Interference to RNSS reception

Mr Mario Maniewicz Radiocommunication Bureau International Telecommunication Our Ref: 19.02.2025 No 17-5/2025/0199 Union Place des Nations CH-1211, Geneva 20 Interference to RNSS reception Dear Mr Maniewicz Please find attached submission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on continuing interference to RNSS reception. Yours sincerely, Erko Kulu talituse juhataja Arvo Rammus +372 667 2071 [email protected] Endla 10a / 10122 Tallinn / ESTONIA Phone: +372 667 2000 / Fax: +372 667 2001 / E-mail: [email protected] / http://www.ttja.ee  Submission from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concerning interference to RNSS services Dear Mr Maniewicz Recognizing the efforts already done by the Bureau on solving the interference to RNSS, referring to resolves to urge administrations 3 of Resolution 676 (WRC-676) and RR No 15.41 Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Administrations would like to inform You about continuing interference to RNSS services. Lithuania has made repeated efforts to contact the authority of Russian Federation (recorded in SIRRS Case ID No. ITU2024-67625). No communication was received. Estonia has made repeated efforts to contact the authority of Russian Federation (recorded in SIRRS Case ID No. ITU2024-67597, ITU2024-69915 and ITU2024-70134). Only acknowledgements according to RR 15.35 have been received without any other actions. Latvia for the first time addresses BR and provides information about the degradation of the RNSS signal quality of flight traffic. Kindly be informed, that despite all efforts regarding the harmful interference affecting RNSS services, the issue remains unresolved. The ongoing harmful interference has not ceased and continues with significant implications for safety, communication, and economic operations in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Main victims of interference are airplanes flying in the airspace of our countries near the border with Russian Federation. Estonia is constantly monitoring interference and we are aloso receiving interference reports from Estonian Air Navigation Services. On the basis of this information we have detected areas of interference sources in the teritory of Russian Federation in Leningrad region. Example of results can be found in Annex 1. Lithuania reported in letter (54.1Mr)1B-2909 dated 7th of November, 2024, the recurring interference cases in the airspace over the territory of Lithuania during the time period starting from September 2024 have increased and still persist, threatening the reliability of a safety service like radionavigation- satellite service (RNSS), which affects the operation of aircrafts RNSS stations receiving GPS L1 signals at 1 575.42 MHz predominantly in heights above 10 000 feets above ground (Annex 2, Fig 1, Fig. 2). Monitoring activities have also detected sources of interfering signals in the GLONASS L1, GALILEO G1, GPS L2, GPS L5 frequency bands. The continuity of interfering signals received indicate they could be transmitted deliberately for jamming and spoofing purposes. Monitoring data assessment 1 indicate the sources of all interfering signals originate in the territory of the Kaliningrad region of Russian Federation (Annex 2, Fig. 3-5). This, in addition to Article 45 of CS breaches also Article 47 of CS: Member States agree to take the steps required to prevent the transmission or circulation of false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety or identification signals, and to collaborate in locating and identifying stations under their jurisdiction transmitting such signals. Latvia is continuously monitoring the quality of the RNSS signal for air traffic, accumulating information on the impact on the quality in the coverage areas of the sensors located in country territory. The accumulated information since September 2024 shows a significant degradation in the quality of the RNSS signal of flight traffic. Additional information is available in Annex 3 Administrations submitting this document would like to ask the Bureau to continue efforts in accordance with the provisions of Section I of Article 13. We are on your disposal if any additional information is needed. We kindly ask you to bring this issue to the attention of Radio Regulations Board at the forthcoming meeting, taking place 17-21 of March 2025 in Geneva. Erko Kulu Head of Frequency Management Division Estonian Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Aurhority Jana Lusvere Deputy Director of Electronic Communications Department Ministry of Transport of Republic of Latvia Darius Kuliešius Deputy Chair of Council of Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania 2  Annex 1 Example of interference situation in Estonia 1. Reports sent by airplanes in Estonian airspace (Time, Flight call sign, Waypoint names, Flight level): Date 07.02.2025 08.02.2025 09.02.2025 Flight data 1001 ESSKI KUNUX F170 0529 BTI30W KUNUX F250 0146 CSN451 RESMO 1157 BTI3KL GIGDI F300 0840 CSG2579 RESMO F340 F340 1157 FIN5PA ARSAM F195 0921 UAE63Q MOTAR F360 0428 SWR1317 GIGDI 1257 FIN1048 RIPEX F150 1249 BTI60W KEMET F310 F150 1327 TDR2000 KEMET 0542 BTI30W KUNUX F330 F250 1553 PIA781 NOTAR F340 0641 BTI7HW NEKAX 2035 FIN4NC KEXLE F240 F130 2302 LOT7TE SOKVA F290 2. Summary of reports sent by airplanes: 3. Monitoring results: Monitoring station in Narva (59°22'50 N, 028°11'27 E) region near the border with Russian Federation detected two sources of interference with bearings 26° - 27° and 70° - 72°. The sources of interference are located in Russian Federation in Leningrad Region.  Annex 1 4. Spectrum screenshots of interferring signal (dBuV/m) on 08.02.2025 and 09.02.2025 respectivly, center frequencies of interfering signals are 1575,4 MHz, 1561,0 MHz and 1602,0 MHz:  Annex 2 Information on GNSS interference in Lithuania Fig. 1 Distribution of affected aircrafts in western part of Lithuania (15 September 2024 – 18 February 2025). Fig. 2. 2024-2025 affected aircrafts in whole Lithuania airspace, unique ICAO IDs per month counted. 1  Annex 2 1 vieta 2 vieta 3 vieta Fig. 3. 2025 January 27 detected GPS L1 interfering emission from territory of Russia (Kaliningrad). Fig. 4. 2025 January 27 detected wideband interfering emission from territory of Russia (Kaliningrad), affecting all GNSS bands. Fig. 5. Interfering emission in GPS L1, GALILEO E1 and GLONASS G1 frequency bands from territory of Russia (Kaliningrad) detected on 2024 October 16, 2024, November 4 and 2025 January 27. 2  Annex 3 Latvian submits information collected starting from September 2024 to January 2025 on RNSS interference cases. RNSS quality data from aircrafts are depicted in the images below. All flights (within the shaded area) during each month are considered, and the GNSS accuracy outside the normal range is calculated as a percentage - Green colour - the error exceeds the norm between 0% and 2% Yellow colour – the error exceeds the norm between 2% and 10% Red colour – the error exceeds the norm by more than 10% The numbers of affected flights are depicted in the table Nb1. The flights included in the table correspond to the images shown below. The table of affected flights includes only those flights whose number of GNSS quality errors during the flight over the displayed area are >10. The month The number of affected flights September 2024 4624 October 2024 5393 November 2024 5830 December 2024 7523 January 2025 7369 Table Nb1 September 2024 October 2024 November 2024  Annex 3 Decembre 2024 January 2025