Ref. Ares(2021)7430531 - 02/12/2021
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT
Directorate A - Policy coordination
The Director
Brussels,
MOVE.A.4/JS/MOVE.A.4(2021)7865744
Dear Sir,
In the Action Plan attached to the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy1 adopted on 9
December 2020 the Commission announced to issue a Communication of the
Commission containing revised interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 on public passenger transport by rail and by road2 (Action No. 62). Please
find enclosed the draft text of such a Communication.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 is an important legislative text of the transport acquis,
which aims to ensure the provision of public transport services in road, rail and other
track-based modes under conditions of fair competition and meeting the needs of
citizens. Public Service Obligation (PSO) services are particularly important for rail
because rail passenger services under PSO represent about two thirds of all rail transport
services. Boosting sustainable public transport is a key component of the Sustainable and
Smart Mobility Strategy.
This Regulation is a complex text, which is why Interpretative Guidelines were adopted
already in 20143. A revision of these Guidelines is needed a) to take account of the new
provisions that were introduced by the 4th Railway Package in 2016 (e.g. on competitive
tendering in rail), b) to reflect recent ECJ jurisprudence related to the Regulation and c)
to include Commission case practice. These updates and clarifications will enhance legal
certainty for all actors in the public land transport sector and potentially reduce litigation.
1
Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy –
putting European transport on track for the future, COM(2020) 789 final, Brussels, 9.12.2020
2
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on
public passenger transport services by rail and by road, OJ L 315 3.12.2007, p. 1
3
Communication from the Commission on interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road, OJ C 92, 29.3.2014, p. 1–21
Mr Marten KOKK
Deputy Permanent Representative of Estonia to the EU
Rue Guimard, 11-13
1040 Bruxelles
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111
Office: DM28 01/040 - Tel. direct line +32 229-95083
[email protected]
The Commission's intention is to consult the main stakeholders – European associations
of the public transport sector as well as Member States – on the draft document before
adopting the interpretative guidelines in the first half of next year.
In order to meet this timetable, I would like to invite you to submit your possible
comments and suggestions to the functional e-mail address MOVE-PSO-
[email protected] within 8 weeks after the date of dispatching of the present
letter.
Yours faithfully,
Electronically signed
Mona BJÖRKLUND
Enclosure: Draft revised interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation 1370/2007
2
Electronically signed on 01/12/2021 18:01 (UTC+01) in accordance with article 11 of Commission Decision C(2020) 4482
Ref. Ares(2021)7430531 - 02/12/2021
NON-PAPER
Revised interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public
passenger transport services by rail and by road
1. INTRODUCTION
As expressed in its Communication on a Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy1 transport
decisive action is needed to shift more activity towards more sustainable transport modes.
Public transport services are crucial to deliver the European Green Deal goals of sustainable,
smart and inclusive mobility. To this end, the availability of resource-efficient and
environmentally friendly public transport services is key. These services are regulated by
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council
Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/702 (‘Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007’).
In accordance with Protocol (No 26) on services of general interest, national, regional and
local authorities play an essential role and enjoy a wide discretion in providing,
commissioning and organising services of general economic interest. Where public transport
services are considered to be in the general economic interest, they cannot be always operated
on a commercial basis, but may require public financial support. It is for Member States to
identify the mobility needs of their citizens and provide the required support, if needed.
At the same time, financial support should be subject to conditions that ensure an undistorted
functioning of the internal market. These conditions are spelled out in Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 entered into force on 3 December 2009. It was amended by
Regulation (EU) 2016/2338 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December
20163, in the framework of the Fourth Railway Package4.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 lays down the conditions under which public transport
services by rail and other track-based modes of transport and by road can be organised and
financed: it applies, in particular, to bus, tram, metro and rail. It can also apply to inland
waterways and national seawaters if Member States so decide.
The conditions concern, inter alia, the definition of public service obligations, the scope of
public service contracts, the modalities for awarding such contracts and the determination of
the compensation paid to public transport operators. If the provisions of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 are complied with, the compensation is deemed compatible with the internal
market and exempt from the requirement of prior notification to the Commission under
Article 108(3) of the TFUE.
1
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting
European transport on track for the future (COM/2020/789 final), 9.12.2020.
2
OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1.
3
Regulation (EU) 2016/2338 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 amending
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services
by rail. OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 22.
4
The Fourth Railway Package is a set of six legislative texts designed to complete the single market for rail
services; see https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/packages/2013_en.
1
In 2014, the Commission adopted a first Communication on Interpretative Guidelines
concerning Regulation (EC) No 1370/20075 (the ‘2014 Interpretative Guidelines’), designed
to communicate to stakeholders its understanding of a number of provisions of the
Regulation, and inspired by best practices in Member States.
In the meantime, there has been an evolution of the legislative framework: in 2016,
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 was substantively amended, notably to extend the principle of
competitive tendering of public services to the railway sector. The Court of Justice of the
European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) has also interpreted certain provisions of Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007 and rules applicable to the services of general economic interest. It is
therefore necessary to revise the 2014 Interpretative Guidelines in the light of these
developments, and also to cater for the orderly launch of new initiatives, such as the
possibility of organising and supporting international public services such as night trains as a
more environmentally friendly transport option.
Before adopting this new Communication, the Commission has consulted Member States and
stakeholders representing interested parties, such as European associations of the public
transport sector, including transport staff and passenger organisations.
This Communication only covers selected provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and
does not create any new rules. The interpretation of the Union law is ultimately the
prerogative of the Court of Justice.
2. THE COMMISSION’S UNDERSTANDING OF REGULATION (EC) No
1370/2007
2.1. Scope of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
This section provides interpretative guidance on the relationship between Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 and the following directives: Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive
2004/18/EC6 (‘Directive 2014/24/EU’); Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC7 (‘Directive
2014/25/EU’); and Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts8 (‘Directive 2014/23/EU’). This
section also explains how to apply Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to inland waterways and
national seawaters.
2.1.1. Article 5(1) and Article 1(3). Relationship between Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
and the public procurement and concession directives
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 governs the award of public service contracts as defined in
Article 2(i) thereof, in the field of public passenger transport by rail and other track-based
modes of transport and by road. However, depending on their characteristics, public service
contracts may also fall within the scope of the public procurement directives (Directive
5
Communication from the Commission on interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
on public passenger transport services by rail and by road of 29 March 2014, OJ C 92, 29.3.2014, p. 1.
6
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65.
7
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243.
8
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1.
2
2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU)9 or of the concession directive (Directive
2014/23/EU) .
The distinction between service contracts and service concessions is important to determine
which legal instrument applies to the award.
Article 2(1), points (1), (2) and (5) of Directive 2014/25/EU defines ‘service contracts’ as
contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more contracting
entities, pursuing the activities referred to in Articles 8 to 14 of the Directive, and one or
more economic operators and having as their object the provision of services. When these
contracts involve ‘contracting authorities’, within the meaning of Article 2(1) point (1) of
Directive 2014/24/EU, not exercising the activities referred to in Articles 8 to 14 of Directive
2014/25/EU, they are considered as ‘public service contracts’ in accordance with Article 2(1)
points (6) and (9) of Directive 2014/24/EU.
Article 5(1)(b) of Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts defines ‘service
concessions’ as contracts ‘for pecuniary interest concluded in writing by means of which one
or more contracting authorities or contracting entities entrust the provision and the
management of services other than the execution of works referred to in point (a) to one or
more economic operators, the consideration of which consists either solely in the right to
exploit the services that are the subject of the contract or in that right together with payment’.
Article 5(1) specifies further that ‘the award of a works or services concession shall involve
the transfer to the concessionaire of an operating risk in exploiting those works or services
encompassing demand or supply risk or both. The concessionaire shall be deemed to assume
operating risk where, under normal operating conditions, it is not guaranteed to recoup the
investments made or the costs incurred in operating the works or the services, which are the
subject matter of the concession. The part of the risk transferred to the concessionaire shall
involve real exposure to the vagaries of the market, such that any potential estimated loss
incurred by the concessionaire shall not be merely nominal or negligible’.
This distinction between public service contracts and service concessions is important
because, according to Article 10(3) of Directive 2014/23/EU, this Directive shall not apply to
concessions for public passenger transport services within the meaning of Regulation (EC)
No 1370/2007. Therefore, the award of service concessions for these public passenger
transport services is solely governed by Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, regardless of the
transport mode.
For service contracts, however, the transport mode matters. Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC)
No 1370/2007 specifies that the award of public service contracts for transport services by
bus or tram is governed by Directives 2004/17/EC10 and 2004/18/EC11, except where such
contracts take the form of service concessions. The award of public service contracts for bus
or tram services is thus solely governed by the procurement directives (Directives
2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU).
Conversely, the award of public service contracts for public passenger transport services by
railway and metro is governed solely by Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (and excluded from
the scope of Directive 2014/24/EU, according to its recital 27 and Article 10(i), and from the
scope of Directive 2014/25/EU, according to its recital 35 and Article 21(g)).
9
It should be noted that Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 still refers to Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC,
which in the meantime have been repealed and replaced by Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. All these
references should be understood as relating to the new directives.
10
Repealed and replaced by Directive 2014/25/EU.
11
Repealed and replaced by Directive 2014/24/EU.
3
For works concessions, Article 1(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 states that ‘this
Regulation shall not apply to public works concessions within the meaning of Article 1(3)(a)
of Directive 2004/17/EC or Article 1(3) of Directive 2004/18/EC’. After the entry into force
of Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts, works concessions for public
passenger transport services by rail and other track-based modes and by road are governed
solely by this Directive. The term ‘works concession’ is now defined in Article 5(1)(a) of
Directive 2014/23/EU.
Table
Summary of the applicable legal basis for contract awards by type of contractual
arrangement and by transport mode
Transport mode Public service contracts as defined in Service concessions as defined in
Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU Directive 2014/23/EU
Bus and tram Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
Railway and metro Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
2.1.2. Article 1(2). National decisions to apply Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to inland
waterways and national seawaters
Article 1(2) states that Member States may apply Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to public
passenger transport by inland waterways and, without prejudice to Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to
maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage)12, national sea waters.
To ensure legal certainty, a Member State’s decision to apply Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
to public passenger transport by inland waterways or by national seawaters should be adopted
in a transparent manner, through a legally binding act. Applying Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 to inland waterway or national seawater passenger transport services may be
especially useful where those services are integrated into a wider public passenger transport
network.
In the absence of a decision to apply Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to inland waterway
passenger transport services, these services are governed directly by Article 93 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In its Communication on the
interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/9213, the Commission provides guidance
on the application of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to maritime cabotage services.
2.1.3. Article 1(2). Application of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to international public
transport services
Article 1(2) specifies that Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 applies also to the international
operation of public passenger transport services, and that subject to agreement of the
competent authorities of the Member States on whose territory the services are provided,
public service obligations may concern services at cross-border level, including those
covering local and regional transport needs.
12
OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7.
13
Communication from the Commission on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92
applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime
cabotage) (COM/2014/0232 final ), 22.4.2014.
4
While Article 1(2) specifically refers to local and regional transport needs, the notion of
international public service covers also long-distance public passenger services. The pre-
requisite for the establishment of an international public service is the agreement of the
competent authorities of the Member States on whose territory the services are provided.
Such competent authorities remain free to decide whether to recognise the public service
status of the proposed service on the territory under their jurisdiction. The agreement required
for the establishment of the international public service cannot be limited to a general
provision ensuring access to the transport infrastructure, as the latter is already guaranteed by
Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012
establishing a single European railway area14. However, competent authorities enjoy large
discretion as regards the content of the agreement. Provided that public service obligations
are imposed by the competent authority of at least one participating Member States, there is
no obligation for a competent authority agreeing to the international service to specify public
service obligations on the territory under its competence or to provide a financial
contribution. In the light of the Green Deal objectives, the Commission encourages Member
States to agree to the establishment of international public transport services using sustainable
modes of transport, such as, for instance, international night train services, if they cannot be
provided on a commercial basis.
If a competent authority does not give its agreement to the proposed international public
service, the passenger transport services shall be provided on a commercial basis on the
territory under its jurisdiction.
2.1.4. Public service obligations on freight transport services
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not apply to freight transport services. Freight transport
services can only be qualified as services of general economic interest when the Member
State concerned establishes that there is a genuine need for such services that is not, or not
sufficiently, met by the market (see section 2.2.3). If Member States wish to establish support
measures for rail freight transport services which do not fulfil the conditions defined in the
Altmark judgment15 and constitute State aid, they must notify those measures to the
Commission pursuant to Article 108(3) of the TFEU.
2.1.5 Article 1(2). Multimodal public service obligations
According to its Article 1(2) this Regulation applies to public passenger transport services by
rail and other track-based modes as well as by bus and coach. If so decided by Member States
it can also apply to public passenger transport by inland waterways and national sea waters
(see Section 2.1.2). Hence competent authorities may decide to grant public service contracts
with public service obligations covering one or more of the transport modes under this
Regulation. According to recital 17, competent authorities are free to establish social and
qualitative criteria for public service obligations, including for environmental protection.
Competent authorities can specify public service obligations for several modes in a manner to
promote environmental sustainability of multimodal public transport.
14
OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32
15
Judgment of the Court of 24 July 2003, Altmark Trans, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415 (the ‘Altmark judgment’).
5
2.2. Definition of public service obligations and general rules/contents of public service
contracts
This chapter provides interpretative guidance on key characteristics of general rules and on
how competent authorities define the nature and extent of public service obligations and of
exclusive rights in the context of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. Furthermore, it addresses
the conditions under which extensions of the duration of public service contracts can be
granted, as well as the conditions for subcontracting, including in the case of internal
operators.
2.2.1. Article 2 point (i). Constitutive features of a public service contract
To take account of the different legal regimes and traditions in the Member States, the
definition of a public service contract provided by Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 is very
broad and includes various types of legally binding acts, which do not always take the form
of a contract under national law.
According to Article 2 point (i), a public service contract consists of ‘one or more legally
binding acts confirming the agreement between a competent authority and a public service
operator to entrust to that public service operator the management and operation of public
passenger transport services subject to public service obligations’. The contract may also
consist of a decision adopted by a competent authority taking the form of an individual
legislative or regulatory act or containing conditions under which the competent authority
itself provides the services or entrusts them to an internal operator. A combination of a legal
act assigning the operation of services to an operator with an administrative act setting out
detailed service requirements and a method for calculating the compensation can also
constitute a public service contract. The notion of ‘public service contract’ as defined by
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 also covers public service concessions.
2.2.2. Article 2 point (l) and Article 3(2) and (3). General rules
General rules are defined in Article 2 point (l) as measures that apply ‘without discrimination
to all public passenger transport services of the same type in a given geographical area for
which a competent authority is responsible’. General rules are therefore measures that apply
to all operators of one or several types of public transport services in a non-discriminatory
manner. The measure may be restricted to the geographical area for which a competent
authority is responsible, but does not necessarily need to cover the entire geographical area.
A competent authority may decide to use general rules to establish social or qualitative
standards in accordance with recital 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
Member States and/or competent authorities may organise public transport through general
rules such as laws, decrees or regulatory measures. Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 covers only general rules which take the form of compensated maximum tariffs
for all passengers or for certain categories of passengers. For these general rules, there is no
obligation to conclude a public service contract.
Article 3(3) allows the Member States to exclude from the scope of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 general rules on financial compensation for public service obligations which
establish maximum tariffs for the transport of pupils, students, apprentices and persons with
reduced mobility. If a Member State decides to do so, the national authorities must assess
whether compensation granted under these general rules constitutes State aid. In the
affirmative, the rules must be notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 108
TFEU.
Member States are not precluded from establishing other general rules that include public
service obligations. Where they involve compensation, there is an obligation to conclude a
6
public service contract, pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. Such
contracts should be available to all operators, including new entrants.
2.2.3. Article 2 point (e) and Article 2a. Definition of the nature and extent of public
service obligations and of the scope of public service contracts
General principles and definition of public service obligations
Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 on services of general interest annexed to the TFEU lay
out the general principles of how Member States define and provide services of general
economic interest (SGEI). As already mentioned, according to Protocol No 26, national,
regional and local authorities play an essential role and have wide discretion in providing,
commissioning and organising SGEIs tailored as closely as possible to the needs of the users.
The specification of a public service obligation may only be called into question by the
Commission in the event of a manifest error16. However, the Member State’s power to define
a SGEI is not unlimited and may not be exercised arbitrarily for the sole purpose of allowing
a particular sector to circumvent the application of the competition rules17.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 lays down the legal framework within which Member States
can provide, commission and organise SGEIs in the field of public passenger transport by rail
and by road. Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 states that its purpose ‘is to define
how, in accordance with the rules of Union law, competent authorities may act in the field of
public passenger transport to guarantee the provision of services of general interest which
are among other things more numerous, safer, of a higher quality or provided at lower cost
than those that market forces alone would have allowed’.
As mentioned in Article 2 point (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, a public service
obligation is a requirement to ensure public passenger transport services in the general
interest that an operator, if it were considering its own commercial interests, would not
assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the same conditions without
reward.18
Public service obligations usually set requirements on the operator as regards, for instance,
the frequency of services, service quality, tariff obligations and service provision in particular
at smaller intermediate stations or at destinations that may not be commercially attractive,
and the provision of early morning and late evening services. Other requirements are
possible.
As stated in Article 2a of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, it is for the competent authorities
to lay down specifications for public service obligations in accordance with Article 2(e).
Consistency with the objectives of Member States’ public transport policy
When applying Article 2a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, the competent authority
must ensure that the public service specifications are consistent with the policy objectives
16
Judgement of 29 November 2018, ARFEA, T-720/16, EU:T:2018:853, para 88; judgement of 24 November
2020, Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, C-445/19, EU:C:2020:952 para 33.
17
Judgment of the General Court of 12 February 2008, BUPA and Others v Commission, T‑289/03,
EU:T:2008:29, para 168.
18
This approach is consistent with the Commission's general approach to Services of General Economic Interest
in other sectors. See, in particular, point 48 of the Communication from the Commission on the application of
the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic
interest (the ‘SGEI Communication’) (OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 4).
7
stated in the Member State’s public transport policy documents. Member States have a wide
margin of manoeuvre in determining the content and format of such documents and the
procedures for consulting relevant stakeholders. Such documents, to be adopted before the
public service obligations are specified, should define the objectives of public transport
policy, such as territorial connectivity and the development of sustainable transport, in
sufficient detail (in particular a quantitative assessment of the services to be provided per
route) and identify the means to attain them across the different transport modes.
Stakeholders to be consulted may include transport operators actually or potentially present in
the geographical area concerned, infrastructure managers and representative passenger
organisations, employee organisations and environmental organisations.
Existence of a real need for public service obligations
The Union courts have made it clear that before laying down specifications for public service
obligations, the competent authority should assess whether there is a genuine need for the
planned public transport services and to that end, whether there is a genuine demand from
users that cannot be addressed, even partly, by market operators in the absence of public
service obligations. A need for public service can occur only where there is a user demand
and that demand is not capable of being met by the interplay of market forces alone. To meet
the need thus identified, the competent authority should give priority to the approach that is
least restrictive for the fundamental freedoms and least harmful for the proper functioning of
the internal market19.
The Commission considers that it would not be appropriate to attach specific public service
obligations to an activity, which is already provided or can be provided satisfactorily and
under conditions, such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the
service, consistent with the public interest, as defined by the State, by undertakings operating
under normal market conditions20.
o Ex ante assessment of the demand for public transport services
In line with Article 1 of Protocol 26 annexed to the TFEU, Member States have a wide
discretion in providing, commissioning and organising public services that are as closely as
possible tailored to the needs of the users. Public transport services should be organised in
the interest of the users. The Member State’s wide discretion to establish public transport
services is therefore subject to the demonstration of a demand for those services.
A Member State can justify the demand for public transport by the pursuit of a legitimate
objective in the public interest such as the provision of more numerous, safer, of a higher
quality services or environment-friendlier services.21 The ex ante assessment of the demand
for a public service can be carried out through representative polls or public consultation of
the users to identify their expectations from the public services.22 Competent authorities may
use other tools or methodologies, provided they reflect adequately the demand for the
envisaged public transport services. Ideally, this assessment should be conducted at the stage
of preparation of the public transport policy documents referred to in Article 2(a)(1).
19
See, to that effect, Judgment of 1 March 2017, Société nationale maritime Corse Méditerranée (SNCM) v
European Commission, T-454/13, EU:T:2017:134, paragraphs 134 (the ‘SNCM judgment’).
20
Judgment of the Court of 20 February 2001, Analir, C-205/99, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 71.
21
Judgment of 18 January 2017, Andersen v Commission, T-92/11 RENV, EU:T:2017:14, paragraphs 69-70
(the ‘Andersen judgment’).
22
SNCM judgment, paragraph 135.
8
In any case, Member States must demonstrate the existence of a real demand for the public
transport services contemplated by the public authorities23. In principle, the Commission
considers that this condition is satisfied in the presence of an ex ante quantitative assessment
of the services to be provided for the overall period considered. When competent authorities
are not in a position to quantify ex ante the need for transport services, such authorities will
be required to define a precise methodology laying down the criteria for estimating such
demand and for its re-evaluation during the lifetime of the contract.
o Analysis of the market failure
Member States must assess whether the identified demand for public transport services
cannot be met by operators on open access in the absence of a public service obligation.
There cannot be a genuine public service need if the user demand is already capable of being
met by such operators in the absence of an obligation laid down by the public authorities to
that end (Article 2e of Regulation 1370/2007).
The assessment of the market failure should normally be done by way of a public
consultation of the operators on their interest to offer the relevant services on open access
taking into account the scope of the user demand for each route concerned. As the market for
the services at hand has now been liberalised, Member States must assess the level of open
access services provided or about to be provided and only if needed, enact general measures
or award a public service contract.
Market operators may for example be consulted on the nature, volume and frequency of
services they already provide or plan to provide in the geographical area concerned or on the
level of tariffs they apply or intend to apply. It is up for Member States to define the content
of the public consultation depending on the identified user demand. When assessing the
existence of a shortage of private initiative in a given geographical area or on certain routes,
Member States should also take into account not only actual commercial services, but also
those services that are expected or announced by a market operator to be launched within a
reasonably short deadline (for example, where the operator has informed the regulatory body
and the infrastructure manager of its intention to launch the service pursuant to Article 38(4)
of Directive 2012/34/EU).
The assessment of the market failure can also take into consideration the existence of
comparable transport services provided by other modes of transport. In this assessment of the
comparability of transport modes, the competent authorities may take into account the
specificities of each mode of transport. In the case of rail transport, these specificities include
the issues of investment burden and infrastructure costs.24 They may also include its
environmental benefits compared to other modes.
o Selection of the least harmful approach to the functioning of the internal
market
When considering whether the public service obligations laid down in a public service
contract are the least restrictive for the fundamental freedoms and least harmful to for the
proper functioning of the internal market, the competent authority may consider alternative
23
See the SNCM judgment, paragraph 133: “if there is no demand from users for all or part of the services
falling within the scope of the public service remit, as defined by the national authorities, that public service or
its scope clearly cannot be considered necessary and proportionate in relation to a real public service need”.
24
See the Andersen judgment, paragraph 70. The General Court refers to the particularities of rail transport
mentioned in recital 25 of Regulation No 1370/2007. That recital refers to the specific issues of investment
burden and investment costs.
9
measures in line with Union law. For example, the competent authority may consider
imposing general rules instead of awarding a public service contract to a single operator,
subject to compliance with State aid rules.
Possibility to group cost-covering and non-cost-covering services in the public service
contract
The obligation to consider the offer from market operators does not prevent competent
authorities from grouping cost-covering services with non-cost-covering services. This
possibility is specifically acknowledged in Article 2(a)(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
However, the Commission considers that including cost-covering services in the scope of the
public service obligations should mainly be justified by the objective of ensuring a coherent
transport system, notably at a geographical level, and of reaping the benefits of positive
network effects, rather than only limiting the amount of the compensation. If so, such
grouping may help ensuring that the specifications of the public service obligations achieve
the public policy objectives in a cost-effective manner, as required under Article 2(a)(2) of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
When specifying public service obligations and defining their geographical scope, the
competent authorities are bound by the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Union
law, as recalled in Article 2(a)(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. The grouping of cost-
covering and non-covering services must be necessary and proportional to the objective of
fulfilling a real need for public service.
Competent authorities should pay particular attention to adhere to the conditions set out in
this section so as not to expose themselves to the risk of a manifest error in the definition of
the scope of the public service obligation. In such case, the entire public service
compensation should be declared State aid incompatible with the internal market and be
recovered from the benefitting operator.
2.2.4. Article 2 point (f), Article 3(1) and Article 4(1). Definition of the nature and extent
of exclusive rights to ensure compliance with Union law
Under Article 3(1), subject to the limited exceptions of Article 3(2), a public service contract
must be concluded if a competent authority decides to grant an operator an exclusive right
and/or compensation in return for the discharge of public service obligations. An exclusive
right is defined in Article 2 point (f) as ‘a right entitling a public service operator to operate
certain public passenger transport services on a particular route or network or in a particular
area, to the exclusion of any other such operator’. Under Article 4(1), the public service
contract must specify the conditions for exercising the exclusive right, in particular the type
of transport service it refers to, its geographical scope and the duration of the exclusive right.
The wording of the definition set out in Article 2 point (f) limits the scope of the exclusive
rights to particular public transport services and to particular routes, networks or particular
areas.
The evolution of the single market, and in particular the right for railway undertakings to
access infrastructure to provide open-access services on the Member States’ domestic
markets, introduced by Article 10 of Directive 2012/34/EU, has implications for the notion of
exclusive rights granted as a form of compensation for the discharge of public service
obligations.
10
The interplay between exclusive rights and access rights is explained in Article 6 of
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/179525 on the economic equilibrium test:
while Member States may grant exclusive rights, they may not limit the right of access of
other operators to the railway infrastructure concerned for the provision of rail passenger
services, unless such services would compromise the economic equilibrium of the public
service contract, as laid down in Articles 11 and 11a of Directive 2012/34/EU.
With the exception of public service contracts falling within the scope of Article 11(5) of
Directive 2012/34/EU, for which access can be limited unconditionally, in all other cases the
necessary protection of public service contracts granting exclusive rights from revenue
abstraction resulting from open-access services is ensured exclusively via the economic
equilibrium test, pursuant to Articles 11 and 11a of Directive 2012/34/EU. As specified in
Article 6 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1795 on the economic
equilibrium test, in carrying out the test, the regulatory body must give due consideration to
the monetary value of such exclusive rights.
Member States may grant certain rights that may appear non-exclusive but de facto prevent
other undertakings from participating in the market through legal rules or administrative
practices. For example, administrative arrangements granting authorisation to operate public
transport services subject to criteria, such as a desirable volume and quality of services, could
have the practical effect of limiting the number of operators on the market. Such de facto
exclusive rights must also comply with Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
2.2.5. Article 4 and Article 8. Duration of public service contracts and conditions under
which a 50% extension up to 50% of the duration of the public service contract can be
granted
Articles 4 and 8 lay down provisions on the maximum duration of public service contracts
and time limits for their award and expiry.
The ‘duration of the contract’ must be determined by reference to the start of transport
operations. This interpretation is also corroborated by the fact that key provisions of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 start to apply from that date such as, for instance, those on the
obligation of competent authorities to compensate public service obligations. It is the
Commission’s understanding that in several Member States the ‘duration of the contract’ is
contractually established by reference to the start of transport operations.
The performance of a public service contract may be preceded by a ‘mobilisation phase’,
during which the public service operator prepares for the start of operations. The time
required to mobilise resources can vary widely depending on the differences in the public
service obligations under the old and new contract, ranging from a few weeks for direct
awards not requiring significant preparation, to three or even four years for public transport
operators that must invest heavily, e.g. by procuring new rolling stock, to provide the
required services.
However, the mobilisation period between the moment when the contractual obligations
come into being (which typically coincides with the signature of the contract) and the start of
transport operations is not included in the duration of the contract and should always be
commensurate to the operator’s demonstrable needs to prepare for operations and consistent
with past practice in the Member State concerned. The timing of the award in relation to the
25
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1795 of 20 November 2018 laying down procedure and
criteria for the application of the economic equilibrium test pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2012/34/EU, OJ
L 294 of 21.11.2018, p. 5.
11
start of operations should not result in circumvention of the provisions of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 on the phasing-out of unconditional direct awards, enshrined in Article 8(2)(iii).
This may be the case where a public service contract is directly re-awarded to an incumbent
operator in close proximity of the cut-off date of 24 December 2023 concerning direct awards
and publicity requirements, while operations under the new contract are scheduled to start
significantly after that date in the absence of an objective justification for the duration of the
mobilisation period.
Article 4(4) allows for an extension of the duration of a public service contract by a
maximum of 50%, if necessary and having regard to the conditions of asset depreciation.
Such an extension can be granted if the public service operator provides assets that are
significant in relation to the overall assets needed to carry out the passenger transport services
covered by the public service contract and are predominantly linked to the passenger
transport services covered by the contract.
Recital 15 further explains that ‘it is necessary to make provision for extending public service
contracts by a maximum of half their initial duration where the public service operator must
invest in assets for which the depreciation period is exceptional and, because of their special
characteristics and constraints, in the case of the outermost regions’ specified in Article 349
TFEU.
Since it is an exception to the general rule on the duration of public service contacts, the
possibility of extending their duration by up to 50% should be applied restrictively. On a
case-by-case basis, the competent authority must assess whether an extension is necessary to
enable the operator to amortise its assets at a typical or legally prescribed depreciation rate
and whether the additional duration is proportionate to this objective. When carrying out this
assessment, the competent authority takes into account only the share of assets financed by
the operator itself, and not the share financed by public funds.
In principle, the competent authority will decide to extend the contract’s duration before the
award of a new contract so that the duration of the contract is clear from the date of its award.
An extension of the duration while the contract is running is only possible subject to certain
conditions. The intended investments in new rolling stock must be objectively justified, for
instance, due to technical reasons that arose at a later stage. It should be demonstrated that
without the extension, the residual duration of the contract should not allow for a meaningful
amortisation of the investment. The possibility and conditions of such an extension should be
clearly indicated in the tender documents and in the contract. In addition, such an extension
may affect the level of compensation, which should be adjusted as a result.
In application of Article 8(2), the duration of contracts awarded in accordance with Article
5(6) between 3 December 2019 and 24 December 2023 cannot exceed ten years. This is a
specific and absolute limit, aimed at preserving the effects of the cut-off date of 24 December
2023 and prevent that contracts awarded in accordance with Articles 5(6) and 7(3) continue
to apply for a long time. Therefore, the duration of such contracts cannot be extended in
application of Article 4(4).
2.2.6. Article 4(7) and Article 5(2)(e). Conditions of subcontracting
Under Article 4(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, a public service contract must stipulate
whether, and if so to what extent, subcontracting is possible. If subcontracting takes place, the
public transport operator is always required to perform “a major part” of the public passenger
transport services itself.
Public service contracts directly awarded to an internal operator may also be subcontracted,
albeit under stricter conditions. Pursuant to Article 5(2)(e), the internal operator must provide
12
‘the major part’ of the public passenger transport services itself. With this provision, the
legislator intended to preclude the internal operator from subcontracting to another entity
more than a modest share of the transport services, as in such a situation the concept of
‘internal operator’ under the control of the competent authority would be devoid of meaning.
Without prejudice to a case-by-case analysis, it would seem reasonable to consider that
subcontracting more than one third of the public transport services would require a strong
justification, in particular in view of the objectives of Article 5(2)(e), such as the attempt to
avoid the establishment of false internal operators. Typically, the fraction of transport
services to be subcontracted is measured in value terms or in timetable kilometres26.
As regards public service contracts awarded under the second sentence of Article 5(1) of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, i.e. in accordance with the procedures provided for under the
public procurement directives, the rules on subcontracting laid down in Article 4(7) of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 take precedence over those laid down in those directives27.
In any case, subcontracting must be carried out respecting the relevant public procurement
legislation.
Finally, Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not prevent the public service contract from
stipulating a minimum percentage of transport services in value terms to be subcontracted by
the operator under a public service contract. The contract can stipulate this, provided the
provisions of that Regulation are respected, especially those on the maximum share of a
public service contract that may be subcontracted.
2.3 Access to essential production factors and information
This section provides interpretative guidance on access to rolling stock, information essential
for the award of public service contracts and transfer of staff.
2.3.1. Article 5a. Access to rail rolling stock
Access to rail rolling stock is essential for operators to be able to submit bids in procedures
for the competitive award of public service contracts, in particular when they are new
entrants without a large rolling stock fleet at their disposal.
Under Article 5a, competent authorities must assess whether measures are necessary to
ensure effective and non-discriminatory access to suitable rolling stock. When assessing the
extent to which operators have effective access to rolling stock, the competent authority
should assess the financial, technical or regulatory barriers that may hinder such access.
Supply from leasing companies, from other market actors providing rolling stock or from
pools of rolling stock operated by competent authorities should be taken into account. This
assessment should also take account of the mobilisation period, i.e. the time required for
operators to be able to use the rolling stock for transport operations. When considering
whether access to rolling stock is non-discriminatory, competent authorities must assess
whether some operators have access to rolling stock on less favourable conditions than
competitors. Finally, they should analyse whether the available rolling stock is suitable, i.e.
whether it fulfils the requirements in terms of price, quality and technical standards
prescribed in the tender documentation.
26
For a case of measurement in timetable kilometers, see judgment of the Court of 27 October 2016, Hörmann
Reisen, C-292/15, EU:C:2016:817 (the ‘Hörmann Reisen judgment’).
27
See, to that effect, the Hörmann Reisen judgment, paragraphs 34 to 48.
13
This assessment report must be made publicly available sufficiently in advance to allow all
stakeholders to react, so that an effective review can be completed before a competitive
tendering procedure is launched.
When the assessment report concludes that measures are necessary to ensure effective and
non-discriminatory access to suitable rolling stock, competent authorities are not legally
required under Article 5a(2) to take such measures. However, the Commission underlines that
by not adopting appropriate measures, a competent authority runs the risk of having the
award of the public service contract reviewed under Article 5(7), on the grounds that the
award procedure was not fair and did not observe the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination, in line with Article 5(3).
Article 5a(2) provides a list of measures that competent authorities may adopt to ensure
effective and non-discriminatory access to rolling stock. This list is not exhaustive. Among
other possible measures, the competent authority can also introduce in the public service
contract an obligation to transfer the rolling stock at the end of the contract to the incoming
operator at the market price, net of any public funds received by the outgoing operator for the
purchase of the rolling stock.
2.3.2. Article 4(4a), (4b), (5) and (6). Staff protection in the case of a change of operator
Recital 12 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2338 lays out that in establishing the single European
railway area Member States should ensure an adequate level of social protection for the staff
of public service operators. Article 4(4a) and (4b) recalls the relevant rules and obligations
applicable to public transport operations.
In compliance with Article 4(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, and as explained in its
recitals 16 and 17, Member States and their competent authorities have the following options
in the case of a change of operator as regards staff protection:
(i) Not to take any specific action. In this case, employees' rights such as the transfer of
staff have to be granted only where the conditions for the application of the Council
Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses28 are
fulfilled, for instance, where there is a transfer of significant tangible assets such as
rolling stock29.
(ii) To require a transfer of staff previously taken on to provide services with the rights to
which the staff would have been entitled, whether or not Directive 2001/23/EC applies
(i.e. even in a situation where there is no transfer within the meaning of Directive
2001/23/EC).
28
OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16.
29
In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, Directive 2001/23/EC is applicable to a transfer of
undertaking which takes place following a tendering procedure for the award of a public service contract. In
sectors of activity based on tangible assets, such as bus or rail transport, Directive 2001/23/EC applies if
significant tangible assets are transferred. The existence of a transfer within the meaning of Directive
2001/23/EC is not precluded by the fact that ownership of the tangible assets previously used by a transferor and
taken over by a transferee is not transferred, for example in case the tangible assets taken over by the new
contractor did not belong to its predecessor but were provided by the contracting authority; see , to that effect,
Judgment of the Court of 20 November 2003, Abler, C-340/01, EU:C:2003:629; see also Judgment of the Court
of 26 November 2015, ADIF, C-509/14, EU:C:2015:781.
14
(iii) To require the public transport operator to respect certain social standards for all staff
involved in the provision of public transport services ‘in order to ensure transparent and
comparable terms of competition between operators and to avert the risk of social
dumping’ as stated in recital 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. For instance, these
standards could relate to a collective agreement at company level or a collective
agreement concluded for the relevant market segment.
(iv) To apply a combination of options (ii) and (iii).
Article 4(6) provides that information about applicable rules and provisions in the field of
staff protection such as quality and social standards, quality and social criteria, and rights and
obligations relating to the transfer of staff in the case of a change of operator, have to be
included in the tender documents.
2.3.3. Article 4(8). Access to information essential for the award of public service contract
Competent authorities must make available to all interested parties the information required
to prepare offers for competitive tendering procedures. To that end, public service contracts
must include an obligation for the operator to provide the competent authority with all the
information required for the award of the next prospective contract. When existing contracts
do not contain such a provision, they should be amended accordingly. The competent
authority is required to ensure the legitimate protection of confidential business information.
Article 4(8) provides a list of information that is typically made available by the competent
authorities. This list is not exhaustive. It is for the competent authority to assess, on a case-
by-case basis, which information is necessary, taking into account relevant elements such as,
for instance, the characteristics of the contract to be awarded (e.g. net cost or gross cost
contracts) and the legitimate protection of confidential business information. Information
items not listed in this provision, but which can be deemed essential for bidders include, for
instance, the maintenance records of the rolling stock that may be transferred to the new
public service operator.
2.4. Award of public service contracts
This section provides interpretative guidance on a number of provisions related to the award
of public service contracts. The guidance covers the conditions under which public service
contracts can be directly awarded as well as the procedural requirements for the competitive
tendering of contracts.
2.4.1. Article 5(2)(b). Conditions under which a public service contract may be directly
awarded to an internal operator
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 allows competent local authorities to provide public
passenger transport services by rail and by road themselves or to award a public service
contract directly to an internal operator. However, if they choose the second option, they
must respect a number of strict rules and conditions set out in Article 5(2). The Commission
notes the following:
(i) Article 5(2) provides that a public service contract may be awarded directly to internal
operators by a competent local authority or a group of such authorities providing
integrated public passenger transport services. This means that the public passenger
transport services under a contract directly awarded by a group of competent local
authorities must be integrated from a geographical, transport or tariff point of view
15
across the territory for which such a group of authorities is responsible. The
geographical scope of such services provided under the responsibility of a competent
local authority or a group of such authorities may only cover the needs of an urban
agglomeration or rural areas, or both.
(ii) The rules on control of the internal operator by the competent authority defined in
Article 2(j) and specified in Article 5(2) must in any event be respected. An internal
operator must be ‘a legally distinct entity over which a competent local authority or, in
the case of a group of authorities, at least one competent local authority exercises
control similar to that exercised over its own departments’. Point (a) of Article 5(2) lays
down a set of criteria that shall be taken into consideration in assessing whether a
competent authority effectively controls its internal operator. These criteria are ‘the
degree of representation on administrative, management or supervisory bodies,
specifications relating to this representation in the articles of association, ownership,
effective influence and control over strategic decisions and individual management
decisions’. The assessment of control must be based on all relevant criteria.
With regard to the ownership criterion, Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not require
the competent authorities to hold 100% of the internal operator’s capital. This could be
relevant, for example, in cases of public-private partnerships. In this respect, the notion
of internal operator under Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 is broader that the notion of
‘in house’ operator under the case-law of the Court of Justice30. However, effective
control by the competent authority has to be proven by other criteria as mentioned in
Article 5(2)(a).
(iii) To reduce distortions of competition, Article 5(2)(b) requires that the transport
activities of internal operators and any entity over which this operator exercises even a
minimal influence should be geographically confined within the territory of the
competent authority or of the group of local competent authorities.
The internal operator or the entity influenced by the internal operator must not operate
public passenger transport services, including as a subcontractor, or participate in
tender procedures outside the competent authority’s territory within the Union or, due
to a possible indirect effect on the internal market, elsewhere in the world.
Article 5(2)(b) is drafted in broad terms to prevent the creation of corporate structures
that aim to circumvent this geographical confinement. Without prejudice to the
provisions on outgoing lines or other ancillary elements entering the territory of
neighbouring competent local authorities, as mentioned in point (v), this provision on
geographical confinement must be applied strictly.
(iv) The Commission considers that the participation of an internal operator in a
competitive tendering procedure could call into question the validity of the direct award
of a public service contract to that operator31.
(v) Article 5(2)(b) allows internal operators to operate ‘outgoing lines or other ancillary
elements of that activity which enter the territory of neighbouring competent local
authorities’. This provision provides some flexibility by catering for transport between
30
Judgment of the Court of 13 November 2008 Coditel Brabant, C-324/07, EU:C:2008:621, paragraph 30.
31
Opinion of the Advocate General delivered on 25 October 2018 in Joined Cases C-350/17 and C-351/17,
Mobit, EU:C:2018:869, paragraph 104.
16
neighbouring regions. Internal operators may therefore operate services beyond the
territory of their competent local authority to a certain extent. To assess whether the
services under public service contract are compliant with this provision, the following
criteria should be applied: whether those services connect the territory of the competent
authority in question to a neighbouring territory, and whether they are ancillary rather
than the main purpose of the public transport activities under public service contract.
(vi) Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not apply to the direct award of
contracts for public passenger transport services by bus, which do not take the form of
service concessions, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/23/EU. The
direct award of such contracts to an in-house operator must be made in compliance with
Article 12 of Directive 2014/24/EU or with Article 28 of Directive 2014/25/EU32.
2.4.2. Article 5(3). Procedural requirements for the competitive tendering of public service
contracts
Article 5(3) stipulates that, if a competent authority uses a third party other than an internal
operator to provide public passenger transport services, it shall award public service contracts
through a fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory competitive tendering procedure.
Article 5(3) also provides a few other details on the conditions under which a competitive
tendering procedure should be organised. As laid out under point 2.5.1, contract award
procedures must be designed so as to create conditions for effective competition. The
application of the general principles of the Treaty, such as the principles of transparency and
non-discrimination, implies, for instance, that the assessment criteria for the selection of
offers must be published with the tender documents. The more detailed procedural rules of
Union public procurement legislation, such as the ones laid down in Directives 2014/24/EU
and 2014/25/EU, or in Directive 2014/23/EU on concessions, although not required, may be
applied if Member States so wish.
In order to comply Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, public procurement
procedures must be designed so as to create the best conditions for effective competition. An
award procedure involving negotiation between the competent authority and the bidders may
comply with the principle of non-discrimination, provided that the negotiations are impartial,
fair, and transparent. For example, a purely negotiated procedure without prior publication of
a contract notice would breach the principles of transparency and non-discrimination set out
in Article 5(3). Similarly, a tender procedure that unduly restricts the number of potential
bidders would also not comply with the requirements of Article 5(3).
According to Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, the competent authority may
also choose to negotiate with pre-selected parties, after a pre-selection of tenders, in case
there are specific or complex requirements. An example of this is when bidding operators
must come up with technologically innovative transport solutions to meet the requirements
published in the tender documents. Even when using pre-selection and negotiation, the
selection and award procedure must nevertheless comply with all the conditions set out in
Article 5(3).
In order to provide potential tenderers with fair and equal opportunities, the period between
the launch of the competitive tendering procedure and the submission of the offers, as well as
the period between the launch of the competitive tendering procedure and the moment from
32
Judgment of the Court of 21 March 2019, Rhein-Sieg-Kreis, Joined Cases C-266/17 and C-267/17,
EU:C:2019:241.
17
which the operation of the transport services has to start, must be of appropriate and
reasonable length.
2.4.3. Article 5(3a). Conditions under which competent authorities may directly award a
public service contract for rail under exceptional circumstances
As regards public service contracts for rail transport, competent authorities may decide to
temporarily award new contracts directly when the authority considers that this is justified by
exceptional circumstances, in particular where:
-there are a number of competitive tendering procedures that are already being run by
the competent authority or other competent authorities which could affect the number
and quality of bids likely to be received if the contract is the subject of a competitive
tendering procedure, or
- changes to the scope of one or more public service contracts are required in order to
optimise the provision of public services.
Such exceptional circumstances include situations where a competent authority wants to
redesign the geographical coverage or size of contract lots. For example, in cases where a
competent authority plans to provide public transport services under one single contract,
while they are currently being provided under two existing contracts with different expiry
dates, it may be necessary to temporarily directly award the contract with the earliest expiry
date, so that both contracts can end at the same date.
Although the list of situations provided in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 that constitute
exceptional circumstances is an open one, the term ‘exceptional circumstances’ has to be
interpreted in a strict manner. For this reason, this provision shall only be used if it allows
competent authorities to ensure that the services are delivered in the most cost-effective
manner. The duration of contracts awarded according to this provision shall be limited to
what would appear to be proportionate to the exceptional circumstance concerned, and in any
case not exceed 5 years. The competent authority has to respect certain transparency
requirements. It must swiftly inform the Commission of the decision to award a contract on
that basis, which must be duly substantiated. The detailed publication references (e.g. link to
the relevant website) shall be sent to the General Directorate for Mobility and Transport of
the European Commission33 for analysis and follow-up. This information requirement does
not make the award conditional on the Commission’s agreement. The competent authority
must also publish the public service contract. A competent authority can use this legal option
for the award of a public service contract covering the same public service obligations only
once.
2.4.4. Article 5(4). Conditions under which a competent authority may directly award a
public service contract in case of a small contract volume
In the case of a direct award of a public service contract of small value (Article 5(4)), the
competent authority may directly award the contract without a competitive tendering
procedure. A public service contract is considered to be of small value if its average annual
value is estimated at less than EUR 1 million or if it involves the annual provision of less than
300 000 kilometres of public passenger transport services. In case of contracts including
public passenger transport services by rail, these two thresholds are respectively EUR 7.5
33
Add the address of a functional e-mail box
18
million average annual value and 500 000 kilometres of public passenger transport services.
In the case of a contract awarded to a small or medium-sized enterprise (‘SME’) operating no
more than 23 road vehicles, the thresholds may be increased to an average annual value
estimated at less than EUR 2 million or the annual provision of less than 600 000 kilometres
of public transport services.
The existence of a threshold specifically concerning SMEs defined in terms of ‘road vehicles’
indicates that this provision only applies to the transport by bus, and not to transport by tram,
metro or train. The threshold of 23 road vehicles has to be interpreted in a restrictive manner
in the light of the exceptional character of Article 5(4). Therefore, the terms ‘vehicles being
operated’ must be interpreted as referring to the total number of vehicles being operated by
the public transport operator and not to the number of vehicles operated for services covered
by a particular public service contract. To qualify as a small or medium-sized undertaking,
the operator must fulfil the criteria of the SME Recommendation34.
2.4.5. Article 5(4). Possibility of Member States to set lower thresholds allowing for direct
award in the case of contracts of small value or small and medium-sized operators
In application of Article 5(4), Member States may decide to require competitive tendering for
all contracts, including those of small value and those awarded to small and medium-sized
operators. By the same token, they may also choose to lower the thresholds below which
direct award is admissible.
2.4.6. Article 5(4a). Conditions under which competent authorities may directly award a
public service contract for rail in case of certain structural and geographic characteristics
of the market and network and of performance improvements
Article 5(4a) allows the competent authority to directly award public service contracts for
public passenger transport services by rail when two conditions are met. As an exception to
the principle of the competitive tendering procedure for the award of public service contracts,
this provision should be interpreted restrictively.
The first condition is that the direct award is justified by the relevant structural and
geographical characteristics of the market and network concerned, and in particular size,
demand characteristics, network complexity, technical and geographical isolation and the
services covered by the contract.
The list of the specific characteristics is not exhaustive. The competent authority can
therefore consider the need for direct award also with reference to other characteristics than
the ones listed in the text. The conclusion of a competent authority that the market and
network characteristics justify the direct award should be based on objective grounds. It is
settled case-law that the burden of proving the actual existence of circumstances justifying
derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances. For that reason, in its
substantiated decision to award a contract under Article 5(4a), the competent authority must
bring sufficient evidence proving that the conditions specified in that provision of Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007 are fulfilled.
34 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).
19
Taking into account the rationale for the so-called “performance based-exception”, i.e. that in
certain cases, the improvement of the service and / or its cost-efficiency cannot be achieved
by competitive tendering, due to certain market and network characteristics, what is essential
is not so much the number and nature of the characteristics invoked by the Member State but
the demonstration that in the specific case at hand, direct award is “justified”, as point (a) of
Article 5(4a) first subparagraph puts it, in that it better meets the quality and cost objectives
which the Regulation presumes to be achieved more effectively, in principle, by competitive
tendering.
Without prejudice to the assessment of each individual case, the Commission’s understanding
of the meaning and measurement of the relevant characteristics is the following: market size
should be measured in train-kilometres whereas network size in track-kilometres. Network
complexity could be characterised, for instance, by the presence of many intermodal hubs,
typically in local or suburban networks. Technical isolation could e.g. refer to a situation
where major network constituents deviate from EU standards such as Technical
Specifications of Interoperability. Geographical isolation could mean networks that have no
physical links to neighbouring networks, when for instance they are situated on an island. The
term ‘services covered by the contract’ could refer for instance to a ‘strategic value’ of the
services.
The second condition to be satisfied to justify a direct award under Article 5(4a) is that the
contract must result in an improvement in quality of services or cost-efficiency compared to
the previously awarded public service contract. Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not
specify the margin of the improvement, so it is up to the competent authority to decide on
this. However, in order to prevent the circumvention of the obligation of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 and to ensure its useful effect, the improvement of services should be meaningful.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 also requires that the competent authority publishes its
substantiated decision to use the direct award and inform the Commission thereof within one
month of its publication. This is designed to enable market actors and the Commission to take
note of the use of the direct award procedure and its justification. The detailed publication
references (e.g. link to the relevant website) shall be sent to the General Directorate for
Mobility and Transport of the European Commission35 for analysis and follow-up. This
information requirement does not make the award conditional on the Commission’s
agreement.
Member States with an annual market volume of rail passenger transport of less than 23
million train- kilometres on 24 December 2017, only one competent authority at national
level and one public service contract covering the entire rail network are deemed to fulfil the
first condition. However, also in those Member States, the second condition for a direct
award still has to be fulfilled. Therefore, they also have to publish a substantiated decision
and inform the Commission thereof. A list of Member States whose rail passenger market
was below 23 million train-kilometres per year on 24 December 2017 is annexed to these
Guidelines.
The contract shall include specific performance requirements covering aspects of quality of
service and of cost-efficiency. The performance requirements must be measurable,
transparent and verifiable. They shall be expressly based on indicators that enable the
35
Add the address of a functional e-mail box
20
competent authority to carry out conclusive periodic assessments. These indicators must be
able to unambiguously reflect the improvement of service quality and/or cost-efficiency of
the directly awarded contract in comparison to the previous one. Otherwise, the requirement
that the contract must bring improvements in comparison to the previous one could not be
effectively fulfilled and monitored. Performance requirements should in particular cover
punctuality of services, frequency of train operations, quality of rolling stock and transport
capacity for passengers. This list is an open one, meaning that the enumerated quality
requirements must be included in the public service contract as a minimum; competent
authorities can use additional requirements.
The competent authority is obliged to assess periodically, at least every five years, the
fulfilment of the contractual improvement requirements. To ensure a constant and meaningful
monitoring of compliance and to be able to detect non-compliance at an early stage and, if
applicable, to take measures to regain compliance, more frequent assessments may be
warranted. The competent authority should ensure that it will be able to effectively monitor
performance. Hence, it has to make sure – for instance, through contractual requirements –
that it effectively obtains the data from relevant actors that enables it to assess compliance.
The competent authority has to make the results of its periodic assessments public.
The contract must also include effective and deterrent measures to be imposed in case the
railway undertaking fails to meet the performance requirements. This means that all
requirements must be fulfilled at the periodical assessments to avoid applying such effective
and deterrent measures. Therefore, the competent authority is not entitled to waive the
application of these measures. Such measures can have various forms and may include fines.
Lastly, if the operator fails to meet the performance requirements, the competent authority
may at any time wholly or partially suspend or terminate the contract awarded directly on the
basis of Article 5(4a). The operator should also not be able to seek damages for the
suspension or termination of the contract, if it was done in line with the provisions of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
Contracts awarded on the basis of Article 5(4a) cannot be longer than 10 years, or than 15
years if they include significant investment in compliance with Art 4(4). These contracts must
be also published.
2.4.7. Article 5(5). Emergency awards
In the event of an actual or imminent disruption of services, Article 5(5) empowers
competent authorities to directly award, extend or impose an existing public service contract
for a period not exceeding two years. The scope of emergency awards covers also substantive
modifications of contracts. Such modifications shall be temporary in nature and limited to the
duration of the crisis, whose consequences the emergency award addresses, and in any event,
cannot exceed two years. If the initial contract has been suspended rather than terminated and
has not yet expired upon the end of the emergency measures, the initial terms of the contract
apply again. The modified contracts shall specify the modalities of a return to the previous
contract, where applicable. Emergency public service contracts cannot be applied
retroactively.
2.4.8. Article 5(6). Rail services that qualify for the direct award procedure
Article 5(6) allows competent authorities to award public service contracts directly for rail
transport, ‘with the exception of other track-based modes such as metro and tramways’.
21
The award by an authority of contracts for the provision of services of general interest to a
third party has to respect general Treaty principles, such as the principles of transparency and
equal treatment36. Contracts directly awarded under Article 5(6) are not exonerated from
compliance with these Treaty principles. This is the reason why Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 requires notably, in Article 7(2) and (3), that competent authorities publish certain
information about directly awarded public service contracts in rail at least one year before
and within one year of the award.
The exception to the general rule of a competitive award procedure must also be applied
restrictively. Rail substitute services, such as transport services by bus and coach that may be
contractually required from the public service operator in cases of disruption of the rail
network, cannot be considered as rail transport services and thus do not fall under Article
5(6). Subcontracting such rail substitute services by bus and coach according to relevant
public procurement legislation is thus required.
Whether certain types of urban or suburban rail transport systems, such as the S-Bahn (in
Austria, Germany and Denmark) and the RER (in France), or modes of transport that are
similar to ‘other track based modes’ (for instance, metro or tram services), such as tram-train
services and certain automatic train services operated under optical guidance systems, are
included in the rail exemption of Article 5(6), must be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
applying suitable criteria. In particular, this will depend on factors such as whether the
systems in question are normally interoperable and/or share infrastructure with the traditional
heavy rail network. Although tram-train services do use heavy rail infrastructure, their special
characteristics mean they should nonetheless be regarded as ‘other track-based modes’.
2.4.9. Art. 5(7). Review of award decisions
This provision stipulates that Member States must take necessary measures to ensure that
competent authorities' decisions taken in accordance with Article 5(2) to (6) may be reviewed
effectively and rapidly, at the request of any person having or having had an interest in
obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged
infringement (‘interested parties’) on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Union
law or national rules implementing that law. Such review bodies may be of a judicial
character.
In its second subparagraph, Article 5(7) further specifies that for cases of direct award
covered by its paragraphs 4a and 4b, such measures must include the possibility for interested
parties to request an assessment of the substantiated decision taken by the competent
authority by an independent body designated by the Member State concerned.
As explained in Recital 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2338, Member States may decide that
the assessment is made as part of a judicial review. This assessment can thus be specifically
provided by the designated independent body, to be used in the context of the review
procedure referred to in Article 5(7), first subparagraph. The Commission considers that this
independent body should have the appropriate knowledge of the market and access to the
necessary information in order to provide an expert assessment. For these reasons, rail
regulatory bodies within the meaning set out in Article 55 of Directive 2012/34/EU are better
placed to provide this function. In cases where a Member State appoints an independent body
36
See for instance recital 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007: ‘Where a public authority chooses to entrust a
general interest service to a third party, it must select the public service operator in accordance with Community
law on public contracts and concessions, as established by Articles 43 to 49 of the Treaty, and the principles of
transparency and equal treatment’.
22
other than its rail regulatory body, its level of independence should be sufficient to ensure
legal and operational independence from the interests of competent authorities and railway
undertakings and be, at least, equal to the level of independence of the rail regulatory body.
The outcome of such assessment must be made publicly available in accordance with national
law. The Commission understands that at least the essential points of the assessment and the
final result stating whether the justification of the award decision is compliant with the rules
of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 must be published.
Where bodies responsible for review procedures are not judicial in character, written reasons
for their decisions shall always be given. Furthermore, in such a case, their decisions must be
subject to judicial review or review by another body, which is a court or tribunal within the
meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
2.4.10. Modifications of public service contracts
Where a running public service contract needs to be amended, for instance where the
transport service volume and corresponding compensation amount need to be adapted due to
an extension of a metro line, the question arises as to whether the competent authority should
start a new award procedure or whether the contract can be amended without a new award.
The Court of Justice has held that in the case of minor, non-substantial modifications a new
award it may not be necessary to ensure that general Treaty principles such as transparency
and non-discrimination are complied with and a simple amendment of the contract may be
sufficient. On the other hand, according to the Court of Justice, in order to ensure
transparency of procedures and equal treatment of tenderers, substantial amendments to
essential provisions of a service concession contract or to contracts subject to the public
procurement directives require the award of a new contract in certain cases. This is the case,
in particular, if the new provisions are materially different in character from the original
contract and are therefore such as to demonstrate the intention of the parties to renegotiate the
essential terms of that contract37.
According to the Court of Justice, an amendment to a contract during its term may be
regarded as substantial if it introduces conditions which, if they had been part of the original
award procedure, would have allowed for the admission of tenderers other than those
originally admitted or would have allowed for the acceptance of an offer other than that
originally accepted38.
In the absence of specific provisions in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, the principles of the
abovementioned case-law are fully applicable to modifications of public service contracts
37
Judgment of the Court of 5 October 2000, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, C-
337/98, EU:C:2000:543, paragraphs 44 and 46; Judgment of the Court of 19 June 2008, pressetext
Nachrichtenagentur, C-454/06, EU:C:2008:351, paragraph 34; and Judgment of the Court of 13 April 2010,
Wall, C-91/08, EU:C:2010:182, paragraphs 37 and 38 (the ‘Wall judgment’); Judgment of 14 May 2020, T-
Systems Magyarország Zrt., C-263/19, EU:C:2020:373, paragraph 61. The case-law of the Court of Justice was
also taken into account in setting the conditions under which modifications to a contract during its performance
require a new procurement procedure under Article 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 89 of Directive
2014/25/EU. Similar provisions are also set under Article 43 of Directive 2014/23/EU.
38
Judgment of the Court of 19 June 2008, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, C-454/06, EU:C:2008:351,
paragraphs 35 to 37; Wall judgment, paragraph 38; Judgment of the Court of 7 September 2016 Finn Frogne, C-
549/14, EU:C:2016:634, paragraph 28;; Judgment of the Court of 3 October 2019, Delta Antrepriză de
Construcţii şi Montaj 93, C-267/18, EU:C:2019:826, paragraph 33.
23
covered by that Regulation. In order to determine what constitutes non-substantial
modifications, a case-by-case assessment based on objective criteria is required39.
These principles apply to contracts awarded on the basis of a competitive tendering
procedure. Furthermore, when substantial amendments to essential provisions of contracts
awarded under Article 5(6) are made after 24 December 2023, this should require the award
of a new contract.
Moreover, the specific rules on the modification of contracts during their term set under
Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU40 apply to contracts that are awarded in
accordance with those Directives, pursuant to Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
2.5. Compensation for public services
Unlike other economic sectors, Article 106(2) TFEU does not apply in cases where
compensation is paid for public service obligations in land transport. Rather, such
compensation is covered by Article 93 TFEU. Accordingly, the Union compatibility rules
regarding compensation for services of general economic interest41, which are based on
Article 106(2) TFEU, do not apply to land transport42.
The rules on compensation laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 aim to ensure that
operators are not overcompensated, taking into account a reasonable profit, that the
compensation ensures the financial sustainability of the provision of public passenger
transport in the long term43 and that the system encourages overall efficiency. Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007 also spells out details of the Commission's ex ante and ex post
investigations into the level of compensation granted.
In the case of public passenger transport services by rail and by road, provided that
compensation for those services is paid in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007,
such compensation shall be deemed compatible with the internal market and shall be exempt
from the prior notification requirement laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU, in accordance with
Article 9(1) of that Regulation.
This presumption of compatibility and the exemption from the notification requirement is
only relevant if the compensation constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU. Public service compensation fulfilling the conditions laid down by the Court of
Justice in the Altmark judgment44 does not constitute State aid and is therefore not subject to
39
The Court of Justice pointed out in the Wall judgment case that a change of subcontractor, even if the
possibility of a change is provided for in the contract, may in exceptional cases constitute a substantial
amendment to one of the essential provisions of a concession contract where the use of one subcontractor rather
than another was, in view of the particular characteristics of the services concerned, a decisive factor in
concluding the contract, which is in any event for the referring court to ascertain.
40
Article 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 89 of Directive 2014/25/EU.
41
Notably Commission Decision on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest (OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3) and EU framework for State aid in the form of public service
compensation (OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15).
42
However, Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 to de
minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic (OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8) applies
to aid granted to undertakings providing land transport services, with the exception of aid granted to
undertakings performing road freight transport for hire and reward (see recital 7 and Article 1(2)(g) of
Regulation (EU) No 360/2012).
43
Article 2a (2).
44
See the Altmark judgment, and also, in particular, section 3 of the SGEI Communication.
24
a prior notification obligation. Nevertheless, to be compliant with Union law, such public
service compensation would still need to fulfil the other requirements of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007.
2.5.1. Contracts awarded on the basis of a competitive tender
Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 provides that public service contracts and
general rules shall establish in advance, in an objective and transparent manner, the
parameters on the basis of which the compensation payment, if any, is to be calculated, and
the nature and extent of any exclusive rights granted, in a way that prevents
overcompensation.
However, Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 does not impose specific conditions on how public
service compensation must be designed when the related public service contract is awarded
on the basis of a competitive tendering procedure in application of Article 5(3) of Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007. The Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (the ‘Annex’) is not
applicable to those contracts.
A competitive tendering procedure that is open, transparent and non-discriminatory should in
principle ensure that the price that the competent authority pays to obtain the public service
described in the tender specifications involves the least cost to the community. However,
competent authorities should be particularly attentive to signs suggesting a lack of effective
competition for the tender.
Notwithstanding this principle, compliance with that condition does not rule out
overcompensation within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b), i.e. that the compensation must not
exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public
service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit45. In
other words, the public authorities must clearly identify with an appropriate methodology the
costs that are directly attributable to the discharge of public service obligations in order to
calculate the public service compensation and avoid any overcompensation. This is in
particular the case where an undertaking carries out activities falling both inside and outside
the scope of the public service obligation, as further detailed below. In addition, safeguards
should be put in place to ensure that in case of unforeseeable deviation from the initial traffic
forecasts, the undertaking carrying out the public service operation will not be
overcompensated.
Where the undertaking holds several public service contracts, the common costs should be
allocated to each individual contract (irrespective of the compensation methodology used).
Market prices for the use of the resources, where available, can be taken as a benchmark. In
the absence of such market prices, the appropriate contribution to the common costs can be
determined by reference to the level of reasonable profit the undertaking is expected to make
on the activities falling outside the scope of the public service obligation or by other
methodologies where more appropriate.
After the full opening of the passenger transport services market by rail, it will be more and
more likely that the operator also carries out activities falling outside the scope of the public
service obligation. This is typically the case of “hybrid” passenger transport services by rail,
for example, where a single train service includes transport services operated partly
commercially and partly under public service obligations.
45
This is both valid under the third Altmark condition and under the conditions set in Article 4 of Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007.
25
The operation of public services may benefit operators that also provide commercial services
through positive network effects. First, this concerns predominantly hybrid services where
the network effects are important, as the assets (rolling stock in particular) and staff used to
provide the transport services are common to the services operated commercially and under
the public service contract. The operators cannot cross-subsidise commercial activities thanks
to the funding provided in the form of a public service compensation. Such compensation
must then be adapted accordingly. Second, if the routes under public service contracts link up
with and feed routes operated on commercial terms, the public service operator may see its
client base increase. Where such network effects are quantifiable, they should be taken into
account in the compensation
2.5.2. Compensation for directly awarded contracts
When a public service contract is directly awarded in accordance with Article 5(2), 5(3a),
5(4), 5(4a), 5(4b) 5(5) or 5(6), or a competent authority imposes general rules within the
meaning of Article 3(2), the level of compensation is not the result of competitive market
forces, but of direct negotiation. In these circumstances, in accordance with Articles 4 and
6(1), the methodology to calculate the maximum compensation amount laid out in the Annex
has to be applied to avoid overcompensation.
If the Annex is complied with (in addition to all other relevant provisions of Regulation (EC)
No 1370/2007), such compensation is deemed as compatible with the internal market, and,
thus, benefits from the block exemption under Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
2.5.3. Overcompensation – ex post checks
The contract agreed between the public service operator and the competent authority can take
different forms, in particular as regards risk-sharing arrangements and the maximum level of
reasonable profit that the operator is entitled to retain. Typically, competent authorities will
need to carry out regular ex post checks to detect any overcompensation and foresee in the
public service contracts claw back mechanisms providing for the recovery of any amount
granted in excess of the costs directly incurred by the public service obligations.
This principle applies to competitively tendered and directly awarded contracts, as the
prohibition of overcompensation laid down in Article 4(1) applies to all contracts.
The ex post check will be carried out by reference to the costs and revenues and the maximal
level of profit that shall normally be established in the contract. To enable these ex post
checks to be conducted, the contract should normally set a cap on the maximum profit margin
that the operator is entitled to make. For reasons of consistency, the method used for the ex
post checks should also take into account network effects, where these are quantifiable.
2.5.4. The notion of ‘reasonable profit’
Article 4(1)(c) provides that the costs to be taken into account in a public service contract
may include ‘a suitable return on capital’, i.e. a reasonable profit. This provision applies,
whether the contracts are directly awarded or competitively tendered. The Annex defines
‘reasonable profit’ as ‘a rate of return on capital that is normal for the sector in a given
Member State and that takes account of the risk, or absence of risk, incurred by the public
service operator by virtue of public authority intervention’. The Annex does not provide
further guidance on how to establish that level of profit.
However, useful indications on how to determine an appropriate level of reasonable profit
can be drawn from the SGEI Communication.
The SGEI Communication explains that ‘where a generally accepted market remuneration
exists for a given service, that market remuneration provides the best benchmark for the
26
compensation in the absence of a tender’46. An example are market contracts in the same
sector of activity, with similar characteristics and in the same Member State.
In that case, the level of reasonable profit can be determined by comparing the profit margin
required by a typical, well-run undertaking active in the same sector to provide the service in
question47. However, market benchmarks do not always exist48 and when they exist, they may
need to be adjusted, if their features are not comparable to the transaction at stake49.
The standard measurement of the return on capital of a public service contract is the internal
rate of return (IRR) that the company makes on its invested capital over the lifetime of the
project, that is, the IRR on the contract’s cash flows. However, accounting measures such as
the return on equity (ROE), the return on capital employed (ROCE) or other generally
accepted economic indicators for the return on capital may also be used.
It should be borne in mind that indicators may be influenced by the accounting methods used
by the operator and may reflect its situation only in a given year. Where this is the case, care
should be taken to use indicators which reflect long-term economic realities linked to the
execution of the public service contract. Whenever feasible, the level of reasonable profit
should be assessed over the lifetime of the contract. Account should be taken of the
differences in economic models of railways, tramways, metro and bus transport. For example,
railway transport is very capital-intensive, whereas for bus transport personnel tends to be the
main cost factor.
The adequate level of reasonable profit must be established by the competent authority on the
basis of a case-by-case assessment which should essentially consist in comparing the profit
level of the contract with comparable contracts on the market. That remuneration must take
into account the normal market remuneration for similar services and the level of risk
involved in the contract. For example, a public service contract under which the
compensation can be adjusted to take into account unforeseen costs will be less risky than a
contract where compensation is fixed. All other things being equal, the reasonable profit
should be lower for the less risky contract. The contract should explicitly indicate whether,
and under which circumstances, the compensation amount can be adjusted to reflect relevant
external developments, as an increase in the compensation which departs from the ex ante
contractual terms will normally be considered not compliant with Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007.
The compensation mechanism should generally encourage management efficiency50.
Compensation schemes which mechanically cover actually incurred costs do not encourage
the transport operator to become more cost-efficient over time. Such mechanisms are only
acceptable where costs are highly uncertain and the transport operator needs a high degree of
protection against uncertainty.
46
Point 69 of the SGEI Communication.
47
Further guidance is given in the SGEI Communication on what is to be considered a ‘typical undertaking,
well run and adequately provided with material means so as to be able to meet the necessary public service
requirement’. See in particular points 70-76.
48
There are persisting strong differences between national rail markets (as highlighted by the 7th Report on
monitoring development of the rail market published by the Commission in January 2021) as well as very
significant State interventions distorting prices on this market. See
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/market/market_monitoring_en
49
This means that it is not always possible to use as a benchmark the average profit margin in the sector. The
specificities of the contract and notably the risk involved by the contract may require an adjustment of the profit
margin in a particular case, to ensure that this profit margin remains reasonable.
50
In particular point 7 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
27
2.5.5. Article 4(1) and (2) and the Annex. Preventing the cross-subsidisation of
commercial activities
When a public service provider also carries out commercial activities, it should be ensured
that it cannot use the public compensation to strengthen its competitive position in other
markets where it operates commercially. To this effect, the Annex prescribes accounting
separation between public service and commercial activities, as well as a sound cost
allocation method reflecting the real costs of providing the public service.
Article 4(1) and (2), read in connection with the Annex, requires that the costs and revenues
of the operator must be correctly allocated between the public services (on a contract-by-
contract basis) and the commercial services (see Section 2.5.2).
If, for example, the costs of services rendered in stations to the public service and commercial
activities were allocated only to the public service, this would constitute a cross-subsidy
incompatible with Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. Specific obligations on the separation of
accounts of railway undertakings are also enshrined in Directive 2012/34/EC51.
Each public service contract should contain specific rules on compensation and should give
rise to specific accounting entries. If an undertaking has entered into several public service
contracts, its accounts should specify which public compensation corresponds to which
contract. At the written request of the Commission, these accounts must be made available in
accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
2.5.6. Article 4(1). Efficiency incentives
Recital 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 states that in the case of a direct award or
general rules, the parameters for compensation should be set in such a way that compensation
is appropriate and reflects a ‘desire for efficiency and quality of service’. Point 7 of the
Annex specifies that the method of compensation should ‘promote the maintenance or
development of effective management by the public service operator, which can be the
subject of an objective assessment’.
This means that incentives for an economically efficient provision of the service should be
built into the compensation mechanism. Efficiency should improve over time and
improvements should be objectively measurable.
Efficiency should be understood as the relation between the quality (or level) of the public
services and the resources employed. Incentives can thus be designed to reduce costs and/or
increase the quality/level of service. However, cost reductions that are achieved at the
expense of service quality/level do not count as efficiency improvements.
Efficiency incentives should be realistic, proportionate and precisely defined in the contract.
Efficiency gains should be appropriately shared between the operator, the public authorities
and, where appropriate, the users. The operator should not be allowed to keep a
disproportionate part of such benefits. Any such mechanism for incentivising efficiency
improvements must be based on objective and measurable criteria set out in the entrustment
act and subject to transparent ex post assessment carried out by the competent authority.
2.5.7. Article 6(1). Checking compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
Competent authorities are required to carry out regular checks during the lifetime of the
public service contract not only to verify compliance with its terms, but also to detect (and
51
Article 6 on the separation of accounts of railway undertakings and railway infrastructure managers.
28
claw back) at an early stage any overcompensation. This is important in particular for long-
term contracts.
2.5.8. Article 1(1) and Article 6(1). Requirement to pay operators ‘appropriate’
compensation for public service obligations
According to point 7 of the Annex to Regulation, ‘the method of compensation must promote
the maintenance or development of […] the provision of passenger transport services of a
sufficiently high standard’. This principle is also enshrined in Article 2a(2)(b), which states
that the compensation of the net financial effort for public service obligations must
financially sustain the provision of public passenger transport in the long term.
This means that the compensation made available by competent authorities should make it
possible for operators to provide high-quality services on a financially sustainable basis.
Underfunding would result in a degradation of the quality of service. In addition, for
competitively awarded contracts, an excessively low compensation would discourage
prospective bidders from participating in tender procedures.
2.6. Article 7(2), (3) and (4). Publication and transparency
The interpretative guidance provided in this section covers the obligation of competent
authorities to ensure transparency about the award of public service contracts before and after
the award procedure.
Article 7(2) states that at least one year before the publication of an invitation to tender or the
direct award of a public service contract, competent authorities shall publish certain
information on the contract envisaged in the Official Journal of the European Union. The
obligation to publish this information also applies when the public service contracts are
awarded under the second sentence of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 in
accordance with the procedure provided for by the public procurement directives, even
though these directives do not provide for such a publication52.
The objective of Article 7(2) is, first, to enable economic operators to react to the intentions
of the competent authority, in particular to the type of award that it intends to resort to
(invitation to tender or direct award), and second, to give economic operators time to better
prepare for an invitation to tender. As a result, failure to publish the information pursuant to
Article 7(2) can result in the annulment of the call for tender if the lack of prior information
caused a significant disadvantage to operators compared to the operator that currently
performs the contract, and therefore has exact knowledge of all its characteristics53. Such
failure will also deprive Member States from the exemption of notification pursuant to
Article 108(3) TFEU54.
Article 7(3) states that within one year of the direct award of a public service contract for rail
services, competent authorities shall publish certain information on the awarded contract.
52
Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2018, Stefan Rudigier, C-518/17, EU:C:2018:757 (the ‘Rudigier
judgment’).
53
As set out in the Rudigier judgment.
54
See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of 12 October 1978, Commission and Belgium, C-156/77, paragraph
10 and judgment of the Court of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel GmbH, C-493/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:577,
paragraph 38.
29
The Commission services have developed model forms and procedures that allow competent
authorities to comply with these publication requirements. In view of the publication of the
information in the Official Journal of the European Union, the competent authorities should
use the specific tool ‘eNotices’55 for filling-in and submitting notices for publication on the
‘Tenders Electronic Daily’ (TED).
Article 7(4) provides that a competent authority, when so requested by an interested party,
shall forward to it the reasons for directly awarding a public service contract. A competent
authority must determine its intention to award a contract directly at least one year in
advance, since this information must be published in the Official Journal of the European
Union (Article 7(2), in particular subparagraph (b)). Thus, interested parties are placed in a
position to formulate questions a long time before the contract is awarded, which must be one
year later at the earliest. In order to grant effective legal protection, the information requested
in accordance with Article 7(4) should be provided without undue delay.
Article 7(2) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 do not require a competent authority to
publish or communicate to any interested economic operators all the information necessary in
order to enable them to submit a sufficiently detailed offer which could be subject to a
comparative assessment, nor to carry out such a comparative assessment of all bids that may
have been received following publication of that information56.
2.7. Transitional arrangements
This section provides interpretative guidance on some aspects of the provisions on
transitional arrangements concerning contracts awarded before the entry into force of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and those awarded during the transitional periods as defined
in Article 8.
2.7.1. Article 8(3) (b) and (c). Maximum duration of 30 years
Article 8(3)(b) and (c) states that public service contracts awarded ‘before 26 July 2000 on
the basis of a procedure other than a fair competitive tendering procedure’ or awarded ‘as
from 26 July 2000 and before 3 December 2009 on the basis of a fair competitive tendering
procedure […] may continue until they expire, but for no longer than 30 years’.
Although this provision does not expressly specify the starting point from which the
maximum period of 30 years must be calculated, the Court of Justice has held that this period
runs from the date of entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 57. Consequently,
given the fact that this Regulation entered into force on 3 December 2009, all public service
contracts that fall under the provisions of Article 8(3)(b) and (c) may continue until 3
December 2039, at the latest.
2.7.2. Article 8(3)(d). Meaning of ‘limited duration comparable to the durations specified
in Article 4’
Article 8(3)(d) states that public service contracts awarded ‘as from 26 July 2000 and before
24 December 2017 on the basis of a procedure other than a fair competitive tendering
procedure […] may continue until they expire, provided they are of limited duration
comparable to the durations specified in Article 4’.
55
This tool is available in all EU languages at the address https://enotices.ted.europa.eu.
56
Judgment of the Court of 24 October 2019, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, C-515/18,
EU:C:2019:893.
57
Judgment of the Court of 19 March 2020, Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña, C-45/19, EU:C:2020:224.
30
The Commission considers that the term ‘comparable to the durations specified in Article 4’
should be interpreted restrictively, so as to ensure that Member States work towards
achieving the objectives of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 from the date of its entry into
force on 3 December 2009. The Commission therefore takes the view that it would be
sensible to consider that the duration of public service contracts should be very similar to
those indicated in Article 4.
31
ANNEX
Member States with a market volume of rail passenger transport of less than 23 million train-
kilometres in December 2017
Bulgaria
Estonia
Greece
Croatia
Ireland
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Slovenia
32
Saatja: Webdesktop <
[email protected]>
Saadetud: 02.12.2021 17:55
Adressaat: MKM info <
[email protected]>
Koopia: Meelis Kivinurm MFA <
[email protected]>
Teema: Webdesktop: Kiri nr 10.2-12.M/1227: Draft revised interpretative
guidelines concerning Regulation 1370/2007
TereEdastan Komisjoni kirja.Reg. number: 10.2-12.M/1227Reg. kuupäev:
02.12.2021Sisu: Revised interpretative guidelines concerning Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by
roadHeade soovidega-- Kersti NeemeEesti alaline esindus EL juuresSekretär