Annex – Non-exhaustive list of letters, position papers, news articles and
independent studies against Country-of-Origin
October 2017
Deutsche Filmakademie: Brandbrief nach Brüssel. Please find it here.
October 2017
Article published in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). Please find it
here.
September 2017
Letter from the Audiovisual Sector Coalition: Why the provisions on Country-of-Origin must be
deleted and why compromises on scope of services/content covered are harmful to the entire
audiovisual eco-system in Europe.
July 2017
Letter from the Audiovisual Sector Coalition to the Estonian Presidency and the members of the
Council IP Working Party on the Council Presidency Compromise Proposal for discussion on 10-11
July 2017 (document number 10551/17).
June 2017
Study published by Professor Pablo Ibanez Colomo on the interplay between the SatCab
Regulation and Competition Law. Please find it here.
May 2017
‘411 letter’: similar to the ‘101 letter’ sent out in July 2016, but this time co-signed by 401
audiovisual organisations from all across Europe. Please find it here.
May 2017
Declaration by the association representing the European Film Agency Directors (EFADs). Please
find it here.
February 2017
Audiovisual Sector Coalition letter/comments on Ms Kammerevert’s (CULT) Draft Opinion.
February 2017
CEP study: EU Regulation: digital cross-border transmission of TV and radio. Please find it here.
November 2016
Audiovisual Sector Coalition position paper: The European Commission Draft Regulation Applying
the Country of Origin Principle to Licensing of Certain Broadcasters’ Rights Online: A Threat to
Consumer Choice and Cultural Diversity in Europe.
November 2016
European Film Agency Directors (EFADs) position paper. Please find it here.
October 2016
Audiovisual Sector Coalition analysis of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment on the
proposed SatCab Regulation.
September 2016
Creativity Works! Statement on the Broadcasters’ Regulation here. Full position here.
July 2016
‘101 letter’: letter co-signed by 101 organisations and individuals representing film and television
producers, publishers on physical media and online, sports event organisers, distributors,
broadcasters, screenwriters, cinemas, film agencies, platforms, media and entertainment trade
unions throughout Europe. Please find it here.
May 2016
Oxera study: The impact of cross-border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers. Please
find it here.
March 2014
CRA study: Economic analysis of the territoriality of the making available right in the EU. Please
find it here.
Letter from the Audio-Visual Sector Coalition
Main reasons why the Country‐of‐Origin provisions in
the Proposed Broadcasters’ Regulation (the Proposal) must be deleted
Brussels, 16 October 2017
The entire audio‐visual sector ranging from writers, directors, performers, skilled professionals through
all business partners in production, marketing and distribution have been very clear and vocal (see Annex)
in expressing their position since the beginning of the debate around the application of the Country of
Origin (CoO) principle to broadcasters’ ancillary online services: The relevant provisions (Articles 1.1a, 2
and 5 as well as Recitals 8‐11, 15) must be deleted. The proposals on CoO will not achieve the stated
goals and will act to the detriment of consumers and the industry alike. Our position is not the
consequence of an unwillingness to compromise or conservatism – rather, it is based on rational
arguments that are all, considered individually, and certainly combined, reason enough to delete the
above mentioned relevant provisions.
1. CoO does not reduce transaction costs for broadcasters:
The so‐called problem identified by the European Commission (“EC”) to justify the introduction of the CoO
principle to the licensing of ancillary online services to a broadcast is the “high transaction costs for the
acquisition of rights for their online services when they are offered across borders”1. However, the EC’s
impact assessment acknowledges that the EC has no data to verify this assumption2 and that even the
relevant stakeholder(s) (e.g. the EBU, representing public service broadcasters) most vocal in calling for
EC action in this field, has not been able to provide any data on cross‐border transaction costs for clearing
online rights, as compared to transaction costs in one jurisdiction.
In reality, applying the CoO principle would not reduce broadcasters’ transactions costs as explained by
Professor Jan Bernd Nordemann (Honorary Professor, Humboldt University Berlin) at a recent workshop
organised by the European Audiovisual Observatory at the request of the Commission:
“He concluded that transaction costs would not be reduced with the application of the COO
principle, as territorial rights are just one cost factor out of five. In addition, the rights are more
expensive if acquired on a more extensive territorial basis, or they may not be available.”
(summary of the EAO workshop of 21 June 2017 p. 16, par 2)
This is confirmed by the 2014 CRA study3 that also found only small or negligible transaction costs for
broadcasters as the exclusive exploitation of rights for an audio‐visual work are typically aggregated in the
hands of a single licensing entity: the producer.
Conclusion: Absent any data and (verified) justification for the introduction of the CoO principle, the
relevant provisions should be deleted in accordance with the requirements of the Better Regulation
Guidelines4, as the obligation to provide quantitative and qualitative analyses has clearly not been
fulfilled. Providing a “buy one, get 27 on top” benefit to (public service) broadcasters (see point 2 below)
is not a valid justification – particularly in light of the negative consequences for producers, distributors,
1 Impact Assessment, p. 24.
2 IA, p. 21.
3 Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU, Charles River Associates, March 2014, p.96, also
invoked in the IA, p. 14, footnote 35.
4 Better Regulation Guidelines. 19.05. 2015
sport event organisers, authors, performers and other creative talent across the European audio‐visual
sector as well as for consumers5.
2. CoO would erode territorial exclusivity with no commercial freedom for rights owners
The audio‐visual industry has argued consistently that CoO would interfere with the territorial‐exclusive
nature of copyright. This would result in an erosion of meaningful territorial licensing and with that
remove the commercial freedom of rights owners to raise financing to develop, produce, market and
distribute films and other audio‐visual content. This is so for the following reasons:
CoO would stipulate as a default rule that it is sufficient to clear rights in 1 Member State, even if
the content is made available on a pan‐EU basis (the “buy 1, get 27 on top” principle);
The EC has argued that – even though the territorial nature of copyright is affected by CoO – it is
possible to address the negative effects of the de facto pan‐EU license by contract (see Recital 11
of the Proposal).
This argument is fundamentally flawed:
o Without the proposed application of CoO, the broadcaster has to explicitly negotiate the
desired territorial scope of the rights (opt‐in system). With the proposed application of
CoO, the producers would have to explicitly negotiate a limitation of the licensed territory
(opt‐out system, i.e. negotiate down from covering the entire EU to e.g. a single territory).
This assumes, incorrectly, that producers have the requisite bargaining power to convince
broadcasters to forego automatic pan‐EU CoO rights. The commercial value of online
catch‐up rights which increasingly are European audiences’ preferred access to TV
programming and the fact that catch‐up rights are licensed together with primary TV
rights, only compounds the imbalance in bargaining power between producers and
broadcasters6.
o Application of competition law: Exclusive territorial licensing legally is not as such
considered restrictive of competition.7. The imposition of the CoO principle would remove
this important legal justification. Hence, while the EC argues that the proposed CoO would
not oblige (but only facilitate) broadcasters to make available the works covered across
borders, competition law experts, such as Professor Ibáñez Colomo (Competition law
professor at the London School of Economics and College of Europe), are of the opinion
that this is not the case and that it is reasonable to infer from the Murphy‐case8 that the
introduction of the CoO principle would challenge measures to ensure meaningful
territorial licensing – as it could no longer be justified by the territorial nature of copyright.
The EC has often (but not always) denied the interplay between the CoO principle and the
commercial freedom to license full territorial exclusivity. In practice, however, as Professor Pablo
Ibáñez Colomo has observed9:
5
The impact of cross‐border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers, Oxera and O&O, May 2016.
6
Contrary to the situation at the time of the adoption of the Cable‐ and Satellite Directive where satellite rights represented a
more modest part of the exploitation of a particular title.
7
See Coditel II.
8 Joined Cases, C‐403/08 and C‐429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (“Murphy”), EU:C:2011:631, para 137.
9 https://antitrustlair.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/ibanez‐colomo‐copyright‐reform‐against‐the‐background‐of‐pay‐tv‐and‐
murphy.pdf
o If the EC adopts a prohibition decision in the Pay TV case concluding that the agreements
at issue are restrictive by object and cannot be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU, it is
reasonable to presume that all similar agreements concluded by other broadcasters and
content providers would also be contrary to Article 101 TFEU.
o Even if the EC does not intend to take action against other broadcasters or content
providers, national courts and competition authorities may enforce against them on the
basis of the findings of the Pay TV case.
o References to contractual freedom in the Proposal do not change this conclusion – as
primary EU law would in any event take precedence over the Regulation, if eventually
adopted.
As a result of the introduction of CoO, many broadcasters would no longer be able to obtain exclusive
licenses from producers for content with international appeal. The only winners would be large
international platforms, which are not necessarily best suited to promote the European cultural industries
and European cultural diversity and respond to the needs of local audiences.
Conclusion: The so‐called ‘contractual’ freedom to opt out of the CoO principle is an illusion because of
the interplay with EU competition law and because of lack of bargaining power on the part of producers.
The resulting erosion of territoriality and the impact on the ability of producers of content to license on
an exclusive territorial basis will adversely impact financing, production, distribution and availability of
works in Europe, and have a negative effect on cultural and linguistic diversity as well as on consumer
welfare10.
3. Reducing the scope of CoO to certain kinds of production/ genres is not a solution
The same concerns apply to any attempts to mitigate the harmful impact of the Proposal by reducing the
scope of application of the default CoO principle to so‐called ‘commissioned’, ‘fully‐financed’, ‘co‐’ or
‘own’ productions. While such amendments to Article 2 of the Proposal would arguably limit the scope of
application of the CoO principle, they would still negatively affect many productions and cannot cure the
fundamental harm caused by removing the territorial nature of copyright. In a nutshell:
Excluding certain productions from the scope of application still keeps CoO as a default rule. That
means that the burden of proof that a certain production does not qualify as a ‘commissioned’,
‘fully‐financed’, ‘co‐’ or ‘own’ production lies with the producer/right holder.
The terms 'fully financed', 'commissioned', ‘purchased’ or ‘own’ productions are not harmonised
legal terms – nor should they be. In each Member State, these concepts differ, depending on
local regulations, terms of trade, and basically the commercial viability of each individual project.
Introducing these terms into a Regulation would lead to large scale legal and business uncertainty.
Moreover, co‐productions and/or commissioned content often involve a territorial split of the
distribution rights between the broadcaster and the producer as part of the contractual
arrangements governing the sharing of responsibilities, financing and future recoupment.
Applying the CoO principle to such cases would expropriate the producers’ benefits under such
an arrangement. European film and drama will be particularly at risk as they rely on co‐production
10 Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU, Charles River Associates, March 2014; The
impact of cross‐border access to audiovisual content on EU consumers, Oxera and O&O, May 2016.
schemes which require partners to pull together resources by agreeing to focus their activities on
specific markets.
Even if it were possible in a legally and commercially sound manner to define a pure broadcaster‐
owned production, in which producers have no rights, as seems to be the idea behind the notion
of a “broadcasters’ own production”, subjecting these to the CoO principle would still devalue
these productions from a broadcaster perspective, as broadcasters would not be able to grant
meaningful territorial exclusivity in licenses with other territories (see above on the interplay with
competition law). This would, in turn, significantly decrease the (commercial) broadcasters’ ability
to re‐invest in new content.
Conclusion: A limitation of scope to certain productions, even if “fully financed”/ “broadcasters’ own
productions”, does not alleviate the core concerns with regards to the erosion of territorial exclusivity
and removal of commercial freedom.
*****
Signatories
ACT ‐ Association of Commercial Television in IFTA ‐ Independent Film & Television Alliance,
Europe, Grégoire Polad, Director General ‐ Jean Prewitt, CEO ‐
[email protected]
[email protected]
IVF ‐ International Video Federation ‐ Publishers
BUNDESLIGA ‐ Stefan Brost, Head of EU Office ‐ of Audiovisual Content on Digital Media and
stefan.brost@dfb‐dfl.de Online, Charlotte Lund Thomsen, Legal Counsel
‐ clthomsen@ivf‐video.org
CEPI ‐ European Coordination of Independent
Producers, Elena Lai, Secretary General ‐ LALIGA ‐ The Spanish Football League
Cepi@europe‐analytica.com Javier Tebas, President ‐ contact: Laura Vilches ‐
[email protected]
EUROCINEMA ‐ Association de Producteurs de
Cinéma et de Télévision, Yvon Thiec, General MEDIAPRO ‐ Jaume Roures, Legal
Delegate ‐
[email protected] Representative Mediaproducción S.L.U.,
[email protected]
EUROPA DISTRIBUTION ‐ European Network of
Independent Film Distributors, Christine Eloy, MPA ‐ Motion Picture Association, Stan McCoy,
General Manager ‐ christine.eloy@europa‐ President and Managing Director MPA EMEA ‐
distribution.org
[email protected]
EUROPA INTERNATIONAL ‐ Daphné Kapfer, PREMIER LEAGUE ‐ Mathieu Moreuil, Head of
Managing Director ‐ European Public Policy ‐
[email protected] [email protected]
FERA ‐ Federation of European Film Directors, SPIO ‐ Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft
Pauline Durand‐Vialle, CEO ‐ (Association of the German Film Industry),
[email protected] Alfred Holighaus, President ‐
[email protected]
FIA ‐ International Federation of Actors, UNI‐MEI ‐ Uni Global Union Media
Dominick Luquer, Secretary General ‐ Entertainment and Arts, Johannes Studinger,
[email protected] Head of UNI‐MEI ‐
[email protected]
FIAD ‐ International Federation of Film
Distributors Associations, Nikolas Moschakis, UNIC ‐ International Federation of Cinemas,
Secretary General ‐
[email protected] Laura Houlgatte, CEO ‐ lhoulgatte@unic‐
cinemas.org
FIAPF ‐ International Federation of Film
Producers Associations, Benoît Ginisty, Director VPRT ‐ Association of Commercial Broadcasters
General ‐
[email protected] and Audiovisual Services, Julia Maier‐Hauff,
Senior Counsel European Affairs ‐
FSE ‐ Federation of Screenwriters in Europe,
[email protected]
David Kavanagh, Executive Officer ‐
[email protected]
Letter from the Audio-Visual Sector Coalition
Call to delete Country-of-Origin provisions in the proposed Broadcasters’ Regulation
and to reject compromises on scope
Brussels, 13 December 2017
Dear Minister Saar,
On Friday 8 December, the EU Council Presidency circulated a compromise proposal on the Proposal for
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright
and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and
retransmissions of television and radio programmes (“Compromise Proposal”) with a view to agreeing on
a General Approach at the COREPER I meeting of Friday 15 December.
The Compromise Proposal would apply the Country of Origin (CoO) principle to ancillary online services
offered by a broadcasting organisation of programmes (excluding sports events) which are: (a) produced
and financed exclusively by the broadcasting organisation, or (b) commissioned by the broadcasting
organisation where solely this organisation has the rights in these programmes for the purpose of
exploitation in their ancillary online service, or (c) co-produced by the broadcasting organisation with third
parties, with the exception of films and television series.
The entire audio-visual sector ranging from scriptwriters, authors, directors, performers and skilled
professionals through all business partners in production, marketing, broadcasting and distribution as
well as cinema operators and sports rights owners have been very clear and vocal in expressing their
position since the beginning of the debate around the application of the CoO principle to broadcasters’
ancillary online services: The provisions relevant to CoO (Articles 1.1a, 2 and 5 as well as Recitals 8-11,
15) must be deleted. By weakening the territoriality of copyright through the extension of the country of
origin principle to broadcasters’ online transmissions, together with the uncertainties stemming from an
ongoing competition case, the main effect will be a dramatic loss in industry’s capacity to invest in films
and quality TV programming which supports the local economy. This in turn would lead to a smaller
amount of less varied films and audiovisual content being available as well as higher prices for consumers.
The proposals on CoO will not achieve the stated goals and will act to the detriment of consumers and the
industry alike. See also the arguments set out in the AV sector letter of 16 October 2017 in annex hereto.
Our specific concerns about the Presidency Compromise Proposal are as follows:
Reducing the scope of application of the default CoO principle to certain types of content, including so-
called ‘commissioned’, ‘exclusively financed’, ‘co-’ or ‘own’ productions will not alleviate the negative
effects. While such amendments to Article 2 of the Proposed Regulation would arguably limit the scope
of application of the CoO principle, they would still negatively affect many productions and would not
mitigate the fundamental harm that would be caused by removing the territorial nature of copyright. The
fact that the Compromise Proposal stipulates that it would not establish any obligation for broadcasting
organisations to communicate or make available programmes in their ancillary online services or to
provide such ancillary online services in a Member State other than the Member State of their principal
establishment does not give us any comfort in this regard. The CoO principle would still remove the
territoriality of copyright and all copyright relevant acts would only take place in the Member State of the
broadcaster’s principal establishment. Hence, as soon as broadcasters would make programmes available
on their ancillary online service even in the Member State of principal establishment only, the territoriality
of these programmes will be affected, and producers and broadcasters will have no effective means to
preserve territorial exclusivity (see point 2 in the attached letter for more details) for the purposes of
raising production capital and ensuring the best local marketing and distribution in each Member State.
In more detail:
Excluding certain productions from the scope of application still keeps CoO as the default rule.
That means that the burden of proof that a certain production does not qualify as, ‘exclusively
financed’, ‘commissioned’ or ‘co-produced’ lies with the producer/right holder.
The terms ‘exclusively financed’, ‘commissioned’ or ‘co-produced’ are not harmonised legal terms
– nor should they be. In each Member State, these concepts differ, depending on local
regulations, terms of trade, and basically the commercial viability of each individual project.
Introducing these terms into a Regulation would lead to large scale legal and business uncertainty.
Moreover, co-productions and/or commissioned content often involve a territorial split of the
distribution rights between the broadcaster and the producer as part of the contractual
arrangements governing the sharing of responsibilities, financing and future recoupment.
Applying the CoO principle to such cases would expropriate producers’ benefits under such an
arrangement. The Compromise Proposal does not address this issue since it would be sufficient
that the broadcaster has exclusive rights in the programmes concerned “for the purpose of
exploitation in their ancillary online service” in the Member State of establishment of the
broadcaster. This means that the proposal would still significantly devalue the territorial exclusive
exploitation of all other rights retained by the producer and related to any exploitation other than
on the broadcaster’s ancillary online service (such as notably all primary online and on-demand
exploitation rights). European film, television series, drama and documentaries will be particularly
at risk as they rely on co-production schemes, which require partners to pool financial resources
by agreeing to focus their activities on specific markets.
In addition, the Proposed Regulation and the Compromise Proposals still suffer from a
fundamental flaw in that territorially exclusive arrangements – if agreed between the producer
and the broadcaster concerned – will still be subject to primary EU law, including competition law
and related, pending investigations.
Conclusion: The European Parliament has taken an important step by confirming the EP JURI Committee
Report as the European Parliament’s negotiating mandate for the tri-party negotiations. We hope to be
able to also count on the Member States’ support to resist against compromise proposals which would
erode territorial exclusivity and restrict commercial freedom. We therefore kindly urge you to reject any
compromise that would apply CoO licensing to certain productions even if limited to “exclusively
financed”/ “broadcasters’ commissioned productions”.
*****
Signatories
ACT - Association of Commercial Television in IFTA - Independent Film & Television Alliance,
Europe, Grégoire Polad, Director General - Jean Prewitt, CEO -
[email protected]
[email protected]
IVF - International Video Federation - Publishers
BUNDESLIGA - Stefan Brost, Head of EU Office - of Audiovisual Content on Digital Media and
[email protected] Online, Charlotte Lund Thomsen, Legal Counsel
-
[email protected]
CEPI - European Coordination of Independent
Producers, Elena Lai, Secretary General - LALIGA - The Spanish Football League
[email protected] Javier Tebas, President - contact: Laura Vilches -
[email protected]
EUROCINEMA - Association de Producteurs de
Cinéma et de Télévision, Yvon Thiec, General MEDIAPRO - Jaume Roures, Legal
Delegate -
[email protected] Representative Mediaproducción S.L.U.,
[email protected]
EUROPA DISTRIBUTION - European Network of
Independent Film Distributors, Christine Eloy, MPA - Motion Picture Association, Stan McCoy,
General Manager - christine.eloy@europa- President and Managing Director MPA EMEA -
distribution.org
[email protected]
EUROPA INTERNATIONAL - Daphné Kapfer, PREMIER LEAGUE - Mathieu Moreuil, Head of
Managing Director - European Public Policy -
[email protected] [email protected]
FERA - Federation of European Film Directors, SPIO - Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft
Pauline Durand-Vialle, CEO - (Association of the German Film Industry),
[email protected] Alfred Holighaus, President -
[email protected]
FIA - International Federation of Actors, UNI-MEI - Uni Global Union Media
Dominick Luquer, Secretary General - Entertainment and Arts, Johannes Studinger,
[email protected] Head of UNI-MEI -
[email protected]
FIAD - International Federation of Film
Distributors Associations, Nikolas Moschakis, UNIC - International Federation of Cinemas,
Secretary General -
[email protected] Laura Houlgatte, CEO - lhoulgatte@unic-
cinemas.org
FIAPF - International Federation of Film
Producers Associations - YBP - Benoît Ginisty, VPRT - Association of Commercial Broadcasters
Managing Director to FIAPF Headquarters - and Audiovisual Services, Julia Maier-Hauff,
[email protected] Senior Counsel European Affairs -
[email protected]
FSE - Federation of Screenwriters in Europe,
David Kavanagh, Executive Officer -
[email protected]