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Sotsiaalministeerium · 15. veebruar 2021
Viit
1.4-2/500-1
Registreeritud
15. veebruar 2021
Dokumendi liik
Sissetulev kiri
Adressaat
World Health Organization
Saabumis/saatmisviis
e-post
Funktsioon
1.4 EL otsustusprotsess ja rahvusvaheline koostöö
Sari
1.4-2 Rahvusvahelise koostöö korraldamisega seotud kirjavahetus (Arhiiviväärtuslik)
Toimik
1.4-2/2021
Vastutaja
Agnes Alajõe (Sotsiaalministeerium, Kantsleri vastutusvaldkond, Euroopa Liidu ja väliskoostöö osakond)
Lahendamise tähtaeg
17. märts 2021

Failid

  • 📎Attachment letter VOC_ENG (2).pdf320 KB
  • 📎E-kiri.pdf77 KB
  • 📎Estonia.pdf310 KB

Sisu (failidest)

Readiness for new SARS-COV-2 variants of concern and increased transmission in countries 1 February 2021 Background SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has had a major impact on human health globally by infecting millions of people; causing severe disease and associated long-term health sequelae; and resulting in deaths and excess mortality, especially among older and vulnerable populations. As viruses circulate, they mutate naturally. Often these mutations and variations cause no change to the transmission or presentation of the disease or presentation. However, the natural evolution of the virus may also result in changes in key characteristics of the virus and the disease it causes. The key to preventing further genetic changes in SARS-CoV-2 is to reduce the circulation of the virus between humans – this should remain the utmost priority, especially in Europe where transmission remains widespread. With ongoing transmission, new variants will continue to emerge and spread. WHO routinely assesses if variants of SARS-CoV-2 result in any changes relevant to COVID-19’s impact on public health. Several variants of public health concern (“variants of concern” or VOCs) have been reported to WHO, most recently from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (SARS-CoV-2 VOC 202012/01 or B.1.1.7); South Africa (501Y.V2 or B.1.351); and Brazil (P1). WHO assessment • An initial assessment by WHO suggests that both VOC 202012/01 and VOC 501Y.V2 show increased transmissibility. If this results in a higher case incidence, it will lead to an increase in hospitalizations and deaths due to COVID-19. • Age distribution of cases for VOC 202012/01 is the same as for other circulating lineages in the United Kingdom. There is currently no evidence to suggest that this new VOC is more infectious in children or young adults. • There is no evidence so far signalling any change in the mode of transmission of any of the VOCs. • While the clinical presentation of the VOC appears similar, there is some evidence from the United Kingdom that VOC 202012/01 may be associated with a statistically significant and clinically relevant increased risk of death compared to non-VOC viruses. Further research is needed to confirm these findings. • VOC 202012/01 has already spread to many European countries; it is circulating in several countries and will continue to spread. It is likely that over time, this VOC, or others with evolutionary advantages, will spread and replace other circulating variants. More intensive implementation of current public health measures may be required to control transmission of these VOCs. • To date, all WHO interim guidance for COVID-19 remains valid and relevant for all variants of SARS-CoV-2. WHO guidance will continue to be updated based on a systematic assessment of emerging evidence, as required. 1 Reporting by Member States to WHO on VOCs All Member States are requested to report COVID-19 weekly surveillance data, including on VOCs, to the TeSSy reporting platform. Member States may report in a case-based or aggregate format. Further information on reporting requirements can be obtained by writing to [email protected]. WHO advice and readiness actions WHO advice to countries has been shared on the Event Information Site for National IHR Focal Points (IHR EIS) and is available publicly via the WHO Disease Outbreak News postings. Regardless of the circulating variant, countries across the WHO European Region need to reduce COVID-19 transmission urgently. Countries should continue to implement critical preparedness, readiness and response actions to respond to COVID-19. In the context of new VOCs with increased transmissibility, if additional control measures are not put in place, Member States will need to prepare for a decrease in performance of the control measures currently in place. COVID-19 Strategic Additional actions to mitigate increased transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Preparedness and the emergence of VOCs Response Plan Pillar 1. Country level To date, the identified VOCs do not alter the measures required to control coordination, COVID-19, but they do increase the need for public health and social planning and measures to be effective. Public health and social measures (PHSM) should monitoring be urgently intensified and adjusted to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2. National coordination mechanisms for COVID-19 should define strategies to mitigate the increased public health impact caused by the circulation of new VOCs, including: • key actions and responsibilities to reduce transmission in order to prevent the emergence of VOCs with their possible increased transmissibility or other characteristics; • key actions to reduce the impact of new VOCs should they emerge and spread; and • communicate strategy and provide briefings for government sectors and partners. 2. Risk communication As variants emerge and spread across the WHO European Region, the and community public and health care workers need to be engaged in protecting their own engagement health by continuing and increasing individual measures. Member States are encouraged to develop a communication plan with consideration of the following. WHO/Europe will support with message and product development. Goal: Engage key target audiences to align their risk perception with updated risk assessments, in order to enhance health protection and reinforce the need for individual measures. Objective: Proactively communicate through different tools and channels based on the target audience. These include: use of targeted messaging 2 through social media, media and web platforms, as well as engagement of audiences. Audiences • General public o All groups, particularly groups with lower risk perception and/or higher social or behavioral likelihood of contributing to transmission. o Groups with higher vulnerability and risk: older people, people with underlying conditions, people facing socioeconomic marginalization. • Health and social workers o General practitioners and/or primary care workers. o Health care workers and social workers providing care to people with COVID-19. 3. Surveillance, rapid • Weekly surveillance data collections should include capture of virus response, case variant information. investigation and • Regardless of the variant, rapid identification and isolation of cases contact tracing should be ensured, followed by expeditious tracing and quarantining of close contacts, not least when public health safety measures are lifted. • Contact tracing remains a key public health measure to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and should be prioritized also when community transmission is widespread. If the number of cases and contacts exceeds contact-tracing capacities, priority should be given to tracing household contacts; contacts in long-term care and other closed facilities; contacts that are health care workers; and vulnerable contacts. Dedicated attention may also be given to possible superspreading events, i.e. retrospective contact tracing. • Strict adherence to national isolation and quarantine requirements is paramount to controlling the spread of the disease. 4. Points of entry, • Include VOCs in risk assessments for domestic and international travel international travel restrictions. and transport • The need for measures including entry bans, testing and quarantine requirements and contact tracing should be conducted on a regular basis using the most recent WHO considerations for international travel. The risk assessments should consider the risk of importing new VOCs through incoming travelers. • Adherence to all public health and social measures, including during travel, is crucial to controlling the spread of the disease. • At points of entry, further strengthen risk communication to the public and staff by providing information on local transmission and individual measures required. 5. National laboratories • A strategy should be defined to identify the variants among positive cases using representative sampling. • Depending on the variants circulating, this may be either based on increasing the number of sequenced positive samples (next- generation sequencing or Sanger sequencing targeting the S gene), or 3 on developing specific PCR tests (or more extensive implementation of existing PCR tests shown to possibly identify the variants), or a combination of both. 6. Case • Existing case-management capabilities and surge-capacity planning management and (for beds, supplies, human resources, and trainings) should be surge capacity at evaluated and strengthened taking into consideration the potential hospitals increase in the number of cases hospitalized due to increased transmission patterns (with an emphasis on improving hospital infrastructure with oxygen/life-support capabilities) • Gathering of data on the clinical course of the disease should be reinforced, also through the WHO Global COVID-19 Clinical Data Platform, to better characterize the clinical features. • If necessary, the hospital admission criteria should be re-evaluated as a consequence of increased transmission. 7. Infection prevention • The existing IPC strategies required to prevent or limit transmission of and control (IPC) COVID-19 in health care facilities (including long-term care and primary health care facilities) must be further strengthened. These are: 1. Screening and triage for early recognition, 2. Applying standard precautions for all patients, 3. Implementing additional transmission- based precautions, 4. Implementing administrative controls, and 5. Implementing environmental and structural engineering controls. • Adherence to IPC practices (hand hygiene, physical distancing, mask wearing, avoiding crowded spaces, ensuring adequate ventilation, etc.) must be reinforced to limit transmission in non-health care settings (also through effective risk communication and community engagement practices) 8. Operational support • No additional actions are required. However, consideration of and logistics increased transmission should be included in supply chain management. 9. Maintaining essential Whether due to VOCs or other drivers of transmission, increased health services and transmission will further affect essential health service delivery as the systems (EHS) burden on the health system increases. EHS coordinators in ministries of health should pay additional attention to the specific challenges expected, by assessing the risks to EHS posed by VOCs, and reviewing overall EHS continuity strategies that should include the following components: • ensure monitoring system/s are in place to track service delivery; • develop a list of essential health services to be maintained; • determine which essential services will continue in their existing location, and which need to be referred to alternative facilities; • promote home-based care for COVID-19 patients with mild or moderate symptoms and who can safely isolate at home; • implement 3- or 6-month dispensation of medication for healthy, stable patients; • use telemedicine tools (video, telephone calls, and SMS) for screening, follow-up, and refilling prescriptions; • Reallocate and share tasks as needed: re-assign staff from less busy services to assist with essential services. 4 10. COVID-19 vaccine • There is no current indication that any of the VOCs will significantly deployment affect the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines. • Vaccine deployment should continue regardless of the level of transmission of COVID-19 and circulating variants. 5 Saatja: GERMAIN JULSKOV, Nathalie <[email protected]> Saadetud: 13.02.2021 17:26 Adressaat: Tanel Kiik <[email protected]>; Triin Uusberg <[email protected]> Koopia: Elen Ohov <[email protected]>; Triin Uusberg <[email protected]>; SM Info <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; KÖHLER, Kristina <[email protected]> Teema: WHO/Europe - Readiness actions for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants and increased COVID-19 transmission Please see the attached correspondence sent from the World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe. One or more attachments may be included.Veuillez vous r¨¦f¨¦rer ¨¤ la correspondance ci-jointe du Bureau r¨¦gional de l'Europe de l'Organisation mondiale de la sant¨¦. Une ou plusieurs annexes peuvent ¨ºtre jointes.Mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme der beiliegenden Korrespondenz (eine oder mehrere Anlagen), Weltgesundheitsorganisation, Regionalb¨¹ro f¨¹r Europa.§³§Þ. §á§â§Ú§Ü§â§Ö§á§Ý§Ö§ß§ß§í§Ö §á§Ú§ã§î§Þ§Ñ §à§ä §¦§Ó§â§à§á§Ö§Û§ã§Ü§à§Ô§à §â§Ö§Ô§Ú§à§ß§Ñ§Ý§î§ß§à§Ô§à §Ò§ð§â§à §£§ã§Ö§Þ§Ú§â§ß§à§Û §à§â§Ô§Ñ§ß§Ú§Ù§Ñ§è§Ú§Ú §Ù§Õ§â§Ñ§Ó§à§à§ç§â§Ñ§ß§Ö§ß§Ú§ñ (§à§Õ§Ú§ß §Ú§Ý§Ú §ß§Ö§ã§Ü§à§Ý§î§Ü§à §á§â§Ú§Ü§â§Ö§á§Ý§Ö§ß§ß§í§ç §æ§Ñ§Û§Ý§à§Ó). &nbsp; &nbsp; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION MONDIALE DE LA SANTÉ WELTGESUNDHEITSORGANISATION ВСЕМИРНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ Date: 10 February 2021 REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE BUREAU RÉGIONAL DE L’EUROPE Mr Tanel Kiik REGIONALBÜRO FÜR EUROPA ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ БЮРО Minister of Health and Labour Ministry of Social Affairs Head office: Suur-Ameerika 1 UN City, Marmorvej 51, DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø, Denmark 10129 Tallinn Tel.: +45 45 33 70 00; Fax: +45 45 33 70 01 Estonia Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.euro.who.int Our reference: Your reference: Notre référence: Votre référence: Unser Zeichen: Ihr Zeichen: См. наш номер: На Ваш номер: Dear Sir, WHO/Europe Readiness actions for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants and increased COVID-19 transmission WHO/Europe presents its compliments to the Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia. Though it is normal for viruses to mutate naturally, SARS-CoV-2 variants of public health concern (“variants of concern”) have recently been reported to WHO that may pose additional challenges to ongoing COVID-19 control measures. Variants of concern, including those that have emerged both in and outside of the WHO European Region, have already spread to many European countries and will continue to do so. With their evolutionary advantages, these variants are likely to replace other circulating variants over time. By means of this letter, I would like to highlight the following points: • Where there is a demonstrated increase in transmissibility and possible changes in disease severity, more intensive implementation of, and adherence to, current public health measures may be required to control transmission. Additional actions that should be immediately and urgently considered at country level, and WHO advice can be found in the enclosed document and checklist. • At the present time, based on available evidence, WHO is not currently making changes to its guidance on personal protective equipment or other infection prevention and control measures, and strongly recommends that countries take a comprehensive approach to preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 to ensure that all measures are effectively implemented. • All Member States are requested to report COVID-19 weekly surveillance data, including on variants of concern, to the TeSSy reporting platform. These can be reported in a case-based or aggregate format. Further information on reporting requirements can be obtained by writing to [email protected]. UN City, Marmorvej 51 Tel.: +45 45 33 70 00 Email: [email protected] DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø Fax: +45 45 33 70 01 Website: http://www.euro.who.int Denmark SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has had a major impact on human health globally by infecting millions of people; causing severe disease and associated long-term health sequelae; and resulting in death and excess mortality, especially among older and vulnerable populations. WHO/Europe stands ready to continue providing technical assistance and aid to the Government of Estonia, and to the Ministry of Social Affairs in particular. Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration. On behalf of WHO/Europe, I thank you for your collaboration, particularly regarding your efforts in protecting the people of Estonia from the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yours very truly, Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge Regional Director Encls: Readiness for new SARS-COV-2 variants of concern and increased transmission in countries Copy for information to: Ms Elen Ohov, Adviser, European Union Affairs and International Co-operation Department, Ministry of Social Affairs, Suur-Ameerika 1, 10122 Tallinn, Estonia Ms Triin Uusberg, Head, European and International Coordination Department, Ministry of Social Affairs, Suur-Ameerika 1, 10129 Tallinn, Estonia H.E. Ms Katrin Saarsalu-Layachi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva, Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28A, CH-1209 Genève, Switzerland H.E. Mr William Mart Laanemäe, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Frederiksgade 19, 4th floor, 1265 Copenhagen K, Denmark Ms Kristina Köhler, Liaison Officer, WHO Country Office, Estonia, Paldiski Road 81, 10617 Tallinn, Estonia –2–
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