Readiness for new SARS-COV-2 variants of concern and increased transmission in countries
1 February 2021
Background
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has had a major impact on human health globally by infecting
millions of people; causing severe disease and associated long-term health sequelae; and resulting in
deaths and excess mortality, especially among older and vulnerable populations.
As viruses circulate, they mutate naturally. Often these mutations and variations cause no change to the
transmission or presentation of the disease or presentation. However, the natural evolution of the virus
may also result in changes in key characteristics of the virus and the disease it causes. The key to
preventing further genetic changes in SARS-CoV-2 is to reduce the circulation of the virus between humans
– this should remain the utmost priority, especially in Europe where transmission remains widespread.
With ongoing transmission, new variants will continue to emerge and spread. WHO routinely assesses if
variants of SARS-CoV-2 result in any changes relevant to COVID-19’s impact on public health.
Several variants of public health concern (“variants of concern” or VOCs) have been reported to WHO, most
recently from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (SARS-CoV-2 VOC 202012/01 or
B.1.1.7); South Africa (501Y.V2 or B.1.351); and Brazil (P1).
WHO assessment
• An initial assessment by WHO suggests that both VOC 202012/01 and VOC 501Y.V2 show increased
transmissibility. If this results in a higher case incidence, it will lead to an increase in
hospitalizations and deaths due to COVID-19.
• Age distribution of cases for VOC 202012/01 is the same as for other circulating lineages in the
United Kingdom. There is currently no evidence to suggest that this new VOC is more infectious in
children or young adults.
• There is no evidence so far signalling any change in the mode of transmission of any of the VOCs.
• While the clinical presentation of the VOC appears similar, there is some evidence from the United
Kingdom that VOC 202012/01 may be associated with a statistically significant and clinically
relevant increased risk of death compared to non-VOC viruses. Further research is needed to
confirm these findings.
• VOC 202012/01 has already spread to many European countries; it is circulating in several
countries and will continue to spread. It is likely that over time, this VOC, or others with
evolutionary advantages, will spread and replace other circulating variants. More intensive
implementation of current public health measures may be required to control transmission of
these VOCs.
• To date, all WHO interim guidance for COVID-19 remains valid and relevant for all variants of
SARS-CoV-2. WHO guidance will continue to be updated based on a systematic assessment of
emerging evidence, as required.
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Reporting by Member States to WHO on VOCs
All Member States are requested to report COVID-19 weekly surveillance data, including on VOCs, to the
TeSSy reporting platform. Member States may report in a case-based or aggregate format. Further
information on reporting requirements can be obtained by writing to
[email protected].
WHO advice and readiness actions
WHO advice to countries has been shared on the Event Information Site for National IHR Focal Points
(IHR EIS) and is available publicly via the WHO Disease Outbreak News postings. Regardless of the
circulating variant, countries across the WHO European Region need to reduce COVID-19 transmission
urgently. Countries should continue to implement critical preparedness, readiness and response actions to
respond to COVID-19.
In the context of new VOCs with increased transmissibility, if additional control measures are not put in
place, Member States will need to prepare for a decrease in performance of the control measures currently
in place.
COVID-19 Strategic Additional actions to mitigate increased transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and
Preparedness and the emergence of VOCs
Response Plan Pillar
1. Country level To date, the identified VOCs do not alter the measures required to control
coordination, COVID-19, but they do increase the need for public health and social
planning and measures to be effective. Public health and social measures (PHSM) should
monitoring be urgently intensified and adjusted to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
National coordination mechanisms for COVID-19 should define strategies
to mitigate the increased public health impact caused by the circulation of
new VOCs, including:
• key actions and responsibilities to reduce transmission in order to
prevent the emergence of VOCs with their possible increased
transmissibility or other characteristics;
• key actions to reduce the impact of new VOCs should they emerge and
spread; and
• communicate strategy and provide briefings for government sectors
and partners.
2. Risk communication As variants emerge and spread across the WHO European Region, the
and community public and health care workers need to be engaged in protecting their own
engagement health by continuing and increasing individual measures. Member States
are encouraged to develop a communication plan with consideration of
the following. WHO/Europe will support with message and product
development.
Goal: Engage key target audiences to align their risk perception with
updated risk assessments, in order to enhance health protection and
reinforce the need for individual measures.
Objective: Proactively communicate through different tools and channels
based on the target audience. These include: use of targeted messaging
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through social media, media and web platforms, as well as engagement of
audiences.
Audiences
• General public
o All groups, particularly groups with lower risk perception
and/or higher social or behavioral likelihood of
contributing to transmission.
o Groups with higher vulnerability and risk: older people,
people with underlying conditions, people facing
socioeconomic marginalization.
• Health and social workers
o General practitioners and/or primary care workers.
o Health care workers and social workers providing care to
people with COVID-19.
3. Surveillance, rapid • Weekly surveillance data collections should include capture of virus
response, case variant information.
investigation and • Regardless of the variant, rapid identification and isolation of cases
contact tracing should be ensured, followed by expeditious tracing and quarantining
of close contacts, not least when public health safety measures are
lifted.
• Contact tracing remains a key public health measure to control the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 and should be prioritized also when community
transmission is widespread. If the number of cases and contacts
exceeds contact-tracing capacities, priority should be given to tracing
household contacts; contacts in long-term care and other closed
facilities; contacts that are health care workers; and vulnerable
contacts. Dedicated attention may also be given to possible
superspreading events, i.e. retrospective contact tracing.
• Strict adherence to national isolation and quarantine requirements is
paramount to controlling the spread of the disease.
4. Points of entry, • Include VOCs in risk assessments for domestic and international travel
international travel restrictions.
and transport • The need for measures including entry bans, testing and quarantine
requirements and contact tracing should be conducted on a regular
basis using the most recent WHO considerations for international
travel. The risk assessments should consider the risk of importing new
VOCs through incoming travelers.
• Adherence to all public health and social measures, including during
travel, is crucial to controlling the spread of the disease.
• At points of entry, further strengthen risk communication to the public
and staff by providing information on local transmission and individual
measures required.
5. National laboratories • A strategy should be defined to identify the variants among positive
cases using representative sampling.
• Depending on the variants circulating, this may be either based on
increasing the number of sequenced positive samples (next-
generation sequencing or Sanger sequencing targeting the S gene), or
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on developing specific PCR tests (or more extensive implementation of
existing PCR tests shown to possibly identify the variants), or a
combination of both.
6. Case • Existing case-management capabilities and surge-capacity planning
management and (for beds, supplies, human resources, and trainings) should be
surge capacity at evaluated and strengthened taking into consideration the potential
hospitals increase in the number of cases hospitalized due to increased
transmission patterns (with an emphasis on improving hospital
infrastructure with oxygen/life-support capabilities)
• Gathering of data on the clinical course of the disease should be
reinforced, also through the WHO Global COVID-19 Clinical Data
Platform, to better characterize the clinical features.
• If necessary, the hospital admission criteria should be re-evaluated as
a consequence of increased transmission.
7. Infection prevention • The existing IPC strategies required to prevent or limit transmission of
and control (IPC) COVID-19 in health care facilities (including long-term care and
primary health care facilities) must be further strengthened. These
are: 1. Screening and triage for early recognition, 2. Applying standard
precautions for all patients, 3. Implementing additional transmission-
based precautions, 4. Implementing administrative controls, and
5. Implementing environmental and structural engineering controls.
• Adherence to IPC practices (hand hygiene, physical distancing, mask
wearing, avoiding crowded spaces, ensuring adequate ventilation,
etc.) must be reinforced to limit transmission in non-health care
settings (also through effective risk communication and community
engagement practices)
8. Operational support • No additional actions are required. However, consideration of
and logistics increased transmission should be included in supply chain
management.
9. Maintaining essential Whether due to VOCs or other drivers of transmission, increased
health services and transmission will further affect essential health service delivery as the
systems (EHS) burden on the health system increases. EHS coordinators in ministries of
health should pay additional attention to the specific challenges expected,
by assessing the risks to EHS posed by VOCs, and reviewing overall EHS
continuity strategies that should include the following components:
• ensure monitoring system/s are in place to track service delivery;
• develop a list of essential health services to be maintained;
• determine which essential services will continue in their existing
location, and which need to be referred to alternative facilities;
• promote home-based care for COVID-19 patients with mild or
moderate symptoms and who can safely isolate at home;
• implement 3- or 6-month dispensation of medication for healthy,
stable patients;
• use telemedicine tools (video, telephone calls, and SMS) for screening,
follow-up, and refilling prescriptions;
• Reallocate and share tasks as needed: re-assign staff from less busy
services to assist with essential services.
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10. COVID-19 vaccine • There is no current indication that any of the VOCs will significantly
deployment affect the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines.
• Vaccine deployment should continue regardless of the level of
transmission of COVID-19 and circulating variants.
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Saatja: GERMAIN JULSKOV, Nathalie <
[email protected]>
Saadetud: 13.02.2021 17:26
Adressaat: Tanel Kiik <
[email protected]>; Triin Uusberg
<
[email protected]>
Koopia: Elen Ohov <
[email protected]>; Triin Uusberg <
[email protected]>;
SM Info <
[email protected]>; <
[email protected]>; <
[email protected]>;
<
[email protected]>; <
[email protected]>; KÖHLER, Kristina
<
[email protected]>
Teema: WHO/Europe - Readiness actions for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2
variants and increased COVID-19 transmission
Please see the attached correspondence sent from the World Health
Organization, Regional Office for Europe. One or more attachments may be
included.Veuillez vous r¨¦f¨¦rer ¨¤ la correspondance ci-jointe du Bureau
r¨¦gional de l'Europe de l'Organisation mondiale de la sant¨¦. Une ou
plusieurs annexes peuvent ¨ºtre jointes.Mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme
der beiliegenden Korrespondenz (eine oder mehrere Anlagen),
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WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DE LA SANTÉ
WELTGESUNDHEITSORGANISATION
ВСЕМИРНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ Date: 10 February 2021
REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE
BUREAU RÉGIONAL DE L’EUROPE Mr Tanel Kiik
REGIONALBÜRO FÜR EUROPA
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ БЮРО
Minister of Health and Labour
Ministry of Social Affairs
Head office: Suur-Ameerika 1
UN City, Marmorvej 51,
DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø, Denmark
10129 Tallinn
Tel.: +45 45 33 70 00; Fax: +45 45 33 70 01 Estonia
Email:
[email protected]
Website: http://www.euro.who.int
Our reference: Your reference:
Notre référence: Votre référence:
Unser Zeichen: Ihr Zeichen:
См. наш номер: На Ваш номер:
Dear Sir,
WHO/Europe
Readiness actions for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants and increased COVID-19
transmission
WHO/Europe presents its compliments to the Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia.
Though it is normal for viruses to mutate naturally, SARS-CoV-2 variants of public health concern
(“variants of concern”) have recently been reported to WHO that may pose additional challenges to
ongoing COVID-19 control measures. Variants of concern, including those that have emerged both in
and outside of the WHO European Region, have already spread to many European countries and will
continue to do so. With their evolutionary advantages, these variants are likely to replace other
circulating variants over time.
By means of this letter, I would like to highlight the following points:
• Where there is a demonstrated increase in transmissibility and possible changes in disease
severity, more intensive implementation of, and adherence to, current public health measures
may be required to control transmission. Additional actions that should be immediately and
urgently considered at country level, and WHO advice can be found in the enclosed document
and checklist.
• At the present time, based on available evidence, WHO is not currently making changes to its
guidance on personal protective equipment or other infection prevention and control measures,
and strongly recommends that countries take a comprehensive approach to preventing the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 to ensure that all measures are effectively implemented.
• All Member States are requested to report COVID-19 weekly surveillance data, including on
variants of concern, to the TeSSy reporting platform. These can be reported in a case-based or
aggregate format. Further information on reporting requirements can be obtained by writing
to
[email protected].
UN City, Marmorvej 51 Tel.: +45 45 33 70 00 Email:
[email protected]
DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø Fax: +45 45 33 70 01 Website: http://www.euro.who.int
Denmark
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has had a major impact on human health globally by
infecting millions of people; causing severe disease and associated long-term health sequelae; and
resulting in death and excess mortality, especially among older and vulnerable populations.
WHO/Europe stands ready to continue providing technical assistance and aid to the Government of
Estonia, and to the Ministry of Social Affairs in particular.
Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration. On behalf of WHO/Europe, I thank you
for your collaboration, particularly regarding your efforts in protecting the people of Estonia from the
adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yours very truly,
Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge
Regional Director
Encls:
Readiness for new SARS-COV-2 variants of concern and increased transmission in countries
Copy for information to:
Ms Elen Ohov, Adviser, European Union Affairs and International Co-operation Department, Ministry of
Social Affairs, Suur-Ameerika 1, 10122 Tallinn, Estonia
Ms Triin Uusberg, Head, European and International Coordination Department, Ministry of Social Affairs,
Suur-Ameerika 1, 10129 Tallinn, Estonia
H.E. Ms Katrin Saarsalu-Layachi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative,
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations Office and other international
organizations in Geneva, Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28A, CH-1209 Genève, Switzerland
H.E. Mr William Mart Laanemäe, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the Republic of
Estonia, Frederiksgade 19, 4th floor, 1265 Copenhagen K, Denmark
Ms Kristina Köhler, Liaison Officer, WHO Country Office, Estonia, Paldiski Road 81, 10617 Tallinn, Estonia
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