POSITION PAPER
Proposal for an EU Directive on fair minimum wages
Executive summary
1. European employers agree with the overall objectives of achieving adequate wages
across the EU, making work pay, fighting poverty, and strengthening the role of social
partners and social dialogue, in line with national industrial relations systems.
Employers are not in favour of competition based on lowering social standards.
2. A lot of work on this topic has already been done, in particular as part of the European
semester. As stated in our answer to the Commission’s social partner consultation,
there is therefore room for discussion on this topic at EU level and we are available
to support and participate in furthering this work, as part of a quadripartite process
towards a council recommendation.
3. At the same time we strongly warned against an EU directive as the wrong
instrument. A directive by definition hands over power to the legislator and to the
courts, not to the social partners. Where national social partners are weak, European
legislation cannot suddenly make them strong. Strength of the social partners can
only come from representativity and the desire and ability to find balanced solutions
A directive also ignores that minimum wages cannot be seen in isolation from social
security schemes, minimum income schemes and taxation, which are important in
safeguarding good living conditions and tackling poverty.
4. The proposal on minimum wages is completely against the letter and spirit of the
EU treaty on pay and collective bargaining, which are for good reasons the
competence of Member States and social partners in line with the principle of
subsidiarity. It disrespects diverse national systems and social partners’ autonomy.
It goes against the strict division of competences between the EU and member
states. According to Treaty articles 153 (5) and 153 (1f), and related ECJ rulings, the
EU has no competence to introduce a binding legal instrument on the level of
minimum wages or on collective bargaining and the representation of workers and
employers interest. Whilst the directive does not directly regulate the level of wages,
by setting binding criteria for adequacy, it goes beyond the very limited space that
the Treaty gives, if any, for EU intervention in the area of pay – in line with rulings of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU cannot regulate the “constituent parts
of pay”.
5. The proposal also goes against the well-recognised principle of freedom of
association enshrined in the ILO, which refers to the voluntary nature of collective
bargaining. It also goes against ILO convention 131 on minimum wage fixing, which
enshrines the principle of universal coverage, but not as an obligation of absolute
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result, since States and national social partners can determine the groups of
employees to be covered.
6. Different proposals included in the directive will harm statutory minimum wage
systems and collective agreements – more information is provided in the specific
remarks.
7. The Commission wrongly supposes that the directive will “reinforce trust among
Member States and social partners”. In fact, it will do the opposite. Not only does this
proposal put social partners in opposition, it also goes against the majority view of
EU Member States, many of which are in favour of a non-binding instrument. It is
also strongly opposed by Nordic trade unions rightly fearing that it will undermine
their well-functioning social models.
8. The directive will also weaken social partners in the long-term due to the proposed
binding target of 70% coverage of collective bargaining: In some countries, probably
the only way to achieve such a target is to automatically extend collective agreements
negotiated by social partners to all companies and workers (including those that are
not members of an employer organisation or trade unions). This would strongly
reduce the role of social partners because companies and workers would be covered
by minimum wages anyway.
9. The Commission states that the responses to the social partner consultation have
been taken into account in coming forward with this proposal. This is not true. This is
a very one-sided proposal, which completely ignores the views of the business
community and the approach which we proposed - and even wrongly presents our
views expressed in the social partner consultation. For example, aside from the
notion of productivity, other important economic factors, such as competitiveness and
employment, are not considered. Also, our call for the focus to be on persons living
in EU member states, which is particularly important for some sectors, has not been
taken into account in the scope. By not attempting to find a balanced solution, the
Commission inflicts harm on the social dialogue both at European and national level.
10. A directive on minimum wages is particularly damaging now, as our economies and
societies are confronted with the unprecedented challenge of Covid-19, which is
putting workers and companies in economic difficulty, for some companies potentially
risking their survival. Whereas we need to avoid actions which will exacerbate the
current situation, the Commission itself recognises that this proposal is expected to
lead to “increased labour costs for firms, increased prices and, to a lesser extent,
lower profits”. More specifically, according to the Commission’s own impact
assessment, setting the minimum wage at 60 % of the median wage and 50 % of the
average wage, as set out in recital 21 and article 5.3 of the proposal, would lead to
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an overall increase in the EU wage bill of up to 53 billion euros of total economic
cost1.
11. The current crisis is also expected to give rise to significant unemployment increases
in the coming year, whereas, based on the commission’s own estimates2, (which are
likely to be on the low side given the present circumstances), the proposal would
reduce employment in the majority of EU member states. For example, in Spain, the
official unemployment rate is currently just over 16% (twice the EU average and
around 40% for young people, a group for which an increase in the minimum wage
can have the most negative effects. Based on the commission’s own estimates of
the impact on employment of setting the minimum wage at 60 % of the median wage
and 50 % of the average wage, the proposal could lead to a reduction in employment
of almost 140.000 jobs in Spain. In Poland, it could lead to a reduction in employment
of more than 130.000 jobs; in Ireland, it could lead to a reduction of around 20,000
jobs – equivalent to a 1 percentage point reduction in employment; and based on the
commission's own estimates Greece would suffer particularly hard: a reduction of
over 40,000 jobs – equivalent to around 1.3 percentage points reduction in
employment. In particular at this moment, the last thing that Europe needs is
regulation that will lead to a reduction in employment in a number of countries, and
hurt the most vulnerable workers, in particular when other measures would be more
effective in reducing poverty without such negative impacts.
12. The Commission expects that the costs of the increased minimum wage will be borne
by companies with lower margins, consumers through higher prices, as welI as
workers through higher unemployment. It is important however to note that, at
present, as a result of the COVID crisis, many small businesses have severely
weakened balance sheets, making them less able to absorb increased costs than
standard economic models (such as that used in the Commission's impact
assessment) assume. In the present circumstances placing more costs on vulnerable
businesses would lead to much higher rates of firm closures, and in turn falls in
employment, than models developed in normal economic times assume.
13. The impact on employment is also likely to lead to an unwelcome growth in the
number of undeclared workers which is already a major problem in many EU Member
States, leading to unfair competition. Furthermore, the undeclared workers would be
without any rights including to a minimum wage or obligations like paying taxes and
social security contributions.
1 See EC impact assessment, p64:
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23093&langId=en
2 Based on Graph A12.9, page 197 of the Commission’s impact assessment
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14. Of course those facing unemployment and poverty during this crisis, including
frontline workers, need support. However, short-time work schemes and social
protection measures, such as minimum income schemes, are the right approach, not
an instrument that harms employment and social dialogue.
15. The Commission proposal ignores that minimum wages are not a social transfer -
wages are a compensation for the work performed and according to hours worked.
Employers support well-functioning social protection systems, which are the right
system to provide social transfers for those in need. Minimum wage policy must not
be driven by political objectives at the cost of employers and employees alike.
16. BusinessEurope therefore urges the European Parliament and the Council to reject
this proposal and to request the commission to pursue the objectives through EU
guidance in a non-legally binding tool such as a Council Recommendation. As we
have highlighted from the very start of the social partner consultation process, there
is room and rationale to discuss the issue of minimum wages and collective
bargaining at EU level, However, only a non-binding approach would allow for
respect of national competences and industrial relations systems, by working
together at the European level, whilst leaving the decision on what action is needed
and the approach to the national level, including the social partners. This would also
make it possible to take the broad approach necessary to at the same time promote
employment and fight poverty.
17. Furthermore, the issues included in the draft directive are much better adapted to a
recommendation, supported by the European semester process. We were willing to
seek a mandate with our members to negotiate a framework agreement with the
trade unions, to be implemented by a council recommendation, because we felt this
was the best way to keep it in the hands of the social partners. This was turned down
by the trade unions, due to a majority position of their members in favour of an EU
directive.
18. We remain ready and available to play a part in developing a Council
Recommendation, which fully respects the EU Treaty article 153 (1f and 5), the
relevant ECJ jurisprudence, national competences and the autonomy of social
partners regarding minimum wages and collective bargaining, by participating in a
quadripartite process with the Commission, trade unions and governments. This is
the best way to allow for a trust-based and constructive approach between all parties.
19. The aim of a council recommendation should be to achieve well-functioning national
minimum wage setting in all EU Member States in a way that fully respects national
competences and social partner autonomy, to improve incomes of people working in
jobs that are paid at the minimum wage level. Improving incomes of people who are
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at the lower end of labour markets in terms of pay will also depend on the success of
EU and national skills policies in their ability to improve the productivity of the low-
skilled workers. Should national governments consider that political intervention is
needed to improve the low-skilled incomes, this should be done without raising the
cost of work for employers. This means looking into the role of well-targeted and
balanced in-work benefits paid via social protection systems aiming to encourage
employment participation and, at the same time, a reduction of in-work poverty.
20. We also suggest to build on the existing cooperation between the social partners, the
Commission and Council in the framework of the European Semester on minimum
wages and the 2016 joint statement “new start for social dialogue” e.g. with more
monitoring. The Technical Support Instrument can also be mobilised to help Member
States develop or improve the technical aspects of minimum wage frameworks.
Specific remarks
21. Whatever is in the text of the directive, including derogations and specific provisions,
the fact that it is binding on Member States means that there is no water-tight
protection of the autonomy of the national social partners and national competences
regarding wage setting and collective bargaining. The provisions on respect of the
social partners are of a declaratory nature without any substance and are often in
conflict with the objective and the minimum requirements of the directive. They would
have an uncertain legal value in a court case. The mere existence of such a legally
binding text means that Member States will need to transpose it and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) will acquire jurisdiction on purely national collective
agreements and wage setting and on issues that are of national competence.
22. Three examples to illustrate the point above:
• The “subject matter” or binding objective of the whole directive as set out in
article 1.1 is that it is an EU obligation for the national legislator to set up a
framework for adequate minimum wages. Adequate minimum wage is
defined in recital 21 as: “Minimum wages are considered adequate if they are
fair in relation to the wage distribution in the country and if they provide a
decent standard of living”. This article will invite court cases to specify how a
minimum wage can be set in a Member State. This provision not only applies
to Member States with statutory minimum wages but also the 6 Member
States and two EEA members without a statutory minimum wage and
collective agreements that do not cover all workers and can also affect the
agreement between EU and Switzerland.
• Article 1.1. sets an EU obligation for the national legislator to secure access
for all workers either to a statutory minimum wage or minimum wages set by
collective agreements. It makes it a matter for the legislator to secure access
for all workers to collective agreements not respecting the autonomy of social
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partners to decide if and for which workers they want to enter into collective
agreements. This brings the objective of the directive in conflict with the
declaratory statement that the directive respects the autonomy of the social
partners and in conflict with the declaration in article 1.3 that nothing in this
directive can be construed as imposing on Member States to introduce a
statutory minimum wage.
• For those member states where wages are exclusively based on collective
agreements, there are specific conditions applying to the declaration that the
directive does not oblige you to introduce a statutory minimum wage. This
should be ensured without any conditions. If the Commission had wanted to
ensure that the directive does not affect those Member States who want to
base themselves on well-functioning collective agreements, they should have
found a legally water-tight way to limit the objective of the directive to statutory
minimum wages.
23. The Commission argues that the initiative is respecting the principle of subsidiarity
as “national action has not been enough to address the problem of insufficient
adequacy and/or coverage of minimum wage protection. Without policy action at EU
level, individual countries may be little inclined to improve their minimum wage
settings because of the perception that this could negatively affect their external cost
competitiveness.” This is not correct as the Commission’s own impact assessment
shows: some of the biggest increases in minimum wages have been in Member
States with lower levels of wealth.3
24. Since wages and collective bargaining are a national competence, the most
important aspect to take into account to ensure that EU action is fully in line with the
principle of subsidiarity, is the statement that matters should be decided as closely
as possible to the citizens, also since this increases their effectiveness. As wages
are a key issue for workers, companies and for social partners, it is also more
effective if they are directly involved.
25. Whereas the commission suggests that a directive would improve social dialogue
and support collective bargaining, it would do just the opposite, by taking away power
from the social partners. This would undermine a fundamental feature of the best
performing social dialogue systems in Europe: independent collective bargaining
between representative employers’ and trade unions’ organisations. This will be
particularly damaging in those countries where social partners are solely or
predominantly responsible for setting wages, e.g. the Nordic countries, but also in
3
See pages 149 to 151 in the Commission impact assessment including graph A8.9 and A8.10 where it is
concluded that: The statutory minimum wage has increased faster in low-wage countries, even as compared
to other wages or compared to productivity growth.
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countries where statutory minimum wages are linked to collectively agreed minimum
wages or based on procedures agreed with the social partners.
26. This directive is also likely to lead to numerous ECJ rulings, since it is overly detailed
and includes many different possibilities to derogate from various provisions,
according to complex conditions. This will create great legal uncertainty for
employers, workers and governments, no doubt for many years to come. This is not
the foundation on which to build a well-functioning social dialogue.
27. The Commission highlights that the objective is to improve working conditions and
convergence of wage levels in the single market, however, the only way to improve
social convergence across the EU, is by improving economic conditions including the
functioning of the single market. Also, as shown by Eurofound, wages across the EU
have been gradually converging.
28. The sole focus on “improving living and working conditions” in the Member States is
not balanced. The Commission’s proposal is focused uniquely on minimum wage
adequacy, whereas the way minimum wages are set impacts employment. We
therefore regret the negative view that is reflected in the proposal regarding the role
of diverse forms of employment on the labour markets. Diverse forms of employment
in fact play a key role to encourage hiring by employers and ensure greater employee
choice in view of changing availability for work in view of personal circumstances.
Also, there should be a clearer acknowledgement that there is no causal relationship
between wage levels and the form of work. Employment participation objectives
should be at the core of minimum wage setting.
29. In the longer-term, there is a need for well-targeted and balanced in-work benefits
paid via social protection systems aiming to encourage employment participation
and, at the same time, a reduction of in-work poverty. The business community calls
on the European Commission and on the Council’s employment and social protection
committees to prioritise policy learning and exchanges with social partners on in-
work benefits to support Member States designing and implementing their policy
initiatives in that field drawing on most effective existing in-work benefit schemes.
30. The focus of Commission action on minimum wages, as a maximum through a
council recommendation, should be on:
• Encouraging well-functioning autonomous collective bargaining on wage setting;
• Improving social partner involvement in legal minimum wage setting systems,
including by highlighting useful procedures for this;
• Supporting and promoting capacity building of social partners where relevant
and asked for by them as part of better wage setting and involvement in statutory
minimum wage setting;
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• Acknowledging that the role of a wage is to provide an adequate compensation
for work performed and should therefore not be confused with the role of
minimum income;
• Encouraging an approach where adequacy and economic factors are combined,
recognising that social partner agreements establish a balance between
economic and social considerations;
• Supporting compliance with statutory minimum wage provisions and other
existing provisions, whilst fully respecting the diversity of national wage setting
systems.
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Saatja: Denis Evelyne <
[email protected]>
Saadetud: 04.12.2020 17:42
Teema: BusinessEurope position paper on fair minimum wages
Dear Minister,
Please find attached BusinessEurope position paper on the EC proposal for
an EU directive on fair minimum wages.
Yours faithfully,
(sent on behalf of)
Maxime Cerutti
DIRECTOR, SOCIAL AFFAIRS
SOCIAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
168 AVENUE DE CORTENBERGH
1000 BRUSSELS - BELGIUM
Tel : +32 (0) 2 237 65 30
Fax : +32 (0) 2 231 14 45
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