroplanes’. The new GM5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Use of DH for NPA flown using the CDFA technique’ is added. This clarifies that it is not usually necessary to add an increment to the MDA/H for an NPA procedure in order to derive a DA/H for a CDFA operation. In some circumstances (e.g. descent path steeper than 3.5 degrees), the operator may need to make a specific safety assessment. GM6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Increments specified by the competent authority’ is the former GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110(a) and has been modified to include the approaches flown without the use of CDFA among those operations to which the competent authority may specify additional increments to the published minima. The new GM7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Use of commercially available information’ is added to clarify the operator’s responsibility for determination of aerodrome operating minima. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The new GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Low temperature correction’ provides guidance to support operators in implementing the new requirement in AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110(c) to apply a temperature correction when altimeters can be expected to over read due to low ambient temperatures. The table has been taken from ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS) Chapter 4 (altimeter corrections). GM9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — Helicopters’: helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. The new GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110(b)(5) ‘Visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure’ is introduced in order to clarify the intention of the requirement in CAT.OP.MPA.110(b)(5). CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Approach flight technique — aeroplanes’ The amendments to point (a) are of an editorial nature; point (b) is revised and shortened; the amended provision specifies that an approval is required for each particular runway for which the CDFA technique is not used; the penalties on the RVR minima are removed from the IR on the performance-based principle that an IR should contain the safety objective, while the means to achieve the safety objective should be put at AMC level. The content removed from the IR represents only the means to achieve the safety objective identified in the IR and is already addressed in the AMC to CAT.OP.MPA.110. The rule for stabilised approaches and CDFA is simplified to avert any potential confusion between stabilised approach operations (SAp) and CDFA operations (the definition of the CDFA in Annex I is also amended). The use of SAp is considered to be a significant factor in the mitigation of the risks of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and runway excursions on landing. All approaches must be flown as SAp according to the definition in Annex I and AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 (see below). Both circling approach operations and non-CDFAs can be flown as stabilised approaches in accordance with the definition and the AMC. NPA procedures may be flown as either 2D or 3D instrument approach operations depending on whether the avionics provide vertical navigation guidance to the pilot. In either case, the approach should be flown using the CDFA technique. The existing rule imposes a penalty to the use of non-CDFA technique by requiring the use of different minimum RVR. This has been removed from point (b) and transferred to AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 as the determination of aerodrome operating minima is covered by CAT.OP.MPA.110. Where an operator is unable to apply the CDFA technique for a particular instrument approach operation and has approval for another flight technique, the operator is required to implement procedures to ensure that an aircraft will not operate below the MDA/H without adequate visual reference (see the revised AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110). GM6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 clarifies that the competent authority may require additional increments to the aerodrome operating minima, for example for the use of a non-CDFA technique. AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Approach flight technique — aeroplanes’ AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Continuous descent final approach (CDFA)’, containing information about SAp and CDFA, is fully replaced with new text containing criteria applicable to CDFA. Only a part of the requirements of the existing AMC1 relating to CDFA has been retained; the wording is changed to make it clear that certain requirements are only applicable to multi-pilot operations. The listing of the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail types of approach suitable for CDFA is removed. The requirement that the operator should use an ‘add-on’ to the published minima when using CDFA (see GM5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 for an explanation) is also removed. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘NPA operations without applying the CDFA technique’: only a few editorial changes have been made to this AMC. AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Operational procedures and instructions and training’ provides criteria for operational procedures and instructions and training. The whole AMC text has been simplified to avoid duplication of requirements stated in AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.115 or elsewhere in Part-CAT (e.g. rate of descent and visual reference requirements). Whereas it may have been necessary to provide detailed AMC for CDFA training when the requirement was first introduced, CDFA is now a normal part of initial and recurrent pilot training and operators need to ensure that their training programmes reflect their operational requirements. The new GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Operational reasons for higher-than-normal approach speeds’ is added, as AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 no longer refers to air traffic control (ATC) speed restriction as a reason to use a higher-than-normal approach speed below 1 000 ft, but requires the operator to specify all reasons in its operations manual (OM). This GM highlights that one reason to apply this procedure would be to comply with the ATC speed constraints. The new AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) ‘Stabilised approach operations — aeroplanes’ describes the means to comply with the definition of a stabilised approach operation for all approach procedures and aircraft types. As the entire approach operation should be ‘stabilised’, the AMC introduces the new term ‘stabilised for landing’ in order to clarify the conditions that should be achieved before reaching the runway threshold in order to mitigate the risk of excess energy on landing (and possible consequence of runway overrun). The requirement to be ‘stabilised for landing’ by either 1 000 ft or 500 ft above runway threshold elevation (ARTE), depending on whether the pilot has visual reference with the ground, is retained from the existing text of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 point (b). The criteria for being ‘stabilised for landing’ do not include being on the extended runway centreline as this may not be the case for all approaches, particularly for circling approach operations or approaches offset from the runway centreline. The requirement is that the aircraft should be tracking with an acceptable tolerance of the required lateral and vertical path. The maximum acceptable rate of descent (i.e. 1 000 fpm) has been moved to GM as it is not applicable to all types of aircraft and operation. There is a provision to allow a later stabilisation if a higher approach speed is required for operational reasons. In order to ensure that such operational reasons are considered by the operator and subject to an appropriate risk assessment in accordance with ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) rather than being left to the discretion of the commander, the reasons must be specified in the OM (see points (f) and (g)); similarly, the operator is required to specify in the OM the acceptable tolerances for energy and path control and the point on the approach from which the stabilised approach criteria should apply. This ensures that the criteria can be applied to different aircraft types and different types of operation and that the commander has clear criteria to determine whether the aircraft is stabilised for landing. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) ‘Target rate of descent of stabilised approach’: the specific maximum rate of descent that should be acceptable for a stabilised approach (i.e. 1 000 fpm) has been moved from AMC to GM as it is not applicable to all types of operation. A category D aircraft flying a steeper- TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail than-normal approach might have a rate of descent higher than 1 000 fpm while still being stabilised; conversely, a category A aircraft on a three-degree slope would not be stabilised with a rate of descent of 1 000 fpm. The GM also clarifies that being aligned with the runway is not one of the criteria for being stabilised for landing. New GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) ‘Alternative stabilised approach criteria’: it is established that the CDFA technique is useful in reducing the number of accidents and is, therefore, preferred to non-CDFA techniques. There may be sound operational reasons why the CDFA is not suitable for some approaches on some runways and there may be a public interest in maintaining such operations. CAT.OP.MPA.115(b) allows that, for particular runways, the competent authority may approve another flight technique. In such circumstances, the competent authority has the responsibility to determine whether approval should be granted on a case-by-case basis. This GM clarifies that, unlike an AltMoC, the level of safety for a non-CDFA may not be the same as for a CDFA, nevertheless the competent authority will need to be satisfied that an acceptable level of safety is achieved taking into account the operational need and public interest. The existing GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 ‘Continuous descent final approach (CDFA)’ has been renamed GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(b); changes for consistency with the rest of the text have been made. CAT.OP.MPA.185 ‘Planning minima for IFR flights — aeroplanes’ and CAT.OP.MPA.186 ‘Planning minima for IFR flights — helicopters’: the existing text is not changed within this RMT, as these rules will be fully addressed by RMT.0573 ‘Fuel planning and management’. CAT.OP.MPA.265 ‘Take-off conditions’ The text has been revised to improve readability and consistency. A new point (b) containing the text of the existing paragraph (e) of CAT.OP.MPA.110 is added. This new point requires the flight crew to verify whether for the selected aerodrome operating minima all necessary components (such as ground equipment, aircraft systems, aircraft performance, and flight crew qualifications) are available and operative. This ensures consistency with the requirement for aerodrome operating minima for approach operations in CAT.OP.MPA 300. CAT.OP.MPA.300 ‘Approach and landing conditions’ The rule text is amended to improve readability, and some editorial amendments have been proposed for consistency; the reference to ‘missed approach’ is replaced with the term ‘go-around’ to also take into account such operations below the DA/H or MDA/H. As mentioned above, a definition of the term ‘go-around’ is added to Annex I (Definitions). Moreover, a new point (b) is added with the rule content of the existing point (e) of CAT.OP.MPA.110. This new point requires the flight crew to be satisfied that all necessary components (such as ground equipment, aircraft systems, aircraft performance, and flight crew qualifications) are available for the selected aerodrome operating minima. It should be noted that the whole CAT.OP.MPA.300 will be amended through RMT.0296 ‘Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations’, to introduce the new concept of ‘in-flight assessment of landing performance’ having regard to the performance information contained in the OM. CAT.OP.MPA.305 ‘Commencement and continuation of approach’ TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The rule has been reworded for clarification. This requirement is also known by the term ‘approach ban’. It is considered to be a safety-critical rule to avoid CFIT. This rule complies with a corresponding ICAO Annex 6 standard. The appropriateness of this rule has been in particular discussed from the perspective of operations using EFVS/CVS for operational credits. For such operations, a credit to the RVR minimum is allowed. The reduced RVR minimum can be applied to comply with the approach ban requirement. The reference to landing runway is added to clarify which RVRs are relevant to the approach ban and account for the case where a pilot commences an approach without the intention of landing, for example training approaches planned to be followed by a missed approach. This is not directly relevant to CAT operations but has been included here for consistency with Part-NCC (and Part-NCO). The description of which RVR to consider is moved to an AMC level; the provisions describing what a pilot ‘may’ do are moved to GM. AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.305 ‘Commencement and continuation of approach’ GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 ‘Application of RVR or VIS reports’ Point (a): The existing CAT.OP.MPA.305 states in point (a) that a pilot may commence an approach regardless of the reported RVR or visibility. The text is not appropriate at IR level as pilots do not require a specific enabling rule to transition from one phase of flight to the next; nevertheless, the group of experts of RMT.0379 considered that it is useful to clarify that there is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on reported visibility and that in the event that there is no report of RVR or VIS, then there is no restriction on continuation of the approach. Point (b): This requirement was transferred from the existing CAT.OP.MPA.305 point (d). As for (a) above, the experts considered that this provides useful clarification of the action to be taken in the event of a deterioration in visibility when an aircraft has already descended below 1 000 ft or into the FAS. Moreover, this is an alignment with the FAA - AC 120-28D requirements (paragraph 6.2.7), according to which ‘operations based on an Alert Height (AH) may continue to the AH and then land, if weather is reported to be at or above minima before passing the AH, or if suitable visual reference has been established by the pilot. Operations based on an AH may continue to land regardless of reported weather conditions if equipped with a fail operational rollout system which did not indicate a malfunction prior to passing alert height, and the pilot considers continuation a safe course of action.’. However, one element that should be highlighted is that in Europe firefighting services do not guarantee the required services in visibility less than 75 m. Point (c): According to the proposed AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(a), only the touchdown RVR is controlling (see below). The GM clarifies that the midpoint and stop-end RVRs may nonetheless be useful to the pilot and provides a reference to AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a). This information could be useful to operators who determine that there could be an operational or safety benefit from imposing their own limits on minimum or stop-end RVR. The new AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(a) ‘RVR minimum for continuation of approach’ is added: the criteria for the ‘controlling’ RVR are simplified. The RMT.0379 experts considered that the objectives of the ‘approach ban’ are to prevent the situation where a pilot arrives at a DH with insufficient visibility to adequately control the aircraft for landing and to reduce the rate of missed approaches from DH. The RVR relevant to the approach ban should therefore be the touchdown zone (TDZ). Where this is not available, the midpoint (MID) may be used as this is the value most likely to be representative of the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail TDZ. Amending this rule has the benefit of simplifying a previously complex requirement, the result of which will be its clear understanding and, consequently, a consistent application. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(b) ‘Visual references for instrument approach operations’ (previously AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(e)): the visual reference requirements at DH are unchanged, but the provisions relating to low-visibility approach operations requiring a specific approval are moved to Part-SPA. CAT.OP.MPA.310 ‘Operating procedures — threshold crossing height — aeroplanes’ The term ‘precision approaches’ has been replaced with ‘Type B instrument approach operations’. CAT.OP.MPA.312 ‘EFVS 200 operations’ The new CAT.OP.MPA.312 and NCC.OP.235 with their related AMC and GM have been introduced to address EFVS operations in Part-CAT and in Part-NCC respectively. They introduce a new concept into the Air OPS Regulation: the conduct of EFVS operations with operational credits without the need for a specific approval to be granted in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA). The concept was initially proposed by representatives of non-commercial operators and aircraft manufacturers, who reported that the existing approval requirements for EFVS operations with operational credits placed an undue burden on the industry which resulted in very few operators being able to apply successfully for the approval of EFVS operations with operational credits and significant safety and operational benefits being therefore denied to the industry. The proposed requirements are intended to be proportionate, to avoid placing an undue burden on the industry or competent authorities and to provide some of the benefits of EFVS operations without the need for an approval. The provisions of the new rules are intended to permit EFVS operations in CAT and NCC operations, where the safety risks are well understood and can be mitigated by prescriptive requirements. More complex operations using newer technologies and representing greater potential safety risks will still require a specific approval in accordance with Annex V. For these reasons, the new EFVS rules permit the use of EFVS without natural vision only down to a height of 200 ft above the aerodrome and only in conditions equivalent to an RVR of 550 m or greater (i.e. LVOs are not permitted under this rule). CAT.OP.MPA.312 and NCC.OP.235 stipulate the requirements that operators intending to conduct EFVS 200 operations must fulfil (which are further developed in the related AMC and GM): the aircraft is certified for the intended operations, only runways and IAPs suitable for EFVS operations might be used, the flight crew is competent to conduct the intended operation, safety assessments are carried out and performance indicators are established to monitor the level of safety, etc. The requirement for a safety assessment is transposed from ICAO standards (Attachment 2A Annex 6 Part 2). These are the same as the requirements for operators seeking approval for EFVS operations in accordance with Annex V (SPA.LVO.105), but with the additional requirement that the operating minima take into account the capability of the systems used. Introducing this new concept will lead to closer alignment with the FAA, which allows EFVS operations without approval for non-commercial operators (‘Part 91’), but would be a departure from ICAO standards, which require any operation with operational credits to be an ‘approval’ item (ICAO Annex 6 Part II, paragraph 2.2.2.2.1.1). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The main benefit of this rule is expected to be felt by operators conducting CAT operations with smaller or non-complex aircraft to secondary airports that do not have sophisticated ground infrastructure in place, for example airports without an ILS approach or with an ILS approach but with limited approach lighting. The term ‘EFVS 200 operations’ describes this operation in the domain of CAT operations as well as in NCC operations. Note: the proposal of this type of operations has been discussed at the meeting of ICAO OPS panel; despite introducing a new concept about the principles set in ICAO Annex 6 (especially the requirement for a special approval), the formal introduction of such a concept has been found feasible not only for the NCC, but also for the CAT operations. AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.312 and to NCC.OP.235 ‘EFVS 200 operations’ GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312 and GM1 NCC.OP.235 ‘EFVS operations’ provide a logical description of the different elements of the system that the operator needs to put in place and which are described in different AMC. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(a) and respectively AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a) ‘Equipment certification’ describe the equipment required for EFVS 200 operations. The proposed CS will certify EFVSs as either ‘EFVS- Approach (EFVS-A) or EFVS-Landing (EFVS-L). Either system will be suitable for EFVS 200 operations as the pilot will not be relying on EFVS below a height of 200 ft (natural visual reference is required below 200 ft). Many existing systems or systems certified under existing requirements will also be suitable for EFVS 200 operations so point (b) confirms that systems approved for ‘EVS with operational credit’ under existing requirements will be acceptable. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) and respectively AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b) ‘Aerodromes and instrument procedures suitable for EFVS 200 operations’: the responsibility for determining the suitability of aerodromes and approach procedures for EFVS 200 operations will rest with the aircraft operator, so these AMCs describe the requirements for aerodromes and approach procedures to be used for EFVS 200 operations. In order to ensure that the pilot will have path information from the EFVS image and from internal cues, the proposal is that EFVS 200 operations should only be available for 3D operations. The EFVS will include path information (e.g. a flight path vector). In order for this flight path information to correlate with the EFVS or natural visual image, the proposal is that EFVS 200 operations should only be flown where the final approach track is aligned with the runway centreline (+/- 2 degrees). This will ensure that the pilot can ‘place’ the flight path vector over the runway threshold when flying the approach. Further explanation of the other requirements (point (a)) is provided in GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) and respectively in GM1 NCC.OP.235(b). GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) and respectively GM1 NCC.OP.235(b) ‘Verifying the suitability of runways for EFVS operations’ explain the steps that an operator could take to establish if a runway is suitable for EFVS 200 operations. If the runway has been promulgated as suitable by the State of the aerodrome (i.e. in the AIP), then no further investigation is required. It has been assumed that, at least in the short term, there will be a few runways so promulgated. Recommendations are therefore provided to describe how an operator could ensure that obstacle clearance would be maintained during the ‘visual’ part of the approach, bearing in mind that the pilot may be relying on the enhanced image rather than natural vision and that visual avoidance of obstacles may not be practical. The GM also suggest a possible method to ensure obstacle clearance in the event of a balked landing. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) and respectively AMC1 NCC.OP.235 (c) ‘Initial training for EFVS 200 operations’: the training requirements for EFVS 200 operations are the same as those for the conduct of EFVS operations requiring an approval in accordance with Annex V (see the proposed AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b)) and are based on existing requirements for operations with EVS. This training programme will not need to be approved by the competent authority. It is assumed that most operators will use third-party training providers and that this will be a subcontracted activity in accordance with ORO.GEN.205; nevertheless, the training syllabus will have to appear in the OM (ORO.FC.145(a)). AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) and respectively AMC2 NCC.OP.235(c) ‘Recurrent training and checking for EFVS 200 operations’: the recurrent training and checking requirements for EFVS 200 operations ensure that pilots will need to demonstrate continued competence. AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) and respectively AMC3 NCC.OP.235(c) ‘Recent experience requirements for EFVS 200 operations’: a recent experience requirement has also been added to ensure that pilots will complete at least four EFVS approaches annually (two for recency and two during the demonstration of competence). This is based on the existing requirement for recurrent training and checking for operations using a HUD. The recent experience and checking requirements are different from the FAA requirements. The FAA requires a larger number of EFVS approaches to maintain recency, but no demonstration of competence. AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) and respectively AMC4 NCC.OP.235(c) ‘Differences training for EFVS 200 operations’ provide the requirements for differences training for EFVS 200 operations in the event of a change of equipment or operational procedures. The proposed recurrent training/checking requirement for EFVS 200 operations is for flight crew to demonstrate proficiency by conducting a minimum of two EFVS 200 approaches at each demonstration of competence. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) and respectively GM1 NCC.OP.235(c) ‘Recurrent checking for EFVS 200 operations’ have been added to highlight the need to vary the scenarios used for this check so that pilots are able to demonstrate proficiency in dealing with different technical failures and weather conditions and, in particular, to practise decision-making. The requirements for operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations appear in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(d) and respectively AMC1 NCC.OP.235(d) ‘Operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations’. Many operators will adopt procedures developed by aircraft manufacturers; nevertheless, these procedures will have to be published in each operator’s OM; this could be done by including the ‘pilot operating handbook’ or an equivalent document into the OM in accordance with point (g) of AMC1 ORO.MLR.100. The requirements for operating procedures are closely based on those for EFVS operations requiring a specific approval in the proposed AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(c) and AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c). The crucial difference is that, for EFVS 200 operations, pilots must have natural visual reference by a height of 200 ft above the runway or else execute a go-around. Like in AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c), the visual reference requirements at the DA/H have been transposed from the existing AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305, but the wording is amended to be more closely aligned with that of the FAA. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(h) and respectively AMC1 NCC.OP.235(h) ‘Aerodrome operating minima — EFVS 200 operations’ detail the operating minima for EFVS 200 operations. EFVS allows an operational TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail credit to the visual segment of the approach so the DA/H is always unchanged. The credits for RVR or VIS have been transposed from the existing requirements for operations with EVS (AMC6 SPA.LVO.100) but with a lower ‘cut-off’ at 550 m. Operations in RVRs of less than 550 m are ‘low-visibility operations’ and so will require specific approval in accordance with Annex V. It is expected that new technologies may offer performance in excess of the credits allowed for EFVS 200. In order to take advantage of such performance, operators would need to apply for approval for EFVS operations in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA). The credits allowed for EFVS 200 are intentionally conservative and based on proven requirements. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail Annex V ‘Specific approvals’ (Part-SPA) and related AMC & GM SPA.GEN.100 ‘Competent authority’ This rule is amended to include the LVOs in the list of SPA to which the approval by the competent authority is not required for non-commercial operations using aircraft registered in a third country. SPA.LVO.100 ‘Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits’ In order to develop a performance-based regulation and allow for the introduction of new technologies, the list of specific types of operation has been removed from the IR. In accordance with ICAO standards, the IR specifies that all take-off operations below 400 m, low- visibility approach operations and operations with operational credits require specific approval. Therefore, under the revised definitions, any take-off with an RVR of less than 550 m will be classified as LVTO, but only LVTOs with an RVR of less than 400 m will require an approval (as it is the case now). All approach operations in an RVR of less than 550 m (LVOs) will require prior approval of the competent authority. The list of operations for which specific approval can be granted is moved to AMC. For any new types of operations or any new technologies used to meet the performance requirements of already defined operations, only additional AMC or amendments to existing AMC will be necessary. Lower-than-standard category I (LTS CAT I) operation is not transposed into the revised IR or AMC. During the rule-development procedure, the use of a hazard identification and risk assessment process revealed a latent safety risk in relation to LTS CAT I. There are inconsistencies across the different aviation domains in the current requirements. The use of an autoland system with an (instrument landing system) ILS certified to class I/T/1 (as allowed by the current AMC3 SPA.LVO.100) is not anticipated by certification specifications and thus type certificate holders have not demonstrated this during the certification process; similarly, neither aerodrome operators nor aircraft operators are obliged to verify that the pre-threshold terrain of a runway used for LTS CAT I operations is compatible with the autoland system. It appears that few operators regularly use LTS CAT I and thus the level of exposure to this risk has been low. Whereas rules for each aviation domain have previously been made independently and by different organisations (e.g. JAA and EASA), the cross-domain approach adopted through RMT.0379 provides the opportunity to introduce a new operational credit (SA CAT I) that mitigates the risks associated with LTS CAT I and will provide significant operational and safety benefits. Under SA CAT I, the lower RVR required for approach can be paired with a lower DH, meaning that the probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference at or below DH is significantly less than for LTS CAT I. AMC and GM to SPA.LVO.100 ‘Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits’ The existing AMC1, AMC3, AMC4, AMC5 and AMC6 to SPA.LVO.100 are deleted and new AMC are created, partly using the text of the deleted rules. AMC and GM provide further details on how standard LVOs and operations with operational credits can be approved. For any new types of operations or any new technologies used to meet the performance requirements of already defined operations, only additional AMC or amendments to existing AMC will be necessary. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail GM1 SPA.LVO.100 ‘Documents containing information related to LVOs and operations with operational credits’ contains minor editorial changes. The new AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) ‘LVTO operations — aeroplanes in an RVR of less than 400 m but not less than 125 m’ transposes the requirements for LVTO down to 125 m from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 and incorporates the requirements for LVTO in multi-engined aeroplanes without the performance to stop or continue a take-off in the event of an engine failure. These have been transposed from AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.110, as a specific approval is required. The requirement to have a 90 m visual segment is moved to GM2 SPA.LVO.100(a) because this is the intention of requiring an RVR of 125 m, not an additional requirement. Point (c) clarifies that the specified RVR is required for the reporting points on the parts of the runway that will be used for the take-off roll or in the event of a rejected take-off. The intent of the requirement is not changed. The new AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) ‘LVTO operations — aeroplanes in an RVR of less than 125 m’ transposes the requirements for LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m but also allows for the situation where equipment is certified for take-off in specific values of RVR. This is to facilitate the future implementation of new technologies that could have different capabilities. Note that SPA.LVO.105 and AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a) detail the equipment required for LVTO below 125 m. AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(a) ‘LVTO operations — helicopters’: helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. The new AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘CAT II operations’ transposes the requirements for CAT II operations from the existing AMC4 SPA.LVO.100 but removes the criteria for other-than-standard category II (OTS CAT II) operations (operations with operational credits are dealt with in separate AMC, see AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(c) for the requirements for SA CAT II). The equipment requirements and operating procedures have been moved to SPA.LVO.105 and the aerodrome requirements to SPA.LVO.110. The requirement for the DH to be not lower than ‘the minimum height to which the precision approach (PA) aid can be used without the specified visual reference’ is removed as this is a duplication of the minimum DH for the approach category. The new AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘CAT III operations’ transposes the requirements for CAT III operations from the existing AMC5 SPA.LVO.100. The equipment requirements and operating procedures have been moved to SPA.LVO.105 and the aerodrome requirements to SPA.LVO.110. The subdivisions of category III have been removed. The lowest DH values to be used for particular aircraft installations will be described in the AFM. The reference to the type of roll-out systems used is included to allow determination of the appropriate RVR value based on the pilot’s need to be able to control the roll-out (the certification requirements are described in CS-AWO). GM2 SPA.LVO.100(b) offers additional information about which systems are required for certain DHs. The lowest RVR for a DH between 50 and 100 ft (previously CAT IIIA) will be 175 m (previously 200 m), to be aligned with the new ICAO standard for CAT IIIA. The provision for an RVR of 150 m for aircraft certificated as ‘super fail-passive’ is removed. 175 m will now be required for DHs down to 50 ft. It is understood that this provision was applicable to a single aircraft type that is no longer in production. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail As the equipment of super fail-passive has been demonstrated as suitable for use down to 150 m, operators with such aircraft could consider applying for an AltMoC. The minimum RVR for DH below 50 is 125 m in the current rules, based on a fail-passive roll-out system; this has been retained but, based on input from an aircraft manufacturer, a provision has been inserted to allow a minimum RVR of 75 m where this has been demonstrated during the equipment certification process. The minimum RVR for no DH operations is currently 75 m, based on the assumption that the roll-out system is fail-operational. However, it is possible to get a no DH certification for a fail-passive roll-out system; this is now reflected in a range of RVR, 75-125 m, which has been added to this AMC and will be subject to the same considerations and approval as described for DHs below 50 ft. The requirement for the DH to be not lower than ‘the minimum height to which the precision approach aid can be used without the specified visual reference’ is removed as this is a duplication of the minimum DH for the approach category. AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘Effect on CAT II/CAT III landing minima of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment’ replaces the existing AMC7 SPA.LVO.100. The instructions on when the values in the table should be applied has been moved to GM (GM4 SPA.LVO.100(b). The only change to the table is that the row for ‘edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights’ has been replaced with separate rows for each item. New AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘Operational credit: special authorisation category 1 (SA CAT I)' introduces special authorisation category 1 as an operational credit allowing operation to a DH of 150 ft subject to holding specific approval from the competent authority. SA CAT I has been developed using a cross- domain approach and evaluating all of the elements of the ‘total system’ for approach operations. There are, therefore, specific requirements for airborne equipment (see AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a)) approach procedures (see AMC1 SPA.LVO.110(a)) and operating procedures (AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c)). Complementary rules have been developed for the aerodrome and certification domains to ensure that all of these elements can be used together to extend the instrument segment of a CAT I approach. SA CAT I will provide a significant operational benefit compared to LTS CAT I as it allows operation to a lower DH as well as reduced RVR. GM3 SPA.LVO.100(c) provides a description of SA CAT I. The new AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘Operational credit: approval of the special authorisation category 2 (SA CAT II)’ introduces SA CAT II as an operational credit. SA CAT II incorporates the previous requirement for OTS CAT II but is more closely aligned with the FAA standards. SA CAT II allows a CAT II operation without meeting all the lighting requirements for CAT II and therefore requires increased RVR to mitigate the less detailed visual reference. The RVR requirements for SA CAT II based on the DH are transposed from the existing AMC4 SPA.LVO.100 except that there are no increased minima for category D aircraft. The equipment requirements and operating procedures are in SPA.LVO.105 and the aerodrome requirements in SPA.LVO.110. The new AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘Operational credit: EFVS operations’ allows approach EFVS operations, including in low-visibility conditions (RVR less than 550 m), and landing EFVS operations considering them operations with operational credits. Such operations will require the operator to hold a specific approval from the competent authority. ICAO standards require that operational credits are specifically TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail approved by the competent authority, hence this requirement is in Part-SPA. The term ‘EFVS’ is introduced to describe a system that can be used for operational credits as opposed to ‘EVS’, which refers to a system to be used only for improved situational awareness (see definitions in Annex I). NOTE: There is a proposal to allow EFVS operations without specific approval where the equipment is not used below 200 ft and where the RVR is more than 550 m; see CAT.OP.MPA.312 and NCC.OP.235. It is anticipated that CS-AWO will allow equipment manufacturers to specify the performance of a particular EFVS in different weather conditions and that this information will be presented in the AFM in the form of a table of visibility credits in different weather conditions. In order to allow operators to take advantage of the performance of the particular EFVS being used, this AMC allows the RVR to be determined in accordance with the demonstrated performance as shown in the AFM. For ‘legacy’ systems and other systems where the AFM does not include such information, the new Table 8 has been transposed from Table 6 in the existing AMC6 SPA.LVO.100. If EFVS operations are to be conducted in visibilities of less than 550 m, then such operations would be LVOs. Point (c) ensures that LVOs are conducted only if LVPs are established at the aerodrome of intended landing. The new GM1 SPA.LVO.100(a) ‘Classification of low-visibility take-off operations’ is introduced to clarify that not all LVTOs require a specific approval, only operations below an RVR of 400 m. The new GM2 SPA.LVO.100(a) ‘Visual segment for take-off’: the requirement to have a 90 m visual segment is removed from the criteria for LVTO (AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a)) because this is the intention of requiring an RVR of 125 m, not an additional requirement to be met. This new GM explains the requirement. This GM could be useful to operators wishing to implement an AltMoC to AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) because the flight deck geometry of their particular aircraft would allow a 90 m visual segment in different RVR conditions. The new GM1 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘Classification of standard approach operations’ explains the revised categorisation of approach operations and the relationship with the ICAO standard. This GM provides a table on the classification of standard approach operations. It will be useful to operators of aircraft where the AFM includes a reference to CAT IIIA or CAT IIIB rather than a specific DH. The new GM2 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘Equipment certification for low-visibility approach operations’ rephrases the information available in CS-AWO in simpler terms, for the easy understanding of operational personnel. GM3 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘Establishment of minimum RVR for CAT II and CAT III operations’ is updated with the addition of a paragraph in point (c)(2). This is in order to clarify that it is not necessary for the visual reference on a ‘CAT III with no DH’ approach to include a lateral element of the approach lighting system. New GM4 SPA.LVO.100(b) ‘Effect on CAT II/CAT III landing minima of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment’: this GM provides more guidance on the use of the table of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment (previously AMC7 SPA.LVO.100 item (a)). The new GM1 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘The concept of operations with operational credits’ explains the concept of operations with operational credits, which has been introduced in accordance with ICAO standards. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The new GM2 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘Special authorisation category 1 (SA CAT I) operations’ explains SA CAT I operations. The new GM3 SPA.LVO.100(c)‘Special authorisation category 2 (SA CAT II) operations’ explains SA CAT II operations. Note: Other than-standard category II (OTS CAT II) has been removed from the proposed changes to the rule as special authorisation category II (SA CAT II) has been introduced. The new GM4 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘EFVS operations’ provides an overview of EFVS operations has been provided to collate the requirements for EFVS operations into one place and will be useful to help operators to identify where the specific requirements can be found in AMC and to understand EFVS operations. The new GM5 SPA.LVO.100(c) ‘Combined vision systems’ clarifies that, in the proposed rule set, there is no operational credit in the visual segment for CVSs other than that available for EFVSs. A CVS consisting of an EFVS and an SVS could be approved for EFVS operations if it met all the certification requirements of an EFVS. It is anticipated that, in the future, synthetic vision guidance systems (SVGS) and CVSs may be used for LVOs and other operations with operational credits. When such systems are available and certificated, then operators could apply for an AltMoC to allow operations with operational credits and EASA could develop additional AMC. SPA.LVO.105 ‘Specific approval criteria’ The title of SPA.LVO.105 was changed from ‘LVO approval’ to ‘Specific approval criteria’. In line with other specific approvals of Part-SPA, this IR specifies the main criteria to obtain a specific approval for LVOs and/or operations with operational credits, which include the components required for safe operations such as: — aircraft capabilities, — flight crew competence, — operating procedures, — minimum equipment list (MEL), — continuous airworthiness, and — safety assessments and continuous monitoring. The proposed text is aligned with a corresponding proposed amendment to ICAO Annex 6. It is expected that ICAO will publish a related State Letter with the proposed amendment in the course of 2018. The current text of the IR is completely replaced with new text. The old requirements are moved to the new AMC related to SPA.LVO.100. AMC and GM to SPA.LVO.105 ‘Specific approval criteria’ TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail Following the principle of stating the safety objective and relevant criteria in the IRs and providing technical means of achieving those objectives and criteria at AMC level, the following current requirements have been moved to AMC level (AMC to SPA.LVO.105): — SPA.LVO.110 ‘General operating requirements’; — SPA.LVO.125 ‘Operating procedures’; and — SPA.LVO.130 ‘Minimum equipment’. The following AMC have been deleted: — AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 ‘LVO approval’ — Operational demonstration — aeroplanes; — AMC3 SPA.LVO.105 ‘LVO approval’ — Continuous monitoring — all aircraft; — AMC4 SPA.LVO.105 ‘LVO approval’ — Transitional periods for CAT II and CAT III operations; — AMC5 SPA.LVO.105 ‘LVO approval’ — Maintenance of CAT II, CAT III AND LVTO equipment; and — AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 ‘LVO approval’ — Eligible aerodromes and runways. The existing AMC1, AMC2 and AMC3 to SPA.LVO.105 are superseded by the new AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(f) ‘Safety assessment prior to the grant of an approval’. The existing AMC4 SPA.LVO.105 ‘Transitional periods for CAT II and CAT III operations’ is deleted. The opinion of the RMT.0379 experts was that there is no clear safety benefit from imposing an elapsed time limit on the grant of CAT II/III approvals to new operators. It could be argued that the increased probability of go-arounds and diversion resulting from higher operating minima during such a transitional period could result in a lower level of safety. Operators will be required to gather data in order to carry out a safety assessment prior to the grant of an approval. GM2 SPA.LVO.05(f) contains guidance on the extent of operational experience that could be required to gather sufficient data. The existing AMC5 SPA.LVO.105 ‘Maintenance of CAT II, CAT III and LVTO equipment’ is deleted because maintenance of equipment is not an operational matter. Maintenance requirements are stipulated in the applicable airworthiness regulation. The existing AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 ‘Eligible aerodromes and runways’ is superseded by the new AMC3 SPA.LVO.110(a) ‘Suitable aerodromes: Approach operations’. The existing GM1 SPA.LVO.105 ‘Criteria for a successful approach and automatic landing’ has a changed subtitle (previously ‘Criteria for a successful CAT II, OTS CAT II, CAT III approach and automatic landing’). This GM provides operators with criteria (supplemental information) for a successful approach and automatic landing. The new AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a): ‘Equipment certification’ details the equipment requirements for certain types of LVOs and operations with operational credits. The requirements have been transposed from the existing rules with the following differences: — For LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m, a system certificated for the purpose is stipulated. GM1 provides information about the types of system that could be certificated for the purpose; — A specific certification is proposed for SA CAT I operations (aligned with the proposed CS-AWO). Equipment certified for CAT II/III operations will not automatically be certificated for SA CAT I as TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail the quality of the ILS signal to be used will not be the same (this differs from the regulations applicable in some other states, e.g. USA and Australia); — SA CAT II operations will require a CAT II certified aircraft (this will supersede OTS CAT II); and — Details of the specific aircraft systems suitable for CAT II/III operations (e.g. autoland/HUD) are removed from the AMC as this is determined by the certification of the aircraft and equipment. New GM1 SPA.LVO.105(a) ‘Equipment eligible for take-off in an RVR less than 125 m’: the new AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a) specifies that LVTO requires a system certified for the purpose. In order to provide for the development of new technologies, the AMC does not specify a particular type of system. This GM provides information about technologies certificated on current aircraft types. New AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures for LVO’: these requirements for LVOs have been transposed from SPA.LVO.125. New AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: general’: these operating procedures requirements have been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.125. The content of the AMC has been reworded and reordered to aid understanding. References to specific types of operation and technologies (e.g. instrument landing system (ILS)) have been removed to ensure that the requirements are applicable to all types of LVOs and operations with operational credits, including the use of technologies that may not be available at the time of writing. An additional requirement has been added that procedures should deviate to the minimum extent practicable from normal procedures used for routine operations as this is considered to be a useful mechanism to reduce the probability of errors. This is a policy that is already widely adopted for LVOs. New AMC3 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: CAT II’: these requirements for CAT II operations have been transposed from SPA.LVO.110 and the existing AMC4 SPA.LVO.100. The visual reference requirements have been transposed from AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 as they are only applicable to operations requiring a special approval. The existing AMC4 SPA.LVO.100 states that the minima for CAT II is contingent on operation ‘auto- coupled or approved HUDLS’ down to 80 % of the DH. The intention of this requirement was to ensure that, in limiting conditions, the HUDLS/autopilot is used down to the DH and that the pilot does not disconnect the autopilot instantly once visual reference is acquired. It was not intended to prevent disconnection of the autopilot once satisfactory visual reference is acquired and maintained. Point (c) of the new AMC3 SPA.LVO.105(c) is added to achieve the intent of this requirement while allowing greater operational flexibility. The requirement for the DH to be determined by the use of a radio altimeter is modified to allow the adoption of future technologies that could achieve an equivalent level of accuracy (point (d)). New AMC4 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: CAT III’: these requirements for CAT III operations have been transposed from the existing SPA.LVO.110 and AMC5 SPA.LVO.100. The visual reference requirements have been transposed from the existing AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 as they are only applicable to operations requiring a specific approval. The requirement that the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter has been modified to allow the adoption of future technologies that could achieve at least an equivalent level of accuracy. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The new AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: SA CAT I’ details the requirements for SA CAT I operations. The requirements are based on regulations adopted in other States, specifically the USA and Australia. Unlike other low-visibility approach operations, there is no specific requirement for SA CAT I operations to be flown with a crew of two pilots. The visual reference requirements have been adopted from the requirements for CAT II as these are known to provide sufficient visual reference for a continued approach from a DH as low as 150 ft. The requirement that the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter has been modified to allow the adoption of future technologies that could achieve at least an equivalent level of accuracy. New AMC6 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: SA CAT II’: the operating requirements for SA CAT II are identical to those for ‘standard’ CAT II operations. AMC6 is added to ensure a consistent layout of AMC for LVOs and operations with operational credits. New AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Operating procedures: EFVS operations’: the operating requirements for EFVS operations have been adapted from the existing AMC6 SPA.LVO.100 and updated to allow ‘EVFS- L’ operations and also to be aligned with recently published FAA regulations. The existing provision requires to have natural visual reference of the runway by 200 ft for NPA or APV operations. This provision is removed, as CS-AWO now requires system performance to be demonstrated down to 100 ft for ‘EVFS-L’. ‘EVFS-L’ may require this ‘natural’ visual reference by a certain height, in which case the height will be indicated in the AFM. The new CS.AWO.A.EFVS is developed following a performance-based philosophy. This allows flexibility in the minimum height for which natural vision reference is required. Therefore, point (f) allows two cases: when the manufacturer is following the new CS-AWO, the height is specified in the AFM allowing thus EFVS-A operations and EFVS-L operations; when the equipment has been certified before the new CS-AWO, then the height of 100 ft is required as previously stipulated in the regulation. The visual reference requirements have been transposed from the existing AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305, but the wording is amended to be more closely aligned with that used by the FAA. GM1 SPA.LVO.105(c) ‘Flight crew actions in case of autopilot failure at or below DH in fail-passive CAT III operations’ has been transposed from the existing GM1 SPA.LVO.100(e). New AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f) ‘Safety assessment and performance indicators’: ICAO standards require a safety assessment prior to conducting LVOs. The existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 requires operators to gather and analyse data prior to the grant of a specific approval, and AMC3 SPA.LVO.105 requires operators to gather data about LVOs and monitor the performance of individual aircraft. This new AMC describes some of the data that should be collected and performance indicators that should be monitored. These data and performance indicators will also be useful for hazard identification and safety performance monitoring in accordance with ORO.GEN.200(a)(3). The new AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(f) ‘Safety assessment prior to obtaining an approval’ mandates that the data and performance indicators in accordance with the new AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f) be used by the operator for conducting a safety assessment prior to obtaining a specific approval. This safety assessment is proposed to replace the ‘operational demonstration’ currently required by AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 and AMC2 SPA.LVO.105. The AMC clarifies that the intent of this data gathering is to demonstrate that the operation will achieve an acceptable level of safety. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The existing operational demonstration requires a fixed number of approaches. As this number may not be appropriate for all types of operation, the requirements have been moved to the new GM2 SPA.LVO.105(f) in order to allow more flexibility for operators and competent authorities to determine the number of approaches required to demonstrate that operations will achieve an acceptable level of safety. It must be emphasised that these demonstration approaches do not replace the demonstration required for equipment certification which necessitates substantially more data than that which could be gathered in the context of an ‘operational demonstration’. The existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 contains a provision that if the number of approaches is difficult to achieve, this number may be reduced in certain conditions. This provision is no longer needed because the number of approaches is not specified in the AMC (it has been moved to GM level). The operator is responsible to determine the number of approaches required to demonstrate the required level of safety and to satisfy the competent authority that sufficient data will be available to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety. GM2 SPA.LVO.105(f) provides guidance on how relevant data could be obtained. Points (c) and (d) of the new AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(f) clarify that data for the safety assessment could come from similar operations with the same aircraft or with a different aircraft type provided that the data is relevant to the approval being sought. It is thought that this might be the case where different aircraft types from the same manufacturer and with similar characteristics and equipment were being used. The existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 only allows this for variants within a single aircraft type which is considered to be unnecessarily restrictive. The new GM1 SPA.LVO.105(f) ‘Safety performance monitoring’ provides more details and explains the requirements for safety performance monitoring referred to in AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f). It ensures the link to the hazard identification and safety performance monitoring requirements of ORO.GEN.200(a)(3). The data collection requirements derive from the existing requirements in AMC1 SPA.LVO.105, AMC2 SPA.LVO.105, and AMC3 SPA.LVO.105. The list of potential unacceptable safety outcomes to be considered has been developed in the context of the hazard analysis conducted as part of this RMT. The new GM2 SPA.LVO.105(f) ‘Data gathering for safety assessment prior to obtaining an approval’ details and explains the objective of the safety assessment required prior to the grant of an approval as per the new AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(f). The method of conducting the risk assessment is not specified, as this should be in accordance with the risk assessment methodology adopted by the operator in accordance with ORO.GEN.200(a)(3). The data collection requirements derive from the existing requirements in AMC1 SPA.LVO.105, AMC2 SPA.LVO.105, and AMC3 SPA.LVO.105. The number of required approaches has been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.105. This number of approaches is unlikely to be sufficient to conduct a statistical analysis of the data, but has been used for many years as a means of providing confidence in an operator’s equipment, procedures, training, and maintenance systems. The GM highlights that some elements of this confidence could be developed from operations conducted in a flight simulation training device (FSTD). This would especially be the case where the intention was to validate novel operating procedures or training programmes. The GM highlights the potential risks of conducting LVOs without all the required elements in place. An example of this would be conducting autoland operations without the protection of the ILS signal. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail Many operators adopt operating procedures and training programmes developed by, or in conjunction with, an aircraft manufacturer. In such cases, useful data may be available from that manufacturer or from other operators using similar procedures; this data would contribute to the safety assessment. The GM suggests that such data could be shared, when appropriate. As the AMC on ‘transitional periods for CAT II and CAT III operations’ is deleted (AMC4 SPA.LVO.105), guidance has been provided in point (f) about the amount of operational experience that might be required for an operator applying for LVO approval. These figures derive from expert opinion. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail SPA.LVO.110 ‘ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements’ In the existing requirements, aerodrome provisions are addressed in SPA.LVO.115. Where appropriate, the existing requirements of SPA.LVO.110 have been transposed to AMC. The new SPA.LVO.110 states only the safety objective — that only aerodromes and instrument procedures suitable for the intended operations must be used for operations described in SPA.LVO. The details on how to implement the safety objective stated in the rule are moved to AMC level. Since ICAO Annex 14 Standards do not yet address operations with operational credits, it cannot be assumed that aerodrome operators will have to be approved for operations with operational credits. According to the revised rule, the air operator is responsible for establishing whether a particular aerodrome could be used. For some operations with operational credits (e.g. SA CAT I), an IAP published in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) will be required (at AMC level). However, for the majority of operations, a dedicated published IAP for operations with operational credits will be neither available nor required. These operations will use the published procedure for the standard operation, e.g. an EFVS operation with operational credits may use the CAT I IAP. In such cases, it is the responsibility of the operator to ensure that the IAP used is suitable for the intended operation. AMC and GM to the new content of SPA.LVO.110 ‘ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements’ New AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Suitable instrument approach procedures’: the requirement for operations with operational credits to be offset by no more than 2 degrees is amended to 3 degrees in accordance with the certification requirements in AMC AWO.A.EFVS.109 ‘EFVS performance’. Where a particular system is certificated to allow a greater offset, this will be stated in the AFM, and the AMC allows for a different offset in this case. New AMC2 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Suitable aerodromes — LVTO’: the requirements have been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.100. New AMC3 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Suitable aerodromes: approach operations other than EFVS operations’: the requirements have been transposed from the existing AMC3 SPA.LVO.100, AMC4 SPA.LVO.100, AMC5 SPA.LVO.100, AMC6 SPA.LVO.100, and AMC4 SPA.LVO.105. The revised runway classifications have also been implemented. For SA CAT I operations, an ILS performing to the standards required for CAT I only will be required. It is considered that the new CS-AWO will require aircraft equipment to perform to an acceptable standard using such an ILS; the aircraft original equipment manufacturer (OEM) should carry out an assessment on the interface between the aircraft navigation system and the worst-case ILS performance (defined in ICAO Annex 10) in terms of localiser (LOC) deviation and glide path deviation and the outcome of this activity should be captured in the AFM; based on the ILS facility performance that should be made available to air operators by the aerodrome operators, the air operator should then assess if the ILS classification and performance of the intended runway was compatible with the AFM prior to conducting SA CAT I operations. The new CS-AWO will not require IAPs to be promulgated as suitable for EFVS, so it will be the responsibility of the air operator to verify that a particular procedure is suitable (AMC5 SPA.LVO.110 enhances this requirement). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail LTS and OTS CAT II have been removed from the new rules. However, the new rule introduces a similar concept, SA CAT I and SA CAT II. Point (d) of AMC3 SPA.LVO.110 has been transposed from the previous AMC4 SPA.LVO.100 (point (a)(1)). For SA CAT I, the integrity level is as demonstrated during the certification process. A minimum of integrity level of 2 is recommended for LVOs noted in 2.14 of Attachment C to ICAO Annex 10. According to the existing AMC6 SPA.LVO.105, an operator should verify each aircraft type/runway combination by the successful completion of at least one approach and landing in CAT II or better conditions, prior to commencing CAT III operations. Where a runway is promulgated as suitable for CAT III operations, this is considered unnecessary and the requirement has been removed. There is also a requirement that, for runways with irregular pre-threshold terrain or other foreseeable or known deficiencies, each aircraft type/runway combination should be verified by operations in CAT I or better conditions, prior to commencing SA CAT I, SA CAT II or CAT III operations. The pre-threshold terrain could affect the performance of autoland systems. The intent of this requirement was to verify satisfactory autoland performance. The requirement has been amended in point (g) to clarify that the requirement relates to autoland performance, rather than to a specific classification of operation. With regard to point (c)(2), the new text has been added considering the following rationale: the aircraft OEM should carry out an assessment on the interface between the aircraft navigation system and the worst-case ILS performance (defined in ICAO Annex 10) in terms of LOC deviation and glide path deviation and the outcome of this activity should be captured in the AFM; based on the ILS facility performance that should be made available to air operators by the aerodrome operators, the air operator should than assess if the ILS classification and performance of the intended runway was compatible with the AFM prior to conducting SA CAT I operations. On the requirement related to the ILS certification, the change from OTS CAT II to SA CAT II did not involve significant differences. OTS CAT II requirements were developed when II/D/2 was typically used for regular CAT II. Later on, ICAO Annex 10, Vol I was published with the indication that the ILS should typically be II/D/3 (in Attachment C to the Annex, paragraph 2.14.2): ‘2) Level 3 is the performance objective for ILS equipment used to support operations which place a high degree of reliance on ILS guidance for positioning through touchdown. This level is a required objective for equipment supporting Category II and IIIA operations’. Level 2 is nowadays intended to support CAT I requirements. Since the ILS in formation (through HUD or autoland) is used to compensate for lack of visual references, it could be argued that the SA CAT II ILS should indeed meet at least the same criteria as for regular CAT II. Therefore the ILS classification for SA CAT II is proposed to be II/D/3. The new AMC4 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Low-visibility procedures’ enables operators to develop procedures to facilitate LVOs at airports not approved for CAT II/III operations provided that LVPs or equivalent procedures are established. This is intended to facilitate operations with operational credits (e.g. EFVS) in an RVR below 550 m to airports that do not have the usual infrastructure for LVOs. The requirement for LVPs to be established for take-off in an RVR of less than 550 m is moved from AMC1 SPA.LVO.100 to CAT.OP.MPA.110, as this applies to all operators, not only those holding approval for LVTO. New AMC5 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Verifying the suitability of runways for EFVS operations’: the requirements for verifying the suitability of runways for EFVS operations have been developed based on existing rules and equivalent FAA requirements. It has been assumed that there is a higher probability of baulked TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail landing during EFVS operations than during standard operations and that obstacle clearance should therefore be provided in the event of a go-around initiated at any point until touchdown. The new GM1 SPA.LVO.110 ‘ILS classification’ has been transposed from GM2 SPA.LVO.100. The new GM2 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Suitable aerodromes — instrument approach procedures for SA CAT I and SA CAT II’ details the requirements for instrument approach operations using operational credits. The new GM3 SPA.LVO.110 ‘Verification of the suitability of runways for EFVS operations’ is added to detail the requirements for verification of the suitability of approach procedures for EFVS operations using operational credits. SPA.LVO.115 ‘Aerodrome related requirements’ is deleted. SPA.LVO.120 ‘Flight crew competence’ The title of SPA.LVO.120 has been changed from ‘Flight crew training and qualifications’ to ‘Flight crew competence’. The proposed requirement describes the safety objectives and the responsibilities of the operator in relation to flight crew competence, training and checking, and record-keeping. In this regard, it should be noted that it is planned to move the initial and recurrent training, testing and checking requirements for LVOs from Part-FCL to Part-SPA so that it is clear that the training is the responsibility of the aircraft operator. AMC and GM to the new content of SPA.LVO.120 ‘Flight crew competence’ The existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 ‘General provisions’ is deleted so that the training and checking requirements for LVOs can be presented more clearly. The proposal is to have separate AMC for take- off and approach operations and to have separate AMC for initial and recurrent training. GM1 SPA.LVO.120 ‘Flight crew training’ is proposed to be deleted. New AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a) ‘Experience in type or class or as pilot-in-command’: The existing AMC determines a minimum time/sectors on type before commencing CAT II/CAT III operations. The experts involved in the RMT concluded that the relevant minimum experience is difficult to establish, as it depends on many factors. These minimum experience requirements exposed the unexperienced crew to an increased probability of performing a go-around and diversion which could result in a lower level of safety. The requirement is amended to make the operator responsible for determining this minimum level of experience and establish the appropriate mitigation measures. The figures have been transposed to GM1 SPA.LVO.120(a). New AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a) ‘Recent experience requirements for EFVS operations’ and AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) ‘Recent experience requirements for SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations’: these new AMC have been developed to clarify that the approaches required by the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 do not need to be conducted under a training with a qualified instructor but may be conducted in ‘line operations’. For clarity, these approaches are to be referred to as ‘recent experience’. Approaches conducted in an FSTD and/or during a proficiency check will count towards this recent experience requirement. The current recurrent training requirement for pilots using autoland for LVOs is a minimum of two approaches, one of which may be substituted by an approach and landing in the aircraft. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The new GM1 SPA.LVO.120(a) ‘Experience in type or class or as pilot-in-command/commander’ has been transposed from AMC. See the explanatory note regarding AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a). New AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Initial training for LVTO in an RVR less than 400 m’: prior to being authorised to conduct take-offs in RVRs below 400 m, the flight crew should complete training to cover system failures and engine failures resulting in continued as well as rejected take-offs. This AMC transposes the initial training requirements for LVTO operations from AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. The ground training course requirements have been amended to include only those parts relevant to LVTO. Pilots who have not previously been authorised to conduct LVTO with an EU operator are required to complete a check. This transposes the requirements of Section 6 of the line proficiency check (LPC) detailed in Appendix 9 to Part-FCL. The new AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Initial training and checking for SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations’ transposes the initial training requirements for SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III operations from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. Pilots who have not previously been authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations with an EU operator are required to complete a check. This transposes the requirements of Section 6 of the LPC detailed in Appendix 9 to Part-FCL. The number of approaches required during the abbreviated FSTD training for pilots previously authorised for AWOs have not been changed, but the actual number has been included in this AMC for clarity. The existing requirements state that pilots previously qualified for LVOs may complete an abbreviated ground school programme depending on their previous training and experience. This is now amended to clarify that it is the flight crew members’ existing knowledge that should determine the content of the ground school training. The existing requirements state that flight crew should complete a check before conducting CAT II/III operations but allowed that the check could be replaced by successful completion of training. (FCL.605(b)) of Regulation (EU) No 1178/201113 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Aircrew Regulation’) currently requires completion of training at an ATO and a check before being authorised for DHs below 60 m. As it is proposed that this requirement should be removed from the Aircrew Regulation, the proposed AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) will require pilots who have not previously been qualified for low- visibility approach operations with an EU operator to complete the check. New AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Initial training and checking for EFVS operations’: operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the conversion training mentioned in this AMC before being authorised to conduct EFVS operations. There are prescribed elements of the ground training, as well as a course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases. This AMC transposes the initial training requirements for EFVS operations from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. As EFVS operations under Part-SPA may include LVOs, the ground training includes the requirements for LVOs. 13 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 311, 25.11.2011, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1494247473340&uri=CELEX:32011R1178). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail There is no additional credit against line flying under supervision (LIFUS) for training conducted in a level ‘D’ full-flight simulator (FFS), as there is currently no enhanced fidelity requirement for EFVSs in level ‘D’ simulators. Flight crew members will be required to complete FSTD training in each operating capacity in which they will be authorised to operate, i.e. completing FSTD training as pilot monitoring will not qualify the pilot to act as pilot flying. A reference to operational suitability data (OSD) has been added to ensure that operators can take advantage of any available credits. New AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Recurrent checking for LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III approach operations': the recurrent training requirements for SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations have been transposed for the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. This AMC does not include recurrent training requirements for EFVS operations. The current recurrent training requirement for pilots using autoland for LVOs is a minimum of two approaches, one of which may be substituted by an approach and landing in the aircraft. A missed approach is also required. The revised requirement is for at least one approach to be completed during the proficiency check but the recent experience requirement (two approaches) must also be satisfied. New AMC5 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Differences training for LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations’: the differences training requirements for SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III approach operations have been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. The new AMC6 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Recurrent checking for EFVS operations’ describes the recurrent checking requirements for EFVS operations. These have been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. It should be noted that the recent experience and checking requirements are not the same as those adopted by the FAA. The FAA mandates recent experience of six approaches using EFVS every six months. It is considered to be valuable to have exposure to EFVS operations in a training environment, ideally in an FSTD, in order to be able to practise go-around procedures and use of the EFVS in restricted visibility. The intention is that the completion of a ‘check’ will mitigate any skill fade resulting from the lower rate of exposure compared to the FAA system, because pilots will be required to demonstrate their competence to perform EFVS operations. Pilots will be required to meet the recent experience and recurrent checking requirements in each operating capacity that they are authorised to operate (pilot flying or pilot monitoring). New AMC7 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Differences training for EFVS operations’: the differences training requirements for EFVS operations have been transposed from the existing AMC1 SPA.LVO.120. A reference to OSD has been included to ensure that operators can take advantage of available credits. The new GM1 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Flight crew training’ clarifies that the number of approaches required in initial and recurrent training are not cumulative, but where techniques are the same, the training may cover all classifications of operations and operations with operational credits using those techniques. It also specifies that the recent experience requirements may be substituted by approaches flown in an FSTD. This GM also includes a summary table with the number of approaches and landings to be completed in various conditions — described in the preceding AMC. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail The new GM3 SPA.LVO.120(b) ‘Flight crew training’ provides further details about the ground training course in AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) points (a)(1)(i) and (iv). This GM was transposed from AMC1 FCL.725 point (f) that is now deleted from Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation. The current requirements SPA.LVO.125 and SPA.LVO.130 have been deleted. Their content is incorporated in the revised rules. Annex VI ‘Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft’ (Part-NCC) and related AMC & GM NCC.OP.101 ‘Altimeter check and settings’ This new rule is introduced to ensure consistency with Part-CAT; this issue is not yet covered in the Air OPS Regulation or the SERA Regulation; as proper settings are essential for IFR operations, they should be properly covered by regulations; since they are not specific to LVOs or to CAT, the same text is repeated in the GMs to all applicable Annexes (Part-CAT, Part-NCC, Part-NCO and Part-SPO) with the reference to ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume I: 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’; 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’; 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’. The new GM1 NCC.OP.101 ‘Altimeter setting procedures’ provides relevant references from ICAO PANS-OPS, which an operator should use when establishing its operating procedures. NCC.OP.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — general’ This requirement is aligned with CAT.OP.MPA.110 in a proportionate manner. AMC and GM to NCC.OP.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — general’ For all related AMC and GM: for aeroplanes, the text is amended for consistency with the changes to the related AMC and GM to CAT.OP.MPA.110; the parts related to helicopters are not presented in the existing rules and will be presented in AWO NPA Phase 2. AMC3 NCC.OP.110 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — general / Take-off operations’ has editorial changes and a new provision for the calculation of the ‘required RVR’ for aeroplanes. The new provision provides clearer requirements depending on the aeroplane used. Helicopter operations will be dealt with in Phase 2 of the AWO project. The content of the existing AMC4 NCC.OP.110 ‘NPA, APV, CAT I operations — criteria for establishing RVR/CMV’ is moved to the new GM7 NCC.OP.110. The new AMC4 NCC.OP.110 ‘Determination of DH/MDH for instrument approach operations’ combines and amends the content of the existing AMC4 (‘Criteria for establishing RVR/CMV’) and AMC5 (‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV, CAT I — aeroplanes’); parts of the old content of AMC4 and AMC5 are moved to GM. The fully revised AMC5 NCC.OP.110 ‘Determination of RVR or VIS for instrument approach operations — aeroplanes’ combines and amends the content of the former AMC4 NCC.OP.110 (‘Criteria for establishing RVR/CMV’) and AMC5 NCC.OP.110 (‘Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV, CAT I — aeroplanes’); parts of the old content of AMC4 and AMC5 have been moved to GM. The AMC also now provides for the applicable RVR to be determined depending on the type of runway used, i.e. where a precision approach is flown to a non-precision runway or an instrument approach to a non- TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail instrument runway. The lowest applicable RVR may be limited by either the type of runway, the DH/MDH and the class of lighting or the ground facilities and the type of approach, so the AMC specifies that the RVR to be used should be not less than the greatest of these three as determined by the applicable tables. The content of the AMC is identical to the requirements for CAT operators (AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110). NCC.OP.111 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — NPA, APV, CAT I operations’ This IR is proposed to be deleted. Its content is incorporated into the new AMC4 NCC.OP.110. For additional explanations, please see the relevant paragraphs. NCC.OP.112 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — circling approach operations with aeroplanes’ The terms ‘circling’ and ‘circling approach operations’ are defined in Annex I ‘Definitions’. The rule text is slightly modified to ensure consistency with the new terminology. Moreover, incorrect references to ‘procedures’ are corrected with references to ‘operations’. The editorial error in (b)(2) is corrected and the requirement to take into account the minimum RVR for the preceding approach procedure is removed, as this will always be less than the visibility prescribed for circling. GM to NCC.OP.112 ‘Aerodrome operating minima — circling operations with aeroplanes’ The existing GM1 NCC.OP.112 ‘Supplemental information’ has been updated to change ‘visibility’ with ‘VIS’ and to remove the references to the instrument approach track being determined by means of radio navigation aids (see also AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110). NCC.OP.115 ‘Departure and approach procedures’ No change AMC and GM to NCC.OP.115 ‘Departure and approach procedures’ The new AMC1 NCC.OP.115(c) ‘Approach flight technique — aeroplanes’ states that all approach operations should be flown as stabilised approach operations and the CDFA technique should be used for NPA procedures. This AMC has been developed to highlight the importance of the stabilised approach and the appropriate technique that should be used when flying a non-precision approach. NCC.OP.195 ‘Take-off conditions’ This requirement is aligned with CAT.OP.MPA.265, the only difference being the use of the term ‘pilot- in-command’ instead of ‘commander’. NCC.OP.225 ‘Approach and landing conditions’ The content of this rule is fully changed. The requirement is redrafted in alignment with CAT.OP.MPA.300, the only difference being the use of the term ‘pilot-in-command’ instead of ‘commander’. NCC.OP.230 ‘Commencement and continuation of approach’ This requirement is aligned with CAT.OP.MPA.305, the only difference being the use of the term ‘pilot- in-command’ instead of ‘commander’. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail AMC and GM to NCC.OP.230 ‘Commencement and continuation of approach’ AMC1 NCC.OP.230 ‘RVR minima for continued approach: the subtitle of this AMC is changed. The existing content of point (a) is transferred to the new AMC1 NCC.OP.230(b) and the existing points (b), (c) and (d) are transferred to the AMC to SPA.LVO.105(c). With the criteria for the ‘controlling’ RVR being simplified, the experts of RMT.0379 considered that the intention of the ‘approach ban’ is to prevent the situation where a pilot arrives at a DH with insufficient visibility to adequately control the aircraft for landing and thus to reduce the rate of missed approaches from the DH. The intention is to mitigate the risk of loss of control during the roll-out after landing. The only RVR relevant to the ‘approach ban’ should therefore be the TDZ. Where this is not available, the MID may be used as this is the value most likely to be representative of TDZ. With this amendment, a previously complex requirement is now simplified; this should increase the probability of the requirement being clearly understood and applied consistently. The new GM1 NCC.OP.230 ‘Application of RVR or VIS reports’ has been introduced to clarify that there is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on the reported RVR or visibility. The text of this GM is aligned with CAT.OP.MPA.305, which states in point (a) that a pilot may commence an approach regardless of the reported RVR or visibility. The experts of RMT.0379 considered that text was not appropriate at IR level as pilots do not require a specific enabling rule to transition from one phase of flight to the next; nevertheless, it was considered important to clarify that in a GM. A similar new GM has been introduced also to CAT.OP.MPA.305. The new AMC1 NCC.OP.230(a) ‘Approaches with no intention to land’ deals with the situation where approaches are being flown for training purposes with the intention of executing a missed approach. In this situation, there is no need for the approach to be discontinued at 1 000 ft. This clarifies that the prohibition on continuing into the final approach segment is not applicable in this case. The new AMC1 NCC.OP.230(b) ‘Visual references for instrument approach operations’: visual reference requirements at DH are transferred from the existing AMC1 NCC.OP.230 point (a), but remain unchanged. NCC.OP.235 ‘EFVS 200 operations’ Please see the explanations provided above to CAT.OP.MPA.312 and NCC.OP.235, in 3.2.4 ‘Annex IV Commercial air transport operations (Part-CAT)’. Annex VII ‘Non-commercial operations with other-than complex motor-powered aircraft’ (Part-NCO) and related AMC & GM The NPA proposing amendments to Part-NCO and to helicopters will be published at a later stage. The changes to Part-NCO will be made taking into account the proportionality principle towards the more complex Part-CAT or Part-NCC operations. Consequently, the IRs in Part-NCO will be more prescriptive than for CAT operations, including detailed technical aspects. Annex VIII ‘Specialised operations’ (Part-SPO) and related AMC & GM Part-SPO is still in development; the requirements should mirror the relevant requirements under Subpart B ‘Operational procedures’ of Part-NCO; the outcome will be published in the same package with the proposed amendments to helicopter operations in all Annexes and to Part-NCO. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail Helicopter issues in Annexes IV (Part-CAT) – VIII (Part-SPO) and related AMC & GM Helicopter AWO-related matters, taking into account all the specificities of the helicopters’ design, equipment and operations, will be addressed in the AWO NPA Phase 2, together with General- Aviation-related matters (Part-NCO). The proposed draft changes to the Air OPS IRs and of the associated AMC & GM applicable exclusively to helicopters are excluded from the Chapter 3 content (reference to the titles provided only for informative purposes for the readers’ convenience and marked accordingly). 2.2. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 (Draft EASA decision) — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs General All the requirements related to training, testing and checking with regard to LVOs are now transferred to Annex V (Part-SPA) to the Air OPS Regulation and the related AMC/GM. Consequently, all the requirements on LVO training, testing and checking contained so far in Annex I (Part-FCL) to the Aircrew Regulation are deleted. FCL.605 ‘IR — Privileges’ FCL.605(b) is deleted. As a consequence, privileges for DHs lower than 200 ft (as set out in FCL.605 (a)) as well as for acting as pilot during operations in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA) Subpart E to the Air OPS Regulation can only be obtained in accordance with the Air OPS Regulation. In addition, such privileges shall be recorded by the operator in accordance with SPA.LVO.115(c). AWO privileges will not be endorsed on the Part-FCL licence. Appendix 9 ‘Training, skill test and proficiency check for MPL, ATPL, type and class ratings, and proficiency check for IRs’ The following parts of Appendix 9 to Part-FCL are amended in such a way that the content related to LVOs (CAT II/III operations) of the following sections is deleted: — Section B (aeroplanes): paragraph 2 (last two sentences); — Section B (aeroplanes): Section 6 of the skill test programme (CAT II/III exercises); — Section D (powered-lift aircraft): Section 6 of the skill test programme (CAT II/III exercises); and — Section E (airships): Section 6 of the skill test programme (CAT II/III exercises). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law The main objective of this NPA is to present the newly developed proposals for changes of soft law regulatory material relevant for the AWO content. For completeness purposes and in order to facilitate the review of the text, a consolidated regulatory text, as applicable, is provided, presenting both the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ law elements. Note: In cases where both the hard law and the soft law are affected by the intended change, both are presented; if only either the relevant hard law’ or soft law is affected by the intended change, only the proposed change is presented with the note, indicating specifically the intended change (e.g. no changes to the relevant hard law). The following convention has been applied when drafting the proposed amendments of the regulatory text presented in this Chapter. The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text, and unchanged text, as shown below: — deleted text is marked with strike through; — new or amended text is highlighted in grey; — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the remaining the text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment; and — the unchanged text is presented in a typical way as non-highlighted or with strike through (when it is found beneficial for the completeness of the meaning of the changed text). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 3.1. Proposed changes — air operations Article 5 Air operations […] 2. Operators shall comply with the relevant provisions of Annex V when operating: (a) aeroplanes and helicopters used for: (i) operations using performance-based navigation (PBN); (ii) operations in accordance with minimum navigation performance specifications (MNPS); (iii) operations in airspace with reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM); (iv) low-visibility operations (LVOs) and operations with operational credits. […] Annex I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII […] ‘aerodrome operating minima’ means the limits of usability of an aerodrome for: (a) take-off operations, expressed in terms of visibility and/or runway visual range (RVR) and, if necessary, cloud conditions; (b) two-dimensional (2D) instrument approach operations or circling approach operations, expressed in terms of visibility and/or RVR, minimum descent altitude/height (MDA/H) and, if necessary, cloud conditions; and (c) three-dimensional (3D) instrument approach operations, expressed in terms of visibility and/or RVR and decision altitude/height (DA/H); ‘approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) operation’ means an instrument approach which utilises lateral and vertical guidance, but does not meet the requirements established for precision approach and landing operations, with a decision height (DH) not lower than 250 ft and a runway visual range (RVR) of not less than 600 m; (13) ‘category I (CAT I) approach operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing using an instrument landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), GLS (ground-based augmented global navigation satellite system (GNSS/GBAS) landing system), precision approach radar (PAR) or GNSS using a satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) with a decision height (DH) not lower than 200 ft and with a runway visual range (RVR) not less than 550 m for aeroplanes and 500 m for helicopters; (14) ‘category II (CAT II) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS with: (a) DH below 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft; and (b) RVR of not less than 300 m; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (15) ‘category IIIA (CAT IIIA) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS with: (a) DH lower than 100 ft; and (b) RVR not less than 200 m; (16) ‘category IIIB (CAT IIIB) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS with: (a) DH lower than 100 ft, or no DH; and (b) RVR lower than 200 m but not less than 75 m; […] (20) ‘circling’ means the visual phase of an instrument approach to bring an aircraft into position for landing on a runway/FATO that is not suitably located for a straight-in approach; ‘circling’ means the visual phase of a circling approach operation; ‘circling approach operation’ means an approach operation to bring an aircraft into position for landing on a runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) that is not suitably located for a straight-in approach. Circling is a Type A instrument approach operation; ‘continuous descent final approach (CDFA)’ means a technique, consistent with stabilised approach procedures, for flying the final-approach segment (FAS) of a non-precision approach (NPA) procedure as a continuous descent, without level-off, from an altitude/height at or above the final approach fix altitude/height to a point approximately 15 m (50 ft) above the landing runway threshold or the point where the flare manoeuvre shall begins for the type of aircraft flown; for the FAS of an NPA procedure followed by a circling, the CDFA technique applies until circling minima (circling obstacle clearance altitude/height (OCA/H)) or visual flight manoeuvre altitude/height are reached; ‘decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH)’ means a specified altitude or height in a 3D instrument approach operation at which a missed approach procedure must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established; (47) ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’ means a system to display electronic real-time images of the external scene achieved through the use of imaging sensors; ‘enhanced flight vision system (EFVS)’ is an electronic means to provide the flight crew with a real-time sensor- derived or enhanced display of the external scene topography (the natural or man-made features of a place or region especially in a way to show their relative positions and elevation) through the use of imaging sensors; an EFVS is integrated with a flight guidance system and is implemented on a head-up display or an equivalent display system; if an EFVS is certificated according to the applicable airworthiness requirements and an operator holds the necessary specific approval, then EFVS may be used for EFVS operations and may allow operations with operational credits. ‘EFVS operation’ means an operation in which visibility conditions require an EFVS to be used in lieu of natural vision in order to perform an approach or landing, identify the required visual references or conduct a roll-out. ‘EFVS 200 operation’ means an operation in which visibility conditions require an EFVS to be used instead of natural vision in order to continue an approach to 200 ft above the runway threshold in other than low- visibility operations (LVOs). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law ‘final approach segment (FAS)’ means that segment of an instrument approach procedure (IAP) in which alignment and descent for landing are accomplished; ‘go-around’ means a transition from an approach operation to a stabilised climb. This includes manoeuvres conducted at or above the MDA/H or DA/H, or below the DA/H (balked landings); (55) ‘head-up display (HUD)’ means a display system which presents flight information to the pilot’s forward external field of view and which does not significantly restrict the external view; (56) ‘head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS)’ means the total airborne system that provides head-up guidance to the pilot during the approach and landing and/or missed approach procedure. It includes all sensors, computers, power supplies, indications and controls; 'head-up display landing system (HUDLS)’ means the total airborne system which provides head-up guidance to the pilot to enable the pilot to either control the aircraft or to monitor the autopilot during take-off (if applicable), approach and landing (and roll-out if applicable), or go-around. It includes all the sensors, computers, power supplies, indications and controls; ‘instrument approach operation’ means an approach and landing using instruments for navigation guidance based on an IAP. There are two methods for conducting instrument approach operations: (a) 2D instrument approach operation, using lateral navigation guidance only; and (b) 3D instrument approach operation, using both lateral and vertical navigation guidance; ‘instrument approach procedure (IAP)’ means a series of predetermined manoeuvres by reference to flight instruments with specified protection from obstacles from the initial approach fix or, where applicable, from the beginning of a defined arrival route to a point from which a landing can be completed and thereafter, if a landing is not completed, to a position at which holding or en-route obstacle clearance criteria apply. IAPs are classified as follows: (a) non-precision approach (NPA) procedure, which means an IAP designed for 2D instrument approach operations Type A; (b) approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) means a performance-based navigation (PBN) IAP designed for 3D instrument approach operations Type A; (c) precision approach (PA) procedure means an IAP based on navigation systems designed for 3D instrument approach operations Type A or B; (74) ‘low visibility procedures (LVP)’ means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe operations during lower than standard category I, other than standard category II, category II and III approaches and low visibility take-offs; (76) ‘lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operation’ means a category I instrument approach and landing operation using category I DH, with an RVR lower than would normally be associated with the applicable DH but not lower than 400 m; ‘low-visibility operations (LVOs)’ means approach or take-off operations on a runway with any RVR less than 550 m or taxiing at an aerodrome at which any RVR is less than 550 m; ‘low-visibility take-off (LVTO)’ means a take-off with an RVR lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m; less than 550 m; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law ‘minimum descent altitude (MDA) or minimum descent height (MDH)’ means a specified altitude or height in a 2D instrument approach operation or circling approach operation below which descent must not be made without the required visual reference; (83) ‘non-precision approach (NPA) operation’ means an instrument approach with a minimum descent height (MDH), or DH when flying a CDFA technique, not lower than 250 ft and an RVR/CMV of not less than 750 m for aeroplanes and 600 m for helicopters; ‘obstacle clearance altitude (OCA) or obstacle clearance height (OCH)’ means the lowest altitude or the lowest height above the elevation of the relevant runway threshold or the aerodrome elevation, as applicable, used in establishing compliance with the appropriate obstacle clearance criteria; ‘operation with operational credits’ means an operation using specific aircraft or ground equipment, or a combination of aircraft and ground equipment, such that: (a) lower-than-standard aerodrome operating minima can be applied for a particular classification of operation; or (b) visibility requirements can be satisfied or reduced; or (c) fewer ground facilities are required. (92) ‘other than standard category II (OTS CAT II) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS where some or all of the elements of the precision approach category II light system are not available, and with: (a) DH below 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft; and (b) RVR of not less than 350 m; ‘Type A instrument approach operation’ means an operation with an MDA/H or a DA/H at or above 250 ft; ‘Type B instrument approach operation’ means an operation with a minimum DA/H below 250 ft. Type B instrument approach operations are categorised as: (a) Category I (CAT I): a DA/H not lower than 200 ft and with either a visibility not less than 800 m or an RVR not less than 550 m; (b) Category II (CAT II): a DH lower than 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft, and an RVR not less than 300 m; (c) Category III (CAT III): a DH lower than 100 ft or no DH, and an RVR less than 300 m or no RVR limitation;’ ‘visibility’ means visibility for aeronautical purposes, which is the greater of: (a) the greatest distance at which a black object of suitable dimensions, situated near the ground, can be seen and recognised when observed against a bright background; and (b) the greatest distance at which lights in the vicinity of 1 000 candelas can be seen and identified against an unlit background; ‘visual approach operation’ means an approach operation when either part or all parts of an instrument approach procedure IAP is (are) not completed and the approach operation is executed with visual reference to the terrain; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law ‘weather-permissible aerodrome’ means an adequate aerodrome where, for the anticipated time of use, weather meteorological reports, or forecasts, or any combination thereof, indicate that the weather meteorological conditions will be at or above the required aerodrome operating minima, and the runway surface condition reports indicate that a safe landing will be possible. GM2 Annex I Definitions ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CVS combined vision system (…) FAS final approach segment (…) EFVS enhanced flight vision system EFVS-A enhanced flight vision system used for approach EFVS-L enhanced flight vision system used for landing (…) FOV field of view (…) OFZ obstacle free zone (…) PVD paravisual display (…) SVS synthetic vision system (…) TDZE touchdown zone elevation (…) VSS visual segment surface (…) GM16 Annex I Definitions DEFINITIONS USED FOR ALL-WEATHER OPERATIONS For the purpose of AMC and GM to this Regulation, the following definitions should apply: ‘EFVS-Approach (EFVS-A)’ is a system that has been demonstrated to meet the criteria to be used for approach operations from a DA/H or an MDA to 30 m (100 ft) touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) whilst all system components are functioning as intended, but may have failure modes that could result in the loss of EFVS capability. It should be assumed for an EFVS-A that: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) the pilot will conduct a go-around above 30 m (100 ft) TDZE, in the event of an EFVS failure; and (b) descent below 30 m (100 ft) above the TDZE through to touchdown and roll-out should be conducted using natural vision in order that any failure of the EFVS does not prevent the pilot from completing the approach and landing. ‘EFVS-Landing (EFVS-L)’ is an EFVS that has been demonstrated to meet the criteria to be used for approach and landing operations that rely on sufficient visibility conditions to enable unaided roll-out and to mitigate for loss of EFVS function. ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’ is an electronic means to provide the flight crew with a real-time sensor- derived and enhanced image of the external scene topography (the natural or man-made features of a place or region especially in a way to show their relative positions and elevation) through the use of imaging sensors. An EVS that is not an EFVS cannot be used for EFVS operations and therefore does not attract an operational credit. ‘head-up display (HUD) or equivalent display system’ means a display system which presents flight information to the pilot’s forward external field of view (FOV) and which does not significantly restrict the external view. GM17 to Annex I Definitions ENHANCED VISION SYSTEMS (EVSs) (a) Introduction to EVS EVSs use sensing technology to improve a pilot’s ability to detect objects and topographical features ahead of the aircraft. Different types of sensing technology are used on different aircraft installations. Sensing technologies used include forward-looking infrared, millimetre wave radiometry, millimetre wave radar or low-light level intensification; additional technologies may be developed in the future. The image from sensors may be displayed to the pilot in a number of different ways including ‘head-up’ and ‘head-down’ displays. (b) EVS and EFVS An EFVS is an EVS that is integrated with a flight guidance system, which presents the image from sensors to the pilot on a head-up display (HUD) or equivalent display. If EFVS equipment is certificated according to the applicable airworthiness requirements and an operator holds the necessary specific approval, then an EFVS may be used for EFVS operations. An EFVS operation is an operation with an operational credit which allows operating in visibility conditions lower than those in which operations without the use of EFVS are permitted. (c) Functions of EVSs Depending on the capabilities of the particular system, EVS may be useful for the following during operations at night or in reduced visibility: (1) improving visibility of airport features and other traffic during ground operations; (2) displaying terrain and obstructions in flight; (3) displaying weather in flight; (4) improving visibility of the runway environment during approach operations; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) improving visibility of obstructions on a runway (e.g. aircraft, vehicles or animals) during take-off and approach operations. (d) Limitations of EVS EVS is a useful tool for enhancing situational awareness; however, each EVS installation has its own specific limitations. These may include: (1) Performance variations according to conditions including ambient temperature and lighting and weather phenomena. A system may provide very different image qualities in the same visibility depending on the particular phenomena causing restricted visibility, e.g., haze, rain, fog, snow, dust, etc. (2) An EVS may not be able to detect certain types of artificial lighting. Light emitting diode (LED) lights have a much lower infrared signature than incandescent lights and therefore may not be detected by some types of EVSs. LED lighting is used for runway, taxiway and approach lighting at many airports. (3) Monochrome display. EVSs will generally not be able to detect and display the colour of airport lighting. This means that colour coding used on airport lighting will not be visible to the pilot using an EVS. (4) Many EVS installations do not have redundancy, so a single failure may lead to loss of the EVS image. (5) The location of the sensor on the airframe may mean that in certain conditions it could be susceptible to ice accretion or to obscuration from impact damage from objects such as insects or birds. (6) Where an EVS image is presented on a HUD or an equivalent display, the image needs to be consistent with the pilot’s external view through the display. Particular installations may have limitations on the conditions under which this consistent image can be generated (e.g. crosswind conditions during approach). (7) Imaging sensor performance can be variable and unpredictable. Pilots should not assume that a flightpath is free of hazards because none are visible in an EVS image. (e) Considerations for the use of EVS EVSs may be used in all phases of flight and have significant potential to enhance pilot’s situational awareness. No specific approval is required for the use of EVS; however, the operator is responsible to ensure that the flight crew members have received training on the equipment installed on their aircraft in accordance with ORO.FC.120, also to evaluate the risks associated with system limitations and implement suitable mitigations in accordance with ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) before using the EVS. The use of EVSs does not permit the use of different operating minima and EVS images cannot replace natural vision for required visual reference in any phase of flight including take-off, approach or landing. GM18 Annex I Definitions INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) Depending on the instrument approach procedure (IAP) in use, the lateral and vertical navigation guidance for an instrument approach operation may be provided by: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) a ground-based radio navigation aid; or (2) computer-generated navigation data from ground-based, space-based, self-contained navigation aids or a combination of them. (b) A non-precision approach procedure flown as CDFA with vertical path guidance calculated by on-board equipment is considered to be a 3D instrument approach operation. Depending on the limitations of the equipment and information sources used to generate vertical guidance, it may be necessary for the pilot to cross-check this guidance against other navigational sources during the approach and to ensure that the minimum altitude/height over published step-down fixes is observed. (c) Further guidance on the classification of an instrument approach operation based on the designed lowest operating minima is contained in Appendix J to ICAO Doc 9365 Manual of All-Weather Operations, Fourth Edition, July 2016. GM 19 Annex I Definitions DECISION ALTITUDE (DA) OR DECISION HEIGHT (DH) (a) Decision altitude (DA) is referenced to mean sea level and decision height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation. (b) For operations using DA, the aircraft altimeters are set to QNH. For operations using a barometric DH, the aircraft altimeters are set to QFE. (c) For SA CAT I, SA CAT II, CAT II/III operations, the DH is based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. The DH is determined with reference to threshold elevation, but the value of the DH set for the approach will be based on the height of the aircraft above the pre-threshold terrain, which may be higher or lower than the threshold. GM 20 Annex I Definitions MINIMUM DESCENT ALTITUDE (MDA) OR MINIMUM DESCENT HEIGHT (MDH) (a) Minimum descent altitude (MDA) is referenced to mean sea level and minimum descent height (MDH) is referenced to the aerodrome elevation or to the threshold elevation if that is more than 2 m (7 ft) below the aerodrome elevation. An MDH for a circling approach is referenced to the aerodrome elevation. (b) ‘Required visual reference’ means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the desired flight path. In the case of a circling approach, the required visual reference is the runway environment. (c) For convenience, when both expressions are used, they may be written in the form ‘minimum descent altitude/height’ and abbreviated ‘MDA/H’. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Doc 9365 Manual of All-Weather Operations J-1 APPENDIX J Performance-Based Approach Classification Summary Domain Document ICAO Panel Operations Type A Type B Classification Approach (>=250’) (200<=DA/H<250’) (<200’) Annex 6 FLTOPSP Operations 2D or 3D 3D 3D MDA/H or DA/H DA/H DA/H MDA/H or Non-instrument RWY DA/H >= VCM M(DA/H) >=250’ Non-precision RWY Visibility >=1 000 m Approach Minima DA/H >= 200’ Runway Annex 14 ADOP Precision RWY, Category I Requirements RVR >=550 m DA/H >=100’ Precision RWY, Category II RVR >=300 m DA/H >=0’ Precision RWY, Category III (A, B, C) RVR >= 0 m Annex 10, VOR, NDB, LOC System NSP PANS-OPS, and LDA w/ GS ILS, MLS, Performance IFPP Volume II, GBAS Procedures PBNSG PBN (including SBAS), ILS, MLS, GBAS PBN Manual TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. 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Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex II Authority requirements for air operations (Part-ARO) AMC5 ARO.OPS.200 Specific approval procedure PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL OF LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS Before issuing an approval for low-visibility operations (LVOs), the competent authority should verify that the applicant has: (a) taken account of the relevant airworthiness requirement and limitations; (b) established relevant aerodrome operating minima; (c) established and documented relevant operating procedures; (d) established and conducted adequate training and checking programmes; (e) adopted the minimum equipment list (MEL) for the LVOs to be undertaken; (f) made the relevant assessments as to which runways are eligible for the LVOs to be conducted; and (g) established and conducted the relevant risk assessment and monitoring programmes. Appendix II is replaced by the following: ‘APPENDIX II OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS (subject to the approved conditions in the operations manual) Issuing Aauthority Ccontact Ddetails Telephone(1): ___________________; Fax: ___________________; Email: ___________________ AOC(2): Operator Nname(3): Date(4): Signature: Dba Ttrading Nname Operations specifications #: Aircraft model(5): Registration marks(6): Types of operations: Commercial operations air transport ☐ Passengers ☐ Cargo ☐Others(7): _______________ Area of operation(8): TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Special limitations(9): Specific approvals: Yes No Specification(10) Remarks Dangerous goods: ☐ ☐ Low-visibility operations CAT(11).... Take-off ☐ ☐ RVR(112): m Approach and landing ☐ ☐ CAT(12)…. DA/H: ft, RVR: m Operational credits ☐ ☐ CAT(13)…..DA/H: ft, RVR: m RVSM(143) ☐ N/A ☐ ☐ Maximum diversion ETOPS(154) ☐ N/A ☐ ☐ time(165): min. (187) Complex navigation specifications for ☐ ☐ PBN operations(176) Minimum navigation performance ☐ ☐ specification (1918) Operations of single-engined turbine aeroplane at night or in IMC (SET- ☐ ☐ IMC) Helicopter operations with the aid of ☐ ☐ night vision imaging systems Helicopter hoist operations ☐ ☐ Helicopter emergency medical ☐ ☐ service operations Helicopter offshore operations ☐ ☐ Cabin crew training(2019) ☐ ☐ Issue of CC attestation(210) ☐ ☐ Continuing airworthiness ☐ ☐ (221) Others(232) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) Telephone and fax contact details of the competent authority, including the country code. Email to be provided if available. (2) Insertion of associated air operator certificate (AOC) number. (3) Insertion of the operator’s registered name and the operator’s trading name, if different. Insert ‘Dba’ before the trading name (for ‘Doing business as’). (4) Issue date of the operations specifications (dd-mm-yyyy) and signature of the competent authority representative. (5) Insertion of ICAO designation of the aircraft make, model and series, or master series, if a series has been designated (e.g. Boeing-737-3K2 or Boeing-777-232). (6) The registration marks are listed either in the operations specifications or in the operations manual. In the latter case, the related operations specifications must make a reference to the related page in the operation manual. In case not all specific approvals apply to the aircraft model, the registration marks of the aircraft may be entered in the remark column to the related specific approval. (7) Other type of transportation to be specified (e.g. emergency medical service). (8) Listing of geographical area(s) of authorised operation (by geographical coordinates or specific routes, flight information region or national or regional boundaries). (9) Listing of applicable special limitations (e.g. VFR only, day only, etc.). (10) List in this column the most permissive criteria for each approval or the approval type (with appropriate criteria). (11) Insertion of applicable precision approach category: LTS CAT I, CAT II, OTS CAT II, CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB or CAT IIIC. Insertion of minimum runway visual range (RVR) in meters and decision height (DH) in feet. One line is used per listed approach category. (1211) Insertion of approved minimum take-off RVR in metres. One line per approval may be used if different approvals are granted. (1312) Insertion of applicable PA category: LTS CAT I, CAT II, OTS CAT II, or CAT III IIIA, CAT IIIB or CAT IIIC. Insertion of minimum RVR in metres and DH in feet. One line is used per listed approach category. (13) Insertion of applicable operational credit: SA CAT I, SA CAT II, EFVS, EFVS 200 etc. Insertion of minimum RVR in metres and DH in feet. One line is used per listed operational credit. (1314) Not Applicable (N/A) box may be checked only if the aircraft maximum ceiling is below FL290. (1415) Extended range operations (ETOPS) currently applies only to two-engined aircraft. Therefore, the not applicable (N/A) box may be checked if the aircraft model has more or less than two engines. (1516) The threshold distance may also be listed (in NM), as well as the engine type. (1617) Performance-based navigation (PBN): one line is used for each complex PBN specific approval (e.g. RNP AR APCH), with appropriate limitations listed in the ‘Specifications’ and/or ‘Remarks’ columns. Procedure-specific approvals of specific RNP AR APCH procedures may be listed in the operations specifications or in the operations manual. In the latter case, the related operations specifications must have a reference to the related page in the operations manual. (1718) Specify if the specific approval is limited to certain runway ends and/or aerodromes. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1819) Insertion of the particular airframe/engine combination. (1920) Approval to conduct the training course and examination to be completed by applicants for a cabin crew attestation as specified in Annex V (Part-CC) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011. (2021) Approval to issue cabin crew attestations as specified in Annex V (Part-CC) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011. (2122) The name of the person/organisation responsible for ensuring that the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is maintained and a reference to the regulation that requires the work, i.e. Subpart G of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. (2223) Other approvals or data may be entered here, using one line (or one multi-line block) per authorisation (e.g. short landing operations, steep approach operations, helicopter operations to/from a public interest site, helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area, helicopter operations without a safe forced landing capability, operations with increased bank angles, maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval, aircraft used for non-commercial operations). EASA Form 139 Issue 34 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex III Organisation requirements for air operations (Part-ORO) There are no changes proposed for ORO.GEN.130 ‘Changes relevant to an AOC holder’. GM1 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from the competent authority as specified in the applicable implementing rules: (…) (p) method used to establish aerodrome operating minima; (pq) (…) (qr) (…) (rs) (…) (st) (…) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Appendix I DECLARATION in accordance with Commission Regulation (ECEU) No 965/2012 on Air operations Operator Name: Place in which the operator is established or residing and place from which the operations are directed: Name and contact details of the accountable manager: Continuing airworthiness management organisation in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003(EU) 1321/2014 Name and address of the organisation and approval reference (as per EASA Form 14) Aircraft operation Starting date of operation/applicability date of the change: Type(s) of operation: ⎕ Part-NCC: (specify if passenger and/or cargo) ⎕ Part-SPO: (specify which type of activity) Type(s) of aircraft, registration(s) and main base: Details of approvals held (attach list of specific approvals to the declaration, if applicable) Details of specialised operations authorisation held (attach authorisations, if applicable) Name of operations with operational credits conducted (e.g. EFVS 200, SA CAT I, etc.): List of alternative means of compliance with references to the AMCs they replace (attach to the declaration) Statements ⎕ The management system documentation, including the operations manual, reflects the applicable requirements set out in Part-ORO, Part-NCC, Part-SPO and Part-SPA. All flights will be carried out in accordance with the procedures and instructions specified in the operations manual. ⎕ All aircraft operated hold a valid certificate of airworthiness and comply with Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014(EC) No 2042/2003. ⎕ All flight crew members and cabin crew members, as applicable, are trained in accordance with the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law applicable requirements. ⎕ (If applicable) The operator has implemented and demonstrated conformity conformance to an officially recognised industry standard. Reference of the standard: Certification body: Date of the last conformance conformity audit: ⎕ Any change in the operation that affects the information disclosed in this declaration will be notified to the competent authority. ⎕ The operator confirms that the information disclosed in this declaration is correct. Date, name and signature of the accountable manager TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex IV Commercial air transport operations (Part-CAT) CAT.OP.MPA.101 Altimeter check and settings (a) The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter checking before each departure. (b) The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter settings for all phases of flight. If the State of the aerodrome or the State of the airspace has prescribed a different procedure from those established by the operator, that procedure shall be taken into account by the operator. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.101 Altimeter check and settings ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES The operator procedures should be aligned with the following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume I: (a) 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’; (b) 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’; (c) 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’. CAT.OP.MPA.107 Adequate aerodrome The operator shall consider an aerodrome as adequate if, at the expected time of use, the aerodrome is available and equipped with necessary ancillary services such as air traffic services (ATS), sufficient lighting, communications, weather meteorological reporting, navigation aids and emergency services. CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima (a) The operator shall establish aerodrome operating minima for each departure, destination or alternate aerodrome planned to be used. These minima shall not be lower than those established for such aerodromes by the State in which the aerodrome is located, except when specifically approved by that State. Any increment specified by the competent authority shall be added to the minima. (b) The use of a head-up display (HUD), head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS) or enhanced vision system (EVS) may allow operations with lower visibilities than the established aerodrome operating minima if approved in accordance with SPA.LVO. (c) When establishing aerodrome operating minima, the operator shall take the following into account: (1) the type, performance and handling characteristics of the aircraft; (2) the composition, competence and experience of the flight crew; (3) the dimensions and characteristics of the runways/final approach and take-off areas (FATOs) that may be selected for use; (4) the adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual ground aids; (5) the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation and/or control of the flight path during the take-off, the approach, the flare, the landing, rollout and the missed approach; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (6) for the determination of obstacle clearance, the obstacles in the approach, missed approach and the climb-out areas necessary for the execution of contingency procedures; (7) the obstacle clearance altitude/height for the instrument approach procedures; (8) the means to determine and report meteorological conditions; and (9) the flight technique to be used during the final approach. (d) The operator shall specify the method of determining aerodrome operating minima in the operations manual. (e) The minima for a specific approach and landing procedure shall only be used if all the following conditions are met: (1) the ground equipment shown on the chart required for the intended procedure is operative; (2) the aircraft systems required for the type of approach are operative; (3) the required aircraft performance criteria are met; and (4) the crew is appropriately qualified. (a) The operator shall establish aerodrome operating minima for each departure, destination or alternate aerodrome planned to be used in order to ensure separation of the aircraft from terrain and obstacles and to mitigate the risk of loss of visual references during the visual flight segment of instrument operations. (b) The method used to establish aerodrome operating minima shall take the following elements into account: (1) the type, performance and handling characteristics of the aircraft; (2) the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation, acquisition of visual references and/or control of the flight path during take-off, approach, landing and the missed approach; (3) any conditions or limitations stated in the aircraft flight manual (AFM); (4) the dimensions and characteristics of the runways/final approach and take-off areas (FATOs) that may be selected for use; (5) the adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure; (6) the obstacle clearance altitude/height (OCA/H) for the instrument approach procedures (IAPs); (7) the obstacles in the climb-out areas and necessary clearance margins; (8) any non-standard characteristics of the aerodrome, the IAP or the environment; (9) the composition of the flight crew, their competence and experience; (10) the IAP; (11) the aerodrome characteristics and the available air navigation services (ANS); (12) any minima that may be promulgated by the State of the aerodrome; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (13) the conditions prescribed in the operations specifications including any specific approvals for LVOs or operations with operational credits; and (14) relevant operational experience of the operator. (c) The operator shall specify a method of determining aerodrome operating minima in the operations manual. (d) The method used by the operator to establish aerodrome operating minima and any change to that method shall be approved by the competent authority. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES (a) General (1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility (VIS) or runway visual range (RVR) limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome runway planned to be used and aircraft characteristics and equipment. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling cloud conditions, should be specified. (2) The commander should not commence take-off when the RVR is less than 550 m unless low- visibility procedures (LVPs) are established. (23) The commander should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome unless a weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.: (i) the departure aerodrome is a weather-permissible aerodrome; or (ii) a weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available. (34) When the reported meteorological visibility (VIS) is below that required for take-off and the RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum. (45) When no reported meteorological visibility VIS or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum. (b) Visual reference (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine. (2) For night operations, ground the prescribed runway lights should be available to illuminate in operation to mark the runway and any obstacles. (c) Required RVR/ or VIS — aeroplanes (1) For multi-engined aeroplanes, with performance such that, in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off, the aeroplane can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the take-off TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/CMV (converted meteorological visibility) or VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A. (2) For multi-engined aeroplanes without the performance to comply with the conditions in (c)(1) in the event of a critical engine failure, there may be a need to re-land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles in the take-off area. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the following take-off minima provided they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the height specified. The take-off minima specified by the operator should be based upon the height from which the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) net take-off flight path can be constructed. The RVR minima used should not be lower than either of the values specified in Table 1.A or Table 2.A. (3) For single-engined turbine aeroplane operations approved in accordance with Subpart L (SET-IMC) of Annex V (Part-SPA) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/CMV values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A below. Unless the operator is making use of a risk period, whenever the surface in front of the runway does not allow for a safe forced landing, the RVR/CMV values should not be lower than 800 m. In this case, the proportion of the flight to be considered starts at the lift-off position and ends when the aeroplane is able to turn back and land on the runway in the opposite direction or glide to the next landing site in case of power loss. (4) When RVR or VIS meteorological visibility is not available, the commander should not commence take-off unless he/ or she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima. Table 1.A: Take-off — aeroplanes (without an approval for low-visibility take-off (LVTO)): RVR/ or VIS Facilities RVR/ or VIS (m) * Day only: Nil** 500 Day: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline markings 400 Night: at least runway edge lights and runway end lights or runway centreline lights and runway end lights *: The reported RVR/ or VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. **: The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 2.A: Take-off — aeroplanes Assumed engine failure height above the runway versus RVR/ or VIS Assumed engine failure height RVR/ or VIS (m) * above the take-off runway (ft) <50 400 (200 with LVTO approval) 51–100 400 (200 with LVTO approval) 101–150 400 151–200 500 201–300 1 000 >300 *or if no positive take-off flight path can be 1 500 constructed *: 1 500m is also applicable if no positive take-off flight path can be constructed. **: The reported RVR/ or VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS Place holder AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima NPA, APV, CAT I OPERATIONS DETERMINATION OF DH/MDH FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) The decision height (DH) to be used for a non-precision approach (NPA) 3D approach operation or a 2D approach operation flown with the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique, approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) or category (CAT) I operation should not be lower than the highest of: (1) the minimum height to which the approach aid can be used without the required visual reference; (12) the obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft; (23) the published approach procedure DH or minimum descent height (MDH) where applicable; (34) the system minimum specified in Table 3.A; or (4) the minimum DH permitted for the runway specified in Table 4.A; or (5) the minimum DH specified in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or equivalent document, if stated. (b) The minimum descent height (MDH) for an NPA operation 2D approach operation flown without the CDFA technique should not be lower than the highest of: (1) the OCH for the category of aircraft; (2) the published approach procedure MDH where applicable; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (32) the system minimum specified in Table 3.A; or (4) the lowest MDH permitted for the runway specified in Table 4.A; or (53) the minimum lowest MDH specified in the AFM, if stated. Table 3.A: System minima Facility Lowest DH/MDH (ft) ILS/MLS/GLS 200 GNSS/SBAS (LPV) 200* GNSS (LNAV) 250 GNSS/Baro-VNAV (LNAV/VNAV) 250 LOC with or without DME 250 SRA (terminating at ½ NM) 250 SRA (terminating at 1 NM) 300 SRA (terminating at 2 NM or more) 350 VOR 300 VOR/DME 250 NDB 350 NDB/DME 300 VDF 350 * For localiser performance with vertical guidance (LPV), a DH of 200 ft may be used only if the published FAS datablock sets a vertical alert limit not exceeding 35 m. Otherwise, the DH should not be lower than 250 ft. DME: distance measuring equipment; GNSS: global navigation satellite system; ILS: instrument landing system; LNAV: lateral navigation; LOC: localiser; LPV: localiser performance with vertical guidance SBAS: satellite-based augmentation system; SRA: surveillance radar approach; VDF: VHF direction finder; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 64 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law VNAV: vertical navigation; VOR: VHF omnidirectional radio range. Table 4.A: Runway type minima Runway type Lowest DH/MDH (ft) Precision approach (PA) runway category I 200 NPA runway 250 Non-instrument runway Circling minima as shown in Table 10 Non-instrument FATO/runway for helicopters 250 (c) Where a barometric DA/H is used, this should be adjusted where the ambient temperature is significantly below international standard atmosphere (ISA). GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Low temperature correction’ provides a table with temperature corrections to be applied. AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING RVR/CMV (a) Aeroplanes The following criteria for establishing RVR/CMV should apply: (1) In order to qualify for the lowest allowable values of RVR/CMV specified in Table 6.A, the instrument approach should meet at least the following facility specifications and associated conditions: (i) Instrument approaches with designated vertical profile up to and including 4.5° for category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for category C and D aeroplanes where the facilities are: (A) ILS/microwave landing system (MLS)/GBAS landing system (GLS)/precision approach radar (PAR); or (B) APV; and where the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for category C and D aeroplanes. (ii) Instrument approach operations flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical profile, up to and including 4.5° for category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, with a final approach segment of at least 3 NM, which also fulfil the following criteria: (A) the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for category C and D aeroplanes; (B) the final approach fix (FAF) or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is available, or distance to threshold (THR) is available by flight management system/GNSS (FMS/GNSS) or DME; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 65 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (C) if the missed approach point (MAPt) is determined by timing, the distance from FAF or another appropriate fix to THR is ≤ 8 NM. (iii) Instrument approaches where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, not fulfilling the criteria in (a)(1)(ii), or with an MDH ≥ 1 200 ft. (2) The missed approach operation, after an approach operation has been flown using the CDFA technique, should be executed when reaching the DA/H or the MAPt, whichever occurs first. The lateral part of the missed approach procedure should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart. DETERMINATION OF RVR OR VIS FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES (a) The RVR/CMV for straight-in instrument approach operations should be not less than the greater of the following: (1) The minimum RVR or VIS for type of runway used according to Table 5.A; or (2) The minimum RVR or VIS determined according to the MDH or DH and class of lighting facility according to Table 6.A; or (3) The minimum RVR or VIS according to the visual and non-visual aids and on-board equipment used according to Table 7.A. (b) For Category A and B aeroplanes, if the RVR or VIS determined in accordance with point (a) is greater than 1 500 m, then 1 500 m should be used. (c) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above the MDA/H, then 200 m should be added to the calculated RVR for Category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes. (d) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings, runway edge lights, threshold lights, runway end lights and approach lights as defined in Table 8.A. (e) For night operations or for any operation where credit for visual aids is required, the lights should be on and serviceable except as provided for in Table 12. Table 5.A: The type of runway vs minimum RVR or VIS Type of runway Minimum RVR or VIS (m) Precision approach runway, category I 550 Non-precision approach runway 750 Non-instrument runway According to Table 10 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 66 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 6.A: RVR/CMV vs DH/MDH DH or MDH Class of lighting facility (ft) FALS IALS BALS NALS RVR/CMV (m) 200 - 210 550 750 1 000 1 200 211 - 240 550 800 1 000 1 200 241 - 250 550 800 1 000 1 300 251 - 260 600 800 1 100 1 300 261 - 280 600 900 1 100 1 300 281 - 300 650 900 1 200 1 400 301 - 320 700 1 000 1 200 1 400 321 - 340 800 1 100 1 300 1 500 341 - 360 900 1 200 1 400 1 600 361 - 380 1 000 1 300 1 500 1 700 381 - 400 1 100 1 400 1 600 1 800 401 - 420 1 200 1 500 1 700 1 900 421 - 440 1 300 1 600 1 800 2 000 441 - 460 1 400 1 700 1 900 2 100 461 - 480 1 500 1 800 2 000 2 200 481 500 1 500 1 800 2 100 2 300 501 - 520 1 600 1 900 2 100 2 400 521 - 540 1 700 2 000 2 200 2 400 541 - 560 1 800 2 100 2 300 2 400 561 - 580 1 900 2 200 2 400 2 400 581 - 600 2 000 2 300 2 400 2 400 601 - 620 2 100 2 400 2 400 2 400 621 - 640 2 200 2 400 2 400 2 400 641 660 2 300 2 400 2 400 2 400 661 and above 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 67 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 7.A: The visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment vs minimum RVR — multi-pilot operations Lowest RVR Type of Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot operations operations 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway centreline No limitation operations lights (RCLL) without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or equivalent No limitation 600 m system; coupled auto-pilot or flight director to the DH No RTZL and RCLL, not using HUDLS or equivalent system 750 m 800 m or auto-pilot to the DH. 2D Final approach track offset <15o for category A and B 750 m 800 m operations aeroplanes or <5o for Category C and D aeroplanes Final approach track offset  15o for Category A and B 1 000 m 1 000 m aeroplanes Final approach track offset  5o for Category C and D 1 200 m 1 200 m aeroplanes Table 8.A: Approach lighting systems Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights (f) The RVR/CMV for Type A and Type B CAT I instrument approach operations should be not greater than the lesser of the value calculated in point (a) or: (1) for Category A and B aeroplanes, 1 500 m; (2) for Category C and D aeroplanes, 2 400 m. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 68 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (g) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings, runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights and approach lights as defined in Table 8.A. (h) For night operations or for any operation where credit for visual aids is required, the lights should be on and serviceable except as provided for in Table 12. (i) Where any visual or non-visual aid specified for the approach and assumed to be available in the determination of operating minima is unavailable, revised operating minima will need to be determined. AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, APV, CAT I — AEROPLANES AMC5 AMC6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, CAT I INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS Place holder AMC6 AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima CIRCLING OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES (a) Circling minima The following standards should apply for establishing circling minima for operations with aeroplanes: (1) the MDH for circling operation should not be lower than the highest of: (i) the published circling OCH for the aeroplane category; (ii) the minimum circling height derived from Table 710; or (iii) the DH/MDH of the preceding instrument approach procedure IAP; (2) the MDA for circling should be calculated by adding the published aerodrome elevation to the MDH, as determined by (a)(1); and (3) the minimum VIS visibility for circling should be the highest of: (i) the circling VISvisibility for the aeroplane category, if published; or (ii) the minimum VIS visibility derived from Table 710.; or (iii) the RVR/CMV derived from Tables 5 and 6.A 5.A for the preceding instrument approach procedure. Table 710: Circling — aeroplanes MDH and minimum VIS visibility vs aeroplane category Aeroplane category A B C D MDH (ft) 400 500 600 700 Minimum meteorological visibility VIS 1 500 1 600 2 400 3 600 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 69 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (m) (b) Conduct of flight — general: (1) the MDH and OCH included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation; (2) the MDA is referenced to mean sea level; (3) for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the meteorological visibility VIS; and (4) operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre. (c) Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks (1) When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised, but not below the MDA/H, the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach procedure IAP until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached. (2) At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach track determined by radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS should be maintained until the pilot: (i) estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure; (ii) estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and (iii) is able to determine the aeroplane’s position in relation to the runway of intended landing with the aid of the appropriate external visual references. (3) When reaching the published instrument MAPt and the conditions stipulated in (c)(2) are unable to be established by the pilot, a missed approach should be carried out in accordance with that instrument approach procedure IAP. (4) After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the aeroplane to: (i) attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and (ii) remain within the circling area and in such way that visual contact with the runway of intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times. (5) Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H. (6) Descent below the MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone TDZ. (d) Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 70 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) The aeroplane should remain on the initial instrument approach procedure IAP until one of the following is reached: (i) the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or (ii) the MAPt. (2) The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the circling manoeuvre divergence point. (…) (8) Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from the MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the touchdown zone TDZ. (e) Missed approach (1) Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling: (i) (…) (ii) If the instrument approach procedure IAP is carried out with the aid of an ILS, an MLS or an stabilised approach (SAp), the MAPt associated with an ILS, or an MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used. (…) AMC7 AMC8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima ONSHORE CIRCLING OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS Place holder AMC8 AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima VISUAL APPROACH OPERATIONS The operator should not use an RVR of less than 800 m for a visual approach operation. AMC9 AMC10 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima CONVERSION OF REPORTED METEOROLOGICAL VISIBILITY TO RVR (a) A conversion from meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV should not be used: (a) If the reported RVR is not available, a converted meteorological visibility (CMV) may be substituted for the RVR, except: (1) when reported RVR is not available; (21) for calculating take-off minima; and or (32) for any RVR minima less than 800 m for the purpose of continuation of an approach in LVO. (b) If the RVR is reported as being above the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g. ‘RVR more than 1 500 m’, it should not be considered as a reported value for (a)(1). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 71 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) If the minimum RVR for an approach is more than the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g. ‘RVR more than 1 500 m’, then CMV should be used. (c) When converting meteorological visibility to RVR in circumstances other than those in (a), the conversion factors specified in Table 8 should be used. (c) In order to determine CMV from reported or forecast visibility, the conversion factors specified in Table 11 should be used. Table 811: Conversion of reported meteorological visibility VIS to RVR/CMV Light elements in operation RVR/CMV = reported VIS meteorological visibility x Day Night HI approach and runway lights 1.5 2.0 Any type of light installation other than above 1.0 1.5 No lights 1.0 not applicable AMC10 AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT (a) General These instructions are intended for use both preflight and in-flight. It is, however, not expected that the commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 912, and the approach may have to be abandoned. (b) Conditions applicable to Table 912: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 912 should not be acceptable; (2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; and (3) failures other than ILS, MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH; and (4) when one or more lights are unserviceable on a runway, Table 13 may be used to assess whether the remaining lights will be sufficient for that lighting group to be considered operative. Table 912: Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima Operations without a low visibility operations an LVO approval Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment CAT IType B APV, NPA Type A ILS/MLS stand-by transmitter No effect TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 72 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment CAT IType B APV, NPA Type A APV —not applicable Not allowed except if NPA with final approach fix replaced by height (FAF): no effect unless used as check at 1 000 ft the FAF Outer marker required height or glide path can be If the FAF cannot be identified checked using other (e.g. no method available for means, e.g. DME fix timing of descent), non- precision operations cannot be conducted Middle marker No effect No effect unless used as MAPt RVR assessment systems No effect Approach lights Minima as for NALS Approach lights except the last Minima as for BALS 210 m Approach lights except the last Minima as for IALS 420 m Standby power for approach No effect lights Day: no effect; Edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights Night: not allowed except in the case of partial unserviceability (see Table 13) No effect if F/D, HUDLS or autoland Centreline lights No effect otherwise RVR of 750 m Centreline lights spacing No effect increased to 30 m No effect if F/D, HUDLS or autoland; Touchdown zone TDZ lights No effect otherwise RVR of 750 m Taxiway lighting system No effect TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 73 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 74 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 13: Minimum serviceability for a lighting group to be considered operative Lighting group Minimum specification to be considered operative Runway edge lights — Minimum runway edge light spacing for an instrument runway is 60 m. — Minimum runway edge light spacing for a non- instrument runway is 100 m. — Lights should be uniformly spaced in rows; however, at intersections to runways or due to temporary unserviceability, lights may be spaced irregularly or omitted, provided that adequate guidance remains available to the pilot. Runway threshold lights — A minimum of 6 threshold lights is required for a non-instrument runway. — On a precision approach runway CAT I, at least the number of lights that would be required if the lights were uniformly spaced at intervals of 3 m between the rows of runway edge lights, is required. — On a non-instrument or non-precision approach runway which has a displaced threshold, the runway threshold lights may be replaced by runway wing bar lights. Runway wing bar lights — Each wing bar should be formed by at least 5 lights extending at least 10 m outward from the runway edge lights. Runway end lights — A minimum of 6 runway end lights is required. Runway centreline lights — Minimum runway centreline light spacing is 15 m AMC11 AMC12 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima VFR OPERATIONS WITH OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT (…) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 75 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEMS — ICAO, FAA The following table provides a comparison of ICAO and FAA specifications. Table 1 14: Approach lighting systems with ICAO and FAA specifications Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS ICAO: CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥ 900 m) (HIALS ≥ 720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline FAA: ALSF1, ALSF2, SSALR, MALSR, high or medium intensity and/or flashing lights, 720 m or more IALS ICAO: simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette FAA: MALSF, MALS, SALS/SALSF, SSALF, SSALS, high or medium intensity and/or flashing lights, 420–719 m BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) FAA: ODALS, high or medium intensity or flashing lights 210–419 m NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights Note: ALSF: approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights; MALS: medium-intensity approach lighting system; MALSF: medium-intensity approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights; MALSR: medium-intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights; ODALS: omnidirectional approach lighting system; SALS: simple approach lighting system; SALSF: short approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights; SSALF: simplified short approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights; SSALR: simplified short approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights; SSALS: simplified short approach lighting system. GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima MEANS TO DETERMINE THE REQUIRED RVR BASED ON DH AND LIGHTING FACILITIES (a) The values in Table 6.A are derived from the formula below. Required RVR or VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048)/tanα] — length of approach lights (m) where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 6.A up to 3.77° and then remaining constant. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 76 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) The lighting system classes in Table 8.A have the meaning specified in Table 15. Table 15: Approach lighting systems Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights GM5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima USE OF DH FOR NON-PRECISION APPROACHES FLOWN USING THE CDFA TECHNIQUE AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 provides that, in certain circumstances, a published MDH may be used as a DH for a 2D operation flown using the CDFA technique. The safety of the use of MDH as DH in CDFA operations has been verified by at least two independent analyses concluding that CDFA using MDH as DH without any add-on is safer than the traditional step-down and level- flight NPA operation. A comparison has been made between the safety level of using MDH as DH without an add-on with the well-established safety level resulting from the ILS collision risk model. The NPA used was the most demanding, i.e. most tightly designed NPA, which offers the least additional margins. It should be noted that the design limits of the ILS approach design, e.g. the maximum GP angle of 3,5 degrees, must be observed for the CDFA in order to keep the validity of the comparison. There is a wealth of operational experience in Europe confirming the above-mentioned analytical assessments. It cannot be expected that each operator is able to conduct similar safety assessments, and this is not necessary. The safety assessments already performed take into account the most demanding circumstances at hand, like the most tightly designed NPA procedures and other ‘worst-case scenarios’. The assessments naturally focus on cases where the controlling obstacle is located in the missed approach area. However, it is necessary for operators to assess whether their cockpit procedures and training are adequate to ensure minimal height loss in case of a go-around manoeuvre. Suitable topics for the safety assessment required by each operator include: — understanding of the CDFA concept including the use of the MDA/H as DA/H; — cockpit procedures that ensure flight on speed, on path and with proper configuration and energy management; — cockpit procedures that ensure gradual decision making; and — identification of cases where an increase of the DA/H may be necessary because of non-standard circumstances, etc. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 77 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110(a) Aerodrome operating minima INCREMENTS SPECIFIED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY Additional increments to the published minima may be specified by the competent authority to take into account certain operations, such as downwind approaches, and single-pilot operations or approaches flown without the use of the CDFA technique. GM7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION When an operator uses commercially available information for Part C of the operations manual, the operator remains responsible for ensuring that the material used is accurate and suitable for the operation, and that aerodrome operating minima are calculated in accordance with the method approved by the competent authority. The operator should apply the procedures in ORO.GEN.205 ‘Contracted activities’. GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima LOW TEMPERATURE CORRECTION (a) An operator may determine the temperature below which a correction should be applied to the DA/H. (b) Table Z may be used to determine the correction that should be applied. Table 16: Temperature corrections to be applied to barometric DH/MDH Aerodrome Height above the elevation of the altimeter setting source (ft) temperature 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000 (°C) 0 20 20 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 90 120 170 230 280 -10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 150 200 290 390 490 -20 30 50 60 70 90 100 120 130 140 210 280 420 570 710 -30 40 60 80 100 120 140 150 170 190 280 380 570 760 950 -40 50 80 100 120 150 170 190 220 240 360 480 720 970 1 210 -50 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 450 590 890 1 190 1 500 GM9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA — HELICOPTERS Place holder GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110(b)(5) Aerodrome operating minima VISUAL AND NON-VISUAL AIDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE ‘Visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure’ refers to all equipment and facilities required for the procedure to be used for the intended instrument approach operation. This includes but is not limited to lights, markings, ground- or space-based radio aids, etc. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 78 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique — aeroplanes (a) All approaches operations shall be flown as stabilised approaches operations unless otherwise approved by the competent authority for a particular approach to a particular runway. (b) Non-precision approaches (1) The continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique shall be used for all non-precision approaches. (2) Notwithstanding (1), another approach flight technique may be used for a particular approach/runway combination if approved by the competent authority. In such cases, the applicable minimum runway visual range (RVR): (i) shall be increased by 200 m for category A and B aeroplanes and by 400 m for category C and D aeroplanes; or (ii) for aerodromes where there is a public interest to maintain current operations and the CDFA technique cannot be applied, shall be established and regularly reviewed by the competent authority taking into account the operator’s experience, training programme and flight crew qualification. The CDFA technique shall be used for approach operations using NPA procedures except for such particular runways for which the competent authority has approved another flight technique. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique — aeroplanes CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) (a) Flight techniques: (1) The CDFA technique should ensure that an approach can be flown on the desired vertical path and track in a stabilised manner, without significant vertical path changes during the final segment descent to the runway. This technique applies to an approach with no vertical guidance and controls the descent path until the DA/DH. This descent path can be either: (i) a recommended descent rate, based on estimated ground speed; (ii) a descent path depicted on the approach chart; or (iii) a descent path coded in the flight management system in accordance with the approach chart descent path. (2) The operator should either provide charts which depict the appropriate cross check altitudes/heights with the corresponding appropriate range information, or such information should be calculated and provided to the flight crew in an appropriate and usable format. Generally, the MAPt is published on the chart. (3) The approach should be flown as an SAp. (4) The required descent path should be flown to the DA/H, observing any step-down crossing altitudes if applicable. (5) This DA/H should take into account any add-on to the published minima as identified by the operator’s management system and should be specified in the OM (aerodrome operating minima). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 79 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (6) During the descent, the pilot monitoring should announce crossing altitudes as published fixes and other designated points are crossed, giving the appropriate altitude or height for the appropriate range as depicted on the chart. The pilot flying should promptly adjust the rate of descent as appropriate. (7) The operator should establish a procedure to ensure that an appropriate callout is made when the aeroplane is approaching DA/H. If the required visual references are not established at DA/H, the missed approach procedure is to be executed promptly. (8) The descent path should ensure that little or no adjustment of attitude or thrust/power is needed after the DA/H to continue the landing in the visual segment. (9) The missed approach should be initiated no later than reaching the MAPt or at the DA/H, whichever comes first. The lateral part of the missed approach should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart. (b) Flight techniques conditions: (1) The approach should be considered to be fully stabilised when the aeroplane is: (i) tracking on the required approach path and profile; (ii) in the required configuration and attitude; (iii) flying with the required rate of descent and speed; and (iv) flying with the appropriate thrust/power and trim. (2) The aeroplane is considered established on the required approach path at the appropriate energy for stable flight using the CDFA technique when: (i) it is tracking on the required approach path with the correct track set, approach aids tuned and identified as appropriate to the approach type flown and on the required vertical profile; and (ii) it is at the appropriate attitude and speed for the required target rate of descent (ROD) with the appropriate thrust/power and trim. (3) Stabilisation during any straight-in approach without visual reference to the ground should be achieved at the latest when passing 1 000 ft above runway threshold elevation. For approaches with a designated vertical profile applying the CDFA technique, a later stabilisation in speed may be acceptable if higher than normal approach speeds are required by ATC procedures or allowed by the OM. Stabilisation should, however, be achieved not later than 500 ft above runway threshold elevation. (4) For approaches where the pilot has visual reference with the ground, stabilisation should be achieved not later than 500 ft above aerodrome elevation. However, the aeroplane should be stabilised when passing 1 000 ft above runway threshold elevation; in the case of circling approaches flown after a CDFA, the aircraft should be stabilised in the circling configuration not later than passing 1 000 ft above the runway elevation. (5) To ensure that the approach can be flown in a stabilised manner, the bank angle, rate of descent and thrust/power management should meet the following performances: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 80 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (i) The bank angle should be less than 30 degrees. (ii) The target rate of descent (ROD) should not exceed 1 000 fpm and the ROD deviations should not exceed ± 300 fpm, except under exceptional circumstances which have been anticipated and briefed prior to commencing the approach; for example, a strong tailwind. Zero ROD may be used when the descent path needs to be regained from below the profile. The target ROD may need to be initiated prior to reaching the required descent point, typically 0.3 NM before the descent point, dependent upon ground speed, which may vary for each type/class of aeroplane. (iii) The limits of thrust/power and the appropriate range should be specified in the OM Part B or equivalent document. (iv) The optimum angle for the approach slope is 3 and should not exceed 4.5. (v) The CDFA technique should be applied only to approach procedures based on NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV and fulfil the following criteria: (A) the final approach track off-set ≤ 5 except for Category A and B aeroplanes, where the approach-track off-set is ≤ 15; and (B) a FAF, or another appropriate fix, e.g. final approach point, where descent initiated is available; and (C) the distance from the FAF or another appropriate fix to the threshold (THR) is less than or equal to 8 NM in the case of timing; or (D) the distance to the THR is available by FMS/GNSS or DME; or (E) the minimum final-segment of the designated constant angle approach path should not be less than 3 NM from the THR unless approved by the authority. (7) The CDFA techniques support a common method for the implementation of flight-director-guided or auto-coupled RNAV approaches. The following criteria apply to CDFA: (a) For each NPA procedure to be used, the operator should provide information allowing the flight crew to determine the appropriate descent path. This information is either: (1) a descent path depicted on the approach chart including check altitude/heights against range; (2) a descent path coded into the aircraft flight management system; or (3) a recommended descent rate based on estimated ground speed. (b) The information provided to the crew should observe the human factors principles. (c) The descent path should be calculated and flown to pass at or above the minimum altitude specified at any step down fix. (d) The optimum angle for the descent path is 3 and should not exceed 4,5 except for steep approach operations approved in accordance with this Part. (e) For multi-pilot operations, the operator should establish procedures that require: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 81 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) the pilot monitoring to verbalise any deviation from the required descent path; (2) the pilot flying to make prompt corrections to deviation from the required descent path; and (3) a call-out to be made when the aircraft is approaching the DA/H. (f) A missed approach should be executed promptly at the DA/H or the MAPt, whichever is first, if the required visual references have not been established. (g) For approaches other than circling approaches, the lateral part of the missed approach should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique — aeroplanes NPA OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPLYING THE CDFA TECHNIQUE (…) (d) In case the CDFA technique is not used and when the MDA/H is high, it may be appropriate to make an early descent to the MDA/H with appropriate safeguards such as the application of a significantly higher RVR/ or VIS. (e) The procedures that are flown with level flight at/ or above the MDA/H should be listed in the OM. (f) Operators should categorise aerodromes where there are approaches that require level flight at/ or above the MDA/H as B and C. Such aerodrome categorisation will depend upon the operator’s experience, operational exposure, training programme(s) and flight crew qualification(s). AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique — aeroplanes OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS AND TRAINING (a) The operator should establish procedures and instructions for flying approaches using the CDFA technique and not using it. These procedures should be included in the OM and should include the duties of the flight crew during the conduct of such operations. The operator should ensure that initial and recurrent flight crew training required by ORO.FC includes the use of the CDFA technique. (b) Operators holding an approval to use another technique for NPAs on certain runways should establish procedures for the application of such techniques. (b) The operator should at least specify in the OM the maximum ROD for each aeroplane type/class operated and the required visual reference to continue the approach below: (1) the DA/H, when applying the CDFA technique; and (2) the MDA/H, when not applying the CDFA technique. (c) The operator should establish procedures which prohibit level flight at MDA/H without the flight crew having obtained the required visual references. It is not the intention to prohibit level flight at MDA/H when conducting a circling approach, which does not come within the definition of the CDFA technique. (d) The operator should provide the flight crew with unambiguous details of the technique used (CDFA or not). The corresponding relevant minima should include: (1) type of decision, whether DA/H or MDA/H; (2) MAPt as applicable; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 82 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (3) appropriate RVR/VIS for the approach operation and aeroplane category. (e) Training (1) Prior to using the CDFA technique, each flight crew member should undertake appropriate training and checking as required by Subpart FC of Annex III (ORO.FC). The operator’s proficiency check should include at least one approach to a landing or missed approach as appropriate using the CDFA technique or not. The approach should be operated to the lowest appropriate DA/H or MDA/H, as appropriate; and, if conducted in a FSTD, the approach should be operated to the lowest approved RVR. The approach is not in addition to any manoeuvre currently required by either Part-FCL or Part-CAT. The provision may be fulfilled by undertaking any currently required approach, engine out or otherwise, other than a precision approach (PA), whilst using the CDFA technique. (2) The policy for the establishment of constant predetermined vertical path and approach stability is to be enforced both during initial and recurrent pilot training and checking. The relevant training procedures and instructions should be documented in the operations manual. (3) The training should emphasise the need to establish and facilitate joint crew procedures and crew resource management (CRM) to enable accurate descent path control and the provision to establish the aeroplane in a stable condition as required by the operator’s operational procedures. (4) During training, emphasis should be placed on the flight crew’s need to: (i) maintain situational awareness at all times, in particular with reference to the required vertical and horizontal profile; (ii) ensure good communication channels throughout the approach; (iii) ensure accurate descent-path control particularly during any manually-flown descent phase. The monitoring pilot should facilitate good flight path control by: (A) communicating any altitude/height crosschecks prior to the actual passing of the range/altitude or height crosscheck; (B) prompting, as appropriate, changes to the target ROD; and (C) monitoring flight path control below DA/MDA; (iv) understand the actions to be taken if the MAPt is reached prior to the MDA/H; (v) ensure that the decision for a missed approach is taken no later than when reaching the DA/H or MDA/H; (vi) ensure that prompt action for a missed approach is taken immediately when reaching DA/H if the required visual reference has not been obtained as there may be no obstacle protection if the missed approach procedure manoeuvre is delayed; (vii) understand the significance of using the CDFA technique to a DA/H with an associated MAPt and the implications of early missed approach manoeuvres; and (viii) understand the possible loss of the required visual reference due to pitch-change/climb when not using the CDFA technique for aeroplane types or classes that require a late change of configuration and/or speed to ensure the aeroplane is in the appropriate landing configuration. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 83 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) Additional specific training when not using the CDFA technique with level flight at or above MDA/H (i) The training should detail: (A) the need to facilitate CRM with appropriate flight crew communication in particular; (B) the additional known safety risks associated with the ‘dive-and-drive’ approach philosophy which may be associated with non-CDFA; (C) the use of DA/H during approaches flown using the CDFA technique; (D) the significance of the MDA/H and the MAPt where appropriate; (E) the actions to be taken at the MAPt and the need to ensure that the aeroplane remains in a stable condition and on the nominal and appropriate vertical profile until the landing; (F) the reasons for increased RVR/Visibility minima when compared to the application of CDFA; (G) the possible increased obstacle infringement risk when undertaking level flight at MDA/H without the required visual references; (H) the need to accomplish a prompt missed approach manoeuvre if the required visual reference is lost; (I) the increased risk of an unstable final approach and an associated unsafe landing if a rushed approach is attempted either from: (a) inappropriate and close-in acquisition of the required visual reference; or (b) unstable aeroplane energy and or flight path control; and (J) the increased risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique — aeroplanes OPERATIONAL REASONS FOR HIGHER-THAN-NORMAL APPROACH SPEEDS Operational reasons for specifying a higher-than-normal approach speed below 1 000 ft may include compliance with air traffic control (ATC) speed restrictions. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) Approach flight technique — aeroplanes STABILISED APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES The following criteria should be satisfied for all stabilised approach operations with aeroplanes: (a) The flight management systems and approach aids should be correctly set and any required radio aids identified before reaching a predetermined point or altitude/height on the approach. (b) The aeroplane should be flown according to the following criteria from a predetermined point or altitude/height on the approach: (1) the angle of bank should be less than 30 degrees; and (2) the target rate of descent should be that required to maintain the correct vertical path at the planned approach speed. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 84 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (c) Variations in the rate of descent should normally not exceed 50% of the target rate of descent. (d) An aeroplane should be considered stabilised for landing when the following conditions are met: (1) the aeroplane is tracking within an acceptable tolerance of the required lateral path; (2) the aeroplane is tracking within an acceptable tolerance of the required vertical path; (3) the vertical speed of the aeroplane is within an acceptable tolerance of the required rate of descent; (4) the airspeed of the aeroplane is within an acceptable tolerance of the intended landing speed; (5) the aeroplane is in the correct configuration for landing, unless operating procedures require a final configuration change for performance reasons after visual reference is acquired; and (6) the thrust/power and trim settings are appropriate. (e) The aeroplane should be stabilised for landing before reaching 500 ft above the landing runway threshold elevation. (f) For approach operations where the pilot does not have visual reference with the ground, the aeroplane should additionally be stabilised for landing before reaching 1 000 ft above the landing runway threshold elevation except that a later stabilisation in airspeed may be acceptable if higher than normal approach speeds are required for operational reasons specified in the operations manual. (g) The operator should specify the following in the operations manual: (1) the acceptable tolerances referred to in (d); (2) the means to identify the predetermined point referred to in (a) and (b) above. This should normally be the FAF. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) Approach flight techniques — aeroplanes TARGET RATE OF DESCENT OF STABILISED APPROACH (a) The target rate of descent for the final approach segment (FAS) of a stabilised approach should not normally exceed 1 000 fpm. Where a rate of descent of more than 1 000 fpm will be required (e.g. due to high ground speed or a steeper-than-normal approach path), this should be briefed in advance. (b) For operations where a level flight segment is required during the approach (e.g. circling approaches or approaches flown as non-CDFA), the criteria in point (b) of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) should apply from the predetermined point until the start of the level flight segment and again from the point at which the aircraft begins descent from the level flight segment down to a point of 50 ft above the threshold or the point where the flare manoeuvre is initiated, if higher. (c) The requirement for the aircraft to be tracking within an acceptable tolerance of the required lateral path does not imply that the aircraft has to be aligned with the runway centreline by any particular height. GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) Approach flight techniques — aeroplanes ALTERNATIVE STABILISED APPROACH CRITERIA TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 85 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law When requesting approval for an alternative to the stabilised approach criteria for a particular approach to a particular runway, the operator should demonstrate that the proposed alternative will ensure that an acceptable level of safety is achieved. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 86 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(b) Approach flight technique — aeroplanes CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) (a) Introduction (1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is a major hazard in aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the final approach segment FAS of non-precision approaches approach operations flown using NPA procedures the use of stabilised-approach criteria on a continuous descent with a constant, predetermined vertical path is seen as a major improvement in safety during the conduct of such approaches. Operators should ensure that the following techniques are adopted as widely as possible, for all approaches. (2) The elimination of level flight segments at MDA close to the ground during approaches, and the avoidance of major changes in attitude and power/thrust close to the runway that can destabilise approaches, are seen as ways to reduce operational risks significantly. (3) The term CDFA has been selected to cover a flight technique for any type of instrument approach operations using NPA procedures operation. (4) The advantages of CDFA are as follows: (i) the technique enhances safe approach operations by the utilisation of standard operating practices; (ii) the technique is similar to that used when flying an ILS approach, including when executing the missed approach and the associated missed approach procedure manoeuvre; (iii) the aeroplane attitude may enable better acquisition of visual cues; (iv) the technique may reduce pilot workload; (v) the approach profile is fuel-efficient; (vi) the approach profile affords reduced noise levels; (vii) the technique affords procedural integration with APV 3D approach operations; and (viii) when used and the approach is flown in a stabilised manner, CDFA is the safest approach technique for all NPA operations instrument approach operations using NPA procedures. (b) CDFA (1) CDFA Continuous descent final approach is defined in Annex I to this Regulation. (2) An approach is only suitable for application of a CDFA technique when it is flown along a nominal vertical profile: a nominal vertical profile is not forming part of the approach procedure design, but can be flown as a continuous descent. The nominal vertical profile information may be published or displayed on the approach chart to the pilot by depicting the nominal slope or range/distance vs height. Approaches with a nominal vertical profile are considered to be: (i) NDB, NDB/DME; (ii) VOR, VOR/DME; (iii) LOC, LOC/DME; (iv) VDF, SRA; or TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 87 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (v) GNSS/LNAV. (23) Stabilised approach (SAp) is defined in Annex I to this Regulation. (i) The control of the descent path is not the only consideration when using the CDFA technique. Control of the aeroplane’s configuration and energy is also vital to the safe conduct of an approach. (ii) The control of the flight path, described above as one of the specifications for conducting an SAp, should not be confused with the path specifications for using the CDFA technique. The predetermined path specification for conducting an SAp are established by the operator and published in the operations manual part B. (iii) The appropriate descent path predetermined approach slope specifications for applying the CDFA technique is are established by the following: (A) the published ‘nominal’ slope information when the approach has a nominal vertical profile; and (B) the designated final-approach segment minimum of 3 NM, and maximum, when using timing techniques, of 8 NM. (iv) An SAp CDFA operation will never have any level segment of flight at the DA/H or the MDA/H as applicable. This enhances safety by mandating a prompt missed approach procedure manoeuvre at the DA/H or the MDA/H. (v) An approach using the CDFA technique will always be flown as an SAp, since this is a specification for applying CDFA. However, an SAp does not have to be flown using the CDFA technique, for example, a visual approach. CAT.OP.MPA.265 Take-off conditions Before commencing take-off, the commander shall verify be satisfied that: (a) according to the information available to him/her, the meteorological conditions weather at the aerodrome or operating site and the condition of the runway or/ FATO intended to be used would will not prevent a safe take-off and departure; and (b) established the selected aerodrome operating minima will be complied with are consistent with: (1) the operative ground equipment; (2) the operative aircraft systems; (3) the aircraft performance; and (4) flight crew qualifications. CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions Before commencing an approach to land operation, the commander shall be satisfied that:, according to the information available to him/her, the weather (a) the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or operating site and the condition of the runway or/FATO intended to be used will should not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach go- TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 88 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law around, having regard to considering the performance information contained in the operations manual; and (b) the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with: (1) the operative ground equipment; (2) the operative aircraft systems; (3) the aircraft performance; and (4) flight crew qualifications. CAT.OP.MPA.305 Commencement and continuation of approach (a) The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated may commence an instrument approach regardless of the reported RVR/VIS. (b) If the reported RVR/VIS is less than the applicable minimum the approach shall not be continued: (1) below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome; or (2) into the final approach segment in the case where the DA/H or MDA/H is more than 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. (c) Where the RVR is not available, RVR values may be derived by converting the reported visibility. (d) If, after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome, the reported RVR/VIS falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DA/H or MDA/H. (e) The approach may be continued below DA/H or MDA/H and the landing may be completed provided that the visual reference adequate for the type of approach operation and for the intended runway is established at the DA/H or MDA/H and is maintained. (f) The touchdown zone RVR shall always be controlling. If reported and relevant, the midpoint and stopend RVR shall also be controlling. The minimum RVR value for the midpoint shall be 125 m or the RVR required for the touchdown zone if less, and 75 m for the stopped. For aircraft equipped with a rollout guidance or control system, the minimum RVR value for the midpoint shall be 75 m. (a) If the reported visibility or controlling RVR for the runway to be used for landing is less than the applicable minimum, then an instrument approach operation shall not be continued: (1) past a point at which the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation; or (2) if the DH or MDH is higher than 1 000 ft, in the final approach segment (FAS). (b) If the required visual reference is not established, then a missed approach shall be executed at or before the DA/H or the MDA/H. (c) If the required visual reference is not maintained after the DA/H or the MDA/H, then a go-around shall be executed promptly. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 Commencement and continuation of approach APPLICATION OF RVR OR VIS REPORTS (a) There is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on the reported RVR or VIS. The restriction in CAT.OP.MPA.305 applies only if the RVR or VIS is reported and applies to the continuation TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 89 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law of the approach past a point where the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation or into the FAS as applicable. (b) If a deterioration in RVR or VIS is reported once the aircraft is below 1 000 ft or into the FAS, as applicable, then there is no requirement for the approach to be discontinued. In this situation, if visual reference is required, it would apply at the DA/H. (c) Where additional RVR information is provided (e.g. midpoint and stop end), this is advisory; such information may be useful to the pilot in order to determine whether there will be sufficient visual reference to control the aircraft during roll-out and taxi. For operations where the aircraft will be controlled manually during roll-out, Table 1.A in AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) provides an indication of the RVR that may be required to allow manual lateral control of the aircraft on the runway. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(a) Commencement and continuation of approach RVR MINIMUM FOR CONTINUATION OF APPROACH (a) The controlling RVR should be the touchdown RVR. (b) If the touchdown RVR is not reported, then the midpoint RVR should be the controlling RVR. (c) Where the RVR is not available, CMV should be used. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305(be) Commencement and continuation of approach VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) NPA, APV and CAT I operations At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: For instrument approach operations Type A and CAT I instrument approach operations Type B, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot at the MDA/H or the DA/H: (a1) elements of the approach lighting system; (b2) the threshold; (c3) the threshold markings; (d4) the threshold lights; (e5) the threshold identification lights; (f6) the visual glide slope indicator; (g7) the TDZ touchdown zone or TDZ touchdown zone markings; (h8) the TDZ touchdown zone lights; (i9) FATO/runway edge lights; or (j10) other visual references specified in the operations manual. (b) LTS CAT I operations At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 90 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them; (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS usable to at least 150 ft. (c) CAT II or OTS CAT II operations At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them; (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS to touchdown. (d) CAT III operations (1) For CAT IIIA operations and for CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUDLS: at DH, a segment of at least three consecutive lights being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (2) For CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail- operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at DH, at least one centreline light is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (3) For CAT IIIB operations with no DH, there is no specification for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown. (e) Approach operations utilising EVS — CAT I operations (1) At DH, the following visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image: (i) elements of the approach light; or (ii) the runway threshold, identified by at least one of the following: (A) the beginning of the runway landing surface, (B) the threshold lights, the threshold identification lights; or (C) the touchdown zone, identified by at least one of the following: the runway touchdown zone landing surface, the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone markings or the runway lights. (2) At 100 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 91 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (i) the lights or markings of the threshold; or (ii) the lights or markings of the touchdown zone. (f) Approach operations utilising EVS — APV and NPA operations flown with the CDFA technique (1) At DH/MDH, visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image as specified under (a). (2) At 200 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified under (a) should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS. CAT.OP.MPA.310 Operating procedures — threshold crossing height — aeroplanes The operator shall establish operational procedures designed to ensure that an aeroplane conducting precision approaches Type B instrument approach operations crosses the threshold of the runway by a safe margin, with the aeroplane in the landing configuration and attitude. CAT.OP.MPA.312 EFVS 200 operations An operator intending to conduct EFVS 200 operations shall ensure that: (a) the aircraft is certified for the intended operations; (b) only runways and instrument approach procedures (IAPs) suitable for EFVS operations are used; (c) the flight crew is competent to conduct the intended operation and that a training and checking programme for the flight crew members and relevant personnel involved in the flight preparation is established; (d) operating procedures are established; (e) any relevant information is documented in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (f) any relevant information is documented in the maintenance programme; (g) safety assessments are carried out and performance indicators are established to monitor the level of safety; and (h) the aerodrome operating minima take into account the capability of the system used. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312 EFVS 200 operations GENERAL (a) EFVS operations exploit the improved visibility provided by the EFVS to extend the visual segment of an instrument approach. EFVS cannot be used to extend the instrument segment of an approach and thus the DH for EFVS 200 operations is always the same as for the same approach conducted without EFVS. (b) Equipment for EFVS 200 operations (1) In order to conduct EFVS 200 operations, a certified EFVS is used (EFVS-A or EFVS-L). An EFVS is an enhanced vision system (EVS) that also incorporates a flight guidance system and displays the image on a HUD or equivalent display. The flight guidance system will incorporate aircraft flight information and flight symbology. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 92 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) In multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery is provided to the pilot monitoring. (c) Suitable approach procedures (1) Types of approach operation are specified in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b). EFVS 200 operations may be used for 3D approach operations. This may include operations based on NPA procedures, approach procedures with vertical guidance and precision approach procedures including approach operations requiring specific approvals, provided that the operator holds the necessary approvals. (2) Offset approaches Refer to AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b). (3) Circling approaches EFVSs incorporate a HUD or an equivalent system so that the EFVS image of the scene ahead of the aircraft is visible in the pilot’s forward external FOV. Circling operations require the pilot to maintain visual references that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft and may not be aligned with the current flight path. EFVS cannot therefore be used in place of natural visual reference for circling approaches. (d) Aerodrome operating minima for EFVS 200 operations determined in accordance with AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(h) The performance of EFVSs depends on the technology used and weather conditions encountered. Table 1 ‘Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction’ has been developed after an operational evaluation of two different EVSs both using infrared sensors, along with data and support provided by the FAA. Approaches were flown in a variety of conditions including fog, rain and snow showers, as well as at night to aerodromes located in mountainous terrain. Table 1 contains conservative figures to cater for the expected performance of infrared sensors in the variety of conditions that might be encountered. Some systems may have better capability than those used for the evaluation, but credit cannot be taken for such performance in EFVS 200 operations. (e) Conditions for commencement and continuation of the approach in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.305 Pilots conducting EFVS 200 operations may commence an approach and continue that approach below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS if the reported RVR or CMV is equal to or greater than the lowest RVR minima determined in accordance with AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(h) and if all the conditions for the conduct of EFVS 200 operations are met. Should any equipment required for EFVS 200 operations be unserviceable or unavailable, the conditions to conduct EFVS 200 operations would not be satisfied and the approach should not be commenced. In the event of failure of the equipment required for EFVS 200 operations after the aircraft descends below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS, the conditions of CAT.OP.MPA.305 would no longer be satisfied unless the RVR reported prior to commencement of the approach was sufficient for the approach to be flown without EFVS in lieu of natural vision. (f) EFVS image requirements at the DA/H specified in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(d) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 93 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law The requirements for features to be identifiable on the EFVS image in order to continue the approach below the DH are more stringent than the visual reference requirements for the same approach flown without EFVS. The more stringent standard is needed because the EFVS might not display the colour of lights used to identify specific portions of the runway and might not consistently display the runway markings. Any visual approach path indicator using colour-coded lights may be unusable. (g) Obstacle clearance in the visual segment The ‘visual segment’ is the portion of the approach between the DH or the MAPt and the runway threshold. In the case of EFVS 200 operations, this part of the approach may be flown using the EFVS image as the primary reference and obstacles may not always be identifiable on an EFVS image. The operational assessment specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b) is therefore required to ensure obstacle clearance during the visual segment. (h) Visual reference requirements at 200 ft above the threshold For EFVS 200 operations, natural visual reference is required by a height of 200 ft above the runway threshold. The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the pilot will have sufficient visual reference to land. The visual reference should be the same as the one required for the same approach flown without EFVS. Some EFVSs may have additional requirements that have to be fulfilled at this height to allow the approach to continue, such as a requirement to check that elements of the EFVS display remain correctly aligned and scaled to the external view. Any such requirements will be detailed in the AFM and included in the operator’s procedures. (i) Use of EFVS to touchdown In order to use an EFVS to touchdown, the operator needs to hold a specific approval in accordance with Part-SPA. (j) Go-around A go-around will be promptly executed if the required visual references are not maintained on the EFVS image at any time after the aircraft has descended below the DA/H or if the required visual references are not distinctly visible and identifiable using natural vision after the aircraft is below 200 ft. It is considered more likely that an EFVS 200 operations could result in the initiation of a go-around below DA/H than the equivalent approach flown without EFVS and thus the operational assessment required by AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) takes into account the possibility of a balked landing. An obstacle free zone (OFZ) may also be provided for CAT I precision approach procedures. Where an OFZ is not provided for a CAT I precision approach, this will be indicated on the approach chart. NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance provide obstacle clearance for the missed approach based on the assumption that a go-around is executed at the MAPt and not below the MDH. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(a) EFVS 200 operations EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (a) For EFVS 200 operations, the aircraft should be equipped with an approach system using EFVS (EFVS-A) or a landing system using EFVS (EFVS-L). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 94 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) Legacy systems that have been certificated as ‘EVS with an operational credit’ may be considered an approach system using EFVS if approved by the operator’s competent authority. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) EFVS 200 operations AERODROMES AND INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES SUITABLE FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS (a) For EFVS 200 operations, the operator should verify the suitability of a runway before authorising EFVS operations to that runway through an operational assessment taking into account: (1) the obstacle situation; (2) the type of aerodrome lighting; (3) the available IAPs; (4) the aerodrome operating minima; and (5) any non-standard conditions that may affect the operations. (b) EFVS 200 operations should only be conducted as 3D operations, using an IAP in which the final approach track is off-set by a maximum of 3 degrees from the extended centreline of the runway and intercepts the centreline at the threshold. (c) The IPA should be designed in accordance with PANS-OPS, Volume I (ICAO Doc 8168) or equivalent criteria. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.312(b) EFVS 200 operations VERIFYING THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations may be conducted as follows: (a) Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS operations or is certified as a precision approach runway category II or III by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check if and where LED lights are installed in order to assess the impact on the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (b) If the check in point (a) above comes out negative, then proceed as follows: (1) For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS)14 may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted. (2) If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS). (3) VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by 14 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1029266 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 95 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. (4) Obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance should not be accepted. (5) For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions. (c) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations INITIAL TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS Operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the following conversion training before being authorised to conduct EFVS 200 operations unless credits related to training and checking are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012: (a) A course of ground training including at least the following: (1) characteristics and limitations of head-up displays (HUDs) or equivalent display systems including information presentation and symbology; (2) EFVS sensor performance in different weather conditions, sensor limitations, scene interpretation, visual anomalies and other visual effects; (3) EFVS display, control, modes, features, symbology, annunciations and associated systems and components; (4) interpretation of EFVS imagery; (5) interpretation of approach and runway lighting systems and display characteristics when using EFVS; (6) pre-flight planning and selection of suitable aerodromes and approach procedures; (7) principles of obstacle clearance requirements; (8) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems; (9) normal, abnormal and emergency procedures for EFVS operations; (10) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions; (11) human factors aspects of EFVS operations; (12) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to EFVS 200 operations. (b) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows: (1) Phase one (EFVS 200 operations with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives: (i) understand the operation of equipment required for EFVS 200 operations; (ii) understand operating limitations of the installed EFVS; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 96 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (iii) practise the use of HUD or equivalent display systems; (iv) practise setup and adjustment of EFVS equipment in different conditions (e.g. day and night); (v) practise monitoring of automatic flight control systems, EFVS information and status annunciators; (vi) practise the interpretation of EFVS imagery; (vii) become familiar with the features needed on the EFVS image to continue approach below DH; (viii) practise identification of visual references using natural vision while using EFVS equipment; (ix) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to EFVS operations including, where appropriate, the use of the flare cue and guidance for landing; (x) practise coordination with other crew members; and (xi) become proficient at procedures for EFVS 200 operations. (2) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises: (i) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight; (ii) the use of HUD or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight; (iii) approach using the EFVSs installed in the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing; (iv) approach with all engines operating using the EFVS, down to the appropriate DH followed by missed approach, all without external visual reference, as appropriate. (3) Phase two (low-visibility approach operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives: (i) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceabilities including use of the MEL; (ii) understand the effect on aerodrome operating minima of failed or downgraded equipment; (iii) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in status of the EFVS including HUD or equivalent display systems; (iv) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below the DH; (v) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and (vi) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during EFVS 200 operations. (4) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises: (i) approaches with engine failures at various stages on the approach; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 97 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (ii) approaches with failures of the EFVS at various stages of the approach, including failures between the DH and the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired, require either: (A) reversion to head down displays to control missed approach; or (B) reversion to flight with downgraded or no guidance to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway. (iii) incapacitation procedures appropriate to EFVS 200 operations; (iv) failures and procedures applicable to the specific EFVS installation and aircraft type; and (v) FSTD training, which should include minimum eight approaches. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform EFVS 200 operations is checked at each required demonstration of competence by performing at least four approaches, of which one should be flown without natural vision to 200 ft. AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS Pilots should complete a minimum of four approaches using the operator’s procedures for EFVS 200 operations during the validity period of the periodic demonstration of competence unless credits-related currency is defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members authorised to conduct EFVS 200 operations are provided with a differences training or familiarisation training whenever there is a change to any of the following: (1) the technology used in flight guidance and flight control system; (2) the HUD or equivalent display systems; or (3) the operating procedures. (b) The differences training should: (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course; (2) take into account the flight crew members’ previous experience; and (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 98 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law If a flight crew member is to be authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS 200 operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required FSTD training for each operating capacity. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 99 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(c) EFVS 200 operations RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS In order to provide the opportunity to practise decision-making in the event of system failures and failure to acquire natural visual reference, the recurrent training/checking for EFVS 200 operations should periodically include different combinations of equipment failures, go-around due to loss of visual reference and landings. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(d) EFVS 200 operations OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS (a) The following provisions should apply to EFVS 200 operations: (1) the pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach; (2) in multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery should be provided to the pilot monitoring; (3) the approach between the FAF and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance; (4) the approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either: (i) the approach light system; or (ii) both of the following: (A) the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and (B) the touchdown zone identified by the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone runway markings or the runway lights; and (5) a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by 200 ft above the threshold. (b) Operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations should: (1) be consistent with the AFM; (2) be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used; (3) specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight; (4) ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; and (5) deviate to the minimum extent practicable from normal procedures used for routine operations. (c) Operating procedures should include: (1) required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight; (2) correct seating and eye position; (3) determination of aerodrome operating minima; (4) required visual references at the DH; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 100 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) action to be taken if natural visual reference is not acquired by 200 ft; (6) action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual reference; and (7) procedures for balked landing. (d) Operating procedures should be included in the operations manual. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.312(h) EFVS 200 operations AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA — EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to EFVS 200 operations: (a) The DA/H used should be the same as for operations without EFVS. (b) The lowest RVR minima to be used should be determined by reducing the RVR presented in Table 6.A in AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110. Table 1: Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction RVR presented in Table 6.A in RVR (m) AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 for EFVS 200 operations 550 550 600 550 650 550 700 550 750 550 800 550 900 600 1 000 650 1 100 750 1 200 800 1 300 900 1 400 900 1 500 1 000 1 600 1 100 1 700 1 100 1 800 1 200 1 900 1 300 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 101 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law RVR presented in Table 6.A in RVR (m) AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 for EFVS 200 operations 2 000 1 300 2 100 1 400 2 200 1 500 2 300 1 500 2 400 1 600 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 102 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex V Specific approvals (Part-SPA) Subpart A: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS SPA.GEN.100 Competent authority (…) (b) Notwithstanding (a)(2), for non-commercial operators using aircraft registered in a third country, the applicable requirements under this Annex for the approval of the following operations shall not apply if these approvals are issued by a third-country State of Registry: (1) Performance-based navigation (PBN); (2) Minimum operational performance specifications (MNPS); (3) Reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM) airspace; and (4) Low-visibility operations (LVOs). SUBPART E: LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS (LVOs) AND OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS SPA.LVO.100 Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits The operator shall only conduct the following low visibility operations (LVO) when approved by the competent authority: (a) low visibility take-off (LVTO) operation; (b) lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operation; (c) standard category II (CAT II) operation; (d) other than standard category II (OTS CAT II) operation; (e) standard category III (CAT III) operation; (f) approach operation utilising enhanced vision systems (EVS) for which an operational credit is applied to reduce the runway visual range (RVR) minima by no more than one third of the published RVR. The operator shall conduct the following operations only if approved by the competent authority: (a) take-off operations with visibility conditions less than 400 m RVR; (b) instrument approach operations with visibility conditions less than 550 m RVR; and (c) operations with operational credits. AMC1 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations LVTO OPERATIONS – AEROPLANES This AMC is deleted. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 103 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC3 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations LTS CAT I OPERATIONS This AMC is deleted. AMC4 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations CAT II AND OTS CAT II OPERATIONS This AMC is deleted. AMC5 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations CAT III OPERATIONS This AMC is deleted. AMC6 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations OPERATIONS UTILISING EVS This AMC is deleted. GM1 SPA.LVO.100 Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits DOCUMENTS CONTAINING INFORMATION RELATED TO LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS LVOs AND OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS The following documents provide further information to low-visibility operations (LVOs): (a) ICAO Annex 2 — Rules of the Air; (b) ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft; (c) ICAO Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications Vol. 1 (Volume I — Radio Navigation Aids); (d) ICAO Annex 14 —Aerodromes (Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations); (e) ICAO Doc 8168 — PANS-OPS — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations; (f) ICAO Doc 9365 — AWO Manual Manual of All-Weather Operations; (g) ICAO Doc 9476 — Manual of surface movement guidance and control systems (SMGCS); (h) ICAO Doc 9157 — Aerodrome Design Manual; (i) ICAO Doc 9328 — Manual of RVR Observing and Reporting Practices; (j) ICAO EUR Doc 013 — European Guidance Material on Aerodrome Operations under Limited Visibility Conditions; (k) ECAC Doc 17, Issue 3; and (l) CS-AWO All weather operations. GM2 SPA.LVO.100 Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits ILS CLASSIFICATION (…) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 104 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits LVTO OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 400 M BUT NOT LESS THAN 125 M The following provisions should apply to low-visibility take-off (LVTO) with an RVR of less than 400 m but more than 125 m: (a) Required RVR (1) For multi-engined aeroplanes which, in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off, can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the criteria in Table 1.A should apply: Table 1.A: LVTO — aeroplanes: RVR vs facilities RVR (m) Required facilities Not less than 300 by day — Runway centreline markings Not less than 300 by night Additionally: — Runway edge lights; and/or — Runway centreline lights Not less than 150 Additionally: — Runway centreline lights Not less than 125 Additionally: — Centreline lights spaced at 15 m intervals or less; and — Edge lights spaced at 60 m intervals or less (2) For multi-engined aeroplanes not complying with the conditions in (a)(1), there may be a need to land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the take- off minima shown in Table 2.A and the marking and lighting criteria shown in Table 1.A, provided that they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the height specified: Table 2.A: LVTO — aeroplanes: assumed engine failure height vs RVR Assumed engine failure height RVR (m) above the take-off runway (ft) Less than 50 Not less than 200 More than 50 but less than 100 Not less than 300 (b) The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 105 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (c) The minimum RVR value specified in Table 1.A or 2.A should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the calculated accelerate-stop distance from that point. AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits LVTO OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 125 M (a) For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the reported RVR should be not less than the minimum specified in the AFM or, if no such minimum is specified, not less than 75 m. (b) The minimum required RVR should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the greater of the calculated take-off distance or accelerate-stop distance from that point. (c) The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits CAT II OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to CAT II operations: (a) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than the highest of: (1) the minimum DH for CAT II specified in the AFM, if stated; (2) the applicable obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aeroplane; (3) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or (4) 100 ft. (b) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 3: Table 3: CAT II operation minima: RVR (m) vs DH (ft) Aeroplane categories A, B, C D 100–120 300 300/350* 121–140 400 400 DH (ft) 141–199 450 450 *: An RVR of 300 m may be used for a Category D aeroplane conducting an autoland. AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits CAT III OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to CAT III operations: (a) For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than: (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated; (2) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 106 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) Operations with no DH should only be conducted if: (1) operation with no DH is specified in the AFM; (2) there is no published information indicating that the approach aid or aerodrome facilities cannot support operations with no DH; and (3) the flight crew is qualified to operate with no DH. (c) The lowest RVR to be used should be determined in accordance with Table 4: Table 4: CAT III operation minima: RVR vs DH DH (ft) Roll-out control/guidance RVR (m) system 50–99 Not required 175 Fail-passive 125* 0–49 or no DH Fail-operational 75 *: If a fail-passive roll-out control system is used and the AFM specifies that the equipment was demonstrated to be suitable for use in RVRs down to 75 m as part of the certification process, then operations may be conducted in RVRs down to 75 m provided that the operator has implemented appropriate operating procedures and training. AMC7 AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits EFFECT ON CAT II/CAT III LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED EQUIPMENT (a) General These instructions are intended for use both pre-flight and in-flight. It is however not expected that the pilot-in-command/commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command/commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 7, and the approach may have to be abandoned. Table 5 should be used to determine the effect of temporarily failed of downgraded equipment on the required RVR for CAT II/III approach operations. (b) The following conditions should be applicable to the tables below applied to Table 5: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 75 are not acceptable; (2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; (3) for CAT II and CAT III operations, a combination of deficiencies in runway/FATO lights and RVR assessment equipment are not permitted; and (4) failures other than ILS and MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 107 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 75: Failed or downgraded equipment — affect effect on landing minima Operations with an LVO approval CAT II/III operations Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment CAT III(B) CAT IIIB CAT IIIA CAT II (No DH) DH<50 ft DH>=50 ft ILS/MLS stand- RVR of Not allowed No effect by transmitter 200 m Outer marker No effect if replaced by height check at 1 000 ft Middle marker No effect At least one RVR value RVR to be On runways equipped with two or more RVR assessment available on assessment units, one may be inoperative systems the aerodrome Approach Not allowed for operations No effect Not allowed lights with DH >50 ft Failed or downgraded equipment Approach lights except No effect Not allowed the last 210 m Approach lights except No effect the last 420 m Standby power for approach No effect lights Edge lights, Day: no Day: no effect threshold effect lights and No effect runway end Night: RVR Night: not allowed lights 550 m Day: Day: no effect no effect Night: Edge lights No effect 550 m Night: Night: not allowed RVR of 550 m Threshold As edge N/E N/E As edge lights lights lights TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 108 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment CAT III(B) CAT IIIB CAT IIIA CAT II (No DH) DH<50 ft DH>=50 ft Runway end No effect if centreline lights are serviceable lights Day: RVR of Day: RVR of Day: RVR of 350 m 200 m 300 m Centreline Not lights allowed Night: RVR of Night: not Night: RVR of 550 m (400 m with allowed 400 m HUDLS or autoland) Centreline lights spacing RVR of 150 m No effect increased to 30 m Day: RVR Day: RVR of 300 m 200 of m Touchdown No effect TDZ lights Night: RVR Night: RVR of 550 m, 350 m with of 300 m HUDLS or autoland Taxiway light No effect system AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits OPERATIONAL CREDIT: SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 1 (SA CAT I) The following provisions should apply to special authorisation category 1 (SA CAT I) operations: (a) The decision height (DH) of an SA CAT I operation should not be lower than the highest of: (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated; (2) the applicable OCH for the category of aeroplane; (3) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or (4) 150 ft. (b) Where the DH for an SA CAT I operation is less than 200 ft, it should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. (c) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 6. For class of approach lighting facility, see GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 109 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 6: SA CAT I operation minima RVR (m) vs approach lighting system Class of approach lighting facility * FALS IALS 150–170 400 450 171–199 450 500 200–210 450 500 DH (ft) 211–220 500 550 221–230 500 600 230–240 500 650 241–249 550 700 AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits OPERATIONAL CREDIT: SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 2 (SA CAT II) The following provisions should apply to special authorisation category 2 (SA CAT II) operations: (a) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process, and be not lower than the highest of: (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated; (2) the applicable OCH for the category of aeroplane; (3) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or (4) 100 ft. (b) The following visual aids should be available: (1) approach lights as specified in Table 7; (2) standard runway markings; (3) category I runway lights. (c) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 7: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 110 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 7: SA CAT II operation minima: RVR (m) vs DH (ft) Class of light facility FALS IALS BALS NALS 100–120 350 450 600 700 DH (ft) 121–140 400 500 600 700 141–160 400 500 600 750 161–199 400 550 650 750 AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits OPERATIONAL CREDIT: EFVS OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to EFVS operations: (a) The DA/H used should be the same as for operations without EFVS. (b) The lowest RVR minima to be used should be determined: (1) in accordance with criteria specified in the AFM for the expected weather conditions or, if no such criteria are specified, (2) by reducing the RVR determined for operation without the use of EFVS/CVS in accordance with Table 8. (c) Where the lowest RVR to be used, determined in accordance with (b), is less than 550 m, then this should be increased to 550 m unless low-visibility procedures (LVPs) are established at the aerodrome of intended landing. (d) Where EFVS is part of a CVS, it is only the EFVS element that should provide the operational credits. The other part of the CVS, the synthetic vision system (SVS), should not provide operational credits. Table 8: Operations utilising EFVS/CVS — RVR/CMV reduction RVR/CMV (m) required RVR/CMV (m) without the use of EFVS with the use of EFVS 550 350 600 400 650 450 700 450 750 500 800 550 900 600 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 111 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law RVR/CMV (m) required RVR/CMV (m) without the use of EFVS with the use of EFVS 1 000 650 1 100 750 1 200 800 1 300 900 1 400 900 1 500 1 000 1 600 1 100 1 700 1 100 1 800 1 200 1 900 1 300 2 000 1 300 2 100 1 400 2 200 1 500 2 300 1 500 2 400 1 600 (e) Where the lowest RVR to be used, determined in accordance with (c), is less than 550 m, then this should be increased to 550 m unless LVPs are established at the aerodrome of intended landing. GM1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits CLASSIFICATION OF LOW-VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS Take-off operations are classified as ‘normal take-off operations’ with an RVR at or above 550 m and ‘LVTO operations’ with an RVR below 550 m. Only LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 400 m require a specific approval. GM2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits VISUAL SEGMENT FOR TAKE-OFF The value of 125 m RVR for take-off with 15 m centreline light spacing has been selected because flight deck geometry means that this will provide at least a 90 m visual segment for the large majority of aircraft types. In a 90 m visual segment the pilot is expected to be able to see six centreline lights at 15 m spacing once lined up on the runway centreline. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 112 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits CLASSIFICATION OF STANDARD APPROACH OPERATIONS The different types of approach and landing operations are classified according to the lowest DH (or MDH) and RVR applicable to the approach type. The classification of approach types does not depend on the technology used for the approach. The lowest minima specified do not take account of ‘operational credits’ that may allow for lower operating minima. In accordance with the ICAO terminology, approach operations are classified as either ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’. Type A instrument approach operations are those with a minimum DH or MDH at or above 250 ft; Type B instrument approach operations are those with a DH below 250 ft. Type A instrument approach operations may be 2D operations (lateral guidance) or 3D operations (lateral and vertical guidance), whereas all Type B instrument approach operations are 3D operations. Type B instrument approach operations are then further subcategorised into CAT I, II or III according to the usual DA/H and RVR. Differently from ICAO, the classification in the European regulations does not subdivide CAT III operations into CAT IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. The actual minima applicable to any operation depends on the aircraft equipment and the specific LVO approval held by the air operator. Table 9: Classification of standard approach operations Approach classification Lowest MDH, DH (ft) Lowest RVR (m) Type A 250 600 CAT I 200 550 Type B CAT II 100 300 CAT III 0 or no DA/H 0 The AFM for aircraft certificated for CAT III operations will state the lowest usable DH, or no DH. Some AFMs may refer to ICAO classifications. These are as follows: — CAT IIIA: a DH lower than 30 m (100 ft) or no DH and an RVR not less than 175 m; — CAT IIIB: a DH lower than 15 m (50 ft) or no DH and an RVR less than 175 m but not less than 50 m; and — CAT IIIC: no DH and no RVR limitations. CAT IIIC has not been used in Europe and the minimum RVR in the European regulations is 75 m. Where an operational credit allows operation to lower-than-standard minima, this is not considered a separate approach classification. GM2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION FOR LOW-VISIBILITY APPROACH OPERATIONS This GM is purely informative and describes the certification requirements of CS-AWO. Operators should always refer to CS-AWO for the actual requirements. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 113 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Aircraft suitable for low-visibility approach operations are certificated according to the minimum usable DH which is stated in the AFM. Certification specifications (CS-AWO) allow for systems to be certificated for SA CAT I, CAT II or CAT III operations. Systems certificated for CAT III operations may specify: — a lowest usable DH of:  less than 100 ft;  less than 50 ft; or — no DH. Legacy systems may be described as capable of ‘CAT 3A’ or ‘CAT IIIA' operations. This implies a minimum DH of less than 100 ft but not less than 50 ft. Systems described as capable of ‘CAT 3B’ or ‘CAT IIIB’ may be certificated for a DH of less than 50 ft or no DH. Operations to a DH of less than 100 ft but not less than 50 ft will typically require a fail-passive automatic landing system or a HUD or equivalent system. Operations to a DH of less than 50 ft will require a fail-passive landing system, a fail-passive go-around system automatic thrust control and either automatic ground roll control or ground roll guidance using a HUD. For no DH operations the ground roll control system is required to be fail-passive. The RVR required for SA CAT I, CAT II and SA CAT II approach operations is determined by the DH and the aircraft approach speed category. The RVR required for CAT III approach operations is determined by the DH and the capability of the ground-roll control system. Operations with fail-passive roll control systems require a greater RVR than operations with fail-operational ground control systems because the pilots would need to have sufficient visibility to maintain lateral control in the event of a system failure. GM1 SPA.LVO.100(c),(e)GM3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM RVR FOR CAT II AND CAT III OPERATIONS (…) (c) CAT III fail-passive operations (1) CAT III operations utilising fail-passive automatic landing equipment were introduced in the late 1960s and it is desirable that the principles governing the establishment of the minimum RVR for such operations be dealt with in some detail. (2) During an automatic landing the pilot needs to monitor the performance of the aircraft system, not in order to detect a failure that is better done by the monitoring devices built into the system, but so as to know precisely the flight situation. In the final stages the pilot should establish visual contact and, by the time the pilot reaches the DH, the pilot should have checked the aircraft position relative to the approach or runway centreline lights. For this the pilot will need sight of horizontal elements (for roll reference) and part of the touchdown area. The pilot should check for lateral position and cross-track velocity and, if not within the pre-stated lateral limits, the pilot should carry out a missed approach procedure. The pilot should also check longitudinal progress and sight of the landing threshold is useful for this purpose, as is sight of the TDZ lights. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 114 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Where a fail-operational automatic landing and roll-out system is used, it is not considered necessary for the pilot to check the lateral position and cross-track velocity, and thus it is not necessary for the visual reference requirements to include horizontal elements of the lighting system. (…) GM4 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits EFFECT ON CAT II/CAT III LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED EQUIPMENT The instructions for the effect on landing minima of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment are intended for use both preflight and in-flight. It is, however, not expected that the pilot-in-command/commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command/commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 5, and the approach may have to be abandoned. GM1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS For each specific class of standard take-off or approach operations, a standard combination of airborne equipment, aerodrome infrastructure and equipment, and procedures (system components) needs to be available to ensure the required performance of the total system. In practical operations, one or more system components may exceed the required standard performance. The aim of the concept of operations with operational credits is to exploit such enhanced performance to provide operational flexibility beyond the limits of standard operations. In certain circumstances it may be possible to achieve the required system performance without some standard items being available by using other enhanced equipment or procedures. In order to apply an operational credit, it is necessary that the equipment or procedures employed mitigate effectively the shortcomings in other system components. Another application of operational credits is to use the enhanced performance of certain system components to allow operations to lower than the standard minima presented in Table 9. For approach operations, an operational credit can be applied to either the instrument or the visual segment. Where an operational credit allows operation to lower than standard minima, this is not considered a separate approach classification. GM2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 1 (SA CAT I) OPERATIONS SA CAT I is an operational credit that exploits a navigation solution with superior performance to that required for standard CAT I by extending the instrument segment of CAT I approach operations. This navigation solution may be an ILS installation with the necessary performance coupled to a suitably certified autoland system or a HUD or equivalent display system. The extended instrument segment means that the DH can be reduced from the standard minimum of 200 down to 150 ft. The lower DH allows a corresponding reduction in the RVR required for the approach. SA CAT I is not a separate approach classification, it is an operational credit applied to a CAT I operation. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 115 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 2 (SA CAT II) OPERATIONS SA CAT II is an operational credit that applies to the visual segment of an approach conducted where aerodrome, runway and approach lighting system do not meet the usual requirements for a CAT II precision lighting system. SA CAT II exploits the performance of a suitably certified system. The DH will be the same as for standard CAT II and the required RVR will depend on the class of light facility installed. GM4 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits EFVS OPERATIONS (a) EFVS operations, if approved, exploit the improved visibility provided by the EFVS to allow an operational credit applied to the visual segment of an instrument approach. An EFVS cannot be used to extend the instrument segment of an approach and thus the DH for operation with an EFVS is always the same as for the same approach conducted without an operational credit. (b) EFVS operations require specific approval from the competent authority in accordance with Part-SPA. However, other EFVS operations may be conducted by operators and without a specific approval if specifically covered in accordance with Part-CAT, Part-NCC or Part-SPO. (c) Equipment for EFVS operations (1) In order to conduct EFVS operations, a certified EFVS is used. An EFVS is an enhanced vision system (EVS) that also incorporates a flight guidance system and displays the image on a HUD or an equivalent display. The flight guidance system will incorporate aircraft flight information and flight symbology. (2) For operations for which a minimum flight crew of more than one pilot is required, the aircraft will also be equipped with a head-down view of the EVS image or another means of easily displaying EFVS-derived information to the pilot monitoring the progress of the approach. (3) Legacy systems may be certificated as ‘EVS with an operational credit’. Such a system may be considered an EFVS used for approach (EFVS-A). (4) Aircraft holding a type certificate issued by a third country may be certificated for operations equivalent to EFVS operations. Specific approval for an operational credit for EFVS operations will be available only if the operator can demonstrate that the equipment meets all the requirements for certification in accordance with CS-AWO. (5) For approaches for which natural visual reference is not required prior to touchdown, the EFVS (EFVS used for landing (EFVS-L)) will additionally display: (i) flare prompt or flare guidance information; and (ii) height AGL. (d) Suitable approach procedures (1) Types of approach operation are specified in AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c). EFVS operations may be used for 3D approach operations. This may include operations based on non-precision approach (NPA) procedures, approach procedures with vertical guidance and PA TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 116 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law procedures including approach operations requiring specific approvals, provided that the operator holds the necessary approvals. An NPA procedure flown using vertical guidance from computer-generated navigation data from ground-based, space-based, self-contained navigation aids, or a combination of them may be considered a 3D instrument approach operation so EFVS may be used for NPA procedures provided that vertical guidance is available to the pilot. (2) Offset approaches The extent to which EFVS can be used for offset approaches will depend on the FOV of the specific system. Where an EFVS has been demonstrated to be usable with a final approach track offset more than 3 degrees from the runway centreline, this will be stated in the AFM. Instrument approach procedures (IAPs) may have the final approach course significantly offset from the centreline of the runway and still be considered ‘straight-in approaches’. Many approach procedures with an offset final approach course are constructed so that the final approach course crosses the runway centreline extended well out from the runway. Depending on the construction of a particular procedure, the wind conditions and the available FOV of a specific EFVS installation, the required visual references may not come into view before the aircraft reaches the DH. (3) Circling approaches EFVSs incorporate a HUD or an equivalent system so that the EFVS image is visible in the pilot’s forward external FOV. Circling operations require the pilot to maintain visual references which may not be directly ahead of the aircraft and may not be aligned with the current flight path. EFVS cannot therefore be used in place of natural visual reference for circling approaches. (e) Aerodrome operating minima for EFVS operations are determined in accordance with AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c). The performance of EFVSs depends on the technology used and weather conditions encountered. The minimum RVR for an approach is based on the specific capabilities of the installed equipment in the expected weather conditions so the RVR for a particular operation is determined according to criteria stipulated in the AFM. Table 8 has been provided to allow calculation of an appropriate RVR for aircraft where the AFM does not contain criteria to determine the minimum usable RVR. This table has been developed after an operational evaluation of two different EVSs both using infrared sensors, along with data and support provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Approaches were flown in a variety of conditions including fog, rain and snow showers, as well as at night to aerodromes located in mountainous terrain. Table 8 contains conservative figures to cater for the expected performance of infrared sensors in the variety of conditions that might be encountered. (f) Conditions for commencement and continuation of the approach are in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.305. Pilots conducting EFVS operations may commence an approach and continue that approach below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or in the final approach segment (FAS) if: (1) the reported RVR or converted meteorological visibility (CMV) is equal to or greater than the lowest RVR minima determined in accordance with AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c); and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 117 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) all the conditions for conducting EFVS operations are met. If any equipment required for EFVS operations is unserviceable or unavailable, then the conditions for conducting EFVS operations would not be satisfied and the approach cannot be commenced. Operators may develop procedures for flight crew to follow in the event of unserviceability arising after the aircraft descends below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS. Such procedures should ensure that the approach is not continued unless the RVR is sufficient for the type of approach that can be conducted with equipment that remains available. In the event of failure of the equipment required for EFVS operations, a go-around would be executed unless the RVR reported prior to commencement of the approach was sufficient for the approach to be flown without the use of EFVS in lieu of natural vision. (g) EFVS image requirements at the DA/H are specified in AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c). The requirements for features to be identifiable on the EFVS image in order to continue approach below DH are more stringent than the visual reference requirements for the same approach flown without EFVS. This is necessary because the EFVS might not display the colour of lights used to identify specific portions of the runway and might not consistently display the runway markings. Any visual approach path indicator using colour-coded lights may be unusable. (h) Obstacle clearance in the visual segment The ‘visual segment’ is the portion of the approach between the DH or the MAPt and the runway threshold. In the case of EFVS operations, this part of the approach may be flown using the EFVS image as the primary reference and there may be obstacles that are not always identifiable on an EFVS image. Approach procedures designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria will ensure that the visual segment is protected for obstacles. Procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS may have not been assessed for terrain or obstacle clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. (i) Visual reference requirements at minimum height to continue approach without natural visual reference For operations other than EFVS to touchdown, natural visual reference is required before landing. The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the pilot will have sufficient visual reference to land. The visual reference should be the same as the one required for the same approach flown without the use of EFVS. The specific height at which this is required will depend on the capability of the aircraft installation and will be specified in the AFM. For aircraft certificated for EFVS operations but where no such height is specified in the AFM, natural visual reference is required by a height of 100 ft above the threshold elevation. Specific EFVSs may have additional requirements that must be fulfilled at this height to allow the approach to continue, such as a requirement to check that elements of the EFVS display remain correctly aligned and scaled to the external view. Any such requirements will be detailed in the AFM. (j) Use of EFVS to touchdown In order for the use of EFVS to touchdown to be approved, the EFVS will provide flare cueing and guidance (EFVS-L). This mitigates the fact that a 2D image and a narrow FOV displayed by the EFVS may cause erroneous perceptions of depth or height. The EFVS will also display height above the runway by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. Unless the operator has verified that the terrain ahead of the threshold is suitable for the use of a radio altimeter, TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 118 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law such a system should not be relied upon to provide accurate information about the height of the aircraft above the runway threshold until the aircraft is over the runway surface. (k) Missed approach A go-around will be promptly executed if the required visual references are not maintained on the EFVS image at any time after the aircraft has descended below the DA/H or if the required visual references are not distinctly visible and identifiable using natural vision after the aircraft is below the minimum height to continue approach without natural visual reference (if applicable). It is considered more likely that an operation with EFVS could result in initiation of a missed approach below the DA/H than the equivalent approach flown without EFVS. AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f) requires that operators involved in EFVS operations keep records of the number of successful and unsuccessful approaches using EFVS in order to detect and act on any undesirable trends. For Category II and III PA procedures designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria, obstacle protection is provided for a go-around initiated below the DH (balked landing) by means of an obstacle free zone (OFZ). An OFZ may also be provided for Category I PA procedures. Where an OFZ is not provided for a Category I PA, this will be indicated on the approach chart. NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance provide obstacle clearance for the missed approach based on the assumption that a go-around is executed at the MAPt and not below the MDH. GM5 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits COMBINED VISION SYSTEMS A combined vision system (CVS) consisting of an EFVS and an SVS can be approved for EFVS operations if it meets all the certification requirements of an EFVS. SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval To obtain an LVO approval from the competent authority, the operator shall demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this Subpart. SPA.LVO.105 Specific approval criteria To obtain a specific approval required by SPA.LVO.100, the operator shall demonstrate for the intended operations that: (a) for low-visibility approach operations, LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 125 m, and operations with operational credits, the aircraft is certified for the intended operations; (b) the flight crew members are competent to conduct the intended operation and a training and checking programme for the flight crew members and relevant personnel involved in the flight preparation is established; (c) operating procedures are established; (d) any relevant information is documented in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (e) any relevant information is documented in the maintenance programme; and (f) safety assessments are carried out and performance indicators are established to monitor the level of safety. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 119 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATION – AEROPLANES This AMC is deleted. AMC3 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval CONTINUOUS MONITORING – ALL AIRCRAFT This AMC is deleted. AMC4 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval TRANSITIONAL PERIODS FOR CAT II AND CAT III OPERATIONS This AMC is deleted. AMC5 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval MAINTENANCE OF CAT II, CAT III AND LVTO EQUIPMENT This AMC is deleted. AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval ELIGIBLE AERODROMES AND RUNWAYS This AMC is deleted. GM1 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval Specific approval criteria CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL CAT II, OTS CAT II, CAT III APPROACH AND AUTOMATIC LANDING (a) The purpose of this GM is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the criteria for a successful approach and landing to facilitate fulfilling the requirements prescribed in SPA.LVO.105. (b) An approach may be considered to be successful if: (1) from 500 ft to start of the flare: (i) speed is maintained as specified in AMC-AWO 231, paragraph 2 ‘Speed Control’ and within +/- 5 kt of the intended speed, disregarding rapid fluctuations due to turbulence; (ii) no relevant system failure occurs; and (2) from 300 ft to the DH: (i) no excess deviation occurs; and (ii) no centralised warning gives a missed approach procedure command (if installed). (c) An automatic landing may be considered to be successful if: (1) no relevant system failure occurs; (2) no flare failure occurs; (3) no de-crab failure occurs (if installed); (4) longitudinal touchdown is beyond a point on the runway 60 m after the threshold and before the end of the touchdown zone TDZ light (900 m from the threshold); TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 120 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear is not outside the touchdown zone TDZ light edge; (6) sink rate is not excessive; (7) bank angle does not exceed a bank angle limit; and (8) no roll-out failure or deviation (if installed) occurs. (d) More details can be found in CS-AWO 131, CS-AWO 231 and AMC-AWO 231CS AWO.A.ALS.106, CS AWO.B.CATII.113 and AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a) Specific approval criteria EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (a) Aircraft used for LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m should be equipped with a system certified for the purpose. (b) Aircraft used for low-visibility approach operations should be equipped in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements and certified as follows: (1) For CAT II operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations. (2) For CAT III operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT III operations. (3) For SA CAT I, the aircraft should be certified for SA CAT I operations. (4) For SA CAT II, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations and HUDLS or fail-passive autoland or better. (5) For EFVS operations, the EFVS should be certified for the intended operation. GM1 SPA.LVO.105(a) Specific approval criteria EQUIPMENT ELIGIBLE FOR TAKE-OFF IN AN RVR LESS THAN 125 M Systems that are used to qualify for take-off in an RVR less than 125 m typically allow the pilot to use the external visual cues as well as instrumented guidance to track the runway centreline. The kind of systems in use today include paravisual display (PVD) and HUD. It is expected that EFVSs will be certified for take-off guidance in the future. Where the PVD or HUD uses an ILS localiser signal as reference, the ILS sensitive area must be protected by the LVPs at the aerodrome. AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR LVOs Prior to commencing an LVO, the pilot-in-command/commander should be satisfied that: (a) the status of visual and non-visual facilities is as required; (b) LVPs are in effect; and (c) the flight crew members are appropriately qualified. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 121 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: GENERAL (a) Operating procedures should be established for all types of LVOs for which an operator is seeking approval. The operating procedures should: (1) be consistent with the AFM; (2) be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used; (3) specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight; (4) ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; (5) deviate to the minimum extent practicable from normal procedures used for routine operations. (b) Operating procedures should include: (1) required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight; (2) correct seating and eye position; (3) determination of aerodrome operating minima; (4) increment to be added to minima for use by pilots-in-command/commanders who are new to the aircraft type, if applicable; (5) the effect on aerodrome operating minima of temporarily failed or downgraded ground equipment; (6) the effect on aerodrome operating minima of the failure or change of status of any aircraft systems; (7) the requirement for LVPs to be established; (8) a requirement for a call-out approaching minima to prevent inadvertent decent below the DA/H; (9) the requirement for height call-outs below 200 ft to be based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if applicable; (10) required visual references; (11) action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual reference; and (12) maximum allowable flight path deviations and action to be taken in the event that such deviations occur. (c) Operators required to comply with the requirements of Annex III (Part-ORO) to this Regulation should include operating procedures in the operations manual required by ORO.MLR.100. The operators to which Part-ORO does not apply should include the operating procedures in a ‘procedures manual’. AMC3 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: CAT II The following provisions should apply to CAT II operations: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 122 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots. (b) The approach should be flown using a certificated system as identified in the AFM. (c) If the approach is flown using autopilot, for a manual landing the autopilot should remain engaged until after the pilot has achieved visual reference. (d) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. (e) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process. (f) At DH the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centreline of the approach lights or TDZ lights or runway edge lights or a combination of them; and (2) the visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ light unless the operation is conducted using a HUD or an equivalent system to touchdown. AMC4 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: CAT III The following provisions should apply to CAT III operations: (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots. (b) The approach should be flown using a certificated system as identified in the AFM. (c) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. (d) For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process. (e) At DH the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) for operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUD or equivalent display system: a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centreline of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them to be attained and maintained by the pilot; and (2) for operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail- operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at least one centreline light to be attained and maintained by the pilot. (f) For operations with no DH, there is no specification for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown. AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: SA CAT I TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 123 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law The following provisions should apply to SA CAT I operations: (a) The approach should be flown using a certificated system as identified in the AFM. (b) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. (c) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process. (d) At DH the following visual references should be visible to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centreline of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them; and (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUD or an equivalent system usable down to 120 ft above the runway threshold. AMC6 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: SA CAT II The following provisions should apply to SA CAT II operations: (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots. (b) The approach should be flown using a certificated system as identified in the AFM. (c) If the approach is flown using autopilot, for a manual landing the autopilot should remain engaged until after the pilot has achieved visual reference. (d) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. (e) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process. (f) At DH the visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centreline of the approach lights or TDZ lights or runway edge lights or a combination of them; (2) the visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ light unless the operation is conducted using a HUD or an equivalent system to touchdown. AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria OPERATING PROCEDURES: EFVS OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to EFVS operations: (a) The approach should be flown using a certificated EFVS-A or EFVS-L as identified in the AFM. (b) The pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach. (c) In multi-pilot operations, the pilot monitoring should monitor the EFVS-derived information. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 124 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (d) The approach between the final approach fix (FAF) and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance. (e) The approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either: (1) the approach light system; or (2) both of the following: (i) the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and (iii) the TDZ identified by the TDZ lights, the TDZ runway markings or the runway lights. (f) Unless the aircraft is equipped with a certified EFVS-L, a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by the following height above the threshold: (1) the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired by the crew as stated in the AFM; or (2) if the AFM does not specify such a height, 100 ft. GM1 SPA.LVO.100(e)105(c) Low-visibility operations Specific approval criteria FLIGHT CREW ACTIONS IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT FAILURE AT OR BELOW DH IN FAIL-PASSIVE CAT III OPERATIONS (…) AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f) Specific approval criteria SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (a) The operator should monitor LVOs and operations with an operational approval in order to validate the effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight guidance systems, training, flight crew procedures, aircraft maintenance programme and to identify hazards. (b) Data should be collected whenever an LVO or an operation with an operational approval is attempted regardless of whether the approach is abandoned, is unsatisfactory, or is concluded successfully. The data should include records of the following: (1) occasions when it was not possible to commence an approach due to deficiencies or unserviceabilities of related airborne equipment; (2) occasions when approaches were discontinued, including the reasons for discontinuing the approach and the height above the runway at which approach was discontinued; (3) occasions when system abnormalities required pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing; (4) landing performance, whether or not the aircraft landed satisfactorily within the desired touchdown area with acceptable lateral velocity or cross-track error. The approximate lateral and longitudinal position of the actual touchdown point in relation to the runway centreline and the runway threshold, respectively, should be recorded. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 125 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (c) Data about LVOs should be collected by means of the operator’s flight data monitoring programme or, for operators not required to implement a flight data monitoring programme, by means of reports submitted by flight crew. (d) Performance indicators should include the following: (1) the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches, i.e. the number of attempted approaches terminating in discontinued approaches, approaches where pilot intervention was required to ensure a continued approach or safe landing or where landing performance was unsatisfactory, compared to the number of low-visibility approaches attempted; (2) measures of performance of the airborne equipment required for low-visibility approaches or operations with an operational approval of each individual aircraft; (3) safety performance indicators related to other specific risks associated with LVOs. (e) The following information should be retained for a period of 5 years: (1) the total number of low-visibility approaches or operations with an operational approval attempted or completed, including practice approaches, by aircraft type; and (2) reports of unsatisfactory approaches and/or landings, by aerodrome and aircraft registration, in the following categories: (i) airborne equipment faults; (ii) ground facility difficulties; (iii) missed approaches because of air traffic control (ATC) instructions; or (iv) other reasons. AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(f) Specific approval criteria SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL (a) Prior to commencing LVOs or operations with operational credits, an operator should demonstrate to the competent authority that such operations will achieve an acceptable level of safety. This requires the operator to gather data from operations using the relevant systems and procedures and conduct safety assessments taking that data into account. (b) The operator applying for the approval of low-visibility approach operations should determine the minimum number of approaches required to gather sufficient data to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety and the time period over which such data should be gathered. (c) If an operator is applying for more than one LVO approval or an approval for operation with operational credits for a particular aircraft type, then data gathered from operations using the systems and procedures designed for one classification of operations or operation with operational credits may be used to support the application for another classification of operations or operation with operational credits provided the following elements are similar: (1) type of technology, including: (i) flight control/guidance system (FGS) and associated displays and controls; (ii) flight management system (FMS) and level of integration with the FGS; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 126 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (iii) use of HUD or an equivalent display system; (iv) use of EFVS; (2) operational procedures, including: (i) alert height; (ii) manual landing/automatic landing; (iii) no DH operations; (iv) use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; and (v) use of EFVS to touchdown; and (3) handling characteristics, including: (i) manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach; (ii) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and (iii) automatic/manual roll-out. (d) An operator holding an approval for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits may use data gathered from approaches conducted using one aircraft type to support an application for approval for a different aircraft type or variants provided the following elements are similar: (1) type of technology, including the following: (i) FGS and associated displays and controls; (ii) FMS and level of integration with the FGS; and (iii) use of HUD or an equivalent display system; (iv) use of EFVS; (2) operational procedures, including: (i) alert height; (ii) manual landing/automatic landing; (iii) no DH operations; and (iv) use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; (v) use of EFVS to touchdown; and (3) handling characteristics, including: (i) manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach; (ii) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and (iii) automatic/manual roll-out. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 127 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM1 SPA.LVO.105(f) Specific approval criteria SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING (a) Data gathering for safety performance monitoring of LVOs and operations with operational credits will need to include sufficient information for the operator to identify hazards and assess the risks associated with LVOs and operations with operational credits. (b) Where data is collected by means of flight crew reports, each report may include: (1) date and time; (2) aircraft details (type and registration); (3) airport, approach procedure, final approach and take-off area (FATO) and/or runway used; (4) the type of LVO or operation with operational credits attempted or completed; (5) weather conditions including wind, reported RVR and nature phenomena restricting visibility; (6) the reason for a discontinued approach (if applicable); (7) details of any pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing; (8) adequacy of speed control; (9) trim at time of automatic flight control system disengagement (if applicable); (10) compatibility of automatic flight control system, flight director and raw data; (11) an indication of the position of the aircraft relative to the centreline when descending through 30 m (100 ft); (12) touchdown position relative to the TDZ; (13) an assessment of the sink rate, lateral velocity and bank angle at touchdown; (14) the nature of any problems encountered by the crew in relation to operating procedures or training; and (15) any human factors issues that arose in relation to the operation. (c) Where data is gathered as part of the operator’s flight data monitoring programme, procedures should be established to ensure that information that is only available directly from the flight crew or other sources (e.g. weather information) is captured. (d) In order to assess the risks associated with LVOs, operators may consider hazards with the potential to result in the following unacceptable safety outcomes: (1) loss of control in flight; (2) runway overrun or excursion; (3) controlled flight into terrain; (4) runway incursion and ground collision; (5) airborne conflict. (e) Operators’ safety control processes will ensure that LVOs and operations with operational credits: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 128 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) meet the safety objectives and performance standards established in the operator’s safety policy; (2) achieve at least the same level of safety as operations other than LVOs and operations without operational credits; and (3) have a continuously improving safety performance. GM2 SPA.LVO.105(f) Specific approval criteria DATA GATHERING FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL (a) General The intention of the safety assessment is to validate the use and effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight control and guidance systems, procedures, flight crew training and aircraft maintenance programme. The intention is not to repeat the statistical analysis required for certification of equipment, but rather to demonstrate that the various elements of the ‘total system’ for LVOs work together for a particular operator. (b) Data gathering for safety assessment: low-visibility take-off If the procedures used for LVTO are not significantly different from those used for standard take-off, it may be sufficient for operators to conduct only a small number of take-offs using the procedures established for LVTO for the purpose of data gathering. The following could be considered as minimum: (1) For LVTO in an RVR of 125 m or more: 1 take-off; (2) For LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m: 10 take-offs; An operator holding approval for LVTO on one aircraft type and applying for LVTO on another type or variant may use data from LVTO conducted on the first type if the following are similar: (1) level of technology, including flight deck displays, HUD or an equivalent guidance system; (2) operational procedures; and (3) handling characteristics. (c) Data gathering for safety assessment: low-visibility approach operations The data required for the safety assessment needs to be gathered from approaches conducted in a representative sample of expected operating conditions. The operator should consider seasonal variations in operating conditions such as prevalent weather, planned destinations and operating bases, and ensure that the approaches used for data gathering are conducted over a sufficient period of time to be representative of the planned operation. In order to ensure that data is representative of planned operations, approaches should be conducted at a variety of airports and runways. If more than 30 % of approaches are conducted to the same runway, the operator may increase the number of approaches required and take measures to ensure that the data is not distorted. The number of approaches used for data gathering will depend on the performance indicators and analysis methods used by the operator. The operator will need to demonstrate that the rate of successful low-visibility approaches is not lower than that anticipated by CS-AWO (i.e. 95 %) and also that the operation for which approval is sought will achieve an acceptable level of safety. The following TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 129 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law figures may be considered a minimum for an operator without previous experience of low-visibility approach operations: (1) for approval of operations with a DH of not less than 50 ft: 30 approaches; (2) for approval of operations with a DH of 50 ft or less: 100 approaches. Approaches conducted for the purpose of gathering data in order to conduct a safety assessment prior to obtaining an LVO approval may be conducted in line operations or any other flight where the operator’s procedures are used. Approaches may also be conducted in an FSTD if the operator is satisfied that this would be representative of the operation. The data gathered from these approaches will only be representative if all required elements of the total system for LVOs are in place. These include not only operating procedures and airborne equipment, but also airport and ATC procedures and ground- or space-based navigation facilities. If the operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements in place, then the data analysis should take into account the effect of at least the following: (1) air traffic services (ATS) factors including situations where a flight conducting an ILS approach is vectored too close to the FAF for satisfactory localiser and glideslope capture, lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas or ATS requests to discontinue the approach; (2) misleading navigation signals such as ILS localiser irregularities caused by taxiing aircraft or aircraft overflying the localiser array; (3) other specific factors that could affect the success of LVOs that are reported by the flight crew. (d) Safety considerations for approaches used for data gathering If an operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements of the total system for LVOs in place, then the operator should take actions to ensure an acceptable level of safety. (e) Sharing of data Operators may use data from other operators or aircraft manufacturers to support the safety assessment required to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety. The operator applying for a specific approval would need to demonstrate that the data used was relevant to the proposed operation. (f) It is expected that operators should have more than six months or 1 000 hours of total operational experience before they can have sufficient data to set up meaningful performance indicators and establish whether planned LVOs would achieve an acceptable level of safety. SPA.LVO.110 General operating requirements ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements (a) The operator shall only conduct LTS CAT I operations if: (1) each aircraft concerned is certified for operations to conduct CAT II operations; and (2) the approach is flown: (i) auto-coupled to an auto-land that needs to be approved for CAT IIIA operations; or (ii) using an approved head-up display landing system (HUDLS) to at least 150 ft above the threshold. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 130 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) The operator shall only conduct CAT II, OTS CAT II or CAT III operations if: (1) each aircraft concerned is certified for operations with a decision height (DH) below 200 ft, or no DH, and equipped in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements; (2) a system for recording approach and/or automatic landing success and failure is established and maintained to monitor the overall safety of the operation; (3) the DH is determined by means of a radio altimeter; (4) the flight crew consists of at least two pilots; (5) all height call-outs below 200 ft above the aerodrome threshold elevation are determined by a radio altimeter. (c) The operator shall only conduct approach operations utilising an EVS if: (1) the EVS is certified for the purpose of this Subpart and combines infra-red sensor image and flight information on the HUD; (2) for operations with an RVR below 550 m, the flight crew consists of at least two pilots; (3) for CAT I operations, natural visual reference to runway cues is attained at least at 100 ft above the aerodrome threshold elevation; (4) for approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) and non-precision approach (NPA) operations flown with CDFA technique, natural visual reference to runway cues is attained at least at 200 ft above the aerodrome threshold elevation and the following requirements are complied with: (i) the approach is flown using an approved vertical flight path guidance mode; (ii) the approach segment from final approach fix (FAF) to runway threshold is straight and the difference between the final approach course and the runway centreline is not greater than 2o; (iii) the final approach path is published and not greater than 3,7o; (iv) the maximum cross-wind components established during certification of the EVS are not exceeded. The operator shall ensure that only aerodromes and instrument procedures suitable for the intended operations are used for LVOs and operations with operational credits. GM1 SPA.LVO.110(c)(4)(i) General operating requirements APPROVED VERTICAL FLIGHT PATH GUIDANCE MODE This GM is deleted. AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements SUITABLE INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES (a) CAT II instrument approach operations should only be conducted using a CAT II IAP. (b) CAT III instrument approach operations should only be conducted using a CAT III IAP. (c) SA CAT I operations should only be conducted using an CAT I IAP that includes an OCH based on radio altimeter. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 131 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (d) SA CAT II operations should only be conducted using a CAT II IAP. (e) EFVS operations should only be conducted using an IAP, which is offset by a maximum of 3 degrees unless a different approach offset is stated in the AFM. AMC2 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements SUITABLE AERODROMES — LVTO The following provisions should apply to LVTO with an RVR of less than 125 m: (a) The runway has centreline lights spaced at intervals of 15 m or less. (b) If an ILS signal is used for lateral guidance, the ILS localiser signal meets the requirements for category III operations including the availability of the standby transmitter; and (c) LVPs include protection of the runway and, where an ILS localiser signal is used, the ILS-sensitive area. AMC3 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements SUITABLE AERODROMES – APPROACH OPERATIONS OTHER THAN EFVS OPERATIONS (a) For CAT II instrument approach operations, a PA runway category II or category III should be used. (b) For CAT III instrument approach operations, a PA runway category III should be used. (c) For SA CAT I operations: (1) where an ILS/MLS is used, it should not be promulgated with any restrictions affecting its usability and should not be offset from the extended centreline; (2) where an ILS is used, it should be at least the minimum ILS classification stated in the AFM and meet any of the required minimum performance parameters stated in the AFM; (3) the glide path angle is 3.0o unless the operator has assessed that a steeper glide path, not exceeding 3.5o, provides an equivalent level of safety; (4) the pre-threshold terrain should have been surveyed and assessed as suitable with regard to the usability of the radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and autoland systems; and (5) runway markings, category I approach lights and the following runway lights: runway edge lights, threshold lights, and runway end lights should be available. (d) For SA CAT II operations: (1) where an ILS/MLS is used, it should not be promulgated with any restrictions affecting its usability and not be offset from the extended centreline; (2) where an ILS is used, it should be certified to class II/D/3; (3) the glide path angle is 3.0o unless the operator has assessed that a steeper glide path, not exceeding 3.5O, provides an equivalent level of safety; (4) the pre-threshold terrain should have been surveyed and assessed as suitable with regard to the usability of the radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and autoland systems; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 132 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) the following visual aids should be available: (i) standard runway markings, category I approach lights and the following runway lights: runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights; and (ii) for operations with an RVR of less than 400 m, additionally TDZ and/or centreline lights. (e) The operator should verify the suitability of a runway before authorising the use of autoland on any runway other than a PA runway category II or a PA runway category III. (f) Each aircraft type/equipment/runway combination should be verified by operations in CAT I or better conditions before authorising the use of autoland on any runway with irregular pre-threshold terrain or other foreseeable or known difficulties. AMC4 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements LOW-VISIBILITY PROCEDURES (a) An operator should only use an aerodrome for low-visibility approach operations when: (1) the aerodrome is approved or assessed as suitable as follows: (i) In case of CAT II or CAT III operations, the aerodrome has been approved for such operations by the State of the aerodrome; (ii) In case of other than CAT II or CAT III operations: (A) the aerodrome has been approved for such operations, where the State of the aerodrome issues such approvals as within the Member States; or (B) the aerodrome has been assessed by the operator as suitable for the intended operation, where the State of the aerodrome does not issue such approvals; (2) suitable low-visibility procedures (LVPs) have been established and are in effect as verified by the commander before each approach. (b) Notwithstanding (a), if an operator selects an aerodrome, where the term ‘LVP’ is not used, the operator should verify that suitable procedures are established to ensure an equivalent level of safety to that achieved at approved aerodromes. This situation should be clearly noted in the operations manual or procedures manual, including guidance to the flight crew on how to determine that the equivalent LVPs are in effect at the time of an actual operation. AMC5 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements VERIFYING THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS OPERATIONS (a) The operator should conduct an operational assessment before authorising the use of the following approach procedures for EFVS operations: (1) NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance; (2) category I PA procedures on runways where an OFZ is not provided; and (3) approach procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria. (b) The operational assessment should identify whether obstacle clearance can be assured: (1) in the visual segment, without reliance on visual identification of obstacles; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 133 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) in the event of a balked landing. (c) If the operational assessment determines that obstacle clearance cannot be assured in the visual segment without reliance on visual identification of obstacles, the operator should not authorise EFVS operations to that runway or restrict the operation to the type and/or category of instrument approach operations where obstacle clearance is assured. (d) If the operational assessment determines that obstacle clearance is not assured in the event of a go- around initiated at any point prior to touchdown, the operator should not authorise the operation unless procedures to mitigate the risk of inadequate obstacle clearance are developed and implemented. (e) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, the operational assessment should include a determination of whether these requirements can be met. GM1 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements ILS CLASSIFICATION The ILS classification system is specified in ICAO Annex 10, Volume I. GM2 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements SUITABLE AERODROMES — INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES FOR SA CAT I AND SA CAT II ICAO design criteria for IAPs are contained in PANS-OPS (Doc 8168), Volume II. The design criteria for SA CAT I are the same as those used for standard CAT I approaches, except that the procedures used for SA CAT I should have an OCH based on radio altimeter height loss since the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance to determine the DH is prescribed. PANS-OPS Volume II contains the following statement about OCH based on the use of a radio altimeter: ‘If the radio altimeter OCA/H is promulgated, operational checks shall have confirmed the repeatability of radio altimeter information.’ To assist in assessing the suitability of the approach area for the use of a radio altimeter, aerodromes may produce a precision approach terrain chart. Such a chart is a standard requirement for CAT II/III runways. The criteria for the precision approach terrain chart are contained in ICAO Annex 4, which explains the function as follows: ‘The chart shall provide detailed terrain profile information within a defined portion of the final approach so as to enable aircraft operating agencies to assess the effect of the terrain on DH determination by the use of radio altimeters.’ A DH of 150 ft is located approximately 600 m before the threshold on a 3o glide path. For SA CAT I operations, the instrument approach chart should contain an OCH based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, and the information in Part C of the operations manual must contain a DH based on the use of a radio altimeter. This procedure may be titled ‘SA CAT I’ or ‘CAT I’. For SA CAT II, the situation is similar. The design criteria are identical to those for CAT II approaches in PANS- OPS, the only exception being the lack of some lighting systems. The OCH and DH are based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. Since some of the lighting systems are missing, it is unlikely that a State will publish the instrument approach chart as CAT II or OTS CAT II but preferably as SA CAT II, even though the design criteria are the same. If a State, however, promulgates such an instrument approach as CAT II, it can be used for SA CAT II operations. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 134 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law SA CAT II operations can be conducted on regular CAT II runways and following CAT II procedures, but given the conditions for SA CAT II, this is probably not cost-effective. However, in case of long-term outages of certain lighting systems, SA CAT II operations may be considered. GM3 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS OPERATIONS (a) EFVS operations allow operation below the DA/H without ‘natural’ visual reference. Obstacles that could be avoided visually may not be obvious to the crew using the EFVS display and thus the approach procedure used has to ensure that obstacle clearance will be provided as long as the aircraft follows the intended approach path in the visual segment. (b) When operating below the DA/H, pilots rely on the EFVS and, for EFVS operations to touchdown, the pilot flying must acquire ‘natural’ visual reference at some point prior to touchdown. Therefore, EFVS operations may present a higher probability of initiating a go-around below the DA/H than standard operations, depending on the equipment used. (c) The purpose of the operational assessment of IAPs is to confirm that clearance from terrain and obstacles will be available at every stage of the approach including the visual segment and, in the event of a go-around initiated below the DH, the missed approach segment. (d) If an approach has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS operations, it may be assumed that the required terrain and obstacle clearance is assured and an operational assessment may not be required. (e) Procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS may have not been assessed for terrain or obstacle clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. The following approach procedures do not necessarily ensure obstacle clearance if a go-around is initiated below the DA/H: (1) NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance; (2) category I PA procedures for which an OFZ is not provided; (3) approach procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria. (f) The operational assessment may either examine each approach procedure and check that the required obstacle clearance is available or it may consider the design criteria used for development of the approach procedure. The operator could develop operational procedures for all approaches designed in accordance with these criteria. (g) For approach procedures where obstacle clearance is not assured for a balked landing, operational procedures available to the operator could include the following actions: (1) follow a published departure procedure for the landing runway (standard instrument departure or omnidirectional departure) in the event of a missed approach initiated below the DA/H; (2) require that a go-around should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by a height above the threshold that will ensure that obstacle clearance in the missed approach segment. This height might be greater than 100 ft or the height below which an approach should not be continued if the flight crew does not acquire natural visual reference as stated in the AFM; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 135 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (3) develop an alternative lateral profile to be followed in the event of a go-around below the DA/H; and (4) impose an aircraft mass restriction for EFVS operations so that the aircraft can achieve a sufficient missed approach climb performance to clear any obstacles in the missed approach segment if a go-around is initiated at any point prior to touchdown. (h) The terrain/obstacle clearance required in the missed approach phase for EFVS operations should be the same as for the same approach flown without EFVS. (i) Certain EFVSs may have additional requirements for the suitability of the runways to be used. These could include verification of the accuracy of charting information for the runway threshold or the type of approach lighting installed (incandescent or LED). The operational assessment will include verification that all such requirements can be satisfied before EFVS operations are authorised for a particular runway. GM4 SPA.LVO.110 ANS- and aerodrome-related requirements USE OF AUTOLAND It may be assumed that category II and category III runways will support autoland systems unless the State of the aerodrome has published information indicating otherwise. Where other runways are to be authorised for autoland operations, the operator should consult the aircraft manufacturer to establish any requirements for satisfactory autoland performance and may conduct autoland in CAT I or better conditions before authorising other use of autoland. If an operator is not aware of current CAT II/III operations at a particular runway by some other operator and similar aircraft type, it is a good practice for the operator to have conducted at least one approach using the Category II or III system and procedures and preferably with LVPs in effect, to each runway intended for Category II/III operations in weather better than that requiring the use of Category II minima. SPA.LVO.115 Aerodrome related requirements This implementing rule is deleted. SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications Flight crew competence The operator shall ensure that, prior to conducting an LVO: (a) each flight crew member: (1) complies with the training and checking requirements prescribed in the operations manual, including flight simulation training device (FSTD) training, in operating to the limiting values of RVR/VIS (visibility) and DH specific to the operation and the aircraft type; (2) is qualified in accordance with the standards prescribed in the operations manual; (b) the training and checking is conducted in accordance with a detailed syllabus. (a) The operator shall ensure that the flight crew is competent to conduct the intended operations. (b) The operator shall ensure that the flight crew members successfully complete training and checking for all types of LVOs and operations with operational credits. Such training and checking shall: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 136 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) include initial and recurrent training and checking; (2) include normal, abnormal and emergency procedures; (3) be tailored to the type of technologies used in the intended operations; and (4) take into account the human factor risks associated with the intended operations. (c) The operator shall be responsible for keeping records of the training and qualifications of the flight crew members. (d) The training and checking shall be conducted by appropriately qualified personnel. In the case of flight and flight simulation training and checking, the personnel providing the training and conducting the checks shall be qualified in accordance with Annex I (Part-FCL) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011. AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications GENERAL PROVISIONS This AMC is deleted. GM1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications FLIGHT CREW TRAINING This GM is deleted. AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence EXPERIENCE IN TYPE OR CLASS OR AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND/COMMANDER The operator should assess the risks associated with the conduct of low-visibility approach operations by pilots new to the aircraft type or class and take the necessary mitigation. Where such mitigation includes an increment to the visibility/RVR for LVOs, this should be stated in the operations manual. AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFVS OPERATIONS (a) Pilots should complete a minimum of two approaches using the operator’s procedures for EFVS operations during the validity period of the periodic demonstration of competence unless credits related to currency are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. (b) If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, he or she should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity. AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS During the validity period of each operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence: (a) pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits using HUD or equivalent display systems to touchdown should complete at least four approaches using the operator’s procedures for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits using HUD; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 137 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits should complete at least two approaches using the operator’s procedures for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits. GM1 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence EXPERIENCE IN TYPE OR CLASS OR AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND/COMMANDER As general guidance, the operator may use the following reference to assess the experience in type or class or as pilot-in-command/commander referred to in AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a): (a) Before commencing CAT II operations, the following additional provisions may apply to pilots-in- command/commanders or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type or class: (1) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and (2) 100 m may be added to the applicable CAT II RVR minima when the operation requires a CAT II manual landing to touchdown until: (i) a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type; or (ii) a total of 50 hours or 20 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type where the flight crew member has been previously qualified for CAT II manual landing operations with an EU operator; (3) 100 m may be added to the applicable CAT II RVR minima when the operation requires the use of CAT II HUDLS to touchdown until: (i) a total of 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type; or (ii) a total of 20 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type where the flight crew member has been previously qualified for CAT II HUDLS to touchdown with an EU operator. The sector provisions in points (a)(1) may always be applicable; the hours on type or class may not fulfil the provisions. (b) Before commencing CAT III operations, the following additional provisions may be applicable to pilots- in-command/commanders or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type: (1) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and (2) 100 m may be added to the applicable CAT II or CAT III RVR minima unless they have previously qualified for CAT II or III operations with an EU operator, until a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type. AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence INITIAL TRAINING FOR LVTO IN AN RVR LESS THAN 400 M The operator should ensure that the flight crew members have completed the following training and checking prior to being authorised to conduct take-offs in an RVR below 400 m unless credits related to training and checking are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 138 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) A ground training course including at least the following: (1) characteristics of fog; (2) effects of precipitation, ice accretion, low level wind shear and turbulence; (3) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions; (4) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems; (5) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m (200 m for Category D aeroplanes); (6) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to conduct LVOs; and (7) importance of correct seating and eye position. (b) A course of FSTD/flight training covering system failures and engine failures resulting in continued as well as rejected take-offs. Such training should include at least: (1) normal take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions; (2) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure: (i) for aeroplanes between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed), or as soon as safety considerations permit; (ii) for helicopters at or after the take-off decision point (TDP); and (3) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure: (i) for aeroplanes before V1 resulting in a rejected take-off; and (ii) for helicopters before the TDP. (c) The operator approved for LVTOs with an RVR below 150 m should ensure that the training specified in (a) is carried out in an FSTD. This training should include the use of any special procedures and equipment. (d) The operator should ensure that a flight crew member has completed a check before conducting LVTOs in RVRs of less than 150 m: (1) The check should require the execution of: (i) at least one LVTO in the minimum approved visibility; (ii) at least one rejected take-off at minimum authorised RVR in an aircraft or FSTD: (2) For pilots with previous experience with an EU operator of LVTO in RVRs of less than 150 m, the check may be replaced by successful completion of the FSTD and/or flight training specified in (a), (b) and (c). AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS The operator should ensure that the flight crew members have completed the following training and checking before being authorised to conduct SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations unless credits TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 139 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law related to training and checking are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012: (a) Flight crew members who do not have previous experience with an EU operator of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this subpart: (1) A course of ground training including at least the following: (i) characteristics and limitations of different types of approach aid; (ii) characteristics of the visual aids; (iii) characteristics of fog; (iv) operational capabilities and limitations of airborne systems to include symbology used on HUD or equivalent display systems, if appropriate; (v) effects of precipitation, ice accretion, low level wind shear and turbulence; (vi) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions; (vii) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems; (viii) principles of obstacle clearance requirements; (ix) recognition of and action to be taken in the event of failure of ground equipment; (x) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m; (xi) significance of DHs based upon radio altimeters and the effect of terrain profile in the approach area on radio altimeter readings and on automatic approach/landing systems. This applies to other devices capable of providing equivalent information; (xii) importance and significance of alert height, if applicable, and action in the event of any failure above and below the alert height; (xiii) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to conduct LVOs; and (xiv) importance of correct seating and eye position. (2) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows: (i) Phase one (LVO with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives: (A) understand the operation of equipment required for LVO; (B) understand the operating limitations resulting from airworthiness certification; (C) practise monitoring of automatic flight control systems and status annunciators; (D) practise the use of HUD or equivalent display systems, where appropriate; (E) practise monitoring of automatic flight control systems and status annunciators; (F) understand the significance of alert height, if applicable; (G) become familiar with the maximum lateral and vertical deviation permitted for different types of approach operation; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 140 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (H) become familiar with the visual references required at DH; (I) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to low-visibility approach operations; (J) practise coordination with other crew members; and (K) become proficient at procedures for low-visibility approach operations with serviceable equipment. (ii) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises: (A) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight; (B) the use of HUD or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight, if applicable; (C) approach using the appropriate flight guidance, autopilots, and control systems installed in the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing; (D) approach with all engines operating using the appropriate flight guidance, autopilots and control systems installed on the aircraft, including HUD or equivalent display systems, down to the appropriate DH followed by missed approach, all without external visual reference; (E) where appropriate, approaches using autopilot to provide automatic flare, hover, landing and roll-out; and (F) where appropriate, approaches using approved HUD or equivalent display system to touchdown. (iii) Phase two (low-visibility approach operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives: (A) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceability including use of the MEL; (B) understand the effect on aerodrome operating minima of failed or downgraded equipment; (C) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in status of automatic flight control/guidance systems including HUD or equivalent display systems; (D) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below alert height, if applicable; (E) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and (F) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during low- visibility approach operations. (iv) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises: (A) approaches with engine failures at various stages on the approach; (B) approaches with critical equipment failures, such as electrical systems, auto-flight systems, ground or airborne approach aids and status monitors; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 141 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (C) approaches where failures of auto-flight or flight guidance systems, including HUD or equivalent display systems, require either: (a) reversion to manual control for landing or missed approach; or (b) reversion to manual flight or a downgraded automatic mode to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in contact with the runway. This should include aircraft handling if, during a CAT III fail-passive approach, a fault causes autopilot disconnect at or below the DH when the last reported RVR is 300 m or less; (D) failures of systems that will result in excessive lateral or vertical deviation both above and below the DH in the minimum visual conditions for the operation; (E) incapacitation procedures appropriate to low-visibility approach operations; and (F) failures and procedures applicable to the specific aircraft type. (v) FSTD training should include: (A) for approaches flown using HUD or equivalent display systems, a minimum of eight approaches; (B) otherwise, a minimum of six approaches. (vi) For aircraft for which no FSTDs representing the specific aircraft are available, operators should ensure that the flight training phase specific to the visual scenarios of low-visibility approach operations is conducted in a specifically approved FSTD. Such training should include a minimum of four approaches. Thereafter, type-specific training should be conducted in the aircraft. (3) A check requiring the completion of at least the following exercises in an aircraft or FSTD: (i) Low-visibility approaches in simulated instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew coordination (task sharing, call-out procedures, mutual surveillance, information exchange and support) should be observed. For CAT III operations, the operator should use an FSTD approved for this purpose; (ii) Go-around after approaches as indicated in (2) on reaching the DH; and (iii) Landing(s) with visual reference established at the DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing should be performed. (4) For operators for which LIFUS is required by Part-ORO, practice approaches during LIFUS, as follows: (i) For low-visibility approach operations using a manual landing: (A) if a HUD or equivalent display system is used to touchdown, four landings, or if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for ZFT training, two landings; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 142 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (B) otherwise, three landings, or if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for ZFT training, one landing; (ii) For low-visibility operations using autoland: (A) if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for ZFT training, one landing, or none if the fight crew member successfully completed a type rating based on ZFT training; (B) otherwise, two landings. (b) Flight crew members who have previous experience of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this subpart when changing to an aircraft type for which a new class or type rating is required with the same operator: (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member’s existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations. (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member’s previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on a type where the following were the same or similar: (i) technology used in flight guidance and flight control system; (ii) operating procedures; (iii) handling characteristics; and (iv) use of HUD or equivalent display systems, then he or she may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings: (i) if a HUD or an equivalent display system is utilised to touchdown, then four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around; or (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest authorised RVR and a go- around. (c) Flight crew members who have previous experience with an EU operator of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this subpart when joining another operator: (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member’s existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations. (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member’s previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant, or on a different type or variant where the following were the same or similar: (i) technology used in flight guidance and flight control system; (ii) operating procedures; (iii) handling characteristics; and (iv) use of HUD or equivalent display systems, TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 143 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law then he or she may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least two approaches including a landing at the lowest authorised RVR and a go-around. (3) Practice approaches during LIFUS as required by (a)(3) above, unless the flight crew member’s previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant. AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS The operator should ensure that the flight crew members have completed the following conversion training before being authorised to conduct EFVS operations unless credits related to training and checking are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012: (a) Flight crew members who do not have previous experience with an EU operator of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this subpart: (1) A course of ground training including at least the following: (i) characteristics and limitations of HUDs or equivalent display systems including information presentation and symbology; (ii) EFVS sensor performance, sensor limitations, scene interpretation, visual anomalies and other visual effects; (iii) EFVS display, control, modes, features, symbology, annunciations and associated systems and components; (iv) interpretation of EFVS imagery; (v) interpretation of approach and runway lighting systems and display characteristics when using EFVS; (vi) weather associated with low-visibility conditions and its effect on EFVS performance; (vii) preflight planning and selection of suitable aerodromes and approach procedures; (viii) principles of obstacle clearance requirements; (ix) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems; (x) normal, abnormal and emergency procedures for EFVS operations; (xi) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions; (xii) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less; (xiii) human factors aspects of EFVS operations; and (xiv) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval for EFVS operations. (2) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows: (i) Phase one (EFVS operations with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 144 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (A) understand the operation of equipment required for EFVS operations; (B) understand operating limitations of the installed EFVS; (C) practise the use of HUD or equivalent display systems; (D) practise setup and adjustment of EFVS equipment in different conditions (e.g. day and night); (E) practise monitoring of automatic flight control systems, EFVS information and status annunciators; (F) practise interpretation of EFVS imagery; (G) become familiar with the features needed on the EFVS image to continue approach below the DH; (H) practise identification of visual references using natural vision while using EFVS equipment; (I) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to EFVS operations including, where appropriate, the use of the flare cue and guidance for landing; (J) practise coordination with other crew members; and (K) become proficient at procedures for EFVS operations. (ii) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises: (A) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight; (B) the use of HUD or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight; (C) approach using the EFVSs installed in the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing; (D) approach with all engines operating using the EFVS, down to the appropriate DH followed by missed approach, all without external visual reference; (E) where appropriate, approaches using approved EFVS to touchdown. (iii) Phase two (low-visibility approach operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives: (A) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceabilities including use of the MEL; (B) understand the effect on aerodrome operating minima of failed or downgraded equipment; (C) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in status of the EFVS including HUD or equivalent display systems; (D) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below the DH; (E) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 145 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (F) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during EFVS operations. (iv) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises: (A) approaches with engine failures at various stages on the approach; (B) approaches with failures of the EFVS at various stages of the approach, including failures between the DH and the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired, requiring either (a) reversion to head-down displays to control missed approach; or (b) reversion to flight with no, or downgraded, guidance to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway. (C) incapacitation procedures appropriate to EFVS operations; and (D) failures and procedures applicable to the specific EFVS installation and aircraft type. (v) FSTD training should include a minimum of eight approaches. (vi) If a flight crew member is to be authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required FSTD training for each operating capacity. (3) For operators for which LIFUS is required by Part-ORO, practice approaches during LIFUS, as follows: (i) if EFVS is used to touchdown, four landings; or (ii) otherwise, three landings. (b) Flight crew members who have previous experience of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this subpart and changing to an aircraft type for which a new class or type rating is required with the same operator: (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member’s existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations; (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member’s previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on a type where the following were the same or similar: (i) technology used in EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system; (ii) operating procedures; and (iii) handling characteristics, then he or she may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings: (i) For EFVS to touchdown, four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around, or TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 146 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest authorised RVR and a go- around. (c) Flight crew members who have previous experience with an EU operator of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this subpart when joining another operator: (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member’s existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations; (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member’s previous experience of EFVS operations is on the same aircraft type and variant with the same EFVS or on a different type or different EFVS where the following were the same or similar: (i) technology used in EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system; (ii) operating procedures; and (iii) handling characteristics, then he or she may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings: (i) for EFVS to touchdown, four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around, or (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest authorised RVR and a go- around. (3) Practice approaches during LIFUS as required by (a)(3) above, unless the flight crew member’s previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant. AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence RECURRENT CHECKING FOR LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform LVOs for which they are authorised is checked at each required operator proficiency check or demonstration of competence by completing at least the following exercises in an aircraft or FSTD: (1) Rejected take-off at minimum authorised RVR; (2) Low-visibility approaches in simulated instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew coordination (task sharing, call-out procedures, mutual surveillance, information exchange and support) should be observed. For CAT III operations, the operator should use an FSTD approved for this purpose; (3) Go-around after approaches as indicated in (2) on reaching the DH; and (4) Landing(s) with visual reference established at the DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing should be performed. (b) During each required operator proficiency check or demonstration of competence: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 147 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) Pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits using HUD or equivalent display systems to touchdown should complete at least two low- visibility approaches, one of which should be a landing at the lowest approved RVR. (2) Other pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits should complete at least one low-visibility approach and go-around. (c) Pilots authorised to conduct CAT III operations on aircraft with a fail-passive flight control system, including HUD or equivalent, should complete a missed approach at least once over the period of three consecutive operator proficiency checks or demonstrations of competence as the result of an autopilot failure at or below the DH when the last reported RVR was 300 m or less. (d) Pilots authorised for LVTO in an RVR of less than 150 m should additionally conduct at least one LVTO in the minimum approved visibility. AMC5 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members are provided with a differences training or familiarisation training whenever they are required to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits requiring an approval under this subpart for which they are not already authorised, or whenever there is a change to any of the following: (1) the technology used in the flight guidance and flight control system; (2) the operating procedures including: (i) fail-passive/fail-operational; (ii) alert height; (iii) manual landing or automatic landing; (iv) operations with DH or no DH operations; (3) the handling characteristics; (4) the use of HUD or equivalent display systems; (5) the use of EFVS. (b) The differences training should: (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course; (2) take into account the flight crew members’ previous experience; and (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. AMC6 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform EFVS operations is checked at each required demonstration of competence by performing at least two approaches of which one should be TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 148 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law flown without natural vision, to the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired. (b) If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity. AMC7 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members authorised to conduct EFVS operations are provided with a differences training or familiarisation training whenever there is a change to any of the following: (1) the technology used in EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system; (2) the operating procedures; and (3) the handling characteristics. (b) The differences training should (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course; (2) take into account the flight crew members’ previous experience; and (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. GM1 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence FLIGHT CREW TRAINING (a) The number of approaches referred to in AMC2, AMC3, AMC4 and AMC6 to SPA.LVO.120(b) represents the minimum number of approaches that the flight crew members should conduct during initial and recurrent training and checking. More approaches or other training exercises may be required in order to ensure that flight crew members achieve the required proficiency. (b) Where flight crew members are to be authorised to conduct more than one classification of LVOs or operation with operational credits for which the technology and operating procedures are similar, there is no requirement to increase the number of approaches in initial training if the training programme ensures that the flight crew members are competent for all operations for which they will be authorised. Where flight crew members are to be authorised to conduct more than one classification of LVOs or operations with operational credits using different technology or operating procedures, then the required minimum number of approaches should be completed for each different technology or operating procedure. (c) Where flight crew members are authorised to conduct more than one classification of LVOs or operation with operational credits for which the technology and operating procedures are similar, then there is no requirement to increase the number of approaches flown during recurrent checking. However, where flight crew members are authorised to conduct more than one classification of LVOs or operation with operational credits using different technology or operating procedures, then the required number of approaches should be completed for each different technology or operating procedure. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 149 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (d) Flight crew members are required to complete initial and recurrent FSTD training for each operating capacity for which they will be authorised (e.g. as pilot flying and/or pilot monitoring). A pilot who will be authorised to operate in either capacity will need to complete the minimum number of approaches in each capacity. (e) Approaches conducted in a suitably qualified FSTD and/or during a proficiency check or demonstration of competence may be counted towards the recent experience requirements. If a flight crew member has not complied with the recent experience requirements of AMC4 SPA.LVO.120 or AMC5 SPA.LVO.120, the required approaches may be conducted during recurrent training, an operator proficiency check or a periodic check of competence either in an aircraft or on an FSTD. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 150 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law LVO / Technology Previous experience Reference Initial practical Line flying Recent experience and Notes operational (FSTD) training under recurrent training credit supervision (LIFUS) (if required) 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 3 landings or none 6 approaches 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (a)(2)(v) 1 landing1 Total 2 approaches Previously qualified 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with the same 2 approaches none 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (b)(2) operator, similar type Total 2 approaches CAT II Manual Previously qualified 1 approach (aircraft) + with a different EU AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 2 approaches none 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 2 approaches and variant Previously qualified 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 3 landings or with a different EU 2 approaches 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (c)(2) 1 landing1 operator, similar type Total 2 approaches 2 landings or 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) none 6 approaches 1 landing1 or 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (a)(4)(ii) no landings2 Total 2 approaches Previously qualified 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with the same 2 approaches None 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (b)(2) CAT II / III operator, similar type Total 2 approaches SA CAT I Autoland Previously qualified 1 approach (aircraft) + SA CAT II with a different EU AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 2 approaches none 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 2 approaches and variant Previously qualified 2 landings or 1 approach (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with a different EU 2 approaches 1 landing1 or 1 approach to G/A (FSTD) point (c)(2) operator, similar type no landings2 Total 2 approaches TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 151 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 4 landings or none 8 approaches 2 approaches (FSTD) point (a)(2)(v) 2 landings1 Total 4 approaches Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with the same 4 approaches None 2 approaches (FSTD) point (b)(2) CAT II / III HUD / operator, similar type Total 4 approaches SA CAT I manual Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + SA CAT II landing with a different EU AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 4 approaches none 2 approaches (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 4 approaches and variant Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 4 landings or with a different EU 4 approaches 2 approaches (FSTD) point (c)(2) 2 landings1 operator, similar type Total 4 approaches 2 landings or 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) none 8 approaches 1 landing1 or 2 approaches (FSTD) point (a)(4) no landings2 Total 4 approaches Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with the same 4 approaches None 2 approaches (FSTD) point (b)(2) CAT II / III HUD / operator, similar type Total 4 approaches SA CAT I automatic Previously qualified SA CAT II landing 2 approaches (aircraft) + with a different EU AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) 4 approaches None 2 approaches (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 4 approaches and variant Previously qualified 2 landings or 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) with a different EU 4 approaches 1 landing1 or 2 approaches (FSTD) point (c)(2) operator, similar type no landings2 Total 4 approaches 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) none 8 approaches 3 landings 2 approaches (FSTD) Approach point (a)(2) (HUD) Total 4 approaches using EFVS Previously qualified AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) 2 approaches (aircraft) + 2 approaches None with the same point (b)(2) 2 approaches (FSTD) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 152 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law operator, similar type Total 4 approaches Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + with a different EU AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) 2 approaches none 2 approaches (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 4 approaches and variant Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) with a different EU 2 approaches 3 landings 2 approaches (FSTD) point (c)(2) operator, similar type Total 4 approaches 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) none 8 approaches 4 landings 2 approaches (FSTD) point (a)(2) Total 4 approaches Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) with the same 4 approaches None 2 approaches (FSTD) point (b)(2) operator, similar type Total 4 approaches EFVS to land HUD Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + with a different EU AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) 4 approaches none 2 approaches (FSTD) operator, same type point (c)(2) Total 4 approaches and variant Previously qualified 2 approaches (aircraft) + AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) with a different EU 4 approaches 4 landings 2 approaches (FSTD) point (1) (c)(2) operator, similar type Total 4 approaches Notes: 1: Fewer landings during LIFUS are required if a level ‘D’ FSTD is used for conversion training. 2: No landings are required if a candidate has completed the zero flight time (ZFT) type rating. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 153 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM2 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS In order to provide the opportunity to practise decision-making in the event of system failures and failure to acquire natural visual reference, the recurrent training/checking for EFVS operations should periodically include different combinations of equipment failures, go-around due to loss of visual reference and landings. GM3 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS The ground training referred to in points (a)(1)(i) and (iv) ofAMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) may include: (a) airborne and ground equipment: (1) technical requirements; (2) operational requirements; (3) operational reliability; (4) fail operational; (5) fail passive; (6) equipment reliability; (7) operating procedures; (8) preparatory measures; (9) operational downgrading; and (10) communications; and (b) procedures and limitations: (1) operational procedures; and (2) crew coordination. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 154 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex VI Non-commercial air operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC) NCC.OP.101 Altimeter check and settings (a) The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter checking before each departure. (b) The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter settings for all phases of flight. If the State of the aerodrome or the State of the airspace has prescribed a different procedure from those established by the operator, that procedure shall be taken into account by the operator. GM1 NCC.OP.101 Altimeter check and settings ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES The operator procedures should be aligned with the following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume I: (a) 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’; (b) 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’; (c) 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’. NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general (a) For instrument flight rules (IFR) flights, the operator shall establish aerodrome operating minima for each departure, destination and alternate aerodrome to be used. Such minima shall: (1) not be lower than those established by the State in which the aerodrome is located, except when specifically approved by that State; and (2) when undertaking low visibility operations, be approved by the competent authority in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), Subpart E to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. (b) When establishing aerodrome operating minima, the operator shall take the following into account: (1) the type, performance and handling characteristics of the aircraft; (2) the composition, competence and experience of the flight crew; (3) the dimensions and characteristics of the runways and final approach and take-off areas (FATOs) that may be selected for use; (4) the adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual ground aids; (5) the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation and/or control of the flight path, during the take-off, the approach, the flare, the landing, the rollout and the missed approach; (6) the obstacles in the approach, the missed approach and the climb-out areas necessary for the execution of contingency procedures; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 155 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (7) the obstacle clearance altitude/height for the instrument approach procedures; (8) the means to determine and report meteorological conditions; and (9) the flight technique to be used during the final approach. (c) The minima for a specific type of approach and landing procedure shall only be used if all the following conditions are met: (1) the ground equipment required for the intended procedure is operative; (2) the aircraft systems required for the type of approach are operative; (3) the required aircraft performance criteria are met; and (4) the crew is qualified appropriately. (a) The operator shall establish aerodrome operating minima for each departure, destination or alternate aerodrome planned to be used in order to ensure separation of the aircraft from terrain and obstacles and to mitigate the risk of loss of visual references during the visual flight segment of instrument operations. (b) The method used to establish aerodrome operating minima shall take the following elements into account: (1) the type, performance and handling characteristics of the aircraft; (2) the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation, acquisition of visual references and/or control of the flight path during take-off, approach, landing and missed approach; (3) any conditions or limitations stated in the aircraft flight manual (AFM); (4) the dimensions and characteristics of the runways/final approach and take-off area (FATO) that may be selected for use; (5) the adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure; (6) the obstacle clearance altitude/height (OCA/H) for the instrument approach procedures (IAPs); (7) the obstacles in the climb-out areas and necessary clearance margins; (8) any non-standard characteristics of the aerodrome, the IAP or the environment; (9) the composition of the flight crew, their competence and experience; (10) the IAP; (11) the aerodrome characteristics and the available ANS; (12) any minima that may be promulgated by the State of the aerodrome; (13) the conditions prescribed in any specific approvals for LVOs or operations with operational credits; and (14) the relevant operational experience of the operator. (c) The operator shall specify a method of determining aerodrome operating minima in the operations manual. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 156 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC3 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS (a) General: (1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility (VIS) or RVR limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics and equipment. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling cloud conditions, should be specified. (2) The pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome, unless a weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available. (3) When the reported meteorological visibility VIS is below that required for take-off and the RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum. (4) When no reported meteorological visibility VIS or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the visibility RVR/ VIS along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum. (b) Visual reference: (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine. (2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles the prescribed runway lights should be in operation to mark the runway and any obstacles. (c) Required RVR/ or VISvisibility: (1) Aeroplanes: (i) For aeroplanes, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A. (ii) When reported RVR or meteorological visibility is not available, the pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless he/she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima. (i) For multi-engined aeroplanes, with such performance that in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off the aeroplane can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR or VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A. (ii) Multi-engined aeroplanes without the performance to comply with the conditions in (c)(1)(i) in the event of a critical engine failure may need to re-land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles in the take-off area. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the following TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 157 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law take-off minima provided they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the specified height: (A) The take-off minima specified by the operator should be based upon the height from which the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) net take-off flight path can be constructed. (B) The RVR minima used should not be lower than either of the values specified in Table 1.A or Table 2.A. (iii) For single-engined turbine aeroplane operations approved in accordance with Subpart L (SET-IMC) of Annex V (Part-SPA) to this Regulation, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/CMV values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A below. Unless the operator is using a risk period, whenever the surface in front of the runway does not allow for a safe forced landing, the RVR/CMV values should not be lower than 800 m. In this case, the proportion of the flight to be considered starts at the lift-off position and ends when the aeroplane is able to turn back and land on the runway in the opposite direction or glide to the next landing site in case of power loss. (iv) When the RVR or the VIS is not available, the commander should not commence take-off unless he or she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima. Table 1.A: Take-off — aeroplanes (without an approval for low-visibility take-off (LVTO) approval) RVR/ or VIS Facilities RVR/ or VIS (m)* Day only: Nil** 500 Day: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline markings 400 Night: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline lights and runway end lights *: The reported RVR/ or VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. **: The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control. AMC4 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING RVR/CMV (a) In order to qualify for the lowest allowable values of RVR/CMV specified in Table 4.A, the instrument approach should meet at least the following facility requirements and associated conditions: (1) Instrument approaches with designated vertical profile up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are: (i) instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/GBAS landing system (GLS)/precision approach radar (PAR); or TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 158 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (ii) approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV); and where the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes. (2) Instrument approach operations flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical profile, up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are non-directional beacon (NDB), NDB/distance measuring equipment (DME), VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR), VOR/DME, localiser (LOC), LOC/DME, VHF direction finder (VDF), surveillance radar approach (SRA) or global navigation satellite system (GNSS)/lateral navigation (LNAV), with a final approach segment of at least 3 NM, which also fulfil the following criteria: (i) the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes; (ii) the final approach fix (FAF) or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is available, or distance to threshold (THR) is available by flight management system (FMS)/area navigation (NDB/DME) or DME; and (iii) the missed approach point (MAPt) is determined by timing, the distance from FAF to THR is ≤ 8 NM. (3) Instrument approaches where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, not fulfilling the criteria in (a)(2), or with an minimum descent height (MDH) ≥ 1 200 ft. (b) The missed approach operation, after an approach operation has been flown using the CDFA technique, should be executed when reaching the decision height/altitude (DH/A) or the MAPt, whichever occurs first. The lateral part of the missed approach procedure should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart. DETERMINATION OF DH/MDH FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) The decision height (DH) to be used for a 3D approach operation or a 2D approach operation flown with the CDFA technique should not be lower than the highest of: (1) the obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft; (2) the published approach procedure DH or MDH where applicable; (3) the system minimum specified in Table 3.A; (4) the minimum DH permitted for the runway specified in Table 4.A; or (5) the minimum DH specified in the AFM or equivalent document, if stated. (b) The minimum descent height (MDH) for a 2D approach operation flown without the CDFA technique should not be lower than the highest of: (1) the OCH for the category of aircraft; (2) the published approach procedure MDH where applicable; (3) the system minimum specified in Table 3.A; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 159 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (4) the lowest MDH permitted for the runway specified in Table 4.A; or (5) the lowest MDH specified in the AFM, if stated. Table 2.A: System minima Facility Lowest DH/MDH (ft) ILS/MLS/GLS 200 GNSS/SBAS (LPV) 200* GNSS (LNAV) 250 GNSS/Baro-VNAV (LNAV/VNAV) 250 LOC with or without DME 250 SRA (terminating at ½ NM) 250 SRA (terminating at 1 NM) 300 SRA (terminating at 2 NM or more) 350 VOR 300 VOR/DME 250 NDB 350 NDB/DME 300 VDF 350 * For localiser performance with vertical guidance (LPV), a DH of 200 ft may be used only if the published final approach segment (FAS) datablock sets a vertical alert limit not exceeding 35 m. Otherwise, the DH should not be lower than 250 ft. Table 3.A: Runway type minima Runway type Lowest DH/MDH (ft) PA runway category I 200 NPA runway 250 Circling minima as shown in Table 1 Non-instrument runway in NCC.OP.112 Non-instrument FATO/runway for helicopters 250 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 160 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC5 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, APV, CAT I FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES (a) The minimum RVR/CMV/VIS should be the highest of the values specified in Table 3 and Table 4.A but not greater than the maximum values specified in Table 4.A, where applicable. (b) The values in Table 3 should be derived from the formula below: required RVR/VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048) / tanα] – length of approach lights (m); where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 3 up to 3.77° and then remaining constant. (c) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above MDA/H, 200 m should be added for Category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes to the minimum RVR/CMV/VIS value resulting from the application of Table 3 and Table 4.A. (d) An RVR of less than 750 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used: (1) for CAT I operations to runways with full approach lighting system (FALS), runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway centreline lights (RCLL); (2) for CAT I operations to runways without RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS), or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach or flight-director-flown approach to a DH. The ILS should not be published as a restricted facility; and (3) for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up display (HUD). (e) Lower values than those specified in Table 3 may be used for HUDLS and auto-land operations if approved in accordance with Annex V (Part SPA), Subpart E. (f) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings and approach and runway lights as specified in Table 2. The competent authority may approve that RVR values relevant to a basic approach lighting system (BALS) are used on runways where the approach lights are restricted in length below 210 m due to terrain or water, but where at least one cross-bar is available. (g) For night operations or for any operation where credit for runway and approach lights is required, the lights should be on and serviceable, except as provided for in Table 6. (h) For single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the following additional criteria: (1) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for CAT I approaches provided any of the following is used at least down to the applicable DH: (i) a suitable autopilot, coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS that is not published as restricted; or (ii) an approved HUDLS, including, where appropriate, enhanced vision system (EVS), or equivalent approved system; (2) where RTZL and/or RCLL are not available, the minimum RVR/CMV should not be less than 600 m; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 161 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (3) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved HUDLS, or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach to a DH equal to or greater than 250 ft. Table 2: Approach lighting systems Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥ 720 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420 – 719 m) single source, Barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS 210 – 419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS < 210 m) or no approach lights Note: HIALS: high intensity approach lighting system; MIALS: medium intensity approach lighting system; ALS: approach lighting system. Table 3: RVR/CMV vs. DH/MDH DH or MDH Class of lighting facility FALS IALS BALS NALS See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR < 750/800 m ft RVR/CMV (m) 200 - 210 550 750 1 000 1 200 211 - 220 550 800 1 000 1 200 221 - 230 550 800 1 000 1 200 231 - 240 550 800 1 000 1 200 241 - 250 550 800 1 000 1 300 251 - 260 600 800 1 100 1 300 261 - 280 600 900 1 100 1 300 281 - 300 650 900 1 200 1 400 301 - 320 700 1 000 1 200 1 400 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 162 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law DH or MDH Class of lighting facility FALS IALS BALS NALS See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR < 750/800 m ft RVR/CMV (m) 321 - 340 800 1 100 1 300 1 500 341 - 360 900 1 200 1 400 1 600 361 - 380 1 000 1 300 1 500 1 700 381 - 400 1 100 1 400 1 600 1 800 401 - 420 1 200 1 500 1 700 1 900 421 - 440 1 300 1 600 1 800 2 000 441 - 460 1 400 1 700 1 900 2 100 461 - 480 1 500 1 800 2 000 2 200 481 500 1 500 1 800 2 100 2 300 501 - 520 1 600 1 900 2 100 2 400 521 - 540 1 700 2 000 2 200 2 400 541 - 560 1 800 2 100 2 300 2 500 561 - 580 1 900 2 200 2 400 2 600 581 - 600 2 000 2 300 2 500 2 700 601 - 620 2 100 2 400 2 600 2 800 621 - 640 2 200 2 500 2 700 2 900 641 - 660 2 300 2 600 2 800 3 000 661 - 680 2 400 2 700 2 900 3 100 681 - 700 2 500 2 800 3 000 3 200 701 - 720 2 600 2 900 3 100 3 300 721 - 740 2 700 3 000 3 200 3 400 741 - 760 2 700 3 000 3 300 3 500 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 163 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law DH or MDH Class of lighting facility FALS IALS BALS NALS See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR < 750/800 m ft RVR/CMV (m) 761 - 800 2 900 3 200 3 400 3 600 801 - 850 3 100 3 400 3 600 3 800 851 - 900 3 300 3 600 3 800 4 000 901 - 950 3 600 3 900 4 100 4 300 951 - 1 000 3 800 4 100 4 300 4 500 1 001 - 1 100 4 100 4 400 4 600 4 900 1 101 - 1 200 4 600 4 900 5 000 5 000 1 201 and above 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 Table 4.A: CAT I, APV, NPA – aeroplanes Minimum and maximum applicable RVR/CMV (lower and upper cut-off limits) Facility/conditions RVR/CMV Aeroplane category (m) A B C D Min According to Table 3 ILS, MLS, GLS, PAR, GNSS/SBAS, GNSS/VNAV Max 1 500 1 500 2 400 2 400 NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, Min 750 750 750 750 VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV with a Max 1 500 1 500 2 400 2 400 procedure that fulfils the criteria in AMC4 NCC.OP.110 (a)(2). For NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, Min 1 000 1 000 1 200 1 200 VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV: Max According to Table 3 if flown using the CDFA technique, otherwise an add-on of — not fulfilling the 200/400 m applies to the values in Table 3 criteria in AMC4 NCC.OP.110 but not to result in a value exceeding (a)(2)., or 5 000 m. — with a DH or MDH ≥ 1 200 ft TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 164 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) The RVR or VIS for straight-in instrument approach operations should not be less than the greatest of the following: (1) The minimum RVR or VIS for the type of runway used according to Table 4.A; or (2) The minimum RVR or VIS determined according to the MDH or DH and class of lighting facility according to Table 5.A; or (3) The minimum RVR or VIS according to the visual and non-visual aids and on-board equipment used according to Table 6.A. (b) For Category A and B aeroplanes, if the RVR or VIS determined in accordance with (a) is greater than 1 500 m, then 1 500 m should be used. (c) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above the MDA/H, 200 m should be added to the calculated RVR for Category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes. (d) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings, runway edge lights, threshold lights, runway end lights and approach lights as defined in Table 5.A. (e) For night operations or for any operation where credit for visual aids is required, the lights should be on and serviceable except as provided for in Table 10. (f) Where any visual or non-visual aid specified for the approach and assumed to be available in the determination of operating minima is unavailable, revised operating minima will need to be determined. Table 4.A: Type of runway vs minimum RVR or VIS Type of runway Minimum RVR or VIS (m) Precision approach runway, category I 550 Non-precision approach runway 750 Non-instrument runway According to Table 1 in NCC.OP.112 Table 5.A: RVR/CMV vs DH/MDH DH or MDH Class of lighting facility (ft) FALS IALS BALS NALS RVR/CMV (m) 200 - 210 550 750 1 000 1 200 211 - 240 550 800 1 000 1 200 241 - 250 550 800 1 000 1 300 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 165 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law DH or MDH Class of lighting facility (ft) FALS IALS BALS NALS RVR/CMV (m) 251 - 260 600 800 1 100 1 300 261 - 280 600 900 1 100 1 300 281 - 300 650 900 1 200 1 400 301 - 320 700 1 000 1 200 1 400 321 - 340 800 1 100 1 300 1 500 341 - 360 900 1 200 1 400 1 600 361 - 380 1 000 1 300 1 500 1 700 381 - 400 1 100 1 400 1 600 1 800 401 - 420 1 200 1 500 1 700 1 900 421 - 440 1 300 1 600 1 800 2 000 441 - 460 1 400 1 700 1 900 2 100 461 - 480 1 500 1 800 2 000 2 200 481 500 1 500 1 800 2 100 2 300 501 - 520 1 600 1 900 2 100 2 400 521 - 540 1 700 2 000 2 200 2 400 541 - 560 1 800 2 100 2 300 2 400 561 - 580 1 900 2 200 2 400 2 400 581 - 600 2 000 2 300 2 400 2 400 601 - 620 2 100 2 400 2 400 2 400 621 - 640 2 200 2 400 2 400 2 400 641 660 2 300 2 400 2 400 2 400 661 and above 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 Table 6.A: Visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment vs minimum RVR — Multi-pilot operations Type of Lowest RVR (m) Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. 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Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law operations operations 3D RTZL and RCLL [no limitation] operations without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or equivalent system; coupled auto-pilot or [no limitation] 600 flight director to the DH No RTZL and RCLL, not using HUDLS or 750 800 equivalent system or auto-pilot to the DH. 2D Final approach track offset <15 o for category operations A and B aeroplanes or <5 o for Category C and 750 800 D aeroplanes Final approach track offset  15o for 1 000 1 000 Category A and B aeroplanes Final approach track offset  5o for Category 1 200 1 200 C and D aeroplanes Table 7: Approach lighting systems Class of lighting facility Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights AMC8 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general CONVERSION OF REPORTED METEOROLOGICAL VISIBILITY (VIS) TO RVR/CMV (a) A conversion from meteorological visibilityVIS to RVR/CMV should not be used: (1) when the reported RVR is available; (2) for calculating take-off minima; and (3) for other RVR minima less than 800 m the purpose of continuation approach in low-visibility operations. (b) If the RVR is reported as being above the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g. ‘RVR more than 1 500 m’, it should not be considered as a reported value for (a)(1). (c) When converting meteorological visibility VIS to RVR in circumstances other than those in (a), the conversion factors specified in Table 58 should be used. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 167 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 59: Conversion of reported meteorological visibility VIS to RVR/CMV RVR/CMV = reported VIS meteorological visibility Light elements in operation Day Night HI approach and runway lights 1.5 2.0 Any type of light installation other than 1.0 1.5 above No lights 1.0 not applicable AMC9 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT (a) General These instructions are intended for both preflight and in-flight use. It is, however, not expected that the pilot-in-command would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in- command’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 610 and, if considered necessary, the approach should be abandoned. (b) Conditions applicable to Table 610: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 610 should not be acceptable; (2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; and (3) failures other than ILS, MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH. Table 6 10: Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded Effect on landing minima equipment CAT I Type B APV, NPA Type A ILS/MLS standby No effect transmitter APV — not applicable No effect if Outer marker replaced by NPA with FAF: no effect unless used as height check at FAF TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. 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Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Failed or downgraded Effect on landing minima equipment CAT I Type B APV, NPA Type A 1 000 ft the required height If the FAF cannot be identified (e.g. no or glide path can method available for timing of descent), be checked using non-precision operations cannot be other means, e.g. conducted DME fix Middle marker No effect No effect unless used as MAPt RVR assessment systems No effect Approach lights Minima as for NALS Approach lights except the Minima as for BALS last 210 m Approach lights except the Minima as for IALS last 420 m Standby power for No effect approach lights Edge lights, threshold lights Day — no effect and runway end lights Night — not allowed No effect if flight director (F/D), HUDLS or Centreline lights No effect autoland; otherwise RVR of 750 m Centreline lights spacing No effect increased to 30 m No effect if F/D, HUDLS or Touchdown zone TDZ lights autoland; No effect otherwise RVR 750 m Taxiway lighting system No effect TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 169 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM1 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general AIRCRAFT CATEGORIES (…) Table 111: Aircraft categories corresponding to VAT values (…) GM4 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEMS — ICAO, FAA The following table provides a comparison of the ICAO and FAA specifications. Table 12: Approach lighting systems — ICAO and FAA specifications Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS ICAO: CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥ 720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline FAA: ALSF1, ALSF2, SSALR, MALSR, high- or medium-intensity and/or flashing lights, 720 m or more IALS ICAO: simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette FAA: MALSF, MALS, SALS/SALSF, SSALF, SSALS, high- or medium-intensity and/or flashing lights, 420–719 m BALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) FAA: ODALS, high- or medium-intensity or flashing lights 210–419 m NALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights GM6 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general SBAS OPERATIONS (a) SBAS CAT I operations with a DH of 200 ft depend on an SBAS approved for operations down to a DH of 200 ft. (b) The following systems are in operational use or in a planning phase: (1) European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS), operational in Europe; (2) wide area augmentation system (WAAS), operational in the USA; (3) multi-functional satellite augmentation system (MSAS), operational in Japan; (4) system of differential correction and monitoring (SDCM), planned by Russia; (5) GPS-aided geo-augmented navigation (GAGAN) system, planned by India; and (6) satellite navigation augmentation system (SNAS), planned by China. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 170 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law GM7 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general MEANS TO DETEMINE THE REQUIRED RVR BASED ON DH AND LIGHTING FACILITIES (a) The values in Table 5.A are derived from the formula below: Required RVR or VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048)/tanα] — length of approach lights (m), where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 5.A up to 3.77° and then remaining constant. (b) The lighting system classes in Table 5.A have the meaning specified in Table 13. Table 13: Approach lighting systems Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights facility FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (e.g. HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights GM8 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general USE OF DH FOR NPA FLOWN USING CDFA The safety of the use of MDH as DH in CDFA operations has been verified by at least two independent analyses concluding that a CDFA using MDH as DH without any add-on is safer than the traditional step-down and level flight NPA operation. A comparison was made between the safety level of using MDH as DH without an add-on with the well-established safety level resulting from the ILS collision risk model (CRM). The NPA used was the most demanding, i.e. most tightly designed NPA, which offers the least additional margins. It should be noted that the design limits of the ILS approach design, e.g. the maximum glide path (GP) angle of 3,5 degrees, must be observed for the CDFA in order to keep the validity of the comparison. There is a wealth of operational experience in Europe confirming the above-mentioned analytical assessments. It cannot be expected that each operator is able to conduct similar safety assessments and this is not necessary. The safety assessments already performed take into account the most demanding circumstances at hand, like the most tightly designed NPA procedures and other ‘worst-case scenarios’. The assessments naturally focus on cases where the controlling obstacle is located in the missed approach area. However, it is necessary for operators to assess whether their cockpit procedures and training are adequate to ensure minimal height loss in case of a go-around manoeuvre. Suitable topics for the safety assessment required by each operator include: — Understanding of the CDFA concept including use of the MDA/H as DA/H; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 171 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law — Cockpit procedures that ensure flight on speed, on path and with proper configuration and energy management; — Cockpit procedures that ensure gradual decision-making; and — Identification of cases where an increase of the DA/H may be necessary because of non-standard circumstances, etc. GM9 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general INCREMENTS SPECIFIED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY Additional increments to the published minima may be specified by the competent authority to take into account certain operations, such as downwind approaches and single-pilot operations. GM10 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION When an operator uses commercially available information for Part C of the operations manual, the operator remains responsible for ensuring that the material used is accurate, suitable for its operation, and that aerodrome operating minima are calculated in accordance with the method approved by the competent authority. The operator should apply the procedures in ORO.GEN.205 ‘Contracted activities’. GM1 NCC.OP.110(b)(5) Aerodrome operating minima VISUAL AND NON-VISUAL AIDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE ‘Visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure’ refers to all equipment and facilities required for the procedure to be used for the intended instrument approach operation. This includes but is not limited to lights, markings, ground or space-based radio aids, etc. NCC.OP.111 Aerodrome operating minima — NPA, APV, CAT I operations This IR is deleted. Its text is incorporated in the new AMC4 NCC.OP.110. NCC.OP.112 Aerodrome operating minima — circling operations with aeroplanes (a) The MDH for a circling approach operation with aeroplanes shall not be lower than the highest of: (1) the published circling OCH for the aeroplane category; (2) the minimum circling height derived from Table 1; or (3) the DH/MDH of the preceding instrument approach procedure IAP. (b) The minimum visibility for a circling approach operation with aeroplanes shall be the highest of: (1) the circling visibility for the aeroplane category, if published; or (2) the minimum visibility derived from Table 2;1. or (3) the runway visual range/converted meteorological visibility (RVR/CMV) of the preceding instrument approach procedure. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 172 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table 1 MDH and minimum VIS for circling vs aeroplane category Aeroplane category A B C D MDH (ft) 400 500 600 700 Minimum meteorological visibility VIS (m) 1 500 1 600 2 400 3 600 GM1 NCC.OP.112 Aerodrome operating minima — circling operations with aeroplanes SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION (a) The purpose of this guidance material is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the application of aerodrome operating minima in relation to circling approaches. (b) Conduct of flight — general: (1) the MDH and obstacle clearance height (OCH) included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation; (2) the MDA is referenced to mean sea level; (3) for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the meteorological visibility VIS; and (4) operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre. (c) Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks: (1) When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised, but not below the MDA/H — the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach procedure (IAP) until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached. (2) At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS should be maintained until the pilot: (i) estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure; (ii) estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and (iii) is able to determine the aeroplane’s position in relation to the runway of intended landing with the aid of the appropriate external visual references. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 173 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (3) When reaching the published instrument MAPt and the pilot cannot establish the conditions stipulated in (c)(2) are unable to be established by the pilot, a missed approach should be carried out in accordance with that instrument approach procedure IAP. (4) After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the aeroplane to: (i) to attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and (ii) to remain within the circling area and in a such a way that visual contact with the runway of intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times. (5) Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H. (6) Descent below the MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone TDZ. (d) Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track. (1) The aeroplane should remain on the initial instrument approach procedure IAP until one of the following is reached: (i) the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or (ii) the MAPt. (2) The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the circling manoeuvre divergence point. (…) (8) Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from the MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the touchdown zoneTDZ. (e) Missed approach (1) Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling: (i) if the missed approach procedure is required to be flown when the aeroplane is positioned on the instrument approach track defined by radio navigation aids; RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLSand before commencing the circling manoeuvre, the published missed approach for the instrument approach should be followed; or (ii) if the instrument approach procedure IAP is carried out with the aid of an ILS, an MLS or a stabilised approach (SAp), the MAPt associated with an ILS or an MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used. (…) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 174 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 NCC.OP.115(c) Departure and approach procedures APPROACH FLIGHT TECHNIQUE — AEROPLANES (a) All approach operations should be flown as stabilised approach operations. (b) The CDFA technique should be used for NPA procedures. NCC.OP.195 Take-off conditions Before commencing take-off, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied verify that: (a) according to the information available, the weather the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the runway or/FATO intended to be used would will not prevent a safe take-off and departure; and (b) the applicable aerodrome minima will be complied with. (b) the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with: (1) the operative ground equipment, (2) the operative aircraft systems; (3) the aircraft performance; and (4) flight crew qualifications. NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions Before commencing an approach to land operation, the pilot-in-command shall verify be satisfied that:, according to the information available , the weather (a) the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the runway/or FATO intended to be used will would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach go-around, considering the performance information contained in the operations manual; and (b) the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with: (1) the operative ground equipment; (2) the operative aircraft systems; (3) the aircraft performance; and (4) flight crew qualifications. NCC.OP.230 Commencement and continuation of approach (a) The pilot-in-command may commence an instrument approach regardless of the reported runway visual range/visibility (RVR/VIS). (b) If the reported RVR/VIS is less than the applicable minimum the approach shall not be continued: (1) below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome; or (2) into the final approach segment in the case where the decision altitude/height (DA/H) or minimum descent altitude/height (MDA/H) is more than 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 175 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (c) Where the RVR is not available, RVR values may be derived by converting the reported visibility. (d) If, after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome, the reported RVR/VIS falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DA/H or MDA/H. (e) The approach may be continued below DA/H or MDA/H and the landing may be completed provided that the visual reference adequate for the type of approach operation and for the intended runway is established at the DA/H or MDA/H and is maintained. (f) The touchdown zone RVR shall always be controlling. (a) If the reported visibility or controlling RVR for the runway to be used for landing is less than the applicable minimum, then an instrument approach operation shall not be continued: (1) past a point at which the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation; or (2) if the DH or MDH is higher than 1 000 ft into the FAS. (b) If the required visual reference is not established, a missed approach shall be executed at or before the DA/H or the MDA/H. (c) If the required visual reference is not maintained after the DA/H or the MDA/H, a go-around shall be executed promptly. AMC1 NCC.OP.230 Commencement and continuation of approach VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS RVR MINIMA FOR CONTINUED APPROACH (a) NPA, APV and CAT I operations At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) elements of the approach lighting system; (2) the threshold; (3) the threshold markings; (4) the threshold lights; (5) the threshold identification lights; (6) the visual glide slope indicator; (7) the touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings; (8) the touchdown zone lights; (9) FATO/runway edge lights; or (10) other visual references specified in the operations manual. (b) Lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operations At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 176 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS usable to at least 150 ft. (c) CAT II or OTS CAT II operations At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS to touchdown. (d) CAT III operations (1) For CAT IIIA operations and for CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUDLS: at DH, a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (2) For CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail- operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at DH, at least one centreline light is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (3) For CAT IIIB operations with no DH there is no requirement for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown. (e) Approach operations utilising EVS – CAT I operations (1) At DH or MDH, the following visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS: (i) elements of the approach light; or (ii) the runway threshold, identified by at least one of the following: (A) the beginning of the runway landing surface, (B) the threshold lights, the threshold identification lights; or (C) the touchdown zone, identified by at least one of the following: the runway touchdown zone landing surface, the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone markings or the runway lights. (2) At 100 ft above runway threshold elevation at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS: (i) the lights or markings of the threshold; or (ii) the lights or markings of the touchdown zone. (f) Approach operations utilising EVS – APV and NPA operations flown with the CDFA technique (1) At DH/MDH, visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image as specified under (a). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 177 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) At 200 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified under (a) should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS. (a) The controlling RVR should be the touchdown RVR. (b) If the touchdown RVR is not reported, then the midpoint RVR should be the controlling RVR. (c) Where the RVR is not available, converted meteorological visibility (CMV) should be used. GM1 NCC.OP.230 Commencement and continuation of approach APPLICATION OF RVR OR VIS REPORTS (a) There is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on the reported RVR or VIS. The restriction in CAT.OP.MPA.305 applies only if the RVR or VIS is reported and applies to the continuation of the approach past a point where the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation or in the FAS as applicable. (b) If a deterioration in the RVR or VIS is reported once the aircraft is below 1 000 ft or in the FAS, as applicable, then there is no requirement for the approach to be discontinued. In this situation, the normal visual reference requirements would apply at the DA/H. (c) Where additional RVR information is provided (e.g. midpoint and stop end), this is advisory; such information may be useful to the pilot in order to determine whether there will be sufficient visual reference to control the aircraft during roll-out and taxi. For operations where the aircraft will be controlled manually during roll-out, Table 1.A in AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) provides an indication of the RVR that may be required to allow manual lateral control of the aircraft on the runway. AMC1 NCC.OP.230(a) Commencement and continuation of approach APPROACHES WITH NO INTENTION TO LAND If the intention is to execute a missed approach at or before the DA/H or the MDA/H, for example for training, then the approach may be continued regardless of the reported RVR or VIS. Such operations should be coordinated with air traffic services (ATS). AMC1 NCC.OP.230(b) Commencement and continuation of approach VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS For instrument approach operations Type A and CAT I instrument approach operations Type B, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot at the MDA/H or the DA/H: (a) elements of the approach lighting system; (b) the threshold; (c) the threshold markings; (d) the threshold lights; (e) the threshold identification lights; (f) the visual glideslope indicator; (g) the TDZ or TDZ markings; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 178 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (h) the TDZ lights; (i) FATO/runway edge lights; or (j) other visual references specified in the operations manual. NCC.OP.235 EFVS 200 operations An operator intending to conduct EFVS 200 operations with operational credits and without a specific approval shall ensure that: (a) the aircraft is certified for the intended operations; (b) only runways and IAPs suitable for EFVS operations are used; (c) the flight crew are competent to conduct the intended operation and that a training and checking programme for the flight crew members and relevant personnel involved in the flight preparation is established; (d) operating procedures are established; (e) any relevant information is documented in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (f) any relevant information is documented in the maintenance programme; (g) safety assessments are carried out and performance indicators are established to monitor the level of safety; and (h) the aerodrome operating minima take into account the capability of the system used. GM1 NCC.OP.235 EFVS 200 operations GENERAL (a) EFVS operations exploit the improved visibility provided by the EFVS to extend the visual segment of an instrument approach. EFVS cannot be used to extend the instrument segment of an approach and thus the DH for EFVS 200 operations is always the same as for the same approach conducted without EFVS. (b) Equipment for EFVS 200 operations (1) In order to conduct EFVS 200 operations, a certified EFVS is used (EFVS-A or EFVS-L). An EFVS is an enhanced vision system (EVS) that also incorporates a flight guidance system and displays the image on a HUD or equivalent display. The flight guidance system will incorporate aircraft flight information and flight symbology. (2) In multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery is provided to the pilot monitoring. (c) Suitable approach procedures (1) Types of approach operation are specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b). EFVS 200 operations are used for 3D approach operations. This may include operations based on NPA procedures, approach procedures with vertical guidance and precision approach procedures including approach operations requiring specific approvals, provided that the operator holds the necessary approvals. (2) Offset approaches TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 179 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Refer to AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b). (3) Circling approaches EFVSs incorporate a HUD or an equivalent system so that the EFVS image of the scene ahead of the aircraft is visible in the pilot’s forward external FOV. Circling operations require the pilot to maintain visual references that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft and may not be aligned with the current flight path. EFVS cannot therefore be used in place of natural visual reference for circling approaches. (d) Aerodrome operating minima for EFVS 200 operations are determined in accordance with AMC1 NCC.OP.235(h). The performance of EFVSs depends on the technology used and weather conditions encountered. Table 1 ‘Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction’ has been developed after an operational evaluation of two different EVSs, both using infrared sensors, along with data and support provided by the FAA. Approaches were flown in a variety of conditions including fog, rain and snow showers, as well as at night to aerodromes located in mountainous terrain. Table 1 contains conservative figures to cater for the expected performance of infrared sensors in the variety of conditions that might be encountered. Some systems may have better capability than those used for the evaluation, but credit cannot be taken for such performance in EFVS 200 operations. (e) Conditions for commencement and continuation of the approach are in accordance with NCC.OP.230. Pilots conducting EFVS 200 operations commence an approach and continue that approach below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS if the reported RVR or CMV is equal to or greater than the lowest RVR minima determined in accordance with AMC1 NCC.OP.235(h) and if all the conditions for the conduct of EFVS 200 operations are met. Should any equipment required for EFVS 200 operations be unserviceable or unavailable, the conditions to conduct EFVS 200 operations would not be satisfied and the approach should not be commenced. In the event of failure of the equipment required for EFVS 200 operations after the aircraft descends below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS, the conditions of NCC.OP.230 would no longer be satisfied unless the RVR reported prior to commencement of the approach was sufficient for the approach to be flown without the use of EFVS in lieu of natural vision. (f) EFVS image requirements at the DA/H are specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(d). The requirements for features to be identifiable on the EFVS image in order to continue approach below the DH are more stringent than the visual reference requirements for the same approach flown without EFVS. The more stringent standard is needed because the EFVS might not display the colour of lights used to identify specific portions of the runway and might not consistently display the runway markings. Any visual approach path indicator using colour-coded lights may be unusable. (g) Obstacle clearance in the visual segment The ‘visual segment’ is the portion of the approach between the DH or the MAPt and the runway threshold. In the case of EFVS 200 operations, this part of the approach may be flown using the EFVS image as the primary reference and obstacles may not always be identifiable on an EFVS image. The operational assessment specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b) is therefore required to ensure obstacle clearance during the visual segment. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 180 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (h) Visual reference requirements at 200 ft above the threshold For EFVS 200 operations, natural visual reference is required by a height of 200 ft above the runway threshold. The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the pilot will have sufficient visual reference to land. The visual reference should be the same as the one required for the same approach flown without the use of EFVS. Some EFVSs may have additional requirements that have to be fulfilled at this height to allow the approach to continue, such as a requirement to check that elements of the EFVS display remain correctly aligned and scaled to the external view. Any such requirements will be detailed in the AFM and included in the operator’s procedures. (i) Use of EFVS to touchdown In order to use an EFVS to touchdown, the operator needs to hold a specific approval in accordance with Part-SPA. (j) Go-around A go-around will be promptly executed if the required visual references are not maintained on the EFVS image at any time after the aircraft has descended below the DA/H or if the required visual references are not distinctly visible and identifiable using natural vision after the aircraft is below 200 ft. It is considered more likely that an EFVS 200 operation could result in the initiation of a go-around below the DA/H than the equivalent approach flown without EFVS and thus the operational assessment required by AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b) takes into account the possibility of a balked landing. An obstacle free zone (OFZ) may also be provided for CAT I precision approach procedures. Where an OFZ is not provided for a CAT I precision approach, this will be indicated on the approach chart. NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance provide obstacle clearance for the missed approach based on the assumption that a go-around is executed at the MAPt and not below the MDH. AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a) EFVS 200 operations EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (a) For EFVS 200 operations, the aircraft should be equipped with an approach system using EFVS (EFVS-A) or a landing system using EFVS (EFVS-L). (b) Legacy systems that have been certificated as ‘EVS with an operational credit’ may be considered an approach system using EFVS only if approved by the operator’s competent authority. AMC1 NCC.OP.235(b) EFVS 200 operations AERODROMES AND INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES SUITABLE FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS (a) For EFVS 200 operations, the operator should verify the suitability of a runway before authorising EFVS operations to that runway through an operational assessment taking into account: (1) the obstacle situation; (2) the type of aerodrome lighting; (3) the available IAPs; (4) the aerodrome operating minima; and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 181 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (5) any non-standard conditions that may affect the operations. (b) EFVS 200 operations should only be conducted as 3D operations, using an IAP in which the final approach track is offset by a maximum of 3 degrees from the extended centreline of the runway and intercepts the centreline at the threshold. (c) The IAP should be designed in accordance with PANS-OPS, Volume I (ICAO Doc 8168) or equivalent criteria. AMC2 NCC.OP.235(b) EFVS 200 operations VERIFYING THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations may be conducted as follows: (a) Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS 200 operations or is certified as a precision approach category II or III runway by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check if and where LED lights are installed in order to assess the impact on the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (b) If the check in point (a) above comes out negative, then proceed as follows: (1) For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS)15 may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted. (2) If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS). (3) VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. (4) Obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance are not acceptable. (5) For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions. (c) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met. 15 https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1032731 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 182 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations INITIAL TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS Operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the following conversion training before being authorised to conduct EFVS operations unless credits related to training and checking are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012: (a) A course of ground training including at least the following: (1) characteristics and limitations of head-up displays (HUDs) or equivalent display systems including information presentation and symbology; (2) EFVS sensor performance in different weather conditions, sensor limitations, scene interpretation, visual anomalies and other visual effects; (3) EFVS display, control, modes, features, symbology, annunciations and associated systems and components; (4) interpretation of EFVS imagery; (5) interpretation of approach and runway lighting systems and display characteristics when using EFVS; (6) preflight planning and selection of suitable aerodromes and approach procedures; (7) principles of obstacle clearance requirements; (8) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems; (9) normal, abnormal and emergency procedures for EFVS 200 operations; (10) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions; (11) human factors aspects of EFVS 200 operations; (12) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to EFVS 200 operations. (b) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows: (1) Phase one (EFVS 200 operations with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives: (i) understand the operation of equipment required for EFVS 200 operations; (ii) understand operating limitations of the installed EFVS; (iii) practise the use of HUD or equivalent display systems; (iv) practise setup and adjustment of EFVS equipment in different conditions (e.g. day and night); (v) practise monitoring of automatic flight control systems, EFVS information and status annunciators; (vi) practise interpretation of EFVS imagery; (vii) become familiar with the features needed on the EFVS image to continue approach below the DH; (viii) practise identification of visual references using natural vision while using EFVS equipment; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 183 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (ix) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to EFVS 200 operations including, where appropriate, the use of the flare cue and guidance for landing; (x) practise coordination with other crew members; and (xi) become proficient at procedures for EFVS 200 operations. (2) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises: (i) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight; (ii) the use of HUD or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight; (iii) approach using the EFVSs installed in the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing; (iv) approach with all engines operating using the EFVS, down to the appropriate DH followed by missed approach, all without external visual reference, as appropriate. (3) Phase two (low-visibility approach operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives: (i) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceabilities including use of the MEL; (ii) understand the effect on aerodrome operating minima of failed or downgraded equipment; (iii) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in status of the EFVS including HUD or equivalent display systems; (iv) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below the DH; (v) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and (vi) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during EFVS 200 operations. (4) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises: (i) approaches with engine failures at various stages on the approach; (ii) approaches with failures of the EFVS at various stages of the approach, including failures between the DH and the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired, require either: (A) reversion to head down displays to control missed approach; or (B) reversion to flight with downgraded or no guidance to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway. (iii) incapacitation procedures appropriate to EFVS 200 operations; (iv) failures and procedures applicable to the specific EFVS installation and aircraft type; and (v) FSTD training, which should include minimum eight approaches. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 184 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC2 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform EFVS 200 operations is checked at each required demonstration of competence by performing at least four approaches, of which one should be flown without natural vision to 200 ft. AMC3 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS Pilots should complete a minimum of four approaches using the operator’s procedures for EFVS 200 operations during the validity period of the periodic demonstration of competence unless credits-related currency is defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. AMC4 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members authorised to conduct EFVS 200 operations are provided with a differences training or familiarisation training whenever there is a change to any of the following: (1) the technology used in flight guidance and flight control system; (2) the HUD or equivalent display systems; or (3) the operating procedures. (b) The differences training should: (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course; (2) take into account the flight crew members’ previous experience; and (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. AMC5 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS If a flight crew member is to be authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS 200 operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required FSTD training for each operating capacity. GM1 NCC.OP.235(c) EFVS 200 operations RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS In order to provide the opportunity to practise decision-making in the event of system failures and failure to acquire natural visual reference, the recurrent training/checking for EFVS 200 operations should periodically include different combinations of equipment failures, go-around due to loss of visual reference and landings. AMC1 NCC.OP.235(d) EFVS 200 operations OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 185 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) The following provisions should apply to EFVS 200 operations: (1) the pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach; (2) in multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery should be provided to the pilot monitoring; (3) the approach between the FAF and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance; (4) the approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either: (i) the approach light system; or (ii) both of the following: (A) the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and (B) the touchdown zone identified by the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone runway markings or the runway lights; (5) a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by 200 ft above the threshold. (b) Operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations should: (1) be consistent with the AFM; (2) be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used; (3) specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight; (4) ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; and (5) deviate to the minimum extent practicable from normal procedures used for routine operations. (c) Operating procedures should include: (1) required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight; (2) correct seating and eye position; (3) determination of aerodrome operating minima; (4) required visual references at the DH; (5) action to be taken if natural visual reference is not acquired by 200 ft; (6) action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual reference; and (7) procedures for balked landing. (d) Operating procedures should be included in the operations manual. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 186 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 NCC.OP.235(h) EFVS 200 operations AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA — EFVS 200 OPERATIONS The following provisions should apply to EFVS 200 operations: (a) The DA/H used should be the same as for operations without EFVS. (b) The lowest RVR minima to be used should be determined by reducing the RVR presented in Table 3.A in AMC5 NCC.OP.110 in accordance with Table 1: Table 1: Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction RVR (m) presented in Table RVR (m) 3.A in AMC5 NCC.OP.110 for EFVS 200 operations 550 550 600 550 650 550 700 550 750 550 800 550 900 600 1 000 650 1 100 750 1 200 800 1 300 900 1 400 900 1 500 1 000 1 600 1 100 1 700 1 100 1 800 1 200 1 900 1 300 2 000 1 300 2 100 1 400 2 200 1 500 2 300 1 500 2 400 1 600 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 187 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex VII Non-commercial air operations with other-than complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCO) Note: the wording of this Part is in final development stage by the dedicated Part-NCO OPS task force group; outcome will be published as part of the AWO Opinion TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 188 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Annex VIII Specialised operations (Part-SPO) NOTE: IN DEVELOPMENT TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 189 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 3.2. Proposed changes — aircrew Note: There is not any air-crew-related soft law; no soft law elements have been added, so only hard law elements (for reference purposes) are presented Annex I Flight Crew Licensing Note: Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 is amended as follows: (1) FCL.605, on IR privileges, FCL.605 IR — Privileges (a) The privileges of a holder of an IR are to fly aircraft under IFR with a minimum decision height of 200 feet (60 m). (b) In the case of a multi-engine IR, these privileges may be extended to decision heights lower than 200 feet (60 m) when the applicant has undergone specific training at an ATO and has passed section 6 of the skill test prescribed in Appendix 9 to this Part in multi-pilot aircraft. (c) Holders of an IR shall exercise their privileges in accordance with the conditions established in Appendix 8 to this Part. (d) Helicopters only. To exercise privileges as PIC under IFR in multi-pilot helicopters, the holder of an IR(H) shall have at least 70 hours of instrument time of which up to 30 hours may be instrument ground time. is replaced with the following: ‘FCL.605 IR — Privileges (a) Privileges The privileges of holders of an IR are to fly aircraft under IFR, including PBN operations, with a minimum decision height of no less than 200 ft (60 m). (b) Conditions (1) Holders of an IR shall exercise their privileges in accordance with the conditions established in Appendix 8 to this Annex (Part-FCL). (2) Helicopters only To exercise privileges as PIC under IFR in multi-pilot helicopters, holders of an IR(H) shall have at least 70 hours of instrument time, of which up to 30 hours may be instrument ground time.’ (2) Appendix 9 ‘Training, skill test and proficiency check for MPL, ATPL, type and class ratings, and proficiency check for IRs’ of Part-FCL is amended as follows: (a) Point 2 of Section B is replaced by the following: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 190 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 2. In the case of multi-pilot and single-pilot high performance complex aeroplanes, the applicant shall pass all sections of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure of more than five items will require the applicant to take the entire test or check again. Any applicant failing five or less items shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item on the re-test or re-check including those items that have been passed at a previous attempt will require the applicant to take the entire check or test again. Section 6 is not part of the ATPL or MPL skill test. If the applicant only fails or does not take section 6, the type rating will be issued without CAT II or CAT III privileges. To extend the type rating privileges to CAT II or CAT III, the applicant shall pass the section 6 on the appropriate type of aircraft. ‘2. In the case of multi-pilot and single-pilot high-performance complex aeroplanes, applicants shall pass all sections of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure in more than five items will require applicants to take the entire test or check again. Applicants failing five or fewer items shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item of the retest or recheck, including those items that have been passed on a previous attempt, will require the applicant to take the entire check or test again.’ (b) In the table following point 6 of Section B, (i) the row with ‘General remarks’ before the headline ‘Section 6’; (ii) Section 6 comprising exercises 6.1 to 6.4; and (iii) the ‘Note’ following exercise 6.4 are deleted: MULTI-PILOT PRACTICAL TRAINING ATPL/MPL/TYPE AEROPLANES AND SINGLE- RATING SKILL TEST PILOT HIGH-PERFORMANCE OR PROF. CHECK COMPLEX AEROPLANES Instru Chkd in Examiner Manoeuvres/Procedures ctor initials FFS initial when test OTD FTD FFS A A s completed when traini ng comp leted ……… …….. ……………. SECTION 6 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 191 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Additional authorisation on a type rating for instrument approaches down to a decision height of less than 60 m (200 ft) (CAT II/III). The following manoeuvres and procedures are the minimum training requirements to permit instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft). During the following instrument approaches and missed approach procedures all aeroplane equipment required for type certification of instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft) shall be used. 6.1* Rejected take-off at P* —> —>X M* minimum authorised RVR An aircraft may not be used for this exercise 6.2* ILS approaches: in P—> —> M simulated instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew coordination (task sharing, call out procedures, mutual surveillance, information exchange and support) shall be observed 6.3* Go-around: after P—> —> M* approaches as indicated in 6.2 on reaching DH. The training shall also include a go-around due to (simulated) insufficient RVR, wind shear, aeroplane deviation in excess of approach limits for a successful approach, TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 192 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law and ground/airborne equipment failure prior to reaching DH and, go- around with simulated airborne equipment failure. 6.4* Landing(s): with visual P—> —> M reference established at DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing shall be performed Note: CAT II/III operations shall be accomplished in accordance with the applicable air operations requirements (c) Point 1 of Section D is replaced by the following: 1. In the case of skill tests or proficiency checks for powered-lift aircraft type ratings, the applicant shall pass sections 1 to 5 and 6 (as applicable) of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure in more than five items will require the applicant to take the entire test or check again. An applicant failing not more than five items shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item of the re- test or re-check or failure in any other items already passed will require the applicant to take the entire test or check again. All sections of the skill test or proficiency check shall be completed within 6 months. ‘1. In the case of skill tests or proficiency checks for powered-lift aircraft type ratings, applicants shall pass Sections 1 to 5 of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure in more than five items will require applicants to repeat the entire test or check. Applicants failing not more than five items shall repeat the failed items. Failure in any item in the case of a retest or a recheck or failure in any other items already passed will require applicants to repeat the entire test or check. All sections of the skill test or proficiency check shall be completed within 6 months.’ (d) In point 6(a) of Section D, the phrase ‘and if applicable, section 6’ is deleted: 6(a) Applicants for the skill test for the issue of the powered-lift aircraft type rating shall take pass sSections 1 to 5 and, if applicable, section 6. (e) In point 6(b) of Section D, the phrase ‘and/or 7’ is deleted: 6(b) Applicants for the revalidation or renewal of the powered-lift aircraft type rating proficiency check shall take pass sSections 1 to 5 and, if applicable sSection 6 and/or 7. (f) In the table following point 8 of Section D, Section 6 comprising exercises 6.1 to 6.4 is deleted, and Section 7 ‘Optional equipment’ is renumbered to read ‘Section 6’: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 193 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT PRACTICAL TRAINING SKILL TEST CATEGORY ORPROFICIENCY CHECK Instruct Checked Examiner Manoeuvres/Pprocedures or in initials initials FFS when test OTD FTD FFS PL when PL completed training comple ted ……. ……. …….. SECTION 6 — Additional authorisation on a type rating for instrument approaches down to a decision height of less than 60 m (CAT II/III) 6. Additional authorisation on a type rating for instrument approaches down to a decision height of less than 60 m (CAT II/III). The following manoeuvres and procedures are the minimum training requirements to permit instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft). During the following instrument approaches and missed approach procedures all powered-lift aircraft equipment required for the type certification of instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft) shall be used 6.1 Rejected take-off at P —> M* minimum authorised RVR 6.2 ILS approaches in simulated P —> —> M* instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 194 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law coordination (SOPs) shall be observed 6.3 Go-around after P —> —> M* approaches as indicated in 6.2 on reaching DH. The training shall also include a go-around due to (simulated) insufficient RVR, wind shear, aircraft deviation in excess of approach limits for a successful approach, ground/ airborne equipment failure prior to reaching DH, and go-around with simulated airborne equipment failure 6.4 Landing(s) with visual P —> M* reference established at DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing shall be performed SECTION 76 — Optional equipment 7. 6. Use of optional equipment P —> —> (g) Point 1 of Section E 1. In the case of skill tests or proficiency checks for airship type ratings the applicant shall pass sections 1 to 5 and 6 (as applicable) of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure in more than five items will require the applicant to take the entire test/check again. An applicant failing not more than five items shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item of the re-test/re- check or failure in any other items already passed will require the applicant to take the entire test/check again. All sections of the skill test or proficiency check shall be completed within 6 months. is replaced by the following: ‘1. In the case of skill tests or proficiency checks for airship type ratings, applicants shall pass Sections 1 to 5 of the skill test or proficiency check. Failure in more than five items will require applicants to take the entire test or check. Applicants failing not more than five items, shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item in the case of a retest or a recheck, or failure in any other items already passed will require applicants to repeat the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 195 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law entire test or check again. All sections of the skill test or proficiency check shall be completed within 6 months.’ (h) In point 6(a) of Section E, the phrase ‘and, if applicable, section 6’ is deleted: 6(a) Applicants for the skill test for the issue of the airship shall take pass sSections 1 to 5 and, if applicable, section 6. (i) In point 6(b) of Section E, the phrase ‘and, if applicable, section 6’ is deleted: 6(b) Applicants for the revalidation or renewal of the airship type rating proficiency check shall take pass sSections 1 to 5 and, if applicable section 6. (j) In the table after point 8 of Section E, Section 6 comprising exercises 6.1 to 6.4 is deleted, and Section 7 ‘Optional equipment’ is renumbered to read ‘Section 6’: POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT PRACTICAL TRAINING SKILL TEST CATEGORY ORPROFICIENCY CHECK Instruct Checked Examiner Manoeuvres/Pprocedures or in initials initials FFS when test OTD FTD FFS As when As completed training comple ted ……. ……. …….. SECTION 6 — Additional authorisation on a type rating for instrument approaches down to a decision height of less than 60 m (CAT II/III) 6. Additional authorisation on a type rating for instrument approaches down to a decision height of less than 60 m (CAT II/III). The following manoeuvres and procedures are the minimum training requirements to permit instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft). During the following instrument approaches and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 196 of 197 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(C) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law missed approach procedures all airship equipment required for the type certification of instrument approaches down to a DH of less than 60 m (200 ft) shall be used. 6.1 Rejected take-off at P —> M* minimum authorised RVR 6.2 ILS approaches in simulated P —> —> M* instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew coordination (SOPs) shall be observed 6.3 Go-around After P —> —> M* approaches as indicated in 6.2 on reaching DH. The training shall also include a go-around due to (simulated) insufficient RVR, wind shear, aircraft deviation in excess of approach limits for a successful approach, and ground/airborne equipment failure prior to reaching DH and, go-around with simulated airborne equipment failure. 6.4 Landing(s) With visual P —> M* reference established at DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing shall be performed SECTION 76 — Optional equipment 7. 6. Use of optional equipment P —> TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 197 of 197 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-06(A) All-weather operations RMT.0379 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of rulemaking task (RMT).0379 is to modernise the European Union (EU) aviation regulatory framework applicable to all-weather operations (AWOs) so it ensures the highest level of safety while enabling efficiency gains based on the latest technological advancements. It addresses in a coordinated manner all relevant disciplines: initial airworthiness, air operations, flight crew licensing and aerodromes. It proposes a performance- and risk-based approach, as much as feasible, considering also the appropriate balance between performance-based and prescriptive principles (depending on the type of air operations (CAT, NCC, NCO, and SPO). This NPA proposes to update the AWO-relevant rules in many aviation domains such as airworthiness (CS-AWO), air operations (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012), aircrew (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011) and aerodromes (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR.DSN). The main aim has been to allow for a better integration of the regulatory requirements related to the operational use of new, advanced technology — either developed already or to be developed in the future — such as, for example, enhanced flight vision system (EFVS), as well as the application of some advanced new operational procedures, which may support AWOs. Significant focus has been invested in developing resilient rules, which are not technology-dependent. A particular attention was paid to the development of requirements enabling the use of EFVS to the maximum extent possible (e.g. use of EFVS for landing). A new concept of ‘light operational credits’ for EFVS 200 operations, not requiring the use of specific low-visibility procedures (LVPs), has also been introduced. The proposed changes are expected to maintain safety, reduce the regulatory burden, increase cost-effectiveness, improve harmonisation (e.g. with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)), and achieve as much as feasible alignment with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). NPA 2018-06 is divided in four parts. The present sub-NPA(A) includes: — the procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; — the presentation of the issue under discussion; — the impact assessment as well as the hazard identification and risk assessment; and — the proposed actions to support implementation. The other sub-NPAs are organised as follows: — sub-NPA(B) – initial airworthiness (CS-AWO); — sub-NPA(C) – air operations and aircrew; and — sub-NPA(D) – aerodromes. Action area: Airlines, air operators other than airlines Affected rules: AMC/GM to the Air OPS Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012); AMC/GM to the Aircrew Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) Νο 1178/2011); AMC/GM to the aerodromes rules (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR-DSN); and CS-AWO Affected stakeholders: manufacturers, maintenance organisations (MOs), air operators, approved training organisations (ATOs), aerodrome operators, ATM/ANS, Member States Driver: Level playing field Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: Light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard 9.12.2015 13.7.2018 2019/Q2 2020/Q2 2020/Q4 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA .................................................................................................................................. 4 1.1. How this NPA was developed .................................................................................................................4 1.2. How to comment on this NPA.................................................................................................................4 1.3. The next steps .........................................................................................................................................4 2. In summary — why, what and when .................................................................................................. 6 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale .............................................................................6 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives .................................................................................................8 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals ....................................................................10 2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals .......................................................15 2.5. Proportionate approach to the level of flexibility in the requirements depending on the type of operations .............................................................................................................................................15 2.7. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) 2017/373..............................................................20 3. Impact assessment (IA) .................................................................................................................... 21 3.1. Reference ..............................................................................................................................................21 3.2. Overview ...............................................................................................................................................21 3.3. What is the issue ...................................................................................................................................21 3.3.1. Safety risk assessment ..................................................................................................................22 3.3.2. Who is affected .............................................................................................................................22 3.3.3. How could the issue/problem evolve ...........................................................................................22 3.4. What we want to achieve — objectives ...............................................................................................22 3.5. How it could be achieved — options ....................................................................................................23 3.6. Methodology and data..........................................................................................................................24 3.7. What are the impacts............................................................................................................................24 3.7.1. Safety impact ................................................................................................................................24 3.7.2. Environmental impact...................................................................................................................25 3.7.3. Social impact .................................................................................................................................25 3.7.4. Economic impact...........................................................................................................................25 3.7.5. General Aviation and proportionality issues ................................................................................28 3.8. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................28 3.9. Monitoring and evaluation ...................................................................................................................28 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) ............................................................................. 29 4.1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................29 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) Table of contents 4.2. AWO system description .......................................................................................................................29 4.3. Accidents and hazards ..........................................................................................................................30 4.4. Safety constraints..................................................................................................................................31 4.5. Application of the STPA methodology ..................................................................................................31 4.5.1. Process variables...........................................................................................................................32 4.5.2. Inadequate control flows ..............................................................................................................32 4.5.3. Unsafe control actions (UCAs) ......................................................................................................33 4.5.4. Causal factors and control flaws ...................................................................................................36 4.5.5. End-result of the hazards review ..................................................................................................37 5. Proposed actions to support implementation ................................................................................... 46 6. References ...................................................................................................................................... 47 6.1. Related regulations ...............................................................................................................................47 6.2. Affected decisions (CSs, AMC and GM).................................................................................................48 6.3. Other reference documents .................................................................................................................50 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme3 under RMT.0379. RMT.0379 was initiated with the publication of the related Terms of Reference (ToR) and Concept Paper RMT.0379 Issue 14 on 9 December 2015. For the development of the implementing rules (IRs), the accelerated procedure5 is applied; for the development of the acceptable means of compliance (AMC), guidance material (GM) and certification specifications (CSs), the standard rulemaking procedure is followed. As part of the accelerated procedure, EASA has already consulted its Advisory Bodies (ABs) on the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and the description of operations (DoOs). In the context of the second consultation phase (focused consultation), EASA consulted on the proposed amendments to the IRs only. In addition, EASA provided responses to the comments received during the AB consultation and presented the subsequent amendments to the RIA and the DoOs. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of the Experts’ Task Force Groups (air operations, airworthiness, and aerodromes). It is hereby submitted to all interested parties6 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/7. The deadline for submission of comments is 15 October 2018. 1.3. The next steps Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments. Based on the comments received EASA will: — update the proposed text of the affected CSs/AMC & GM; 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management- board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php 4 https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20and%20Concept%20Paper%20RMT.0379%20Issue%201.pdf 5 In accordance with Article 16 of MB Decision No 18-2015. 6 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure. 7 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 1. About this NPA — issue an opinion (developed on the basis of the focused consultation and taking into account the comments received to the AWO NPA) containing the proposed amendments to Regulations (EU) Nos 965/2012, 1178/2011 and 139/2014; the opinion will be submitted to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to prepare an EU regulation; and — for sub-NPA(B) issue a decision containing CS-AWO to which the related comment-response document (CRD) will be annexed. Following the adoption of the regulation, EASA will issue the associated decisions containing the related AMC & GM. The comments received and the EASA responses for sub-NPAs (A), (C) and (D) will be reflected in CRDs. The CRDs will be annexed to the opinion. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when 2. In summary — why, what and when 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale The existing rules in the relevant aviation domains regulating AWOs: — do not sufficiently address technological advancements; — do not fully support new operational concepts; — are in some areas not anymore aligned with the ICAO SARPs — for example, they do not efficiently address the concept of operational credits; — are not completely consistent across the different domains, obstructing thus the use of the full potential of certified products and systems as well as reaping the full safety and economic benefits; and — have been drafted without a consistent cross-domain hazard identification and risk assessment which should provide a guarantee that all safety risks have been identified, properly addressed, and mitigated across all affected domains. In addition to the above, the results of the harmonisation efforts with the FAA, especially the results of the All Weather Operations Harmonization Aviation Rulemaking Committee (AWOHARC) work, have not yet been considered in the development of the EU regulatory framework. Related safety issues (safety risk portfolio and safety recommendations) This RMT does not directly address any issue from the relevant safety risk portfolio or any particular safety recommendations (SRs). Exemptions8 in accordance with Article 14 ‘Flexibility provisions’ of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 There have been no exemptions pertinent to the scope of this RMT. Alternative means of compliance (AltMoC) relevant to the content of this RMT There have been no AltMoC having an impact on the development of this RMT content. ICAO and third countries references relevant to the content of this RMT ICAO Annex 3 — Meteorological service for international air navigation: the definition of ‘visibility’ has been proposed for ensuring that the meaning of ‘visibility’ used by pilots is the same as that used by meteorological services, aerodromes and air traffic services. 8 Exemptions having an impact on the development of this RMT content and referring to: — Article 14.1: Measures taken as an immediate reaction to a safety problem; — Article 14.4: Exemptions from substantive requirements laid down in the Basic Regulation and its implementing rules in the event of unforeseen urgent operational circumstances or operational needs of a limited duration; — Article 14.6: Derogation from the rule(s) implementing the Basic Regulation where an equivalent level of protection to that attained by the application of the said rules can be achieved by other means; and — Article 22.2(b): Individual flight time specifications schemes deviating from the applicable certification specifications which ensure compliance with essential requirements and, as appropriate, the related implementing rules. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft (Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes; Tenth Edition, July 2016): the relevant new definitions have been taken into account (e.g. aerodrome operating minima (Annex 6, 4.2.8.1) in case of 2D and 3D instrument approach operations, as well as certain principles such as operational credit(s) (for operations with aeroplanes equipped with automatic landing systems (ALSs), head-up displays (HUDs) or equivalent displays, an EFVS, synthetic vision systems (SVSs) or combined vision systems (CVSs)); the new classification of the instrument approach operations (as Type A and Type B from ICAO Annex 6, 4.2.8.3.) has been also included; finally, the definitions of ‘decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH)’ as well as that of ‘final approach segment (FAS)’ have been transposed. ICAO Doc 9365 — Manual of All-Weather Operations, Fourth Edition, July 2016: the criteria such as aerodrome operating minima, provision of facilities and services at aerodromes, basic requirements for the aeroplane and flight crew (operating procedures), surface movement guidance and control of aeroplanes and vehicles, minima for approach and landing operations, example of visibility credit for enhanced vision systems have been considered. Other ICAO documents considered during this rulemaking task: ICAO Doc 4444 — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management, 6th Edition, 2016 ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes (Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations), 7th Edition, 2016 ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes (Volume II— Heliports), 4th Edition, 2013 ICAO Doc 9830 — Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) Manual, 1st Edition, 2004 ICAO Doc 8168 — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (Volume I — Flight Procedures), Fifth edition, 2006: the definition of circling approach and a straight-in approach has been also transposed, 5th Edition, 2006 ICAO Doc 8168 — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (Volume II — Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures), 6th Edition, 2014 ICAO EUR Doc 013 — European Guidance Material On Aerodrome Operations Under Limited Visibility Conditions, 5th Edition,2016 ICAO Expert Group — Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) / All Weather Operations Sub Group (AWO- SG) (Flight Operations Panel/ Third Meeting, Montreal, 24 to 28 October 2016, Agenda Item 4.6): the conclusions provided in this document have been considered in developing this NPA. The paper provides the concept of operations for performance-based aerodrome operating minima (PBAOM). The higher performance capabilities of new and improved avionics could mitigate some of the performance requirements of the ground-based navigation equipment. The underlying principle is that the minima will be predicated upon the combined capabilities of the ground and airborne facilities. This ICAO paper addresses also operational credits, which are already described in ICAO Annex 6, paragraph 4.2.8.1.1. As stipulated in the paper, operational credits can refer to lowering of the aerodrome operating minima (RVR and/or DH) for the purposes of an approach ban, reducing the visibility requirements, or requiring less demanding ground facilities as the overall performance can be achieved by enhanced airborne capabilities (one application of operational credits may be represented by the use of an EFVS). It is important to understand that when using the concept of PBAOM, a TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when distinction should be made between a ‘basic aircraft’ (an aircraft with the minimum equipment required for the type and/or category of approach and landing operation intended) and an ‘advanced aircraft’ (an aircraft with equipment in addition to that required for the ‘basic aircraft’, as e.g. auto- flight systems capable of coupled approaches and/or autoland, HUD or equivalent displays, EFVS, CVS, and SVS). ICAO Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications (Volume I — Radio Navigation Aids): SARPs for the global navigation satellite system (GNSS). ICAO Paper GNSSP-WP-8, Validation of GBAS CAT I Accuracy: A GLS Model and Autoland Simulations for Boeing Airplanes, presented at the ICAO Global Navigation Satellite Systems Panel, Working Group B Meeting, Seattle, WA, May 29 - June 9, 2000. SESAR project — AAL EFVS operation with operational credit: impact on ATM-Aerodrome Differences between the content of this RMT and ICAO SARPs, FARs, etc. The proposed rules are considerably aligned with the ICAO framework (SARPs and guidance material); however, differences may exist in the technical details. With regard to the instrument approach operations as referred in ICAO Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes; Tenth Edition, July 2016), this RMT introduces in the context of the Type B instrument approach operation a common CAT III approach operation without further subdividing into the subcategories CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB, and CAT IIIC, as is the case of the currently published ICAO approach classification; ICAO and the FAA, however, have initiated a proposal to eliminate these CAT III-related subcategories from the definition. This NPA proposes a definition for ‘low-visibility operations (LVOs)’, which is featured in the regulations applicable for each domain (air operations, aircrew, aerodromes, etc.), in order to ensure a common understanding across the entire regulatory system. This term is currently not defined in ICAO standards; however, there is a comparable definition in the ICAO AWO Manual. Detailed specifications for approving the special authorisation category 1 (SA CAT I) operations (ref. EU regulatory material in this RMT) have been developed considering the actual needs of the aviation industry; however, there is no relevant reference in the ICAO SARPs. This topic has been brought forward at IACO level in order to implement changes at their level which should minimise to a great extent any misalignment in this field. 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives The following objectives have been identified: Taking a performance- and risk-based approach, the objectives of the proposed EU regulatory framework in the area of AWOs are to: — provide for safety, efficiency and consistency across all aviation domains, based on common operational concepts and a common method for systemic hazard assessments; — foster safety and efficiency gains that new technologies and operational experience offer (established industry standards are taken into account as much as feasible); and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when — promote harmonisation with the ICAO SARPs and documents, and with rule developments in the FAA and other major regulators, as far as possible. The AWO Project aims to achieve a harmonised approach in all affected aviation domains. To this end, it addresses airworthiness, air operations, aircrew, and aerodrome design and operations aspects under RMT.0379, whereas air traffic management (ATM)/air navigation services (ANS) are addressed under the currently ongoing RMT.04649. Overview of the applicable framework — The conduct of all-weather operations (AWOs) involves many different components which interact with one another:  hardware (such as aircraft and the equipment installed on the aircraft — airborne equipment or at aerodromes — ground equipment);  software (such as computer codes or operating procedures used by personnel), and some of these components are represent; and  liveware (i.e. the people who operate the system, e.g. air traffic controllers (ATCOs), pilots, maintenance personnel). For AWOs to be conducted safely, each component of the system must perform as intended and must interact correctly with the other components of the overall system. — In order to apply a common basis for the development of consistent rules across the different relevant domains, the AWO project has adopted a classification of standard operations, classified in terms of lowest aerodrome operating minima. Having set this basis, the concept of operations with operational credits has been introduced with the purpose of enabling the best use of the available technological solution (either airborne or ground-based) and/or advanced operational procedures by providing operational flexibility beyond the limits of standard operations. — The main reason behind the description of operations with operational credits is the need to specify the required performance for such operations. Consequently, the requirements should be as much as possible technology-independent and performance-based, providing thus the relevant principles and criteria at IR level and the supporting technical details at AMC & GM or CS level. — To satisfy the AWOs’ safety objectives and criteria, the different system components must comply with the relevant requirements which are identified with the support of the common hazard identification and risk assessment methodology. Principles The principles applied by EASA for the development of the proposed draft changes to the AWO rules should ensure that the requirements will enable the use of newly developed technology and/or 9 Please refer to Opinion No 03/2018(available at https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions/opinion-032018). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when evolved procedures in the framework of ICAO terminology of classifying the approach operations as ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’: — Operations with the operational credits: the main aim of the AWO project is to introduce the appropriate regulatory framework for the concept of operations with operational credits. The introduction of this concept should enable the best use of new technologies and provide further operational flexibility beyond the limits of standard operations. For approach operations, an operational credit could be applied to the instrument and/or visual segment; the scope of operational credits should not be limited to airborne equipment as operational credits may also be granted on the basis of enhanced ground-based equipment (e.g. airborne radar approach operations are current examples of such operational credits). — Technology-independent required performances for certain types of operations with operational credits: considering a performance- and risk-based development concept, all requirements should be technology-independent as much as feasible; however, the appropriate performance criteria shall be required. — Demonstration of the required performances: The required performances shall be successfully demonstrated. This demonstration includes active contribution of both, the airborne equipment as well as ground equipment taking into account the relevant weather conditions. The aircraft certification process shall play a very important role. 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals Overview The proposed changes to the relevant IRs and related CSs, AMC and GM enable the use of new technologies and provide operational flexibility beyond the limits of the established standard operations; the new regulatory material should be, as much as possible, technology-independent, performance-based and safety-objective-oriented. In terms of rules’ resilience, the proposed rules should not need to be further amended over the next years when new technologies, new products or new operational concepts will be available. The concept of operations with operational credits on the basis of either new technologies or newly developed operational principles should be broadly made possible by the proposed IRs. The related AMC, GM and CSs should provide the means for implementation and any future developments, both in terms of new technologies and operational procedures, should be appropriately addressed without changing the requirements stipulated in the IRs. The proposed changes have a cross-domain nature, and are based on common operational concepts and cross-domain systemic hazard identification and risk assessments. Total system approach It is essential that all regulations that impact the introduction of the new types of operations are appropriately considered. For example, the OPS proposed amendments to the existing rules (e.g. SPA.LVO.110) should be interfaced with the relevant CS-AWO (airworthiness) and CS-ADR-DSN (aerodromes) requirements. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when Note: In the context of how RMT.0379 AWO interlinks with CS AWO and CS ADR DSN are addressed. CS-AWO has been rewritten taking a performance-based approach and thus the technical content is stipulated in the AMC (Book2); a similar approach has been taken in CS-ADR-DSN. Considering traditional way of addressing the AWO approvals and operations, interfaces should be mostly addressed from an operational perspective. For example, the aircraft OEM will be required to carry out an assessment on the interface between the aircraft navigation system and the worst case ILS performance (defined in ICAO Annex 10) in terms of localiser deviation and glide path deviation and the outcome of this assessment should be presented in the AFM. Based on the ILS performance offered by the aerodrome, the operator will verify that the classification and performance of the intended runway is compatible with the AFM prior to conducting SA CAT I operations. An overview of already identified main topics of changes and/or expected impact (necessary adaptations to the current rules, rules under development (through NPAs) or foreseen rules as part of future development) may be summarised as follows: — Consideration of the potential new equipment installed on board the aircraft: airworthiness (CS-AWO) and flight crew licensing (Part-FCL); — Potential use of the relevant new procedures: air operations (general parts like Definitions, Part-ARO and Part-ORO; technical parts like Part-CAT, Part-SPA, Part-NCC, Part-NCO and Part-SPO) and flight crew licensing (Part-FCL); — Consideration of the possible impact of the ground equipment with other aerodrome infrastructure (e.g. change in radio altimeter operating area requirements) and aerodrome operational procedures: aerodrome design criteria (CS-ADR-DSN) and aerodrome operating requirements (Part-ADR.OPS); — The potential need of the additional meteorological (MET) data might be needed: meteorological services requirements (Part-MET); — New approach procedures types affect air space design requirements (Part-ASD) as well as requirements for air traffic services (Part-ATS) and single European rules for the air (SERA), as well as ATCO training; and — Possible impact stemming for the potential need of new/additional aeronautical data (data to support SVS guidance): Part-AIS and Part-DAT as well as possible impact of the redesigned air traffic flow management (ATFM). Impact on aerodromes The impact on aerodromes depends on the type of operations considered: — To support SA CAT I operations, the following ‘technical issues’ were considered: improvements of visual aids as approach lights, upgrading of non-visual aids, that is navigation aids (as, for instance, ILS CAT I) ensuring signal integrity down to a DH of 150 ft), establishment of sensitive areas, secondary power supply and switch-over time, radio altimeter (RA) pre-threshold area, OFZ, LVPs, AIP updates, etc. For an aerodrome, it should be a business case which leads towards the decision to either establish such a standard which will enable the SA CAT I operation or not. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when Note: Based on the ILS facility performance made available to air operators by the aerodrome operator and taking into account the AFM data capturing the assessment result carried out by the aircraft OEM (the interface between the aircraft navigation system and the worst case ILS performance defined in ICAO Annex 10 in terms of localiser deviation and glide path deviation), the operator will verify that the classification and performance of the intended runway was compatible with the AFM prior to conducting SA CAT I operations. — To support EFVS to touchdown operations, the following ‘technical issues’ were considered: visual aid as approach lights, runway lights, runway centre line lights, taxiway lights; non-visual aid as navigation aids, secondary power supply with 1 sec switch-over time, serviceability levels as of CAT I, automated measurement of the touchdown RVR, radio altimeter pre-threshold area, OFZ, LVPs, AIP updates, etc. When the proposed amendments to ADR rules have been considered, the related issues with ATS have been also taken into consideration. Note: It has been considered whether it is necessary to position certain relevant rules on low visibility in ANS and ADR regulations in the same parts (e.g. either in the part of organisation requirements (OR), or in the part of technical requirements (TR)) or not (e.g. LVPs in ADR rules are foreseen in the part of ADR.OPS and in ATS rules in the part of TR providing a link to the OR through an AMC). Potential impact on ATM/ANS The AWO-related topics potentially interfacing with the content of ATM/ANS regulatory material (main reference represented by Regulation (EU) 2017/37310) have been considered either in the context of the ongoing ATM/ANS regulatory activities (e.g. Opinion No 03/2018 ‘Requirements for air traffic services’ (RMT.0464) and for ASD in the context of Opinion No 02/2018 ‘Technical requirements and operating procedures for airspace design, including flight procedure design’ (RMT.0445)) or will be addressed — if necessary — in the context of other ATM/ANS ongoing and upcoming RMTs. The following candidate topics were identified: — Part-ATS — Subpart ATS.OR Coordination between aerodrome operators and ATS providers is expected to be properly addressed in ATS.OR.110; AMC4 specifically stipulates the necessity to establish arrangements between the ATS provider and the ADR operator to define responsibilities for the LVOs; this complements the requirements provided in ATS.TR.265, concerning the control of aerodrome surface traffic in conditions of low visibility. Requirements of this Subpart stipulate further the obligation of providing relevant information on conditions and operations status. For instance, ATS.OR.520 ‘Information on aerodrome conditions and the operational status of associated facilities’ introduces the obligation for the information concerning temporary hazards on the 10 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/373 of 1 March 2017 laying down common requirements for providers of air traffic management/air navigation services and other air traffic management network functions and their oversight, repealing Regulation (EC) No 482/2008, Implementing Regulations (EU) No 1034/2011, (EU) No 1035/2011 and (EU) 2016/1377 and amending Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1516614735343&uri=CELEX:32017R0373) TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when movement area and facilities. Furthermore, ATS.OR.525 ‘Information on the operational status of navigation services’ requires that ATS providers are timely informed of the operational status of radio navigation services and visual navaids. Similarly, points ATS.OR.510 and ATS.OR.515 prescribe the availability of relevant meteorological information for APP, TWR and AFIS units. — Part-ATS — Subpart ATS.TR AMC1 ATS.TR.150 ‘Aeronautical ground lights’ stipulates the operational needs for ground lights and the associated GM1 to AMC1 describes the technical details of aeronautical ground lighting (approach lighting, runway lighting, obstacle lighting, taxiway lighting, stop bars). AMC1 ATS.TR.205(c) ‘Provision of ATC service’ prescribes the obligation of aerodrome controllers to ‘control on all flight operations on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome, as well as on vehicles and personnel on the manoeuvring area, should be continuously maintained’; it additionally foresees the use of ATS surveillance system for aerodrome control to augment visual observation of traffic in low-visibility conditions. ATS.TR.240 ‘Control of persons and vehicles at controlled aerodromes ‘in point (b) establishes the requirements to be applied when LVPs are in operation, including the need for the application of a prescribed separation minimum between vehicles and aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area. ATS.TR.245 ‘Use of surface movement surveillance equipment at aerodromes‘ prescribes the use of an A-SMGCS or other suitable surveillance equipment by the aerodrome ATS in to ensure or to supplement visual observation of the traffic in the manoeuvring area, and the associated GM1 indicates the use of surface movement radar information in surface movement control. ATS.TR.265 ‘Control of aerodrome surface traffic in conditions of low visibility‘ specifies the principles to be applied to ensure safe holding of aircraft/vehicles at intersection of taxiways and prescribes the determination and the approval of longitudinal separation on taxiways and mandates the establishment of specific procedures for CAT II/III operations and for departures with an RVR of less than 550 m; AMC1 ATS.TR.265(b) on the ‘Procedures for control of aerodrome traffic in LVOs’ complements the specification by establishing the details to be addressed by the procedures for aerodrome control in CAT II/III conditions (e.g. RVR values, minimum ILS/MLS equipment, other facilities, minimum spacing between arriving/departing aircraft, between aircraft and vehicles/person on the manoeuvring area, etc.). — Part-MET Relevant ATS requirements dealing with weather conditions should be generally applicable; however, requirements related to the weather conditions should appropriately considered from the AWO point of view to prevent potential inconsistencies or ambiguous interpretation of the MET-related notions and terms in different regulations (e.g. Part MET of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 and the AWO NPA). — Part-ASD A possible impact on the flight procedure criteria and obstacle protections of the SA CAT I operations with a 150 ft DH, as well as charting and naming of such approaches together with the associated phraseology for SA CAT I and EFVS should be considered. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when — Part-PERS The AWO matters related to the SA CAT I and the EFVS should not cause differences on current ground personnel rules, so Part PERS should not be impacted. — Part-ATFM Considering the specificities of the European ATM network, in the conditions when LVOs are carried out at an aerodrome and the maximum capacity of this aerodrome is reached, as a consequence special operational procedures might be needed to regulate the traffic at this aerodrome. Such procedures should be included in the network operations handbook; in the further there might be a need for a consideration of update of the existing ATFM operating procedures to be updated in order to capture specific AWO impact. — Part-AIS AIS/AIM and DAT rules address the quality of data; Opinion No 02/2018 proposes to update Part-AIS of Regulation (EU) 2017/373; it introduces, in particular, rules and AMC which are applicable to SVSs through GM1 to AIS.TR.350, AIS.TR.355, AIS.TR.360 ‘Terrain and obstacle data’. Note: ICAO data quality requirements (DQRs), covered in ICAO Annex 15, Appendix 7 and partly in Appendix 8, and in the near future in the Annex 15 Data Catalogue, were used as a baseline for the EASA rules; DQRs in this context are not specified on the basis of specific end-user applications; they are specified under the understanding that they would be fit to support the most stringent use of this data. The fact that these applications may evolve or that new applications may need to be added, could indeed have an impact on the established DQRs. Therefore, the DQRs need to be assessed whether requirements need to be made more stringent or if new requirements need to be added; in the context of the AWO RMT, the data quality aspect pertaining to newly introduced operations with operational credits has not been specifically addressed. Potentially, there might be a need to assess whether the ICAO Annex 15 provisions are sufficient in this case. — Part-DAT In the future, further considerations related to the case when SVS is used for the guidance (data processed to model the outside environment) might be needed; specifically, it might be reviewed whether there should be any recording needs of displayed data in the cockpit (e.g. from the accident investigation point of view) or would it be possible to reconstruct the scenario on the basis of the EFVS and the recorded data taken in accordance with the existing provisions. CS-ACNS has not been specifically addressed in the scope of the current task; considering that integrated performance-based navigation (PBN) operations coupled with EFVS/CVS/SVS could allow operations with operational credits, it might be feasible in the future to consider introduction of the reference to the performance of the navigation systems as identified during the certification process. Third-country operator (TCO) Existing TCO rules do not foresee a possibility for TCOs to obtain additional operational approvals to those issued by their competent authority. There is no specific basis enabling, for example, obtaining TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when an SA CAT I approval in accordance with the intended EU AWO regulatory content. Taking into account that certain differences with regard to the exact definitions and specifications of operations with operational credits could exist among States which have implemented such a concept, it might become appropriate to tackle the topic of how to ensure that the potential gaps in criteria and related technical requirements for operations with operational credits in different aviation systems (e.g. Europe, USA, Australia) are properly addressed (e.g. a case when an US operator with the SA CAT I approval issued by the FAA requests the SA CAT I privilege in the environment of EU regulatory system). 2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals This RMT introduces the possibility to apply the new principles together with relevant technology without mandating either equipment or procedural elements. Enabling operations with operational credits should enhance the overall efficiency while maintaining a high level of safety. The complete impact assessment was already published on 18 November 2016 in the context of the focused consultation pertaining to the proposed changes at IR level11. An updated impact assessment will be provided as part of the Opinion stemming from the AWO Project. 2.5. Proportionate approach to the level of flexibility in the requirements depending on the type of operations General overview The main concept followed in this RMT is the development of performance- and risk-based rules applicable to AWOs; however, the proportionality criterion among the different types of operations is considered as well, especially with regard to the capabilities of identifying and mitigating risks as appropriate to the level of complexity (e.g. Part-NCC versus Part-CAT). The main development concept should ensure maintaining the rules with relevant safety impact at IR level. However, taking into account the specific characteristics of various sectors of the civil aviation industry, as captured by the different technical Parts of the air operations rules (Part-CAT, Part-NCC, Part-NCO, and Part-SPO), a different balance between the technical details stipulated at either IR or AMC level has been applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In Part-CAT the technical details are at AMC level, whereas in other technical Parts these technical details are at IR level. The reason for the difference is the intent to allow more flexibility based on use of the safety management principles in the operational domain regulated by Part-CAT. Such approach allows operators to use the concept of alternative means of compliance (AltMoC) instead of direct use of the AMC for demonstrating compliance with the IRs. AltMoC shall be based on safety assessments and, as already required, the operators shall obtain a prior approval from the competent authority. However, for the other types of operations (as e.g. Part-NCC, and Part-NCO, etc.), the described principle of Part- CAT cannot be applicable and the relevant rules must have an adequate enforceability. 11 http://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/awo-consultation-workshop — Second phase of focused consultation, in continuation to the AWO Consultation Workshop TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when Use of technological benefits of the EFVS as light operational credits (‘EFVS 200 operation’ and potential consideration of ‘EFVS 100 operation’) Through this NPA, the principles of the EFVS have been proposed for introduction into the European regulatory system to enable the full deployment of the newly developed technologies; this provides also alignment with the term used by the FAA regulatory system. An EFVS refers to aircraft-installed systems which provide an enhanced view of the external environment with specific functionalities required by the relevant airworthiness requirements to enable operations with operational credits. The EFVS represents an electronic means to provide the flight crew with a real-time sensor-derived or enhanced display of the external scene topography (the natural or manmade features of a place or region especially presented in a way that shows their relative positions and elevation) through the use of imaging sensors. An EFVS is integrated with a flight guidance system and is implemented on a HUD or an equivalent display system. It should be certified according to the newly applicable airworthiness requirements (amended CS-AWO) and an operator should obtain the necessary approval (amended OPS IRs) for enabling the EFVS to be used for EFVS operations with operational credits. Considering the current technical capabilities of the EFVS, an additional concept of ‘EFVS operations’ as operations where EFVS is used in place of natural visual reference for approach or landing, rather than just to improve situational awareness, has been further developed. This new concept introduces the use of the ‘light operational credit’ for operations which could be considered as the non-LVOs despite the fact that certain technical benefits of the EFVS are used in conditions of reduced visibility. Considering that certain operations qualified as ‘normal’ and ‘non-LVO’ operations have been conceptually agreed and this should be applicable for operations identified with an RVR of 550 m and a DA/H of 200 ft. These ‘normal’ operations should allow the advantageous of the EFVS use below the aerodrome published DH to the ‘predetermined minimum height’ of 200 ft taking into account the RVR minimum defined in accordance with the EFVS approved performance by the certification process (but not lower than 550 m). The new definition of ‘EFVS 200 operation’ has been developed describing a particular type of operation with EFVS, whereby, subject to compliance with specific requirements, operators will be permitted to conduct certain EFVS operations without needing a specific approval (SPA). Such operations may be conducted only in CAT I or better meteorological conditions (i.e. non-LVOs) and down to a height of 200 ft above the runway threshold (the approach may only be continued below 200 ft if the pilots have ‘natural’ visual reference). EASA has modified the initial draft regulatory AWO text in relevant parts of the OPS IRs (e.g. Part-CAT and Part-NCC — Part-SPA does not specify the ‘normal’ operational procedures) to accommodate the above-described type of operations in the regulatory text. ‘EFVS 200’ is intended to be incorporated in Part-SPO and published in scope of the AWO-NPA Phase 2. As such type of operations should not be considered LVOs, no specific approval should be required (by Part-SPA). This very recent modification of the already drafted rules should cater for business jet operators interested for such ‘light OPS credit’ without the need to access an airport only with demanding CAT II or III (e.g. the use of properly certified HUD) approach procedures. For the operators aiming for the maximum possible use of the high EFVS technology (‘EFVS-Approach (EFVS-A)’ and ‘EFVS-Landing (EFVS-L)’), a relevant special approval for the LVOs should be issued (in TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when accordance with Part-SPA), allowing operators to access an airport during the low-visibility conditions, when the cloud ceiling is below a DA/H of 200 ft and/or the visibility is less than 550 m, that is down to 100 ft (with EFVS-A) and down to touchdown with a reduced RVR of 300 m/1 000 ft (with EFVS-L). The operating requirements for EFVS have been adapted to allow the ‘EFVS-L’ operations (alignment with the published FAA regulations). In order to obtain the flight crew competencies for using an EFVS, the relevant set of requirements has been set-up; less demanding training and checking requirements should be foreseen for the ‘EFVS 200 operations’ with the characteristic RVR of 550 m and the DH/DA of 200 ft compared to the typical ‘EFVS operations’ with the LVO nature (operations down to a DH/DA of 100ft and/or with an RVR of less than 550 m or even for the operations using EFVS down to the touchdown). The developed concept of ‘EFVS 200’ as proposed in this AWO NPA Phase 1 has been presented to ICAO OPS panel; the concept has been found very feasible. The concept of ‘EFVS 200’ might experience further evolution into ‘EFVS 100’ (if so supported by the received comments). ‘EFVS 100’ should enable operations of the EFVS down to a DH/DA of 100 ft without a dedicated special approval; however, the system shall be appropriately certified (dual HUD required) and the operator should be the holder of an adequate LVO special approval (e.g. CAT II or CAT III). General Aviation (part-NCO) aspects General When addressing the General Aviation (GA)-related content of the AWOs, considerations were mainly focused on Part-NCO of the OPS regulatory material. During the development of the AWO OPS regulatory material, it has been gradually more and more firmly identified that the same methodology as the one used for drafting Part-CAT and Part-SPA (or even the methodology adapted for the use in Part-NCC) is not suitable for General Aviation. The scope of analysis needed for the development of the proposed changes to Part-NCO, and the need for a proper deployment and engagement of the relevant experts of the GA community, as well the necessity to set up appropriate specific criteria and have them confirmed, has led to the conclusion that the NCO specificities should be addressed by a dedicated Task Force group, nominated as ‘Sub- task force group for AWO matters in Part-NCO’ under the umbrella of the existing AWO OPS Task Force group. Main principles of technical nature: The appropriate competence attested with the Instrument Rating of GA pilots’ should represent the backbone for the GA operations in certain AWO conditions; already from general operational point of view but especially considering the operations of GA in IFR conditions and applying AWO principles. The relevant rules should have an encouraging impact on the GA community to fly in the IFR instead of forcing them into the VFR. Level of safety: The level of safety and the operational environment of GA have had a significant impact on the development of Part-NCO; the assumption of the lower acceptable level of safety in the domain of Part-NCO, compared to the domains of Part-CAT and Part-NCC, should also be recognised. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when The type of certain GA operations should be carefully considered from different operational points of view, especially the risk interactions. There needs to be a distinction between the case when Part-NCO operations are carried-out in the ‘isolated environment’ of the GA aviation/pure Part-NCO operations, (e.g. one light, piston engine aeroplane operating at the local airfield) and the case when a Part-NCO operator ‘interfaces’ with or even ‘penetrates’ into the demanding environment of an aerodrome used largely by airlines (operating in the regime of LVOs). IFR access to smaller aerodromes: IFR access to smaller aerodromes should be considered having regard to the advent of new technologies as GNSS, SBAS (in Europe, EGNOS), etc. It is desirable and cost-effective to enable IFR using instrument approach procedures (IAPs) at aerodromes where only VFR was previously possible due to the very limited facilities for weather reporting and characteristics of the non-instrument runways. It is important that the newly developed regulatory proposal does not require unrealistic safety for NCO at these aerodromes, driving them back into a more hazardous VFR operational regime. Pilot as a decision-maker: Pilot decision-making is a fundamental principle of the GA Roadmap. The level of regulatory protection provided should depend upon the ability of those exposed to risk to exercise control over that risk. For NCO, the premise is that the operator is the pilot-in-command and the pilot-in-command in NCO has direct control over the risk to which he or she is exposed. When taking into account the pilot decision role in the NCO environment, it should be considered that the majority of GA AWO-related accidents could be attributed to reckless disregard of impacting risks, rather than due to bad or weak judgment by prudent operators in marginal cases. Potential safety principles of approaches: There should be a distinction between the operational behaviour in the instrument segment and in the visual segment: — adherence to DH/MDH is needed for the instrument segment to ensure an adequate level of safety; — safety of the visual segment is primarily achieved by a pilot assessment at or before DH/MDH; visual reference has been acquired and the conditions are such that it can be maintained. Go-around risk: For NCO, a go-around, if visual reference is not acquired, does not present an unacceptable risk and does not present the problem of competitive erosion of safety. GA should be treated differently from CAT on the assessment and control of risk, as for CAT we could assume that a go-around, if visual reference is not acquired, bears some additional risk, and an objective metric for deciding whether an approach should be attempted is necessary to avoid the erosion of safety. LVTO for NCO: The requirement for an approval under Part-SPA for low-visibility take-off (LVTO), i.e. take-off in a visibility of less than 400 m, might introduce/represent a significant restriction for NCO. There is limited practical experience about the handling of such cases. Only a few applications and prospective applications for such operations by NCO have been launched, obviously representing difficulties and operational costs for NAAs in order to approve such operations. It could be seen that there is no sound data clarity as to the level of safety for such an operation, little experience in NAAs of assessing such applications, etc. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when 2.6. Helicopter operations and the AWO concept Helicopter AWO-related matters, taking into account all the specificities of the helicopter’s design, equipment and operations, will be addressed in the AWO-NPA Phase 2. Detailed references for the AWO development related to the helicopter operations will be provided in ToRs Issue 2. Traditionally, helicopter operators do not conduct large-scale AWOs. Considering the specificities of the helicopter operations, there have been certain natural limiting factors for deploying the AWO concept. Already flying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) might have constraints taking into account the established operational limits for helicopter operations. Typically, European CAT helicopter operators holding an approval for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations operate to CAT I approach minima. Statistically, less than 10 % of these operators hold an approval for LVTO operations with an RVR less than 400 m. The introduction of: — required navigation performance (RNP) 0.3, — point-in-space approaches (PinS), and — new technologies, has opened possibilities and triggered more interest of the helicopter community to conduct IFR operations. Several helicopter models are now equipped with avionics that are equivalent to those fitted in the latest generation of large aeroplanes used in airline activities. Having regard to all those changes, there is a growing tendency to apply the AWO concept in helicopter operations as well. From the EASA point of view, there is a significant need to carry-out in the context of the AWO project a dedicated analysis regarding helicopter operations. Considering the whole context of helicopter operations and available airborne and ground equipment, the most feasible would be to initially introduce the appropriate formal basis for the development of the helicopter operations’ procedures for Type A operations: — approach based on PinS, — approach with vertical guidance (APV), and — specific radar approaches (e.g. offshore airborne radar approaches (ARA)), considering the minima determination method for different type of operations (for example, CAT and NCC minima for the onshore operations. Helicopter issues potentially pertaining to AWOs will not be dealt with only in the context of this RMT.0379, but also in the context of two other RMTs, that is RMT.0573 ‘Fuel planning and management’ (e.g. consideration of the landing alternates on the fuel planning for IFR flights) and RMT.0325 ‘HEMS performance and public interest sites’. It might happen that a continuation on AWO issues in the helicopter domain would be needed and should continue beyond the already scheduled envisaged Phase 2 of the current AWO RMT.0379. In such a case, an OPS RMT dealing with regular updates might be used as a formal placeholder in order to process such AWO issues). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 2. In summary — why, what and when CAT I operations to heliports/helidecks are challenging (otherwise, they would have been already widely in use by now) and typically, for the time being, not demonstrated by the OEM in scope of the certification process. As an orientation reference, there are quite many helideck-equipped fixed installations and a significant number of mobile drilling rigs in the North Sea. Those helidecks are not designed to a common standard, although it is acknowledged that the UK CAA CAP 437 is a generally accepted guidance. ICAO Annex 14 Volume II and the ICAO Heliport Manual are not transposed in a consistent manner throughout Europe, and despite these offshore operations being carried out under IFR and IMC, in several countries they take place in the ‘unclassified airspace’, without the support of any air traffic services (ATS). A similar rationale applies to heliports located at hospitals, on the number of which EASA has no data available. It is estimated that there are around 2 500 hospital heliports in Europe, of which only a very limited number are supporting IFR operations. Despite all the significant factors to be considered, there is a potential and a need for the appropriate formal framework for helicopter operations with operational credits in Europe as well. However, the approach would require a very cautious consideration of all the specificities of helicopter operations (e.g. helicopter operating minima in SERA and air operations requirements, new performance-based approach classification; helicopter performance classes, certification in category A, IFR certification, offshore airborne radar approaches (ARA), IFR departure and approach procedure design, performance based navigation, etc.). 2.7. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) 2017/373 An explanation of already identified and potential interfaces between the AWO topics and ATM/ANS issues is provided in Section 5.6. Overview of the AWO-affected issues/topics in view of the inter- domain dependency. Note: Apart from a reference to SERA.3210, there are no requirements for ATS providers in respect of LVOs; nevertheless, EASA transposed in the context of RMT.0464 ‘Requirements for air traffic services’ parts of ICAO Annex 11 and of ICAO Doc 4444 related to the provision of ATS; the proposed IRs contain requirements for LVPs, and are included in Opinion No 03/2018. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) 3. Impact assessment (IA) 3.1. Reference The full regulatory impact assessment (RIA) was already published on 18 November 2016 in the context of the focused consultation pertaining to the proposed changes at IR level. The document is accessible through the EASA website in ‘events’ page Newsroom & Events / Past events under the title “09 Nov – 11 Nov 2016 - AWO Consultation Workshop”, that is: http://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/awo-consultation-workshop and within the scope of the documents under subtitle “Second phase of focused consultation, in continuation to the AWO Consultation Workshop / Event Proceedings / Documents for the second phase of focused consultation”. 3.2. Overview Considering the specific characteristics of this RMT, which is setting up a regulatory framework to enable the use of new technologies through the principle of operational credits, the related RIA further identifies and assesses the main rationale behind this approach. It assesses the impact on the following areas: safety, economy, environment, social aspects, general aviation (GA) and proportionality, and better regulation and harmonisation with other States. Considering that the set-up objective of this RMT is to enable the use of new technologies through the principle of operational credits, this ‘option’ is the one in line with the main task objective; the other two ‘options’, that is the one taking no regulatory action and the one mandating the use of new technology, have been analysed and included in the RIA. Enabling operations with operational credits would enhance the overall network efficiency because weather-related diversions to CAT II/III aerodromes could be reduced. Lower operating minima will also benefit air navigation service providers (ANSPs) by offering more flexibility in selecting the efficient arrival patterns with regard to arrival rates in reduced visibility conditions. Furthermore, it is assumed that air operators could benefit from the reduction of costs incurred by weather-related delays, diversions and cancellations. The RIA also contains aerodrome-related statistics for the European airspace. The vast majority of airports used by airlines support CAT I operations as their lowest approach category. This implies that there is a good potential for operations with operational credits in Europe. It is assumed that quite many of these CAT I aerodromes could support operations with lower operating minima without significant infrastructure investments. This document also includes case studies for air operators in order to further assess benefits and costs of operations with operational credits. 3.3. What is the issue The following deficiencies have been identified: — The current rules do not sufficiently address technological advancements and do not fully support new operational concepts; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) — In some areas, EU rules are not anymore aligned with the ICAO SARPs; furthermore, the new ICAO approach classification needs to be transposed into all domains; and — Existing rules (conventional LVOs as well as other AWOs) have been drafted in a domain-centric manner. No exemptions12 in accordance with Article 14 ‘Flexibility provisions’ of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 are pertinent to the scope of this RMT. There are no alternative means of compliance (AltMoC) relevant to the content of this RMT. 3.3.1. Safety risk assessment The core objective of this RMT is not to address safety issues but to improve efficiency and to ensure level playing field considering the principle of proportionality. Nevertheless, the analysis includes an assessment of occurrences data. No specific SRs addressed to EASA through aircraft accident investigation report(s) published by the designated safety investigation authority13 are considered in the context of this RMT. 3.3.2. Who is affected Potentially affected stakeholders by the issue are: aircraft manufacturers, maintenance organisations (MOs), air operators in the CAT, NCC, NCO and SPO domains, aerodromes (also ‘secondary aerodromes’ providing services to e.g. business aviation, etc.), ANSPs, and Member States. The current situation and regulatory conditions do not raise public concern or stir controversy among the general public. 3.3.3. How could the issue/problem evolve The relevant technology for LVOs, as well as the related operational practices will be in continuous development. If no action is taken, there would be no civil aviation rules enabling the use of new technology by obtaining operational credits. The existing AWO-related rules will remain inconsistent across the various domains and partly incomplete; EU aviation safety rules will remain non-harmonised with the ICAO SARPs and with the most relevant rules of certain States, especially bilateral partners. 3.4. What we want to achieve — objectives The operational objectives of this proposal are as follows: 12 Exemptions having an impact on the development of this RMT content and referring to: — Article 14.1: Measures taken as an immediate reaction to a safety problem — Article 14.4: Exemptions from substantive requirements laid down in the Basic Regulation and its implementing rules in the event of unforeseen urgent operational circumstances or operational needs of a limited duration; — Article 14.6: Derogation from the rule(s) implementing the Basic Regulation where an equivalent level of protection to that attained by the application of the said rules can be achieved by other means; — Article 22.2(b): Individual flight time specifications schemes deviating from the applicable certification specifications which ensure compliance with essential requirements and, as appropriate, the related implementing rules. 13 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35) (http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1494843364894&uri=CELEX:32010R0996). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) — The EU regulatory framework in the area of AWOs should provide for safety, efficiency and consistency across all aviation domains, relying on a performance- and risk-based approach; it should also be based on common operational concepts and a common method for systemic hazard assessments; — Manufacturers, air operators and aerodrome operators should be able to benefit from the safety and economic advantages that new technologies and operational experience offer. Considering this, established industry standards should be taken into account; and — The AWO Project should be used to promote harmonisation with the ICAO SARPs and documents, and with rule developments in the FAA and other major regulators, as far as possible. 3.5. How it could be achieved — options To follow the established standard approach/principle of the RIA, the following possible approaches (named ‘options’ for the purpose of the RIA) have been analysed: Table 1: Possible options Option Short title Description No 0 No action Take no regulatory action No safety rules available for the use of new vision and guidance systems. New vision and guidance systems cannot be used for obtaining operational credits. AWO rules remain inconsistent and partly incomplete across domains. Rules remain not harmonised with ICAO standards and with rules of those States having a more developed regulatory framework. 1 Enabling Enable the use of technologies in the domain of AWOs such as flight path control automation, new vision and flight guidance systems, etc. for operations with operational credits and ensure consistency of the AWO rules across all domains. Develop a consistent regulatory framework across all domains for the use of new vision and flight guidance systems on a voluntary basis. Develop a regulatory framework for operational credits. Ensure consistency of the AWO rules across all domains through a common reference document which describes certain types of operations in a cross-domain manner. Ensure consistency with ICAO standards and with the rules of other States as far as possible. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) 2 Mandating Mandate the use of new vision and flight guidance systems in certain areas, and ensure consistency of the AWO rules across all domains. Develop a consistent regulatory framework across all domains for the mandatory use of new vision and flight guidance systems. Develop a regulatory framework for operational credits. Ensure consistency of the AWO rules across all domains through a common reference document which describes certain types of operations in a cross-domain manner. Ensure consistency with ICAO standards and with the rules of other States as far as possible. Considering that the set-up objective of this RMT is the enablement of the use of new technologies through the principle of operational credits, Option 1 is the one in line with this objective as it provides for the optimal combination of safety and efficiency benefits and offers the required flexibility for future technological advancements. The proposal has a positive an impact on Member States’ obligations towards ICAO as it increases harmonisation. It also harmonises the EU requirements with third-country requirements (FAA). 3.6. Methodology and data Data was collected via several sources including surveys addressed to affected stakeholders. The analysis also benefits from the case studies developed and included in the RIA. 3.7. What are the impacts Only impacts of the concept of enabling the new technologies and operational practices without mandating new issues (formally referred to as Option 1) are summarised in this NPA; for more details, please refer to the original published version of the RIA, including an analysis of the other options. Option 1 would also allow to a much higher extent the application of globally harmonised rules. Furthermore, this option allows to draft rules in a more performance-based manner and to improve the provisions which could be misinterpreted. 3.7.1. Safety impact This option would provide manufacturers, air operators, ATOs, aerodrome operators and ANSPs with incentives to further invest in equipment to enable air operations with enhanced vision and flight guidance systems using EFVSs, SVSs, CVSs, HUDs or equivalent systems, autoland systems or hybrids of the systems already mentioned. These investments are considered to enhance safety. These systems will provide improved situational awareness to the flight crew and will be also (or primarily) used during normal operations, where operational credits are not needed. This is expected to reduce the number of accidents and incidents caused by the loss of situational awareness. Furthermore, operational rules would be aligned with the ICAO standards as much as feasible and would provide for a consistent reference for global operations. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) This option would not raise any safety concern. 3.7.2. Environmental impact This option creates significant environmental benefits by enabling operations in shorter routes, and by reducing the number of delays and diversions, the consequential additional fuel burn, as well as noise and gas emissions. 3.7.3. Social impact Pilots would be trained to use new technologies and could improve their qualifications and knowledge. High-level jobs could be created through research and development activities for new technologies undertaken by manufacturers. Should the new systems lead to an increase in efficiency for air operators and, as a consequence, an increase in business and flights, additional jobs could be created by the need for additional pilots and flight crew. Accessibility to small aerodromes during marginal meteorological conditions could be improved and, therefore, this could provide a positive stimulus for the development of the respective regions. Furthermore, accessibility to heliports could be improved without major infrastructure investments (e.g. hospital heliports where a very limited number is equipped to accommodate IFR operations). 3.7.4. Economic impact Manufacturers This option provides manufacturers with the opportunity to better market newly developed vision and flight guidance systems. Furthermore, this option may provide manufacturers with the positive incentive to continue or even increase research and development investments in new technologies resulting thus to technology which will increase safety and efficiency. In addition, updated and harmonised CSs will reduce the costs for the certification of new products as well as for the development of new ones. This option does not directly create costs because manufacturers will not be obliged to develop new vision and flight guidance systems or apply new certification standards for ongoing or completed certification projects. Moreover, several manufacturers have already developed new vision and flight guidance systems14. 14 A manufacturer provided data on the extent to which EFVS/SVS/CVS/HUDs and autoland technologies are installed in its aircraft. According to said data, HUDs are implemented in some aircraft types (and planning to install it in new types over the next years) while autoland is installed in all its aircraft delivered from 2015 onwards. As regards the cost, interesting figures have been provided; further reference is made in the case studies. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) Air operators Enabling operations with operational credits (such as SA CAT I, or operations using EFVS/CVS) would provide a greater availability of suitable destination and alternate aerodromes during periods of reduced visibility. This would effectively reduce the number of weather-related delays, cancellations or diversions of flights to CAT II/III aerodromes. It would also permit shorter routings and reduced fuel costs, a faster return to scheduled operations, and fewer passenger inconveniences. In the case study on weather-related diversion costs, a magnitude of costs is provided. In the scenario analysed, a total cost of EUR 5 615 309 for the period from January 2015 till May 2016 for air operators has been estimated. This shows the potential benefits for air operators that could avoid diversions by using new vision and flight guidance systems. Since the investment in new vision systems is not mandated, this option would not directly create costs. However, if an operator wishes to perform operations with operational credits based on enhanced vision and flight guidance systems, additional costs would apply. These costs may vary for operators already approved or not for CAT II/III operations. For an air operator conducting CAT II operations, the incremental costs for commencing SA CAT I operations will be minimal provided that the same technology (e.g. autoland or HUD) is used for both types of operation. The only cost incurred in this scenario will be the management time taken to establish operating procedures, select suitable aerodromes, amend manuals, design training, and prepare an application for approval to the competent authority. For operators not approved for CAT II/III operations, additional costs incurred would be comparable to those for a specific approval for CAT II operations. The operator would have, among others, to obtain a specific approval; cover potential additional investment and maintenance costs for vision and flight guidance systems; cover additional initial and recurrent training for pilots and other relevant personnel; and cover costs for potentially drafting new operating procedures and amending the minimum equipment list (MEL). As regards the additional costs for operations with operational credits based on EFVS, an estimate is provided in the case study on ‘Air operators’. The costs shown are quite low: initial costs EUR 21 624, and annual recurring costs EUR 1 002. In addition, for operations involving ‘instrument approach procedures (IAPs)’ not based on standard PANS-OPS CAT I criteria or aerodromes not meeting the specifications to support CAT I operations, operational assessment would be necessary. Costs incurred by rule changes for improving the overall consistency across domains and with ICAO standards are negligible. These changes may require minor amendments to the OM. Pilots, ATOs Pilots would be trained and qualified to use new technologies. Such pilots may benefit from a competitive and consequently economic advantage compared to pilots not trained in new vision and flight guidance systems. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) ATOs, in case they deliver training on behalf of the operator (in accordance with ORO.GEN.205), may benefit from potential additional revenues by expanding training to new technologies. ATOs, in case they deliver training on behalf of the operator (in accordance with ORO.GEN.205), would have to prepare training material and equipment suitable for the training of operations with operational credits. It is assumed that the training costs for pilots for the use of new technologies will be borne by the air operator. ANSPs, aerodrome operators Airborne modern vision and flight guidance systems permit lower aerodrome operating minima on CAT I runways. Aerodromes which currently support only CAT I approach operations to a DA/H of 200 ft and an RVR of 550 m could support approach operations down to a DA/H of 150 ft and an RVR of 400 m (SA CAT I) and/or operations with a DA/H of 200 ft and an RVR of 300 m (EFVS & CVS) without the infrastructure investments and associated maintenance costs necessary for CAT II facilities. Therefore, these aerodrome operators could improve access to their aerodromes without significant additional investments and maintenance costs. Aerodromes which support CAT II/III approach operations could operate at SA CAT I minima instead of only CAT I minima in case CAT II/III facilities are downgraded. Furthermore, enabling SA CAT I or operations using EFVS/CVS on aerodromes only supporting CAT I operations, would enhance the overall network efficiency because weather-related diversions to CAT II/III aerodromes could be effectively reduced. ANSPs could also benefit from lower minima as they would be provided with more flexibility in selecting the most efficient arrival patterns to maximise arrival rates in reduced visibility conditions. Since aerodrome operators and ANSPs are not obliged to support operations with operational credits based on enhanced vision and flight guidance systems, this option does not directly create costs. Costs incurred by rule changes for improving the overall consistency across domains and with ICAO standards are minor. These changes may require minor amendments to manuals. However, additional costs would apply if an aerodrome operator and an ANSP wish to support operations with operational credits based on enhanced vision and flight guidance systems, depending on whether the aerodrome has been already approved to support CAT II/III operations or not. For aerodromes which are already approved for CAT II/III operations, no significant additional costs would apply. For SA CAT I operations, it would be necessary to verify that the CAT II procedure can be applied and then to publish an SA CAT I procedure in the AIP. For operations using EFVS, the aerodrome should provide additional information in the AIP concerning the status of LED lights. For aerodromes which are not approved for CAT II/III operations, additional costs would apply; however, significantly less than for supporting CAT II operations. There should be no significant investment costs required for the facilities. The aerodrome operator together with the ANSP may have to ask for an amendment of their certificate to allow for operations in low-visibility conditions. This may involve the development of new or amendment of existing LVPs to support operations with TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 3. Impact assessment (IA) operational credits. There may also be the need for additional training for the aerodrome operator and ANSP staff and for amendments to their manuals. Furthermore, the support of operations with operational credits should be mentioned in the AIP. SA CAT I operations will depend on the capabilities of the on-board equipment to provide equivalent information to the flight crew, such as runway centre line (RWY CL) lights and simple TDZ lights. If the on-board equipment cannot provide equivalent information, adequate upgrading of the ground equipment would be needed. 3.7.5. General Aviation and proportionality issues For GA, and in particular for NCC operations, the use of new vision and flight guidance systems could provide safety and economic benefits as described above in the sections addressing safety and economic impacts. Investment in the use of new vision and flight guidance systems may not be economically feasible, in particular for NCO operations. 3.8. Conclusion Comparison of options The preferred option, supported by the in-depth analysis of impacts presented in the full RIA, is to develop the relevant regulatory material as enabler of use of the relevant new technologies and principles without mandating any new element. Sensitivity analysis The subject RMT does not represent a sensitive case as it introduces the formal framework for enabling the use of new technologies and principles without mandating any new element. 3.9. Monitoring and evaluation Monitoring is a continuous and systematic process of data collection and analysis with regard to the implementation/application of a rule/activity. It generates factual information for future possible evaluations and impact assessments (IAs) and helps to identify actual implementation issues. Based on the preferred option of this NPA, EASA proposes to monitor the uptake of the new technologies enabled thanks to this new regulatory framework and the benefits for operators and aerodromes (for example, number of aircraft with ‘autoland’ technology installed). This could be done by national aviation authorities (NAAs) and/or EASA via various tools, including questionnaires. Furthermore, this proposal might be subject to interim/ongoing/ex post evaluation that will assess the performance of the adopted rules, taking into account ex ante analysis made in this IA. The decision whether an evaluation is necessary will also depend on the monitoring results. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) 4.1. Introduction In order to ensure proper consideration of the interactions among the different components involved in the AWOs (aircraft, aerodromes, operational procedures, involved personnel, etc.), the Systems- Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) methodology was applied. The total system for AWOs, including the interactions among the different components, is described in terms of systems theory as a network of controllers and controlled processes; some of these controllers influence the nature of the system development structure which establishes the context within which AWOs are conducted, while other controllers constitute the system operations’ structure that directly controls AWOs in real time. 4.2. AWO system description The adopted STPA methodology represents a hazard analysis technique based on systems thinking and a model of accident causation based on systems theory rather than reliability theory15; the systems theory was developed to deal with the complexity of modern systems where safety-critical elements are too complex for complete analysis and too organised for statistics; the systems theory deals with properties (called emergent properties) that can only be handled adequately holistically, taking into account all the technical and social aspects; these properties arise in the relationships and interactions among system components or behavioural events; the systems theory treats systems as a whole and not the components and events separately. To facilitate the use of this model, a description of the ‘total AWO system’ has been developed in terms of systems theory. The system may be described in terms of a system development structure and a system operations’ structure. The system development structure determines the nature of the different elements of the system, such as approved organisations, personnel, regulations, operating manuals, work instructions and operational practices. The system operations’ structure determines how the system operates in ‘real time’, i.e. while an aircraft is conducting AWOs. The AWO system may be considered as comprising multiple, interlinked ‘control loops’. Within each loop, a controller executes control actions on, and receives feedback from, a controlled process. Within the system, there is a ‘cascade of controllers’ where the controlled process from one control loop triggers other controllers within the system. This cascade of controllers may be considered to include some controllers that are involved in the development of the system and some that are involved in the operation of the system in real time. Both system development and system operation are relevant to the AWO Project. 15 For a full description of the systems theory and the STPA methodology, please refer to ‘Engineering a Safer World — Systems Thinking Applied to Safety’ by Nancy G. Leveson, published by the MIT Press in 2011, and to ‘An STPA Primer’ (Version 1) by Nancy Leveson, published in 2013. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) System development structure The following controllers have been identified within the AWO system development structure: — regulatory authorities (for example, EASA and the European Commission) that develop regulatory material; — competent authorities (for example, the national aviation authorities of the Member States) that certify and approve organisations; — approved (and certified) organisations; these include design organisations, MOs, air operators, training organisations, ANSPs, aerodrome operators; — operational management within approved organisations; and — operational staff. All these controllers take actions (such as developing regulations, operating manuals or work instructions), which influence the nature of the control structure. These controllers receive feedback based on operational experience, audits, inspections, etc. and thus the system is constantly changing. They do not have a role in the system operations’ structure as they do not have control over aircraft conducting AWOs in real time. System operations’ structure The system operations’ structure involves ‘operations control’ within an approved organisation as one controller providing control actions to the flight crew, who in turn provide control actions to the aircraft either directly through the flight controls or indirectly through the auto-flight control systems. Other controllers in the system operations’ structure include ATCOs, aerodrome operators and ANSPs. Feedback processes within the system operations’ structure are the aircraft instruments and navigation displays, reports sent by the aircraft or pilots to the operations control, or ATC and air traffic surveillance systems. At each level of this system there are, in reality, many different controllers and multiple, interlinked control loops. 4.3. Accidents and hazards The objective of analysing the ‘total system’ and developing regulations is to eliminate hazards and reduce the risk of accidents. The following definitions have been established for the AWO Project based on the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)/STPA methodology16: — Accident: Any event resulting to injuries and/or damages to property and/or equipment17. — Hazard: A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident. 16 The definitions of ‘hazard’ and ‘accident’ used here are specific to the STPA methodology and are not consistent with the ICAO standards or EU regulations relating to safety management. 17 According to the STPA methodology, the definition of accident can include ‘mission loss’. For the purposes of the AWO Project, this has been excluded from the definition of accident. The hazard analysis, therefore, considers only safety-related outcomes rather than operational disruption or commercial loss. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) The following hazards have been identified in relation to the AWO system: — H1: loss of control in flight (LOC-I), upset when airborne; — H2: loss of separation with terrain while airborne; — H3: loss of separation with flying objects when airborne; — H4: loss of separation with obstacles on the ground; — H5: loss of control on the ground (LOC-G) during landing and take-off; — H6: loss of control on the ground (LOC-G) during taxiing; — H7: un-stabilised approach; and — H8: loss of separation with aircraft or vehicle on the ground. 4.4. Safety constraints The STAMP/STPA methodology generates safety constraints that must be complied with in order to prevent a system hazard. These safety constraints form the starting point from which the rules will ultimately be derived. The generation of a complete set of safety constraints relies on the depth and quality of the system analysis, which in turn are influenced by the available resources (e.g. time, expertise). Also, compliance with all the safety constraints might not be always feasible due to external factors (e.g. available technology and financial cost). Therefore, following the hazard identification and the generation of safety constraints, the ‘imperfections’ of the system in operation become part of its design assumptions. These ‘imperfections’ shall be monitored for their validity and shall be eliminated over time, when feasible. The high-level safety constraints generated so far are as follows: — S1: the aircraft shall be under control when airborne (instrument and visual segment); — S2: the aircraft shall maintain adequate separation from terrain before landing; — S3: the aircraft shall maintain adequate separation from flying objects when airborne; — S4: the aircraft shall maintain adequate separation from obstacles on the ground; — S5: the aircraft shall remain under control during landing and take-off; — S6: the aircraft shall remain under control during taxiing18; — S7: the aircraft shall remain stabilised during approach; — S8: the aircraft shall maintain adequate separation from aircrafts or vehicles on the ground. 4.5. Application of the STPA methodology The control structure considers that every controller follows a process model for managing its control actions. Once the high-level hazards are identified, they can be translated into safety requirements or 18 For helicopter operations, this relates to hovering/manoeuvre to the take-off/landing zone. A roll-out or rolling landing is only performed as part of an emergency procedure in case of engine failure (in case of multi-engine helicopters) or other controllability failures, but these failures are not considered in these safety constraints. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) constraints that apply to the system design. The hazard analysis is here primarily focused on the flight crew who is the front line actor dealing with clearly observable unacceptable hazards. For instance, the pilot will logically take actions to correct a vertical deviation displayed on the guidance system during an ILS approach before this becomes a collision with the ground. 4.5.1. Process variables In order to further refine the analysis of the various hazards linked to each control loop, process variables have been included to specify the context in which each control action is activated. Two main process variables are considered: — the first one is the phase of flight (approach above the DH (instrument phase) — between the DH and the flare (visual references acquired), the flare, the landing roll, the taxiing, the go- around, etc.); this phase of flight can differ for the pilot and the navigation system depending on the context of information made available to each of them (sensors of the automatic flight control system can suggest a different context than the one perceived by the pilot in case of erroneous radio-altimeter information); — the second main process variable considered is the type of taxiing/take-off/approach performed (e.g. CAT I, SA CAT I, etc.) and/or the related instruments qualification in use. 4.5.2. Inadequate control flows The hazard analysis follows the STPA methodology for the different ‘control loops’ within the AWO system. The hazard analysis considers the control actions that may be taken by different controllers, the actuators available, and the sensors providing feedback. From these control actions, ‘unsafe control actions’ are derived. These are the actions that could result in a system hazard. The types of unsafe actions are as follows: — An unsafe control action is provided that creates a system hazard; — A required control action is not provided to avoid a hazard; — A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early or in the wrong order; — A continuous safe control action is provided for too long or is stopped too soon; and — An unsafe condition can also exist when a control action is provided but not followed. These ‘unsafe control actions’, with variations depending on the process variables selected, are used to derive ‘inadequate control flows’ (ICFs). For each ICF, the interfaces with other controlled processes are considered and the causal factors are evaluated. These can lead to further ICFs. All the unsafe control actions establish the safety requirements that are needed to validate the proposed regulatory requirements, and the ICFs identify the hazards that have to be adequately addressed by the proposed rules. The following assumptions are made: — The core objective of the task of each controller is to keep the aircraft on its approach or departure path and land, take-off and taxi safely; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) — The system is composed of qualified flight crew, approved operators with a valid air operator certificate (AOC), aircraft with a valid certificate, and approved ANS with qualified ATCOs; — As long as no human deficiency is identified, it is expected that operators (flight crew, ATCOs) respond to all information presented in the form of visual cues and warnings in an appropriate and faithful manner; — As long as no technical deficiency is identified, it is expected that systems respond to single failures as per their certification or qualification criteria and system logic; — The analysis is limited to new operational credits developed in this AWO concept and the evolution from conventional precision instrument departure and approach. The experience in conducting conventional PAs is credited to validate the safety of the existing system. 4.5.3. Unsafe control actions (UCAs) The list of controlled actions is established. The system is mainly centred on the aircrew to manage safety-critical hazards. The core tasks assigned to the pilot is to fly, navigate, communicate and manage the flight using either manual or automated controls in the context of AWO. For each unsafe controlled action, the process variables further refine the context in which it takes place. The feedback loop before the DH (assumption is that no visual reference is established) might differ from the feedback loop after the DH where visual references have been established. The detailed list of tasks considered for each controller cannot be presented in this document. An example of the UCAs for the pilots clustered in their task to fly manually is given below. Control actions Not providing Providing causes Too early/too late, Stopping too hazard wrong order soon, applying too long UCA.101.1 Pilot UCA.101.7 Pilot UCA.101.12 Pilot CA.101 Pilot provides control to does not provide lagged or provides provides control change L/V flight path control to change a wrong change to to change L/V when established on L/V flight path L/V flight path and flight path when flight path above the when deviation increase deviations deviation occur DH occurs above the above the DH DH. UCA.101.8 Pilot UCA.101.13 Pilot provides control to UCA.101.2 Pilot lagged or provides change L/V flight does not a wrong change to path when provide control L/V flight path and established on to change L/V increase deviations flight path between flight path when between the DH the DH and the deviation occurs and the flare flare between the DH UCA.101.14 Pilot and the flare UCA.101.9 Pilot lagged or provides provides control to UCA.101.3 Pilot a wrong change to change L/V flight does not L/V flight path and path when provide control increase deviations established on to change L/V at the flare flight path at the flight path when flare UCA.101.15 Pilot TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Control actions Not providing Providing causes Too early/too late, Stopping too hazard wrong order soon, applying too long deviation occurs UCA.101.10 Pilot lagged or provides during the flare provides control to a wrong change to change L/V flight L/V flight path and UCA.101.4 Pilot path when increase deviations does not established during during landing roll provide control landing roll to change L/V UCA.101.16 Pilot flight path when UCA.101.11 Pilot lagged or provides deviation occurs provides control to a wrong change to during landing change L/V flight L/V flight path and roll path when increase deviations established during during take-off roll UCA.101.5 Pilot take-off roll does not provide control to change L/V flight path when deviation occurs during taxiing UCA.101.6 Pilot does not provide control to change L/V flight path when deviation occurs during take-off roll CA.102 UCA.102.1 Pilot UCA.102.5 Pilot at UC.102.6 Pilot Pilot provides does not Vref provides lagged at providing control to change provide control control to change control to change airspeed to change airspeed before airspeed airspeed when landing roll approaching Vs speed deviation UC.102.7 Pilot occurs above lagged at providing the DH control to change UCA.102.2 Pilot airspeed at go- does not around provide control to change airspeed when speed deviation occurs above the DH UC.102.3 Pilot does not provide control TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Control actions Not providing Providing causes Too early/too late, Stopping too hazard wrong order soon, applying too long to change airspeed when speed deviation occurs at the flare UCA.102.4 Pilot does not provide control to brake during landing roll C3 …. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) 4.5.4. Causal factors and control flaws Identification of causal factors and control flaws has to be performed. For each unsafe controlled action (UCA), the inadequate control flows (ICFs) and its origin are then established. UCA ID UCA Hazardous ICF ID ICF source ICFs 1. Pilot Guidance on displays/instruments — Not Y UCA.101.1.1 instruments provided or incorrect Aircraft height/altitude on 1. Pilot Y UCA.101.1.2 displays/instruments — Not provided or instruments Pilot does not provide control to change L/V flight path when deviation occurs above the DH incorrect 1. Pilot Enhanced ground proximity warning system Y UCA.101.1.3 instruments (EGPWS) — Not provided or incorrect 1. Pilot Deviation warning — Not provided or Y UCA.101.1.4 instruments incorrect 1. Pilot Y UCA.101.1.5 System status — Not provided or incorrect instruments 2. Enhanced EFVS or CVS on displays/HUDs — Not Y UCA.101.1.6 displays provided or incorrect UCA.101.1 Automation policy and training — Y UCA.101.1.7 3. Air operator Insufficient Y UCA.101.1.8 3. Air operator Stabilisation criteria — Insufficient crew resource management (CRM) — Y UCA.101.1.9 3. Air operator Insufficient AIS system availability (AFL, NAVAIDS) — Y UCA.101.1.10 3. Air operator Not provided or incorrect Y UCA.101.1.11 4. ANS Wind real-time information — Not provided Provides vectors and altitude clearance — Y UCA.101.1.12 4. ANS Not provided or incorrect Y UCA.101.1.13 5. Infrastructure ILS/GNSS signal - Not provided or incorrect Y UCA.101.1.14 6. Aircraft Crosswind — Not informed Y UCA.101.1.15 6. Aircraft Windshear — Not informed This enables a global review of all the interactions of the control flows listed and checking that the hazards are properly mitigated in all circumstances. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) 4.5.5. End-result of the hazards review The end-result of this hazards review is presented in the table below. Source ICFs Mitigation measure Stall warning, maximum operation speed/maximum operating Mach number, or flap limits, should be displayed to provide the flight crew with a quick-glance sense of speed CS 25.207 Stall warning Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies Aircraft airspeed between primary instrument displays. 1. Pilot instruments on displays / Pilot flying must be able to remove/deselect misleading airspeed. instruments Pilot must be informed/alerted to a significant misalignment between different aircraft computed airspeeds. There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input data. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. Deviations monitoring is always associated with CRM monitoring, altitude and attitude coupling. CRM ensures pilot not-flying monitors the height/altitude that is provided to the pilot flying for errors. Pilot flying must cross-check height guidance with other instruments. Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies Aircraft height / between primary instrument displays. altitude on 1. Pilot instruments displays / Pilot flying must be able to remove/deselect misleading airspeed. instruments Pilot must be informed/alerted to a significant misalignment between different aircraft computed airspeeds. There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input data. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. Airborne until the ground Cause due to sensor failure, computation/processing error, inertial reference system (IRS) common cause failure Deviations monitoring is always associated with CRM monitoring, altitude and attitude coupling. Pilot not-flying monitors and helps the pilot flying to detect attitude deviations. Attitude on Aircraft equipped with GPWS will receive terrain warnings in cases of 1. Pilot instruments displays/ abnormal descent rates. instruments Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies between primary flight displays (PFDs). There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input data. Pilot must be able to remove/deselect erroneous display/guidance. Pilot must be informed/alerted to a navigation error or inability of the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) system to determine position within defined limits. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. Aircraft equipped with flight envelope protection CS 25.1333 (b) (b) Equipment, systems, and installations must be designed so that sufficient information is available to assure control of the aeroplane in airspeed, altitude, direction and attitude by one of the pilots without additional flight crew action after any single failure or combination of failures that is not assessed to be extremely improbable. 2. Airspeed, altitude, and direction display systems. The reliability and independence of the displays used to show compliance with CS 25.1333(b) should be sufficient to ensure continued safe flight and landing appropriate to the intended operation of the aeroplane. From above DH to flare Deviation 1. Pilot instruments CAT II/III warning Deviation monitoring, clear visual indication at each pilot's station. From above DH to flare CAT.IDE.A.150 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) (a) Turbine-powered aeroplanes having an MCTOM of more than 5 700 kg or an MOPSC of more than nine shall be equipped with a TAWS that meets the requirements for Class A equipment as specified in an acceptable standard. 1. Pilot instruments EGPWS (b) Reciprocating-engine-powered aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 5 700 kg or an MOPSC of more than nine shall be equipped with a TAWS that meets the requirement for Class B equipment as specified in an acceptable standard. TAWS/radar altimeter (RAlt) is an AMC for not applying the CFDA technique. Class A excessive downwards glideslope deviation warning for vertical navigation (VNAV) guidance. Flight mode Mitigations inter-related with CRM, call-out, crew training on 1. Pilot instruments annunciator automation policy and safety management system (SMS). Between DH and flare The radio altimeter operating area is determined in CS ADR- DSN.B.205 and additional guidance is provided in GM1 ADR DSN.B.205. However, there are instances where it is impracticable to establish such an area. This has an effect on the DH. 1. Pilot instruments Flight prompt Concerning the provision of electronic terrain and obstacle data, reference is made to AMC1 ADR.OPS.A.005. Furthermore, NPA 2016- 02 contains requirements for the integrity of the aeronautical data. CAT II/III All height call-outs below 200 ft above the aerodrome threshold elevation are determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) device capable of providing equivalent performance. Terrain/runway database must be uploaded correctly and integrity checked before use. Flight ILS setting must be checked 1. Pilot instruments management system (FMS) Above DH only Cause due to sensor failure, computation/processing error, navigational position error due to failure, NAV radio failure. Common cause failure associated with the pilot flying ILS receiver failure deviations monitoring is always associated with CRM monitoring, altitude and attitude coupling. CRM ensures pilot not-flying monitors the L/V path guidance followed for errors. Aircraft equipped with GPWS will receive terrain warnings in cases of abnormal descent rates. Pilot flying must cross-check L/V flight path guidance with other instruments. Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies between PFDs. Guidance on There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input 1. Pilot instruments displays / data. instruments Pilot must be able to remove/deselect erroneous display/ guidance Pilot must be informed/alerted to a navigation error or inability of the system to determine position within defined limits. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. CS 25.1333 (b) (b) Equipment, systems, and installations must be designed so that sufficient information is available to assure control of the aeroplane in airspeed, altitude, direction and attitude by one of the pilots without additional flight crew action after any single failure or combination of failures that is not assessed to be extremely improbable. 2. Airspeed, altitude, and direction display systems. The reliability and independence of the displays used to show compliance with CS 25.1333(b) should be sufficient to ensure continued safe flight and landing appropriate to the intended operation of the aeroplane. Landing Crediting of existing provisions 1. Pilot instruments configuration warning Failure mode should be detected especially when referring to single 1. Pilot instruments System status failure TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Cause due to sensor failure, computation/processing error, navigational position error due to failure, NAV radio failure, ILS receiver failure. Pilot flying must cross check L/V flight path guidance with other instruments. CRM ensures pilot not-flying monitors the L/V path guidance followed for errors. Independent source of information/display in the event of a loss of vertical path guidance to be provided. Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies between PFDs. Pilot flying must be able to remove/deselect misleading display/image. Pilot flying must initiate a go-around if HUD error is detected above the DH. Pilot must be informed/alerted to a significant misalignment between the aircraft position and the defined flight path. Aircraft equipped with GPWS will receive terrain warnings in cases of abnormal descent rates. There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input 2. Enhanced EFVS or CVS on data. displays displays/HUDs The flight crew must be advised of failed aircraft systems or components affecting the decision to continue to use the display/HUD. Terrain/runway database must be uploaded correctly and integrity checked before use. Pilot must be informed/alerted to a navigation error or inability of the system to determine position within the defined limits. Sensor system sources for instrument flight information should be consistent between the HUD and the head-down displays (HDDs) used by the same pilot. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. The EFVS/CVS shall be certified for the intended operation, and the performance of the sensors for different meteorological conditions shall be demonstrated and specified in the AFM. The AFM shall specify a height above the threshold below which natural vision shall be available. SA CAT II permits an RVR as low as 1 200 ft (375 m) and a conservative SA CAT I at 400 m. It is anticipated that approaches to a CAT I runway could be initially permitted to a lowest RVR of 300 m. This number comes from the system design limitation of EFVS MASPS DO-315A. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Common cause failure associated with the displays/HUD frozen image on displays/HUD Pilot flying must cross-check L/V flight path guidance with other instruments. CRM ensures pilot not-flying monitors the L/V path guidance that is provided to the pilot flying for errors. Independent source of information to resolve inconsistencies between primary instrument displays. Pilot flying must be able to remove/deselect misleading display/image Real -time Pilot flying must initiate a go-around if HUD error is detected above image of DH. 2. Enhanced external scene displays Pilot must be informed/alerted to a significant misalignment between topography on displays / HUD the aircraft position and the defined flight path. Aircraft equipped with GPWS will receive terrain warnings in cases of abnormal descent rates. There should be a means to verify the correctness of sensor input data. Pilot must be able to remove/deselect frozen display/image The flight crew must be advised of failed aircraft systems or components affecting the decision to continue to use the display/HUD. Each display should have independent sensors and power supplies. ORO.FC.105(c). In the case of commercial operations of aeroplanes and helicopters, the pilot-in-command/commander or the pilot, to whom the conduct of the flight may be delegated, shall have had Airport initial familiarisation training of the route or area to be flown and of 3. Air operator familiarisation the aerodromes, facilities and procedures to be used. This route/area and aerodrome knowledge shall be maintained by operating at least once on the route or area or to the aerodrome within a 12-month period. AIS system Crediting of existing provisions 3. Air operator unavailability (AFL, NAVAIDS) Competent authority approval required. Flight crew need additional training at an ATO to qualify for operations below DH or 200 ft. Specific crew training (ground and FSTD) required. Automation Minimum crew of two pilots is required. 3. Air operator policy and The air operator must conduct operational demonstration prior to training approval. The air operator must have a certain level of experience in operating the given aircraft type (e.g. 6 months). The air operator must have a process for continuous monitoring of the success rate of AWO approaches. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) The air operator’s SMS evaluates hazards from all components of the system, not just hazards internal to the air operator. Pilot flying must cross-check instruments guidance with other instruments. 3. Air operator CRM CRM ensures pilot not-flying monitors the speed that is provided to the pilot flying for errors. Air operations, CAT II ‘The air operator must have a process for continuous monitoring of the success rate of AWO approaches.’ Standard CAT III operating 3. Air operator Visual reference of three centre line lights required at the DH (RVR procedures (SOPs) on DH 200 m). If the DH is specified, then visual reference of one centre line light is required (CAT III with fail-operational flight control). CAT III Approach shall be automatically flown to touchdown (except for approved HUD). Stabilisation 3. Air operator Specified RVRs required for TDZ and MID. criteria With fail-passive flight control, the pilot shall be able to manually land or perform a go-around. Eligible aerodromes and runways verified. Availability of approach charts Missed This is not addressed yet in the aerodrome rules. NPA 2016-02 4. ANS approach addresses the issue of publication of the aeronautical charts from the instruction AIS/aeronautical information management (AIM) perspective; however, the responsibility to ensure that approach charts are available should be with the aerodrome operator. Provides vectors Crediting of existing provisions 4. ANS and altitude clearance Regulation (EU) 2017/373 requires instrumented systems for CAT II/III runways and CAT I subject to the decision of the competent authority. AMC to this Regulation provide reporting positions LVPs shall be established and in force for air operations with an RVR below 550 m. RVR real-time RVR reporting available below 800 m visibility. 4. ANS information CAT II ATC required. ATC has suitable RVR display equipment. 2 RVR reporting positions. CAT III RVR reporting available. 3 RVR reporting positions. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Taxiing guidance The aerodrome shall establish LVPs 4. ANS and monitoring Visual aids real- CAT II 4. ANS time status 2 RVR reporting positions. Regulation (EU) 2017/373, MET.OR.205 addresses the provision of Wind real-time real-time surface wind information. 4. ANS information ATS.OR.515, as proposed in NPA 2016-09, requires the existence of wind surface displays. The protection of ILS sensitive areas is covered under the AMC/GM to the aerodrome rules. ILS certified to Class II/D/2 Certification of navaids is not yet covered. This could be covered under AMC or at CS, which needs to be developed Availability of approach charts This is not addressed yet in the aerodrome rules. NPA 2016-02 addresses the issue of publication of the aeronautical charts from the AIS/AIM perspective; however, the responsibility to ensure that approach charts are available should be with the aerodrome operator. 5. Infrastructure ILS / GNSS signal Pilot must be informed/alerted to a navigation error or inability of the system to determine position within the defined limits. CAT II For ILS-supported approaches, sensitive areas to be protected from aircraft and vehicles. ILS certified to Class II/D/2. OCA/H published in accordance with PANS-OPS. Approach charts available CAT III LVPs in place Information on status of relevant systems provided to pilots Runway, infrastructure, approach and runway lights and marking in accordance with CS-ADR-DSN/ICAO Annex 14 for CAT I PA runways. Maximum switch-over time for approach lights 15 seconds Visual aids for CAT II/III runways are included in CS-ADR.DSN CAT II or CAT III 5. Infrastructure Visual aids Runway, infrastructure, approach and runway lights and marking in accordance with CS-ADR-DSN/ICAO Annex 14 for CAT II LVPs in place LVTO I LVPs in place. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) Maximum switch-over time for runway end, centre line lights and stop bars 1 second. LVTO II Maximum switch-over time for other runway lights, essential taxiway lights and obstacle lights 15 seconds. Below an RVR of 150 m, 15 m spacing runway centre line lights required. LVPs for taxiing consider RVRs. The RVR is measured only for runway. It is not a useful measure of the difficulty of taxiing. The aerodrome operator should determine the ability to taxi using visual reference, but how? This can only be done by the aircraft operator based upon the entire system (ATM, aerodrome, operator). The 75 m RVR minimum for take-off considers the assisted infrared and colour-wide angle camera development. 6. Aircraft Crosswind Crediting of existing provisions 6. Aircraft Windshear Crediting of existing provisions CS 25.1329(h) When the flight guidance system is in use, a means Deviation 7. AFCS sensors must be provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin monitoring from the speed range of the normal flight envelope. Basic autopilot (AP) safety objectives. Basic airworthiness requirements (see Chapter 6 of Appendix 2 AC 120-29A, edition 2002). If installed, the basic airworthiness (AW) requirements are a prerequisite for any equipment. Equipment mentioned below shall comply with the applicable standards as mentioned in the associated ETSOs. Aircraft CS-25 manufacturer compliance CS-25 (in particular CS 25.1309, 1301, 1322, 1329), including the relevant AMC. Pilot to be able to safely bring the aeroplane at DA/H 200 ft or above from which it can be landed safely within the TDZ of the runway and/or to safely perform a go-around (position is defined in such a way that the pilot may be able to make a correction; performance criteria are therefore aircraft-dependent (e.g. large transport aircraft vs business jet). Equipment: CS-AWO 321 and AC 120-xls Chapter 3.4 and Appendix 4. CS-AWO 321(a)(5) requires excessive deviation alerts; however, according to the FAA, AC 120-xls, para 3.16, an excessive deviation alert is not required. CS-AWO Autoland: CS-AWO 321 and AC-120 xls and Appendix 4. Aircraft Autoland manufacturer Aircraft shall be capable of clearing obstacles following a missed compliance approach at any height. Roll-out control/guidance system required (RVR below 200 m) CAT IIIB Fail-operational roll-out flight control system required for an RVR TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 4. Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) below 125 m. CS-AWO Performance criteria are in CS-AWO 231 and the associated AMC. Safety objective CS-AWO 201. Additional safety objectives criteria are in the ‘failure conditions’ section of CAT 2 of CS-AWO. Equipment (navigation display, FD, AFCS, HUD): CS-AWO 221 and AC Aircraft CS-AWO 120-xls Chapter 3.3 and Appendix 3. manufacturer compliance CS-AWO 221(i) and 236 require excessive deviation alerts; however, according to the FAA AC 120-xls para 3.16, an excessive deviation alert is not required. See also CS-AWO 206. Navigation sensors: AC 120-XLS (ILS, GLS, MLS). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 5. Proposed actions to support implementation 5. Proposed actions to support implementation The following actions are foreseen: — EASA Circular (primarily targeted audience: competent authorities, industry) Development of the related guidance material (‘safety material’) for contributing to the implementation of the AWO regulatory material — Detailed explanation with clarification and indicated hints on the EASA website (competent authorities, industry) Development of the related guidance material (‘safety material’) for contributing to the implementation of the AWO regulatory material — Dedicated thematic workshops/sessions (competent authorities, industry) Presentation of and discussion on the developed related guidance material (‘safety material’) for contributing to the implementation of the AWO regulatory material  CAT OPS community;  NCC OPS community;  NCO OPS (GA) community;  helicopter OPS community; and  ADR community. — Combination of the above selected means (competent authorities, industry) Please refer above. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References 6. References 6.1. Related regulations Air operations Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1). Aircrew Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 311, 25.11.2011, p. 1). Aerodromes Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 of 12 February 2014 laying down requirements and administrative procedures related to aerodromes pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 44, 14.2.2014, p. 1). ATM/ANS Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1034/2011 of 17 October 2011 on safety oversight in air traffic management and air navigation services and amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 (OJ L 271, 18.10.2011, p. 15). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 of 17 October 2011 laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation services and amending Regulations (EC) No 482/2008 and (EU) No 691/2010 (OJ L 271, 18.10.2011, p. 23). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2017/373 of 1 March 2017 laying down common requirements for providers of air traffic management/air navigation services and other air traffic management network functions and their oversight, repealing Regulation (EC) No 482/2008, Implementing Regulations (EU) No 1034/2011, (EU) No 1035/2011 and (EU) 2016/1377 and amending Regulation (EU) No 677/2011. SERA Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 255/2010 (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References 6.2. Affected decisions (CSs, AMC and GM) Initial/continuous airworthiness Decision No. 2003/6/RM of the Executive Director of the Agency of 17 October 2003 on certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and acceptable means of compliance, for all weather operations (« CS-AWO ») Decision 2013/031/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 17 December 2013 adopting Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications Navigation and Surveillance (CS ACNS) ‘CS- ACNS Initial Issue’ Air operations Decision N° 2012/015/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24th October 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — ‘Guidance Material to Annex I – Definitions’ Decision 2014/025/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 28 July 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ARO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2014/014/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 ‘AMC and GM to Part-ARO — Issue 3’ Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2’ Decision 2014/015/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT – Issue 2’ Decision N° 2012/019/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 th October 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-SPA’ Decision N° 2013/021/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC) Aircrew Decision No°2011/016/R of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 15 December 2011 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References the European Parliament and of the Council ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-FCL’ Decision No° 2012/006/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 19th April 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ARA’ Decision No° 2012/007/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 19th April 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORA’ Decision No° 2012/010/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 4th July 2012 on the certification specifications for aeroplane flight simulation training devices Decision No° 2012/011/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 26th June 2012 on the certification specifications for helicopter flight simulation training devices Executive Director Decision 2016/008/R of 2 May 2016 amending the Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-FCL and Part-ARA of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, and the Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO and Part-ARO of Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 ‘Part-FCL (PBN) — Amendment 2, Part-ARA (PBN, ARA.MED) — Amendment 3 Part-FCL (Learning Objectives (LOs)) — Amendment 2 Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 7, Part-ARO (OCC for MPL) — Issue 3, Amendment 2’ Executive Director Decision 2017/022/R of 8 December 2017 amending Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-FCL, Part-ARA and Part-ORA of Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 ‘AMC/GM to Part-FCL — Amendment 3, AMC/GM to Part-ARA — Amendment 4, AMC/GM to Part-ORA — Amendment 4’ Aerodromes Executive Director Decision 2017/021/R of 8 December 2017 issuing Certification Specifications and Guidance Material for Aerodrome Design (CS ADR-DSN) ‘CS ADR-DSN — Issue 4’ Decision 2014/012/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 27 F.ebruary 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 ‘AMC/GM for Aerodromes — Initial Issue’ Executive Director Decision 2017/017/R of 10 July 2017 amending Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 ‘AMC/GM to Authority, Organisation and Operations Requirements for Aerodromes – Amendment 2’ ATM/ANS Decision 2013/031/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 17 December 2013 adopting Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications Navigation and Surveillance (CS ACNS) ‘CS- ACNS Initial Issue’ TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References SERA Executive Director Decision 2015/014/R of 3 July 2015 adopting Guidance Material on the implementation of the remote tower concept for single mode of operation Decision 2013/013/R of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 17 July 2013 adopting the Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 255/2010 ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to the rules of the air’ 6.3. Other reference documents ICAO and FAA regulatory material — ICAO Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing (10th Edition, July 2006) — ICAO Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation (6th Edition, July 2007) — ICAO Annex 4 — Aeronautical Charts (11th Edition, July 2009) — ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft (9th Edition, July 2010) — ICAO Annex 10 —Aeronautical Telecommunications (6th edition, July 2006) — ICAO Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services (13th Edition, July 2001) — ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes (7th Edition, 2016) — ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes (7th Edition, 2016) — ICAO Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services (15th Edition, July 2016) — ICAO Doc 4444 — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management, 6th Edition, 2016 — ICAO Doc 8168 — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations, 5th Edition, 2006 — ICAO Doc 9365 — Manual of All-Weather Operations, 3th Edition, 2013 — ICAO Doc 9261 — Heliport Manual, 3rd Edition, 1995 — ICAO Doc 9830 — Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) Manual, 1st Edition — ICAO EUR Doc 013 — European Guidance Material on Aerodrome Operations under Limited Visibility Conditions, 5th Edition,2016 — FAA Order No 8400.13D — Procedures for the Evaluation and Approval of Facilities for Special Authorization Category I Operations and All Category II and III Operations, 2009 — FAA Order No 8260.3B — United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) with Changes 1-26, 1976 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References — FAA Order No 8260.19F — Flight Procedures and Airspace, 2014 — FAA Notice No 8260.74 — Special Authorization (SA) Category (CAT) I Instrument Landing System (ILS) Missed Approach Procedure Evaluation and Documentation Requirements, 2014 — FAA Order No 8200.1D — US Standard Flight Inspection Manual (USSFIM) with CHG 1, 2015 — FAA Order No 6750.24E — Instrument Landing System and Ancillary Electronic Component Configuration and Performance Requirements, with Change 1 @ 2, 2012 — FAA Order No JO 6750.57A — Instrument Landing System Continuity of Service Requirements and Procedure, with Change 1, 2009 — FAA Part 23 — FAA Part 25 — FAA Part 91 — FAA Part 121 — FAA Part 129 — FAA Part 135 — FAA AC No 120-xls — FAA AC No 90-CAT I — FAA AC No 90-106 — Enhanced Flight Vision Systems, 2010 — FAA AC No 20-167 — Airworthiness Approval of Enhanced Vision System, Synthetic Vision System, Combined Vision System, and Enhanced Flight Vision System Equipment, 2016 — FAA AC No 150/5300-13A — Airport Design, 1989/2012 Standardisation bodies — RTCA DO-315A — Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Enhanced Vision Systems, Synthetic Vision Systems, Combined Vision Systems and Enhanced Flight Vision Systems, 2010 — RTCA DO-359 — Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard (MASPS) for Synthetic Vision Guidance Systems, 2015 — RTCA DO-341 — Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for an Enhanced Flight Vision System to Enable All-Weather Approach, Landing and Roll-Out to a Safe Taxi Speed, 2012 — EUROCAE ED 179 — Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Enhanced Vision Systems, Synthetic Vision Systems, Combined Vision Systems and Enhanced Flight Vision Systems, 2008 — SAE International ARP6023 — Human Engineering Considerations for Implementing Enhanced Synthetic Vision Systems in Vertical Flight Capable Platforms, 2013 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 52 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(A) 6. References — SAE International ARP5677 — Human Engineering Considerations for Airborne Implementation of Enhanced Synthetic Vision Systems, 2012 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 52 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-06(B) All-weather operations RMT.0379 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of rulemaking task (RMT).0379 is to modernise the European Union (EU) aviation regulatory framework applicable to all-weather operations (AWOs) so it ensures the highest level of safety while enabling efficiency gains based on the latest technological advancements. It addresses in a coordinated manner all relevant disciplines: initial airworthiness, air operations, flight crew licensing and aerodromes. It proposes performance- and risk-based approach, as much as feasible, considering also the appropriate balance between performance-based and prescriptive principles (depending on the type of air operations (CAT, NCC, NCO, and SPO). This NPA proposes to update the AWO-relevant rules in many aviation domains such as airworthiness (CS-AWO), air operations (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012), aircrew (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011) and aerodromes (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR.DSN). The main aim has been to allow for a better integration of the regulatory requirements related to the operational use of new, advanced technology — either developed already or to be developed in the future — such as, for example, enhanced flight vision system (EFVS), as well as the application of some advanced new operational procedures, which may support AWOs. Significant focus has been invested in developing resilient rules, which are not technology-dependent. A particular attention was paid to the development of requirements enabling the use of EFVS to the maximum extent possible (e.g. use of EFVS for landing). A new concept of ‘light operational credits’ for EFVS 200 operations, not requiring the use of specific low-visibility procedures, has also been introduced. The proposed changes are expected to maintain safety, reduce the regulatory burden, increase cost-effectiveness, improve harmonisation (e.g. with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)), and achieve as much as feasible alignment with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). NPA 2018-06 is divided in four parts. The present sub-NPA(B) includes: — the procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; and — the proposed amendments to CS-AWO (initial airworthiness). The other sub-NPAs are organised as follows: — sub-NPA(A) – procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; presentation of the issue under discussion; impact assessment as well as the hazard identification and risk assessment; and proposed actions to support implementation; — sub-NPA(C) – air operations and aircrew; and — sub-NPA(D) – aerodromes. Action area: Airlines, air operators other than airlines Affected rules: AMC/GM to the Air OPS Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012); AMC/GM to the Aircrew Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) Νο 1178/2011); AMC/GM to the aerodromes rules (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR-DSN); and CS-AWO Affected stakeholders: manufacturers, maintenance organisations (MOs), air operators, approved training organisations (ATOs), aerodrome operators, ATM/ANS, Member States Driver: Level playing field Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: Light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard 09.12.2015 13.7.2018 2019/Q1 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA .................................................................................................................................. 3 1.1. How this NPA was developed .................................................................................................................3 1.2. How to comment on this NPA.................................................................................................................3 1.3. The next steps .........................................................................................................................................3 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO .................................................................................................... 5 CS-AWO — Book 1 and Book 2 .................................................................................................................5 CSs and Acceptable Means of Compliance for All-Weather Operations (CS-AWO) .................................8 CS-AWO BOOK 1........................................................................................................................................9 CS-AWO BOOK 2......................................................................................................................................63 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme3 under RMT.0379. RMT.0379 was initiated with the publication of the related Terms of Reference (ToR) and Concept Paper RMT.0379 Issue 14 on 9 December 2015. For the development of the implementing rules (IRs), the accelerated procedure5 is applied; for the development of the acceptable means of compliance (AMC), guidance material (GM) and certification specifications (CSs), the standard rulemaking procedure is followed. As part of the accelerated procedure, EASA has already consulted its Advisory Bodies (ABs) on the regulatory impact assessment (RIA)6 and the description of operations (DoOs). In the context of the second consultation phase (focused consultation), EASA consulted on the proposed amendments to the IRs only. In addition, EASA provided responses to the comments received during the AB consultation and presented the subsequent amendments to the RIA and the DoOs. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of the Experts’ Task Force Groups (air operations, airworthiness, and aerodromes). It is hereby submitted to all interested parties7 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/8. The deadline for submission of comments is 15 October 2018. 1.3. The next steps Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments. Based on the comments received EASA will: — update the proposed text of the affected CSs and AMC; and 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management- board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php 4 https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20and%20Concept%20Paper%20RMT.0379%20Issue%201.pdf 5 In accordance with Article 16 of MB Decision No 18-2015. 6 The RIA for the entire NPA is presented in Sub-NPA (A), Chapter 3. 7 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure. 8 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 1. About this NPA — issue a decision containing CS-AWO. The comments received and the EASA responses will be reflected in a comment-response document (CRD). The CRD will be annexed to the decision. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS-AWO — Book 1 and Book 2 In the context of the RMT.0379 activities on AWOs, the CSs for AWOs (CS-AWO) are updated and amended. CS-AWO addresses the required regulatory changes in the airworthiness domain to complement the relevant AWO requirements in other domains from a design and certification point of view by enabling the certification of emerging technologies, such as EFVS, synthetic vision guidance system (SVGS), and CVS and also address special authorisations. In addition, RMT.0379 provided the opportunity to revise and update CS-AWO to reflect developments since it was first published. The initial issue of CS-AWO (dated 17 October 2003) was based upon the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) document JAR-AWO with the inclusion of some of the ongoing JAA Notices of Proposed Amendments (NPAs). The proposed draft CS-AWO Issue 2 incorporates the outstanding JAA NPAs in order to have an updated baseline document. Content from relevant certification review items (CRIs) has been considered, as well as aligned with other widely used authorities’ regulations, such as the FAA’s. The proposed draft of CS-AWO Issue 2 addresses the CSs for Type A operations as a baseline for any applicable operational credits, the CSs for Type B category 1 operations as a baseline for operational credits, and the revised CSs for Type B category 2 and 3 operations to ensure that they reflect current technologies and support the intended operations. The revised CS-AWO also provides and clarifies as well the CSs for airborne equipment to gain the benefits from operational credits including SA CAT I, EFVSs to 100 ft and EFVSs/CVSs to touchdown, and provides the CSs for aircraft conducting taxiing and/or take-off operations in low-visibility conditions. CS-AWO has also been completely restructured to better reflect the utility of the document. As much as possible of the original CS-AWO text was retained in order to build upon its well established foundations. The table below shows the relationship between the initial issue of CS-AWO and the restructured Issue 2. CS-AWO Initial Issue CS-AWO Issue 2 Subpart A — Enabling Equipment Section 1: Automatic Landing Systems Subpart 1 Section 2: Head Up Displays (HUD) N/A Section 3: Enhanced Flight Vision Systems N/A (EFVS) Section 4: Synthetic Vision Guidance N/A Systems (SVGS) Section 5: Combined Vision Systems (CVS) N/A Subpart B — Approach and Landing TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS-AWO Initial Issue CS-AWO Issue 2 N/A Section 1: Airworthiness certification of aeroplanes for Type B operations with decision heights/altitude below 250 ft down to 200 ft — Category 1 operations (CAT I) N/A Section 2: Airworthiness certification of aeroplanes for operations with decision heights below 60 m (200 ft) and down to 45 m (150 ft) — Special Authorisation Category 1 operations (SA CAT I) Sub-part 2 Section 3: Airworthiness certification of aeroplanes for operations with decision heights below 60 m (200 ft) and down to 30 m (100 ft) — Category 2 operations (CAT II) Sub-part 3 Section 4: Airworthiness certification of aeroplanes for operations with decision heights below 30 m (100 ft) or no decision height — Category 3 operations (CAT III) N/A Section 5: Airworthiness certification of aeroplanes for operational credits for visual segment in reduced runway visual range (RRVR) Subpart C — Take-off Section 1: Airworthiness certification of Sub-part 4 aeroplanes for take-off operations in low visibility (TOO) Strikethrough and highlights have been included to show the evolution of the document and allow the reviewer to understand what changes have been made to the existing CS-AWO text. Subpart A provides the certification specifications for the various enabling equipment that can be used to facilitate AWOs or operations in low visibility. The intent is that the equipment provisions are independent (to the greatest extent possible) of the intended operation. It is possible that one or more of the sections of Subpart A will be used for particular design or configuration (e.g. an EFVS displayed on a HUD). Subpart A includes the certification specifications for automatic landing systems, head-up displays, enhanced flight vision systems for approach and landing, synthetic vision guidance systems and combined vision systems. Subpart B provides the required ‘performance’ of the systems that have been selected by the applicant for the chosen DH or category of landing. The certification specifications for Special Authorisation Category 1 (SA CAT) have been included in CS-AWO Subpart B and should be used to demonstrate that the required performance and level of safety can be achieved for the navigation means that is selected TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 178 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO by the applicant. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to assess the effect on the aircraft from external navigation means that may not be as robust as a Category 2 or 3 facility. The proposed amendments to CS-AWO include updates to Category 2 and 3 approaches and landings to ensure that they reflect current technologies and support the intended operations. Subpart C is based upon an amendment to the original text from Subpart 4 and provides a less technology-dependent use of navigation means whilst retaining the original intent of the subpart. The intention of the new structure of CS-AWO is that for a particular system architecture, an applicant would need to combine the certification specifications from Subparts A and B (and possibly C) in order to achieve the required AWO certification for their product. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 178 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CSs and Acceptable Means of Compliance for All-Weather Operations (CS-AWO) CS-AWO Issue 2 8 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS-AWO BOOK 1 SUBPART A — ENABLING EQUIPMENT SECTION 1 AUTOMATIC LANDING SYSTEMS (ALS) GENERAL CS AWO.A.ALS.101 Applicability and terminology (a) Subpart 1A Section 1 of this certification specification airworthiness code is applicable to aeroplanes, which are capable of automatic landing carried out in association with an xLS (instrument landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), and/or ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) landing system (GLS)) both. In addition, the automatic landing system must shall meet the requirements of CS 25.1329. (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.101(a)) (b) The term ‘automatic landing system’ in this CS-AWO refers to the airborne equipment, which provides automatic control of the aeroplane during the approach and landing. It includes all of the sensors, computers, actuators and power supplies necessary to control the aeroplane to touchdown. It also includes provisions to control the aeroplane along the runway during the landing rollout. In addition, it includes the indications and control necessary for its management and supervision by the pilot. (b) If a head-up display (HUD) — or equivalent — is used, then it shall meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended. Refer to CS-AWO Section 2 SA CAT I, Section 3 CAT II or Section 4 CAT III . CS AWO.A.ALS.102 Safety level The safety level in automatic landing may shall not be less than that achieved in manual landing. Hence, in showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of landings made under automatic control. CS AWO.A.ALS.103 Control actions In the absence of failure or extreme conditions, the control actions of the system and the resulting aeroplane flight path may shall not contain unusual features liable to cause a pilot to intervene and assume control. CS AWO.A.ALS.104 Approach speed The approach speed to be used must shall be established taking into account the accuracy with which speed is controlled. It must shall be specified in the aeroplane flight manual (AFM). 9 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO 105 Manual override of automatic pilot When established on the final approach path it must not be possible to change the flight path of the aeroplane with the automatic pilot(s) engaged, except by initiating an automatic go -around. CS AWO 106 Out-of-trim forces at disengagement It must be possible to disengage the automatic landing system at any time without the pilot being faced with out-of-trim forces that might lead to an unacceptable flight path disturbance. CS AWO 107 Manual override of automatic throttle It must be possible to override the automatic throttle (when provided) without using excessive for ce. EQUIPMENT CS AWO.A.ALS.105 Automatic throttle control (a) An automatic landing system must shall include automatic control of throttles to touchdown unless it can be shown that: (1) the aeroplane speed can be controlled manually without an excessive workload in conditions for which the system is to be certified certificated; (2) with manual control of throttles, the touchdown performance limits of CS-AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c) are achieved; and (3) the touchdown performance is not critically affected by reasonable errors in speed control. (b) An automatic throttle system must shall provide safe operation taking into account the factors listed in CS-AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (a). The system should: (1) adjust throttles to maintain aeroplane speed within acceptable limits (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.105 (b)(1)); and (2) provide throttle application at a rate consistent with the recommendations of the appropriate engine and airframe manufacturers. PERFORMANCE CS AWO.A.ALS.106 Performance demonstration (a) The automatic landing system, under the conditions for which its use is to be approved, must shall be demonstrated to achieve the performance accuracy and the limits in CS-AWO 131 point (c) below and taking into account at least the following variables: (1) configurations of the aeroplane (e.g. flap settings); (2) centre of gravity; (3) landing weight; (4) conditions of wind, turbulence and wind shear (see AMC AWO.A.ALS.106, paragraph 3); (5) xLS ILS and/or MLS characteristics (AMC AWO.A.ALS.106, paragraph 4); and (6) system tolerances. 10 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO If limitations are necessary in respect of any of these variables, then these must shall be established. (b) Compliance with tThe accuracy limits of CS-AWO 131 point (c) below must shall be demonstrated by a combination of: (1) an analysis (e.g. by simulation) considering reasonable combinations of variables listed in CS-AWO 131 point (a) and in (AMC AWO.A.ALS.106); and (2) validation of any simulation/analysis by flight test demonstrations (using either statistical or deterministic methods). (c) It must shall be shown that the touchdown performance will be such that exceedance of any of the limits prescribed in this paragraph provision will be improbable (see AMC AWO.A.ALS.106, paragraph 1.4 for acceptable values for the actual probability level) when the variables follow their expected distribution and also when one of the variables is at its most critical value while the others vary in their expected manner: (1) longitudinal touchdown earlier than a point on the runway 60 m (200 ft) from the threshold; (2) longitudinal touchdown beyond the end of the touchdown zone (TDZ) lighting, 823 m (2 700 ft) from threshold; (3) lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear more than 21 m (70 ft) from runway centre line. (This value assumes a 45 m (150 ft) runway. It may be appropriately increased if operation is limited in the aeroplane flight manual AFM to wider runways, or to runways with load-bearing shoulders); (4) Sink rate for structural limit load; and (5) bank angle resulting in hazard to the aeroplane.; and (6) Lateral velocity or slip angle for structural limit load. CS AWO.A.ALS.107 Aerodrome conditions Expected Aaerodrome conditions (e.g. elevation, ambient temperature, runway slope and ground profile under the approach path) must shall be investigated considered and appropriate limitations entered in the aeroplane flight manual AFM where necessary. (AMC AWO.A.ALS.106, paragraph 5). CS AWO.A.ALS.108 Approach and automatic landing with an inoperative engine (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.108) If approval is sought to include automatic landing where the approach is initiated, and the landing made, with an inoperative engine, the automatic landing system must shall be shown to perform a safe landing and, where applicable, safe roll -out in this non-normal aircraft condition taking account of the following: (a) the critical engine inoperative, with the propeller, where applicable, feathered; (b) all flap positions used for landing with an inoperative engine; (c) loss of systems associated with the inoperative engine, e.g. electrical and hydraulic power; (d) crosswinds in each direction greater than 18.5 Km/h (10 kt); and (e) weight of aircraft. 11 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The go-around from any point on the approach to touchdown must shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength and must shall ensure that the aeroplane remains within the obstacle limitation surface for a precision approach runway, Category II or III, specified in ICAO Annex 14. CS AWO.A.ALS.109 Automatic Llanding distance The landing distance required must shall be established and scheduled in the aeroplane flight manual AFM if it exceeds the distance scheduled for manual landing for the same conditions (see AMC AWO.A.ALS.109). CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND WARNINGSALERTS CS AWO.A.ALS.110 Controls, indicators and alerts — General (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.110) The controls, indicators and warnings alerts must shall be designed to minimise flight crew errors, which could create a hazard. Mode and system malfunction indications must shall be presented in a manner compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flight crew. The indications must shall be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible under all expected normal lighting conditions. CS.AWO.A.ALS.111 Audible Warning of Automatic Pilot Disengagement (a) Where, following failure of the automatic pilot or loss of the automatic landing mode, it is necessary for the pilot to assume manual control immediately, an audible warning must be given. This audible warning must be distinct from any other audible cockpit warnings and must operate with no delay until silenced by operating the automatic pilot quick-release control on the control wheel (see CS 25.1329 (d)). It must be audible to all members of the flight crew specified in the aeroplane Flight Manual. (b) The audible warning in paragraph (a) must operate for a period long enough to ensure that it is heard and recognised by the other crew members when the automatic pilot is disengaged by one of the pilots. CS.AWO.A.ALS.112 Automatic throttle (a) An indication of automatic throttle engagement must be provided. (b) An appropriate alert or warning of automatic throttle failure must be provided. (c) Automatic throttle disengagement switches must be mounted on or adjacent to the throttle levers where they can be operated without removing the hand from the throttles. FAILURE CONDITIONS CS AWO.A.ALS.111 General The effects of any failures of, or affecting, the approach and landing system shall be considered in accordance with CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329. The effects of engine failures shall also be considered. 12 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (a) Any single failure or combination of failures affecting trim, flight path or attitude must be shown to be acceptable in relation to its probability. (See CS 25.1309 and its AMC) (b) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a) must be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by appropriate ground simulation or flight tests and may take account of pilot recognition and recovery action in making a landing or go-around as appropriate. (See AMC 25.1309 and AMC 25.1329.) CS AWO.A.ALS.112 xLS ILS and/or MLS navigation means (including signal-in-space) failure (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.112) The effects of failures of the navigation means (including signal in space) (if utilised) must shall be investigated taking into account the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of ICAO Annex 10 relevant to characterisation of failures (e.g. including monitor thresholds, and transmitter changeover or shut down times). AEROPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL CS AWO.A.ALS.113 General The aeroplane flight manual AFM must shall contain the limitations, procedures and other information pertinent to the operation of the automatic landing system and must shall include the following appropriate to the use for which the particular system has been certified certificated: (a) the approved limits established as a result of consideration of the factors listed in CS-AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (a) and 132 CS AWO.A.ALS.107; (b) the approved limits established as a result of consideration of any other factor that the certification has shown to be appropriate; (c) the normal and abnormal procedures, including airspeeds; (d) the minimum required equipment; (e) any additional aeroplane performance limitations (see CS-AWO 142 CS AWO.A.ALS.109); and (f) the category type of the xLS ILS and/or MLS ground navigation means (facilities external to the aircraft) and associated limitations (if any) which have been used as the basis for certification (see AMC AWO.A.ALS.113(f)). CS AWO.A.ALS.114 Wind speed limitations Wind speed limitations higher than those established in showing compliance with CS-AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106 may be specified in the AFM for decision heights (DHs) of 60 m (200 ft) or more, provided that: (a) it can be shown that reliance may be placed on external visual reference for the detection of unsatisfactory performance; and (b) the wind speed limits without reliance on external visual reference are not less than 46 km/h (25 kt) head, 28 km/h (15 kt) cross, and 18.5 km/h (10 kt) tail. 13 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.A.ALS.115 Approach and automatic landing with an inoperative engine If compliance with CS-AWO 140 CS AWO.A.ALS.108 Approach and automatic landing with an inoperative engine (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.108) is established, a statement must shall be included in the Non-normal Procedures, or equivalent section of the flight manual AFM, that approach and automatic landing made with an engine inoperative have been satisfactorily demonstrated, together with the conditions under which that demonstration was made. 14 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 2 HEAD-UP DISPLAYS (HUD) GENERAL CS AWO.A.HUD.101 Applicability and terminology (a) Head-up display landing (and if applicable take-off) system The term 'head-up display landing system (HUDLS)' refers to the total airborne system which provides head-up guidance to the pilot to enable the pilot to either control the aircraft or to monitor the autopilot during: (1) take-off (if applicable); (2) approach and landing (and roll-out if applicable); or (3) go-around. It includes all the sensors, computers, power supplies, indications and controls. (b) A display will be considered to be equivalent to a HUD providing it can be shown to comply with the following: (1) The display shall be presented head-up and shall not require transition of visual attention to the head-down display in order to view the displayed primary flight information. (2) The display shall be conformal with the pilot’s external view. (3) The display shall enable simultaneous viewing of aircraft flight symbology, imagery (if applicable) and the external view. (4) The display shall have characteristics and dynamics that are suitable for manual control of the aircraft. (5) The display of imagery, information and symbology shall be clearly visible to the pilot flying in their normal position with the line of vision looking forward along the flight path. CS AWO.A.HUD.102 Go-around If a HUD (or equivalent) is used for approach guidance, it shall provide sufficient information to permit the pilot to initiate and stabilise a go-around manoeuvre at any point during the approach and the flare without reverting to other displays. This information shall not lead to a speed incompatible with normal go-around procedures and speeds. The approach information shall be removed on selection of go-around unless it is shown that its presence does not interfere with the go-around information. The go-around information shall not be changed or lost if the aeroplane touches the ground during a go-around. In the event of a HUD (or equivalent) failure at any time during the go-around, the pilot shall be able to revert to head-down displays to complete the go-around manoeuvre safely without loss of performance. CS AWO.A.HUD.103 HUD (or equivalent) information below decision height (See AMC AWO.A.HUD.103) 15 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Information presented on the HUD (or equivalent) below the DH shall not mislead, distract or jeopardise the safety of the landing. CS AWO.A.HUD.104 Control of take-off roll, flight path and ground roll (a) HUDLS The system shall provide sufficient guidance information to enable a pilot that is competent to conduct the intended operation to intercept the xLS approach path, if that capability is provided, to track it, to land the aeroplane within the prescribed limits or to make a go-around without reference to other cockpit displays. It shall not require exceptional piloting skill to achieve the required performance. (See CS AWO.B.SACATI.113 or CS AWO.B.CATII.113 or CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 (a) and (b)) or CS AWO.B.CATIII.117. (b) The transition from approach/flare guidance to roll-out control guidance shall be smooth and not distract the pilot from performing the intended operation. (c) If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the aeroplane to intercept and establish the xLS approach path, the point during the approach at which the transition from automatic to manual flight takes place shall be identified and taken into account in the performance demonstration (see CS AWO.B.CATIII.115). The transition from autopilot, to head-up guidance shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness, strength or excessive workload. (d) For take-off roll, the HUD (or equivalent) shall meet the performance requirements of CS AWO.C.TOO.106. (e) The HUD characteristics and dynamics shall be suitable for manual control of the aircraft. CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND ALERTS CS AWO.A.HUD.105 Presentation of information to the flight crew (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.110) (a) Where a HUD (or equivalent) is used to display approach guidance, the following shall apply: (1) Any malfunctions of the HUD (or equivalent) which require immediate action on the part of the pilot shall be indicated by a positive and unmistakable alert to both pilots. These alerts shall be in accordance with CS 25.1322 as far as is practicable (See AMC AWO.A.HUD.105(a)(i)). (2) The system shall be designed such that detected failures will cause the immediate removal of incorrect guidance information from view (See AMC AWO.A.HUD.105(a)(ii)). (3) The pilot using the HUD (or equivalent) shall be able to monitor automatic and manual flight guidance modes and system status (See AMC AWO.A.HUD.105 (a)(iii)). (4) Clear visual indication on the HUD (or equivalent) and at the other pilot's station (e.g. an alert light) when the aeroplane reaches the preselected DH. An additional aural indication is desirable. (5) For normal approach cases, the HUD (or equivalent) symbology, including guidance symbology, shall remain usable at least to the minimum use height (see CS AWO.B.SACATI.114 and CS AWO.B.CATII.114). (b) In addition, for HUDLSs that are used for primary guidance during Category 3 operations (see Subpart B Section 4), the following are also required: 16 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (1) There shall be a means of monitoring the aeroplane approach and landing performance to alert both pilots to unsafe conditions. (2) The pilot who is not flying the aeroplane shall be provided with a display of the adequacy with which the flying pilot is tracking the HUDLS commands. (3) The pilot using the HUDLS shall be able to monitor the system operational status and approach performance continuously without referring to the head-down displays. (4) An alert of excessive deviation from the required approach path shall be provided on the HUD (or equivalent) and at the other pilot's station (See CS AWO.B.CATII.115). (5) If an automatic thrust system is provided, its operation and the information provided on the HUD (or equivalent) shall be consistent. In particular, the mode in which the autothrust is operating shall appear in the HUD (or equivalent), and system operation shall not adversely affect the pilot’s control of the aircraft when using the HUDLS. CS AWO.A.HUD.106 Flight data recording Where a HUD (or equivalent) is installed, a ‘HUD in use’ parameter shall be recorded on the flight data recorder in accordance with CS 25.1549(e). PERFORMANCE CS AWO.A.HUD.107 Performance demonstration (See AMC AWO.A.HUD.107) (a) When a HUDLS is used for primary guidance, the following additional variables shall be included in the performance demonstration (see AMC AWO.A.HUD.107): (1) ambient lighting conditions and approach and runway lighting; (2) variations of the reported runway visual range (RVR); and (3) individual flight crew performance. (b) The HUD (or equivalent) shall meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended. Refer to CS-AWO Subpart B Section 2 SA CAT I, Section 3 CAT II or Section 4 CAT III. CS AWO.A.HUD.108 Fail-operational hybrid landing system Where a HUDLS is fitted as part of a hybrid system, its performance need not meet the same criteria as the primary system provided that it: (a) meets the overall performance requirements, taking into account the probability that it will be used; and (b) is sufficiently compatible with the primary system so as to retain pilot confidence. FAILURE CONDITIONS 17 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.A.HUD.109 Head-up display landing systems In addition, for HUDLSs that are used for primary guidance during Category 3 operations (see Subpart B Section 4), the following are also required: (a) Failure conditions resulting in the inability to complete the landing from the DH using the HUDLS, shall not have a frequency of occurrence of more than once every thousand approaches. (b) In the event of an engine failure, the HUDLS shall permit the pilot to control the aeroplane without reverting to other displays. (c) Wear in mechanical components, e.g. pivots, to be expected in normal service use shall not significantly affect the alignment of the HUDLS display. (d) The radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) shall be such that the probability of the provision of false height information leading to a hazardous situation is extremely remote. The warning for false height information shall be given by the removal or obscuration of displayed information, at least in the height band from 30 m (100 ft) downwards. CS AWO.A.HUD.110 Head-up displays used for enhanced flight vision systems (EFVSs) (a) HUDs (or equivalent displays) used to display EFVS imagery shall have a field of regard (FOR) that is appropriate to the intended usage (see CS AWO.A.EFVS.104 (b), (c) and (d)). (b) Where the EFVS image is superimposed on the HUD (or equivalent display) symbology and is used in combination with other aircraft systems, then the EFVS image and installation shall: (1) satisfactorily perform its intended function; (2) permit the accurate identification and utilisation of visual references, using both EFVS and natural vision, as appropriate; (3) have acceptable display characteristics to accomplish the intended function; (4) not degrade the presentation of essential flight information listed in CS AWO.A.EFVS.105 (a) on the HUD (or equivalent display); (5) not be misleading and not cause confusion or any significant increase in pilot workload; (6) be aligned with and scaled to the external scene, and consider, if needed, the effect of near distance parallax; (7) not significantly or misleadingly alter the colour perception of the external scene to preclude the pilot’s performance of any required tasks by causing confusion or any significant increase in workload; and (8) permit the pilot to recognise misaligned or non-conformal conditions to the external scene that may preclude the pilot’s performance of any required manoeuvres. CS AWO.A.HUD.111 Head-up displays used for synthetic vision guidance systems (SVGSs) A HUD (or equivalent display) used in an SVGS shall: (a) provide a means to control the SVGS scene brightness that is independent of the HUD (or equivalent display) symbology brightness control. This control shall be operable without causing excessive pilot workload, distraction or fatigue; 18 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (b) provide a readily accessible control to enable the pilot to remove and reactivate the SVGS image from the HUD (or equivalent display) without requiring the pilot to remove their hands from the primary flight controls and thrust control; (c) not cause interference with the safe and effective use of the pilot compartment view, either internally or externally; (d) not cause adverse physiological effects such as fatigue or eyestrain; (e) not significantly alter the colour perception of the external scene; (f) allow the pilot to recognise misaligned or non-conformal conditions in a timely manner; and (g) not create a combination of display features to the extent that display clutter reduces the efficiency of reading and interpreting the pilot’s external visual cues. If found to be necessary, a means to control the SVGS scene contrast shall be provided. CS AWO.A.HUD.112 Head-up display landing distance If there is any feature of the HUD or the associated procedures which would result in an increase to the landing distance, the appropriate increment shall be established and scheduled in the AFM. 19 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 3 ENHANCED FLIGHT VISION SYSTEMS (EFVS) CS AWO.A.EFVS.101 General (a) An EFVS uses an electronic means to provide a real-time display of the forward external scene topography through the use of imaging sensors. (b) The EFVS shall provide a demonstrated vision performance in low-visibility conditions and a level of safety suitable for the proposed operational procedure that will allow the required visual references to become visible in the image before they are visible naturally out-the-window. (c) The EFVS shall provide an enhanced vision image that can be used during an instrument approach to enhance the pilot's ability to detect and identify the required visual references for landing in order to gain an operational credit and descend below the decision altitude (DA)/DH or minimum descent altitude (MDA). (d) The EFVS sensor imagery and required aircraft flight information and flight symbology shall be displayed on a HUD (or an equivalent display) so that the imagery and symbology are clearly visible to the pilot flying in their normal position with the line of vision looking forward along the flight path. (e) The EFVS shall include the display element, sensors, computers and power supplies, indications, and controls. It may receive inputs from an airborne navigation system or flight guidance system. The EFVS display characteristics and dynamics shall be suitable for manual control of the aircraft. CS AWO.A.EFVS.102 EFVS designation (a) An EFVS-Approach (EFVS-A) is a system that has been demonstrated to meet the criteria to be used for approach operations from a DA/H or an MDA to 30 m (100 ft) touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) whilst all system components are functioning as intended, but may have failure modes that could result in the loss of EFVS capability. It shall be assumed for an EFVS-A that: (1) the pilot will conduct a go-around above 30 m (100 ft) TDZE, in the event of an EFVS failure; and (2) descent below 30 m (100 ft) above the TDZE through to touchdown and roll-out shall be conducted using natural vision in order that any failure of the EFVS shall not prevent the pilot from completing the approach and landing. (b) An EFVS-Landing (EFVS-L) is a system that has been demonstrated to meet the criteria to be used for approach and landing operations that rely on sufficient visibility conditions to enable unaided roll-out and to mitigate for loss of EFVS function. (c) An EFVS that meets the certification criteria for an EFVS-L shall be considered to have met the certification criteria for an EFVS-A. CS AWO.A.EFVS.103 EFVS depiction (a) The EFVS sensor imagery and the following flight symbology shall be presented so that they are aligned with and scaled to enable a one-to-one (conformal) overlay with the actual external scene: 20 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (1) aircraft attitude; (2) command guidance as appropriate for the approach to be flown; (3) flight path vector (FPV); and (4) flight path angle reference cue (FPARC), and other cues, which are referenced to this imagery and external scene topography. (b) The FPARC shall be suitable for monitoring the vertical flight path of the aircraft on approaches without vertical guidance and shall be displayed referenced to the pitch scale. It shall be possible for the pilot to be able to set the FPARC to the desired descent angle for the approach. The descent angle may also be automatically set to a value found in an on-board database. (c) The displayed EFVS imagery and aircraft flight symbology shall not adversely obscure the pilot's outside view or field of view (FOV) through the cockpit window and shall be free of interference, distortion, and glare that would adversely affect the pilot's normal performance and workload. (d) The EFVS-L shall provide a means of providing a flare cue and shall use a radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) to determine height above terrain. CS AWO.A.EFVS.104 EFVS display (a) The display of the EFVS image on the HUD (or equivalent display) shall not hinder or compromise the pilot's ability to see and use the required primary flight display information. (b) The FOR of the HUD (or other equivalent display) shall be sufficient for the EFVS information to be displayed conformally over the range of anticipated aircraft attitudes, aircraft configurations, and environmental, including wind, conditions for each mode of operation. (c) The EFVS FOR shall be appropriate for the intended operation and function and shall take into consideration: (1) HUD (or equivalent display) and EFVS sensor FOV; (2) orientation of the HUD (or equivalent display) with respect to the aircraft frame of reference; and (3) orientation of the aircraft. (d) The EFVS FOR shall be checked during certification flight test for sufficiency in meeting its intended function. (e) When a minimum flight crew of more than one pilot is required for the conduct of the operation, a suitable display EFVS sensor imagery shall be provided to the pilot monitoring. (f) The EFVS image shall be compatible with the FOV and head motion box of the HUD. (g) A previously certified HUD (or equivalent display) that is used to display EFVS shall continue to meet the conditions of the original approval and shall be adequate for the intended function, in all phases of flight in which the EFVS is used. (h) The EFVS display shall permit the pilot to accurately and easily recognise unusual aircraft attitude (and other abnormal manoeuvres) and initiate a timely recovery. (i) The latency of the EFVS display shall be minimised and shall not be confusing or misleading to the pilot and shall not affect control performance or increase pilot workload. 21 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (j) The EFVS shall minimise the potential for misleading or distracting imagery by precluding off-axis information from folding into the primary FOR imagery. (k) The displayed EFVS image jitter amplitude shall be appropriate and minimised and shall not exhibit jitter greater than that of the HUD (or equivalent display) that it is displayed on. (l) The displayed EFVS image flicker shall be appropriate and minimised and shall not exhibit flicker greater than that of the HUD (or equivalent display) that it is displayed on. (m) The EFVS shall not exhibit any objectionable noise, local disturbances or an artefact that are hazardously misleading and/or detract from the use of the system. (n) The accuracy of the integrated EFVS and HUD (or equivalent display) image shall be appropriate for the intended function and operation. (o) Any passive sensor optical distortion shall be appropriate for the intended function and operation. (p) The EFVS sensor shall provide a means to minimise blooming and shall prevent blooming that results in the required visual references no longer being distinctly visible and identifiable. (q) The EFVS image persistence time shall be appropriate for the intended function and operation. (r) Dead pixels shall be minimised and shall be of a total area appropriate for the intended function and operation. (s) The effects of parallax caused by lateral, vertical, and longitudinal offset of the sensor from the pilots’ design eye position shall not impede the EFVS from performing its intended function and shall not result in significant performance differences in unsatisfactory landing or safety-related performance parameters between EFVS operations and visual operations in the same aircraft. (t) The EFVS-A display providing imagery to the pilot monitoring shall: (1) be located so that it is plainly visible to the pilot monitoring from their station with the minimum practicable deviation from their normal position and line of vision when the pilot is looking forward along the flight path, and any symbology displayed shall not adversely obscure the sensor imagery of the runway environment; (2) provide an image of the visual scene over the range of aircraft attitudes and wind conditions for each mode of operation and enable the pilot monitoring to see and identify visual references and to verify that all visual requirements for the approach and landing are satisfied; (3) not require the pilot monitoring to unduly move their head/body away from their normal scan pattern or their normal seated position; and (4) ensure satisfactory display of imagery in all lighting and environmental conditions and that dimming controls of the display are adequate. (u) The EFVS-L display providing imagery to the pilot monitoring shall: (1) be centred as nearly as practicable about the vertical plane of the pilot’s forward vision; (2) be located so that the pilot monitoring seated at the controls can monitor the aeroplane’s flight path and instruments with minimum head and eye movement; 22 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (3) provide an image of the visual scene over the range of aircraft attitudes and wind conditions for each mode of operation and enable the pilot monitoring to see and identify visual references and to verify that all visual requirements for the approach and landing are satisfied; (4) not require the pilot monitoring to unduly move their head/body away from their normal scan pattern or their normal seated position; and (5) ensure satisfactory display of imagery in all lighting and environmental conditions and that dimming controls of the display are adequate. CS AWO.A.EFVS.105 HUD EFVS symbology (a) In addition to sensor imagery, the flight instrument data that is displayed on the HUD (or equivalent display) shall, as a minimum, include: (1) airspeed; (2) vertical speed; (3) aircraft attitude; (4) heading; (5) altitude; (6) height above ground level (AGL) such as that provided by a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level; (7) command guidance as appropriate for the approach to be flown; (8) path deviation indications; (9) FPV; and (10) FPARC. (b) If a runway outline (or symbolic runway) is used on the approach to increase awareness of the runway environment and its emergent location within the HUD (or equivalent display), then it shall be geo- referenced and shall not occlude the emerging EFVS cues. (c) EFVS-L that are intended to be used from the DA/H through touchdown and roll-out at not less than 300 m (1 000 ft) RVR, shall also display: (1) height AGL such as that provided by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level; and (2) flare prompt or flare guidance for achieving acceptable touchdown performance. (d) The appearance and dynamic behaviour of the EFVS-L flare prompt shall be distinguishable from command guidance and shall appear in a timely and conspicuous manner to the pilot. (e) An FPV shall be provided on the same display as the EFVS imagery and shall provide a position and motion that corresponds to the aircraft’s earth referenced FPV and shall dynamically respond to follow the pilot control inputs. (f) The dynamic response of the FPV symbol to pilot control inputs shall not exhibit undue lag or overshoot. 23 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (g) An FPARC shall be provided on the same display as the EFVS imagery that is suitable for monitoring the vertical path of the aircraft. A means shall be provided to permit the pilot to select the desired descent angle that is represented by the FPARC. It is also possible for the descent angle to be provided automatically from a database. (h) The display of attitude symbology, FPV, FPARC, and other visual elements which are earth-referenced, shall be aligned with, scaled and conformal to the external view. (i) The EFVS display of imagery, flight information and flight symbology shall provide suitable visual reference for the pilot during the manual performance of any manoeuvres within the operating limitations of the aircraft, including taxiing, take-off, approach, landing and roll-out as applicable for the intended function. CS AWO.A.EFVS.106 EFVS display controls (a) A means of controlling the EFVS display contrast/brightness shall be provided that prevents: (1) distraction of the pilot; (2) impairment of the pilot’s ability to detect and identify visual references; (3) masking of flight hazards; and (4) degradation of task performance or safety. (b) If automatic control for image brightness is not provided, it shall be shown that the manual setting of image brightness meets the above criteria and does not cause excessive workload. (c) The EFVS display controls shall be visible to, and within reach of, the pilot flying from any normal seated position and shall provide a readily accessible control to permit the pilot to immediately deactivate or reactivate the display of the EFVS image on a HUD (or equivalent display) without requiring the pilot to remove their hands from the primary flight controls and thrust control. (d) The position and movement of the EFVS controls shall be designed to minimise the likelihood of inadvertent operation. (e) With the exception of controls located on the pilot’s control wheel (or equivalent), EFVS controls shall be adequately illuminated for all normal background lighting conditions, and shall not create any objectionable reflections on the HUD (or equivalent display) or other flight instruments. CS AWO.A.EFVS.107 EFVS safety assessment (a) The normal operation of the EFVS shall not adversely affect, or be adversely affected by, other aircraft systems. (b) A safety assessment of the installed EFVS, considered separately and in conjunction with other relevant installed systems, shall be conducted to meet the requirements of CS 23.1309 or CS 25.1309 as applicable. (c) The EFVS design shall be assessed in accordance with the provisions of either CS 23.1309 or CS 25.1309 as applicable. (d) An aircraft and system level functional hazard assessment (FHA) and system safety assessment (SSA) shall be prepared to determine the hazard level associated with system failure conditions and to determine the minimum required software and hardware design assurance levels (DALs). 24 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (e) Any alleviating flight crew actions that are considered in the EFVS safety analysis shall be validated during testing for incorporation in the AFM. (f) The flight crew workload shall be assessed in accordance with CS 23.1523 or CS 25.1523 as applicable. CS AWO.A.EFVS.108 EFVS level of safety (a) The safety design goals for airworthiness approval shall be established and shall consider the phase of flight and include the required: (1) accuracy; (2) continuity; (3) availability; and (4) integrity. (b) An FHA shall be conducted in accordance with CS 23.1309 or CS 25.1309 as applicable. (c) The EFVS safety level (failure and performance) shall not be less than the safety level required for non- EFVS-A-based precision and non-precision approaches (NPAs) with DAs/DHs of 60 m (200 ft) or above. (d) The ability of the pilot(s) to cope with any failures identified in the SSA or to provide intervention to limit the effect of a hazard shall be demonstrated and justified. (e) In showing compliance, any probabilities used shall not be factored by the fraction of approaches which are made using EFVS. (f) For EFVS-L, a satisfactory level of safety (failure and performance) appropriate to the operations being addressed shall be demonstrated with the visual segment primarily accomplished by the use of an EFVS-L rather than natural vision. (g) For EFVS-L, a system evaluation shall be conducted to establish the failure modes and determine whether the pilot can safely land and roll out with available natural vision plus whatever remains of the EFVS-L. The evaluation shall not assume that a safe landing can be achieved with only available natural vision after any failure of the EFVS-L. CS AWO.A.EFVS.109 EFVS performance (a) A performance demonstration and evaluation of the EFVS shall be performed and shall include demonstrations of: (1) approach; (2) missed approach; (3) failure conditions; and (4) crosswind conditions. (b) The demonstration of performance shall consider the lateral and vertical limits that could exist at the approach minima for the type of intended approach that certification is being sought. (c) The performance of the EFVS sensor shall be established in terms of the range of the enhanced flight visibility when low-visibility conditions exist. This shall be achieved by determining the ability of the EFVS 25 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO sensor to provide the display of the visual references of the runway environment that are required at operationally relevant distances (see AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) point e). (d) The EFVS sensor resolution performance shall adequately resolve, for pilot identification, the runway threshold and the TDZ to enable the intended function. (e) The maximum allowable final approach course offset shall be established. (f) An EFVS-L with superimposed flight symbology shall not mislead, distract or jeopardise the safety of the landing and roll-out, and the performance of the system shall be demonstrated to be equivalent to or better than that normally achieved in visual operations for the specific aircraft type for all performance parameters measured. (g) The image/symbology of an EFVS-L shall provide the visual cues for the pilot to perform the following without requiring exceptional pilot skill, alerting, strength or excessive workload: (1) control of approach speed (manual or automatic) up to the point of landing; (2) transition through flare to landing; (3) approach, flare, and landing at a normal sink rate for the aircraft; (4) prompt and predictable correction of any lateral deviation away from the runway centre line to smoothly intercept the centre line; (5) touchdowns with a bank angle that is not hazardous to the aeroplane; (6) a normal derotation; (7) control of the path of the aeroplane along the runway centre line through roll-out to a safe taxi speed; and (8) a safe go-around anytime including up to touchdown in all configurations to be certified. (h) The lateral and longitudinal touchdown performance of an EFVS-L shall be demonstrated and shall be equivalent to or better than that normally achieved in visual operations. However, if there is any feature of the system or the associated procedures which would result in an increase to the landing distance, the appropriate increment must be established and scheduled in the AFM. (i) The HUD (or equivalent display) shall meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended. Refer to CS-AWO Subpart B Section 2 SA CAT I, Section 3 CAT II or Section 4 CAT III. CS AWO.A.EFVS.110 EFVS monitoring, annunciation and alerting (a) The mode of operation of the EFVS shall be: (1) annunciated on the flight deck; (2) visible to the flight crew; and (3) recorded by the flight data recorder. 26 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (b) Any detected EFVS malfunction that can adversely affect the normal operation of the EFVS shall be annunciated to the flight crew and shall include as a minimum sensor failures and frozen image failure messages. (c) No single EFVS malfunction shall lead to the display of misleading information, and malfunctions shall be annunciated and the malfunctioning display elements removed. CS AWO.A.EFVS.111 EFVS documentation The demonstrated capability and any specific EFVS limitations of the EFVS shall be included within the relevant AFM. 27 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 4 SYNTHETIC VISION GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (SVGS) GENERAL CS AWO.A.SVGS.101 Applicability and terminology An SVGS is an installed airborne system that comprises the following elements: (a) a flight display, displayed head down or head up; (b) a means to monitor the system performance with the capability to provide alerts; (c) a means to monitor aircraft position with the capability to provide alerts; (d) a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level; (e) terrain, runway and obstacle databases; (f) a means to depict the runway of intended landing; (g) a means to provide an FPARC; (h) a means to provide FPV; and (i) a means to identify the missed approach point (MAPt). CS AWO.A.SVGS.102 SVGS scene depiction The SVGS primary display at each pilot station shall provide: (a) a geospatially correct depiction of the external topography and obstacles from the perspective of the flight deck (egocentric) and not provide a pilot’s view that is depicted below the earth’s surface; (b) a means of giving a sense of motion while on the final approach segment (FAS); (c) a clear and obvious means of the display status of the SVGS scene depiction; (d) a means to easily identify and correlate prominent topographical features with the actual external scene; (e) a means to enable the flight crew to be able to perceive relative distances to prominent topographical features; (f) consistency between position accuracy, symbology, and topographical information; (g) integration of terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) (or terrain warning system) terrain alerts that are consistently depicted across all displays; (h) the ability for displayed terrain or displayed obstacle conflicts to be obvious to the flight crew; (i) a scene range from the eye position to the terrain horizon that is sufficient and is not misleading; and (j) an SVGS primary display that does not degrade the pilot's ability to see and use the required primary flight display information. 28 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO If depicted, displays of approach paths shall not be intersected by topographical features. CS AWO.A.SVGS.103 SVGS flight instrument display minimum requirements Pilots operating the aircraft from their normally seated position shall be provided with the following SVGS displays features and characteristics: (a) A clear and distinct geographically accurate, perspective depiction of the runway of intended landing that is integrated with the SVGS scene and derived from an accepted database (see CS AWO.A.SVGS.114, 115, 116, 117 and 118) . The runway depiction shall be displayed within the positional accuracy requirements. This shall be usable by the flight crew at a minimum distance of two nautical miles from the runway threshold. (b) Lateral and vertical path deviations (c) Command guidance display (d) An earth-referenced FPV with a symbol that is scaled to and aligned with the SVGS scene that does not interfere with the display of attitude. (e) An FPARC referenced to the pitch scale at the desired and selected descent angle for the approach that does not interfere with the display of attitude. (f) Error annunciations (SVGS depiction, navigation signal integrity and excessive deviation (flight technical error)) that are displayed in the pilot’s primary FOV. (g) Alerts (warning or caution level as appropriate) to inform the flight crew when the SVGS function is lost or degraded below the required level of performance. Any detected erroneous information shall be removed from the display. (h) Characteristics and dynamics that are suitable and effective to enable manual control of the aircraft (i) Radio altitude or equivalent display The SVGS display shall not interfere with the external visibility, interpretation and use of cues and guidance presented on the head-down display (primary flight display) or HUDs used for the conduct of the approach procedure. CS AWO.A.SVGS.104 Command guidance Command guidance cues (flight director) shall meet the required flight technical error performance and accuracy for the intended operation (see CS-AWO Subpart B Section 2 SA CAT I or Section 3 CAT II). CS AWO.A.SVGS.105 SVGS — using a head-up display (or equivalent display) A HUD (or equivalent display) used in an SVGS shall meet the provisions of Subpart A Section 2 HUD for the intended operation — in particular, CS AWO.A.HUD.111. If the SVGS depiction is included with HUD (or equivalent display) symbology and used in combination with other aircraft systems, then the SVGS depiction shall include all the additional flight instrument features needed for operation, performance and monitoring. The HUD (or equivalent) shall meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended. Refer to CS-AWO Subpart B Section 2 SA CAT I, Section 3 CAT II or Section 4 CAT III. 29 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.A.SVGS.106 Field of regard The FOR of a HUD (or equivalent display) or a head-down display (HDD) used to display SVGS display shall support the intended functions over the range of anticipated aircraft attitudes, aircraft configurations, runway environments and environmental (e.g. wind) conditions. CS AWO.A.SVGS.107 Head-down display minification For a SVGS implemented on head-down primary displays, the minification ratio shall be shown to be satisfactory. SYSTEM MONITORING, ANNUNCIATION AND ALERTING CS AWO.A.SVGS.108 Information provided to the flight crew Sufficient information shall be provided to the flight crew to enable them to monitor the system status and the approach operation progress and safety. This information shall include unambiguous: (a) identification of the intended path for the approach (e.g. approach type, approach identifier, frequency or channel number); and (b) indication of the system status. CS AWO.A.SVGS.109 SVGS mode and status annunciation The flight crew shall be provided with a means to determine the capability of the airborne system elements to accomplish the approach operation prior to the approach in the event of failed aircraft systems or components that affect the decision to continue in SVGS mode. If more than one approach navigation source is available, then the navigation source selected for the approach shall be positively indicated in the primary FOV. CS AWO.A.SVGS.110 SVGS fault detection and alerting The SVGS shall provide an automatic means to detect and alert the pilot to hazardously misleading guidance signals. Annunciations shall be provided in the primary FOV. The SVGS shall be capable of monitoring the continuity of the navigation source. An alert shall be provided if during the final approach the SVGS operation cannot be completed due to system malfunction. CS AWO.A.SVGS.112 Flight technical error The lateral and vertical tracking performance shall be appropriate and comply with performance requirements for the intended operation (see CS AWO.B.SACATI.113 or CS AWO.B.CATII.113 or CS AWO.B.CATIII.115). CS AWO.A.SVGS.113 Navigation system error In order to ensure the required accuracy and integrity of the guidance and SVGS scene depiction, the navigation system or position error shall be monitored. 30 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Positioning and guidance sources shall be monitored. TERRAIN, RUNWAY AND OBSTACLE DATABASES CS AWO.A.SVGS.114 Databases general Any database such as terrain, runway or obstacle that are used for SVGS scene depiction shall have data quality requirements that support the intended function and have a documented means of producing and maintaining the data in accordance with the latest version of ED-76. SVGS FLIGHT DISPLAY ELEMENTS CS AWO.A.SVGS.115 Minimum display size SVGS displays shall be large enough to present information in a form that is usable, readable and identifiable to the flight crew at their design eye positions, relative to the operational and lighting environment and in accordance with the SVGS intended function(s). CS AWO.A.SVGS.116 Display features and symbology In addition to the required minimum symbology in CS AWO.A.SGVS.103, SVGSs shall also provide on the display: (a) the threshold of the runway of intended landing; (b) a means of distinguishing the landing runway from other runways where more than one runway is depicted; (c) a means to provide a sense of ground speed, altitude trend and direction due to aircraft movement through the depicted scene, if not inherently provided by the terrain depiction; and (d) when conforming an image to the outside world, such as on a HUD (or equivalent display), the image shall not obscure or significantly hinder the ability of the flight crew to detect real-world objects. Coded information elements overlaid over images shall: (1) be readily identifiable and distinguishable for all foreseeable conditions of the underlying image and range of motion; (2) not obscure necessary information contained in the image; (3) be depicted with the appropriate size, shape, and placement accuracy to avoid being misleading; (4) retain and maintain their shape, size, and colour for all foreseeable conditions of the underlying image and range of motion; and (5) show that if there is any obscured information, it is either not needed when it is obscured or it can be rapidly recovered. CS AWO.A.SVGS.117 HUD SVGS pilot controls Manual or automatic SVGS scene depiction contrast (if provided) and/or brightness controls shall be effective in dynamically changing background (ambient) lighting conditions to prevent distraction of the pilot, impairment of the pilot’s ability to detect and identify visual references, masking of flight hazards, or any other factor that would otherwise degrade task performance or safety. 31 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Manual or automatic SVGS scene depiction brightness/luminance controls shall not overwrite or interfere with the HUD (or equivalent display) symbology. SVGS FLIGHT DISPLAY PERFORMANCE CS AWO.A.SVGS.118 Latency Latency or system lag shall not be discernible to the pilot and shall not affect control performance or increase pilot workload. The latency period induced by the display system for alerts shall not be excessive and shall take into account the category of the alert and the required crew response time. The dynamic response of the display shall be sufficient to discern and read the displayed information without presenting misleading, distracting, or confusing information. CS AWO.A.SVGS.119 Jitter The jitter amplitude of the displayed SVGS image shall be less than 0.6 milliradian (mrad). CS AWO.A.SVGS.120 Flicker The SVGS display refresh rate shall preclude both the appearance of unacceptable flicker (brightness variations at frequency above 0.25 HZ) and any flicker effects that result in misleading information or difficulty in reading or interpreting information under the full range of ambient environments up to the maximum ambient illumination level. CS AWO.A.SVGS.121 Image artefacts Undesirable display artefacts and characteristics shall be minimised so that information is still readable and identifiable under all foreseeable conditions, is not distracting, and does not lead to misinterpretation of data. Line widths shall be of sufficient size and optimal sharpness to display the intended information with no distracting visual artefacts or ambiguities that could result in the information being unreadable, distracting or misleading. CS AWO.A.SVGS.122 HUD (or equivalent display) processing error Generation of the SVGS depiction shall not result in a scene display error greater than 5 mrad at the centre of the display, independent of sensor inputs. CS AWO.A.SVGS.123 SVGS scene depiction alignment There shall be no discernible image misalignment caused by lateral, vertical, or longitudinal offset of the computed SVGS reference point from the design eye position. AIRCRAFT POSITION MONITORING AND ALERTING CS AWO.A.SVGS.124 Aircraft positioning monitoring and alerting The SVGS shall provide a means of monitoring the difference between the intended flight path and the actual flight path. Information shall be provided to the flight crew to enable the monitoring of progress and safety of the approach operation. 32 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO This information shall be clear and unambiguous and indicate or alert the flight crew if the position of the aircraft with respect to the intended path becomes hazardous due to either: (a) the aircraft being out of position with respect to the defined flight path; (b) an error in the navigation guidance being followed; and/or (c) an error in the position of the SVGS scene. The alerts shall be displayed in the pilot’s primary FOV and active at least from 300 ft height above touchdown to the MAP. CS AWO.A.SVGS.125 Excessive deviation An alert shall be displayed to the pilot when the lateral and vertical deviation exceeds acceptable limits from the guidance being followed. Refer to CS AWO.B.SACATI.115, CS AWO.B.CATII.115, or CS AWO.B.CATIII.120. CS AWO.A.SVGS.126 System mode and status annunciation Any detected SVGS malfunction that can adversely affect the normal operation of the SVGS shall be visually annunciated to the flight crew. The SVGS display shall indicate when SVGS operations are not authorised. Alerts shall be displayed in the pilot’s primary FOV. CS AWO.A.SVGS.127 Determination of the missed approach point (MAPt) The SVGS shall provide a clear and unambiguous means to inform the pilot of the location of the MAPt on the approach path. CS AWO.A.SVGS.128 Altimetry requirements The SVGS display shall include a radio altitude display or another system providing height above terrain with equivalent performance, accuracy, integrity, availability, level of independence and dissimilarity. CS AWO.A.SVGS.129 Barometric altimeter/air data source The altitude source used for the SVGS display shall be consistent with that used for the on-board terrain awareness and alerting system on the aircraft and shall not provide contradictory indications of vertical terrain clearance. If barometric altimetry is used to determine the MAP, then it shall be temperature compensated. CS AWO.A.SVGS.130 Geometric altimetry/GPS data source If geometric/GPS altimetry is used, it shall display geometric altitude relative to mean sea level. SVGS SCENE CS AWO.A.SVGS.131 Depiction of terrain and runway of intended landing The SVGS shall provide a means of integrating the runway and terrain data, and terrain in the area surrounding the runway shall not be depicted floating above or below the runway. 33 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.A.SVGS.132 SVGS scene depiction positioning The SVGS scene depiction positioning sensor shall meet the required positioning performance criteria for the intended operation. SYSTEM SAFETY AND DESIGN ASSURANCE LEVEL (DAL) CS AWO.A.SVGS.133 System safety objectives The SVGS shall be shown to safely perform its intended function for each operation and phase of flight for which it will be used and comply with the requirements of CS 23.1309/CS 25.1309. CS AWO.A.SVGS.134 Overall system safety design criteria The SVGS shall be shown to meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended (CS-AWO SA CAT I, CS-AWO CAT II or CS-AWO CAT III). CS AWO.A.SVGS.135 Flight data recorder The modes of the SVGS operation shall be recorded by the flight data recorder. CS AWO.A.SVGS.136 SVGS documentation The demonstrated capability and any specific SVGS limitations shall be included within the relevant AFM. 34 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 5 COMBINED VISION SYSTEMS (CVS) GENERAL CS AWO.A.CVS.101 General (a) Combined vision systems (CVSs) combine a real-time imaging sensor and display with a synthetic image generated using a terrain and obstacle database utilising a precision navigation position. (b) A CVS shall comply with the provisions of the respective certification specifications for the images that are generated and in addition shall ensure that: (1) images are conformal with each other; (2) images are aligned within 5 mrad laterally and vertically at the boresight of the display; (3) images do not cause confusion to the flight crew; and (4) significant image discrepancies due to failure conditions are obvious to the flight crew. (c) If a HUD (or equivalent) is used to display the images, then it shall meet the performance and integrity requirements applicable to the type of operation intended. Refer to CS-AWO Subpart B Section 2 SA CAT I, Section 3 CAT II or Section 4 CAT III. 35 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SUBPART B — APPROACH AND LANDING SECTION 1 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR TYPE B OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS/ALTITUDE BELOW 250 FT DOWN TO 200 FT — CATEGORY 1 OPERATIONS (CAT I) GENERAL CS AWO.B.CATI.101 Applicability An aeroplane with a basic airworthiness approval for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations shall be eligible to perform xLS approaches down to a DH of 60 m (200 ft), providing that the necessary xLS receiver(s) and instruments and their installation have been approved in accordance with the relevant provisions in CS-23 and CS-25. 36 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 2 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 60 M (200 FT) AND DOWN TO 45 M (150 FT) — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 1 OPERATIONS (SA CAT I) GENERAL CS AWO.B.SACATI.101 Applicability This section is applicable to aeroplanes for which certification is sought to allow the performance of approaches with DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 45 m (150 ft) — Special Authorisation Category 1 (SA CAT I) operations, using a PA system as defined in ICAO Annex 10, which has outputs indicating the magnitude and sense of deviation from a preset azimuth and elevation angle giving equivalent operational characteristics to that of a conventional ILS. (See AMC AWO.B.SACATI.101) CS AWO.B.SACATI.102 Safety level The safety level for precision approaches with DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 45 m (150 ft) shall not be less than the average safety level achieved in precision approaches with DHs of 60 m (200 ft) and above. CS AWO.B.SACATI.103 Go-around rate (See AMC AWO.B.SACATI.103) The proportion of approaches terminating in a go-around below 150 m (500 ft) due to the approach system performance or reliability shall not be greater than 5 % taking into account go-arounds that are caused by on- board navigation receivers. CS AWO.B.SACATI.104 Flight crew workload The workload associated with the use of the approach system shall be considered in showing compliance with CS 25.1523, AMC 25.1523 and CS 25 Appendix D. CS AWO.B.SACATI.105 Control of flight path The approach system shall either: (a) provide information of sufficient quality to the flight crew to permit the manual control of the aeroplane along the flight path within the prescribed limits; or (b) automatically control the aeroplane along the flight path within the prescribed limits. CS AWO.B.SACATI.106 Control of speed Automatic throttle/thrust control shall be provided unless it is demonstrated in flight that speed can be controlled manually by the flight crew within acceptable limits and without excessive workload. When making an approach using an automatic throttle/thrust system, the approach speed may be selected manually or automatically. 37 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.SACATI.107 Manual control (a) In the absence of a failure, the approach down to the DH shall not require a change in the means of control (e.g. a change from the automatic to manual). (b) The use of a manual mode or the transition from an automatic mode to manual control shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength. CS AWO.B.SACATI.108 Oscillations and deviations The approach system shall not cause sustained nuisance oscillations or undue attitude changes or control activity as a result of configuration or power changes or any other disturbance to be expected in normal operation. CS AWO.B.SACATI.109 Decision height recognition DH recognition shall be by means of height measured by a radio altimeter or another system providing height above terrain with equivalent performance, accuracy, integrity, availability, level of independence and dissimilarity. CS AWO.B.SACATI.110 Go-around The go-around shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength to maintain the desired flight path. EQUIPMENT CS AWO.B.SACATI.111 Installed equipment (See AMC AWO.B.SACATI.111) The approach guidance system shall include: (a) two separate navigation receivers or demonstrated equivalent devices with a display of the selected deviation information at each pilot’s station; (b) a flight guidance system with display at each pilot’s station (or an alternative giving equivalent performance and safety); (c) a radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) with displays at each pilot’s station of: (1) height above terrain; and (2) the selected DH; (d) clear visual indication at each pilot’s station (e.g. an alert light) when the aircraft reaches the preselected DH appropriate to the approach; (e) automatic or flight director go-around system or any other attitude indicators that can achieve the required performance, accuracy and function; (f) audible warning of automatic pilot failure (for automatic approach) (refer to CS 25.1329); (g) an automatic throttle/thrust system where necessary (see CS AWO.B.CATII.106); (h) an appropriate alerting system; and 38 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (i) an alert of excess deviation from the required approach path, at each pilot’s station. CS AWO.B.SACATI.112 Minimum equipment The minimum equipment, which must be serviceable at the beginning of an approach, for compliance with the general requirements of this section and those relating to performance and failure conditions, shall be established and articulated in the AFM. PERFORMANCE CS AWO.B.SACATI.113 Flight path and speed control (a) Flight path and speed control shall comply with the provisions of CS AWO.B.CATII.113 down to 45 m (150 ft). (b) The demonstration of performance shall include performance at the lateral and vertical limits for the type of intended approach that certification is being sought. (c) The maximum allowable final approach course offset shall be established. CS AWO.B.SACATI.114 Decision height The DH shall not be less than 1.25 times the minimum permissible height for the use of the approach system. (See AMC 25.1329) CS AWO.B.SACATI.115 Excess-deviation alerts (a) Excess-deviation alerts shall operate when the deviation from the intended flight path exceeds a value from which a safe landing can be made from offset positions equivalent to the excess-deviation alert, without exceptional piloting skill and with the visual references available in these conditions. (AMC AWO.B.CATII.115(a)) (b) They shall be set to operate with a delay of not more than 1 second from the time that the values determined in point (a) above are exceeded. (c) They shall be active at least from 90 m (300 ft) to the DH, but the vertical path alert should not provide nuisance alert below 45 m (150 ft). CS AWO.B.SACATI.116 Go-around climb gradient The AFM shall contain either a weight, altitude, temperature (WAT) limit corresponding to a gross climb gradient of 2.5 %, with the critical engine failed and with the speed and configuration used for go-around, or the information necessary to construct a go-around gross flight path with an engine failure at the start of the go-around from the DH. CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND ALERTS CS AWO.B.SACATI.117 Mode selection and switching The system shall be designed so that no selection or changes of switch settings (other than system disengagement) need be made manually below a height of 150 m (500 ft) in the absence of a failure. 39 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.SACATI.118 Presentation of information to the flight crew (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.110) The display and presentation of information to the flight crew, including that required to monitor the flight path, shall be compatible with the procedures specified in the AFM or flight crew operating manual as appropriate. FAILURE CONDITIONS CS AWO.B.SACATI.119 General The effects of failures of the flight guidance system, including the on-board navigation receivers, shall be considered in accordance with CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329. CS AWO.B.SACATI.120 xLS navigation means (including signal-in-space) failure (See AMC AWO.B.SACAT I.120) The effects of failures and reliability of the navigation means (including signal in space) shall be investigated taking into account the SARPs of ICAO Annex 10 relevant to characterisation of failures (e.g. monitor thresholds, and transmitter changeover or shut down times). CS AWO.B.SACATI.121 Radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) The radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) installation shall be such that the probability of the provision of false height information leading to a hazardous situation is extremely remote. The warning shall be given by the removal or obscuration of displayed information, at least in the height band from 45 m (150 ft) downwards. CS AWO.B.SACATI.122 Excess-deviation alerts The excess-deviation alerts shall be such that the probability of failure to operate when required is no greater than one in one thousand approaches. AEROPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL CS AWO.B.SACATI.123 General (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.122) The AFM shall state: (a) limitations, including the minimum DH to which the aeroplane is certified; (b) the normal and abnormal procedures; (c) changes to the performance information, if necessary (e.g. approach speed, landing distance, go-around climb); (d) the minimum required equipment, including flight instruments; (e) the maximum head, tail and crosswind components in which the performance of the aeroplane has been demonstrated; (f) permitted configurations (e.g. flap setting, number of engines operating); 40 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (g) the type of xLS navigation means (facilities external to the aircraft), any deviations from standard and associated limitations (if any) which have been used as the basis for certification (AMC AWO.B.CATII.122); and (h) any restrictions on the ground installation that may differ from standard Category 1 installation. 41 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 3 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 60 M (200 FT) AND DOWN TO 30 M (100 FT) — CATEGORY 2 OPERATIONS (CAT II) GENERAL CS AWO.B.CATII.101 Applicability and terminology a) Subpart 2 This section of this airworthiness code certification specification is applicable to aeroplanes for which certification is sought to allow the performance of approaches with decision heights DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 30 m (100 ft) — Category 2 operations, using a precision approach system as defined in ICAO Annex 10 Chicago Convention (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.101(a)). i.e. an Instrument Landing System (ILS), or a Microwave Landing System (MLS), which has outputs indicating the magnitude and sense of deviation from a preset azimuth and elevation angle giving equivalent operational characteristics to that of a conventional ILS. (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.101(a) ). b) Terminology 1. The term ‘approach system’ used here refers only to the airborne system. It includes the equipment listed in CS–AWO 221 and all related sensors, instruments and power supplies. 2. ‘Decision height’ is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been visually assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety. Where it is used in this Subpart 2 section 3 it means the minimum decision height at which compliance with the requirements of this Subpart 2 section 3 have been demonstrated. 3. A go-around is the transition from an approach to a stabilised climb. 4. ‘Failure condition’ and terms describing the probabilities and effects of failure conditions are defined in AMC 25.1309. CS AWO.B.CATII.102 Safety level The safety level for precision approaches with decision height DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 30 m (100 ft) must shall not be less than the average safety level achieved in precision approaches with decision height DHs of 60 m (200 ft) and above. Hence, in showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of approaches, which are made with the decision height below 60 m (200 ft). CS AWO.B.CATII.103 Go-around rate (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.103) The proportion of approaches terminating in a go-around below 150 m (500 ft) due to the approach system performance or reliability shall may not be greater than 5 %. 42 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.CATII.104 Flight crew workload The workload associated with the use of the approach system shall be considered in showing compliance with CS 25.1523, AMC 25.1523 and CS 25 Appendix D. CS AWO.B.CATII.105 Control of flight path The approach system must shall either: (a) provide information of sufficient quality to the flight crew to permit the manual control of the aeroplane along the flight path within the prescribed limits; or (b) automatically control the aeroplane along the flight path within the prescribed limits. CS AWO.B.CATII.106 Control of speed Automatic throttle control must shall be provided unless it is demonstrated in flight that speed can be controlled manually by the flight crew within acceptable limits and without excessive workload. When making an approach using an automatic throttle system, the approach speed may be selected manually or automatically. CS AWO.B.CATII.107 Manual control (a) In the absence of a failure, the approach down to the decision height DH must shall not require a change in the means of control (e.g. a change from the automatic flight control system to flight director). to manual). (b) The use of a manual mode or the transition from an automatic mode to manual control must shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength. CS AWO.B.CATII.108 Oscillations and deviations The approach system must shall cause no sustained nuisance oscillations or undue attitude changes or control activity as a result of configuration or power changes or any other disturbance to be expected in normal operation. CS AWO.B.CATII.109 Decision height recognition Decision height DH recognition must shall be by means of height measured by a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level. CS AWO.B.CATII.110 Go around The go-around may shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength to maintain the desired flight path. 43 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO EQUIPMENT CS AWO.B.CATII.111 Installed equipment (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.111) The approach guidance system must shall include: (a) two xLS ILS and/or two MLS receivers with a display of the selected deviation information at each pilot’s station; (b) an automatic approach coupler or a flight director system with display at each pilot’s station (or an alternative giving equivalent performance and safety) (c) a radio altimeter with displays at each pilot’s station of: (1) radio altitude; and (2) the selected decision height DH (e.g. an index on an analogue scale or a digital indication); (d) clear visual indication at each pilot’s station (e.g. an alert light) when the aeroplane reaches the preselected decision height DH appropriate to the approach; (e) automatic or flight director go-around system or acceptable attitude indicators; (f) audible warning of automatic pilot failure (for automatic approach); (g) an automatic throttle system where necessary (see CS–AWO 206 when required by CS AWO.B.CATII.106); (h) an appropriate equipment failure warning system; and (i) an alert of excess deviation from the required approach path, at each pilot’s station (e.g. amber flashing light). CS AWO.B.CATII.112 Minimum equipment The minimum equipment, which must be serviceable at the beginning of an approach, for compliance with the general requirements of this Subpart 2 Section 3 and those relating to performance and failure conditions, must shall be established and articulated. For example, where justified by a system safety assessment, one ILS or one MLS receiver may be unserviceable. PERFORMANCE CS AWO.B.CATII.113 Flight path and speed control (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.113) The performance of the aeroplane and its systems must shall be demonstrated by flight tests supported where necessary by appropriate analysis and simulator tests. Flight testing must shall include a sufficient number of approaches conducted in conditions, which are reasonably representative of actual operating conditions and must shall cover the range of parameters affecting the behaviour of the aeroplane (e.g. wind speed, ILS and/or MLS ground facility characteristics, aeroplane configurations, weight, centre of gravity, etc.). 44 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.CATII.114 Decision height The decision height DH must shall not be less than 1.25 times the minimum permissible height for the use of the approach system. (See AMC 25.1329.) CS AWO.B.CATII.115 Excess-deviation alerts (a) Excess-deviation alerts must shall operate when the deviation from the xLS ILS or MLS glide path or localiser centre line exceeds a value from which a safe landing can be made from offset positions equivalent to the excess-deviation alert, without exceptional piloting skill and with the visual references available in these conditions. (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.115(a)) (b) They must shall be set to operate with a delay of not more than 1 second from the time that the values determined in CS–AWO 236(a) CS AWO.B.CATII.115(a) are exceeded. (c) They must shall be active at least from 90 m (300 ft) to the decision height DH, but the glide path alert should not be active below 30 m (100 ft). CS AWO.B.CATII.116 Go-around climb gradient The aeroplane flight manual AFM must shall contain either a WAT (Weight, Altitude, Temperature) limit corresponding to a gross climb gradient of 2.5%, with the critical engine failed and with the speed and configuration used for go-around, or the information necessary to construct a go-around gross flight path with an engine failure at the start of the go-around from the decision height DH. CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND WARNINGS ALERTS CS AWO.B.CATII.117 Mode selection and switching (a) A positive and continuous indication must be provided of the modes actually in operation. In addition, where engagement of a mode is automatic (e.g. localiser and glide path acquisition) clear indication must be given when the mode has been armed by a member of the flight crew. (b) Where reliance is placed on the pilot to detect non-engagement of go-around mode when it is selected, an appropriate indication or warning must be given. The system must shall be designed so that no selection or changes of switch settings (other than system disengagement) need be made manually below a height of 150 m (500 ft) in the absence of a failure. CS AWO.B.CATII.118 Presentation of information to the flight crew (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.110) a) The display and presentation of information to the flight crew, including that required to monitor the flight path, must shall be compatible with the procedures specified in the aeroplane flight manual AFM or flight crew operating manual as appropriate. All indications must be designed to prevent crew errors. b) Essential information and warnings necessary to the crew in the use of the approach system must be so located and designed as to permit both their accurate use in normal operation and the rapid recognition of malfunctions, in all expected lighting conditions. 45 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS.AWO.B.CATII.119 Audible warning of automatic pilot disengagement (a) Where the approach flight path is controlled automatically, an audible warning must be given following disengagement of the automatic pilot or loss of the automatic approach mode. This warning must comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 153. (b) For aeroplanes with automatic landing systems, the same warning must be used for automatic approach as is used for automatic landing. FAILURE CONDITIONS (See CS 25.1309 and its AMC) CS AWO.B.CATII.119 General The effects of failures of the approach system e.g. false radio altitude information, incorrect flight guidance commands must be considered in accordance with the requirements of CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329.The effects of failures of the flight guidance system, including the navigation means, shall be considered in accordance with the requirements of CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329. CS AWO.B.CATII.120 Automatic pilot The automatic pilot must comply with CS 25.1329 and its AMC. CS.AWO.B.CATII.121 Flight director system (a) The flight director system, or alternative form of information display, must be so designed that the probability of display of incorrect guidance commands to the pilot is Remote when credit is taken for an excess-deviation alert. (b) The deviation profile method of AMC 25.1329 must be used in assessing failures of flight director systems. (c) Wherever practicable a fault must cause the immediate removal from view of the guidance information but, where a warning is given instead, it must be such that the pilot cannot fail to observe it whilst using the information. CS AWO.B.CATII.120 Radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) The radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) installation shall must be such that the probability of the provision of false height information leading to a hazardous situation is extremely remote. The warning shall must be given by the removal or obscuration of displayed information, at least in the height band from 30 m (100 ft) downwards. CS AWO.B.CATII.121 Excess-deviation alerts The excess-deviation alerts must be such that tThe probability of an excess-deviation alert failingure to operate when required is not frequent shall be no greater than one in one thousand approaches. 46 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AEROPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL CS AWO.B.CATII.122 General The aeroplane flight manual AFM must shall state: (a) limitations, including the minimum decision height DH to which the aeroplane is certified certificated; (b) the normal and abnormal procedures; (c) changes to the performance information, if necessary (e.g. approach speed, landing distance, go-around climb); and (d) the minimum required equipment, including flight instruments; (e) the maximum head, tail and crosswind components in which the performance of the aeroplane has been demonstrated;. (f) the permitted configurations (e.g. flap setting, number of engines operating); and (g) the type of xLS navigation means (facilities external to the aircraft) and associated limitations (if any) which have been used as the basis for certification (see AMC AWO.B.CATII.122). 47 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 4 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 30 M (100 FT) OR NO DECISION HEIGHT — CATEGORY 3 OPERATIONS (CAT III) GENERAL CS AWO.B.CATIII.101 Applicability and terminology (a) Subpart 3 This section of this airworthiness code is applicable to aeroplanes for which certification is sought to allow the performance of approaches with decision height DHs below 30 m (100 ft) or with no DH — Category 3 operations, using a precision approach system as defined in ICAO Annex 10 Chicago Convention., i.e. an Instrument Landing System (ILS), or a Microwave Landing System (MLS) which has outputs indicating the magnitude and sense of deviation from a preset azimuth and elevation angle giving equivalent operational characteristics to that of a conventional ILS. The criteria are divided, where necessary, into those applicable to the following types of operation: (1) Decision height DHs below 30 m (100 ft) but not less than 15 m (50 ft); (2) Decision height DHs below 15 m (50 ft); and (3) No decision height DH. (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.101(a)) (b) Terminology (1) The term ‘landing system’ used here refers only to the airborne system. It includes the equipment listed in JAR–AWO 321 and also all related sensors, instruments and power supplies. (2) Automatic Landing System: The airborne equipment which provides automatic control of the aeroplane during the approach and landing. (3) Fail-passive Automatic Landing System: An automatic landing system is fail -passive if, in the event of a failure, there is no significant out-of-trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude but the landing is not completed automatically. (4) For a fail-passive automatic landing system the pilot assumes control of the aircraft after a failure. The following are typical arrangements: (i) A monitored automatic pilot in which automatic monitors will provide the necessary failure detection and protection. (ii) Two automatic pilots with automatic comparison to provide the necessary failure detection and protection. Super Fail-passive Automatic Landing System: An automatic landing system which meets the requirements of paragraph (3) above but has additional features such as automatic align, roll-out and go-around modes which, along with other aircraft 48 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO characteristics defined under CS-AWO 321 (b)(2), permit operations in lower RVRs than less sophisticated fail passive landing systems. (5) Fail-operational Automatic Landing System: An automatic landing system is fail-operational if, in the event of a failure, the approach, flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic system. In the event of a failure, the automatic landing system will operate as a fail-passive system. The following are typical arrangements: (i) Two monitored automatic pilots, one remaining operative after a failure. (ii) Three automatic pilots, two remaining operative (to permit comparison and provide necessary failure detection and protection) after a failure. (6) Fail-operational Hybrid Landing System: A system which consists of a primary fail -passive automatic landing system and a secondary independent guidance system enabling the pilot to complete a landing manually after failure of the primary system. A typical secondary independent guidance system consists of a monitored head -up display providing guidance which normally takes the form of command information, but it may alternatively be situation (or deviation) information. (7) The alert height is a specified radio height, based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail-operational landing system. In operational use, if a failure occurred above the alert height in one of the required redundant operational systems in the aeroplane (including, where appropriate, ground roll guidance and the reversionary mode in a hybrid system), the approach would be discontinued and a go-around executed unless reversion to a higher decision height is possible. If a failure in one of the required redundant operational systems occurred below the alert height, it would be ignored and the approach continued. (8) Decision height is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go -around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety. (9) Where it is used in this document it means the minimum decision height determined in the airworthiness certification. (10) A go-around is the transition from an approach to a stabilised climb CS AWO.B.CATIII.102 Safety level The safety level for precision approaches with decision heights DHs below 30 m (100 ft) or no decision height DH may not be less than the average safety level achieved in precision approaches with decision heights DHs of 60 m (200 ft) and above. Hence, in showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of approaches, which are made with the decision height below 30 m (100 ft). 49 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.CATIII.103 Go-around rate The go-around rate below 150 m (500 ft) attributable to the landing system performance or reliability may shall not be greater than 5 %. Additionally, for decision height DHs below 15 m (50 ft) and no decision height DH, the probability of go-around below the alert height attributable to the landing system performance and reliability must shall be such that compliance with CS–AWO 301 CS AWO.B.CATIII.102 is achieved. (See CS–AWO 365 CS AWO.B.CATIII.123 (a).) CS AWO.B.CATIII.104 Minimum flight crew The workload associated with use of the minimum decision height DH shall must be considered in showing compliance with CS 25.1523, AMC 25.1523, and CS 25 Appendix D. CS AWO.B.CATIII.105 Control of flight path and ground roll The landing system shall must control the aeroplane within the prescribed limits along the flight path to touchdown (see CS–AWO 331 CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 (a) and (b)) and along the runway (see CS–AWO 338 CS AWO.B.CATIII.117) when appropriate, and specifically: (a) For fail-passive automatic landings, Tthe primary mode of controlling the aeroplane must shall be automatic until the main wheels touch the ground (except as in CS–AWO 321 CS AWO.B.CATIII.113(b)(1)), and for operation with no decision height DH, control must shall be automatic until the nose wheels touch down. (b) For decision height DHs below 15 m (50 ft), a fail-operational landing system (automatic or hybrid) must shall be provided which, when appropriate, includes provision for control of the aeroplane along the runway during the ground roll-down to a safe speed for taxiing. (c) If the landing roll-out is to be accomplished automatically using rudder control, the rudder axis should shall be engaged during the approach phase to ensure that it is functioning correctly prior to touchdown. (d) For HUDLSs, the system shall provide sufficient guidance information to enable a pilot that is competent to conduct the intended operation to intercept the xLS approach path, if that capability is provided, to track it, to land the aeroplane within the prescribed limits or to make a go-around without reference to other cockpit displays. It shall not require exceptional piloting skill to achieve the required performance. (See CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 (a) and (b)). (e) If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the aeroplane to intercept and establish the xLS approach path, the point during the approach at which the transition from automatic to manual flight takes place shall be identified and taken into account in the performance demonstration (see CS AWO.B.CATIII.115). CS AWO.B.CATIII.106 Control of speed Automatic throttle control must shall be provided unless: (a) the decision height DH is 15 m (50 ft) or greater; and (b) it is demonstrated in flight that speed can be controlled manually by the flight crew within acceptable limits and without excessive workload. (See CS–AWO 123 CS AWO.A.ALS.105 and AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. 50 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS AWO.B.CATIII.107 Manual control The transition from an automatic mode to manual mode or the use of a manual mode may shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength. CS AWO.B.CATIII.108 Oscillations and deviations The landing system may shall not cause no sustained nuisance oscillations or undue attitude changes or control activity as a result of configuration or power changes or any other disturbance to be expected in normal operation. CS AWO.B.CATIII.109 Alert height (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.109) For a fail-operational system with a decision height DH below 15 m (50 ft) or with no decision height DH, an alert height must shall be established in accordance with CS–AWO 365 CS AWO.B.CATIII.123 (a) and must shall be at least 30 m (100 ft). CS AWO.B.CATIII.110 Decision height When the decision height DH is during the landing flare, it must shall be below the height at which the major attitude changes associated with this manoeuvre take place. CS AWO.B.CATIII.111 Decision height recognition Decision height DH recognition must shall be by means of height measured by a radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level). Arrival at the DH shall be positively annunciated to both pilots. CS AWO.B.CATIII.112 Go-around (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.112) (a) The aircraft must shall be capable of safely executing a go-around from any point on the approach to touchdown in all configurations to be certified certificated. The manoeuvre may shall not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength and must shall ensure that the aeroplane remains within the obstacle limitation surface for a Category II or III precision approach runway as specified in ICAO Annex 14 Chicago Convention. (b) For decision height DHs below 15 m (50 ft), automatic go-around must shall be provided. (c) When automatic go-around is provided, it must shall be available down to touchdown. (d) When automatic go-around is engaged, the subsequent ground contact should shall not cause its disengagement. EQUIPMENT CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 Installed equipment (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113) The following items of equipment must shall be installed for certification to the decision height DHs specified unless it is shown that the intended level of safety is achieved with alternative equipment, or the deletion of some items: 51 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (a) All decision height DHs below 30 m (100 ft) or no decision height DH: (1) Two xLS ILS and/or two MLS receivers. Each pilot’s station must shall display: (i) deviation information from the selected xLS ILS/MLS navigation source; and (ii) deviation information from a source independent of the other pilot’s display. (2) One radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) with display at each pilot’s station. (3) Clear visual indication at each pilot’s station (e.g. an alert light) when the aeroplane reaches the preselected decision height DH appropriate to the approach. (4) An appropriate equipment failure warning system. (5) An alert of excess deviation from the required approach path at each pilot’s station (e.g. amber flashing light). (6) In the case of aeroplanes having a minimum flight crew of two pilots, an automatic voice system, which calls when the aeroplane is approaching the decision height DH (or when approaching the ground during a no decision height DH approach) and when it reaches the decision height DH. (7) An anti-skid braking system unless it can be shown that the aeroplane can land safely without such a system (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113). (8) A means for the pilot to determine that the aeroplane can be stopped within the available runway length (see AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113). The number of xLS ILS and/or MLS receivers and radio altimeters (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) may need to be increased in order to provide fail-operational capability where required. (b) Decision height DH of 15 m (50 ft) or greater (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113(b)(2)): Compliance with any one of the following paragraphs (1) or, (2) or (3) is acceptable. The RVR minima authorised will be dependent on the equipment installed in compliance with a particular paragraph, and in accordance with the operational rules. 1) (i) Fail-passive automatic approach system without automatic landing, provided that: (A) It is demonstrated that manual landings can be made without excessive workload in the visibility conditions; and (B) The aeroplane has a low approach speed, is easily manoeuvrable and the height of the pilot's eyes above the wheels is small; (ii) Automatic throttle control, unless it can be shown that speed control does not add excessively to the crew workload; (iii) Automatic or flight director go-around or suitable attitude indicators. or (12) 52 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (i) Fail-passive automatic landing system or HUDLS head-up display guidance landing system; (ii) Automatic throttle control, unless it can be shown that speed control does not add excessively to the flight crew workload. (iii) Automatic or flight director go-around or suitable attitude indicators. or (23) (i) Super Ffail-passive automatic landing system, provided that: (A) it is demonstrated that a manual go-around can be made without excessive flight crew workload following loss of automatic landing capability; and (B) the aeroplane has a low approach speed, is easily manoeuvrable and the height of the pilot's eyes above the wheels is small; (ii) Automatic throttle control, unless it can be shown that speed control does not add excessively to the flight crew workload; (iii) Fail-passive automatic go-around; (iv) Automatic ground roll control or head up ground roll guidance, for control or guidance, along the runway during the ground roll down to a safe speed for taxiing. (c) Decision height DH below 15 m (50 ft): (1) Fail-operational automatic landing system or fail-operational hybrid landing system; (2) Fail-passive automatic go-around; (3) Automatic throttle control; and (4) Automatic ground roll control or head-up ground roll guidance (see CS–AWO 304 CS AWO.B.CATIII.105). (d) No decision height DH: (1) Fail-operational automatic landing system; (2) Fail-passive automatic go-around; (3) Automatic throttle control; and (4) Fail-operational or fail-passive automatic ground roll control or head-up ground roll guidance (see CS–AWO 304 CS AWO.B.CATIII.105). and (5) Anti-skid braking system. CS AWO.B.CATIII.114 Minimum equipment The minimum equipment, which must be serviceable at the beginning of an approach for compliance with the general criteria of this section Subpart 3 and those relating to performance and failure conditions, must shall be established and articulated. 53 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO PERFORMANCE CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 Performance demonstration (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115) (a) Flight path and speed control must shall comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 231 CS AWO.B.CATII.113 and 243 CS AWO.B.SACATII.116. (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.113) (b) Touchdown performance of automatic landing systems must shall comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106, 132 CS AWO.A.ALS.107, 142 and CS AWO.A.ALS.109. For operation with no decision height DH, compliance with the lateral touchdown performance criteria must shall be demonstrated at main wheel and nose wheel touchdown. (c) The automatic throttle system must shall comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 123 CS AWO.A.ALS.105. (d) Compliance with CS–AWO 337 CS AWO.B.CATIII.116 and 338 CS AWO.B.CATIII.117 (a) may shall be demonstrated primarily by flight test. Compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this provision and CS–AWO 338 CS AWO.B.CATIII.117 (b) must shall be demonstrated by analysis and simulator tests supported by flight tests. Flight testing and any associated analysis must shall include a sufficient number of approaches and landings conducted in conditions which are reason ably representative of actual operating conditions and must shall cover the range of parameters affecting the behaviour of the aeroplane (e.g. wind conditions, runway and xLS ILS or MLS ground facility characteristics, aeroplane configurations, weight, and centre of gravity). (e) In showing compliance with points (a) and (b), when a HUDLS is used for primary guidance, the following additional variables shall be included in the performance demonstration (see AMC AWO.A.HUD.107): (1) ambient lighting conditions and approach and runway lighting; (2) variations of the reported RVR; and (3) individual flight crew performance. CS AWO.B.CATIII.116 Head-up display fail-operational hybrid landing system Where a head-up display HUDLS is fitted as part of a hybrid system, its performance need not meet the same criteria as the primary system provided that it: (a) it meets the overall performance requirements, taking into account the probability that it will be used; and (b) it is sufficiently compatible with the primary system so as to retain pilot confidence . CS AWO.B.CATIII.117 Automatic gGround roll control (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115) (a) When automatic ground roll control or head-up ground roll guidance is being used, the probability must be less than 5 % that the point on the aeroplane centre line between the main wheels will deviate more than 8.2 m (27 ft) from the runway centre line on any one landing shall be less than 5 %. 54 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (b) Additionally, when the operation is predicated on the provision of fail-operational ground roll control, the probability must be less than 10 -6 that the outboard landing gear will deviate to a point more than 21.3 m (70 ft) from the runway centre line while the speed is greater than 74 km/h (40 kt) shall be less than 10 -6 . CS AWO.B.CATIII.118 Landing distance If there is any feature of the system or the associated procedures which would result in an increase to the landing distance required, the appropriate increment must shall be established and scheduled in the aeroplane flight manual AFM. CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND WARNINGS ALERTS CS AWO.B.CATIII.119 Mode selection and switching (a) A positive and continuous indication must be provided of the modes actually in operation. In addition, where engagement of a mode is automatic (e.g. localiser and glide path acquisition), clear indication must be given when the mode has been armed by a member of the flight crew. (b) Where reliance is placed on the pilot to detect non-engagement of go-around mode when it is selected, an appropriate indication or warning must be given. The system must shall be designed so that no manual selections or changes of switch settings need be made below a height of 150 m (500 ft) in normal operation, other than system disengagement or selection of automatic go-around as necessary. CS AWO.B.CATIII.120 Indications and warnings alerts (See AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 and AMC AWO.A.ALS.110) (a) The display of information to the flight crew, including that required to monitor the approach, flare and ground roll, must shall be compatible with the procedures specified in the aeroplane flight manual AFM or flight crew operating manual as appropriate and with normal flight crew tasks. All indications must be designed to minimise crew errors. b) Essential information and warnings necessary to the crew in the use of the landing system must be so located and designed as to permit both their accurate use in normal operation and the rapid recognition of malfunctions in all expected lighting conditions. (b) Any malfunction of the landing system or of the xLS ILS or MLS ground facility which requires a missed approach must shall be annunciate positively and unambiguously annunciated to each pilot, so that pilot action may be initiated promptly without further interpretation. (See AMC 25.1322). (c) Notwithstanding paragraphs points (a), (b) and (b c) of this paragraph provision, for fail- operational systems, failure warnings may be inhibited below alert height if: (1) the failure does not preclude continuation of an automatic landing; and (2) the failure requires no specific action of the flight crew; and (3) information on the occurrence of any failure warnings so inhibited is subsequently available to flight and maintenance crews. 55 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (d) Where the capability of the aeroplane is dependent on equipment serviceability and modes selected, means must shall be provided whereby the pilot can readily determine the capability at alert height (e.g. fail-operational status, ground roll availability). FAILURE CONDITIONS CS AWO.B.CATIII.121 General (See CS 25.1309 and its AMC, AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 and AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121) (a) The automatic landing system must comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 161 and 172. (a) The effects of failures of the flight guidance system including the navigation means shall be considered in accordance with the requirements of CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329. (b) The radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level), and excess-deviation alerts must shall comply with the provisions of CS–AWO 268 CS AWO.B.CATII.120 and 269 CS AWO.B.CATII.121 respectively. CS AWO.B.CATIII.122 Fail-passive automatic landing system (including super fail-passive system) (See AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.122(a) and AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.122(a)) (a) For a fail-passive automatic landing system, failure conditions resulting in the loss of automatic landing control capability below the decision height DH may shall not be Frequent. (See AMC No. 1 and No. 2 to AWO 364(a) and AMC No.2 to CS-AWO 361) occur more frequently than once every thousand approaches. (b) For a fail-passive automatic landing system, any failure condition, which is not extremely remote, must shall be automatically detected and neutralised before it has a significant effect on the trim, flight path or attitude. (See AMCs No.1 and 2 to CS-AWO 361) CS AWO.B.CATIII.123 Fail-operational landing system (automatic or hybrid) (See AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121) (a) For a fail-operational landing system, the probability of total loss of the landing system below the alert height must shall be extremely emote. Demonstration of compliance must shall be by means of a suitable analysis programme supported, where necessary, by a simulation and flight test programme (see AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.122(a) and AWO.B.CATIII.123(a)). Special precautions must shall be taken to ensure that redundant subsystems are not vulnerable to simultaneous disengagement or failure warning. (See AMC AWO 161(b) paragraph 1.3(c).) (b) A fail-operational landing system must shall operate as a fail-passive system following a first failure, which leads to loss of fail-operational capability. (See AMC No.1 to CS-AWO 361) (c) A fail-operational automatic throttle system must shall be provided unless the effect of loss of automatic throttle control is minor. (See AMC No.1 to CS-AWO 361) CS AWO.B.CATIII.124 Head-up display (or other form of guidance display) fail-operational hybrid landing system (See AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 and AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121) Where a head-up display or other form of guidance display HUDLS is fitted for use in the event of automatic landing system failure, the combination of the two systems must shall comply with CS–AWO 56 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 161 CS AWO.A.ALS.111 and 172 CS AWO.A.ALS.112. In addition, the failure modes of the display may shall not be such as might lead a pilot to disengage a satisfactorily functioning autopilot and obey the malfunctioning display. CS AWO.B.CATIII.125 Nose-wheel steering (See AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 and AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121) In showing that the nose-wheel steering system complies with CS 25.745(c), account must shall be taken of the effect of the visibility conditions on the ability of the pilot to detect steering faults and to take over control. CS AWO.B.CATIII.126 Automatic go-around Total failure (shutdown) of the xLS ILS or MLS ground facility may shall not result in loss of automatic go- around capability. AEROPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL CS AWO.B.CATIII.127 General (See AMC AWO.B.CATIII.127(a)) The aeroplane flight manual AFM must shall state: (a) limitations, including the minimum crew, alert height, the DHs for which the aeroplane is certified certificated, etc. (see AMC AWO.B.CATIII.127(a)); (b) the permitted configurations (e.g. flap setting, number of engines operating); (c) the normal and abnormal procedures (see AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121); (d) changes to the performance information, if necessary (e.g. the approach speed, landing distance required, go-around climb); and (e) the minimum required equipment including flight instrumentation (see CS–AWO 321 CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 and 322 CS AWO.B.CATIII.114); (f) the height losses for go-around initiation heights below 30 m (100 ft), determined in accordance with AMC AWO.B.CATIII.112 paragraph 2a.; and (g) the type of xLS navigation means (facilities external to the aircraft) and associated limitations (if any) which have been used as the basis for certification (see AMC AWO.B.CATIII.127(g)). 57 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CERTIFICATION DOCUMENTATION CS AWO.B.CATIII.128 Documentation required Documentation providing the following information is required for certification: (a) A specification of the aeroplane and the airborne equipment. (b) Evidence that the equipment and its installation comply with the applicable standards . (c) A failure analysis and an assessment of system safety (see AMC 25.1309) . (d) A performance analysis demonstrating compliance with the performance criteria of CS-AWO 331 CS AWO.B.CATIII.115, 337 CS AWO.B.CATIII.116 and 338 CS AWO.B.CATIII.117 (see CS-AWO 131 CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (b)). (e) Flight test results including validation of any simulation. (f) Limitations on the use of the system and crew procedures to be incorporated in the aeroplane flight manual AFM. (g) Evidence that the crew workload complies with CS 25.1523. and (h) Inspection and maintenance procedures shown to be necessary by the SSA (see CS 25.1529) 58 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SECTION 5 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONAL CREDITS FOR VISUAL SEGMENT IN REDUCED RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE (RRVR) CS AWO.B.RRVR.101 Applicability An aeroplane shall be considered to be eligible to apply for certification for operational credit for the visual segment of approach and landing in reduced runway visual range ( RRVR) conditions if the aeroplane has demonstrated compliance with Subpart A Section 3 (EFVS) of this certification specification and by inference the applicable provisions of Subpart A Section 2 (HUD). 59 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SUBPART C — TAKE-OFF SECTION 1 DIRECTIONAL GUIDANCE FOR TAKE-OFF IN LOW VISIBILITY AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS IN LOW VISIBILITY (TOO) CS AWO.C.TOO.101 Applicability and terminology a) This Ssubpart 4 C of this airworthiness code certification specification is applicable to aeroplanes for which certification is sought to allow the performance of take-off in lower visibilities than those which are sufficient to ensure that the pilot will at all times have sufficient visibility to complete or abandon the take-off safely. It is only concerned with directional guidance during the ground-borne portion of the take-off (i.e. from start to main wheel lift-off, or standstill in the event of abandoned take-off). (See AMC AWO.C.TOO.101) b) Take-off Guidance System: A take-off guidance system provides directional guidance information to the pilot during the take-off or abandoned take-off. It includes all the airborne sensors, computers, controllers and indicators necessary for the display of such guidance. Guidance normally takes the form of command information, but it may alternatively be situation (or deviation) information. CS AWO.C.TOO.102 Safety level The safety level in take-off in low visibility must shall not be less than the average safety level achieved in take-off in good visibility. Hence, in showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of tak e-offs that are made in low visibility. CS AWO.C.TOO.103 Guidance information The take-off guidance system must shall provide guidance information which will, in the event of loss of visibility during the take-off, enable the pilot to control the aeroplane to the runway centre line during the take-off or abandoned take-off using the normal steering controls. Its use must shall not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness. CS AWO.C.TOO.104 Guidance display (a) The take-off guidance information must shall be provided in such a form that it is immediately usable by the pilot who is making the take-off. Its use must shall not require the pilot him to refer to his the instrument panel for this information, nor must shall it require the other pilot to take control of the aeroplane. Reversion to the system must shall be easy and natural. (b) The information display must shall be usable in all appropriate conditions of ambient light, runway lighting and visibility. (c) The system must shall be designed to minimise crew errors. (See AWO.C.TOO.104(c)). 60 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO EQUIPMENT CS AWO.C.TOO.105 Minimum equipment The minimum equipment, which must shall be serviceable at the start of the take-off for compliance with the general criteria of this sSubpart 4 and those relating to performance and failure conditions, must shall be established and articulated. PERFORMANCE CS AWO.C.TOO.106 Performance demonstration (See AMC AWO.C.TOO.106 and Figure 1) (a) It must shall be demonstrated that the performance of the take-off guidance system is such that the aeroplane will not deviate significantly from the runway centre line during take-off while the system is being used within the limitations established for it. Compliance may be demonstrated by flight test, or by a combination of flight test and simulation. Flight testing must shall cover those factors affecting the behaviour of the aeroplane, e.g. wind conditions, ILS and/or MLS ground facility characteristics, aeroplane configurations, weight, and centre of gravity . (b) In the event that the aeroplane is displaced from the runway centre line at any point during the take-off or abandoned take-off, the system must shall provide such guidance as would enable the pilot to control the aeroplane smoothly back to the runway centre line without any sustained nuisance oscillation. (c) In the event of an engine failure, if the pilot follows the guidance information and disregards external visual reference, the lateral deviation of the aeroplane must shall remain safely within the confines of the runway. CS AWO.C.TOO.107 Limitations and procedures Limitations on the use of the system and appropriate procedures must shall be established, where these are necessary for compliance with the criteria of CS–AWO 431 CS AWO.C.TOO.106. Account should be taken of the method by which the system defines the runway centre line and associated errors or delays. CONTROLS, INDICATORS AND WARNINGS ALERTS CS AWO.C.TOO.108 Warnings Alerts (See AMC AWO.C.TOO.108) (a) System warnings alerts must shall be so designed and located as to ensure rapid recognition of failures. (b) The information display and system warnings alerts must shall not distract the pilot making the take-off or significantly degrade forward view. 61 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO FAILURE CONDITIONS (See AMC 25.1309) CS AWO.C.TOO.109 Guidance system (a) The take-off guidance system must shall be such that the display of incorrect guidance information to the pilot during the take-off run is assessed as remote. In demonstrating compliance with this criterion, account need only be taken of incorrect guidance of such magnitude that it would lead to the aeroplane deviating from the runway, if it is followed. (b) Probability of loss of take-off guidance during the take-off must shall be assessed as remote. CS AWO.C.TOO.110 Aeroplane failures Any single failure of the aeroplane which disturbs the take-off path (e.g. engine failure) must shall not cause loss of guidance information or give incorrect guidance information. AEROPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL CS AWO.C.TOO.111 General (See AMC AWO.C.TOO.111) In relation to the approval of the aeroplane for take-off in reduced visibility, the aeroplane flight manual AFM must shall state: (a) the limitations; (b) the normal and abnormal procedures, including where appropriate, the most critical conditions demonstrated; and (c) the minimum required equipment. 62 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO CS-AWO BOOK 2 SUBPART A — GENERAL AMC TO SECTION 1 AUTOMATIC LANDING SYSTEMS (ALS) AMC AWO.A.ALS.101(a) Applicability and terminology MLS and GLS are is assumed to have equivalent operational characteristics to those of a conventional ILS. The terms ‘localiser’ and ‘glide path’ have been retained for use with either ILS, or MLS or GLS. The term ‘automatic landing system’ refers to the airborne equipment, which provides automatic control of the aeroplane during the approach and landing. It includes all of the sensors, computers, actuators and power supplies necessary to control the aeroplane to touchdown. It also includes provisions to control the aeroplane along the runway during the landing roll-out. In addition, it includes the indications and control necessary for its management and supervision by the pilot. AMC AWO.A.ALS.105(b)(1) Automatic throttle control The approach speed may be selected manually or automatically. AMC AWO.A.ALS.106 Performance demonstration 1 General 1.1 The analysis referred to in CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (b)(1) should: a. establish compliance with the performance limits specified in CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c); NOTE: When systems employing automatic control ground roll are provided, additional analysis may be required. b. determine any limitations on the use of the system for compliance with performance limits of CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c) (see CS AWO.A.ALS.114); and c. provide, if appropriate, information necessary for the calculation of the required landing distance (see CS AWO.A.ALS.109). 1.2 Account should be taken of the variation of wind speed, turbulence, xLS ILS and/or MLS beam characteristics, system performance variation and flight crew procedures. System performance variations due to equipment tolerances (e.g. datum shifts and gain changes) should be investigated taking into account setting-up procedures and monitoring practices. Acceptable models of wind, turbulence and wind shear are given in paragraph 3. ILS and MLS xLS signal-in-space characteristics are given in paragraph 4. 1.3 In accordance with CS AWO.A.ALS.107, the effects of aerodrome conditions (e.g. elevation, ambient temperature, runway slope and ground profile under the approach path) are to be investigated and, if necessary, appropriate limitations derived for inclusion in the aeroplane flight manual AFM. Guidance is given in paragraph 5. 63 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 1.4 Acceptable values for the probabilities of exceedance of the limits of CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c) are as follows. These values may be varied where the characteristics of a particular aeroplane justify such variation. Average Limit a. Longitudinal touchdown earlier than a point on the -6 10 10-5 runway 60 m (200 ft) from the threshold. b. -6 (i). Longitudinal touchdown beyond the end of the TDZ 10 Not applicable lighting, 823 m (2 700 ft) from the treshold. (ii). Longitudinal touchdown beyond the end of the TDZ Not applicable 10-5 lighting, 914 m (3 000 ft) from the threshold. c. Lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear greater than 21 m (70 ft) from the runway centre line, 10-6 10-5 assuming a 45 m (150 ft) runway. d. Sink rate for sStructural limit load (See paragraph -5 10-6 10 1.4.1). e. Bank angle such that wing tip, engine nacelle or 10-8-7 10-7-6 propeller touches the ground before wheels. -6 -5 f. Lateral velocity or slip angle for structural limit load. 10 10 NOTE: The ‘Average’ column is the probability of occurrence if all variables vary according to their probability distributions. The ‘Limit’ column is the probability of occurrence if one variable is held at its most adverse value, while the other variables vary according to their probability distributions. NOTE 1: The ‘Average’ column is the acceptable probability of exceedance where all the variables vary according to their probability distributions. The ‘Limit’ column is the acceptable probability of exceedance if one variable is held at its most adverse value, while the other variables vary according to their probability distributions. In the case where a wind variable is held at its most adverse value, the acceptable probability of exceedance should be taken as the average column factored by the cumulative probability of reported wind as defined in Figure 15 of Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A ‘MODELS’. NOTE 2: For HUDLSs, an alternative means of compliance for CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c) may be used. One acceptable means of compliance is given in paragraph 1.4.2 of this AMC. 1.4.1 An acceptable means of establishing that the structural limit load is not exceeded is to show separately and independently that: a. the sink rate at touchdown does not exceed the limit rate of descent used for certification under CS 25 Subpart C, or 10 ft per second, whichever is the greater; and b. the lateral side load does not exceed the limit value determined for the lateral drift landing condition defined in CS 25.479(d)(2). 64 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 1.4.2 For HUDLSs, where total wind strength has been shown to be the most critical parameter affecting performance, an alternative means of compliance for CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (c) may be used. An acceptable method, based on the demonstration of 80 approaches performed in a simulator at limiting wind conditions using a representative wind model, covering eight cardinal points has been shown to provide adequate demonstration of system robustness, provided that the resulting go-around rate does not exceed 20 %. 1.5 Acceptance limits for automatic throttle speed holding are ±9.3 km/h (±5 kt) (two standard deviations) of programmed airspeed (disregarding rapid airspeed fluctuations associated with turbulence) under all intended flight conditions. 2 Flight demonstrations 2.1 A programme of landings should be completed and be sufficient to demonstrate the validity of the simulation and support the conclusions of the analysis. NOTE: Typically, programmes of 100 landings have been used. Data taken during demonstration flight tests should be used to validate the simulation(s). The objective of a flight test programme should be to demonstrate performance of the system to 100 % of the steady state wind limit values that are used in the simulation statistical performance analysis. Nevertheless, if during flight test campaign, it is not possible to flight test 100 % of the steady state wind limit, the applicant may request acceptance that the simulation is validated, if at least four landings are accomplished during flight test at no less than 80 % of the intended limit steady state wind value (i.e. mean wind), and if it has been shown that the landing system is sufficiently robust near the desired AFM wind limits for which application is made. The robustness of autoland will be assessed as sufficient if: — analysis of the automatic landing system behaviour encountered during flight tests for the four landings selected by the applicant shows satisfactory margins in authority and performance; — analysis of the matching between flight test and simulation for the four landings selected by applicant shows satisfactory correlation. If the four landings flight tested show satisfactory margins and performances, the matching requested may be limited to a subset of the four landings selected; — aircraft loading conditions flown during the four landings (weight and centre of gravity) are sufficiently close to the sizing conditions, that would have an influence on wind demonstration limits (sizing conditions as defined in the certification flight test programme); and — analysis of the automatic landing system behaviour during simulation with the steady state wind value (i.e. mean wind) at the wind limit requested, shows remaining margins for performance. The steady state wind value can be determined by either of the following: a. mean wind value + half gust, as reported by air traffic control (ATC); or 65 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO b. mean wind recorded by the flight test instrumentation, i.e. average of the wind recorded for 20 sec around the touchdown point and recomputed at 33 ft, with the following additional considerations:  Additional credit can be taken for the max average wind demonstrated during flight test if the gust encountered during flight test shows a higher intensity than the one tested during simulation (meaning the wind increase to the average wind is higher during flight test compared to the simulation).  In this case, to give a revised max average wind demonstrated during flight test, the mean wind recorded by the flight test instrumentation may be increased by the difference between flight tested and simulation tested gust intensity. 2.2 Individual landings should be carried out to demonstrate that errors, which can reasonably be expected to occur, are not hazardous. For example: — landing with approach speed 9.3 km/h (5 kt) below the specified speed; and — landing with approach speed 18.5 km/h (10 kt) above the specified speed. 3 Wind model for approach simulation In carrying out the analysis described in paragraph 1, one of the wind, turbulence and wind shear following models contained in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A of wind, turbulence and wind shear may be used: 3.1 Wind Model Number 1 3.1.1 Mean Wind. It may be assumed that the cumulative probability of reported mean wind speed at landing, and the crosswind component of that wind are as shown in Figure 1. Normally, the mean wind which is reported to the pilot, is measured at a height, which may be between 6 m (20 ft) and 10 m (33 ft) above the runway. The models of wind shear and turbulence given in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 assume this reference height is used. 3.1.2 Wind Shear 3.1.2.1 Normal Wind Shear. Wind shear should be included in each simulated approach and landing, unless its effect can be accounted for separately. The magnitude of the shear should be defined by the expression: u = 0·43 U log10 (z) + 0·57 U ············· (1) where u is the mean wind speed at height z metres (z ≥ 1m) and U is the mean wind speed at 10 m (33 ft). 3.1.2.2 Abnormal Wind Shear. The effect of wind shears exceeding those of paragraph 3.1.2.1 should be investigated using known severe wind shear data. 3.1.3 Turbulence 3.1.3.1 Horizontal Component of Turbulence. It may be assumed that the longitudinal component (in the direction of mean wind) and lateral component of turbulence may each be represented by a Gaussian process having a spectrum of the form: 66 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 2 2 L Φ (Ω) = ··········· (2)  1   2 L2 where Φ (er = a spectral density [[metres/sec] 2 per [radian/metre]]. σ = root mean square (rms) turbulence intensity = 0·15 U. L = scale length = 183 m (600 ft) Ω = frequency [radians/metre]. 3.1.3.2 Vertical Component of Turbulence. It may be assumed that the vertical component of turbulence has a spectrum of the form defined by equation (2) in paragraph 3.1.3.1. The following values have been in use: σ = 2.8 km/h (1·5 knots) with L = 9·2 m (30 ft) or alternatively σ = 0·09 U with L = 4·6m (15 ft) when z < 9·2 m (30 ft) and L = 0·5 z when 9·2 < z < 305 m (30 < z < 1 000 ft.) 67 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO NOTE: This data is based on world-wide in-service operations of UK airlines (Sample size about 2000) Figure 1: Cumulative probability of reported mean wind and headwind, tailwind and crosswind components when landing 3.2 Wind Model Number 2 3.2.1 Mean Wind. The mean wind is the steady state wind measured at landing. This mean wind is composed of a downwind component (headwind and tailwind) and a crosswind component. The cumulative probability distributions for these components are provided in Figure 2 (downwind) and Figure 3 (crosswind). Alternatively, the mean wind can be defined with magnitude and direction. The cumulative probability for the mean wind magnitude is provided in Figure 4, and the histogram of the mean wind direction is provided in Figure 5. The mean wind is measured at a reference altitude of 20 feet AGL. The models of the wind shear and turbulence given in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 assume this reference altitude of 20 feet AGL is used. 68 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 3.2.2 Wind Shear. When stable and steady horizontal wind blows over the ground surface, terrain irregularities and obstacles such as trees and buildings alter the steady wind near the surface and a boundary layer will cause a form of windshear. The magnitude of this she ar is defined by the following expression: Vwref = 0·204*V20*ln((h + 0·15)/0·15) where Vwref is the mean wind speed measured at h feet and V 20 is the mean wind speed (feet/sec) at 20 feet AGL. NOTE: This expression does not represent the violent windshears created by unstable airmass conditions. 3.2.3 Turbulence 3.2.3.1 Turbulence Spectra. The turbulence spectra are of the Von Karman form. The vertical component of turbulence (perpendicular to the earth’s surface) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation:  w 2L w 1 8 1  339 L w 2  w  3 1  1 339 L   = 2 2 11 / 6 w The horizontal component of turbulence (in the direction of the mean horizontal wind) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation: u 2Lu u   1   =  1  1  339 Lu 2 5/6 The lateral component of turbulence (perpendicular to the mean horizontal wind) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation: 1  1  339 L v 2 8  v 2L v v  3   = 2 1  1  339 L v 2 11 / 6 where Φ = spectral density [feet/sec] 2 σ = root mean square (rms) turbulence intensity [feet/sec] L = scale length Ω = spatial frequency [radians/foot] = ω/VT ω = temporal frequency [radians/sec] VT = aircraft speed [feet/sec] 3.2.3.2 Turbulence Intensities and Scale Lengths. At or above an altitude h 1, turbulence is considered to be isotropic i.e. the statistical properties of the turbulence components are indep endent. This means that one can consider the turbulence components to have equal intensities. 69 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Below h1, turbulence varies with altitude. In this case, intensity and scale length are expressed as functions of V 20 (feet/sec ... see above) and altitude. Turbulence Intensities σW = 0.1061 V20 For h < h1, W σU = V = 04  0  823 h   0  177    h1   For h ≥ h1, σU = V = W where h1 = 1 000 ft. Scale Lengths For h < h1, LW = h 3 LW  u  = h LU = LV = 12  w   0  823 h   0  177    h1   For h ≥ h1 LW = LU = LV = h1 where h1 = 1 000 ft. 3.2.3.3 Fixed turbulence intensities for pilot-in-the-loop simulations. The following fixed levels of turbulence intensity [feet/sec] have been found to be representative when used to program low altitude simulations with the pilot in the loop. Turbulence Light Medium Heavy Intensity συ = v 2·5 5·0 8·3 σw 1·25 2·5 4·17 Turbulence scale lengths vary with altitude according to the equations of para 3.2.3.2. 70 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 71 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO FIGURE 2 Headwind – Tailwind Description FIGURE 3 Crosswind Description FIGURE 4 Annual percent probability of Mean Wind Speed equalling or exceeding given values 72 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO FIGURE 5 Wind direction relative to Runway Heading 4 Models of xLS ILS and MLS signals in space for use in approach simulations 4.1 ILS Model 4.1.1 General 4.1.1.1 Automatic landing system evaluation, including computer analysis of system performance, should be based on the use of xLS ILSground facilities, which meet the performance characteristics, listed herein. 4.1.1.2 The values given are derived from the performance characteristics for Category II ILS, contained in ICAO Annex 10, Volume 1, Third Edition dated July 1972 at Amendment No. 58 except where indicated. 4.21.1.3 Analysis of results of in-flight demonstrations may include subtraction of measured xLS ILS beam distortions, and treatment of the contribution of the xLS ILS beam on a probability basis using the information that follows (See CS AWO.A.ALS.106 (b)(2)) 4.1.2 Glide Path 4.1.2.1 Glide Path Angles. It should be assumed that the operationally preferred glide path angle is 3°. The automatic landing system should be shown to meet all applicable requirements with promulgated glide path angles from 2·5° to 3°. Where certification is requested for the use of a larger beam angle, performance on such a beam should be assessed. 4.1.2.2 Height of ILS Reference Datum (height of glide path at threshold). For establishing compliance with the longitudinal touchdown performance limits it may be as sumed that the height of the ILS Reference Datum is 15 m (50 ft). 4.1.2.3 Glide Path Alignment Accuracy. It should be assumed that the standard deviation of beam angle about the nominal angle ( ) is 0·025 . 4.1.2.4 Displacement Sensitivity. It should be assumed that the angular displacement from the nominal glide path for 0·0875 DDM has the value of 0·12 . 73 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 4.1.2.5 Glide Path Structure. For the purposes of simulation, the noise spectrum of ILS glide path may be represented by a white noise passed through a low pass first order filter of time constant 0.5 sec. For the whole of the approach path the output of the filter should be set to a two -sigma level of 0·023 DDM. (Background: An interpretation of Annex 10, paragraph 3.1.5.4.2.) NOTE: This model is primarily intended to simulate the characteristics of beams at low altitude, and therefore results derived from its use should not be relied on for heights above 150 m (500 ft). 4.1.3 Localizer 4.1.3.1 Course Alignment Accuracy. It should be assumed that at the threshold the standard deviation of the course line about the centreline is 1·5 m (5 ft). NOTE: This value is in between those given in Annex 10, paragraph 3.1.3 for Category II and Category III ILS which are assumed to be three sigma values, 2·5 m (8·3 ft) and 1·0 m (3·3 ft) respectively. 4.1.3.2 Displacement Sensitivity. It should be assumed that the nominal displacement sensitivity at the threshold has the value of 0·00145 DDM/m. 4.1.3.3 Course Structure. For the purposes of simulation, the noise spectrum of ILS localizers may be represented by a white noise passed through a low pass first order filter of time constant 0·5 sec. For the whole of the approach path the output of the filter should be set to a two -sigma level of 0·005 DDM. (See Note to paragraph 4.2.5.) (Background: An interpretation of Annex 10, paragraph 3.1.3.4.2.) 4.2 MLS Ground Facility Model. The MLS models defined by the ICAO All Weather Operations Panel (AWOP), reference AWOP/14- WP/659, dated 4/2/93 should be used for approach simulations. Alternatively, if certification of MLS is only sought for ILS look-alike operations, the applicant may use the ILS model defined in section 4.1. This is based on the assertion that the MLS quality is equal to or better than that of ILS and requires no further substantiation. 5 Aerodrome conditions 5.1 Elevation and temperature The effects of aerodrome elevation and ambient temperature should be examined where operation is envisaged at aerodromes above about 750 m (2 500 ft) or in temperatures greater than international standard atmosphere (ISA) + 15°C. 5.1.1 High-altitude landing system demonstration using simulation 5.1.1.1 The following describes an acceptable means to demonstrate performance of landing systems at high altitude with a combination of flight test results and validated simulation. The aerodrome elevation at which satisfactory performance of the landing system has been demonstrated by this method may then be documented in the AFM. The flight test demonstration is considered as the primary source of data, which can then be supplemented with data from a validated simulation. 74 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 5.1.1.2 The minimum required altitude or elevation for the flight test which is used to demonstrate a desired AFM elevation value, by this method, is shown in Figure 6 and the accompanying table, below. For example, the applicant may document an AFM elevation value of 8 000 ft, by a successful flight demonstration at 8 000 ft, or by a flight demonstration at a minimum elevation of 5 000 ft with a simulation to the desired 8 000 ft. (Note: The lines in Figure 6 converge at 11 000 ft, indicating that credit for simulation is not available at 11 000 ft or above.) The atmospheric temperature and pressure during the flight test, for either method, should not be more favourable than the international standard atmosphere (ISA) conditions, to ensure that the density altitude is not less than the aerodrome elevation. When the density altitude value of the flight test is less than the aerodrome elevation, then the density altitude value should be used as the effective flight test demonstrated elevation which will decrease the maximum AFM elevation value. 5.1.1.3 Establishing a baseline of landing system performance, for the purposes of then using simulation to obtain a high-altitude approval, will require a sufficient programme of landings at the flight test demonstrated elevation shown in Figure 2, to demonstrate the validity of the simulation and to support the conclusions of the analysis. Note: Typically, programmes of 10-15 landings should be used. An alternative method for simulation validation may be used if found acceptable by the Agency. 5.1.1.4 A simulation may then be conducted with cases at the selected AFM elevation value with the range of atmospheric conditions listed below. A sensitivity analysis should be conducted to assure that performance is not unsafe near any limits. Unless otherwise found acceptable by the Agency, simulation cases should typically include the following: a. temperatures ranging from ISA value to ISA +40°C; b. barometric pressure ranging from ISA value for that elevation to ISA -50 hPa; and c. mean wind variations, including: — headwinds to at least 25 kt; — crosswinds to at least 15 kt; and — tailwinds to at least 10 kt. 75 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AFM elevation value Flight test demonstrated elevation Figure 2: AFM elevation value from flight test and validated simulation AFM elevation value from flight Required elevation of flight Test and validated simulation Test demonstration (feet above mean sea level) (feet above mean sea level) 5 500 0 6 000 1 000 6 500 2 000 7 000 3 000 8 000 5 000 9 000 7 000 10 000 9 000 11 000 11 000 Table associated with Figure 2 76 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 5.1.2 High-altitude landing system demonstration using flight test only For applicants that want to demonstrate landing system performance at high -elevation runways on the basis of flight tests only, i.e. without use of simulation to extrapolate from the demonstrated elevation, a flight test programme should be presented to the Agency for approval. An acceptable programme should include approximately 10-15 approaches and landings, conducted with an instrumented aircraft, in conditions covering the range of operational weight, centre of gravity and aircraft configuration. One-engine-inoperative conditions should also be considered if relevant. The recorded data should allow the assessment of touchdown performance (i.e. touchdown distance, lateral deviation and vertical speed). 5.2 Ground profile 5.2.1 Where use is made of radio altimeter signals in the automatic landing system, any effects of ground profile before the runway or along the runway on the performance of the system should be examined. 5.2.2 The family of profiles to be investigated should take due account of the way in which the system uses the radio altimeter signals at different heights on the approach. Ter rain and runway up slopes, down slopes and other terrain irregularities should be investigated. NOTE: The information on characteristics of aerodromes is contained in ICAO Annex 14. Examination of a number of airports used for automatic landing has shown that the following features may be encountered: a. sloping runway — slopes of 0.8 %; b. hilltop runway — 12.5 % slope up to a point 60 m prior to the threshold; or c. sea-wall — 6 m (20 ft) step up to threshold elevation at a point 60 m prior to the threshold. 6 Fog model For simulator testing associated with the certification of HUDLS certifications, the applicant may propose a fog model. The proposed fog model will have to be acceptable to the Agency. AMC AWO.A.ALS.108 Approach and automatic landing with an inoperative engine — Performance demonstration (a) Identification of a critical engine should consider the effects on performance, handling, loss of systems, and autoland status. More than one engine may be critical for different reasons. (b) If the aeroplane configuration and operation are the same as those used in the performance demonstration of CS AWO.A.ALS.106 for the all-engine operating case, compliance with CS AWO.A.ALS.108 may be demonstrated by, typically, 10 to 15 landings, or by statistical analysis supported by flight test if the aeroplane configuration or operation is changed significantly from the all-engine operating case. (c) If the aeroplane configuration and operation are not the same as for the all-engine operating case, the effect on landing distance will need to be considered. 77 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (d) To aid planning for automatic landing with an inoperative engine, appropriate procedures, performance, and obstacle clearance information will need to be established enabling a safe go- around at any point in the approach. (e) For the purposes of this requirement, demonstration of automatic landing and go -around performance in the event of a second engine failure need not be conside red. AMC AWO.A.ALS.109 Automatic landing distance The landing distance referred to in CS AWO.A.ALS.109 may be derived as follows: (a) The configuration procedure and speed should be those recommended for an automatic landing. (b) The distance from the runway threshold to the touchdown point should be the distance from the runway threshold to the glide-slope origin (SO) plus the mean distance from the glide-slope origin to touchdown (STD) plus three times the standard deviation of the distance from the glide-slope origin to touchdown σ (STD). (c) The gross distance from touchdown to a complete stop should be determined in accordance with CS 25.125, assuming a touchdown speed equal to the main touchdown speed plus three standard deviations of the touchdown speed. Note: The main values and standard deviations considered in points (b) and (c) should be based on random variations. Systematic variation of parameters should cover the normal range of flight manual conditions. (d) The landing distance required should be taken as the distance from the runway threshold to the touchdown point, as defined in (b) above, factored by 1.15 (i.e. 1.15 (SO + STD + 3 σ (STD)), plus the ground roll distance defined in (c) above multiplied by a factor of 1.15. (e) The landing distance required should include corrections for variations in glide-slope angle and variations in glide-slope height at the threshold. Alternatively, these effects may be included by use of conservative assumptions in the basic presentation of data, with the applicable ranges stated in the flight manual. Note: The landing distance as derived under (a) to (e) above should be compared with the normal landing distance according to CS 25.125. AMC AWO.A.ALS.110 Controls, indicators and Warnings alerts — General Where certification of installations involving more than one type of precision approach system (e.g. MLS and ILS and MLS and/or GLS) is requested, the following considerations should be taken into account: (a) Where practicable, the flight deck procedure for the xLS ILS and MLS precision approach should be the same. (b) The loss of deviation data should be indicated on the deviation display. The failure indication on the deviation display for each axis of the xLS ILS and MLS may be common. (c) The specific ILS or MLS precision approach system selected as the navigation source for the approach and automatic landing should be indicated positively in the primary field of view (FOV) at each pilot station. (d) The ILS frequency or MLS/GLS channel data for the selected approach should be displayed to each pilot. 78 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (e) Means should be provided to enable the flight crew to confirm that the intended type of approach system has been correctly selected. (f) A common set of mode indications for the armed and active conditions is recommended. (g) The capability of each element of a multi-mode landing system should be available to the flight crew to support dispatch of the aeroplane. (h) A failure of each element of a multi-mode landing system should be indicated to the flight crew as either an advisory or a caution during en route operation. (i) A failure of the selected element of a multi-mode landing system during an approach should be accompanied by a warning or caution, as appropriate. These alerts may be inhibited at the alert height, if appropriate to the operation. (j) If an indication of a failure in each non-selected element of a multi-mode landing system during an approach and landing is provided, it should be available to the flight crew as an advisory and should not produce a caution or warning. These advisories may be inhibited at the alert height, if appropriate to the operation. (k) Failure indications should not mislead the flight crew through a possible incorrect association with the navigation source. For example, it would be unacceptable for ‘ILS FAIL’ to be displayed when the selected navigation source is MLS and the failure affects the MLS receiver. AMC AWO 161(b) Failure Conditions 1 Analysis of Failure Conditions and their Effects 1.1 Analysis. An analysis should be carried out to define the failure conditions and their effects and to show that the probability of each failure condition is such that the requirements of CS–AWO 161 (a) are achieved. 1.2 Failure conditions and their effects 1.2.1 The effect of a failure condition on the aeroplane and occupants should be established, taking into account the stage of flight. There should be a flight demonstration (see paragr aph 2) taking account of the warning cues and the information available to the pilot making the corrective action. 1.2.2 Where the effect of a failure condition is neither readily apparent nor deducible by analysis, either the most adverse consequence should be assumed, or such testing should be carried out as may be required to establish the effect. 1.2.3 All failures and combinations of failures leading to the same or a similar effect on the functioning of the system should be regarded as the same failure conditions. 1.3 Probability of failure conditions. The probability of a failure condition should be based on engineering judgement of evidence relevant to the components used, and account should be taken of previous experience on similar systems. The analysis should take account of the following: a. A single failure of a system or component may only be accepted when the system or component is assessed to have the necessary order of reliability based on: i. Service experience which can be shown to be applicable, normally supported by analysis and/or testing of the particular design; or 79 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO ii. A detailed engineering evaluation of the design supported by testing. b. A single failure may only be assessed to be an Extremely Improbable failure when it applies to a particular mode of failure and it can be shown from the aspects of design, construction and installation, that such a failure need not be considered as a practical possibility. c. In systems, which rely for their airworthiness on redundancy techniques, particular attention should be given in the analysis to common mode failures (i.e. multiple failures arising from a single cause). The following are typical examples of common mode failures: i. A local fire causing multiple failures; ii. Electro-magnetic interference or electrical transients causing multiple malfunctions; iii. Mechanical vibration causing multiple failures or malfunctions; iv. Leakage of water or other liquids (e.g. from a galley or from cargo) causing multiple electrical failures; v. The failure of a cooling system or the leakage of hot air causing multiple failures in other systems; vi. Lightning strike; and vii. Software errors in digital systems. 1.4 Numerical probabilities 1.4.1 Where numerical analyses are used in assessing compliance with CS–AWO 161 (a) the probability values given in AMC 25.1309 should be used in providing a common point of reference. The analysis should take into account the period in the landing for which the particular failure condition is critical. 1.4.2 Combinations of failures may be accepted on the basis of assessed numerical values only where these values can be substantiated and a suitable analysis technique has been employed. 1.4.3 Statistical methods should be used to complement engineering judgement and sh ould not be regarded as a substitute. 1.5 Dormant failures (latent). When the failure of a device can remain undetected in normal operation, the frequency with which the device is checked will directly influence the probability that such a failure is present on any particular occasion. This should be taken into account when assessing the probabilities of any failure conditions which include the dormant failures of monitoring devices or unchecked redundant items. 1.6 Cascade failures. When failure of a component or equipment can be expected to result in other failures, account should be taken in the analysis of these further failures. In assessing which failures may follow, consideration should be given to any change in the equipment operating conditions for other components or equipment consequential on the first failure. 1.7 Damage from external sources. In considering damage from external sources, account should be taken of the location of the equipment in the aeroplane and other features of the instal lation. 2 Flight Demonstrations 2.1 Simulation tests, and the assessed probability of the failure condition should be taken into account in determining which failure conditions should be demonstrated in flight. 80 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 2.2 Where system tolerances significantly affect the consequences of failure, the system should be adjusted for flight-testing to the most adverse tolerances, which can be maintained in service. 2.3 The effects of failures of the ILS and/or MLS ground facilities should, if necessary, be demonstrated in flight. 3 Consideration of the Effects of Engine Failure 3.1 Where the landing system provides automatic control of the rudder pedals, a demonstration should be made to show that, for automatic approaches initiated with all engines operating: a. automatic go-around, and b. automatic landing, can be performed safely after the failure of any single engine at any point during the approach down to touchdown without the pilot needing to intervene and assume control. 3.2 The automatic pilot should remain engaged following the failure of any single engine, taking account of the loss of systems associated with the failed engine (e.g. electrical and hydraulic systems). AMC AWO.A.ALS.112 xLS navigation means (including signal-in-space) failure The effects of failures of the xLS navigation means (including signal in space)) should, if necessary, be demonstrated in flight. Description of the fault modes of the elected navigation means derived from ICAO Annex 10 Volume I can be found in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. AMC AWO.A.ALS.113(f) Aeroplane flight manual The aeroplane flight manual AFM should define the may contain a statement to the effect that the categories of xLS ILS and/or MLS ground facilities or space facilities (if applicable), which have been used as the a basis for certification. , should not be taken as a limitation. In that case tThe aeroplane flight manual AFM should may also contain a statement on possible usage of automatic landing on lower that some Category of xLS I ILS and/or MLS ground facilities or space facilities (if applicable). may not be suitable for automatic landing 81 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 2 HEADS UP DISPLAYS (HUD) GENERAL AMC AWO.A.HUD.101 Applicability and terminology A HUD or an equivalent display should comply with the relevant requirements of AMC 25 -11. AMC AWO.A.HUD.103 Head-up display information It is acceptable to remove information from the HUD, provided that doing so does not cause a distraction. AMC AWO.A.HUD.105(a)(i) Failure alerting The requirements of CS 25.1322 with respect to colour coding for warnings (red) or cautions (amber) may be impossible to meet whilst only a monochrome display is provided on a HUD. Since a pilot using a HUD will have their attention fixed in a well-defined display area, it is accepted that an alternative means of alerting, other than change of colour, may be provided (e.g. flashing or boxing of parameter, additional aurals, blanking of display area or removal of feature, etc.). A consistent alerting philosophy should be developed which provides distinction between caution, warning and advisory information. Conflicts of meaning with head-down display alerts should be avoided. AMC AWO.A.HUD.105(a)(ii) Indications and alerts The removal of the total display may be an acceptable way of indicating a failure of the system. AMC AWO.A.HUD.105(a)(iii) Monitoring pilot indications As is indicated in CS 25.1329, it is essential that both pilots are aware of the mode of flight guidance being used at all times. Unless the format of the display on the HUD is unique to a particular guidance mode, the pilot using the HUD (whether in automatic or manual flight) will need to have their attention brought to any changes of mode (normal or uncommanded) as soon as they occur. AMC AWO.A.HUD.107 Performance demonstration Where approval is sought for the use of a HUDLS, in order to show compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.115, it will be necessary to use a simulator with an acceptable visual system which accurately represents the real aeroplane, in particular the handling qualities, the ground effect, the fog structure and the cut-off angle. A moving-base simulator is thought to be necessary and consideration of the effect of the structural response of the airframe to turbulence may be necessary to achieve a realistic simulation of the effect of turbulence on the flight deck. Where a head-up guidance landing system is used for primary guidance for Category 3 operations, it may be expected that at least 500 simulated landings will be necessary and that 100 or more landings by the real aeroplane will be made. At least 10 pilots of varying background and experience should be used both in simulator and flight tests. They should be given appropriate training in the use of the HUDLS. No pilot should make more than 8 consecutive landings without a break of at least 1 hour. Monte Carlo techniques should be considered where applicable. 82 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The limit risk demonstration, whilst suitable for autoland certification, has been found to be unsuitable for head-up guidance certification. An acceptable alternative, assuming that wind is the most critical parameter, is to perform 10 simulated approaches and landings in limiting winds from each of the 8 cardinal points of the compass (total 80 runs) and demonstrate that the failure rate does not exceed 20 %. AMC AWO.A.HUD.112 Head-up display landing distance (a) The flare guidance provided by the HUD during landing and any procedure associated with using the HUD may result in an increase to the landing distance. (b) The HUD landing distance should be established as follows: (1) The requirements of CS 25.125 should be applied, except that the configuration, procedure and speed should be those recommended in the associated procedures for using a HUD. (2) The landing distance as derived under (a) above should be compared with the normal landing distance as per CS 25.125. If the HUD landing distance is longer than without using a HUD, then the HUD landing distance should be established and articulated in the AFM. This landing distance may not be shorter than the landing distance established in accordance with CS 25.125 without using a HUD. (3) The operating procedures, aeroplane configuration, approach speed, thrust management, piloting control techniques and the landing distance data applicable for HUD landings should be established and articulated in the AFM. 83 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 3 ENHANCED FLIGHT VISION SYSTEMS (EFVS) AMC AWO.A.EFVS.101 General The intended functions of the EFVS should be defined. This definition should include what features will be displayed and the criticality of pilot decision-making using the display features. The additional intended functions (for example, terrain alerting) should be defined according to AMC 25-11 and CS 23.1301 and 25.1301. This should include its use to visually acquire the visual references required to operate below the DA/H or MDA and the criticality of pilot decision-making based on what is visible using the EFVS display. The purpose of the EFVS is to provide a visual advantage over the pilot’s out-the-window view using natural vision. In low- visibility conditions, the ‘enhanced flight visibility’ should exceed the ‘flight visibility’ and the required visual references should become visible to the pilot at a longer distance with an EFVS than they would out-the- window using natural vision. Visual advantage using an EFVS should be demonstrated before descending below the DA/H or the MDA because this is the point in an instrument approach procedure where the operating rules permit an EFVS to be used in lieu of natural vision for operational benefit. Note 1: The EFVS is not intended to replace the technologies or procedures already used to safely fly the aircraft down to the MDA/H or DA/H. Note 2: While the goal of EFVS is to exceed the natural flight visibility in the majority of cases/weather conditions, there may be meteorological conditions where the EFVS does not provide a significant advantage. Note 3: The HUD (or equivalent display) is separately certified and should remain subject to all applicable rules and guidance for the category of aircraft and operation. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.103 EFVS depiction The EFVS image is in the centre of the pilot's regulated ‘pilot compartment view’. It should be free of interference, distortion, and glare that would adversely affect the pilot's normal performance and workload. A video image can be more difficult for the pilot to see through than symbols also displayed on the HUD. Unlike symbology, the video image illuminates, to some degree, most of the total display area of the HUD with much greater potential interference with the pilot compartment view. It is sufficient for the pilot to see around the video image, but the outside scene must be visible through and around it. Unlike the pilot's external view, the enhanced flight vision image is a monochrome, two-dimensional display. Some, but not all, of the depth cues found in the natural view are also found in the imagery. The quality of the enhanced flight vision image and the level of enhanced flight vision sensor performance could depend significantly on the atmospheric and external light source conditions. Gain settings of the sensor, and brightness or contrast settings of the HUD (or equivalent display), can significantly affect image quality. Certain system characteristics could create distracting and confusing display artefacts. Finally, this is a sensor-based system that is intended to provide a conformal perspective. The sensor image, combined with the required aeroplane state and position reference symbology, are presented to the flight crew on a HUD (or an equivalent display), so that they are clearly visible to the pilot flying in their normal position and line of vision looking forward along the flight path. 84 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The integration of the major components should include the installed sensor, its interconnections with the sensor display processor, the display device, pilot interface, and aircraft mechanical interface, which can include the radome for the sensor. Flare cue An EFVS-L should have a flare cue because it is intended to enable landing in low visibility. The flare cue, whether a flare prompt or flare guidance, should demonstrate compliance with the landing criteria found in CS AWO.A.EFVS.109. For some aircraft, flare guidance may be required because a flare prompt is not sufficient. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.104 EFVS display The EFVS imagery should not degrade the presentation of essential flight information on the HUD. The pilot's ability to see and use the required primary flight display information such as primary attitude, airspeed, altitude, and command bars should not be hindered or compromised by the EFVS image on the HUD. The EFVS imagery displayed on the HUD or equivalent display must account for the pilot compartment view requirements found in CS 25.773 or CS 23.773, including validation that the display of imagery does not conflict with the pilot compartment view. The display of EFVS sensor imagery should be on a system that compensates for the interference caused by the provided imagery. Additionally, the system should provide an undistorted and conformal view of the external scene, a means to deactivate the display and should not restrict the pilot from performing specific manoeuvres. The following tasks associated with the use of the pilot’s view should not be degraded below the level of safety that existed without the video imagery: (a) Detection, accurate identification and manoeuvring, as necessary, to avoid traffic, terrain, obstacles, and other hazards of flight. (b) Accurate identification and utilisation of visual references required for every task relevant to the phase of flight. Note: Although, the EFVS image requirements relate primarily to the approach and landing phases of flight, the EFVS image when viewed head up during ground operations should not create unacceptable distractions due to sensor proximity to the taxiway surface. For EFVSs that are implemented on a HUD, the image should be compatible with the FOV and head motion box of a HUD designed against SAE ARP 5288 (transport category HUD systems). When used in a given phase of flight, the HUD and EFVS FOR must provide a conformal image with the visual scene over the range of aircraft attitudes and wind conditions. EFVS display criteria must meet the airworthiness certification provisions in CS-23 or CS-25 (as applicable) (see Appendix 1 to AMC to Section 3 of Subpart A). Some of these provisions could be specific to EFVS and could be in addition to all other requirements applicable to the HUD and the basic avionics installation. The amount of new test data can be determined by the individual application, availability, and relevance of data. The current certification specifications for HUDs apply with respect to EFVS. These criteria include well- established military as well as civil aviation standards for HUDs as defined in MIL-STD-1787C, Aircraft Display Symbology, and AMC 25-11. SAE design standards for HUD symbology, optical elements, and video imagery are also prescribed within SAE AS 8055, SAE ARP 5288 and SAE ARP 5287. The specific design standards for image size, resolution and line width, luminance and contrast ratio, chromaticity, and grayscale should be applied. 85 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO A HUD modified to display EFVS imagery should continue to meet the conditions of the original approval and be adequate for the intended function in all phases of flight in which the EFVS is used. An accurate, easy, quick-glance interpretation of attitude should be possible for all unusual attitude situations and other ‘non- normal’ manoeuvres to permit the pilot to recognise the unusual attitude and initiate recovery within 1 second. The use of chevrons, pointers, and/or permanent ground-sky horizon on all attitude indications to perform effective manual recovery from unusual attitudes is recommended. Refer to AMC 25-11 for guidance on electronic flight deck displays. EFVS latency should be no greater than 100 milliseconds (msec). Latency should not be discernible to the pilot and should not affect control performance or increase pilot workload. EFVS latency causes, at best, undesirable oscillatory image motion in response to pilot control inputs or turbulence. At worst, EFVS latency may cause pilot-induced oscillations if the pilot attempts to use the EFVS for active control during precision tracking tasks or manoeuvres in the absence of other visual cues. EFVS FOR The minimum fixed FOR should be 20 degrees horizontal and 15 degrees vertical. In applications where the FOR is centred on the FPV, the minimum vertical FOR should be 5 degrees (± 2.5 degrees) and 20 degrees horizontal. (a) The minimum EFVS FOR should not only consider the HUD FOV (i.e. the size of the area that is displayed), but also the area over which this area subtends (i.e. what is shown on the conformal display). The FOR portrayed on the HUD is established by three primary aspects: (1) HUD and EFVS sensor FOV; (2) orientation of the HUD with respect to the aircraft frame of reference (for example, boresight and proximity to pilot’s eye); and (3) orientation (for example, attitude) of the aircraft. (b) SAE ARP 5288 states ‘The design of the HUD installation should provide adequate display fields-of-view in order for the HUD to function correctly in all anticipated flight attitudes, aircraft configurations, or environmental conditions such as crosswinds for which it is approved. Limitations should be clearly specified in the AFM if the HUD cannot be used throughout the full aircraft flight envelope.’ A quantitative EFVS FOR should be established as a minimum design criterion to be qualitatively checked during the certification flight test for sufficiency in meeting its intended function. The EFVS FOR should result from consideration of the minimum FOR criteria for various aircraft attitudes and wind conditions using a critical altitude of 200 ft height above TDZE for EFVS visibility. (c) A variable FOR is permissible assuming a slewable sensor (i.e. variable FOR), centred on the FPV, with a minimum +/- 2.5 degrees about the FPV to allow for momentary flight path perturbations and to allow sufficient fore/aft view of the required visual references. Off-axis rejection A source in object space that is greater than 1 degree outside the FOV should not result in any perceptible point or edge-like image within the FOV. The EFVS should preclude off-axis information from folding into the primary FOR imagery, creating the potential for misleading or distracting imagery. Jitter 86 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO When viewed from the HUD eye reference point, the displayed EFVS image jitter amplitude should be less than 0.6 mrad. Jitter for this use is defined in SAE ARP 5288. This implies that the EFVS and HUD cannot exhibit jitter greater than that of the HUD itself. 87 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Flicker Flicker is brightness variations at frequency above 0.25 Hz per SAE ARP 5288. The minimum standard for flicker should meet the criteria of SAE ARP 5288. Flicker can cause mild fatigue and reduced crew efficiency. Therefore the EFVS and HUD should not exhibit flicker greater than that of the HUD itself. Image artefacts The EFVS should not exhibit any objectionable noise, local disturbances, or an artefact that hazardously detracts from the use of the system. The EFVS design should minimise display characteristics or artefacts (for example, internal system noise, ‘burlap’ overlay, or running water droplets) which obscure the desired image of the scene, impair the pilot's ability to detect and identify visual references, mask flight hazards, distract the pilot, or otherwise degrade task performance or safety. Image conformality The accuracy of the integrated EFVS and HUD image should not result in a greater than 5 mrad display error at the centre of the display at a range of 2 000 ft (100 ft altitude on a 3-degree glideslope). In accordance with SAE ARP 5288, the total HUD system display accuracy error as measured from the HUD eye reference point, should be less than 5.0 mrad at the HUD boresight, with increasing error allowable toward the outer edges of the HUD. Errors away from the boresight should be as defined in SAE ARP 5288. The primary EFVS error components include the installation misalignment of the EFVS sensor from aircraft/HUD boresight and sensor parallax. A range parameter is used in the EFVS conformability requirement to account for the error component associated with parallax. There is no error allowed for the EFVS sensor, since it is assumed that any error can be electronically compensated during installation. With EFVS operations, the aircraft is flown essentially irrespective of the EFVS/HUD dynamic error, to the MDA or DA. From this point to 100 ft height above TDZE, the EFVS conformality error introduces error in the pilot’s ability to track along the extended centre line/vertical glide path as the pilot flies the FPV and glide path reference line toward the EFVS image of the runway. Dynamic range The minimum required dynamic range for passive EFVS should be 48 dB. For active EFVS, side lobes should be 23 dB below the main beam, and 40 dB dynamic range plus sensitivity time control. Sensor image calibration Visible image calibrations and other built-in tests that cannot be achieved within a total latency of 100 msec should occur only either on pilot command or be coordinated by aircraft data to only occur in non-critical phases of flight. If other than normal imagery is displayed during the non-uniformity correction (NUC) or other built-in tests, the image should be removed from the pilot’s display. This prohibits excessive times to complete maintenance or calibration functions which would remove or degrade the EFVS imagery during critical phases of flight, unless the pilot commands the action (with full knowledge of effect based on training and experience). Abnormal imagery should be removed from the display to eliminate the potential for any misleading information. Passive sensor optical distortion Optical distortion should be 5 % or less across the minimal FOR and no greater than 8% outside the minimal FOR. Sensor sensitivity 88 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO In this context, the EFVS sensor sensitivity should be at least a noise-equivalent temperature difference (NETD) of 50° mK tested at an appropriate ambient temperature for passive EFVSs or -20 dB sm/sm (square metre/square metre) surface at Rmax from 200 ft height above TDZE with a typical 3-degree glideslope for active EFVSs. Passive sensors for different visible or short-wave infrared sources can require very sensitive detectors, as specified by low noise-equivalent powers. Blooming The sensor should incorporate features to minimise blooming, which can create an unusable or objectionable image. Objectionable blooming is defined as the condition that obscures the required visual cues. Blooming to the extent the required visual references are no longer distinctly visible and identifiable is unacceptable. Image persistence The image persistence time constant should be less than 100 msec. However, burn-in or longer image persistence caused by high-energy sources (for example, the sun saturating the infrared sensor elements) should be removed from the image. Image artefacts should be removed by a secondary on- demand process (for example, the non-uniformity correction process). Dead pixels Dead pixels or sensor elements replaced by a ‘bad pixel’ replacement algorithm should be limited to 1 % average of the total display area, with no cluster greater than 0.02 % within the minimum FOR. A small number of disparate dead pixel elements can be effectively replaced by image processing but eventually the algorithms will degrade the image quality and accuracy due to the sheer number and closely-spaced location of the element. Parallax The effects of parallax caused by lateral, vertical, and longitudinal offset of the sensor from the pilots’ design eye points should not impede the EFVS from performing its intended function, as evaluated during flight test. Parallax should not cause unsatisfactory landing performance parameters (e.g. flare height, sink rate, touchdown location, groundspeed during landing, exit and taxi) between EFVS operations and visual operations in the same aircraft. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.105 HUD EFVS symbology Flare prompt A flare prompt is intended to notify the pilot that it is time to initiate the flare manoeuvre but does not guide the pilot’s manual pitch control inputs. The pilot should use situational information (e.g. altitude, vertical rate, attitude, FPV, perspective view of the runway) from the EFVS to judge the magnitude and rate of manual pitch control inputs. The appearance and dynamic behaviour of the flare prompt should be distinguishable from command guidance. The flare prompt should appear timely and conspicuously to the pilot using the HUD so that the flare manoeuvre will be neither too early nor too late and within the TDZ as described in AMC AWO.A.EFVS.109. 89 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC AWO.A.EFVS.106 EFVS display controls There should be a means to allow the pilot using the display to immediately deactivate and reactivate the vision system imagery, on demand, without requiring the pilot to remove their hands from the primary flight and power controls, or their equivalent. (Refer to CS 25.775(e)(3)). The EFVS installation and image should have an effective control of EFVS display brightness without causing excessive pilot workload and not cause adverse physiological effects such as fatigue or eyestrain. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.107 EFVS safety assessment The safety assessment should show that the applicant’s specific installation meets all the integrity criteria for the aircraft systems and for the EFVS. All aircraft configurations to be certified should be addressed. The applicant may need to demonstrate by flight test or simulation combinations of EFVS malfunctions that are not shown to be extremely improbable (10-9 per FH). The overall level of safety of the aircraft is based on installed equipment. A complete system safety assessment (SSA) should be conducted. The SSA should consider the potential for hazardously misleading information (HMI) being presented to the flight crew. Examples of HMI that should be considered include at least information providing attitude, altitude, and distance cues as outside terrain imagery, frozen and offset imagery. EFVS fail-safe features The normal operation of the EFVS may not adversely affect, or be adversely affected by other normally operating aircraft systems. Malfunctions of the EFVS which could cause display of misleading information should be annunciated and the misleading information removed. The criticality of the EFVS’s function to display imagery, including the potential to display HMI, should be assessed according to CS 25.1309 and AMC 25-11. Likewise, the hazard effects of any malfunction of the EFVS that could adversely affect interfaced equipment or associated systems should be determined and assessed according to CS 25.1309 and AMC 25-11. Similar criteria can be found in CS 23.1309. This requirement should be met through an SSA and documented via fault tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), and failure mode and effects analysis substantiation (FMEA substantiation), or equivalent safety documentation. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.108 EFVS level of safety During the development and design of an EFVS-A, the safety design goals for airworthiness approval should be established. The safety criteria for each phase of flight, including approach and landing systems, should be defined in terms of accuracy, continuity, availability, and integrity. Appropriate design guidance should be used to determine the overall required level of safety for the aircraft, in any mode of flight, and for any combination of failures which can cause an unsafe condition in order for them to be fully assessed and categorised. This should include the ability of the pilot(s) to cope with these failures. The hazard level for any aircraft system will depend on the ability of the pilot(s) to cope with failures. For failures where the SSA assumes a particular pilot intervention to limit the hazard effects, for example from catastrophic or hazardous to major or minor, it should be shown that the pilot can be relied on to perform that intervention. For example, the pilot might be assumed to detect a system error because of other displays or view out the window. It should be demonstrated that pilots can detect the error in a timely fashion and not be hazardously misled. The demonstration must validate the hazard classification contained in either CS 23.1309 or CS 25.1309 as appropriate. 90 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The applicant should demonstrate a satisfactory safety (failure and performance) level which should not be less than the safety level required for precision and NPAs with decision altitudes (DAs) of 200 ft or above without the use of an EFVS-A. In showing compliance, probabilities cannot be factored by the fraction of approaches which are made using EFVS. Consideration, however, can be given to the EFVS-A critical flight time, such as from the highest DH that can be expected for an approach to 100 ft above the TDZE using an EFVS-A. The selected DALs are directly linked to the specific intended use and to the specific EFVS-A installation as an integrated part of the cockpit flight information system. There are expected to be failure modes within an EFVS-A which will determine that software and hardware DALs which should comply with RTCA/DO-178C (or latest version) or RTCA/DO-254 (or latest version). In showing compliance with these safety criteria, the probabilities of failure conditions of an EFVS-L should not be factored by the fraction of approaches which require an EFVS-L. The probabilities of failure conditions of an EFVS-L should also not be factored by a statistical distribution of visibility conditions. The exposure time used for failure calculations of an EFVS-L should be the elapsed time from descent below the highest expected DA/H for the approach using an EFVS-L to completion of roll-out to a safe taxi speed. Any malfunction, fault detection and annunciation schemes should satisfy the required levels of safety and should perform their intended functions. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.109 EFVS performance The performance of EFVS imaging systems does not solely depend upon system design, but also depends upon the target scene characteristics such as the runway, light structures, electromagnetic radiation, and atmospheric conditions. Since the purpose of the EFVS sensor is to provide a visual advantage over the pilot’s out-the-window view, the design should include a general performance analysis. This analysis should include the calculated performance, which indicates the viability of the system to meet the proposed intended function, specifically including the calculated performance of the sensor operation within the range of the environment proposed. Likewise, since the purpose of the EFVS sensor is to provide a visual advantage over the pilot’s out-the-window view, the general performance analysis should include the calculated transmission of electromagnetic energy in the visible spectrum and other relevant frequencies. The analysis should portray the length of transmission over a path with generalised extinction coefficients at a given wavelength. Note: Examples of acceptable sensor models are MODTRAN and LOWTRAN which can be used to estimate the performance of infrared systems. Other models (FASCODE) for radar systems may be used for these types of sensors and provide a basic measure of signal attenuation helpful in assessing performance and viability for the required functions. Both the installed system and the individual system components should be verified to ensure compliance with the provisions in Book 1 Subpart A Section 3. Airframe and equipment manufacturer-based tests or analyses, as applicable, should be developed and conducted to validate the detailed system criteria. No specific test procedures are cited because alternative methods can be used. Alternate procedures can be utilised if it can be demonstrated that they provide the totality of the required information. System performance tests are the most important tests as they relate to operational capability. Subsystem tests are used as subsystems are added during system build-up to ensure appropriate subsystem performance as it relates to overall system performance. 91 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO An evaluation of the system used during anticipated operational scenarios should be conducted. The minimum detection EFVS range (Figure 1 below) can be derived by using an assumed minimum distance of the aircraft at the nominal Category I (200 ft) DA before which the EFVS should image the runway threshold. On a 3-degree glideslope, the horizontal distance from the aircraft to the runway threshold is approximately 2 816 ft (3 816 ft from the precision TDZ markers) based upon the visual cues required by AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) point (e). This range should be used as a minimum performance value. These values do not take into account pilot decision time or actual atmospheric conditions, the use of NPAs which can require greater distances, or the use of approaches with higher DAs, DHs, or MDAs. DA Visual without reliance on EFVS Typical 52-feet TCH based on a 3-degree 100 feet vertical path above TDZE 1000 908 1908 0 3816 ft Figure 1: Minimum detection range Sensor resolution As a minimum, EFVS resolution performance shall adequately resolve (for pilot identification) the runway threshold and the TDZ to enable the intended function. For example, an EFVS should resolve a 60 ft-wide runway from 200 ft height above TDZE with a typical 3-degree glideslope. The sensor resolution has been established by providing this resolution at a minimum range, allowing the pilot to continue the descent below DA or MDA. (These values do not take into account pilot decision time or actual atmospheric conditions, or the use of NPAs which may require greater distances.) A 60 ft-wide runway has been chosen as the ICAO minimum runway width to support an instrument approach procedure. Display resolution Since the sensor can be active or passive, the EFVS display should adequately resolve a 60 ft-wide runway from 200 ft height above TDZE with a typical 3-degree glideslope. The pilot needs to be able to detect and accurately identify the visual references in the image. The performance demonstration, establishing aircraft system compliance, typically includes bench testing, simulation flight testing, data collection, and data reduction to show that the proposed performance criteria 92 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO can be met. Minimal performance standards necessitate an evaluation of the system used during anticipated operational scenarios. The performance evaluations should therefore include demonstrations of taxi, take-off, missed approaches, failure conditions, crosswind conditions, and approaches into specific airports as appropriate for the system’s intended function. For EFVS, performance at the lateral and vertical limits for the type of approach (for example, precision, non-precision, and approach with vertical guidance) for which operational credit is being sought should be demonstrated. The applicant should demonstrate compliance through flight test using an aircraft that is fully representative for the purpose of the test in terms of flight deck geometry, instrumentation, alerts, indications, and controls (in the air or on the ground). In addition, the applicant should use any of these three general verification methods to supplement flight test: (a) Analysis. Demonstrate compliance using an engineering analysis. (b) Laboratory Test. Demonstrate compliance using an engineering bench representative of the final EFVS being certified. (c) Simulation. Demonstrate compliance using a flight simulator. The individual verification methods that are to be used should be specified in the certification plan to be agreed by the Agency. For extensions, features, and design decisions not explicitly specified in this CS, human factors evaluations should be conducted through analyses, bench, simulation, or flight testing. Final approach course offsets greater than 3 degrees should be subject to additional flight test evaluation. The maximum allowable final approach course offset is established by flight testing. This testing should include the factors related to the offset, such as HUD/EFVS FOV, crosswinds, and the maximum drift angle for a conformal FPV. Benchmark data establishing equivalence to normal visual operations with the specific aircraft should not normally be necessary. However, if flight test results show deviations from the standard criteria listed above, then benchmark data might be used to establish the equivalence of operations with EFVS-L to normal visual operations for that specific aircraft. The image/symbology of EFVS-L should provide the visual cues for the pilot to perform the following actions without requiring exceptional pilot skill, alerting, strength, or excessive workload: (a) Speed control within +10/-5 kt of the approach speed, whether manually controlled or with auto- throttle, up to the point where the throttles are retarded for landing. (b) A smooth transition through flare to landing. (c) Approach, flare, and landing at a normal sink rate for the aircraft. (d) All touchdowns in the TDZ. Lateral touchdown performance should be demonstrated to be no worse than that achieved in visual operations for the specific aircraft. Longitudinal touchdown performance must be demonstrated within the TDZ which is the first one third, or the first 3 000 ft, of the usable runway, whichever is more restrictive, and demonstrated to be equivalent to or better than that achieved in visual operations for the specific aircraft. (e) Prompt and predictable correction of any lateral deviation away from the runway centre line to smoothly intercept the centre line. (f) Touchdowns with a bank angle that is not hazardous to the aeroplane. 93 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (g) Demonstrated performance of the installed EFVS at representative visibilities for operations conducted with EFVS-A and EFVS-L, as described in this document, will determine any additional limitation (for example, crosswind and offset). (h) A normal derotation. (i) Satisfactory and smooth control of the aeroplane from touchdown to a safe taxi speed. (j) Satisfactory and smooth control of the path of the aeroplane along the runway centre line through roll- out to a safe taxi speed. (k) A safe go-around at any time, including up to touchdown in all configurations to be certified. Performance demonstration of EFVS-L For EFVS-Ls and where appropriate for the performance demonstration, the non-visual conditions can be achieved either by natural obscuration or by use of a visibility-limiting device in front of the pilot. Caution should be used if the use of a visibility-limiting device for system performance demonstrations is selected. Visibility-limiting devices may not adequately simulate low-visibility conditions for all performance demonstrations of EFVS-Ls because of the unrealistically good external visibility outside the HUD FOV and the unrealistic image performance of EFVS-Ls in good atmospheric conditions. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.109 EFVS performance — landing distance (a) The flare guidance provided by the HUD during landing and any procedure associated with using the HUD in EFVS-L, may result in an increase to the landing distance. (b) The EFVS landing distance referred to should be established as follows: (1) The requirements of CS 25.125 should be applied, except that the configuration, procedure and speed should be that recommended in the associated procedures for using an EFVS. (2) The landing distance as derived under (a) above should be compared with the normal landing distance as per CS 25. 125. If the EFVS landing distance is longer than without using an EFVS, the EFVS landing distance should be furnished in the AFM. This landing distance may not be shorter than the landing distance established in accordance with CS 25.125 without using EFVS. (3) The operating procedures, aeroplane configuration, approach speed, thrust management, piloting control techniques and the landing distance data applicable for EFVS-Ls should be furnished in the AFM. AMC AWO.A.EFVS.110 EFVS monitoring, annunciation and alerting Failure messages EFVS malfunctions detected by the system, and which can adversely affect the normal operation of the EFVS, should be annunciated. As a minimum, specific in-flight failure message(s) for sensor failure and frozen image should be displayed to the flight crew. EFVS annunciations Any modes of EFVS operation should be annunciated on the flight deck and visible to the crew. The modes of the EFVS operation should be made available to the flight data recorder as required. 94 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Appendix 1 to AMC to Section 3 of Subpart A EFVS compliance The following is a non-exhaustive list of CSs in CS-25 that could be affected by an EFVS installation. Applicants for normal-category aeroplanes (CS-23) can use the list below to establish if the equivalent aspects in CS-23 are affected and address them accordingly. Note: As of Amendment 5 of CS-23, the referenced CS-23 requirement numbers are reflected in the AMC to CS-23. Certification Description Specification 25.251 Vibration and buffeting 25.301 Loads 25.303 Factor of safety 25.307 Proof of structure 25.561/25.562(c)(5)) Emergency landing conditions; head injury criterion (HIC) 25.571 Damage-tolerance and fatigue evaluation of structure 25.581 Lightning protection 25.601 Design and Construction - General 25.603 Materials 25.605 Fabrication methods 25.609 Protection of structure 25.611 Accessibility provisions 25.613 Material strength properties and material design values 25.619 Special factors 95 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Certification Description Specification 25.625 Fitting factors 25.629(d)(8) Aeroelastic stability 25.631 Bird strike damage 25.771 Pilot compartment 25.773 Pilot compartment view 25.777 Cockpit controls 25.1301 Function and installation 25.1309 Equip, systems, and installations 25.1316 Electrical and electronic system lightning protection 23.1308 and 25.1317 High-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) protection 25.1321 Arrangement and visibility 25.1322 Flight crew alerting 25.1323 Airspeed indicating systems 25.1329 Flight guidance system 25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations 25.1357 Circuit protective devices 25.1381 Instrument lights 25.1419 Ice protection 96 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Certification Description Specification 25.1431(a)(c) Electronic equipment 25.1459(e) Flight data recorders 25.1501 Operating limitations and information; General 25.1523 Minimum flight crew 25.1525 Kinds of operation 25.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 25.1581 Aeroplane flight manual; General 25.1583 Operating limitations 25.1585 Operating procedures 97 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 4 SYNTHETIC VISION GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (SVGS) GENERAL AMC AWO.A.SVGS.101 General Further guidance on the integration of an SVGS is contained within RTCA DO-379. 98 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO APPENDIX 1 TO AMC TO SUBPART A ‘MODELS’ Signal-in-space models for approach and landing simulation and fault analysis 1 Purpose The purpose of this AMC is to provide acceptable models of signal in space based on known navigation means that can be used to demonstrate in simulation system performance in approach and landing. To be noted that system performance depends on navigation means performance (nominal limit and fault) and a performance demonstration done using one navigation means may not be valid when using another navigation means due to different nominal, limit and fault characteristics. 2 ILS CAT I/II/III signal-in-space model The values given are derived from the performance characteristics for Category II ILS, contained in ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, Sixth Edition, dated July 2006, at Amendment 89 except where otherwise indicated. ICAO Annex 10, Volume I (Attachment C, paragraph 2.14) defines a standard classification of ILS by using three characters: (1) Facility performance (I, II or III); (2) ILS points (A, B, C, T, D or E — see definition below) to which the localiser structure conforms to the course structure of a CAT II/III localiser; and (3) Level of integrity and continuity of service (1, 2, 3 or 4). ILS point ‘A’ A point on the ILS glide path measured along the extended runway centre line in the approach direction at a distance of 7.5 km (4 NM) from the threshold. ILS Point ‘B’ A point on the ILS glide path measured along the extended runway centre line in the approach direction at a distance of 1 050 m (3 500 ft) from the threshold. ILS Point ‘C’ A point through which the downward extended straight portion of the nominal ILS glide path passes at a height of 30 m (100 ft) above the horizontal plane containing the threshold. ILS reference datum (point ‘T’) A point at a specified height located above the intersection of the runway centre line and the threshold and through which the downward extended straight portion of the ILS glide path passes. ILS Point ‘D’ A point 4 m (12 ft) above the runway centre line and 900 m (3 000 ft) from the threshold in the direction of the localiser. ILS Point ‘E’ A point 4 m (12 ft) above the runway centre line and 600 m (2 000 ft) from the stop end of the runway in the direction of the threshold. 99 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Depending on the intended operation, the minimum class of ILS elected will define the detailed characteristics of the ILS to be used for: — nominal and limit case analysis; — failure cases to be considered; and — integrity and continuity analysis. 2.1 Glide path 2.1.1 Glide path angles It should be assumed that the operationally preferred glide path angle is 3°. The system should be shown to meet all applicable requirements with promulgated glide path angles from 2.5° to 3°. Where certification is requested for the use of a larger beam angle, performance on such a beam should be assessed. — The system should define minimum and maximum glides path angle slope considered in the demonstrations and shall meet all applicable requirements with the defined limits. For CAT I operations, it is recommended to cover at least a 2.5° to 3.5° glideslope range. — For CAT II or CAT III operations, it is recommended to cover a 2.5° to 3° glideslope range. 2.1.2 Height of ILS reference datum (height of glide path at threshold) For establishing compliance with the longitudinal touchdown performance limits, it may be assumed that the height of the ILS reference datum is 15 m (50 ft). 2.1.3 Glide path alignment accuracy It should be assumed that the standard deviation of the beam angle about the nominal angle () is 0.025 . 2.1.4 Displacement sensitivity It should be assumed that the angular displacement from the nominal glide path for 0.0875 DDM has the value of 0.12 . 2.1.5 Glide path structure For the purposes of simulation, the noise spectrum of ILS glide path may be represented by a white noise passed through a low-pass first-order filter of time constant 0.5 sec. For the whole of the approach path, the output of the filter should be set to a two-sigma level of: — 0.035 DDM for facility performance type I; and — 0.023 DDM for facility performance types II or III. (Background: An interpretation of Annex 10, Volume I, paragraph 3.1.5.4.1 & 3.1.5.4.2) Note: This model is primarily intended to simulate the characteristics of beams at low altitude, and therefore results derived from its use should not be relied on for heights above 150 m (500 ft). 2.1.6 Glide fault mode The effect of a glideslope malfunction can be modelled as a ramp with a start time, a ramp rate, a glide monitoring threshold and a time to alert as illustrated in Figure 1. As the effect of the glide fault may differ depending on start time and ramp rate, the combination that provides the most severe effect on aircraft deviation shall be considered. 100 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Slope characterised by ramp rate (DDM/s) Glide monitoring Glide slope error threshold time Time to alert Figure 1: ILS glide malfunction transient The glide malfunction transient depends on the facility performance type: Facility performance Facility performance Type I Types II or III Glide monitoring threshold minus 0.075 θ (below nominal glide) (maximum shift of the mean glide plus 0.10 θ (above nominal glide) path) Time to alert 6s 2s Table 1: Glideslope monitoring threshold and time to alert based on facility performance 2.2 Localiser 2.2.1 Course alignment accuracy It should be assumed that at the threshold the standard deviation of the course line about the centre line is: — 4.5 m (15 ft) for facility performance type I; and. — 1.5 m (5 ft) for facility performance types II or III. NOTE: The Type II or III value is in between those given in Annex 10, paragraph 3.1.3.6 for Category II and Category III ILS which are assumed to be three-sigma values, 2.5 m (8.3 ft) and 1.0 m (3.3 ft) respectively. 2.2.2 Displacement sensitivity It should be assumed that the nominal displacement sensitivity at the threshold has the value of 0.00145 DDM/m. 2.2.3 Course structure For the purposes of simulation, the noise spectrum of ILS localisers may be represented by a white noise passed through a low-pass first-order filter of time constant 0.5 sec. — Facility performance type I: For initial approach path, the output of the filter should be set to a two- sigma level of 0.005 DDM up to ILS point (A, B, C, T, D or E) elected as minimum required for the operation. 101 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO — If minimum required for the operation is ‘A’ or ‘B’, for final approach path, the output of the filter should be set to a two-sigma level of 0.015 DDM up to point ‘C’. After point ‘C’, localiser signal performance is unknown and should not be used. — If minimum required for the operation is ‘C’, ‘T’, ‘D’ or ‘E’, after the elected point, localiser signal performance is unknown and should not be used. — Facility performance types II or III: For the whole of the approach path, the output of the filter should be set to a two-sigma level of 0.005 DDM. 2.2.4 Localiser fault mode The effect of a localiser malfunction can be modelled as a ramp with a start time, a ramp rate, a localiser monitoring threshold and a time to alert as illustrated in Figure 2. As the effect of the localiser fault may differ depending on start time and ramp rate, the combination that provides the most severe aircraft deviation shall be considered. Slope characterised by ramp rate (DDM/s) Localiser monitoring Localiser slope error threshold time Time to alert Figure 2: ILS localiser malfunction transient The localiser malfunction transient depends on the facility performance type: Facility Facility Facility performance performance performance Type I Type II Type III Localiser monitoring threshold (maximum shift of 10.5 m (35 ft) 7.5 m (25 ft) 6 m (20 ft) the mean course line from runway centre line) 102 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Time to alert 10 s 5s 2s Table 2: Localiser monitoring threshold and time to alert based on facility performance 2.2.5 Integrity and continuity The probability of radiating false ILS localiser or glide guidance can be assumed to be: — for integrity level 1 ILS: no demonstrated values; — for integrity level 2 ILS: 1.0 x 10-7 in any one landing; and — for integrity levels 3 & 4 ILS: 0.5 x 10-9 in any one landing. The probability of losing ILS guidance localiser or glide can be assumed to be: — for integrity level 1 ILS: no demonstrated values; — for integrity level 2 ILS: 4.0 x 10-6 in any period of 15 s; — for integrity level 3 ILS: 2.0 x 10-6 in any period of 15 s; and — for integrity level 4 ILS: 2.0 x 10-6 in any period of 30s (localiser) or 15 s (glide) 3 MLS signal-in-space model The MLS models defined by the ICAO All Weather Operations Panel (AWOP) (reference AWOP/14-WP/659, dated 4/2/93) should be used for approach simulations. Alternatively, if certification of MLS is only sought for ILS lookalike operations, the applicant may use the ILS model defined in paragraph 2 above. This is based on the assertion that the MLS quality is equal to or better than that of the ILS and requires no further substantiation. 4 GLS-in-space model What follows describes one acceptable model for the assumed characteristics of GLS guidance errors. Applicants using an alternate model are responsible for documenting the alternate model, its basis (including a mapping to ICAO Annex 10 characteristics and any additional assumptions made), and its validity. The ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) performance model simulates the outputs of a fault-free GBAS airborne receiver when used in conjunction with a GBAS ground station categorised as either GAST C or GAST D. The architecture of the GLS model is illustrated in Figure 3. The GLS model includes a navigation system error (NSE) generator which generates NSEs representative of a GBAS providing approach service type C or D as defined by the applicable requirements [i, ii, iii]. The position calculator adds NSEs to the true position of the GLS reference point (GRP). The deviation calculator computes the deviations of the GRP given the FAS data. A latency model is applied to each output of the GLS model. Development of all components of the GLS model is documented in [iv], [v] and [vi]. The NSE generator and NSE step generator are discussed below. 4.1 GBAS NSE generator The GBAS NSE generator produces NSEs in the along-track, cross-track and vertical directions. The block diagram of the GBAS NSE generator is shown in Figure 4. The Gaussian white noise (GWN) generator produces three independent noise sequences with zero, mean and unity variance. Each sequence is filtered by a second- 103 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO order Butterworth filter. The compensation gain which brings the root mean square (rms) of the filtered noise back to unity is obtained as: 2 2 Gx  T n [1] The filter output is scaled by NSE scale factors Katrk, Kxtrk, and Kvert. At the beginning of each run, the NSE generator filter should be initialised at a value sampled from a Gaussian distribution consistent with these scale factors. FAS Data, GERP Flag, Dev Scale Flags True Ant Pos Deviation Deviations Latency FAS GRP Calc GAST Pos (ECEF) GRP NSE Position Seed & T Generator Calc GRP Pos NSE Latency (LLH) Horiz Dist to LTP Attitudes, Body Latency Rates, GRP Offset, Offset Flag Figure 3: GBAS signal model Katrk Model Type K Value Kxtrk (nominal vs. Selector Limit Kvert Geometry) GAST 2nd Order Compensation  =1 NSEatr X   k Filter Gain Seq1   Seed, T GWN Seq2 2nd Order Compensation  =1   NSE xtrk Generator Filter Gain X    Seq3 s  2nd Order Compensation  =1   NSE ver Filter Gain X   t   Step Function   Generator Step Event Time Limit Case Malfunction Event Time Fault Mode Generator 104 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure 4: GLS NSE generator 4.2 Second-order filter of GBAS NSE generator The second-order filter to be implemented in the GBAS NSE generator is characterised by:  n2 H ( s)  2 s  2 n s   n2 [2] where n is the natural frequency given by: — for GAST C: n = 0.01 rad/sec — for GAST D: n = 0.033 rad/sec 4.3 Noise scale factor The model accounts for the variation in accuracy due to satellite geometry by setting the noise scale factor to a constant which is sampled from a distribution. For each run, the value of Kvert is determined by selecting a sample, x, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The value of Kvert is then given by the following function of x: a3 K vert  f x   a1  a 2 x  x 1 [3] Where the parameters of the function are dependent on the GBAS approach service type as given in Table 3 below: Service type a1 a1 a3 Kvert_max GAST C 0.4 0.2 0.006 10/5.762=1.736 GAST D 0.52 0.47 0.005 10/5.762=1.736 Table 3: GAST dependent parameters for Kvert If the random pick from a distribution between 0 and 1 results in Kvert >Kvert_max, then the value should be discarded and another sample should be selected from the uniform distribution set to the maximum value from the table9. An alternative acceptable means for computing the NSE scale factors is given in Section 2 below. For each run, the value of Kxtrk is determined by selecting a sample, x1, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. For each run, the value of Katrk is determined by selecting a sample, x2, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The cross-track and along-track scale factors are then computed by: K xtrk  f x1   a1  a2 x1  a3 x1  1 [4] 9 This corresponds to the case where VPL>10 m and therefore the system is not available. 105 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO K atrk  f x2   a1  a2 x2  a3 x2  1 [5] where the parameters of the function are dependent on the GBAS approach service type as given in Table 3: Service type a1 a2 a3 Kxtrk_max, Katrk max GAST C 0.2 0.1 0.003 40/5.762=6.942 GAST D 0.21 0.12 0.003 17/5.762=2.951 Table 4: GAST dependent parameters for Kxtrk If the random pick from a distribution between 0 and 1 results in Kxtrk>Kxtrk_max or Kaxttrk>Kxtrk_max, then the value should be discarded and another sample should be selected from the uniform distribution. 4.4 NSE step generator The NSE step generator is illustrated in Figure 5. Step errors will occur when individual satellites are removed from the position solution (e.g. a satellite fails and stops transmitting or the user receiver stops tracking a satellite for any reason). The step generator produces representative step errors in the vertical, along-track and cross-track directions. This is accomplished by scaling a unit step function by factors that are derived from representative statistical distributions. First, three random samples, one for each axis, are selected from a zero mean unit variance normal distribution. Then, these samples are multiplied by scale factors that are chosen to simulate the statistical variation in the size of an error that would result from normal variations in the relative geometry between the user and the satellites. Finally, the resultant constant factors are multiplied with a unit step function time sequence. KStep_atrk Uniform Scale Factor Seed Random x Computation KStep_xtrk Number Generator One sample from Kstep = f(x) KStep_vert Uniform distribution, 0x1 One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSEStep_atrk X X Seed GWN One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSEStep_xtrk X X Generator s One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSE Step_vert X X 0 t = event time Unit Step Function Seq Generator Step Event Time 0 t = event time Figure 5: NSE step generator 4.5 NSE step generator scale factor computation 106 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO For each run, the value of step_vert is determined by selecting a sample, x, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The value of step_vert is then given by the following function of x: b3  step _ vert  f x   b1  b2 x  x  1.01 [6] where the parameters of the function are dependent on the GBAS approach service type as given in Table 5: 107 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Service type b1 b2 b3  step _ vert _ max GAST C 0.4 0.8 0.07 FASVAL/2 GAST D 0.5 0.8 0.05 3.5  step _ vert Table 5: GAST dependent parameters for If the random pick from a distribution between 0 and 1 results in step_vert > step_vert_max, then the value should be discarded and another sample should be selected from the uniform distribution. For each run, the value of step_xtrk is determined by selecting a sample, x1, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The value of step_atrk is determined by selecting a sample, x2, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The cross-track and along-track NSE step scale factors are then computed by:  step _ xtrk  f x1   b1  b2 x1  b3 x1  1 [7]  step _ atrk  f x2   b1  b2 x2  b3 x2  1 [8] where the parameters of the function are dependent on the GBAS approach service type as given in Table 6: Service type b1 b2 b3  step _ axtrk _ max GAST C 0.32 0.32 0.05 20 m GAST D 0.35 0.35 0.35 5.5 m  step _ xtrk  step _ atrk Table 6: GAST dependent parameters for or If the random pick from a distribution between 0 and 1 results in step_xtrk > step_xtrk_max, or step_atrk > step_axtrk_max, then the value should be discarded and another sample should be selected from the uniform distribution. The scale factor, Kstep_vert, of the magnitude of the vertical step error is then selected from a normal distribution with 0 mean and a standard deviation of step_vert. The scale factor, Kstep_xtrk, of the cross-track deviation is selected from a normal distribution with 0 mean and a standard deviation of step_xtrk. 4.6 Latency model The latency of the GLS output should be delayed for a period of 400 msec. 4.7. Fault mode generator 108 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The fault mode generator produces a ramp error with characteristics as illustrated in Figure 7. The effect of a malfunction is modelled as a ramp, with a start time, a ramp rate and a total exposure time, Tmax. The maximum value of the ramp depends on the ramp rate and time to alert. The ramp is assumed to increase to the level of the maximum value and then to exceed that value for a period equal to the time-to- detect and mitigate the failure. The erroneous satellite is isolated and the error returns to the nominal value (i.e. the fault error is set to zero). The model may alternatively produce step errors where the maximum change in error due to the step is specified rather than the ramp rate. (See reference [vii] for more details regarding GLS fault modelling). Limit or Malfunction Axis to Apply KLimit_atrk Uniform Set Limits Seed Random x KLimit_xtrk Number Generator One sample from Kother = f(x) KLimit_vert Uniform distribution, 0x1 One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSELMF_atrk X X Seed GWN One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSELMF_xtrk X X Generator s One sample from normal distribution, =0,  = 1 NSE LMF_vert X X 0 e Unit Ramp Ramp Rate Function Seq Ramp Duration Generator Ramp Event Time 0 t = event time Figure 6: Limit malfunction generator 109 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO From Figure 7, it can be seen that for the ramp: EffectiveVAL TMAX  TTD  RR [9] EMAX and the effective vertical alert limit (VAL) depend on the type of malfunction. For satellite ranging sources, the effective VAL is a function of the maximum error allowable with probability greater than 1x10 -9 by the Pmd performance constrain with conditional probability (reference [Error! Bookmark not defined.], Appendix B, Section 3.6.7.3.3.3), (i.e. 1.6 m) multiplied by the geometry screening limit. E MAX  1.6  S vert _ max [10] S vert _ max where: is the maximum vertical projection for any satellite allowed by geometry screening. This value is set by the aircraft manufacturer to limit the size of E MAX by specifying Svert and Svert2 as described in reference [viii]. For ground segment reference receiver failures, the effective VAL will depend on the geometry screening applied in the airborne equipment. If no additional geometry screening is applied other than VPL<VAL, the maximum effective VAL is 9.35 [m] (see Table 7). If additional geometry screening is applied, a lower effective VAL may result. Reference [viii] explains how to compute the effective VAL given additional geometry screening. Figure 8 shows a plot of maximum vertical and lateral errors as a function of vertical and lateral alert limit screening. The calculations to produce the plot in Figure 8 are described in detail in reference [Error! Bookmark not defined.]. 110 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure 7: Malfunction transient For ionospheric anomalies, the maximum error Emax is less than or equal to EIG  Svert or EIG  Svert2, whichever is larger. Svert and Svert2 are geometry screening parameters set in the airborne equipment as described in [ix]. The Emax will be limited by the airborne equipment, which will limit the EIG X Svert and EIG x Svert2 to a maximum value for the airborne installation for each axis, vertical and lateral. For example, if an aircraft can be certified with an Emax = 12 m, then it will limit Svert and Svert2 to 12 m divided by the broadcast EIG. Table 7 and Table 8 give the characteristics for transient errors in the vertical and horizontal directions respectively for each of the three major identified fault types. Fault type Service Ramp rates Effective VAL Emax Time to type detect [m/s] [m] [m] (TTD) [s] Ranging GAST C 0– 10 Dependent 6 source failures GAST D 0– 1.6  Svert Dependent 2.5 Iono GAST C 0–4 N/A N/A N/A anomaly GAST D 0–4 N/A Max (EIG  Svert) N/A Max (EIG  Svert2) [note 2] Single- GAST C 0– 10 Dependent 6 reference receiver GAST D 0– 9.35 Dependent 2.5 failure [note 1] Table 7: Malfunction transient characteristics in the vertical direction 111 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Note 1: These values are an absolute worst case assuming no geometry screening is done based on TB_ air_vert or M. Only geometry screening of VPL<VAL=10 m is assumed. Smaller maximum values can be obtained by using additional geometry screening as per reference [x]. Note 2: EIG is the uplink parameter for the ionospheric error monitor. Fault type Service Ramp rates Effective Emax Time to type LAL detect [m/s] [m] (TTD) [s] [m] Ranging GAST C 0– 40 Dependent 6 source failures GAST D 0– 1.6  Slat Dependent 2.5 Iono GAST C 0–4 N/A N/A N/A anomaly GAST D 0–4 N/A Max (EIG  N/A Slat) Max (EIG  Slat2) [note 2] Single ref GAST C 0– 40 Dependent 6 receiver failure GAST D 0– 35.9 Dependent 2.5 [note 1] Table 8: Malfunction transient characteristics in the lateral direction Note 1: These values are an absolute worst case assuming no geometry screening is done based on TB_air_lat or M. Only geometry screening of LPL<LAL=40 m is assumed. If geometry screening of LPL<LAL=10 m is applied, then the values for effective LAL would be the same as the value given in Table 7 for effective VAL. Smaller maximum values can be obtained by using additional geometry screening per reference [Error! Bookmark not defined.] (e.g. a limitation on TB_air_lat or M). Note 2: EIG is the broadcast parameter for the ionospheric error monitor. 112 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure 8: Maximum error and Tbac as a function of alert limits 4.8 Integrity and continuity The probability of issuing false GLS guidance can be assumed to be: — for GAST C: 2.0 x 10-7 in any one landing; and — for GAST D: 1 x 10-9 in any period of 15 s. The probability of losing GLS guidance is can be assumed to be: — for GAST C: 8.0 x 10-6 in any period of 15 s; — for GAST D: 2 x 10-6 in any period of 15 s. 4.9 Alternative method for calculating and using NSE model scale factors 4.9.1 Estimation of 10-point piecewise linear interpolation of GBAS NSE — GAST D An alternative method to use the NSE model is to compute, before launching any run of the Monte-Carlo autoland simulations, the distributions of the scale factors, Kvert and Kxtr = Katrk. For these two last quantities, we conservatively allocate the worst horizontal sigma. These distributions have been computed using assumptions described in [xi] and [xii]. Then, for each run of the Monte-Carlo simulations, we draw, from these two distributions, a sigma vertical = Kvert and a worst horizontal sigma for Kxtrk and Katrk, at the beginning of the approach, which are kept constant during the approach. In order to facilitate the use of these distributions, the 10-point piecewise linear interpolation of Kvert and Kworst_horizontal_sigma are provided on the histograms and using a dual entry table X-axis corresponding to Sigma vert or worst_sigma_horizontal in metres. 113 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 4.9.2 Sigma vertical 0.05 bins width = 0.01 m 0.045 0.04 0.035 0.03 nb of occurrences 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.005 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 sigma vert (meters) Figure 9: Sigma vertical samples Sigma_vert Number of occurrences 0.485000000000000 0.000429191837945 0.543326533206011 0.002257116788039 0.655055242735278 0.045229563598357 0.699018742036146 0.043376936959747 0.731326218889690 0.035448466874264 0.860858976217526 0.008926572687034 1.070145122860493 0.001211926592757 1.409975954322260 0.000073333137778 1.573104102697827 0.000010035060959 1.735000000000000 0.000008491205427 114 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 4.9.3 Worst horizontal sigma 0.12 bins width = 0.01 m 0.1 0.08 of nb of occurrences 0.06 occurrences Number 0.04 0.02 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 worst horizontal sigma (meters) Worst horizontal sigma (metres) Figure 10: Worst horizontal sigma samples 115 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Sigma_worst_horizontal Number of occurrences 0.005000000000000 0 0.257665870406134 0.001235856353506 0.293780182441118 0.021311381766140 0.341769349550846 0.107172907188037 0.398519584681962 0.038574002399152 0.489966724012817 0.005669037514146 0.501954763905412 0.003652762189125 0.733255508608094 0.000223859052165 1.294724573608414 0.000000771927766 1.705000000000000 0.000000771927766 As with the NSE noise scale factors, an alternative way of using the step function is to derive scale factors sigma_step_vert and worst_sigma_step horizontal to take into account steps induced by loss of tracking of satellites by the receiver due to geometry (rise/set of satellites) or due to satellite failures. The distributions and the 10-point piecewise linear interpolations are provided below for these two cases for the two dimensions. 4.9.4 Rise/set sigma step vertical 0.035 bins width = 0.01 m 0.03 0.025 of nb of occurrences 0.02 occurrences 0.015 Number 0.01 0.005 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Rise/set - sigma step vert (meters) Rise/set step vert (metres) Figure 11: Rise/set sigma samples 116 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Rise/Set Sigma_step_vert Number of occurrences 0.005000000000000 0.000102160167567 0.072435248412769 0.000251314012215 0.173069321361968 0.007640899466239 0.183661728498818 0.014862132304962 0.266851710720950 0.032471159430220 0.360116883106780 0.022183880145120 0.560386526870370 0.010022935263488 0.707103250848933 0.002542678888367 1.168108921989317 0.000590218235325 1.605000000000000 0 4.9.5 Rise/set worst sigma step horizontal 0.06 bins width = 0.01 m 0.05 0.04 of nb of occurrences 0.03 occurrences Number 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Rise/set - worst sigma step hor (meters) Rise/set – worst sigma step hor (metres) Figure 12: Rise/set worst step horizontal sigma samples 117 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Rise/Set Worst Sigma_Step_Hor Number of occurrences 0.005000000000000 0.000002897188944 0.041875996448845 0.004326488398194 0.054920944044943 0.005392271389607 0.109250543156205 0.058667264538146 0.163832898257929 0.050878995869548 0.205763067528231 0.030017730600579 0.339826367851692 0.005884118967452 0.481495931510671 0.001622467406624 0.537593983881708 0.001038030498786 1.425000000000000 0.000000090537154 4.9.6 Signal loss sigma step vertical 0.025 bins width = 0.01 m 0.02 of 0.015 nb of occurrences occurrences Number 0.01 0.005 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Signal Loss - sigma step vert (meters) Signal loss - sigma step vert (metres) Figure 13: Signal loss sigma step vertical sigma samples 118 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Signal loss Sigma_Step_Vert Number of occurrences 0.005000000000000 0 0.175788354389016 0.000006172962943 0.341225896607212 0.001849289916083 0.501345966346395 0.016428884464905 0.509272880272156 0.014817130740563 0.585415172749149 0.024277512141267 0.634728223925139 0.019985074857159 0.971964045257760 0.004855442265040 0.993665191757176 0.004618156897366 1.565000000000000 0 4.9.7 Signal loss worst sigma step horizontal 0.04 bins width = 0.01 m 0.035 0.03 of 0.025 nb of occurrences 0.02 occurrences Number 0.015 0.01 0.005 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Signal Loss - worst sigma step hor (meters) Signal loss - worst sigma step hor (metres) Figure 14: Signal loss worst sigma step horizontal sigma samples 119 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Signal loss worst Sigma_Step_Hor Number of occurrences 0.005000000000000 0.000476007789371 0.115610839554299 0.025790440689983 0.180148721789614 0.034439075056633 0.320833114781513 0.015472307517217 0.586810140697307 0.003675003851236 0.880744610706960 0.000358424380494 3.908283843494504 0.000000000123437 3.975118428756177 0.000000000123437 4.601736622281720 0 4.995000000000000 0.000000016910875 120 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Wind models for approach and landing simulation 1 Purpose The purpose of this AMC is to provide acceptable wind models, turbulence and wind shear that can be used to demonstrate in simulation system performance in approach and landing. 2.1 Wind model number 1 2.1.1 Mean wind It may be assumed that the cumulative probability of reported mean wind speed at landing, and the crosswind component of that wind are as shown in Figure 15. Normally, the mean wind which is reported to the pilot, is measured at a height, which may be between 6 m (20 ft) and 10 m (33 ft) above the runway. The models of wind shear and turbulence given in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 assume this reference height is used. 2.1.2 Wind shear 2.1.2.1 Normal wind shear Wind shear should be included in each simulated approach and landing unless its effect can be accounted for separately. The magnitude of the shear should be defined by the expression: u = 0.43 U log10 (z) + 0.57 U (1) where ‘u’ is the mean wind speed at height z metres (z ≥ 1 m) and ‘U’ is the mean wind speed at 10 m (33 ft). 2.1.2.2 Abnormal wind shear The effect of wind shears exceeding those of paragraph 2.1.2.1 should be investigated using known severe wind shear data. 2.1.3 Turbulence 2.1.3.1 Horizontal component of turbulence It may be assumed that the longitudinal component (in the direction of mean wind) and lateral component of turbulence may each be represented by a Gaussian process having a spectrum of the form: 2 2 L  1   2 L2 Φ (Ω) = (2) where: () = a spectral density [[metres/sec]2 per [radian/metre]].  = root mean square (rms) turbulence intensity = 0·15 U. L = scale length = 183 m (600 ft)  = frequency [radians/metre]. 2.1.3.2 Vertical component of turbulence It may be assumed that the vertical component of turbulence has a spectrum of the form defined by equation (2) in paragraph 3.1.3.1. The following values have been in use:  = 2.8 km/h (15 kt) with L = 9.2 m (30 ft) 121 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO or alternatively  = 0.09 U with L = 4·6 m (15 ft) when z < 9.2 m (30 ft) and L = 0.5 z when 9.2 < z < 305 m (30 < z < 1 000 ft) Figure 15:Cumulative probability of reported mean wind and headwind, tailwind and crosswind components when landing NOTE: This data is based on worldwide in-service operations of UK airlines (sample size: about 2 000) 2.2 Wind model number 2 2.2.1 Mean wind The mean wind is the steady state wind measured at landing. This mean wind is composed of a downwind component (headwind and tailwind) and a crosswind component. The cumulative probability distributions for these components are provided in Figure 16 (downwind) and Figure 17 (crosswind). 122 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Alternatively, the mean wind can be defined with magnitude and direction. The cumulative probability for the mean wind magnitude is provided in Figure 18, and the histogram of the mean wind direction is provided in Figure 19. The mean wind is measured at a reference altitude of 20 ft above ground level (AGL). The models of the wind shear and turbulence given in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 assume this reference altitude of 20 ft AGL is used. 2.2.2 Wind shear When stable and steady horizontal wind blows over the ground surface, terrain irregularities and obstacles such as trees and buildings alter the steady wind near the surface and a boundary layer will cause a form of windshear. The magnitude of this shear is defined by the following expression: Vwref = 0.204*V20*ln((h + 0.15)/0.15) where Vwref is the mean wind speed measured at h ft and V20 is the mean wind speed (ft/sec) at 20 ft AGL. Note: This expression does not represent the violent windshears created by unstable air mass conditions. 2.2.3 Turbulence 2.2.3.1 Turbulence spectra The turbulence spectra are of the Von Karman form. The vertical component of turbulence (perpendicular to the earth’s surface) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation:  w 2L w 1 8 1  339 L w 2 3  w  2 1  1 339 L   w 2 11 / 6 = The horizontal component of turbulence (in the direction of the mean horizontal wind) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation: u 2Lu 1  1  1 339 L   u 2 5/6 u   = The lateral component of turbulence (perpendicular to the mean horizontal wind) has a spectrum of the form defined by the following equation:  v 2L v 1 8 1  339 L v2 3 v  = 2 1  1 339 L   v 2 11 / 6 where Ω = spectral density [ft/sec]2 σ = root mean square (rms) turbulence intensity [ft/sec] L = scale length Ω = spatial frequency [radians/foot] = /VT 123 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO ω = temporal frequency [radians/sec] VT = aircraft speed [ft/sec] 2.2.3.2 Turbulence intensities and scale lengths At or above an altitude h1, turbulence is considered to be isotropic, i.e. the statistical properties of the turbulence components are independent. This means that one can consider the turbulence components to have equal intensities. Below h1, turbulence varies with altitude. In this case, intensity and scale length are expressed as functions of V20 (ft/sec ) and altitude. Turbulence intensities W = 0.1061 V20 For h < h1,  W 04  0  823 h   0  177     h1   U = V = For h ≥ h1, U = V = W where h1 = 1 000 ft Scale lengths For h < h1, LW = h h 12  u  3  0  823 h  LU = LV = LW   =  0  177      h1   w  For h ≥ h1 LW = LU = LV = h1 where h1 = 1 000 ft 2.2.3.3 Fixed turbulence intensities for pilot-in-the-loop simulations The following fixed levels of turbulence intensity [ft/sec] have been found to be representative when used to programme low-altitude simulations with the pilot in the loop. Turbulence intensity Light Medium Heavy  = v 2.5 5.0 8.3 w 1.25 2.5 4.17 Turbulence scale lengths vary with altitude according to the equations of paragraph 2.2.3.2. 124 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure 16: Headwind — tailwind description Figure 17: Crosswind description 125 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure 18: Annual percent probability of mean wind speed equalling or exceeding given values Wind direction histogram Wind direction relative to runway heading Figure 19: Histogram of the mean wind direction relative to runway heading 126 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 2.3. Wind model number 3 This wind model is a derivative of wind model number 2. The changes are a result of experience from pilot-in- the-loop simulator tests for Category 3 HUD certification, where the wind shear and turbulence intensities were found to be more representative. The changes to wind model 2 are as follows: (a) Para 2.2.2. Change Vwref = 0.204 x V20 log n [(h+0.15) ÷ 0.15] to Vwref = 0.165 x V20 log n [(h +0.046) ÷ 0.046] (b) Para 2.2.3.2. Change w = 0.1061 V20 to w = 0.0625 V20 (c) Para 2.2.3.2. Change Lu to Lu = 600 ft 127 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SUBPART B — APPROACH AND LANDING AMC TO SECTION 1 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR TYPE B OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS/ALTITUDES BELOW 250 FT DOWN TO 200 FT — CATEGORY 1 OPERATIONS (CAT I) GENERAL AMC AWO.B.CATI.101 Book 2 of CS-25 provides the acceptable means of compliance for an aeroplane to be eligible to perform xLS approaches down to a DH of 60 m (200 ft). 128 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 2 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 60 M (200 FT) AND DOWN TO 45 M (150 FT) — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY 1 OPERATIONS (SA CAT I) AMC AWO.B.SACATI.101(a) Applicability and terminology An aeroplane with a basic airworthiness approval for IFR operations is eligible to perform ILS (or equivalent) precision approaches down to a DH of 60 m (200 ft), assuming that the necessary navigation receiver(s) and instruments and their installation have been approved. The purpose of this Section is to specify the supplementary airworthiness requirements for the performance of approaches on author ised Category 1 ILS (or equivalent) runways with DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 45 m (150 ft). Authorised runway criteria include ILS (or equivalent) beam suitability for the operation and pre-threshold terrain compatibility with the use of a radio altimeter (or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level) at a DH of 45 m (150 ft). Terminology (a) The term ‘approach system’ refers only to the airborne system. It includes the equipment listed in AMC AWO.B.SACATI.111 and all related sensors, instruments and power supplies. (b) ‘Decision height (DH)’ is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been visually assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety. Where it is used in this Section, it means the minimum DH at which compliance with the requirements of this Section have been demonstrated. (c) A ‘go-around’ is the transition from an approach to a stabilised climb. (d) ‘Failure condition’ and terms describing the probabilities and effects of failure conditions are defined in AMC 25.1309. (e) The terms ‘localiser’,’glide path’ and ‘beam’ have been retained for use with either ILS or equivalent. (f) ‘ILS or equivalent’ is understood as ILS, MLS and GLS. It may include GNSS approaches if they demonstrate the same global level of precision, integriy and continuity as an ILS CAT II operation with a DH of 150 ft. (g) ‘HUD or equivalent’ is understood as HUD or head-worn display (HWD). Guidance on controls, indicators and alerts that are associated with installations that incorporate more than one type of approach system can be found in AMC AWO.A.ALS.110. System concept The principle of SA CAT I operations is to provide a lower DH than the standard CAT I operation by mitigating ILS category 1 beam and reduced runway lighting by additional approach system requirements. These requirements intend to compensate for lower accuracy, integrity and time to alert of category 1 beams compared to those of category 2 beams, and provide assistance to acquire the visual cues required to complete the landing with reduced lighting. 129 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Systems that have shown or can demonstate compliance with CS-AWO Subpart B — Section 3 (CAT II) are considered to be eligible for SA CAT I operations if they are demonstrated to be safely used in a CAT I environment. Other systems can be considered if suitable justification and mitigation means can be provided. Due to low-visibilty procedures being required to be in place for SA CAT I operations, the following non- exhaustive list of approach systems may be considered for SA CAT I operation: (a) HUD (or equivalent) with flight guidance which is approved for ILS (or equivalent) manual operation down to 36 m (120 ft). (b) SVGS, as a combination of a synthetic vision system (SVS) and flight guidance based on ILS (or equivalent) displayed on the primary flight display or HUD (or equivalent), and high-precision position assurance monitoring. (c) Automatic approach system coupled down to 36 m (120 ft) with a HUD (or equivalent) to ease manual transition at the DH, thanks to the control of the FPV in the visual segment. (d) Automatic landing system alone, provided it is demonstrated that failures linked to category 1 beam can be recognised by pilot in low-visibility conditions. (e) visibility conditions. (f) Automatic landing system with a HUD (or equivalent) to monitor the autoland path along the category 1 beam before and after the DH. AMC AWO.B.SACATI.102 Safety level In showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects should not be factored by the proportion of approaches, which are made with the DH below 60 m (200 ft). AMC AWO.B.SACATI.103 Go-around rate On the assumption that system failures will not significantly reduce the success rate, compliance with this provision may be demonstrated by means of the continuous method of AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 using the following interpretation: (a) A localiser excess deviation alert will occur between 90 m (300 ft) and 45 m (150 ft) in no more than 5 % of the approaches. (b) A glide path excess deviation alert will occur between 90 m (300 ft) and 45 m (150 ft) in no more than 5 % of the approaches. AMC AWO.B.SACATI.107 Manual control A change in the means of control is considered to be a change from the automatic to manual control. AMC AWO.B.SACATI.111 Installed equipment (a) ILS and MLS airborne equipment standards Acceptable standards for airborne receiver equipment include: 130 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (1) Localiser receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED -46B or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and glide path receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-47A or RTCA DO-192 or later revision. Note: The aforementioned localiser specifications are in accordance with the FM Broadcast Interference Immunity requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, and paragraph 3.1.4. (2) MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED -36A or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and DME/P or DME/N transceivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-54 or RTCA DO-189. (3) Combined ILS/MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-74 or equivalent standard. (4) Combined ILS/MLS/GPS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-88 or equivalent standard. (b) Flight guidance system Potentially acceptable flight guidance systems for SA CAT I include: (1) HUD (or equivalent) with flight guidance complying with CS-AWO Subpart A, Section 2 and Subpart B, Section 3. (2) SVGS complying with CS-AWO Subpart A, Section 4. (3) Automatic approach system complying with CS-AWO Subpart A. Section 1, with a HUD (or equivalent) complying with AMC 25.11, to help flight path monitoring and control after the DH. (4) Automatic landing system complying with CS-AWO Subpart A, Section 1 with ILS CAT 1 beam model, and CS-AWO Subpart B, Section 3. (5) Automatic landing system as defined in (4) with a HUD (or equivalent) complying with AMC 25-11 to help flight path monitoring before and after the DH. (6) Any other flight guidance system that can demonstrate the required performance of Subpart B, Section 2. (c) Radio altimeter equipment standard The airborne equipment used to provide height above terrain may be a radio altimeter complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-30 or RTCA DO-155. Alternatively, another device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level may be used. AMC AWO.B.SACATI.113 Flight demonstration Refer to AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 for AMC for performance demonstration of SA CAT I. In addition to AMC AWO.B.CATII.113, for novel or new combinations of navigation means and visual displays/cues, it should be demonstated that it is possible to successfully and safely land the aircraft after the DA/H using the selected navigation means and visual displays/cues. This could be achieved by a proof of concept demonstration in representative weather and visual conditions in at least a simulated environment. 131 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC AWO.B.SACATI.117 Mode selection and switching If a transition from automatic mode to manual control is required by the approach system, it should be demonstrated that this transition can be made without excessive workload in the actual visual references available on a SA CAT I (or equivalent type sought) runway. If the demonstration is to be performed with a simulator, the simulator should be: (a) equipped with a visual system that provides an acceptable representation of the actual visibility conditions for which operational approval is sought; and (b) suitably validated by flight test demonstrations for the intended operation. AMC AWO.B.SACATI.119 Failure conditions In compliance with CS 25.1309 and CS 25.1329, failures of the flight guidance system, including on-board navigation receivers, which would require pilot recognition in relation with external references required by AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c) point (d), should be demonstrated in the actual visual references available on a SA CAT I (or equivalent type sought) runway (See CS AWO.B.SACATI.117). AMC AWO.B.SACATI.120 xLS navigation means (including signal-in-space) failure The effect of detected and undetected failures of the navigation means (including signal in space) intended to be used for the operation should be considered. The guidance of this Section is intended to address non-aircraft system errors. Due to LVPs being in place for SA CAT I operations, the effects of interruption or disturbance of the ground navigation means by surface movement in sensitive or critical aerodrome areas does not need to be considered. A description of the possible fault modes of navigation means (including signal in space) that are derived from ICAO Annex 10 Volume I can be found in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. It includes a description of detected failures and the probability of undetected failures. In the demonstration, credit may be taken for the ground subsystem’s probability of undetected failures. Note: Detected localiser and glide (or equivalent) threshold and time to alert and probability of undetected failures depend on the class of the navigation means. Demonstration made for CAT II/III system may not be applicable for lower-class navigation means. Navigation means (including signal-in-space) failures which would require pilot recognition in relation with external references (required by AMC5.SPA.LVO.105(c) point (d), should be demonstrated in the actual visual references available on a SA CAT I (or equivalent type sought) runway. (See CS AWO.B.SACATI.117) Navigation means (including signal-in-space) should ensure a minimum vertical clearance of 1 m (3 ft) from the obstacle clearance surface including height loss during the missed approach if applicable in the event of a failure (detected or undetected). If crew action is required to trigger a missed approach procedure, a standard delay of 1 s should be considered after crew detection. Probability of exceeding the 1 m (3 ft) clearance from the obstacle clearance surface due to navigation means shall be demonstrated lower than 10-7 per approach. In addition, if automatic landing is provided, it should be demonstrated that the probability of landing outside the limits that define a safe landing due to navigation me ans is lower than 10 -7. 132 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The effect of the probability of failure of the navigation means (including signal in space) should be considered and the effect on the go-around rate should be investigated. 133 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 3 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 60 M (200 FT) AND DOWN TO 30 M (100 FT) — CATEGORY 2 OPERATIONS (CAT II) AMC AWO.B.CATII.101(a) Applicability and terminology A precision approach system as defined in ICAO Annex 10 is considered to be an xLS (ILS, MLS, or GLS) which has outputs indicating the magnitude and sense of deviation from a preset azimuth and elevation angle giving equivalent operational characteristics to those of a conventional ILS. An aeroplane with a basic airworthiness approval for IFR operations is eligible to perform xLS ILS or MLS precision approaches down to a decision height DH of 60 m (200 ft), assuming that the necessary xLS ILS/MLS receiver(s) and instruments and their installation have been approved. The purpose of Subpart B Section 3 is to specify the supplementary airworthiness requirements for the performance of xLS ILS or MLS approaches with decision height DHs below 60 m (200 ft) down to 30 m (100 ft). This material may not be appropriate to for other precision approach aids. Terminology (a) The term ‘approach system’ used here refers only to the airborne system. It includes the equipment listed in CS AWO.B.CATII.111 and all related sensors, instruments and power supplies. (b) ‘DH’ is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been visually assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety. Where it is used in Section 3, it means the minimum DH at which compliance with the requirements of Section 3 has been demonstrated. (c) A ‘go-around’ is the transition from an approach to a stabilised climb. (d) ‘Failure condition’ and terms describing the probabilities and effects of failure conditions are defined in AMC 25.1309. The terms ‘localiser’ and ‘glide path’ have been retained for use with either ILS, or MLS or GLS. Cross reference is made in this Subpart to AMC AWO.A.ALS.110 which provides guidance on controls, indicators and warnings alerts associated with installations incorporating more than one type of approach system (e.g. ILS and MLS and/or GLS). AMC AWO.B.CATII.102 Safety level In showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of pe rformance or failure effects should not be factored by the proportion of approaches, which are made with the decision height DH below 60 m (200 ft). AMC AWO.B.CATII.103 Go-around rate On the assumption that system failures will not significantly reduce the success rate, compliance with this requirement provision may be demonstrated by means of the continuous method of AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 using the following interpretation: 134 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (a) On no more than 5 % of approaches will A localiser excess deviation alert will occur between 90 m (300 ft) and 30 m (100 ft) in no more than 5% of approaches. (b) On no more than 5 % of approaches will A glide path excess deviation alert will occur between 90 m (300 ft) and 30 m (100 ft) in no more than 5% of approaches. AMC AWO.B.CATII.107 Manual control A change in the means of control is considered to be a change from the automatic to manual control. AMC AWO.B.CATII.111 Installed equipment (a) ILS and MLS xLS airborne equipment standards Acceptable standards for airborne receiver equipment include: (1) Localiser receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED -46B or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and glide path receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-47A or RTCA DO-192 or later revision. Note: The aforementioned localiser specifications are in accordance with the FM Broadcast Interference Immunity requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, and paragraph 3.1.4. (2) MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED -36A or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and DME/P or DME/N transceivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-54 or RTCA DO-189. (3) Combined ILS/MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-74 or equivalent standard. (4) Combined ILS/MLS/GPS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-88 or equivalent standard. (5) Combined ILS/MLS/GPS/GLS receivers, or combined ILS/GPS/GLS receivers, complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-88, RTCA DO-246E, and RTCA DO-253D, or equivalent standards. (b) Radio altimeter equipment standard The airborne equipment used to provide height above terrain may be a radio altimeter complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-30 or RTCA DO-155. Alternatively, another device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level may be used. AMC AWO.B.CATII.112 Minimum equipment One xLS receiver may be unserviceable if it is justified by an SSA. AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 Flight demonstration 1 Flight path control Compliance with AWO 231 CS AWO.B.CATII.113 may be shown by a flight test programme covering a representative range of weight, centre of gravity CofG position, ILS and/or MLS ground facility characteristics, aeroplane configurations and wind speed. At least three ILS ground facilities 135 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO and/or at least two MLS/GLS ground facilities should be used with an approximately equal number of approaches to each. The aeroplane and its equipment should be representative of the production standard in relevant areas. For handflown approaches conducted using a flight director displayed on a HUD, at least three different pilots flying should be used with the total number of approaches flown being approximately evenly divided among them. Since it is not economically possible to make a large number of approaches to show compliance with AMC AWO.B.CATII.113, it is necessary to impose a confidence level on the results of the programme. A confidence level of 90 % has been selected to allow a reasonable number of approaches. Two methods of demonstrating compliance are given: the ‘continuous method’ and the ‘pass or fail method’. The mathematical derivation of these two methods is given in Appendix 1 to AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. 1.1 Continuous method (analysis of maximum value) If this method is used, a minimum of 30 approaches should be made to provide an adequate sample. If more than one type of precision approach system is installed, approximately equal numbers of approaches should be carried out for each type of approach system being certified certificated. The maximum glide path and localiser deviations occurring between 90 m (300 ft) and 30 m (100 ft) should be recorded using test instrumentation and the results analysed in one of the following two ways. 1.1.1 Numerical analysis n  x  1 a. Calculate   i 2 2n i 1 where: x i is the maximum glide path (or localiser) deviation recorded between 90 m (300 ft) and 30 m (100 ft) on the approach, and n is the number of approaches. x0  1  28  b. Calculate   1      n  where x0 is the excess deviation alert setting c. Calculate the probability of success, P,,where: :  2     P   = 100 1  e 2      If P() is 95 % or more, the aeroplane meets the criteria with the required levels of confidence. 136 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 1.1.2 Graphical analysis This is essentially the same as the numerical analysis but it allows inspection of the results as the programme progresses so as to give an early indication of the likelihood of success. n a. Calculate  x  i 1 i 2 as the programme progresses and plot the result against the number of approaches completed on Figure 1. Note: Figure 1 is based on excessive glideslope and localiser deviation thresholds of 75 µA and 25 µA, respectively, as specified in AMC AWO.B.CATII.115(a). If lower thresholds are used, Figure 1 should be amended using the method specified in Appendix 1 to AMC AWO.B.CATII.113, paragraph 3, ‘Graphical analysis’. b. When the plotted line enters the ‘pass’ region, the programme may be stopped. 1.2 Pass or fail method This method is suitable for use when it is not practicable to install recording equipment. A total of at least 46 successful approaches are necessary to pass this method. If more than one type of precision approach system is installed, approximately equal numbers of approaches should be carried out for each type of approach system being certified certificated. Each approach is made using category 2 procedures and a record is kept of any unsatisfactory approaches due to ILS or MLS xLS tracking performance or airborne system malfunctions. The success of the programme is judged against the criterion shown in Figure 2. 1.3 Numerical analysis by simulation This method is suitable for use when a simulation has been demonstrated valid by flight tests (i.e. simulation tools to demonstrated CAT III automatic landing as per AMC AWO.A.ALS.106). The numerical analysis method proposed in paragraph 1.1 can be used provided that: — deviation is computed from aircraft positon to intended flight path; — signal-in-space model use for simulation is representative of the elected navigation means for the operation. Signal-in-space models representative of navigation means can be found in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A; and — Wind models used for simulation are representative. Acceptable representative wind models can be found in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. 2 Speed control Where an automatic throttle is used, airspeed should be recorded and shown to remain within ±9.3 Km/h (±5 kt) of the intended value, disregarding rapid fluctuations due to turbulence. 137 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO squared of deviations Sum Number of approaches (n) squared of deviations Sum Number of approaches (n) Figure 1: Graphical analysis 138 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Number of failed approaches Number of approaches The dashed line illustrates achieved progress with failures on approaches 30 and 60. Figure 2: Pass or fail method AMC AWO.B.CATII.115(a) Excess-deviation alerts The excess deviation alerts should be set to operate when the xLS ILS or MLS deviation exceeds not more than: — 75 µA for the glide path; and — 25 µA for the localiser. AMC AWO.B.CATII.122 Aeroplane flight manual The AFM may contain a statement to the effect that the categories of xLS navigation means which have been used as the basis for certification should not be taken as a limitation. In that case , the AFM should also contain a statement that some CAT I xLS navigation means may not be suitable for use by the approach system. 139 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO APPENDIX 1 TO AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 Category 2 xLS ILS and MLS tracking performance 1 Introduction AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 gives acceptable methods of demonstrating acceptable xLS ILS and/or MLS tracking performance. This appendix gives the mathematical derivation of these methods. 2 Numerical analysis The maximum glide path or localiser deviation recorded during an ILS or MLS approach will vary from one approach to another and may be treated as a statistical variable. If it is assumed that the glideslope and localiser deviations recorded during an ILS or MLS approach have a normal distribution with mean zero, then it can be shown that the maximum deviations (ignoring the sign of the maximum value) during a certain approach interval follow a Rayleigh distribution of the form: 2  x   1   2   Px  x  0  e 20 where x is the maximum glideslope or localiser deviation and  0 is the scale parameter of the Rayleigh distribution function. It follows that the probability of recording a maximum deviation less than some specified value x o is: 2 x  x0 1  0 2   Px 0    0  P x dx  1  e  0 It can be shown that: x 20  1 2  x Px  dx 0 2 and, to a good approximation: n 2  1 2n  x  i1 i 2 where n is the number of approaches and xi the maximum deviation recorded on each approach. If large numbers of approaches were made,  0 could be calculated and used to find the probability that the maximum ILS and/or MLS deviation will not exceed the excess deviation alert setting. For example, if: 140 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO n 20  1 2n  x   625 i 1 i 2 and the excess deviation alert setting is 75 µA, then: x0  30 0 and P(x0) = 98.9% However, it is not economically practicable to make large numbers of approaches and the effects of small sample sizes should be considered. The usual method of doing so is to impose a confidence level (in this case, 90 %) on the results of the measured sample. If values of   are calculated from a number of samples, sampling theory shows that they will be normally distributed with a mean value 20 and a standard deviation of where n is the number of approaches in each sample. 2 0 n  2  2  n Parameter    0 is normally distributed with a mean value 0 and a standard deviation 1. 20 The probability (or confidence level) that a value of µ is greater (or smaller) than a certain value is given by the probability distribution function of the normal distribution N (0,1): 1 2  d P    1  P   1     1 e 2 2  Figure A1–1 shows numerical solutions of this integral, in percentages of the inte gral from –∞ to ∞, representing one-sided exceedance probabilities (or confidence levels)  for a range of µ 1 values. 141 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Figure A1–1: Confidence level From this figure, it can be seen that for  = 90 %, µ1 = 1.28. Thus, there is a given level of confidence  that:  2  2  n    0   1 20 2 from which 02   1 1 n 2 The value of  for the sample is, as shown earlier: n 2  1 2n  x  i 1 i 2 Hence, the maximum value of 0 can be calculated, followed by the minimum value of 1 1  n   x0 2 where, as before, x0 is the excess deviation alert setting. The minimum probability of not exceeding the excess deviation alert setting is found by using the probability equation: 142 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO  2     P    100 1  e 2      3 Graphical analysis As before, the distribution of the maximum deviation on an approach is as sumed to be such that the probability that it is less than a value x0 is given by: 2 x   1  0  2  P x 0   1 e  0 From this equation, given that the required probability is 95 %, the value of can be calculated as: x0  2  4477 0 The limiting deviations (x0) are the excess deviation alert settings; 75 µA for the glide path and 25 µA for the localiser. Hence: 0 = 30.64 for the glide path 0 = 10.21 for the localiser As given earlier: n   1 2n  x  i 1 i 2 so that: n  x   2n i 1 i 2 2 = 1 878 n for the glide path = 209 n for the localiser Thus, a 95 % success rate can be represented graphically as in Figure A1–2 showing  xi2 plotted against i: 143 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 95% Figure A1–2: Examples of results of flight trials If, now, a flight trials programme is carried out and the accuracy of the results needs to be checked against the 95 % success criterion, this can be achieved by plotting the value of  xi2, the sum of the squares of the maximum recorded deviations, against n, and the number of runs as the trial progresses. If the results are better than required, the graph will cross the 95 % line as shown by line A above. If they are worse, the results will appear as line B. So far, the effect of sample size has not been considered. Its effect is to lower the 95 % success line. For the sample: n   1 2n  x  i 1 i 2 As shown earlier: 2 20  1 1 n which, in the limiting case becomes:    2  20 1  1   n   Hence: n    20 1  1     n   2 1 n i 1 xi 2 or 144 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO n    x   2n 1  n1  i 1 i 2 2 0 0 = 30.64 for the glide path 0 = 10.21 for the localiser µ1 = 1.28 for 90 % confidence level n  x  i1 1 2 = 1 878 n – 2 403 n for the glide path = 209 n – 267 n for the localiser These expressions have been used to produce Figure 1 of AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. 4 Pass or fail method Suppose the rate of failed approaches measured over a large number of approaches is r. In a number of approaches T, the expected number of failures is n = rT. In any given period of time, the number of failures occurring may be greater or less than n, and the small sample may not be typical. If the failures are randomly distributed with respect to time, the probability p of observing F failures when the expected number is n is given by the various terms of the Poisson distribution, viz.: F 0 1 2 3 F enn2 enn3 ennF P e-n e-nn 2! 3! F! This is a convenient form when the long-term average n is known and the probability of an occurrence of abnormally high or low numbers of failures over short periods is to be found. The problem here is the reverse of this. The observed number F is known and the value of n, which is consistent with it, is required. In this case, n can have any value above zero and less than infinity. By considering all values of n from zero to some selected maximum N, the Poisson distribution can be used to find the probability of occurrence of each value of n. Summing all these probabilities gives the cumulativ e probability P that, for an observed value of F, the expected value is not in excess of N. Thus: 145 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO N nF P  F! e dn 0 n As F is a known whole number then, for various values of F, the value of P may be determined as follows: N F  0, P   e dn  1  e 0 n N N F  1, P   ne dn  1  N  1 e 0 n N N n2en e N F  2, P   2! dn  1  N  2N  2 2 0 2 and generally for any value of F,  NF NF1 NF2  P  1        N  1  eN  F!  F  1! F  2!   By evaluating the integral for various values of N, the variation of P with N is obtained. Then, for a given confidence level P, the value of N corresponding to the observed value F is obtained. Thus if the observed rate is F/T, then, for a selected confidence level, it is possible to determine the maximum value for the failure rate N/T. Figure A1–3: P, N and F relationships From Figure A1–3, it can be seen that for a failure rate r of 5 % and a 90 % confidence level, the required number of approaches T is: 146 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO F N T 0 2.30 46 1 3.9 78 2 5.3 106 3 6.65 133 4 8 160 5 9.2 184 For example, it is necessary to make 46 approaches without a failure, 78 if one failure occurs and so on as shown in Figure 2 of AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. 147 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC TO SECTION 4 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AEROPLANES FOR OPERATIONS WITH DECISION HEIGHTS BELOW 30 M (100 FT) OR NO DECISION HEIGHT — CATEGORY 3 OPERATIONS (CAT III) AMC AWO.B.CATIII.101(a) Applicability and terminology A precision approach system as defined in ICAO Annex 10 is considered to be an xLS (ILS, MLS, or GLS) which has outputs indicating the magnitude and sense of deviation from a preset azimuth and elevation angle giving equivalent operational characteristics to that of a conventional ILS. An aeroplane with a basic airworthiness approval for IFR operations is eligible to perform xLS ILS or MLS precision approaches down to a decision height DH of 60 m (200 ft), assuming that the necessary xLS ILS and/or MLS receiver(s) and instruments and their installation have been approved. The supplementary airworthiness criteria for aeroplanes to perform precision approaches down to a decision height DH below 60 m (200 ft) and down to 30 m (100 ft) are contained in Subpart 2 B Section 3. The purpose of this Section is to specify the supplementary airworthiness criteria for aeroplanes to perform precision approaches with decision height DHs below 30 m (100 ft) or with no decision height DH. This material may not be appropriate to precision approach aids other than xLS ILS and MLS. It should be noted that when other guidance information is used to supplement the xLS ILS or MLS (e.g. inertial navigation systems), some reduction may be acceptable in the standard of xLS ILS or MLS ground facility indicated below. Terminology (a) The term ‘landing system’ used here refers only to the airborne system. It includes the equipment listed in CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 and also all related sensors, instruments and power supplies. (b) Automatic landing system: The airborne equipment which provides automatic control of the aeroplane during the approach and landing. (c) Fail-passive automatic landing system: An automatic landing system is fail -passive if, in the event of a failure, there is no significant out-of-trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude but the landing is not completed automatically. (d) For a fail-passive automatic landing system, the pilot assumes control of the aircraft after a failure. The following are typical arrangements: (1) A monitored automatic pilot in which automatic monitors will provide the necessary failure detection and protection. (2) Two automatic pilots with automatic comparison to provide the necessary failure detection and protection. (e) Super fail-passive automatic landing system: An automatic landing system which meets the requirements of point (c) above but has additional features such as automatic align, roll-out and go-around modes which, along with other aircraft characteristics defined under CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 (b)(2), permit operations in lower RVRs than less sophisticated fail-passive landing systems. 148 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (f) Fail-operational automatic landing system: An automatic landing system is fail -operational if, in the event of a failure, the approach, flare and landing can be completed by the remaining p art of the automatic system. In the event of a failure, the automatic landing system will operate as a fail -passive system. The following are typical arrangements: (1) Two monitored automatic pilots, one remaining operative after a failure. (2) Three automatic pilots, two remaining operative (to permit comparison and provide necessary failure detection and protection) after a failure. (g) Fail-operational hybrid landing system: A system which consists of a primary fail -passive automatic landing system and a secondary independent guidance system enabling the pilot to complete a landing manually after failure of the primary system. A typical secondary independent guidance system consists of a monitored HUD providing guidance which normally takes the form of command information, but it may alternatively be situation (or deviation) information. (h) The alert height is a specified radio height, based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail-operational landing system. In operational use, if a failure occurred above the alert height in one of the required redundant operational systems in the aeroplane (including, where appropriate, ground roll guidance and the reversionary mode in a hybrid system), the approach would be discontinued and a go-around executed unless reversion to a higher DH is possible. If a failure in one of the required redundant operational systems occurred below the alert height, it would be ignored and the approach continued. (i) DH is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety. Where it is used in this document, it means the minimum DH determined in the airworthiness certification. (j) A go-around is the transition from an approach to a stabilised climb. (k) Head-up display landing system (HUDLS) The term ‘HUDLS' refers to the total airborne system which provides head-up guidance to the pilot during the approach and landing or go-around. It includes all the sensors, computers, power supplies, indications and controls. Typically, a HUDLS is used for primary approach guidance for DHs down to 15 m (50 ft). The terms ‘localiser’ and ‘glide path’ have been retained for use with either ILS, or MLS or GLS. Cross reference is made in this Subpart Section to AMC AWO.A.ALS.110 which provides guidance on controls, indicators and warnings alerts associated with installations incorporating more than one type of approach system (e.g. ILS and MLS and/or GLS). 149 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Characteristics of the types of operation BackgroundAdditional and more detailed information regarding the characteristics of the types of operation as distinguished in sub-paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) is presented in more detail in the paragraphs that follow is provided below: (a) Decision height DH below 30 m (100 ft) but not less than 15 m (50 ft) The Runway Visual Range (RVR) required by a pilot to make the decision to land from a decision height DH below 30 m (100 ft) is less than that needed at 30 m (100 ft). Furthermore, the time from the decision height DH to the start of the flare manoeuvre will be less. Consequently, in order to achieve the desired success rate and to preserve the safety level, it has been considered necessary that the aeroplane be fitted with an automatic landing system or a head-up landing guidance system. Use of such a systems also ensures that the aeroplane is within the obstacle- free zone specified in ICAO Annex 14 during approach and any go-around so that there is no need to take obstacle clearance into account in determining the decision height DH. This is chosen to give an acceptably low probability of touching the ground during go-around. The RVR limit is set by the responsible national authority in accordance with applicable operating regulations and provides visibility at and below the decision height DH so that, if either the automatic landing system the ILS or the xLS MLS ground facility fails when the aeroplane is below the decision height DH, the pilot can carry out a manual landing with an acceptable safety level. The ground guidance system is either: (1) a Category III or a Category II ILS complying with the Category III standards of ICAO Annex 10, Chapter 3-1 in respect of all significant performance parameters, at least down to ILS point D, 900 m (3 000 ft) from the runway threshold. or (2) a Category III MLS complying with the requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Chapter 3.11. or (3) a GAST D GLS complying with the requirements of 10 ICAO Annex 10. (b) DH below 15 m (50 ft) Aeroplanes which have a fail-operational landing system can be certified certificated for operation with a decision height DH below 15 m (50 ft). In this type of operation, the RVR needs not only to be sufficient for the pilot to make the decision at the decision height DH, but also to be sufficient to enable the pilot to control the aeroplane during the ground roll. The main purpose of the decision height DH is so that the pilot he can assess the adequacy of the visibility before touchdown and prepare to take over visual m anual control. It is desirable that the decision height DH be late in the flare after the major pitch changes have taken place, and that an automatic go-around system be fitted. There exists an unknown probability that, although the visibility is reported to be adequate, denser patches of fog may lie on the runway, and it is thought prudent to add a margin to the bare minimum required to control the ground roll. The RVR limit is set by the responsible national authority in accordance with applicable operating regulations. 150 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The ground guidance system (xLS ILS and MLS) is as described in point paragraph b (a)(1) above, and, additionally, complies with a continuity of service objective (failure survival capability) of 1 -(2 x 10-6). It is assumed that the pilot is promptly notified by air traffic control (ATC) of a failure or degradation of the required ground equipment (e.g. loss of stand-by xLS ILS or MLS transmitter). (c) No Decision Height DH An aeroplane with a fail-operational landing system with automatic ground roll control (or ground roll guidance) may be certified certificated for operation without a decision height DH (operations when the pilot is not required to make a decision described in the definition of the Decision Height DH). Any required RVR limit is set by the responsible national authority in accordance with applicable operating regulations. In these visibility conditions, the pilot is likely to brake hard during the ground roll and therefore an anti-skid braking system is considered to be essential. Distance and ground speed indications and automatic braking would obviously be useful, but are not considered to be essential and are not required. The ground guidance system (Category III ILS, or Category III MLS or GAST D GLS) complies with the Standards of ICAO Annex 10 and, additionally, complies with an integrity objective of 1 -(0.5 x 10 -9) and a continuity of service objective of 1-(2 x 10 -6) AMC AWO.B.CATIII.102 Safety level In showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of pe rformance or failure effects should not be factored by the proportion of approaches, which are made with the decision height DH below 30 m (100 ft). AMC AWO.B.CATIII.109 Alert height (See CS AWO.B.CATIII.109) It may be operationally useful for the alert height to be somewhat higher than 30 m (100 ft) since this would permit reversion to a higher decision height DH in the event of system failure. A maximum value should be established during certification and it should not normally be a bove 90 m (300 ft). AMC AWO.B.CATIII.112 Go-around 1 Safety considerations 1.1 Effects of contact with the runway For aircraft in which a go-around from a very low altitude may result in inadvertent runway contact, the safety of the procedure should be established giving consideration to at least the following: a. The guidance information and control provided by the go-around mode should be retained and be shown to have safe and acceptable characteristics throughout the manoeuvre. b. Other systems (e.g. automatic throttle, brakes, spoilers, reverse thrust and alerting systems) should not operate in a way that would adversely affect the safety of the go-around manoeuvre. 151 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 1.2 Inadvertent go-around selection Inadvertent selection of go-around mode after touchdown should have no adverse effect on the ability of the aircraft to safely roll out and stop. 2 Performance Height losses from a range of altitudes during the approach and flare should be determined when under automatic control and when using the landing guidance system as appropriate. a. Height losses may be determined by flight testing (with typically 10 flight-demonstrated go- arounds) supported by simulation. b. The simulation should evaluate the effects of variation in parameters, such as weight, centre of gravity, configuration and wind, and show correlation with the flight test results. c. Normal procedures for a go-around with all engines operating should be followed. AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113 Installed equipment (a) The list of items of equipment required to be installed for certification to the decision height DHs specified, is based on experience with conventional medium and large jet transports and it is recognised that changes may be appropriate in significantly different applications. (b) ILS and MLS xLS airborne equipment standards Acceptable standards for airborne receiver equipment include: (1) Localiser receivers with centring accuracy for automatic landing complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-46B or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and glide path receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-47A or RTCA DO-192 or later revision. Note: The aforementioned localiser specifications are in accordance with the FM Broadcast Interference Immunity requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1.4. (2) MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-36A or later revision, or an equivalent standard, and DME/P transceivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-54 or RTCA DO-189. (3) Combined ILS/MLS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-74 or equivalent standard. (4) Combined ILS/MLS/GPS receivers complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-88 or equivalent standard. (5) Combined ILS/MLS/GPS/GLS receivers, or combined ILS/GPS/GLS receivers, complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-88, RTCA DO-246E, and RTCA DO-253D, or equivalent standards. (c) Radio altimeter equipment standards The airborne equipment used to provide height above terrain may be a radio altimeter complying with the minimum performance standards of EUROCAE ED-30 or RTCA DO-155. Alternatively, another device capable of providing equivalent performance and integrity level may be used. 152 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (d) Anti-skid braking systems An anti-skid braking system may not be required depending on the braking characteristics of the aeroplane, its susceptibility to tyre failure during heavy braking, and susceptibility to tyre failure during operations with reduced runway surface friction. (e) Means to determine, assess or manage stopping performance In showing compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 (a)(8), at least one of the following means should be used: (1) An automatic braking system together with information for the flight crew about appropriate automatic brake settings to be used for landing or which provides landing distance information for use by the flight crew to determine which automatic brake setting may or may not be appropriate. (2) A ground speed indicating system together with acceptable procedures for its use. Knowledge of the aircraft position on the runway is assumed. (3) A display showing the adequacy of aircraft deceleration for stopping within the confines (e.g. width and length) of the available runway. (4) A display showing the length of remaining runway after touchdown. (5) A procedural means, acceptable to the regulatory authority, to ensure that a safe stop can be made (without the assistance of an aircraft system). However, a procedural means is not appropriate for minima less than 300 ft RVR (100 m). For an RVR less than 100 m, consideration should be given to the availability of auto-roll-out and anti-skid and if manual braking can be accepted with a contingency procedure (e.g. max braking). AMC AWO.B.CATIII.113(b)(2) Suitability of aircraft for fail-passive operations with a decision height of 50 ft or greater Operations in accordance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.113 (b)(21) and (3) may not be suitable for all aircraft types. When assessing the suitability of an aircraft type in respect of size and approach speed, the following should be taken into account: (a) landing gear track; (b) wingspan; (c) pilot's eye to wheel height; (d) distance from the cockpit to the main wheels; and (e) approach speed at maximum landing weight. The following provides additional guidance in order to assist in the determination of whether an aircraft is suitable for super fail-passive operations: (a) Landing gear track, wingspan and distance from cockpit to the main wheels The landing gear track, wingspan and distance from the cockpit to the main wheels should be considered in relation to the safety of the go-around which is likely to be conducted from a height where ground contact is likely. If the results of the simulator tests show potential for wing tip 153 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO strikes or runway excursions during go-around, then it is unlikely that the aircraft can be approved for super-fail-passive operations. (b) Pilot’s eye-to-wheel height The pilot’s eye-to-wheel height has a direct bearing on the height of the pilot’s eyes above the runway at the DH. This, along with the angle of vision cut-off of the pilot’s downward view, determines the visual segment available in low visibility. The visual segment and number of visible approach lights required are explained in AMC4 SPA.LVO.105(c). It is likely that the size of the visual segment will be determined by the pilot’s need to see at least one barrette of the TDZ lighting in order to have a suitable roll reference in the event of having to perform a manual go-around due to autopilot failure. Since the TDZ lighting is spaced at a maximum of 60 m intervals on Category III runways, a visual segment of 60 m must always be available at and below the DH for super-fail-passive operations. The eye-to-wheel height is affected not only by aeroplane size and geometry, but also by the pitch attitude during approach (which itself, is weight-, centre-of-gravity- and configuration-dependent). Typical eye-to-wheel height values for narrow body turbojets lie between 4 and 5 metres. Aeroplanes with significantly higher values may not be suitable for super -fail-passive operations since the visual segment might be insufficient. It is important to ensure that any pitch attitude changes which may occur as a result of the automatic landing flare are taken into account when determining the eye -to-wheel height. See also CS AWO.B.CATIII.110. (c) Approach speed at maximum landing weight The approach speed should be sufficiently low such that the limited visual references used to verify the aircraft flight path at and below the DH, during continued approach or go-around, can be easily interpreted by the pilot. Experience has shown that super fail-passive operations may safely be conducted on some aircraft types up to a maximum approach speed of 140 kt. This value equates to the upper limit of Category C aeroplanes as defined by CAT.OP.MPA.320 point (b) Table 1 and may be used as a general guide but it may not be limiting. (d) Other aeroplane characteristics The requirement for the aircraft to be easily manoeuvreable relates mainly to the ability of the pilot to safely perform a manual go-around close to the ground, with limited external cues following an autopilot failure below the DH. The assumption is that the more manoeuvreable the aircraft is, the safer the go-around is likely to be. Areas to consider when assessing the manoeuvreability of the aircraft with respect to the manual go-around manoeuvre should include engine spool-up characteristics and trim changes due to thrust (directional and in pitch), trim changes due to flap and gear, and the ability to control airspeed. The aeroplane should also be assessed from the point of view of being able to be safely controlled along the runway from the point at which the automatic landing system is normally disengaged, down to a safe taxi speed in the minimum RVR proposed. 154 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 155 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115 Performance demonstrations 1 Approach The supporting flight tests to show compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 (a) in respect of approach performance may be to a programme of flight demonstrations carried out in accordance with AMC AWO.B.CATII.113. 2 Touchdown For compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.115 (b) in respect of touchdown performance, a programme of flight demonstrations will be required to support the simulation and analysis. (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.106). 3 Ground roll 3.1 A programme of landings should be carried out to ensure that there is a confidence level of 90 % that the criterion of CS AWO.B.CATIII.117(a) is complied with. This programme and the analysis of results should be in accordance with the procedures established for approach performance. (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 paragraph 2) 3.2 When operation is based on fail-operational ground roll, a programme of flight demonstration landings is necessary to support the simulation and analysis programme which is required to demonstrate compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.117(b). (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.106) 4 Considerations for GLS 4.1 Compatibility with rare undetected non-aircraft system error conditions (See Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A) The criteria below establish the compatibility of the ICAO standardised ground monitoring performance for satellite faults and single ground-reference receiver faults with the aircraft performance including satellite geometry screening. The criteria ensure that undetected faults or rare normal errors in the non-aircraft GBAS when combined with all other nominal factors affecting landing performance do not result in an unacceptably high probability of landing outside the limits that define a safe landing. Note: Appendix 1 to AMC.AWO.B.CATIII.115— GBAS performance model for approach and landing simulation contains a list of references that have been used to derive the signal model. These references describe undetected non-aircraft system error conditions, rare normal performance and faults as well as the ICAO standardised ground system monitoring requirements. The aircraft requirements in this Section are intended to address non-aircraft system errors that are below the ground monitoring thresholds. The existence of such errors is not considered a malfunction of the non-aircraft system. For any value of GLS NSE, including the effects of undetected satellite faults and undetected faulted conditions at a single ground reference receiver, it must be shown that the touchdown performance will be such that the exceedance of any of the limits prescribed in CS AWO.A.ALS 106 (c) will be less than that prescribed in AMC AWO.A.ALS.106 paragraph 1.4, for the limit condition. Other non-GLS variables effecting performance shall vary according to their expected distributions when assessing this compatibility. Credit for the prior probability of the fault cannot be taken 156 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO when evaluating the required landing probabilities; however, credit may be taken for the ground subsystem’s probability of detection for satellite faults and the aircraft’s probability of detection for single-reference receiver faults. Note: It is assumed that operations will be approved with knowledge of the runwa y specific glide path and threshold crossing height values and the aircraft’s capability. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine compliance with this Section using the glide path and threshold crossing height values set to limit allowed for the aircraft. 4.2 Compatibility with worst-case undetected guidance errors Rare ionosphere events and undetected satellite or ground station failures could result in significant vertical (and lateral) position errors. Under certain conditions , such errors may go undetected by the system and could result in erroneous guidance if not mitigated. The effect of such errors may not be observable by the flight crew. All undetected errors that are not extremely improbable shall not prevent a safe landing and/or go-around when all other variables effecting performance are at their nominal values. The effect of worst-case undetected errors on landing system performance shall be assessed via simulation using the GLS noise model provided in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. The worst-case undetected errors shall be simulated by using the maximum range domain error given in Table 5 of Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A in conjunction with the appropriate geometry screening factors used by the aircraft. The certification plan must specify how the demonstration will be conducted, including the number of cases and variables with pass/fail criteria. The aeroplane performance shall be assessed in the presence of the full range of bias and ramp type failures produced by the fault mode generator described in Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. AMC AWO.B.CATIII.118 Landing distance This AMC applies when using HUD in manual CAT III operations. A relevant feature of the HUD system to consider would be flare guidance. Relevant procedural elements associated with using the HUD would be any specific aeroplane configuration, approach speed increment, thrust management or ATHR speed target. The increment of the landing distance referred to in CS.AWO.B.CATIII.118 when using a HUD may be derived as follows: (a) The configuration, procedure and speed should be those recommended in the associated procedures. (b) The distance from the runway threshold to the touchdown point should be the distance from the runway threshold to the glide-slope origin (SO) plus the mean distance from the glide-slope origin to touchdown (STD) plus three times the standard deviation of the distance from the glide-slope origin to touchdown (σSTD). (c) The gross distance from touchdown to come to a complete stop should be determined in accordance with the requirements of CS 25.125 (b) (1) through (5), assuming a touchdown speed equal to the main touchdown speed plus three standard deviations of the touchdown speed. 157 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Note: The main values and standard deviations considered in paragraphs (b) and (c) should be based on random variations as determined by AMC AWO.A.HUD.107. Systematic variation of parameters should cover the normal range of AFM conditions. (d) The landing distance should be taken as the distance from the runway threshold to the touchdown point, as defined in (b) above, i.e., (SO + STD + 3σ(STD), plus the ground r oll distance defined in (c) above. (e) The landing distance should include corrections for variations in glide-slope angle and variations in glide-slope height at the threshold. Alternatively, these effects may be included by use of conservative assumptions in the basic presentation of data, with the applicable ranges stated in the AFM. AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 Flight demonstrations of failure conditions 1 Failures 1.1 Indications and Warnings alerts. Failure indications and warnings alerts should be demonstrated. (See AMC 25.1309.) 1.2 Effects For compliance with CS 25.1309, the effects of failure conditions will need to be demonstrated including not only failures of the landing system but also failures in other aeroplane equipment which could affect the landing (e.g. engines, reverse thrust, nose-wheel steering) and failures in the xLS ILS and/or MLS ground facility. Although this demonstration may be done primarily by using a ground simulation, some cases should also be demonstrated in fl ight to confirm the conclusions of the simulation. (See AMC 25.1309.) 2 Crew errors Individual landings additional to those of AMC AWO.A.ALS.106 paragraph 2.1 should be carried out to demonstrate that errors, which can reasonably be expected to occur, are not hazardous (e.g. asymmetric braking or reverse thrust, incorrect approach speed). (See AMC AWO.A.ALS.106 paragraph 2.2. AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.121 Flight crew and maintenance checks When exposure times relevant to failure probability calculations are dependent on flight crew and maintenance checks (i.e. preflight, first flight of the day, pre-land, etc.) and/or inspection intervals for dormant (latent) failures, these tasks, time intervals and the recommended component monitoring programme should be specified in the flight manual AFM or maintenance manual as appropriate. AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.122(a) and AWO.B.CATIII.123(a) Loss of system function For compliance with CS AWO.B.CATIII.122(a) and CS AWO.B.CATIII.123(a), it may be necessary to measure monitored variables in flight to determine the probability that any will reach a warning threshold. (See AMC AWO.B.CATII.113) AMC2 AWO.B.CATIII.122(a) Safety of the manual landing and go-around manoeuvres following loss of automatic control capability for super fail-passive systems 1 Reliability 158 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Certification flight test data may need to be supplemented by either in-service data or analysis, to establish the required level of reliability. 159 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 21 Manual go-around 21.1 Safety considerations 21.1.1 Following loss of the automatic pilot below the decision height DH, the aircraft should be capable of safely executing a manual go-around from any point on the approach down to touchdown, in all configurations to be certified certificated. The manoeuvre may should not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or strength and should ensure that the aeroplane remains within the obstacle limitation surface specified in ICAO Annex 14, for a precision approach runway Category II or III. 21.1.2 For aircraft in which a go-around from a very low altitude may result in inadvertent runway contact, the safety of the procedure should be established giving consideration to at least the following: a. Where the guidance information provided by the go-around mode is retained, it should be shown to have safe and acceptable characteristics throughout the manoeuvre. b. Other systems (e.g. automatic throttle, brakes, spoilers and reverse thrust) should not operate in a way that would adversely affect the safety of the go-around manoeuvre. 21.1.3 Non-normal procedures applicable following loss of a fail-passive automatic landing system (see sub- paragraph 2 3)), may require reversion to manual control using primary display information such as attitude and airspeed, to perform a manual go-around. Where applicable, consideration should be given to failure conditions that could result in loss of both the automatic landing system and relevant primary display information. 21.2 Performance The safety of the go-around manoeuvre may be determined by flight testing (typically 10 go-arounds) supported where necessary by simulator testing. If loss of the automatic pilot can result in loss of the flight director guidance, this should be considered during the performance demonstration. 32 Manual landing Following loss of the automatic control capability below decision height the DH, a safe landing should be demonstrated in accordance with established procedures. a. The demonstration should take into account at least the following variables: i. centre of gravity; ii. landing weight; and iii. wind conditions. b. If the demonstration is to be performed with a simulator, the simulator should be: i. equipped with a visual system that provides an acceptable representation of the actual visibility conditions for which operational approval is sought; and ii. suitably validated by flight test demonstrations for the landing manoeuvre. c. The number of manual landings to be performed should be related to the probability of loss of the automatic landing system below decision height the DH. 160 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 4 Consideration of the effects of engine failure 4.1 Where the landing system provides automatic control of the rudder pedals, a demonstration should be made to show that, for automatic approaches initiated with all engines operating: a. automatic go-around; and b. automatic landing, can be performed safely after the failure of any single engine at any point during the approach down to touchdown without the pilot needing to intervene and assume control. 4.2 The automatic pilot should remain engaged following the failure of any single engine, taking account of the loss of systems associated with the failed engine (e.g. electrical and hydraulic systems). AMC AWO.B.CATIII.127(a) Aeroplane flight manual Actual RVR minima to be used are subject to operating operational regulations and and may vary from one Member State to another taking account of local circumstances. For this reason, RVR minima should not be included in the aeroplane flight manual AFM as limitations. To aid operational assessment and the establishment of landing minima, the RVR values encountered during airworthiness certification may be given. AMC AWO.B.CATIII.127(g) Aeroplane flight manual The AFM may contain a statement that the categories of xLS ground facilities which have been used as the basis for certification should not be taken as a limitation. In that case, the AFM should also contain a statement that some Category 1 xLS ground facilities may be suitable for use by the approach and landing system. 161 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO APPENDIX 1 TO AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115 1 Limit case analysis Demonstration of compliance with sub-paragraph 4.1 of AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115 may be done by analysis to show that for all possible sizes of navigation error, the joint probability that the error is not detected and that the error results in the aeroplane landing outside of the safe landing box as defined in CS AWO.A.ALS.106 is less than 1x10-5. The analysis uses the nominal touchdown distributions (lateral and longitudinal) along with the geometry factors (Svert and Slat), and the maximum allowable Pmd performance of the monitors for satellite ranging source failures and for the reference receiver fault monitor (RRFM). The nominal touchdown distribution is used to compute a probability of an unsuccessful landing given a particular size of error 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸). This probability is then multiplied by the probability of an error not being detected as a function of E, Pmd(E). The probability of an unsuccessful landing given in error is the joint probability that the fault that causes an error, E, is not detected and the landing will be unsuccessful given an error, E: 𝑃𝑈𝐿 (𝐸) = 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸) ∙ 𝑃𝑚𝑑 (𝐸) < 10−5 [1] To form the conditional unsuccessful landing probability, 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸), a conditional touchdown distribution should be used that would result from a constant bias error in addition to the fault-free NSE and flight technical error distributions. This should be done for the full range of relevant error sizes to form the total conditional probability of an unsuccessful landing as a function of the error. The conditional unsuccessful landing probability is expressed as follows for the land short and land long cases: LSC Land short 𝑃(𝑈𝐿|𝐸)(𝐸) = ∫−∞ pTSE_LON|E (x, E)dx [2] ∞ Land long 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸) = ∫LLC pTSE_LON|E (x, E)dx [3] Land with wheels less than 5 ft from the edge of the runway: ∞ −RWE+GW/2 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸) = ∫RWE−GW/2 pTSE_LAT|E (x, E)dx + ∫−∞ pTSE_LAT|E (x, E)dx [4] Where: LSC is the land short criteria (i.e. 200 ft) LLC is the land long criteria (i.e. 3 000 ft) RWE is the lateral landing criteria (i.e. 70 ft) GW is the lateral distance between the main landing gear pTSE_LON|E (x, E) is the probability density function for the longitudinal touchdown given a bias of magnitude E. pTSE_LAT|E (x, E) is the probability density function for the lateral touchdown given a bias of magnitude E. Note: Care should be taken to insure consistency of units when making these calculations. 1.1 Computing Pmd for ranging source errors A bound on the probability of missed detection for the ranging source error, 𝑃𝑚𝑑 (𝐸𝑅 ) is defined by the performance constraint region given in Annex 10 Appendix B section 3.6.7.3.3.2. The P md performance should lie below the curve defined by Table B-76A in the SARPs, repeated here for convenience. 162 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO 163 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Table B-76 A: Pmd_limit parameters Probability of missed detection Pseudorange error (metres) Pmd_limit ≤ 1 0 ≤ |Er| < 0.75 Pmd_limit  10(-2.56|Er| + 1.92) 0.75 ≤ |Er| < 2.7 Pmd_limit  10-5 2.7 ≤ |Er| <  For example, in the case of the longitudinal touchdown requirement, the vertical position error has the largest effect on the touchdown location. The worst-case projection of a range error into vertical error, max(|SAprvert.i |), may be used to determine the resulting limit on 𝑃𝑚𝑑 (𝐸𝑉 ) by substituting ER = 𝐸𝑉 ⁄max(|SAprvert.i |). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between Pmd_limit and the 𝑃𝑚𝑑 (𝐸𝑉 ) for max(|SAprvert.i |)= 5. Pmd range to position domain given SvertMax=5 Probability Pmd limit in the range domain Pmd limit in the vertical position domain EV or ER (metres) Figure 1: Example of the satellite ranging source Pmd in the range domain and position domain 1.2 Computing Pmd for reference receiver fault monitoring The Pmd for the RRFM is given by: T BAC PmdApprox EV    p Bmd  x, EV dx 0 [5] 164 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO where: TBAC is the maximum threshold for the RRFM monitor given by: 2  0.0842  VAL  TBAC  5.5     0.4 Metres 2 [6]  m 1  where: VAL is the vertical alert limit that is used by airborne equipment to screen geometry expressed in metres. And pBmd(x,EV) is the probability density function (pdf) of |Bj,vert(EV)| in the faulted circumstance given by:   0.0842  VAL   dnorm x, EV ,    M 1 M    0.0842  VAL   x  0;  dnorm  x, EV ,  p Bmd x, EV     M 1 M  [7]     x  0;  0 where dnorm(x,,) is the Gaussian pdf   x   2 2 2 dnormx,  ,    e [8] 2  For a derivation of these expressions, see reference [Error! Bookmark not defined.] of Appendix 1 to AMC to Subpart A. 1.3 Example assessments Figure 2 illustrates a landing short assessment for a hypothetical aeroplane with a nominal longitudinal touchdown point of 1 500 ft from the threshold and a dispersion that can be bounded by a Gaussian distribution with σ=220 ft. Also, a max(|SAprvert.i |) of 5, VAL of 10 metres and GPA of 3 degrees is used. Rearranging equation [1]: 10−5 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸) < 𝑃𝑚𝑑 (𝐸) [9] Hence by dividing 10-5 by the Pmd curves for satellite ranging sources and RRFM, the grey ‘keep out regions’ shown in Figure 2 can be obtained. The assessment is then simple. If the curve for 𝑃𝑈𝐿|𝐸 (𝐸) does not enter the keep out regions, then the requirement that 𝑃𝑈𝐿 (𝐸) < 10−5 is met for all values of E. An alternative approach to the analysis is illustrated in Figure 3 where the probability of an unsuccessful landing is explicitly calculated for both monitor types (ranging sources and RRFM). Extension of these examples to the land long and lateral cases is straightforward. 165 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Probability of an unsuccessful landing given EV – Landing short Probability 1e-5/Pmd(EV) ranging source 1e-5/Pmd(EV) RRFM PUL|EV(EV) – Land short EV (metres) Figure 2: Example assessment of landing short performance 166 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO Probability of an unsuccessful landing given EV – Landing short Probability Pmd (EV) ranging error Pmd (EV) RRFM PUL|EV(EV) – Land short PUL = Pmd (EV)*PUL|EV (EV)RE PUL = Pmd (EV)*PUL|EV (EV)RRFM Requirement 10-5 EV (metres) Figure 3: Explicit calculation of PUL for the land short example above 167 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO SUBPART C — TAKE-OFF AMC TO SECTION 1 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT FOR TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS IN LOW VISIBILITY (TOO) AMC AWO.C.TOO.101 Applicability and terminology An aeroplane with a basic airworthiness approval is eligible for take -off in reported visibilities which are sufficient to ensure that the pilot will at all times have sufficient visibility to complete or aband on the take-off safely. The purpose of this Subpart is to specify the supplementary airworthiness criteria for aeroplanes equipped to take-off in lower visibilities. It is only concerned with directional guidance during the ground-borne portion of the take-off (i.e. from start to main wheel lift-off, or standstill in the event of abandoned take-off). The RVR limits for take-off of transport aircraft are set by the responsible national authority in accordance with applicable operating regulations. The purpose of the guidance system, which is the subject of these requirements, is to permit a reduction of these limits but not to allow a take -off in visibility below the minimum necessary for a normal take-off using visual reference. The requirements are based on the assumption that, if the take-off guidance system is based on ILS or MLS information, operational precautions are taken to ensure that the localiser signal is suitable (e.g. in each case the ILS, the localiser is Category III, or the airborne system has been shown to perform satisfactorily on that installation). Terminology Take-off guidance system: A take-off guidance system provides directional guidance information to the pilot during the take-off or abandoned take-off. It includes all the airborne sensors, computers, controllers and indicators necessary for the display of such guidance. Guidance normally takes the form of command information, but it may alternatively be situation (or deviation) information. System concept The criteria for a take-off guidance system given in the points paragraphs that follow are intended to provide for a reduction in take-off minima to a level where the pilot can normally line up on the runway centre line and carry out the take-off by visual reference, but where the visibility is sufficiently low that: (a) any further reductions in the visibility which may be encountered during the take -off run would make directional control by visual reference alone difficult; or (b) significant deviations from the runway centre line may be difficult to correct by visual reference alone. Visual reference remains the primary means of guidance, with the system providing reversionary guidance. The pilot would therefore not commence the take-off run unless he had the prescribed visual reference had been aquired and the values of the RVR reported were adequate. Experience indicates that pilots are able to hold the centre line in very low visibilities (e.g. one or two lights visible at one time), and that this ability improves as the speed increase s. However, in 168 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO such low visibilities the pilot may over-control in attempting to return to the centre line if the aeroplane deviates for any reason, and the reducing speed of an abandoned take -off may be the most critical phase in this respect. AMC AWO.C.TOO.102 Safety level In showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of take-offs that are made in low visibility. AMC AWO.C.TOO.104(c) Guidance display The system should be so designed that it is obvious if the pilot has not taken all the actions necessary for its correct operation. AMC AWO.C.TOO.106 Performance (See also Figure 1) The factors affecting the behaviour of the aeroplane include, for example, wind conditions, ILS and/or MLS ground facility characteristics, aeroplane configurations, weight, and centre of gravity and should be covered by flight testing. The demonstration of system performance should comprise at least the fol lowing: (a) 10 all-engine take-offs; (b) take-offs with simulated failure of the critical engine at V 1MIN + 10 kt; and (c) 2 rejected take-offs with simulated failure of the critical engine at V 1. Half of the all-engines take-offs and two of each of the engine failure conditions should be carried out in crosswinds equal to or greater than the level being sought for certification with optional aeroplane and runway configurations. The remainder should be carried out in optional winds in the most adverse aeroplane configuration at two different runways, which represent the reasonable extremes of those likely to be used in service. In the engine failure take-offs, VR should not be less than 28 km/h (15 kt) above the engine failure speed and should be delayed until the path of the aeroplane has stabilised and the aeroplane is converging with the centre line. The take-off may be begun using external visual reference but, from a speed no greater than 50 % of V1, the guidance commands should be followed as accurately as possible without using the external view. To ensure that this is done, it is recommended that the windscreen is blanked. For ILS- and/or MLS-based systems, compliance may be shown using an ILS and/or MLS, which complies with the requirements for Category III operations in relation to centring error and beam bends along the runway. Allowance may be made for long-term perturbations of the ILS or MLS localiser. AMC AWO.C.TOO.108 Warnings (a) The system should be so designed that wherever practicable, a failure will cause the immediate removal of incorrect guidance information from view. (b) If failure indications are provided during take-off, these should not be such as to distract the pilot when controlling the aeroplane by visual reference (e.g. a persistent flashing light ). 169 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO AMC AWO.C.TOO.111 Aeroplane flight manual — general (a) The flight manual AFM should contain a statement that a system complying with the provisions of this Subpart 4 is approved for reversionary use only. Visual reference should be the primary means of guidance and the pilot should not commence the take-off run unless the visual reference and the reported RVR are within prescribed limits. (b) Actual RVR minima to be used are subject to operating operational regulations and may vary from one Member State to another taking account of local circumstances. For this reason, RVR minima should not be included in the aeroplane flight manual AFM as limitations. To aid operational assessment and the establishment of take-off minima, the RVR values encountered during airworthiness certification may be given. FIGURE 1: DEVIATION ENVELOPES (CENTRE OF MAINWHEELS) 170 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B)) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 171 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO GENERAL ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AMC AWO-1 All-weather operations re-certification following the installation of new or modified navigation receivers providing ILS/MLS xLS capability 1 Purpose The purpose of this AMC is to provide acceptable means of compliance for retrofit certifications, addressing the certification of MLS xLS receivers in the so-called ILS lookalike applications, and the certification of ILS installations with either new or modified receivers, e.g. those designed to provide improved FM immunity. 2 Scope CS-AWO already provides acceptable means of compliance for the certification of new ILS or MLS xLS installations. Where, for an already certificated installation, it is established that the proposed new or modified navigation receiver configuration can be considered to have ILS lookalike characteristics, the contents of this AMC may be used as an alternative for that part of the certification affected by the revised installation. Possible receiver configurations for retrofit applications include:- a) An ILS receiver from a new supplier. b) A modified ILS receiver from the same supplier (e.g. for purposes of providing improved FM Immunity). c) A re-packaged receiver from the same supplier (e.g. the ILS partition in an MMR, or the transition from ARINC 700 to 900 series equipment). d) A stand-alone MLS receiver (‘ILS look alike’). e) An MLS partition in an MMR (‘ILS look alike’). This AMC provides acceptable means of compliance for all-weather operations approval. Other generic certification processes (such as software, equipment, and radio approvals etc.) remain equally applicable to new and retrofit applications. These general certification considerations are summarised for reference in paragraph 56 below.. 3 Background The member States of ICAO agreed to extend the ILS protection date to 2010, to support regional implementation of MLS and to pursue a transition to a GNSS based approach, landing and departure system (GLS) at the COM/OPS 1995 meeting. This decision establishes the need for the incorporation of potentially three approach and landing systems in current and future aircraft. The level of equipage will be an economic decision of the operators. Multi-mode Receiver (MMR) characteristics have been developed by ARINC to provide ILS, MLS and GLS (provisions) functions, as one means of implementing this capability. Based on the work of the FAA/JAA AWO Harmonisation Working Group, the JAA has introduced changes to JAR-AWO, to define the airworthiness requirements for MLS certification. However the 172 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO industry also has a requirement to be able to introduce installations such as Multi -Mode Receivers (MMRs) containing one or more types of landing system, to aircraft with an existing all weather operations airworthiness approval. The JAA has concluded that while the requirement material for new certifications is equally applicable to retrofit applications, the means of compliance required for certification can be simplified, provided the necessary justification is provided. The work required for certification will be dependent on the justification provided, usually in a certification plan. Within this AMC the justification is termed an ‘impact assessment’. 34 Definitions ‘ILS lookalike’ is the ability of a non-ILS-based navigation receiver function to provide operational characteristics and interface functionality to the rest of the aircraft equivalent to that provided by an ILS-based receiver function. Specifically, in the case of an MLS- or GNSS-based receiver function, the output should be in DDM/micro amps, with a sensitivity equivalent to an ILS receiver taking account of the effects of runway length. ‘impact assessment’ is the justification that is provided, usually in a certification plan, to determine the scope of work and certification activity that is required for a retrofit certification. 45 Related requirements and documents This AMC provides alternative another means of compliance for retrofit certifications to the following CS-AWO and CS-25 AMC material. AMC AWO.A.ALS.106 Paragraph 2.1 Flight demonstration — Programme of landings for certification AMC AWO 161(b) Failure Conditions AMC AWO.B.CATII.113 Paragraph 1.1 Flight demonstration — Continuous method (analysis of maximum value) AMC AWO.B.CATIII.115 Performance demonstrations AMC1 AWO.B.CATIII.121 Flight demonstrations of failure conditions AMC AWO.C.TOO.106 Performance (interpretative material) AMC 25.1329 Paragraph 5.3.4. Paragraph 5.3.4. Flight demonstration of autopilot failure conditions coupled to an ILS glide path. 56 General certification considerations 56.1 Certification process An ‘impact assessment’ is required to determine the tasks required to achieve approval of new receiver functionality in a retrofit application. Based on the ‘impact assessment’, the certification plan should consider: (a) differences between the current basis of certification and that requested (if applicable); (b) the functionality being added; and 173 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (c) the credit that can be taken for the existing approval. 56.2 Equipment approval Suitable procedures for equipment approval should be employed. CS-ETSO compliance should be demonstrated where appropriate, including software qualification and receiver environmental qualification to the appropriate levels. 56.3 Aircraft installation approval (CS-25) The following should be considered for approval of the installation: (a) impact on aeroplane SSAs; (b) radio approval (e.g. antenna positions, range, polar diagrams, coverage, compatibility between receiver and antenna); (c) electromagnetic interference (EMI)/electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing; (d) functional integration aspects of the receiver with respect to other systems, controls, warnings, and displays; (e) electrical loading; (f) flight data recorder requirements; (g) impact on the aircraft flight manual; and (h) certification means of compliance for the receiver installation e.g. ground and/or flight testing; and 67 CS-AWO re-certification of the ILS xLS function following the introduction of a new or modified ILS xLS navigation receiver installation. The magnitude of the certification programme will be based upon an ‘impact assessment’ of the differences between the configuration offered for certification and the pre -existing ILS xLS receiver system installed in a given aircraft type. The ‘impact assessment’ should establish the basis and rationale for the work to be accomplished to obtain certification. 67.1 Impact assessment The impact assessment should assess the following aspects of the new or modified ILS xLS receiver, or receiver function, for equivalence with the existing ILSxLS receiver configuration: (a) hardware design; (b) software design; (c) signal processing and functional performance; (d) failure analysis; and (e) receiver function, installation and integration (e.g. with controls, indicators and warnings alerts) The impact assessment should also identify any additional considerations. This may include: (a) any functionality, or provisions for future functionality, which have no impact on the functionality for which certification is sought; and 174 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO (b) any shared resources, which will support future functionality. Based upon the assumption that the ILS xLS receiver, or receiver function, can be shown to be equivalent to the current ILS xLS configuration, it may be proposed that the new installation be treated as a new ILS xLS receiver for approval on a given aeroplane type. 67.2 Failure analysis The failure characteristics of the new or modified installation should be reviewed in the context of the safety assessments of systems using ILS xLS data, to ensure that the failure characteristics are equivalent to, or are compatible with and do not invalidate, the current safety assessments. 67.3 Flight testing For an installation which can be treated as a new ILS xLS receiver, a flight test programme of typically a minimum of eight 10–15 approaches terminating in an automatic landing and roll-out (if applicable) using the flight control/guidance system, including a minimum of two ILS xLS facilities should be carried out. The approaches should include captures from both sides of the beam. The approach and landing performance (flight path deviation, touchdown data, etc.), as appropriate, should be shown to be equivalent to that achieved in the original ILS xLS certification. Recorded flight test data may be required to support the equivalency demonstration. A demonstration of take off guidance performance should be included where applicable. 6.4 Antenna location The implication of differences in position of the xLS aircraft antennas should be assessed for their impact on: (a) wheel-to-threshold crossing height; and (b) lateral and vertical performance. 6.5 Statistical performance assessment The statistical performance assessment of a currently certificated automatic landing system or HUD system should not have to be re-assessed for the addition of xLS functionality to the aircraft provided the xLS receiver (or the xLS partition of a multi-mode receiver (MMR)) is shown to have satisfactory ‘ILS lookalike’ characteristics. This assumes that the flight control/guidance system control algorithms are unchanged. 6.67.4 Documentation The following documentation should be provided for certification: (a) an impact assessment including effects on SSAs; (b) a flight test report; and (c) revisions to the flight manual where appropriate. 7 CS AWO Re-certification following the Introduction of an MLS Navigation Receiver Installation 7.1 Impact Assessment The MLS receiver or receiver function, can be certificated with an ‘impact assessment’ similar to that required for the re-certification of a new or modified ILS receiver, provided that the unit has 175 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO been shown to have satisfactory ‘ILS Look alike’ characteristics. The ‘impact assessment’ should assess the following aspects of the MLS receiver or receiver function, for equivalence with the existing ILS receiver configuration:- a) Hardware design. b) Software design. c) Signal processing and functional performance. d) Failure analysis. e) Receiver function, installation and integration (e.g. with controls, indicators and warnings). The impact assessment should also identify any additional considerations. This may include: - a) Any functionality, or provisions for future functionality, which have no impact on the functionality for which certification is sought. b) Any shared resources, which will support future functionality. Based upon the assumption that the MLS receiver or receiver function, can be shown to have "ILS look alike" characteristics, it may be proposed that the new installation b e treated as a new ILS receiver for approval on a given aeroplane type. 7.2 Failure Analysis The failure characteristics of the new or modified installation should be reviewed in the context of the safety assessments of systems using ILS data to ensure that either the failure characteristics are equivalent to an ILS receiver or are compatible with and do not invalidate, the current safety assessments. 7.3 Statistical Performance Assessment The statistical performance assessment of a currently certificated automatic landing system or Head Up Display system should not have to be re-assessed for the addition of MLS functionality to the aircraft provided the MLS receiver, or the MLS partition of an MMR, is shown to have satisfactory ‘ILS Look alike’ characteristics. This assumes that the flight control/guidance system control algorithms are unchanged. 7.4 Antenna Location The implication of differences in position of the MLS and ILS aircraft antennas should be assessed e.g. impact on:- a) wheel to threshold crossing height. b) lateral and vertical performance. 7.5 Flight testing For an installation which can be treated as a new ILS receiver, a flight test program of typically a minimum of 10-15 approaches terminating in a landing and rollout (if applicable) using the flight control/guidance system, including a minimum of two MLS facilities should be carried out. The approaches should include captures from the both sides of the beam, and representative wind conditions where antenna positions may impact performance. 176 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO The approach and landing performance (flight path deviation, touchdown data etc.) as appropriate, should be shown to be equivalent to that achieved in the original ILS certification. Recorded flight test data may be required to support the equivalency demonstration. A demonstration of take off guidance performance should be included where applicable. 7.6 Documentation The following documentation should be provided for certification:- 1. An Impact Assessment including effects on System Safety Assessments. 2. A Flight Test Report. 3. Revisions to the Flight Manual where appropriate. 177 European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(B) 2. Proposed amendments to CS-AWO i ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) for the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention, Vol 1. ii RTCA / DO-245, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS). iii RTCA / DO-253C, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for GPS Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) Airborne Equipment. iv ICAO Paper GNSSP-WP-8, Validation of GBAS CAT I Accuracy: A GLS Model and Autoland Simulations for Boeing Airplanes, presented at the ICAO Global Navigation Satellite Systems Panel, Working Group B Meeting, Seattle, WA, May 29 - June 9, 2000. v ICAO NSP Mar 2009 WGW/WP 30 "SARPS Support for Airworthiness Assessments GLS Signal Modeling", presented by Tim Murphy, Bretigny, 17-27 March 2009. vi ICAO NSP May 2010 WGW WP 19, " SARPS Support for Airworthiness Assessments - More on GLS Signal Modeling" Prepared by Tim Murphy vii T. Murphy, M Harris, C. Shively, L. Azoulai , M. Brenner "Fault Modeling for GBAS Airworthiness Assessments", Proceedings of the Institute of Navigation Global Navigation Satellite System Conference, 2010. viii M. Harris, T. Murphy, "Geometry Screening for GBAS to Meet CAT III Integrity and Continuity Requirements", Proceedings of the Institute of Navigation International Technical Meeting 2007 ix DO-253C, "Minimum operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation Airborne Equipment", Section 2.3.9.4 x ICAO NSP May10 WGW/WP16, "Computation of Maximum Undetected Error for RRFM in Support of Airworthiness Assessments". xi Neri, P., Macabiau, C., Azoulai, L., "Study of a GBAS Model for CAT II/III Simulations," Proceedings of the 22nd International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2009), Savannah, GA, September 2009 xii Use of GNSS signals and their augmentations for civil Aviation Navigation during Approaches with Vertical Guidance and Precision Approaches – PhD Thesis P. Neri - 2011 178 European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-06(D) All-weather operations RMT.0379 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of rulemaking task (RMT).0379 is to modernise the European Union (EU) aviation regulatory framework applicable to all-weather operations (AWOs) so it ensures the highest level of safety while enabling efficiency gains based on the latest technological advancements. It addresses in a coordinated manner all relevant disciplines: initial airworthiness, air operations, flight crew licensing and aerodromes. It proposes performance- and risk-based approach, as much as feasible, considering also the appropriate balance between performance-based and prescriptive principles (depending on the type of air operations (CAT, NCC, NCO, and SPO). This NPA proposes to update the AWO-relevant rules in many aviation domains such as airworthiness (CS-AWO), air operations (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012), aircrew (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011) and aerodromes (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR.DSN). The main aim has been to allow for a better integration of the regulatory requirements related to the operational use of new, advanced technology — either developed already or to be developed in the future — such as, for example, enhanced flight vision system (EFVS), as well as the application of some advanced new operational procedures, which may support AWOs. Significant focus has been invested in developing resilient rules, which are not technology-dependent. A particular attention was paid to the development of requirements enabling the use of EFVS to the maximum extent possible (e.g. use of EFVS for landing). A new concept of ‘light operational credits’ for EFVS 200 operations, not requiring the use of specific low-visibility procedures (LVPs), has also been introduced. The proposed changes are expected to maintain safety, reduce the regulatory burden, increase cost-effectiveness, improve harmonisation (e.g. with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)), and achieve as much as feasible alignment with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). NPA 2018-06 is divided in four parts. The present sub-NPA(D) includes: — the procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; and — the proposed amendments to aerodromes including CS-ADR.DSN). The other sub-NPAs are organised as follows: — sub-NPA(A) – procedural information pertaining to the regulatory proposal; presentation of the issue under discussion; impact assessment as well as the hazard identification and risk assessment; and proposed actions to support implementation; — sub-NPA(B) – initial airworthiness (CS-AWO); and — sub-NPA(C) – air operations and aircrew. Action area: Airlines, air operators other than airlines Affected rules: AMC/GM to the Air OPS Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012); AMC/GM to the Aircrew Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) Νο 1178/2011); AMC/GM to the aerodromes rules (Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, including CS-ADR-DSN); and CS-AWO Affected stakeholders: Manufacturers, maintenance organisations (MOs), air operators, approved training organisations (ATOs), aerodrome operators, ATM/ANS; Member States Driver: Level playing field Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: Light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard 9.12.2015 13.7.2018 2019/Q2 2020/Q2 2020/Q4 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA .................................................................................................................................. 3 1.1. How this NPA was developed .................................................................................................................3 1.2. How to comment on this NPA.................................................................................................................3 1.3. The next steps .........................................................................................................................................3 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail ................................................................................... 5 2.1. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs — and proposed changes to CSs (CS-ADR-DSN) with related GM (Draft EASA decisions) .............................................................................................................................5 Annex I ‘Definitions’ ........................................................................................................................5 Annex II (Part-ADR.AR)....................................................................................................................5 Annex III (Part-ADR.OR) ..................................................................................................................6 Annex IV (Part-ADR.OPS) ................................................................................................................6 CS-ADR-DSN and associated GM ....................................................................................................8 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law ....................................................................... 10 3.1. Proposed changes — aerodromes ........................................................................................................11 Annex I ‘Definitions’ ................................................................................................................................11 Annex II (Part-ADR.AR) ............................................................................................................................12 Annex III (Part-ADR.OR)...........................................................................................................................13 Annex IV (Part-ADR.OPS).........................................................................................................................14 CS-ADR-DSN — CS Aerodrome Design with related GM ........................................................................24 TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme3 under RMT.0379. RMT.0379 was initiated with the publication of the related Terms of Reference (ToR) and Concept Paper RMT.0379 Issue 14 on 9 December 2015. For the development of the implementing rules (IRs), the accelerated procedure5 is applied; for the development of the acceptable means of compliance (AMC), guidance material (GM) and certification specifications (CSs), the standard rulemaking procedure is followed. As part of the accelerated procedure, EASA has already consulted its Advisory Bodies (ABs) on the regulatory impact assessment (RIA)6 and the description of operations (DoOs). In the context of the second consultation phase (focused consultation), EASA consulted on the proposed amendments to the IRs only. In addition, EASA provided responses to the comments received during the AB consultation and presented the subsequent amendments to the RIA and the DoOs. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of the Experts’ Task Force Groups (air operations, airworthiness, and aerodromes). It is hereby submitted to all interested parties7 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/8. The deadline for submission of comments is 15 October 2018. 1.3. The next steps Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments. Based on the comments received EASA will: — update the proposed text of the affected CSs/AMC & GM; and 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management- board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php 4 https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20and%20Concept%20Paper%20RMT.0379%20Issue%201.pdf 5 In accordance with Article 16 of MB Decision No 18-2015. 6 The RIA for the entire NPA is presented in Sub-NPA (A), Chapter 3. 7 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure. 8 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 1. About this NPA — issue an opinion (developed on the basis of the focused consultation and taking into account the comments received to the AWO NPA) containing the proposed amendments to Regulations (EU) Nos 965/2012, 1178/2011 and 139/2014; the opinion will be submitted to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to prepare an EU regulation; and — for sub-NPA(B) issue a decision containing CS-AWO to which the related comment-response document (CRD) will be annexed. Following the adoption of the regulation, EASA will issue the associated decisions containing the related AMC & GM. The comments received and the EASA responses for sub-NPAs (A), (C) and (D) will be reflected in CRDs. The CRDs will be annexed to the opinion TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail This chapter provides the explanatory note for the proposed amendments to the AWO-related regulatory material presented in Chapter 8 of this NPA. Note: The regulatory material at IR level presented in Chapter 8 of this NPA is not intended to be again subject to the formal public consultation of this NPA, as the consultation should be focused on the relevant AWO-related soft law changes (AMC/GM and CS). Nevertheless, should it be deemed necessary, commenters may also communicate issues related to the IRs. 2.1. Proposed changes to AMC/GM to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 — presented together with the proposed amendments to the IRs — and proposed changes to CSs (CS-ADR-DSN) with related GM (Draft EASA decisions) Annex I ‘Definitions’ New terms ‘decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH): this term is added for clarity. The term is identical to the definition included in ICAO Annex 6, Part I. ‘low-visibility operations (LVOs)’: this term is added for consistency. It has been developed through RMT.0379. The term is currently not defined by ICAO. ‘operation with operational credits’: the term is added for consistency. The term is the same as the one proposed in the Air OPS Regulation. Terms amended ‘low-visibility procedures (LVPs)’: the term is amended to align it with the term ‘low-visibility operations’. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘operations’ refers mainly to aircraft, while ‘procedures’ are meant for aerodromes and ATS. ‘low-visibility take-off (LVTO)’: this term is aligned with the term ‘LVO’. Furthermore, the definition does not anymore contain a lower limit of 75 m to enable operations with lower-visibility minima. Terms deleted ‘lower-than-standard category I operation’: the term is not used anymore in the IR. ‘other-than-standard category II operation’: the term is not used anymore in the IR. Annex II (Part-ADR.AR) There are no amendments proposed to the requirements of Part-ADR.AR since the certification and oversight process of an aerodrome and an aerodrome operator remain unchanged. GM1 ADR.AR.C.035(e) ‘Issuance of certificates’ — MODEL FOR THE TERMS OF THE CERTIFICATE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CERTIFICATES: The GM is amended to include approach operations with EFVS and SA CAT I approach operations under the type of approaches in the terms of the certificate. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail Annex III (Part-ADR.OR) There are no amendments proposed to the requirements of Part-ADR.OR. Annex IV (Part-ADR.OPS) ADR.OPS.A.005 ‘Aerodrome data’ There are no amendments proposed to the requirements. AMC/GM to ADR.OPS.A.005 ‘Aerodrome data’ AMC1 ADR.OPS.A.005 ‘Aerodrome data’: Points (a)(12), (a)(13) and (a)(14) are added. Point (a)(12) is added because EVS technology relies on the infrared heat signature provided by incandescent lights and their replacement with LED currently makes these systems unusable. Point (a)(13) refers to the provision of approach and departure procedures charts. Point (a)(14) refers to the provision of information concerning the non-visual aids (radio or space-based) available to support instrument approach operation. In point (e), category II and III operations have been replaced with operations with a DH of less than 200 ft, in order to include SA CAT I approach operations, where the survey of the pre- threshold area is required. Furthermore, the publication of a precision approach terrain chart is required when electronic terrain and obstacle data are not available, in line with ICAO Annex 15. ADR.OPS.B.030 ‘Surface movement guidance and control system’ The current rule text requires the aerodrome operator to ensure that a ‘surface movement guidance and control system’ (SMGCS) is provided at the aerodrome; the SMGCS ensures the safe manoeuvring of aircraft on the movement area, especially when visibility is limited. The current IR is replaced with new text which specifies the parameters that need to be considered for the design and operation of an SMGCS such as the aerodrome design characteristics, the operational and meteorological conditions at the aerodrome, as well as human factor principles related mainly to flight crew and vehicle drivers; additionally, considering also the ICAO Annex 14 SARPs in Chapter 9.8, the SMGCS shall assist in the prevention of runway incursions and collision between aircraft, as well as collision between aircraft and vehicles and other objects. Furthermore, the IR requires the use of appropriate technical means and procedures for the development of the SMGCS; the associated procedures have to be established in coordination with ATS to ensure the optimum utilisation of the system. AMC/GM to ADR.OPS.B.030 ‘Surface movement guidance and control system’ AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) ‘Parameters to be considered for the development of a surface movement guidance and control system’: The AMC refers to the design of a surface movement guidance and control system. The first sentence of point (a) is adjusted accordingly. AMC2 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) ‘Use of visual aids for surface movement guidance and control’: A subtitle is added to the AMC to provide more clarity. Point (b) is transferred to the corresponding IR, because it is essential that aerodrome operator cooperates for the development of surface movement guidance and control procedures with the air traffic services provider, the latter being one of the main users of the system. AMC3 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) ‘Use of surface movement radar and other surveillance equipment’: ICAO Annex 14 Recommendations 9.8.7 and 9.8.8 are transferred from GM1 ADR.OPS.B.030 to this new TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail AMC. When the RVR falls below 350 m, air traffic services may have difficulties to maintain visual contact with the manoeuvring area or some of its parts. For this reason, the use of a surface movement radar is an acceptable way to maintain operations. Furthermore, a surface movement radar could also be used when there is a need to maintain the regularity of traffic flow when the traffic density is high and there are not alternative procedures and facilities. An advanced surface movement guidance and control system (A-SMGCS) is another way to survey movements of aircraft and vehicles on the manoeuvring area and to optimise traffic flow; however, EASA is awaiting ICAO SARPS as well as European initiatives such as SESAR, in order to include it in the AMC. GM1 ADR.OPS.B.030 ‘Surface movement guidance and control system’ — General: Point (b) and (c) have been transferred to the new AMC3 ADR.OPS.B.030. ADR.OPS.B.045 ‘Low-visibility operations’ As a general rule, and in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 ‘Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management’, any operation with an RVR less than 550 m requires LVPs. The revised IR specifies the cases where LVPs are required and extends this requirement to operations with operational credits, where the actual RVR is less than 550 m; the timely application of LVPs is very important for the safety of operations and to avoid unnecessary aircraft diversions and delays. For this reason, the IR requires the aerodrome operator to establish criteria for the preparation, initiation and termination of LVPs. Furthermore, considering the fact that unavailability of aerodrome facilities may have an impact on the operation of aircraft, the IR is revised to require the aerodrome operator to provide this information to the aeronautical information services (AIS) and/or ATS as appropriate; point (d) is revised to require that changes to LVPs require also prior approval by the competent authority. AMC/GM to ADR.OPS.B.045 ‘Low-visibility operations’ AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.045 ‘Low-visibility operations’: In point (a), the reference to lower-than-standard category I, other-than-standard category II, category II and III approaches and low-visibility take-offs have been deleted, because they are conducted in RVR conditions less than 550 m and are covered by the definition of ‘low-visibility operations’. Point (b) is deleted because it is covered by AMC1 ADR.OPS.A.015. In the existing point (c), a new point (8) is added for the establishment of low- visibility taxi routes. When LVPs are in force, the establishment of specific taxi routes to ensure segregation of traffic is considered appropriate. GM1 ADR OPS.B.045(a) ‘Low-visibility operations’ — Visibility conditions The GM provides information concerning different visibility conditions (e.g. visibility condition 1, visibility condition 2, etc.) and the associated actions required. AMC1 ADR OPS.B.045(b) ‘Low-visibility operations’ — Criteria for low-visibility procedures The extent of the LVPs depends largely on the local conditions. The AMC lists the most important elements (aerodrome layout and its complexity, location of the control tower, and facilities available) that need to be considered when developing LVPs. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.045(c) ‘Low-visibility operations’ — Equipment failures and expected effects on flight operations’ The obligation pertaining to which equipment failures should be reported is stipulated; the availability of certain ground infrastructure is essential to take full benefit of lowest minima; however, failures could occur that may lead to some restrictions in the operations. In the majority of the cases, the restrictions are imposed by the air operators themselves, based on their operational rules. The tables provide information concerning the effects that the most common failures have in the operations. CS-ADR-DSN and associated GM CS ADR-DSN.B.205 ‘Radio altimeter operating area’ Longitudinal slope changes have not been included in the CSs. The new point (d) is added to ensure alignment with ICAO Annex 14 Rec 3.8.4 GM to CS ADR-DSN.B.205 ‘Radio altimeter operating area’ GM1 ADR-DSN.B.205 ‘Radio altimeter operating area’: In point (a), the part of the sentence ‘..except that, when special circumstances so warrant’ is deleted because they cannot be specified. The GM provides information concerning the purpose of the radio altimeter operating area. Although the existence of such area is desirable, it is acknowledged that many aerodromes due to geographical and topographical restrictions are not able to establish such area. The publication of a precision approach terrain chart, or the availability of terrain and obstacle data, especially for category II and III PA runways allows the aircraft operators to evaluate the suitability of the area, therefore point (b) is deleted. Following the deletion of the existing point (b) and the subsequent renumbering of the points of this GM, a new point (c) is inserted, that further clarifies the fact that the radio altimeter operating area is desired on PA category I runway intended to be used for SA CAT I approach operations. This is because currently a DH of 150 ft can only be established by means of a radio altimeter. CS ADR-DSN.H.445 ‘Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ)’ ‘Category I, II and III approach operations’ are replaced with ‘Type B approach operations’. CS ADR-DSN.J.480 ‘Precision approach runways’ The current provisions require the establishment of an obstacle free zone (OFZ) for PA category II and III runways. For PA category I runways that support SA CAT I approach operations, the establishment of the OFZ is necessary, in order to achieve a DH of 150 ft. For this reason, points (a) and (b) have been revised and reference is made to the DH, instead of the category of operation. CS ADR-DSN.S.880 ‘Electrical power supply systems for visual aids requirements’ The title of the CS is proposed to be changed because it now includes power supply systems requirements for radio navigation aids as well. In point (d), a new point (7) is added to include the radio navigation aids. In Table S-1, secondary power supply requirements have been added for PA category I runways intended to be used for SA CAT I approach operations. The values selected for the switch-over time for the common elements between PA category I and category II/III runways are the most demanding between the two categories considering that a DH of 150 ft is in the region of CAT II approach operations. In the same table, when the runway is used by aeroplanes utilising EFVS, the TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 2. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail maximum switch-over time for runway edge, threshold and end lights is set to 1 sec, since the operation of this equipment is dependent largely on the visual aids. A new point (e) and Table S-2 are added for maximum switch-over time for different types of radio navigation aids. The values are based on ICAO Annex 10 and pertain to the most commonly used radio navigation aids. EASA will populate the table when more information is available. CS ADR-DSN.S.895 ‘Serviceability levels’ A new point (g) is introduced referring specifically to category I runways intended to be used for SA CAT I approach operations. The proposal is considering the fact that at the DH of 150 ft the requirements should be at least equal with the requirements for category II approach operations, to ensure that the pilot is provided with adequate guidance. Therefore it is proposed to use the stricter requirements for each element that is common between category I and category II/III PA runways. CS ADR-DSN.S.925 ‘Radio navigation aids’ EASA is introducing CSs for radio navigation aids, having in mind that any instrument approach operation on a runway depends not only on the runway physical characteristics and available visual aids, but also on the available radio navigation aids. EASA acknowledges the fact that in certain cases the installation and maintenance of the aids may be conducted by another organisation different from the aerodrome operator; however, the aerodrome operator being the certificate holder of the aerodrome has to ensure their existence and proper maintenance. Concerning radio navigation aids to support PA operations, EASA has decided, instead of listing all the available radio navigation aids, to refer to the ILS which has been a well-proved technology since many years. Any other radio navigation aid should meet as a minimum the performance of the corresponding ILS. GM to CS ADR-DSN.S.925 ‘Radio navigation aids’ GM1 CS ADR-DSN.S.925 ‘ILS classification’ The GM directs towards to ICAO Annex 10 concerning the classification of ILS. GM2 CS ADR-DSN.S.925 ‘Specification for ILS’ The GM directs towards to ICAO Annex 10 concerning the specifications of ILS. CS ADR-DSN.S.930 ‘Meteorological equipment’ — Runway visual range EASA is introducing CSs for meteorological equipment considering the fact that this equipment in many cases is required to support specific types of operation. The proposed CSs are focusing only on the technical aspects and are consider important elements for the certification of the aerodrome. For the time being, EASA introduces specifications for equipment measuring the RVR. The aerodrome operator, being the certificate holder, is responsible to ensure the installation, proper maintenance and operation of the meteorological equipment. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law The main objective of this NPA is to present the newly developed proposals for changes of soft law regulatory material relevant for the AWO content. For completeness purposes and in order to facilitate the review of the text, a consolidated regulatory text, as applicable, is provided, presenting both the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ law elements. Note: In cases where both the hard law and the soft law are affected by the intended change, both are presented; if only either the relevant hard law’ or soft law is affected by the intended change, only the proposed change is presented with the note, indicating specifically the intended change (e.g. no changes to the relevant hard law). The following convention has been applied when drafting the proposed amendments of the regulatory text presented in this Chapter. The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text, and unchanged text, as shown below: — deleted text is marked with strike through; — new or amended text is highlighted in grey; — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the remaining the text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment; and — the unchanged text is presented in a typical way as non-highlighted or with strike through (when it is found beneficial for the completeness of the meaning of the changed text). TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law 3.1. Proposed changes — aerodromes Annexes I and IV to Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 are amended as follows: Annex I ‘Definitions’ Point (16a) is inserted after point (16): ‘(16a) ‘decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH)’ means a specified altitude or height in a 3D instrument approach operation at which a missed approach must be initiated, if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established; Point (24a) is inserted after point (24): (24) ‘landing distance available (LDA)’ means the length of runway which is declared available and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane landing; ‘(24a) ‘low-visibility operations (LVOs)’ means approach or take-off operations on a runway with any RVR less than 550 m or taxiing at an aerodrome at which any RVR is less than 550 m;’ Point (25) is replaced (25) ‘low visibility procedures’ means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe operations during lower than Standard Category I, other than Standard Category II, Category II and III approaches and low visibility take-offs; by the following: ‘(25) ‘low-visibility procedures (LVPs)’ means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safety during LVOs;’ Point (26) is replaced (26) ‘low visibility take-off (LVTO)’ means a take-off with a runway visual range (RVR) lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m; by the following: ‘(26) ‘low-visibility take-off (LVTO)’ means a take-off with an RVR less than 550 m;’ Point (27) is deleted. (27) ‘lower than Standard Category I operation’ means a Category I instrument approach and landing operation using Category I decision height (DH), with a runway visual range (RVR) lower than would normally be associated with the applicable decision height (DH) but not lower than 400 m; Point (34a) is inserted after the point (34): TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (34) ‘non-instrument runway’ means a runway intended for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures; ‘(34a) ‘operation with operational credits’ means operations using specific aircraft or ground equipment, or a combination of aircraft and ground equipment, such that lower-than-standard aerodrome operating minima can be applied for a particular classification of operation;’ Point (35) is deleted: (35) ‘other than Standard Category II operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS where some or all of the elements of the precision approach Category II ligh GM1 16a Decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH) (a) Decision altitude (DA) is referenced to mean sea level and decision height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation. (b) The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the desired flight path. In Category III operations with a DH, the required visual references is that specified for the particular procedure and operation. Annex II (Part-ADR.AR) ADR.AR.C.035 Issuance of certificates No proposal for a change GM1 ADR.AR.C.035(e) Issuance of certificates MODEL FOR THE TERMS OF THE CERTIFICATE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CERTIFICATES (…) 5 To be specified: approval of the runway for non-instrument, instrument, non-precision approach. In case of precision approach(es), it is to be indicated, which of the following precision approach(es) is (are) approved: — Approach with EFVS; — Standard category I; — Lower-than-standard category I; — Special authorisation category I — Precision approach category II; — Other-than-standard category II; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law — Precision approach category III-A; — Precision approach category III-B; — Precision approach category III-C. (…) Annex III (Part-ADR.OR) ADR.OR.C.005 Aerodrome operator responsibilities In ADR.OR.C.005, a new point (c) is inserted as follows: (a) The aerodrome operator is responsible for the safe operation and maintenance of the aerodrome in accordance with: (1) Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its implementing rules; (2) the terms of its certificate; (3) the content of the aerodrome manual; and (4) any other manuals for the aerodrome equipment available at the aerodrome, as applicable. (b) The aerodrome operator shall ensure directly, or coordinate through arrangements as required with the accountable entities providing the following services: (1) the provision of air navigation services appropriate to the level of traffic and the operating conditions at the aerodrome; and (2) the design and maintenance of the flight procedures, in accordance with the applicable requirements. (c) The aerodrome operator shall have, directly or under contracts, all the means necessary to ensure safe operation of aircraft at the aerodrome. This shall include visual and non-visual aids, MET equipment and any other equipment commensurate with the type of operations conducted at the aerodrome. (cd) The aerodrome operator shall coordinate with the Competent Authority to ensure that relevant information for the safety of aircraft is contained in the aerodrome manual and is published where appropriate. This shall include: (1) exemptions or derogations granted from the applicable requirements; (2) provisions for which an equivalent level of safety was accepted by the Competent Authority as part of the certification basis; and (3) special conditions and limitations with regard to the use of the aerodrome. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (de) If an unsafe condition develops at the aerodrome, the aerodrome operator shall, without undue delay, take all necessary measures to ensure that those parts of the aerodrome found to endanger safety are not used by aircraft. AMC/GM to ADR.OR.C.005 Aerodrome operator responsibilities AMC1 ADR.OR.C.005(c) ‘Aerodrome operator responsibilities’ is changed to AMC1 ADR.OR.C.005(d). AMC1 ADR.OR.C.005(cd) Aerodrome operator responsibilities PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION TO THE AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION PUBLICATION A description of cases involving exemptions, derogations, cases of equivalent level of safety, special conditions, including limitations with regard to the use of the aerodrome, should be published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), after coordination with the Competent Authority. Annex IV (Part-ADR.OPS) ADR.OPS.A.005 Aerodrome data No proposal for a change (referenced text provided for readers’ convenience): The aerodrome operator shall as appropriate: (a) determine, document and maintain data relevant to the aerodrome and available services; (b) provide data relevant to the aerodrome and available services to the users and the relevant air traffic services and aeronautical information services providers. AMC1 ADR.OPS.A.005 Aerodrome data (a) Data relevant to the aerodrome and available services should include, but may not be limited to, items in the following list: (1) aerodrome reference point; (2) aerodrome and runway elevations; (3) aerodrome reference temperature; (4) aerodrome dimensions and related information; (5) strength of pavements; (6) preflight altimeter check location; (7) declared distances; (8) condition of the movement area and related facilities; (9) disabled aircraft removal; (10) rescue and firefighting; and (11) visual approach slope indicator systems.; (12) parts of the aerodrome lighting system which are converted to LED; TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (13) approach and departure procedures charts; and (14) measured ILS classification and performance data. (…) (e) Electronic terrain and obstacle data should be provided for Area 4 for terrain and obstacles that penetrate the relevant obstacle data collection surface, for all runways where precision approach PA Category II or III operations with a DH of less than 200 ft have been established and where detailed terrain information is required by operators to enable them to assess the effect of terrain on the decision height DH determination by the use of radio altimeters. When electronic terrain and obstacle data are not provided, a Precision Approach Terrain Chart — ICAO, should be provided. (f) The aerodrome operator should establish arrangements with the Air Traffic Services providers and the Competent Authority for the provision of obstacles and terrain data outside of the aerodrome boundary. (g) The aerodrome operator should make available measured ILS classification and performance data to interested air operators. ADR.OPS.B.030 ADR.OPS.B.030 Surface movement guidance and control system The aerodrome operator shall ensure that a surface movement guidance and control system is provided at the aerodrome. is replaced by the following: ADR.OPS.B.030 Surface movement guidance and control system (a) The aerodrome operator shall ensure that a surface movement guidance and control system (SMGCS) is provided at the aerodrome. (b) The SMGCS shall: (1) take into account the design characteristics and the operational and meteorological conditions of the aerodrome, as well as human factor principles; (2) be designed to assist in the prevention of: (i) inadvertent incursions of aircraft and vehicles on an active runway; and (ii) collisions between aircraft as well as between aircraft and vehicles or objects on any part of the movement area; and (3) be supported by appropriate technological means and procedures. (c) The aerodrome operator shall coordinate with the air traffic services provider for the development of the surface movement guidance and control procedures. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) Surface movement guidance and control system GENERAL PARAMETERS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SURFACE MOVEMENT GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM (a) The design of an surface movement guidance and control system SMGCS should take into account: (1) the density of air traffic; (2) the visibility conditions under which operations are intended; (3) the need for pilot orientation; (4) the complexity of the aerodrome layout; and (5) movements of vehicles. (…) AMC2 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) Surface movement guidance and control system USE OF VISUAL AIDS FOR SURFACE MOVEMENT GUIDANCE AND CONTROL (a)Where an SMGCS is provided by selective switching of stop bars and taxiway centre line lights, the following requirements should be met: (1a) taxiway routes which are indicated by illuminated taxiway centre line lights should be capable of being terminated by an illuminated stop bar; (2b) the control circuits should be so arranged that when a stop bar located ahead of an aircraft is illuminated, the appropriate section of taxiway centre line lights beyond it is suppressed; and (3c) the taxiway centre line lights are activated ahead of an aircraft when the stop bar is suppressed. (b) The aerodrome operator should develop the surface movement guidance and control system (SMGCS) procedures in cooperation with the aerodrome air traffic services provider. AMC3 ADR.OPS.B.030(b) Surface movement guidance and control system USE OF SURFACE MOVEMENT RADAR AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (a) Surface movement radar or any other suitable surveillance equipment for the manoeuvring area should be provided at an aerodrome intended for use in runway visual range (RVR) conditions less than a value of 350 m; (b) Surface movement radar or any other suitable surveillance equipment for the manoeuvring area should be provided at an aerodrome other than that in (a), when the traffic density and operating conditions are such that regularity of traffic flow cannot be maintained by alternative procedures and facilities. GM1 ADR.OPS.B.030 Surface movement guidance and control system GENERAL (a) The SMGCS should comprise an appropriate combination of visual aids, non-visual aids, procedures, control, regulation, management and information facilities. Systems range from the very simple at small aerodromes, with light traffic operating in good visibility conditions, to the complex systems necessary at large aerodromes with heavy traffic operating in low-visibility TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law conditions. The system selected for an aerodrome will be appropriate to the operational environment in which that aerodrome will operate. (b) Surface movement radar for the manoeuvring area could be provided at an aerodrome intended for use in runway visual range conditions less than a value of 350 m. (c) Surface movement radar for the manoeuvring area could be provided at an aerodrome other than that in (b) above when traffic density and operating conditions are such that regularity of traffic flow cannot be maintained by alternative procedures and facilities. ADR.OPS.B.045 ADR.OPS.B.045 Low visibility operations (a) The aerodrome operator shall ensure that means and procedures are established and implemented for providing safe conditions for aerodrome operations in low visibility conditions. (b) Low visibility procedures shall require prior approval by the Competent Authority. is replaced by the following: ADR.OPS.B.045 Low-visibility operations (a) The aerodrome operator shall ensure that an aerodrome intended to be used for: (1) take-off operations with visibility conditions less than 550 m RVR; (2) approach operations with visibility conditions less than 550 m RVR and/or a DH less than 200 ft (60 m); (3) operations with operational credits where the actual RVR is less than 550 m; or (4) taxiing operations with visibility conditions less than 550 m RVR, is provided with the appropriate aerodrome equipment and facilities, and that appropriate procedures are established and implemented. Such procedures shall coordinate the movement of aircraft and vehicles on the movement area, and restrict or prohibit activities on the movement area. (b) The aerodrome operator shall establish the criteria for the preparation, initiation and termination of low-visibility procedures. The criteria shall be based on the RVR and cloud ceiling. (c) When low-visibility procedures are in effect, the aerodrome operator shall make available to aeronautical information services and/or air traffic services, as appropriate, information on the status of the aerodrome equipment and facilities. (d) Low-visibility procedures, and any changes thereto, shall require prior approval by the competent authority.’ AMC/GM to ADR.OPS.B.045 ‘Low-visibility operations’ AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.045 Low-visibility operations GENERAL TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (a) The aerodrome operator should, in collaboration with the air traffic services provider and the provider of apron management services, if applicable, establish procedures to support for low- visibility operations when lower than Standard Category I, other than Standard Category II, Category II and III approaches and low visibility take-offs are conducted. (b) When low visibility procedures (LVP) are in effect, the aerodrome operator should make available to aeronautical information services and/or air traffic services, as appropriate, information on the status of the aerodrome facilities. (c) The aerodrome operator should establish and implement procedures to ensure that when low- visibility procedures (LVPs) are in effect, persons and vehicles operating on an apron are restricted to the essential minimum. (d) The procedures to be established by the aerodrome operator to ensure safe aerodrome operations during low visibility conditions support low-visibility operations should cover the following subjects: (1) physical characteristics of the runway environment, including pre-threshold, approach and departure areas; (2) obstacle limitation surfaces; (3) surveillance and maintenance of visual aids; (4) safeguarding of non-visual aids essential to LVPs; (5) secondary power supplies; (6) movement area safety; (7) RFFS; and (8) establishment of low-visibility taxi routes. (e) When LVPs are applied, any maintenance activities in the proximity of aerodrome electrical systems should be restricted. GM1 ADR OPS.B.045(a) Low-visibility operations VISIBILITY CONDITIONS Visibility condition 1 (a) Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersection by visual reference, and for air traffic control (ATC) to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. (b) No additional requirements for the protection of ground operations by aircraft are necessary during visibility condition 1. Visibility condition 2 (a) Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, but insufficient for ATC to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual reference. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (b) Actions required in visibility condition 2 are dependent on the dimensions of the manoeuvring area and the position of the control tower. Procedures and visual aids will allow the pilot to determine the position of the aircraft and follow the required route. (c) In the lower ranges of visibility condition 2, the necessary measures might limit the movement rate unless some additional aids are available, such as SMGCS. Adequate safeguards against runway incursions should be in place, such as limited taxi routes, surface movement radar and stop-bars or physical barriers at runway access points. Visibility condition 3 (a) Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi but insufficient to avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, and insufficient for ATC to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. For taxiing, this is normally taken as visibilities equivalent to an RVR of less than 400 m but more than 75 m. (b) In such visibility conditions, it is likely further ATC measures, such as block control, to assist aircraft and vehicle movement including RFF vehicles, should be considered. Visibility condition 4 (a) Visibility insufficient for the pilot to taxi by visual guidance only. This is normally taken as an RVR of 75 m or less. (b) During visibility conditions 3 and 4, advanced surface movement guidance and control systems (A-SMGCSs), where available, may be used to determine the position of vehicles on the manoeuvring area. AMC1 ADR OPS.B.045(b) Low-visibility operations CRITERIA FOR LOW-VISIBILITY PROCEDURES When establishing the criteria for the preparation of LVPs, the aerodrome operator should consider: (a) the aerodrome layout and its complexity; (b) the location of the control tower; and (c) the facilities available. AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.045(c) Low-visibility operations EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND EXPECTED EFFECTS ON FLIGHT OPERATIONS The following equipment failures should be reported: EQUIPMENT FAILURE TO BE REPORTED — LOW-VISIBILITY DEPARTURE OPERATIONS SYSTEM CONSIDERED FAILURE TO BE REPORTED EXPECTED EFFECT ON FLIGHT OPERATIONS ILS ILS localiser downgraded to CAT II No take-off guidance. Guided take-off not permitted (Where used for guided take-off) No take-off guidance. Guided ILS localiser downgraded to CAT I TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law take-off not permitted ILS out of service No take-off guidance. Guided take-off not permitted MLS MLS downgraded to CAT II No take-off guidance. Guided Take-Off not permitted (Where used for guided take-off) No take-off guidance. Guided MLS downgraded to CAT I Take-Off not permitted No take-off guidance. Guided MLS out of service Take-Off not permitted RVR Touchdown RVR system unserviceable Restrictions depending on flight operations rules Restrictions depending on flight Other RVR systems unserviceable operations rules LIGHTING SYSTEMS Runway lighting unserviceable Restrictions depending on flight operations rules Restrictions depending on flight Standby power supply unserviceable operations rules Runway centre line lighting unserviceable Restrictions depending on flight operations rules Restrictions depending on flight Runway edge lighting unserviceable operations rules Restrictions depending on flight Taxiway lighting system unserviceable operations rules ANCILLARY Stop bars unserviceable No effect if runway protection is ensured by other means Ceilometer unserviceable No effect Anemometer unserviceable No effect if other sources available; otherwise, restriction depending on flight operation rules TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law EQUIPMENT FAILURE TO BE REPORTED — APPROACH AND LANDING OPERATIONS ILS ILS downgraded to CAT II Flight operations limited to CAT II ILS downgraded to CAT I Flight operations limited to CAT I ILS out of service Restricted to non-precision approach (or other precision approach aid if available) No limitation if replaced by Outer marker unserviceable published equivalent position; otherwise, restricted to non- precision approach Glide path out of service Restricted to non-precision approach (e.g. localiser only) MLS MLS downgraded to CAT II Flight operations limited to CAT II MLS downgraded to CAT I Flight operations limited to CAT I MLS out of service Restricted to non-precision approach (or other -precision approach aid if available) DME DME (as alternative to marker beacons) No limitation if replaced by unserviceable published equivalent position; otherwise, restricted to non- precision RVR Touchdown RVR system unserviceable Restriction depending on flight operations rules Restriction depending on flight Other RVR systems unserviceable operation rules LIGHTING SYSTEMS Approach lighting unserviceable Restriction depending on flight operation rules Restriction depending on flight Runway lighting unserviceable operation rules Restriction depending on flight Standby power supply unserviceable operation rules TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Runway centre line lighting unserviceable Restriction depending on flight operation rules Restriction depending on flight Runway edge lighting unserviceable operation rules Restriction depending on flight TDZ lighting unserviceable operation rules Restriction depending on flight Taxiway lighting system unserviceable operation rules ANCILLARY Stop bars unserviceable No effect if runway protection is ensured by other means Ceilometer unserviceable No effect Anemometer unserviceable No effect if other sources available; otherwise, restriction depending on flight operation rules TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law CS-ADR-DSN — CS Aerodrome Design with related GM CS ADR-DSN.B.205 Radio altimeter operating area (a) A radio altimeter operating area should be established in the pre-threshold area of a precision approach runway category II and III, and where practicable, in the pre-threshold area of a precision approach runway category I. (b) Length of the area A radio altimeter operating area should extend before the threshold for a distance of at least 300 m. (c) Width of the area A radio altimeter operating area should extend laterally, on each side of the extended centre line of the runway, to a distance of 60 m. The distance may be reduced to no less than 30 m if an safety assessment indicates that such reduction would not affect the safety of operations of aircraft. (d) Longitudinal slope changes Slope changes should be avoided or kept to a minimum. Where slope changes cannot be avoided, they should be as gradual as practicable. In addition, abrupt changes or sudden reversals of slopes should be avoided. GM1 ADR-DSN.B.205 Radio altimeter operating area (a) In order to accommodate aeroplanes making auto-coupled approaches and automatic landings (irrespective of weather conditions), it is desirable that slope changes be avoided or kept to a minimum, on a rectangular area at least 300 m long before the threshold of a precision approach PA runway. The area should be symmetrical about the extended centre line, 120 m wide. When special circumstances so warrant, tThe width may be reduced to no less than 60 m if a safety assessment indicates that such reduction would not affect the safety of operations of aircraft. This is The radio altimeter operating area is desirableneeded because these for aeroplanes which are equipped with a radio altimeter for final height and flare guidance, and when the aeroplane is above the terrain immediately prior to the threshold, the radio altimeter should begins to provide information to the automatic pilot for auto-flare. Where slope changes cannot be avoided, the rate of change between two consecutive slopes should not exceed 2 % per 30 m. (b) The inclusion of detailed specifications for radio altimeter operating area in this GM is not intended to imply that a radio altimeter operating area has to be provided. (bc) With a radio altimeter operating area in the pre-threshold area of a precision approach PA runway, the margin to calculate the decision altitude (DA) should be smaller and the usability of the adjacent runway may be enhanced. (dc) For precision approach category I runways intended for SA CAT I approach operations, the establishment of a radio altimeter operating area may enhance the usability of the adjacent runway and maximise the benefits of reduced DH and RVR minima. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (ed) Further Additional guidance on radio altimeter operating area is given in Manual of All-Weather Operations, (ICAO, Doc 9365, Section 5.2). Guidance on the use of radio altimeters is given in the ICAO, PANS-OPS, Volume II, Part II, Section 1. CS ADR-DSN.H.445 Obstacle free zone (OFZ) (a) An OFZ is intended to protect aeroplanes from fixed and mobile obstacles during Category I, II or III Type B approach operations when approaches are continued below the decision height (DH), and during any subsequent missed approach or balked landing with all engines operating normally. It is not intended to supplant the requirement of other surfaces or areas where these are more demanding. (b) The OFZ is made up of the following obstacle limitation surfaces: (1) inner approach surface; (2) inner transitional surfaces; and (3) balked landing surface. CS ADR-DSN.J.480 Precision approach runways (a) The following obstacle limitation surfaces should be established for a precision approach runway Category I intended to be used for approach operations with a DH not less than 200 ft: (1) conical surface; (2) inner horizontal surface; (3) approach surface; and (4) transitional surfaces. (b) The following obstacle limitation surfaces should be established for a precision approach runway Category II or III intended to be used for approach operations with a DH less than 200 ft: (1) conical surface; (2) inner horizontal surface; (3) approach surface and inner approach surface; (4) transitional surfaces and inner transitional surfaces; and (5) balked landing surface. (c) The heights and slopes of the surfaces should not be greater than, and their other dimensions not less than, those specified in Table J-1, except in the case of the horizontal section of the approach surface in paragraph (d) below. (d) The approach surface should be horizontal beyond the point at which the 2.5 % slope intersects: (1) a horizontal plane 150 m above the threshold elevation; or (2) the horizontal plane passing through the top of any object that governs the obstacle clearance limit; whichever is the higher. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (e) Fixed objects should not be permitted above the inner approach surface, the inner transitional surface or the balked landing surface, except for frangible objects which because of their function should be located on the strip. Mobile objects should not be permitted above these surfaces during the use of the runway for landing. (f) New objects or extensions of existing objects should not be permitted above an approach surface or a transitional surface except when the new object or extension would be shielded by an existing immovable object. (g) New objects or extensions of existing objects should not be permitted above the conical surface and the inner horizontal surface except when an object would be shielded by an existing immovable object, or after safety assessment, it is determined that the object would not adversely affect the safety or significantly affect the regularity of operations of aeroplanes. (h) Existing objects above an approach surface, a transitional surface, the conical surface and inner horizontal surface should, as far as practicable, be removed except when an object would be shielded by an existing immovable object, or after safety assessment , it is determined that the object would not adversely affect the safety or significantly affect the regularity of operations of aeroplanes. CS ADR-DSN.S.880 Electrical power supply systems (a) For a precision approach runway, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the requirements of Table S-1 for the appropriate category of precision approach runway should be provided. Electric power supply connections to those facilities for which secondary power is required should be so arranged that the facilities are automatically connected to the secondary power supply on failure of the primary source of power. (b) For a runway meant for take-off in runway visual range RVR conditions less than a value of 800 m, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the relevant requirements of Table S-1 should be provided. (c) At an aerodrome where the primary runway is a non-precision approach runway, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the requirements of Table S-1 should be provided except that a secondary power supply for visual aids need not be provided for more than one non-precision approach runway. (d) The following aerodrome facilities should be provided with a secondary power supply capable of supplying power when there is a failure of the primary power supply: (1) the signalling lamp and the minimum lighting necessary to enable air traffic services personnel to carry out their duties; (2) obstacle lights which are essential to ensure the safe operation of aircraft; (3) approach, runway and taxiway lighting as specified in CS ADR-DSN.M.625 to CS ADR- DSN.M.745; (4) meteorological equipment; (5) essential equipment and facilities for the parking position if provided, in accordance with CS ADR-DSN.M.750(a) and CS ADR-DSN.M.755(a); and TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (6) illumination of apron areas over which passengers may walk.; and (7) radio navigation aids. Maximum switch-over Runway Lighting aids requiring power time Visual approach slope indicatorsa See b, e Runway edge CS ADR-DSN.M.875(d) and Non-instrument Runway thresholdb, e CS ADR-DSN.M.880(d) Runway endb, e Obstaclea Approach lighting system 15 seconds Visual approach slope indicatorsa, d 15 seconds Runway edged, e 15 seconds Non-precision approach Runway thresholdd, e 15 seconds Runway endd, e 15 seconds Obstaclea 15 seconds Approach lighting system 15 seconds Runway edged,e 15 seconds Visual approach slope indicatorsa, d 15 seconds Precision approach d,e Runway threshold 15 seconds category I Runway ende 15 seconds Essential taxiwaya 15 seconds Obstaclea 15 seconds Inner 300 m of the approach lighting 1 second system Other parts of the approach lighting Precision approach system 15 seconds category I intended to be Obstacle used for SA CAT I Runway edge 15 seconds Runway threshold Runway end 15 seconds TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Table Runway centre line (if installed) S 1 second - Runway toucdown zone (if installed) 1 second 1 . 1 second 1 second S e c Inner 300 m of the approach lighting 1 second o system n Other parts of the approach lighting d 15 seconds system a r Obstaclea 15 seconds y Runway edge 15 seconds Precision approach p category II/III Runway threshold 1 second o Runway end 1 second w e Runway centre line 1 second r Runway TDZ 1 second All stop bars 1 second s u Essential taxiway 15 seconds p p l Runway edge 15 seconds y Runway meant for take-off Runway end 1 second in runway visual range r conditions less than a value Runway centre line 1 second e of 800 m All stop bars 1 second q u Essential taxiwaya 15 seconds i Obstaclea 15 seconds r e m a. Supplied with secondary power when their operation is essential to the safety of flight e operation. n t b. The use of emergency lighting should be in accordance with any procedures established. s c. One second where no runway centre line lights are provided. d. One second where approaches are over hazardous or precipitous terrain. (e) T e. h second where approaches are conducted using EFVS One e power supply switch-over times for radio navigation aids should be dependent on the type of runway and aircraft operations to be supported. Table S-2 indicates representative switch-over times to be met by power supply systems currently available. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Type of runway Aids requiring power Maximum switch-over times (seconds) Instrument approach SRE 15 VOR 15 NDB 15 D/F facility 15 Precision approach category I ILS localiser 10 ILS glide path 10 ILS middle marker 10 ILS outer marker 10 PAR 10 Precision approach category II ILS localiser 0 ILS glide path 0 ILS inner marker 1 ILS middle marker 1 ILS outer marker 10 Precision approach category III Same as category II Table S-2 Power supply switch-over times for ground-based radio aids used at aerodromes CS ADR-DSN.S.895 Serviceability levels (a) A light should be deemed to be unserviceable when the main beam average intensity is less than 50 % of the value specified in the appropriate Figure in CS ADR-DSN.U.940. For light units where the designed main beam average intensity is above the value shown in CS ADR-DSN.U.940, the 50 % value should be related to that design value. (b) A system of preventive maintenance of visual aids should be employed to ensure lighting and marking system reliability. (c) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision approach runway category II or III should have as its objective that, during any period of category II or III operations, all approach and runway lights are serviceable and that, in any event, at least: TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (1) 95 % of the lights are serviceable in each of the following particular significant elements: (i) precision approach category II and III lighting system, the inner 450 m; (ii) runway centre line lights; (iii) runway threshold lights; and (iv) runway edge lights. (2) 90 % of the lights are serviceable in the touchdown zone lights; (3) 85 % of the lights are serviceable in the approach lighting system beyond 450 m; and (4) 75 % of the lights are serviceable in the runway end lights. (5) In order to provide continuity of guidance, the allowable percentage of unserviceable lights should not be permitted in such a way as to alter the basic pattern of the lighting system. (6) Additionally, an unserviceable light should not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light, except in a barrette or a crossbar where two adjacent unserviceable lights may be permitted. (d) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a stop bar provided at a runway-holding position used in conjunction with a runway intended for operations in runway visual range conditions less than a value of 550 m should have the following objectives: (1) no more than two lights should remain unserviceable; and (2) two adjacent lights should not remain unserviceable unless the light spacing is significantly less than that specified. (e) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a taxiway intended for use in runway visual range conditions less than a value of 550 m should have as its objective that no two adjacent taxiway centre line lights be unserviceable. (f) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision approach runway category I should have as its objective that, during any period of category I operations, all approach and runway lights are serviceable and that, in any event, at least 85 % of the lights are serviceable in each of the following: (1) precision approach category I lighting system; (2) runway threshold lights; (3) runway edge lights; and (4) runway end lights. In order to provide continuity of guidance an unserviceable light should not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light unless the light spacing is significantly less than that specified. (g) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision approach category I runway intended to be used for SA CAT I approach operations should have as its objective that, during TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law any period of SA CAT I approach operations, all approach and runway lights are available and that, in any event: (1) at least 95 % of the lights are serviceable in each of the following particular significant elements: (i) the inner 450 m of the precision approach category I lighting system; (ii) runway centre line lights, if installed; (iii) runway threshold lights; and (iv) runway edge lights; (2) at least 85 % of the lights are serviceable in the approach lighting system beyond 450 m; (3) at least 85 % of the lights are serviceable in the runway end lights; (4) in order to provide continuity of guidance, the allowable percentage of unserviceable lights should not be permitted in such a way as to alter the basic pattern of the lighting system; and (5) additionally, an unserviceable light should not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light, except in a barrette or a crossbar where two adjacent unserviceable lights may be permitted. (gh) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a runway meant for take-off in runway visual range conditions less than a value of 550 m should have as its objective that, during any period of operations, all runway lights are serviceable, and that in any event: (1) at least 95 % of the lights are serviceable in the runway centre line lights (where provided) and in the runway edge lights; and; (2) at least 75 % of the lights are serviceable in the runway end lights. In order to provide continuity of guidance, an unserviceable light should not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light. (hi) The system of preventive maintenance employed for a runway meant for take-off in runway visual rang conditions of a value of 550 m or greater should have as its objective that, during any period of operations, all runway lights are serviceable, and that, in any event, at least 85 % of the lights are serviceable in the runway edge lights and runway end lights. In order to provide continuity of guidance, an unserviceable light should not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light. CAT II/III SA CAT I CAT I RVR<550 m RVR>550 m Light type Approach Approach take-off take-off Approach Approach inner 95 % 95 % 85 % - - 450 m TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law Approach outer 85 % 85 % 85 % - - 450 m Runway threshold 95 % 95 % 85 % - - Runway centre line 95 % 95 % 85 % 95 % 85 % Runway edge 95 % 95 % 85 % 95 % 85 % Runway end 75 % 85 % 85 % 75 % 85 % Touchdown zone 90 % 90 %a (85 %)a - - Note (a): If touchdown zone lights are available. Table S-23. Allowable percentages of serviceable lights CS ADR-DSN.S.925 Radio navigation aids (a) Applicability Instrument runways should be supported by radio navigation aids to provide vertical and/or lateral guidance up to the MDA/H or the DA/H, whichever is applicable. (b) Non-precision approaches are supported by: (1) non-directional beacon (NDB); (2) LOC; (3) VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR); and (4) global navigation satellite system (GNSS) lateral navigation (LNAV). (c) Approach procedures with vertical guidance (APV) are supported by GNSS with Baro or SBAS vertical guidance. (d) Precision approach procedures CAT I are supported by: (1) a facility performance Category I ILS; or (2) any other radio navigation aid that has performance characteristics at least equivalent to an ILS mentioned in point (1) above. (e) Precision approach procedures CAT II are supported by: (1) a facility performance Category II ILS; or (2) any other radio navigation aid that has performance characteristics at least equivalent to an ILS mentioned in point (1) above. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (f) Precision approach procedures CAT III are supported by: (1) a facility performance Category III ILS; or (2) any other radio navigation aid that has performance characteristics at least equivalent to an ILS mentioned in point (1) above. (g) Where two separate ILS facilities serve opposite ends of a single runway, an interlock should ensure that only the localiser serving the approach direction in use radiates, except where the localiser in operational use is facility performance category I ILS and no operationally harmful interference results. (h) At locations where ILS facilities serving opposite ends of the same runway or different runways at the same aerodrome use the same paired frequencies, an interlock should ensure that only one facility should radiate at a time. When switching from one ILS facility to another, radiation from both should be suppressed for not less than 20 seconds. GM1 CS ADR-DSN.S.925 Radio navigation aids ILS SPECIFICATIONS AND CLASSIFICATION The ILS specifications and classification system is specified in ICAO Annex 10, Volume I. CS ADR-DSN.S.930 Meteorological equipment RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE (a) Instrumented systems based on transmissometers or forward-scatter meters should be used to assess the runway visual range (RVR) on runways intended for approach and landing operations at runway visual ranges (RVRs less than 550 m. (b) Siting (1) The Runway visual range (RVR) should be assessed at a height of approximately 2.5 m (7.5 ft) above the runway (2) The system should be located at a lateral distance from the runway centre line of not more than 120 m (3) The site for observations to be representative of the touchdown zone should be located about 300 m along the runway from the threshold (4) The sites for observations to be representative of the midpoint and stop end of the runway should be located at a distance of 1 000 to 1 500 m along the runway from the threshold and at a distance of about 300 m from the other end of the runway. (5) The exact position of these sites and, if necessary, additional sites should be decided after considering aeronautical, meteorological and climatological factors, such a long runways, swamps and other fog-prone areas. (c) Display (1) One display or more, if required, should be located in the meteorological station with corresponding displays in the appropriate air traffic services units. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (2) The displays in the meteorological station and in the air traffic services units shall be related to the same sensors, and where separate sensors are required, the displays shall be clearly marked to identify the runway and section of runway monitored by each sensor. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 35 An agency of the European Union  European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2018-06(D) 3. Proposed draft changes to the AWO-related soft law (d) Averaging Where instrumented systems are used for the assessment of the runway visual range (RVR), their output should be updated at least every 60 seconds to permit the provision of current, representative values. The averaging period for RVR values should be: (1) 1 minute for local routine and special reports and for RVR displays in air traffic services units; and (2) 10 minutes for meteorological terminal air report (METAR) and special weather report (SPECI), except that when the 10-minute period immediately preceding the observation includes a marked discontinuity in runway visual range (RVR) values, only those values occurring after the discontinuity should be used for obtaining mean values. TE.RPRO.00034-006 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 35 An agency of the European Union