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Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium · 12. november 2021
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1.15-5/2021/6706-1
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12. november 2021
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Tele2 Eesti AS
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1.15/S Avalikkussuhete korraldamine
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1.15-5/S Teabenõuded, selgitustaotlused, märgukirjad
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1.15-5/2021
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Liisi Moks (Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Kantsleri valdkond, Digiarengu valdkond, Sideosakond)
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12. detsember 2021

Failid

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Saatja: Anna Pauliina Aavik <[email protected]> Saadetud: 12.11.2021 10:52 Adressaat: Andres Sutt <[email protected]>; MKM info <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; <[email protected]> Koopia: Taivo Kendla <[email protected]> Teema: Kiire ja ülikiire internetiühendus Eestis, hinnad ja konkurents Lugupeetud Hr Sutt ja Hr Kajak Palun leidke manusest Tele2 Eesti AS pöördumine seoses kiire ja ülikiire internetiühenduse kättesaadavusega Eestis. Parimate soovidega, Kind regards, Anna Pauliina Aavik Jurist / Lawyer Äriturvalisuse ja Juriidiliste Suhete Osakond / Legal and Business Security Department Tele2 Eesti AS Aadress: Valukoja 8, 11415 Tallinn, EstoniaTelefon: +372 5505576 Kes me oleme? Jälgi meid WeAreTele2 | | ******** IMPORTANT NOTICE ********The content of this e-mail is intended for the addressee(s) only and may contain information that is confidential and/or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any copying, distribution or any other use or dissemination of the information contained in this e-mail (and its attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, kindly notify the sender immediately by replying to this e-mail and delete the e-mail and any copies thereof.Tele2 AB (publ) and its subsidiaries (Tele2 Group) accepts no responsibility for the consequences of any viruses, corruption or other interference transmitted by e-mail. Andres Sutt Ettevõtlus- ja infotehnoloogiaminister Majandus - ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium Suur-Ameerika 1 Tallinn 10122 [email protected] [email protected] Kaur Kajak Tarbijakaitse ja Tehnilise Järelevalve amet Endla 10a Tallinn 10142 [email protected] [email protected] 1 2 .11.2021 nr 1-1/173 Kiire ja ülikiire internetiühendus Eestis, hinnad ja konkurents Lugupeetud Hr Sutt ja Hr Kajak Tele2 tervitab Teie ametiasutuste poolt peetud dialoogi seoses kiire ja ülikiire internetiühenduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasusega Eestis. MKM-i poolt 16.09.2021 kirjas nr 13-2/2021/5439-1 TTJA-le esitatud küsimused on hetkel Eesti ühiskonnas aktuaalsed ning vajavad arutamist. Eesti elanike vajadus kiire ja ülikiire internetiühenduse järele on aina tõusuteel, eelkõige võttes arvesse Covid-19 pandeemiast tingitud interneti tarbimise hüppelist kasvu, mis on näidanud kuivõrd oluline on kiire ja stabiilse internetiühenduse olemasolu tavakasutaja jaoks. Ülikiire, stabiilse ja taskukohase internetiühenduse olemasolu ja kättesaadavus tavakasutaja jaoks on kriitilise tähtsusega, et tagada ühiskonna digitaalne areng. Tänapäeva digitaalses ühiskonnas on oluline, et kõik otsused tehtaks vaatega tulevikku ning nii ka otsused, mis puudutavad internetiühenduse kättesaadavust ja taskukohasust lõpptarbijale, sest mis on täna sobilik ja vajalik, ei pruugi seda enam olla homme. Olles tutvunud TTJA poolt 15.10.2021 kirjas nr 17-2/21-11695-002 MKM-ile esitatud vastustega, soovime ka omalt poolt antud arutlusse panustada. Uuringufirma Civitta Eesti AS on käesoleva aasta oktoobris koostanud kaks analüüsi, mida soovime teiega antud kontekstis jagada, sest leiame, et antud analüüsid täiendavad TTJA poolt esitatud vastust. Esimene analüüs keskendub Telia lairibressursiteenus 3.0 hinnastamisele ning antud hinnastamise mõjule B2B ja B2C segmentide jaehindadele. Teine analüüs annab ülevaate Euroopa telekommunikatsiooniettevõtetes aset leidnud funktsionaalsest ehk funktsioonipõhisest eraldamisest ning kasust, mida selline eraldamine on antud riikidele ja nende riikide tarbijatele kaasa toonud. Loodame, et antud teema säilitab oma prioriteetsuse teie ametkondade töös ning me oleme omalt poolt nõus antud teemasse panustama, et tagada ülikiire, kvaliteetse ja tasukohase internetiühenduse kättesaadavus kõikidele Eesti elanikkondadele, sõltumata nende asukohast. Lugupidamisega Taivo Kendla Juhatuse liige Tele2 Eesti AS /Allkirjastatud digitaalselt/ Lisad: 1. Civitta Eesti AS-i poolt koostatud analüüs Telia lairibaressurssiteenus 3.0 hinnastamine 2. Civitta Eesti AS-i poolt koostatud ülevaade funktsioonipõhise eraldamise näidetest telekommunikatsiooni ettevõtetes Euroopas TELIA 3.0 PRICING ANALYSIS 2021 • Information Classification: Internal REDUCING THE WHOLESALE PRICING HAS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT DROP IN B2B RETAIL INTERNET PRICING, HOWEVER PROBLEMS REMAIN IN B2C SEGMENT MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2B SEGMENT*, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES, B2B, EUR 51% 49% Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2 • With Telia’s new 3.0 44% wholesale solution and 80 37% pricing, it is possible for other -43% 50 Mbit/s 46 operators to offer fixed 35 internet services to business clients 195 -49% 100 Mbit/s 100 • This has resulted in a 50 significant drop in B2B retail fixed internet pricing as well 495 -56% 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s Weighted as increased competition 300 Mbit/s 220 125 MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2C SEGMENT**, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES, B2B, EUR • With Telia’s new 3.0 22 wholesale solution and 0% 50 Mbit/s 22 -27% pricing, it is still impossible -56% for other operators to offer retail fixed internet services 25 -70% 0% 100 Mbit/s 25 to consumers 25 • This has resulted in a no improvements in competition 33 0% -136% 300 Mbit/s 33 or the pricing for the end 31 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s Weighted consumer * 1.75x overbooking for multi-dwelling units ** 4.0x overbooking for multi-dwelling units 2 • Information Classification: Internal AGENDA 1. PRE-STORY 2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 3. RESULTS • Information Classification: Internal ON AVERAGE, ESTONIANS HAVE SLOWER FIXED BROADBAND SPEEDS THAN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES Up to 50 Mbit/s 50 – 75 Mbit/s 76 – 100 Mbit/s Over 100 Mbit/s 89 128 137 63 64 101 104 Keskmine kaabelinterneti allalaadimiskiirus, Mbit/s, aprill 2020 Allikas: Speedtest.net Global Index 4 • Information Classification: Internal COVERAGE OF ULTRAFAST FIXED BROADBAND IS ACTUALLY GOOD IN ESTONIA BUT THE TAKE-UP OF FAST INTERNET IS EXTREMELY LOW • Current take-up of ultrafast broadband is only 11% of Estonian households (2018), far off from the Estonian Digital Agenda target of 60% for 2020 • Estonian ultrafast broadband take-up is one of the worst in the EU despite the coverage being amongst the best in the EU • Fixed broadband market is predominantly owned by Telia due to the acquisition of AS Eesti Telekom 90% Estonian Digital Agenda target (60%) 84% 83% Ultrafast broadband coverage (2018) Ultrafast broadband take-up (2018) 61% 60% 58% 54% 32% 29% 21% 20% 11% Latvia Lithuania Finland Sweden Estonia EU Avg 5 • Information Classification: Internal IT TURNS OUT THAT IN REALITY THE FIXED BROADBAND PRICES ARE VERY HIGH, CAUSING THE LOW TAKE-UP OF FAST INTERNET • Incumbent operator’s (Telia) fixed broadband retail prices are 2-5 times higher than in the neighbouring countries • In the ultrafast segment, Telia’s prices are among the highest in Europe, which is strongly affecting the take-up of higher speed fixed broadband • High prices in the fast and ultrafast segments indicate that effective competition does not take place in the Estonian fixed broadband market 437 B2C retail avg ultrafast price EUR (2019) B2B retail avg ultrafast price EUR (2019) What are the main 98 reasons for high fixed 60 73 71 57 82 broadband prices for end 46 30 26 34 36 customers? Latvia Lithuania Finland Sweden Estonia EU Avg 6 • Information Classification: Internal AGENDA 1. PRE-STORY 2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 3. RESULTS • Information Classification: Internal HIGH RETAIL PRICES ARE A RESULT OF LOW COMPETITION AND HIGH WHOLESALE PRICES • Telia is one of the strongest incumbents in Europe, inheriting the infrastructure from the government, and thus having significant market power and little competition • Telia is keeping high wholesale prices and applies illegal predatory pricing and margin squeeze measures on wholesale access services to keep other operators from using the service • Low or negative margins between wholesale and retail products keep other operators away from the market, allowing Telia to continue high retail pricing • As a result, competition is suffering and Estonian ultrafast broadband take-up is among the worst in the EU INCUMBENT OPERATOR WHOLESALE PRICE 297 50 Mbit/s wholesale price 500 Mbit/s wholesale price 59 55 50 50 35 27 15 19 19 10 11 Latvia Lithuania Finland Denmark Estonia EU Avg 8 • Information Classification: Internal WHOLESALE PRICING SHOULD ENABLE OTHER OPERATORS TO PROVIDE THE FIXED INTERNET SERVICES TO END CUSTOMERS WITHOUT MAKING A LOSS • In a fair competition environment, the incumbent operator should not apply predatory pricing and margin squeeze measures • The cost of offering fixed internet services for other operators, using the incumbents network at wholesale price level, should be lower than the actual price (BTL) paid by the end customer Revenue Indirect Costs Direct Costs Infrastructure Costs PREDATORY PRICING MARGIN SQUEEZE FAIR COMPETITION APPLIED APPLIED ENVIRONMENT 9 • Information Classification: Internal AGENDA 1. PRE-STORY 2. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 3. RESULTS • Information Classification: Internal IN B2B SEGMENT, REDUCED WHOLESALE PRICING HAS INTRODUCED MORE COMPETITION AND SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER PRICES TO THE CONSUMER MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2B SEGMENT, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES SINCE THE No overbooking 2x overbooking 3x overbooking INTRODUCTION OF NEW 3.0 PRICING, B2B, EUR Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2 51% 53% 50% 52% 46% 46% 45% 47% 41% 39% 38% 34% 36% 80 31% 33% 30% 29% -43% 26% 50 Mbit/s 46 35 4% -1% -8% 195 -15% -16% -49% 100 Mbit/s 100 -32% 50 10 Mbit/s 20 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s 500 Mbit/s 1000 Mbit/s Weighted • With Telia’s new 3.0 wholesale solution and pricing, it is possible for other operators to offer fixed 495 internet services to business clients -56% • Only on lower speeds it is currently impossible for other operators to offer fixed internet using 300 Mbit/s 220 the wholesale service 125 • The margins on higher speeds are rather healthy which will potentially reduce the high prices that the end customers in B2B segment are charged with today 13 • Information Classification: Internal IN B2C SEGMENT, NEW WHOLESALE PRICING IS STILL UNATTRACTIVE AND, HENCE, THE COMPETITIVE SITUATION AND RETAIL PRICING HAVE NOT IMPROVED MARGIN SQUEEZE TEST FOR B2C SEGMENT, ESTIMATED PROFITABILITY % RETAIL FIXED INTERNET PRICES SINCE THE 2x overbooking 4x overbooking 6x overbooking INTRODUCTION OF NEW 3.0 PRICING, B2C, EUR Telia (old) Telia (new) Tele2 -15% -10% -17% -11% -21% -30% -27% -32% 22 -43% -48% 0% -56% 50 Mbit/s 22 -62% -70% -77% -91% -127% -126% -136% -133% 25 -153% 0% -162% -172% 100 Mbit/s 25 -183% 25 -214% 10 Mbit/s 20 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s 300 Mbit/s 500 Mbit/s 1000 Mbit/s Weighted 33 • With Telia’s new 3.0 wholesale solution and pricing, it is still impossible for other operators to 0% offer retail fixed internet services to consumers using the wholesale solution 300 Mbit/s 33 • The situation is especially worrisome on higher speeds where serious pricing reform is needed for the wholesale solution in B2C segment 31 14 • Information Classification: Internal OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN PRACTICES OF VERTICAL SEPARATION IN TELCO MARKETS 20.10. 2021 • Information Classification: Internal VERTICAL SEPARATION IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A SOLUTION TO REDUCE DISCRIMINATION IN WHOLESALE PRICING PROBLEMS WITH VERTICALLY INTEGRATED OPERATORS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY Vertically integrated operators with significant market power (SMP) may have incentives to discriminate in favour of their own retail services. For example, by applying better wholesale prices internally or by giving their retail services access to more or better information or systems. “The most sweeping change is a full structural separation, which entails creating two distinct legal entities. NRA’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING COMPETITION Historically, most such splits have been the consequence of government action, as a way for regulators to address perceived STEP 1 deep-rooted market inefficiencies resulting from having one entity, often the former IMPOSING A NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION to prevent such behaviour in the form of either equivalence of state-run monopoly, dominate the telco inputs (EoI) or equivalence of outputs (EoO). market.” • EoI: exactly the same products, prices and processes are offered to competitors as to the SMP operator’s own - from McKinsey’s 2020 study on retail arm. European Telco market1 • EoO: products offered by the SMP operator to alternative operators and to its own retail business are comparable in terms of functionality and price, although different systems and processes may be used. STEP 2 IMPOSING A MODEL OF SEPARATION on the vertically integrated incumbent to ensure compliance with non- discrimination. • Different models of separation: accounting, virtual, functional, legal and structural separation* * See further information about models of separation in the Annex. 1 McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 2 • Information Classification: Internal EFFECTIVE VERTICAL SEPARATION IS IMPLEMENTED IN SEVEN EU COMPANIES, EITHER RESULTING FROM NEW INVESTOR STRATEGY OR NRA PRESSURE CURRENT EXAMPLES OF SEPARATION NON- FORM OF INFRA- SUPERVISORY CAUSE OF SEPARATION RETAIL DISCRIMINA- SEPARATION* STRUCTURE COMMITTE TION IRELAND Functional Agreement with NRA to settle disputes open eir eir ✓ EoI and EoO CZECH REPUBLIC Legal Post-acquisition strategy CETIN O2  General DENMARK Legal Post-acquisition strategy TDC Net Nuuday  EoO ICELAND Legal Result of a regulatory settlement with NRA Mila Siminn ✓ EoI Voluntary after a long tightening of regulatory TIM ITALY Functional conditions wholesale TIM retail ✓ EoI and EoO  Voluntary separation after explicit NRA pressure Orange Orange POLAND Functional EoO (regulatory proceedings started for imposed separation) wholesale retail ✓ Voluntary separation after explicit NRA pressure (plans UK Legal Openreach BT EoI for formal notification to the EC) PAST EXAMPLE OF SEPARATION In 2008, Telia voluntarily separated its access network through Skanova, which was seen as a move to pre- empt a possible imposition of functional separation by NRA. In 2010, the NRA applied the full set of Legal SWEDEN remedies to Telia’s copper- and fibre-based access products despite the voluntary legal separation. Telia EoI and EoO (2008-2016) re-integrated Skanova as part of its larger wholesale organization in 2016, after NRA had confirmed Telia’s compliance with EoI under new, stricter non-discrimination measures implemented in 2015. * Legal separation - separate legal entity remaining under the same overall ownership, physically separated staff, systems and processes; Structural separation - separate legal entity with different ownership Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 3 • Information Classification: Internal NRA PRESSURE EXAMPLE 1. POLISH SEPARATION OCCURRED AFTER NRA’S INVESTIGATION AND ENTAILS REGULAR MONITORING AND COOPERATION HISTORY OF SEPARATION CURRENT STATE 1) In December 2008, UKE (Polish NRA) launched an Functional separation model | OPL has a wholesale department that provides administrative proceeding to impose the separation regulated wholesale services both to OPL’s retail arm and also to ANOs. OPL applies obligation on The Polish incumbent, Orange Polska (OPL) to the following non-discrimination mechanisms: address the complaints from ANOs and prevent OPL’s • Physically separated wholesale department potentially discriminatory practices at wholesale level. • Located separately from the company’s headquarters, in another city 2) OPL reacted in March 2009 by proposing a voluntary model • Separate management, employees and IT systems of separation based on equivalence of access citing this as a • Department is led by an Executive Director who holds an independent better and cheaper alternative to UKE’s proposed separation model. Proposed measures by OPL included: position within OPL’s Management Board • Separate remuneration incentives system • separate management structure and incentives for the • A code of conduct wholesale division • EoO, in combination with a system of KPIs for non-discrimination • code of conduct and a system of trainings • KPIs to measure non-discrimination are reported monthly for the market • EoO and quarterly for UKE. • Chinese walls and IT systems access profiles • UKE also uses Time-To-Market (TTM) procedure, and the margin squeeze • KPIs for non-discrimination between ANOs and OPL’s and price squeeze tests. TMM applies when OPL introduces a retail service based on a regulated wholesale service or a commercial wholesale service. retail division 90 days before launching the spervice, OPL must provide ANOs with the • establishing both an external and internal oversight information to them to create a competitive retail offer based on OPL’s body wholesale service. 3) New non-discrimination model agreed in October 2009. It • ANOs also have the right to conduct inspections and checks on whether included some of the measures proposed by OPL but did not OPL’s wholesale department provides regulated wholesale services under foresee the establishment of a separate supervisory the same conditions as those provided for OPL’s equivalent retail services. committee. OPL is obliged to submit signed protocols from such inspections to UKE. Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 4 • Information Classification: Internal NRA PRESSURE EXAMPLE 2. IRISH SEPARATION WAS A COMPROMISE TO SETTLE NON- COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS AND ENTAILED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERVISORY BODY HISTORY OF SEPARATION CURRENT STATE 1) Before December 2018, ComReg (Irish NRA) launched Functional separation model | open eir, the wholesale unit of the Irish incumbent eir, two separate sets of proceedings against eir, the Irish provides access services to both its retail arm and also to ANOs. Specifically, eir’s incumbent. Eir was charged with five incidences of compromise agreement with ComReg entailed: alleged non-compliance with wholesale obligations, and • Creating an independent oversight body (IOB) responsible for the compliance of eir’s an additional nine ongoing compliance cases. regulatory obligations 2) In December 2018, as a compromise to settle the • IOB is a committee jointly established by ComReg and eir, composing of 5 proceedings, eir reached an agreement with ComReg to: members (3 from NRA and 2 from air). eir must ensure that the IOB has sufficient • create an independent oversight body (IOB) resources to commission reviews, or justify its refusal to do so to NRA. IOB’s initial term is 5 years after which eir will be entitled to replace it with a • increase the independence and transparency committee of executive or non-executive directors. • establish a new regulatory governance model • IOB is charged with supervising, recommending, reviewing and reporting (RGM) • Increase in the independence and transparency of its wholesale unit, open eir • establish and maintain a regulatory code of • Eir created a wholesale senior management team and a separate wholesale practice pricing function. Personnel in the new function are located separately. All 3) In May 2019, IOB was established as a new body with remuneration incentives will reflect only the achievements of the wholesale unit. supervision responsibilities that will monitor Eir’s • However, the wholesale function will not be a separate legal entity, and overall compliance with the governance commitments. It also strategic decisions will continue to be set at Group level in accordance with the ensures that the incumbent adheres to its regulatory decisions made by eir’s Board. obligations in general, as imposed by ComReg’s • Establishing a new regulatory governance model (RGM) to ensure its future decisions. compliance with wholesale non-discrimination and transparency obligations • Combining regulatory and compliance risk management with internal audits whose head will report directly to IOB. • Establishing and maintain a regulatory code of practice Source: Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 5 • Information Classification: Internal INVESTOR STRATEGY EXAMPLE. CZECH SEPARATION CREATED VALUE BOTH FOR ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND THE SOCIETY AT LARGE HISTORY OF SEPARATION1 RESULTS FROM SEPARATION2 BACKGROUND: PPF Group is an international private equity VALUE FOR SHAREHOLDERS company founded in the Czech Republic in 1991. Greatly increased market capitalization and return on capital for retail arm 1) 4Q 2013: PPF acquired the Czech incumbent (O2 Czech Republic) from Telefonica Group COMBINED MARKET CAPITALIZATION, CZK Bn O2 RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL, % 2) 4Q 2014: PPF informed the NRA about its intention to O2 136 131 33 30 121 120 29 28 establish the retail-only and wholesale-only businesses CETIN 84 83 77 +82% 72 67 67 +125% 16 3) 1Q 2015: PPF publicly announced the legal separation 30 10 4) 2Q 2015: Start of operation of the newly separated 54 54 54 54 54 companies, CETIN (wholesale) and O2 (retail) 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2012 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 • CETIN operates and manages fixed and mobile infrastructure in the Czech Republic, as well as transit VALUE FOR SOCIETY infrastructure abroad. It has no retail customers. Greatly increased broadband investments and faster speeds • O2 is a retail-only provider, without any fixed CETIN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, Bn CZK CETIN FIXED ACCESS NETWORK TAKE UP infrastructure but with mobile licences and exchanges. 4,1 BY SPEED, % SHARE OF SUBSCRIBERS • NB! PPF took CETIN private but kept O2 publicly 3,5 3,6 10 20 > 250 Mbps listed. 20 2,5 +44% 20 56-100 Mbps 5) 3Q 2015: NRA decision on remedies imposed KPIs and EoI on 70 CETIN as a result of market analyses undertaken before the separation. Then, NRA started the next market review because 55 50 16-56 Mbps of the new market situation. 6) 1Q 2018: NRA decision on remedies (M3a, M3b, M4) 30 15 10 < 16 Mbps removed obligations from CETIN to provide KPI and EoI 2014 2016 2018 2019E 2015 2018 2020F Sources: 1 Cullen International (2019). Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory committee. 2 McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 6 • Information Classification: Internal SEPARATION IS LIKELY TO BRING BENEFITS TO THE CONSUMER, SOCIETY AS WELL AS THE NEW, FOCUSED BUSINESS UNITS THEMSELVES Lower likelihood of conducting discriminatory practices through better-aligned incentives and increased monitoring and 1 reporting activities 2 Increased competition on retail level driving down prices and increasing high-speed take-up Potential regulatory relief for the separated SMP wholesale and retail units, driving down costs and increasing pricing 3 flexibility for the retail arm 4 Greater addressable market for the carrier-neutral wholesale unit and better investments aligned with the real market demand Cheaper access to capital due to clearly defined business models: 1) Wholesale unit can better attract long-term infrastructure 5 investors; 2) Retail unit can better attract investors looking for higher risk-adjusted returns 6 Sharper management focus as wholesale has a lot longer investment cycles and strategies than quickly changing retail market Better suited for a 5G world as an independent wholesale unit is better positioned to carry the increased total cost of network 7 ownership and increased network sharing 5G is very likely to prompt. Source: CIVITTA analysis and McKinsey (2020). Can telcos create more value by breaking up? 7 • Information Classification: Internal ANNEX. POSSIBLE MODELS OF SEPARATION IDENTIFIED BY OFCOM (NRA OF UK) MODEL OF SEPARATION DESCRIPTION Separate financial reporting, with costs and revenues of the upstream and downstream products allocated into different Accounting separation baskets Creation of a wholesale division A separate wholesale division established to supply inputs to competitors but without equivalence of access Virtual separation Services offered to internal and external customers on equal terms, without any physical separation of the businesses Functional separation Physical separation of the business and its processes, e.g. location, staff, branding, management information systems Functional separation with local Functional separation with separate governance and different management incentives to those of the wider firm incentives Functional separation with Creation of a divisional Board with non-executive members who act independently from the group Board independent governance Upstream business is established as a separate legal entity within the wider group but remains under the same overall Legal separation ownership Split of the vertically integrated operations into separate legal entities, with no significant common ownership and ‘line- Structural separation of-business’ restrictions to prevent them re-entering each other’s markets Source: Ofcom (2016). Strengthening Openreach’s strategic and operational independence . Proposal for comment. 8 • Information Classification: Internal
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