Saatja: Anna Pauliina Aavik <
[email protected]>
Saadetud: 12.11.2021 10:52
Adressaat: Andres Sutt <
[email protected]>; MKM info <
[email protected]>;
<
[email protected]>; <
[email protected]>
Koopia: Taivo Kendla <
[email protected]>
Teema: Kiire ja ülikiire internetiühendus Eestis, hinnad ja konkurents
Lugupeetud Hr Sutt ja Hr Kajak
Palun leidke manusest Tele2 Eesti AS pöördumine seoses kiire ja ülikiire
internetiühenduse kättesaadavusega Eestis.
Parimate soovidega,
Kind regards,
Anna Pauliina Aavik
Jurist / Lawyer
Äriturvalisuse ja Juriidiliste Suhete Osakond / Legal and Business
Security Department
Tele2 Eesti AS
Aadress: Valukoja 8, 11415 Tallinn, EstoniaTelefon: +372 5505576
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Andres Sutt Ettevõtlus- ja infotehnoloogiaminister Majandus - ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium Suur-Ameerika 1 Tallinn 10122
[email protected] [email protected] Kaur Kajak Tarbijakaitse ja Tehnilise Järelevalve amet Endla 10a Tallinn 10142
[email protected] [email protected] 1 2 .11.2021 nr 1-1/173 Kiire ja ülikiire internetiühendus Eestis, hinnad ja konkurents Lugupeetud Hr Sutt ja Hr Kajak Tele2 tervitab Teie ametiasutuste poolt peetud dialoogi seoses kiire ja ülikiire internetiühenduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasusega Eestis. MKM-i poolt 16.09.2021 kirjas nr 13-2/2021/5439-1 TTJA-le esitatud küsimused on hetkel Eesti ühiskonnas aktuaalsed ning vajavad arutamist. Eesti elanike vajadus kiire ja ülikiire internetiühenduse järele on aina tõusuteel, eelkõige võttes arvesse Covid-19 pandeemiast tingitud interneti tarbimise hüppelist kasvu, mis on näidanud kuivõrd oluline on kiire ja stabiilse internetiühenduse olemasolu tavakasutaja jaoks. Ülikiire, stabiilse ja taskukohase internetiühenduse olemasolu ja kättesaadavus tavakasutaja jaoks on kriitilise tähtsusega, et tagada ühiskonna digitaalne areng. Tänapäeva digitaalses ühiskonnas on oluline, et kõik otsused tehtaks vaatega tulevikku ning nii ka otsused, mis puudutavad internetiühenduse kättesaadavust ja taskukohasust lõpptarbijale, sest mis on täna sobilik ja vajalik, ei pruugi seda enam olla homme. Olles tutvunud TTJA poolt 15.10.2021 kirjas nr 17-2/21-11695-002 MKM-ile esitatud vastustega, soovime ka omalt poolt antud arutlusse panustada. Uuringufirma Civitta Eesti AS on käesoleva aasta oktoobris koostanud kaks analüüsi, mida soovime teiega antud kontekstis jagada, sest leiame, et antud analüüsid täiendavad TTJA poolt esitatud vastust. Esimene analüüs keskendub Telia lairibressursiteenus 3.0 hinnastamisele ning antud hinnastamise mõjule B2B ja B2C segmentide jaehindadele. Teine analüüs annab ülevaate Euroopa telekommunikatsiooniettevõtetes aset leidnud funktsionaalsest ehk funktsioonipõhisest eraldamisest ning kasust, mida selline eraldamine on antud riikidele ja nende riikide tarbijatele kaasa toonud. Loodame, et antud teema säilitab oma prioriteetsuse teie ametkondade töös ning me oleme omalt poolt nõus antud teemasse panustama, et tagada ülikiire, kvaliteetse ja tasukohase internetiühenduse kättesaadavus kõikidele Eesti elanikkondadele, sõltumata nende asukohast. Lugupidamisega Taivo Kendla Juhatuse liige Tele2 Eesti AS /Allkirjastatud digitaalselt/ Lisad: 1. Civitta Eesti AS-i poolt koostatud analüüs Telia lairibaressurssiteenus 3.0 hinnastamine 2. Civitta Eesti AS-i poolt koostatud ülevaade funktsioonipõhise eraldamise näidetest telekommunikatsiooni ettevõtetes Euroopas
TELIA 3.0 PRICING
ANALYSIS
2021
• Information Classification: Internal
REDUCING THE WHOLESALE PRICING HAS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT DROP IN B2B
RETAIL INTERNET PRICING, HOWEVER PROBLEMS REMAIN IN B2C SEGMENT
MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2B SEGMENT*, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES, B2B, EUR
51% 49% Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2
• With Telia’s new 3.0
44% wholesale solution and 80
37% pricing, it is possible for other -43%
50 Mbit/s 46
operators to offer fixed 35
internet services to business
clients 195
-49%
100 Mbit/s 100
• This has resulted in a 50
significant drop in B2B retail
fixed internet pricing as well 495
-56%
50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s Weighted as increased competition 300 Mbit/s 220
125
MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2C SEGMENT**, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES, B2B, EUR
• With Telia’s new 3.0 22
wholesale solution and 0%
50 Mbit/s 22
-27% pricing, it is still impossible
-56% for other operators to offer
retail fixed internet services 25
-70% 0%
100 Mbit/s 25
to consumers 25
• This has resulted in a no
improvements in competition 33
0%
-136% 300 Mbit/s 33
or the pricing for the end
31
50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s Weighted consumer
* 1.75x overbooking for multi-dwelling units ** 4.0x overbooking for multi-dwelling units 2
• Information Classification: Internal
AGENDA
1. PRE-STORY
2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
3. RESULTS
• Information Classification: Internal
ON AVERAGE, ESTONIANS HAVE SLOWER FIXED BROADBAND SPEEDS THAN THE
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
Up to 50 Mbit/s
50 – 75 Mbit/s
76 – 100 Mbit/s
Over 100 Mbit/s 89
128 137 63
64
101
104
Keskmine kaabelinterneti allalaadimiskiirus, Mbit/s, aprill 2020 Allikas: Speedtest.net Global Index
4
• Information Classification: Internal
COVERAGE OF ULTRAFAST FIXED BROADBAND IS ACTUALLY GOOD IN ESTONIA BUT THE
TAKE-UP OF FAST INTERNET IS EXTREMELY LOW
• Current take-up of ultrafast broadband is only 11% of Estonian households (2018), far off from the
Estonian Digital Agenda target of 60% for 2020
• Estonian ultrafast broadband take-up is one of the worst in the EU despite the coverage being
amongst the best in the EU
• Fixed broadband market is predominantly owned by Telia due to the acquisition of AS Eesti Telekom
90%
Estonian Digital Agenda target (60%)
84% 83%
Ultrafast broadband coverage (2018)
Ultrafast broadband take-up (2018)
61% 60%
58%
54%
32% 29%
21% 20%
11%
Latvia Lithuania Finland Sweden Estonia EU Avg
5
• Information Classification: Internal
IT TURNS OUT THAT IN REALITY THE FIXED BROADBAND PRICES ARE VERY HIGH,
CAUSING THE LOW TAKE-UP OF FAST INTERNET
• Incumbent operator’s (Telia) fixed broadband retail prices are 2-5 times higher than in the
neighbouring countries
• In the ultrafast segment, Telia’s prices are among the highest in Europe, which is strongly
affecting the take-up of higher speed fixed broadband
• High prices in the fast and ultrafast segments indicate that effective competition does not take
place in the Estonian fixed broadband market
437
B2C retail avg ultrafast price EUR (2019)
B2B retail avg ultrafast price EUR (2019)
What are the main
98
reasons for high fixed
60
73 71
57
82
broadband prices for end
46
30 26
34 36
customers?
Latvia Lithuania Finland Sweden Estonia EU Avg
6
• Information Classification: Internal
AGENDA
1. PRE-STORY
2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
3. RESULTS
• Information Classification: Internal
HIGH RETAIL PRICES ARE A RESULT OF LOW COMPETITION AND HIGH WHOLESALE
PRICES
• Telia is one of the strongest incumbents in Europe, inheriting the infrastructure from the government, and
thus having significant market power and little competition
• Telia is keeping high wholesale prices and applies illegal predatory pricing and margin squeeze measures on
wholesale access services to keep other operators from using the service
• Low or negative margins between wholesale and retail products keep other operators away from the
market, allowing Telia to continue high retail pricing
• As a result, competition is suffering and Estonian ultrafast broadband take-up is among the worst in the EU
INCUMBENT OPERATOR WHOLESALE PRICE
297
50 Mbit/s wholesale price
500 Mbit/s wholesale price
59 55
50 50
35
27
15 19 19
10 11
Latvia Lithuania Finland Denmark Estonia EU Avg
8
• Information Classification: Internal
WHOLESALE PRICING SHOULD ENABLE OTHER OPERATORS TO PROVIDE THE FIXED
INTERNET SERVICES TO END CUSTOMERS WITHOUT MAKING A LOSS
• In a fair competition environment, the incumbent operator should not apply predatory pricing and margin
squeeze measures
• The cost of offering fixed internet services for other operators, using the incumbents network at wholesale
price level, should be lower than the actual price (BTL) paid by the end customer
Revenue
Indirect Costs
Direct Costs
Infrastructure Costs
PREDATORY PRICING MARGIN SQUEEZE FAIR COMPETITION
APPLIED APPLIED ENVIRONMENT
9
• Information Classification: Internal
AGENDA
1. PRE-STORY
2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
3. RESULTS
• Information Classification: Internal
IN B2B SEGMENT, REDUCED WHOLESALE PRICING HAS INTRODUCED MORE
COMPETITION AND SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER PRICES TO THE CONSUMER
MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2B SEGMENT, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES SINCE THE
No overbooking 2x overbooking 3x overbooking INTRODUCTION OF NEW 3.0 PRICING, B2B, EUR
Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2
51% 53% 50% 52%
46% 46% 45% 47%
41% 39%
38% 34% 36% 80
31% 33%
30% 29% -43%
26%
50 Mbit/s 46
35
4%
-1%
-8% 195
-15% -16% -49%
100 Mbit/s 100
-32% 50
10 Mbit/s 20 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s 500 Mbit/s 1000 Mbit/s Weighted
• With Telia’s new 3.0 wholesale solution and pricing, it is possible for other operators to offer fixed 495
internet services to business clients -56%
• Only on lower speeds it is currently impossible for other operators to offer fixed internet using 300 Mbit/s 220
the wholesale service
125
• The margins on higher speeds are rather healthy which will potentially reduce the high prices that
the end customers in B2B segment are charged with today
13
• Information Classification: Internal
IN B2C SEGMENT, NEW WHOLESALE PRICING IS STILL UNATTRACTIVE AND, HENCE, THE
COMPETITIVE SITUATION AND RETAIL PRICING HAVE NOT IMPROVED
MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2C SEGMENT, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES SINCE THE
2x overbooking 4x overbooking 6x overbooking INTRODUCTION OF NEW 3.0 PRICING, B2C, EUR
Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2
-15% -10% -17%
-11%
-21%
-30% -27%
-32% 22
-43% -48% 0%
-56% 50 Mbit/s 22
-62%
-70%
-77%
-91%
-127% -126%
-136% -133% 25
-153% 0%
-162%
-172% 100 Mbit/s 25
-183%
25
-214%
10 Mbit/s 20 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s 500 Mbit/s 1000 Mbit/s Weighted
33
• With Telia’s new 3.0 wholesale solution and pricing, it is still impossible for other operators to 0%
offer retail fixed internet services to consumers using the wholesale solution 300 Mbit/s 33
• The situation is especially worrisome on higher speeds where serious pricing reform is needed
for the wholesale solution in B2C segment 31
14
• Information Classification: Internal
OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN
PRACTICES OF VERTICAL
SEPARATION IN TELCO
MARKETS
20.10. 2021
• Information Classification: Internal
VERTICAL SEPARATION IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A SOLUTION TO REDUCE DISCRIMINATION
IN WHOLESALE PRICING
PROBLEMS WITH VERTICALLY INTEGRATED OPERATORS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Vertically integrated operators with significant market power (SMP) may have incentives to discriminate in favour
of their own retail services. For example, by applying better wholesale prices internally or by giving their retail
services access to more or better information or systems.
“The most sweeping change is a full
structural separation, which entails
creating two distinct legal entities.
NRA’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING COMPETITION Historically, most such splits have been the
consequence of government action, as a
way for regulators to address perceived
STEP 1 deep-rooted market inefficiencies resulting
from having one entity, often the former
IMPOSING A NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION to prevent such behaviour in the form of either equivalence of
state-run monopoly, dominate the telco
inputs (EoI) or equivalence of outputs (EoO).
market.”
• EoI: exactly the same products, prices and processes are offered to competitors as to the SMP operator’s own
- from McKinsey’s 2020 study on
retail arm.
European Telco market1
• EoO: products offered by the SMP operator to alternative operators and to its own retail business are
comparable in terms of functionality and price, although different systems and processes may be used.
STEP 2
IMPOSING A MODEL OF SEPARATION on the vertically integrated incumbent to ensure compliance with non-
discrimination.
• Different models of separation: accounting, virtual, functional, legal and structural separation*
* See further information about models of separation in the Annex. 1 McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 2
• Information Classification: Internal
EFFECTIVE VERTICAL SEPARATION IS IMPLEMENTED IN SEVEN EU COMPANIES, EITHER
RESULTING FROM NEW INVESTOR STRATEGY OR NRA PRESSURE
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF SEPARATION
NON-
FORM OF INFRA- SUPERVISORY
CAUSE OF SEPARATION RETAIL DISCRIMINA-
SEPARATION* STRUCTURE COMMITTE
TION
IRELAND Functional Agreement with NRA to settle disputes open eir eir
✓ EoI and EoO
CZECH
REPUBLIC
Legal Post-acquisition strategy CETIN O2
General
DENMARK Legal Post-acquisition strategy TDC Net Nuuday
EoO
ICELAND Legal Result of a regulatory settlement with NRA Mila Siminn
✓ EoI
Voluntary after a long tightening of regulatory TIM
ITALY Functional
conditions wholesale
TIM retail
✓ EoI and EoO
Voluntary separation after explicit NRA pressure Orange Orange
POLAND Functional EoO
(regulatory proceedings started for imposed separation) wholesale retail
✓
Voluntary separation after explicit NRA pressure (plans
UK Legal Openreach BT EoI
for formal notification to the EC)
PAST EXAMPLE OF SEPARATION
In 2008, Telia voluntarily separated its access network through Skanova, which was seen as a move to pre-
empt a possible imposition of functional separation by NRA. In 2010, the NRA applied the full set of
Legal
SWEDEN remedies to Telia’s copper- and fibre-based access products despite the voluntary legal separation. Telia EoI and EoO
(2008-2016)
re-integrated Skanova as part of its larger wholesale organization in 2016, after NRA had confirmed
Telia’s compliance with EoI under new, stricter non-discrimination measures implemented in 2015.
* Legal separation - separate legal entity remaining under the same overall ownership, physically separated staff, systems and processes; Structural separation - separate legal entity with different ownership Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation,
equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 3
• Information Classification: Internal
NRA PRESSURE EXAMPLE 1. POLISH SEPARATION OCCURRED AFTER NRA’S
INVESTIGATION AND ENTAILS REGULAR MONITORING AND COOPERATION
HISTORY OF SEPARATION CURRENT STATE
1) In December 2008, UKE (Polish NRA) launched an Functional separation model | OPL has a wholesale department that provides
administrative proceeding to impose the separation regulated wholesale services both to OPL’s retail arm and also to ANOs. OPL applies
obligation on The Polish incumbent, Orange Polska (OPL) to the following non-discrimination mechanisms:
address the complaints from ANOs and prevent OPL’s • Physically separated wholesale department
potentially discriminatory practices at wholesale level.
• Located separately from the company’s headquarters, in another city
2) OPL reacted in March 2009 by proposing a voluntary model
• Separate management, employees and IT systems
of separation based on equivalence of access citing this as a
• Department is led by an Executive Director who holds an independent
better and cheaper alternative to UKE’s proposed separation
model. Proposed measures by OPL included: position within OPL’s Management Board
• Separate remuneration incentives system
• separate management structure and incentives for the
• A code of conduct
wholesale division
• EoO, in combination with a system of KPIs for non-discrimination
• code of conduct and a system of trainings
• KPIs to measure non-discrimination are reported monthly for the market
• EoO and quarterly for UKE.
• Chinese walls and IT systems access profiles • UKE also uses Time-To-Market (TTM) procedure, and the margin squeeze
• KPIs for non-discrimination between ANOs and OPL’s
and price squeeze tests. TMM applies when OPL introduces a retail service
based on a regulated wholesale service or a commercial wholesale service.
retail division
90 days before launching the spervice, OPL must provide ANOs with the
• establishing both an external and internal oversight information to them to create a competitive retail offer based on OPL’s
body wholesale service.
3) New non-discrimination model agreed in October 2009. It • ANOs also have the right to conduct inspections and checks on whether
included some of the measures proposed by OPL but did not OPL’s wholesale department provides regulated wholesale services under
foresee the establishment of a separate supervisory the same conditions as those provided for OPL’s equivalent retail services.
committee. OPL is obliged to submit signed protocols from such inspections to UKE.
Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 4
• Information Classification: Internal
NRA PRESSURE EXAMPLE 2. IRISH SEPARATION WAS A COMPROMISE TO SETTLE NON-
COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS AND ENTAILED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERVISORY BODY
HISTORY OF SEPARATION CURRENT STATE
1) Before December 2018, ComReg (Irish NRA) launched Functional separation model | open eir, the wholesale unit of the Irish incumbent eir,
two separate sets of proceedings against eir, the Irish provides access services to both its retail arm and also to ANOs. Specifically, eir’s
incumbent. Eir was charged with five incidences of compromise agreement with ComReg entailed:
alleged non-compliance with wholesale obligations, and • Creating an independent oversight body (IOB) responsible for the compliance of eir’s
an additional nine ongoing compliance cases. regulatory obligations
2) In December 2018, as a compromise to settle the • IOB is a committee jointly established by ComReg and eir, composing of 5
proceedings, eir reached an agreement with ComReg to: members (3 from NRA and 2 from air). eir must ensure that the IOB has sufficient
• create an independent oversight body (IOB) resources to commission reviews, or justify its refusal to do so to NRA. IOB’s
initial term is 5 years after which eir will be entitled to replace it with a
• increase the independence and transparency committee of executive or non-executive directors.
• establish a new regulatory governance model • IOB is charged with supervising, recommending, reviewing and reporting
(RGM) • Increase in the independence and transparency of its wholesale unit, open eir
• establish and maintain a regulatory code of • Eir created a wholesale senior management team and a separate wholesale
practice pricing function. Personnel in the new function are located separately. All
3) In May 2019, IOB was established as a new body with remuneration incentives will reflect only the achievements of the wholesale unit.
supervision responsibilities that will monitor Eir’s • However, the wholesale function will not be a separate legal entity, and overall
compliance with the governance commitments. It also strategic decisions will continue to be set at Group level in accordance with the
ensures that the incumbent adheres to its regulatory decisions made by eir’s Board.
obligations in general, as imposed by ComReg’s • Establishing a new regulatory governance model (RGM) to ensure its future
decisions. compliance with wholesale non-discrimination and transparency obligations
• Combining regulatory and compliance risk management with internal audits
whose head will report directly to IOB.
• Establishing and maintain a regulatory code of practice
Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 5
• Information Classification: Internal
INVESTOR STRATEGY EXAMPLE. CZECH SEPARATION CREATED VALUE BOTH FOR ITS
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE SOCIETY AT LARGE
HISTORY OF SEPARATION1 RESULTS FROM SEPARATION2
BACKGROUND: PPF Group is an international private equity VALUE FOR SHAREHOLDERS
company founded in the Czech Republic in 1991. Greatly increased market capitalization and return on capital for retail arm
1) 4Q 2013: PPF acquired the Czech incumbent (O2 Czech
Republic) from Telefonica Group COMBINED MARKET CAPITALIZATION, CZK Bn O2 RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL, %
2) 4Q 2014: PPF informed the NRA about its intention to
O2 136 131 33 30
121 120 29 28
establish the retail-only and wholesale-only businesses CETIN
84 83 77 +82%
72 67 67 +125% 16
3) 1Q 2015: PPF publicly announced the legal separation 30 10
4) 2Q 2015: Start of operation of the newly separated
54 54 54 54 54
companies, CETIN (wholesale) and O2 (retail)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2012 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
• CETIN operates and manages fixed and mobile
infrastructure in the Czech Republic, as well as transit VALUE FOR SOCIETY
infrastructure abroad. It has no retail customers. Greatly increased broadband investments and faster speeds
• O2 is a retail-only provider, without any fixed CETIN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, Bn CZK CETIN FIXED ACCESS NETWORK TAKE UP
infrastructure but with mobile licences and exchanges. 4,1 BY SPEED, % SHARE OF SUBSCRIBERS
• NB! PPF took CETIN private but kept O2 publicly 3,5 3,6 10 20 > 250 Mbps
listed. 20
2,5 +44% 20 56-100 Mbps
5) 3Q 2015: NRA decision on remedies imposed KPIs and EoI on 70
CETIN as a result of market analyses undertaken before the
separation. Then, NRA started the next market review because 55
50 16-56 Mbps
of the new market situation.
6) 1Q 2018: NRA decision on remedies (M3a, M3b, M4)
30
15 10 < 16 Mbps
removed obligations from CETIN to provide KPI and EoI 2014 2016 2018 2019E 2015 2018 2020F
Sources: 1 Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 2 McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 6
• Information Classification: Internal
SEPARATION IS LIKELY TO BRING BENEFITS TO THE CONSUMER, SOCIETY AS WELL AS
THE NEW, FOCUSED BUSINESS UNITS THEMSELVES
Lower likelihood of conducting discriminatory practices through better-aligned incentives and increased monitoring and
1 reporting activities
2 Increased competition on retail level driving down prices and increasing high-speed take-up
Potential regulatory relief for the separated SMP wholesale and retail units, driving down costs and increasing pricing
3 flexibility for the retail arm
4 Greater addressable market for the carrier-neutral wholesale unit and better investments aligned with the real market demand
Cheaper access to capital due to clearly defined business models: 1) Wholesale unit can better attract long-term infrastructure
5 investors; 2) Retail unit can better attract investors looking for higher risk-adjusted returns
6 Sharper management focus as wholesale has a lot longer investment cycles and strategies than quickly changing retail market
Better suited for a 5G world as an independent wholesale unit is better positioned to carry the increased total cost of network
7 ownership and increased network sharing 5G is very likely to prompt.
Source: CIVITTA analysis and McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 7
• Information Classification: Internal
ANNEX. POSSIBLE MODELS OF SEPARATION IDENTIFIED BY OFCOM (NRA OF UK)
MODEL OF SEPARATION DESCRIPTION
Separate financial reporting, with costs and revenues of the upstream and downstream products allocated into different
Accounting separation
baskets
Creation of a wholesale division A separate wholesale division established to supply inputs to competitors but without equivalence of access
Virtual separation Services offered to internal and external customers on equal terms, without any physical separation of the businesses
Functional separation Physical separation of the business and its processes, e.g. location, staff, branding, management information systems
Functional separation with local
Functional separation with separate governance and different management incentives to those of the wider firm
incentives
Functional separation with
Creation of a divisional Board with non-executive members who act independently from the group Board
independent governance
Upstream business is established as a separate legal entity within the wider group but remains under the same overall
Legal separation
ownership
Split of the vertically integrated operations into separate legal entities, with no significant common ownership and ‘line-
Structural separation
of-business’ restrictions to prevent them re-entering each other’s markets
Source: Ofcom (2016). Strengthening Openreach’s strategic and operational independence . Proposal for comment. 8
• Information Classification: Internal