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Kultuuriministeerium · 15. detsember 2017
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10 Kultuuripoliitika kavandamine ja rakendamine
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10-5 Kirjavahetus audiovisuaalvaldkonda puudutavates küsimustes
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10-5/2017 Kirjavahetus audiovisuaalvaldkonda puudutavates küsimustes
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14. jaanuar 2018

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  • 📎Annex_AV Coalition letter October 13 2017.pdf495 KB
  • 📎AV sector coalition letter_main reasons to delete CoO_Oct 16_Final.pdf357 KB
  • 📎Estonia 2 - AV sector coalition call to COREPER December 15 2017.pdf785 KB

Sisu (failidest)

Annex – Non-exhaustive list of letters, position papers, news articles and independent studies against Country-of-Origin  October 2017 Deutsche Filmakademie: Brandbrief nach Brüssel. Please find it here.  October 2017 Article published in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). Please find it here.  September 2017 Letter from the Audiovisual Sector Coalition: Why the provisions on Country-of-Origin must be deleted and why compromises on scope of services/content covered are harmful to the entire audiovisual eco-system in Europe.  July 2017 Letter from the Audiovisual Sector Coalition to the Estonian Presidency and the members of the Council IP Working Party on the Council Presidency Compromise Proposal for discussion on 10-11 July 2017 (document number 10551/17).  June 2017 Study published by Professor Pablo Ibanez Colomo on the interplay between the SatCab Regulation and Competition Law. Please find it here.  May 2017 ‘411 letter’: similar to the ‘101 letter’ sent out in July 2016, but this time co-signed by 401 audiovisual organisations from all across Europe. Please find it here.  May 2017 Declaration by the association representing the European Film Agency Directors (EFADs). Please find it here.  February 2017 Audiovisual Sector Coalition letter/comments on Ms Kammerevert’s (CULT) Draft Opinion.  February 2017 CEP study: EU Regulation: digital cross-border transmission of TV and radio. Please find it here.  November 2016 Audiovisual Sector Coalition position paper: The European Commission Draft Regulation Applying the Country of Origin Principle to Licensing of Certain Broadcasters’ Rights Online: A Threat to Consumer Choice and Cultural Diversity in Europe.  November 2016 European Film Agency Directors (EFADs) position paper. Please find it here.  October 2016 Audiovisual Sector Coalition analysis of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment on the proposed SatCab Regulation.  September 2016 Creativity Works! Statement on the Broadcasters’ Regulation here. Full position here.  July 2016 ‘101 letter’: letter co-signed by 101 organisations and individuals representing film and television producers, publishers on physical media and online, sports event organisers, distributors, broadcasters, screenwriters, cinemas, film agencies, platforms, media and entertainment trade unions throughout Europe. Please find it here.  May 2016 Oxera study: The impact of cross-border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers. Please find it here.  March 2014 CRA study: Economic analysis of the territoriality of the making available right in the EU. Please find it here. Letter from the Audio-Visual Sector Coalition Main reasons why the Country‐of‐Origin provisions in the Proposed Broadcasters’ Regulation (the Proposal) must be deleted Brussels, 16 October 2017 The entire audio‐visual sector ranging from writers, directors, performers, skilled professionals through all business partners in production, marketing and distribution have been very clear and vocal (see Annex) in expressing their position since the beginning of the debate around the application of the Country of Origin (CoO) principle to broadcasters’ ancillary online services: The relevant provisions (Articles 1.1a, 2 and 5 as well as Recitals 8‐11, 15) must be deleted. The proposals on CoO will not achieve the stated goals and will act to the detriment of consumers and the industry alike. Our position is not the consequence of an unwillingness to compromise or conservatism – rather, it is based on rational arguments that are all, considered individually, and certainly combined, reason enough to delete the above mentioned relevant provisions. 1. CoO does not reduce transaction costs for broadcasters: The so‐called problem identified by the European Commission (“EC”) to justify the introduction of the CoO principle to the licensing of ancillary online services to a broadcast is the “high transaction costs for the acquisition of rights for their online services when they are offered across borders”1. However, the EC’s impact assessment acknowledges that the EC has no data to verify this assumption2 and that even the relevant stakeholder(s) (e.g. the EBU, representing public service broadcasters) most vocal in calling for EC action in this field, has not been able to provide any data on cross‐border transaction costs for clearing online rights, as compared to transaction costs in one jurisdiction. In reality, applying the CoO principle would not reduce broadcasters’ transactions costs as explained by Professor Jan Bernd Nordemann (Honorary Professor, Humboldt University Berlin) at a recent workshop organised by the European Audiovisual Observatory at the request of the Commission: “He concluded that transaction costs would not be reduced with the application of the COO principle, as territorial rights are just one cost factor out of five. In addition, the rights are more expensive if acquired on a more extensive territorial basis, or they may not be available.” (summary of the EAO workshop of 21 June 2017 p. 16, par 2) This is confirmed by the 2014 CRA study3 that also found only small or negligible transaction costs for broadcasters as the exclusive exploitation of rights for an audio‐visual work are typically aggregated in the hands of a single licensing entity: the producer. Conclusion: Absent any data and (verified) justification for the introduction of the CoO principle, the relevant provisions should be deleted in accordance with the requirements of the Better Regulation Guidelines4, as the obligation to provide quantitative and qualitative analyses has clearly not been fulfilled. Providing a “buy one, get 27 on top” benefit to (public service) broadcasters (see point 2 below) is not a valid justification – particularly in light of the negative consequences for producers, distributors, 1 Impact Assessment, p. 24. 2 IA, p. 21. 3 Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU, Charles River Associates, March 2014, p.96, also invoked in the IA, p. 14, footnote 35. 4 Better Regulation Guidelines. 19.05. 2015 sport event organisers, authors, performers and other creative talent across the European audio‐visual sector as well as for consumers5. 2. CoO would erode territorial exclusivity with no commercial freedom for rights owners The audio‐visual industry has argued consistently that CoO would interfere with the territorial‐exclusive nature of copyright. This would result in an erosion of meaningful territorial licensing and with that remove the commercial freedom of rights owners to raise financing to develop, produce, market and distribute films and other audio‐visual content. This is so for the following reasons:  CoO would stipulate as a default rule that it is sufficient to clear rights in 1 Member State, even if the content is made available on a pan‐EU basis (the “buy 1, get 27 on top” principle);  The EC has argued that – even though the territorial nature of copyright is affected by CoO – it is possible to address the negative effects of the de facto pan‐EU license by contract (see Recital 11 of the Proposal).  This argument is fundamentally flawed: o Without the proposed application of CoO, the broadcaster has to explicitly negotiate the desired territorial scope of the rights (opt‐in system). With the proposed application of CoO, the producers would have to explicitly negotiate a limitation of the licensed territory (opt‐out system, i.e. negotiate down from covering the entire EU to e.g. a single territory). This assumes, incorrectly, that producers have the requisite bargaining power to convince broadcasters to forego automatic pan‐EU CoO rights. The commercial value of online catch‐up rights which increasingly are European audiences’ preferred access to TV programming and the fact that catch‐up rights are licensed together with primary TV rights, only compounds the imbalance in bargaining power between producers and broadcasters6. o Application of competition law: Exclusive territorial licensing legally is not as such considered restrictive of competition.7. The imposition of the CoO principle would remove this important legal justification. Hence, while the EC argues that the proposed CoO would not oblige (but only facilitate) broadcasters to make available the works covered across borders, competition law experts, such as Professor Ibáñez Colomo (Competition law professor at the London School of Economics and College of Europe), are of the opinion that this is not the case and that it is reasonable to infer from the Murphy‐case8 that the introduction of the CoO principle would challenge measures to ensure meaningful territorial licensing – as it could no longer be justified by the territorial nature of copyright.  The EC has often (but not always) denied the interplay between the CoO principle and the commercial freedom to license full territorial exclusivity. In practice, however, as Professor Pablo Ibáñez Colomo has observed9: 5 The impact of cross‐border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers, Oxera and O&O, May 2016. 6 Contrary to the situation at the time of the adoption of the Cable‐ and Satellite Directive where satellite rights represented a more modest part of the exploitation of a particular title. 7 See Coditel II. 8 Joined Cases, C‐403/08 and C‐429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (“Murphy”), EU:C:2011:631, para 137. 9 https://antitrustlair.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/ibanez‐colomo‐copyright‐reform‐against‐the‐background‐of‐pay‐tv‐and‐ murphy.pdf o If the EC adopts a prohibition decision in the Pay TV case concluding that the agreements at issue are restrictive by object and cannot be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU, it is reasonable to presume that all similar agreements concluded by other broadcasters and content providers would also be contrary to Article 101 TFEU. o Even if the EC does not intend to take action against other broadcasters or content providers, national courts and competition authorities may enforce against them on the basis of the findings of the Pay TV case. o References to contractual freedom in the Proposal do not change this conclusion – as primary EU law would in any event take precedence over the Regulation, if eventually adopted. As a result of the introduction of CoO, many broadcasters would no longer be able to obtain exclusive licenses from producers for content with international appeal. The only winners would be large international platforms, which are not necessarily best suited to promote the European cultural industries and European cultural diversity and respond to the needs of local audiences. Conclusion: The so‐called ‘contractual’ freedom to opt out of the CoO principle is an illusion because of the interplay with EU competition law and because of lack of bargaining power on the part of producers. The resulting erosion of territoriality and the impact on the ability of producers of content to license on an exclusive territorial basis will adversely impact financing, production, distribution and availability of works in Europe, and have a negative effect on cultural and linguistic diversity as well as on consumer welfare10. 3. Reducing the scope of CoO to certain kinds of production/ genres is not a solution The same concerns apply to any attempts to mitigate the harmful impact of the Proposal by reducing the scope of application of the default CoO principle to so‐called ‘commissioned’, ‘fully‐financed’, ‘co‐’ or ‘own’ productions. While such amendments to Article 2 of the Proposal would arguably limit the scope of application of the CoO principle, they would still negatively affect many productions and cannot cure the fundamental harm caused by removing the territorial nature of copyright. In a nutshell:  Excluding certain productions from the scope of application still keeps CoO as a default rule. That means that the burden of proof that a certain production does not qualify as a ‘commissioned’, ‘fully‐financed’, ‘co‐’ or ‘own’ production lies with the producer/right holder.  The terms 'fully financed', 'commissioned', ‘purchased’ or ‘own’ productions are not harmonised legal terms – nor should they be. In each Member State, these concepts differ, depending on local regulations, terms of trade, and basically the commercial viability of each individual project. Introducing these terms into a Regulation would lead to large scale legal and business uncertainty.  Moreover, co‐productions and/or commissioned content often involve a territorial split of the distribution rights between the broadcaster and the producer as part of the contractual arrangements governing the sharing of responsibilities, financing and future recoupment. Applying the CoO principle to such cases would expropriate the producers’ benefits under such an arrangement. European film and drama will be particularly at risk as they rely on co‐production 10 Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU, Charles River Associates, March 2014; The impact of cross‐border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers, Oxera and O&O, May 2016. schemes which require partners to pull together resources by agreeing to focus their activities on specific markets.  Even if it were possible in a legally and commercially sound manner to define a pure broadcaster‐ owned production, in which producers have no rights, as seems to be the idea behind the notion of a “broadcasters’ own production”, subjecting these to the CoO principle would still devalue these productions from a broadcaster perspective, as broadcasters would not be able to grant meaningful territorial exclusivity in licenses with other territories (see above on the interplay with competition law). This would, in turn, significantly decrease the (commercial) broadcasters’ ability to re‐invest in new content. Conclusion: A limitation of scope to certain productions, even if “fully financed”/ “broadcasters’ own productions”, does not alleviate the core concerns with regards to the erosion of territorial exclusivity and removal of commercial freedom. ***** Signatories ACT ‐ Association of Commercial Television in IFTA ‐ Independent Film & Television Alliance, Europe, Grégoire Polad, Director General ‐ Jean Prewitt, CEO ‐ [email protected] [email protected] IVF ‐ International Video Federation ‐ Publishers BUNDESLIGA ‐ Stefan Brost, Head of EU Office ‐ of Audiovisual Content on Digital Media and stefan.brost@dfb‐dfl.de Online, Charlotte Lund Thomsen, Legal Counsel ‐ clthomsen@ivf‐video.org CEPI ‐ European Coordination of Independent Producers, Elena Lai, Secretary General ‐ LALIGA ‐ The Spanish Football League Cepi@europe‐analytica.com Javier Tebas, President ‐ contact: Laura Vilches ‐ [email protected] EUROCINEMA ‐ Association de Producteurs de Cinéma et de Télévision, Yvon Thiec, General MEDIAPRO ‐ Jaume Roures, Legal Delegate ‐ [email protected] Representative Mediaproducción S.L.U., [email protected] EUROPA DISTRIBUTION ‐ European Network of Independent Film Distributors, Christine Eloy, MPA ‐ Motion Picture Association, Stan McCoy, General Manager ‐ christine.eloy@europa‐ President and Managing Director MPA EMEA ‐ distribution.org [email protected] EUROPA INTERNATIONAL ‐ Daphné Kapfer, PREMIER LEAGUE ‐ Mathieu Moreuil, Head of Managing Director ‐ European Public Policy ‐ [email protected] [email protected] FERA ‐ Federation of European Film Directors, SPIO ‐ Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft Pauline Durand‐Vialle, CEO ‐ (Association of the German Film Industry), [email protected] Alfred Holighaus, President ‐ [email protected] FIA ‐ International Federation of Actors, UNI‐MEI ‐ Uni Global Union Media Dominick Luquer, Secretary General ‐ Entertainment and Arts, Johannes Studinger, [email protected] Head of UNI‐MEI ‐ [email protected] FIAD ‐ International Federation of Film Distributors Associations, Nikolas Moschakis, UNIC ‐ International Federation of Cinemas, Secretary General ‐ [email protected] Laura Houlgatte, CEO ‐ lhoulgatte@unic‐ cinemas.org FIAPF ‐ International Federation of Film Producers Associations, Benoît Ginisty, Director VPRT ‐ Association of Commercial Broadcasters General ‐ [email protected] and Audiovisual Services, Julia Maier‐Hauff, Senior Counsel European Affairs ‐ FSE ‐ Federation of Screenwriters in Europe, [email protected] David Kavanagh, Executive Officer ‐ [email protected] Letter from the Audio-Visual Sector Coalition Call to delete Country-of-Origin provisions in the proposed Broadcasters’ Regulation and to reject compromises on scope Brussels, 13 December 2017 Dear Minister Saar, On Friday 8 December, the EU Council Presidency circulated a compromise proposal on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes (“Compromise Proposal”) with a view to agreeing on a General Approach at the COREPER I meeting of Friday 15 December. The Compromise Proposal would apply the Country of Origin (CoO) principle to ancillary online services offered by a broadcasting organisation of programmes (excluding sports events) which are: (a) produced and financed exclusively by the broadcasting organisation, or (b) commissioned by the broadcasting organisation where solely this organisation has the rights in these programmes for the purpose of exploitation in their ancillary online service, or (c) co-produced by the broadcasting organisation with third parties, with the exception of films and television series. The entire audio-visual sector ranging from scriptwriters, authors, directors, performers and skilled professionals through all business partners in production, marketing, broadcasting and distribution as well as cinema operators and sports rights owners have been very clear and vocal in expressing their position since the beginning of the debate around the application of the CoO principle to broadcasters’ ancillary online services: The provisions relevant to CoO (Articles 1.1a, 2 and 5 as well as Recitals 8-11, 15) must be deleted. By weakening the territoriality of copyright through the extension of the country of origin principle to broadcasters’ online transmissions, together with the uncertainties stemming from an ongoing competition case, the main effect will be a dramatic loss in industry’s capacity to invest in films and quality TV programming which supports the local economy. This in turn would lead to a smaller amount of less varied films and audiovisual content being available as well as higher prices for consumers. The proposals on CoO will not achieve the stated goals and will act to the detriment of consumers and the industry alike. See also the arguments set out in the AV sector letter of 16 October 2017 in annex hereto. Our specific concerns about the Presidency Compromise Proposal are as follows: Reducing the scope of application of the default CoO principle to certain types of content, including so- called ‘commissioned’, ‘exclusively financed’, ‘co-’ or ‘own’ productions will not alleviate the negative effects. While such amendments to Article 2 of the Proposed Regulation would arguably limit the scope of application of the CoO principle, they would still negatively affect many productions and would not mitigate the fundamental harm that would be caused by removing the territorial nature of copyright. The fact that the Compromise Proposal stipulates that it would not establish any obligation for broadcasting organisations to communicate or make available programmes in their ancillary online services or to provide such ancillary online services in a Member State other than the Member State of their principal establishment does not give us any comfort in this regard. The CoO principle would still remove the territoriality of copyright and all copyright relevant acts would only take place in the Member State of the broadcaster’s principal establishment. Hence, as soon as broadcasters would make programmes available on their ancillary online service even in the Member State of principal establishment only, the territoriality of these programmes will be affected, and producers and broadcasters will have no effective means to preserve territorial exclusivity (see point 2 in the attached letter for more details) for the purposes of raising production capital and ensuring the best local marketing and distribution in each Member State. In more detail:  Excluding certain productions from the scope of application still keeps CoO as the default rule. That means that the burden of proof that a certain production does not qualify as, ‘exclusively financed’, ‘commissioned’ or ‘co-produced’ lies with the producer/right holder.  The terms ‘exclusively financed’, ‘commissioned’ or ‘co-produced’ are not harmonised legal terms – nor should they be. In each Member State, these concepts differ, depending on local regulations, terms of trade, and basically the commercial viability of each individual project. Introducing these terms into a Regulation would lead to large scale legal and business uncertainty.  Moreover, co-productions and/or commissioned content often involve a territorial split of the distribution rights between the broadcaster and the producer as part of the contractual arrangements governing the sharing of responsibilities, financing and future recoupment. Applying the CoO principle to such cases would expropriate producers’ benefits under such an arrangement. The Compromise Proposal does not address this issue since it would be sufficient that the broadcaster has exclusive rights in the programmes concerned “for the purpose of exploitation in their ancillary online service” in the Member State of establishment of the broadcaster. This means that the proposal would still significantly devalue the territorial exclusive exploitation of all other rights retained by the producer and related to any exploitation other than on the broadcaster’s ancillary online service (such as notably all primary online and on-demand exploitation rights). European film, television series, drama and documentaries will be particularly at risk as they rely on co-production schemes, which require partners to pool financial resources by agreeing to focus their activities on specific markets.  In addition, the Proposed Regulation and the Compromise Proposals still suffer from a fundamental flaw in that territorially exclusive arrangements – if agreed between the producer and the broadcaster concerned – will still be subject to primary EU law, including competition law and related, pending investigations. Conclusion: The European Parliament has taken an important step by confirming the EP JURI Committee Report as the European Parliament’s negotiating mandate for the tri-party negotiations. We hope to be able to also count on the Member States’ support to resist against compromise proposals which would erode territorial exclusivity and restrict commercial freedom. We therefore kindly urge you to reject any compromise that would apply CoO licensing to certain productions even if limited to “exclusively financed”/ “broadcasters’ commissioned productions”. ***** Signatories ACT - Association of Commercial Television in IFTA - Independent Film & Television Alliance, Europe, Grégoire Polad, Director General - Jean Prewitt, CEO - [email protected] [email protected] IVF - International Video Federation - Publishers BUNDESLIGA - Stefan Brost, Head of EU Office - of Audiovisual Content on Digital Media and [email protected] Online, Charlotte Lund Thomsen, Legal Counsel - [email protected] CEPI - European Coordination of Independent Producers, Elena Lai, Secretary General - LALIGA - The Spanish Football League [email protected] Javier Tebas, President - contact: Laura Vilches - [email protected] EUROCINEMA - Association de Producteurs de Cinéma et de Télévision, Yvon Thiec, General MEDIAPRO - Jaume Roures, Legal Delegate - [email protected] Representative Mediaproducción S.L.U., [email protected] EUROPA DISTRIBUTION - European Network of Independent Film Distributors, Christine Eloy, MPA - Motion Picture Association, Stan McCoy, General Manager - christine.eloy@europa- President and Managing Director MPA EMEA - distribution.org [email protected] EUROPA INTERNATIONAL - Daphné Kapfer, PREMIER LEAGUE - Mathieu Moreuil, Head of Managing Director - European Public Policy - [email protected] [email protected] FERA - Federation of European Film Directors, SPIO - Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft Pauline Durand-Vialle, CEO - (Association of the German Film Industry), [email protected] Alfred Holighaus, President - [email protected] FIA - International Federation of Actors, UNI-MEI - Uni Global Union Media Dominick Luquer, Secretary General - Entertainment and Arts, Johannes Studinger, [email protected] Head of UNI-MEI - [email protected] FIAD - International Federation of Film Distributors Associations, Nikolas Moschakis, UNIC - International Federation of Cinemas, Secretary General - [email protected] Laura Houlgatte, CEO - lhoulgatte@unic- cinemas.org FIAPF - International Federation of Film Producers Associations - YBP - Benoît Ginisty, VPRT - Association of Commercial Broadcasters Managing Director to FIAPF Headquarters - and Audiovisual Services, Julia Maier-Hauff, [email protected] Senior Counsel European Affairs - [email protected] FSE - Federation of Screenwriters in Europe, David Kavanagh, Executive Officer - [email protected]
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