Estonian CAA's (ECAA) comments on NPA 2017-05 A rticle 11(2) of the draft Commission Regulation on drones states that AltMoC may be used to comply with the new Basic Regulation and its Implementing Rules . However, it is not clear whether AltMoCs used by different UAS operators are subject to prior approval or not. For example, ORO.GEN.120 of the Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 says very clearly which operators must receive an approval from the competent authority for the use of AltMoC and which operators need to notify to the competent authority the list of AltMoC it uses. ECAA recommendation: We recommend to add a similar text from the AIR OPS Regulation to the draft Commission Regulation on d ro nes i n order to clarify which UAS operators need to do what before implementing AltMoCs . Appendix I.1 of draft Commission Regulation on drones states that a UAS Class C0 shall have an MTOM of 250 g. Meanwhile, article 15(3) of the same Regulation and UAS.OPEN.20(b), for instance, describe the mass limitation for UAS/UA as being less than 250 g. ECAA recommendation: We recommend to keep uniform mass limitations (less than 250 g) without the possibility to interpret the limitations in different ways. Also the mass limitation should be applicable to the UA only, not to the UAS. Otherwise the total mass of the aircraft itself and a remote control must be less than the specified limit according to the definition in article 2(cc) (<250 g for UAS is quite ridiculous). It is not clear whether the draft Commission Regulation on drones applies to tethered operations or not. There is a considerable number of people carrying out tethered operations. ECAA recommendation: We recommend to clearly state in the draft Commission Regulation on drones whether the tethered operations shall be carried out in accordance with the said Regulation or national legislation. Article 3(1) of the draft Commission Regulation on drones states that a UAS operator shall comply with requirements and regulations related to insurance (among others). We would like to know if there a re any plans to amend the Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 as well. In our opinion this regulation does not clearly state which aircraft fall under the definition of model aircraft. ECAA recommendation: We recommend to amend the Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 in conjunction with adopting a new Commission Regulation on drones in order to clearly state the insurance requirements for drones at EU level. Article 1(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 states that the rules of the air do not apply to model and toy aircraft only. Other unmanned aircraft are not mentioned, which means they must establish two-way communication in certain zones, for instance. ECAA recommendation: We recommend to amend the Regulation ( EU ) No 923/2012 in conjunction with adopting a new Commission Regulation on drones in order to exclude drones from having the obligation to establish two-way communication and other manned-aircraft-related obligations.
European Aviation Safety Agency
Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (A)
Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of
drones
Unmanned aircraft system operations in the open and specific category
RMT.0230
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (hereinafter referred to at the ‘Basic Regulation’), the regulation of unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of less than 150 kg falls within the competence of the European
Union (EU) Member States (MSs). This leads to a fragmented regulatory system hampering the development of a single EU
market for UAS and cross-border UAS operations. A new proposed Basic Regulation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the new Basic
Regulation’), currently under discussion between the Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, aims to
solve this issue, by extending the competence of the EU to regulate all UAS regardless of their MTOM.
In view of the adoption of this new Regulation, the objective of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2017-05 is:
— to ensure an operation-centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-based regulatory framework for all UAS operations
conducted in the open and specific category;
— to ensure a high and uniform level of safety for UAS;
— to foster the development of the UAS market; and
— to contribute to enhancing privacy, data protection, and security.
This NPA proposes to create a new regulation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX’) defining the measures to
mitigate the risk of operations in:
— the open category through a combination of limitations, operational rules, requirements for the competence of the
remote pilot, as well as technical requirements for the UAS; and
— the specific category through a system including a risk assessment conducted by the operator before starting an
operation, or the operator complying with a standard scenario, or the operator holding a certificate with privileges.
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX will provide flexibility to MSs mainly by allowing them to create zones on their territory where the
use of UAS would be prohibited, limited or on the contrary facilitated.
Pursuant to new Basic Regulation, market product legislation (CE marking) ensures compliance with the technical requirements
for mass-produced UAS operated in the open category. A dedicated Annex (Part-MRK) to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX is proposed
to define the conditions for making UAS available on the market.
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX is expected to increase the level of safety of UAS operations, harmonise legislation among the EU
MSs, as well as create an EU market that will reduce the cost of the UAS and allow cross-border operations.
Note: sub-NPA 2017-05 (A) contains the explanatory note and the proposed draft rules, whereas sub-NPA 2017-05 (B) contains
the full impact assessment (IA) for this RMT.
Action area: Civil drones (UAS)
Affected rules: N/a
Affected stakeholders: Operators (private and commercial); competent authorities; MSs; flight crews; remote pilots;
maintenance staff; UAS manufacturers; other airspace users (manned aircraft); service providers of air
traffic management (ATM)/air navigation services (ANS) and other ATM network functions; air traffic
services (ATS) personnel; aerodromes; general public; model aircraft associations
Driver: Efficiency/proportionality; Rulemaking group: No, but expert group
safety
Impact assessment: Full Rulemaking Procedure: Standard
22.12.2016 4.5.2017 2017/Q4 2018/Q1 2018/Q2
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Table of contents
Table of contents
1. About this NPA ..................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. How this NPA was developed ...................................................................................................................3
1.2. How to comment on this NPA...................................................................................................................3
1.3. The next steps ...........................................................................................................................................3
2. In summary — why and what ............................................................................................................... 4
2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale...............................................................................4
2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ...................................................................................................6
2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals ........................................................................6
2.3.1 General issues ..................................................................................................................................6
2.3.1.1 Background of the NPA ................................................................................................................................... 6
2.3.1.2 Structure of the regulation ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.3.1.3 UA zones ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.3.1.4 Security and privacy ........................................................................................................................................ 8
2.3.1.5 Model aircraft ................................................................................................................................................. 9
2.3.1.6 Boundaries of the open, specific, and certified category ............................................................................. 10
2.3.1.7 Third-country UAS operators ........................................................................................................................ 11
2.3.1.8 Registration ................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.3.1.9 Link with the U-Space.................................................................................................................................... 12
2.3.1.10 Applicability ................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.3.2 Open-category issues .....................................................................................................................13
2.3.2.1 Subcategories ................................................................................................................................................ 13
2.3.2.2 CE marking .................................................................................................................................................... 18
2.3.3 Specific-category issues .................................................................................................................19
2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals .........................................................20
3. Proposed draft rules ........................................................................................................................... 21
3.1. Draft regulation (Draft EASA opinion).....................................................................................................21
3.1.1 Draft cover regulation ....................................................................................................................21
3.1.2. Part-UAS .........................................................................................................................................34
3.1.3 Part-MRK ........................................................................................................................................58
3.2. Draft acceptable means of compliance and guidance material (Draft EASA decision) ..........................92
3.2.1 AMC/GM to the draft cover regulation .........................................................................................92
3.2.2 AMC to Part-UAS ............................................................................................................................96
4. Impact assessment (IA) ..................................................................................................................... 124
5. Proposed action to support implementation ..................................................................................... 125
6. References ....................................................................................................................................... 126
6.1. Affected regulations..............................................................................................................................126
6.2. Affected decisions .................................................................................................................................126
6.3. Other reference documents .................................................................................................................126
7. Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 127
7.1. Differences between the U-Space blueprint and the NPA ...................................................................127
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1. About this NPA
1. About this NPA
1.1. How this NPA was developed
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with the Basic Regulation1 and
the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking
Programme3 under rulemaking task (RMT).0230. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA
based on the input of the UAS expert group4. It is hereby submitted to all interested parties5 for
consultation.
1.2. How to comment on this NPA
Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at
http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/6.
The public-consultation period begins on 12 May 2017 and the deadline for submission of comments is
12 August 2017.
1.3. The next steps
Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments.
Based on the comments received, EASA will develop an opinion containing a new proposed draft
Commission implementing regulation laying down rules as regards unmanned aircraft systems
operations. The opinion will be submitted to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical
basis in order to prepare an EU regulation.
Following the adoption of the regulation, EASA will issue a decision containing the related acceptable
means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM). Additional AMC/GM will be proposed in a
subsequent NPA under this RMT.
The comments received and the EASA responses thereto will be reflected in a comment-response
document (CRD). The CRD will be annexed to the opinion.
1
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of
civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC,
Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216).
2
EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such a process has
been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015
of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions,
certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management-board/decisions/easa-
mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure).
3
http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/annual-programme-and-planning.php
4
Section 2.3.1.1 of this sub-NPA 2017-05 (A) provides more details on the expert group composition.
5
In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure.
6
In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (
[email protected]).
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2. In summary — why and what
2. In summary — why and what
2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale
In the last years, the development of small unmanned aircraft (UA) with an MTOM of less than 25 kg has
been extremely fast and has challenged traditional aviation. As stated in the Executive Summary, in
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, the regulation of UAS with an MTOM of less than 150 kg
comes within the competence of the EU MSs. As described in the IA (see sub-NPA 2017-05 (B)), several
EU MSs have adopted and implemented national rules that are not harmonised with each other.
Operators and manufacturers of UAS have pleaded for a harmonisation of such rules to create a
European market for UAS.
As a consequence, the new proposed Basic Regulation, currently under discussion between the Council,
the European Commission and the European Parliament, contains requirements regulating all UAS,
except those used for ‘state’ operations (e.g. military, customs, police, firefighting, etc.), and defines the
essential requirements to ensure the safety of UAS. In addition, said Regulation includes the possibility
of ‘opting in’ for MSs wishing to place UAS under EU regulation.
The requirements for UAS in the new Basic Regulation will be complemented by other Commission
regulations.
This sub-NPA 2017-05 (A) proposes a draft commission regulation for the open and specific category
(Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX).
Safety issues
The two main risks that need to be addressed are the following:
— air risk (collision with a manned aircraft or another UA); and
— ground risk (collision with persons or critical infrastructure).
A safety risk assessment is contained in the IA (see sub-NPA 2017-05 (B)), including a safety risk
portfolio. In this context, it should be noted that since reporting on UAS occurrences is mostly made by
manned-aircraft pilots, the reporting data for air risk is much more extensive than for ground risk where
only anecdotal evidence exists. In general, the number of reported occurrences has considerably
increased in the recent years. The risk assessment has identified three key risk areas:
— airborne conflict;
— aircraft upset (UAS out of control); and
— other systems’ failures.
These risk areas are reflected, where appropriate, in the requirements for the open and specific category
For example, airborne conflict in the open category is mitigated by laying down a requirement for:
— a maximum height;
— operations in visual line of sight (VLOS); and
— for some UAS Class a, a geofencing functionality.
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2. In summary — why and what
Exemptions7 in accordance with Article 14 ‘Flexibility provisions’ and/or Article 22 ‘Air operation
certification’ of the Basic Regulation
There are no such exemptions.
Alternative means of compliance (AltMoC)
No AltMoC relevant to this RMT exist. However, it should be noted that the concept of AltMoC has been
introduced in this sub-NPA 2017-05 (A) only in the context of the specific category. This point is further
developed under Section 2.3 ‘How we want to achieve it — Overview of the proposals’ of this sub-NPA
2017-05 (A).
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and third-countries references
EASA has active cooperation links mainly with ICAO, Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned
Systems (JARUS)8, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The scope of the remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) ICAO Panel is international flights in
instrument flight rules (IFR), which relates to the certified category. Therefore, it is not applicable to this
NPA.
The EASA concept of UAS operations is highly inspired by the JARUS concept that identifies three
categories, A, B, and C, related to the open, specific and certified category, respectively. The draft JARUS
rules for category A and B are based on the EASA ‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned
Aircraft Operations, published on 22 August 20169.
Finally, EASA will incorporate in the additional draft AMC to Regulation (EU) No 201X/XXX (see
Section 3.2), to be published in a subsequent NPA, the specific operations risk assessment (SORA), a
methodology developed by JARUS for the risk assessment required for UAS operations in the specific
category.
The FAA published Part 107 for the regulation of small-UAS operations, which became applicable in
August 2016 and whose scope is comparable to the EASA open category (MTOM of 55 lb which is
equivalent to 25 kg). The main differences are the following:
— The FAA relies more on operator competences and operational limitations, while the Agency uses
in addition design requirements for the UAS.
— The FAA regulates model aircraft activities through Public Law 112-95, Section 336. ‘Special rule
for model aircraft’, while the Agency proposes to regulate both model aircraft and UAS through
the same rules. The conditions of Public Law 112-95, Section 336 are codified in Part 101,
7
Exemptions having a possible impact on the development of this RMT and stemming from:
— Article 14(1): measures taken as an immediate reaction to a safety problem;
— Article 14(4): exemptions from substantive requirements laid down in the Basic Regulation and its implementing rules (IRs) in the
event of unforeseen urgent operational circumstances or operational needs of a limited duration;
— Article 14(6): derogation from the rule(s) implementing the Basic Regulation where an equivalent level of protection to that
attained by the application of said rules can be achieved by other means; and
— Article 22(2)(b): individual flight time specification schemes deviating from the applicable certification specifications that ensure
compliance with the essential requirements and, as appropriate, related IRs.
8
See also http://jarus-rpas.org/.
9
http://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas
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2. In summary — why and what
Subpart E ‘Special Rule for Model Aircraft’. As per the FAA website, model aircraft may also be
flown in accordance with Part 107.
— The FAA has yet to regulate UAS operations conducted over people as well as extended
operations (e.g. operations beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS)), while those are covered in this
NPA.
2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives
The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the new Basic Regulation. This
proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in
Chapter 2.
The specific objectives of this proposal related to UAS, as defined in the IA, are:
— to ensure an operation-centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-based regulatory
framework;
— to ensure a high and uniform level of safety for UAS;
— to foster the development of the UAS market; and
— to contribute to enhancing privacy, data protection, and security.
Based on those objectives, the IA contains a problem tree graph depicting the links between the issues
(problems encountered), the drivers of those issues, as well as their consequences.
2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals
2.3.1 General issues
2.3.1.1 Background of the NPA
This NPA is a follow-up of the concept of UAS operations of A-NPA 2015-1010 publicly consulted between
31.7.2015 and 25.9.2015, as well as of the Opinion of a technical nature11 (published on 18.12.2015)
based on the A-NPA and the feedback received during its consultation. A ‘Prototype’ Commission
Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations was then published in August 2016 providing a first draft
of the UAS regulation. The approximately 600 detailed comments received during the consultation of
the ‘Prototype’ Regulation together with the significant inputs provided by an expert group put in place
by EASA have been taken into account to prepare this NPA. More than additional 1000 comments were
received via email from model aircraft practitioners expressing their dissatisfaction with the
requirements for model aircraft included in the ‘Prototype’ Regulation. Based on these comments, EASA
improved in this NPA the quality of the draft regulation and developed additional options for model
aircraft activities. The above-mentioned expert group included representatives of the EU MSs, the UAS
industry (both for large and small UAS), of manned aviation and of model aircraft associations. The size
of the expert group was small, but as there were many candidatures, individuals not retained as group
members were included in a distribution list and kept informed of the activities of the group, with the
possibility to comment during the drafting of this NPA. Additionally, the work of JARUS has been
considered when drafting this NPA.
10
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2015-10
11
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions/opinion-technical-nature
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2. In summary — why and what
Moreover, the information contained in two complementary reports12 drafted by two EASA task forces
respectively benefitted the work on the NPA:
— Study and Recommendations regarding Unmanned Aircraft System Geo-Limitations; and
— ‘Drone Collision’ Task Force.
The NPA requirements introduce an operation-centric concept. This concept stems from the fact that
the consequences of an accident or incident with a UAS not carrying people are highly dependent on the
environment where the accident or incident takes place. The requirements have been developed
applying also a risk-based and performance-based approach.
The risk-based approach in the open category is exemplified by introducing subcategories, and in the
specific category, by laying down the requirement for a risk assessment to be conducted by the operator
before starting an operation. The subcategorisation in the open category is also based on a risk
assessment where the risks (both air and ground) are mitigated by a combination of limitations,
operational rules, competences of the remote pilot, as well as technical requirements for the UAS.
The performance-based approach is applied by providing the main requirements in the draft regulation
as well as a significant set of related AMC/GM on the one hand, and, when dealing with technical
requirements, by expressing them in terms of functionalities; these technical requirements should be
supported by analogous industry standards.
In accordance with the new Basic Regulation, market product legislation (CE marking) ensures
compliance with the technical requirements for the UAS operated in the open category.
2.3.1.2 Structure of the regulation
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX has the following structure:
— the cover regulation that includes the regulatory scope, definitions of significant terms and
acronyms, the timelines required for the transition period until the full implementation of the
regulation, as well as high-level requirements for operations in the open and specific category
(e.g. requirements for registration, geofencing and electronic identification, competent
authorities, the concept of UA zones, and model aircraft);
— Annex I (Part-UAS) with detailed aviation requirements for UAS operations in the open and
specific category; and
— Annex II (Part-MRK) containing the conditions for making UAS in the open category available on
the market.
Consequently, the requirements in the open category rely both on aviation legislation and product
legislation (CE marking). Such a system has been put in place to avoid applying Annex I (Part-21) to
Regulation (EU) No 748/201213 rules that would be disproportionate for the small UAS. In addition,
small-UAS manufacturers are in general more familiar with the CE marking than with Part-21.
12
http://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas
13
Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental
certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production
organisations (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493049463572&uri=CELEX:32012R0748).
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2. In summary — why and what
Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX defines the issues not addressed by this NPA. It clarifies that said
Regulation does not cover the certified category of UAS, or indoor operations since the new Basic
regulation applies to the single European sky (SES) and indoors activities are not considered part of the
SES.
Counter-UAS equipment and operations are also not addressed in this NPA as they are more related to
security matters.
2.3.1.3 UA zones
In order to address the strong request for flexibility made by certain MSs, a concept of zones has been
introduced into Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. Such zones are defined by MSs and the related
information must be published in a manner and format established by EASA to ensure standardisation.
The requirements of this article must be read in conjunction with those of the open and specific
category. It allows for two generic types of zones:
— those where UAS operations are prohibited or restricted; and
— those that alleviate certain requirements in the open or specific category.
The first type of zones may be established for safety, security, privacy or environmental reasons,
whereas the second one, for example, to facilitate flight testing of new designs or operations.
2.3.1.4 Security and privacy
Furthermore, the NPA addresses security and privacy risks. The need to contribute to the mitigation of
these risks has been disputed as some stakeholders strongly believed that the NPA should deal with
safety issues only. However, Recital 19 of the new Basic Regulation indicates that UAS rules should
contribute as much as possible to respecting the right to privacy and family life. The essential
requirements of said Regulation for UAS also refer to privacy and environment. Based on the above, it is
prudent to include in this NPA requirements that contribute to addressing security threats as well as to
enforcing privacy and data protection rights in order to support the smooth development of an EU UAS
market. Related examples can be found in the requirements for:
— Registration: UAS operators must register the UA except those operating UAS with an MTOM of
less than 250 g. It was considered that below this weight threshold, in case of impact, the energy
involved is low enough to pose only some negligible safety risk. The performance of the UA, in
terms of autonomy, additionally reduces the privacy risk. For security considerations, the UAS
operator must also register the UA when the UA is heavier than 900 g.
— Electronic identification: this functionality is required for UAS equipped with an audio sensor or a
camera of more than 5 megapixels (MP) and a real-time video transmission link or any other type
of sensor able to record personal data, or required by the zone of operation.
— Geofencing: this functionality is required for UAS heavier than 900 g, or required by the zone of
operation.
— The definition of zones: MSs may define zones or airspace areas where UAS operations are
prohibited or restricted also for security or privacy reasons.
— The obligation of the operator to comply with the security requirements defined in Article 3 of
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
— The obligation of the remote pilot of a UA to avoid flying close to emergency response efforts.
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2. In summary — why and what
— The basic remote-pilot competence: in order to operate in the open category, the remote pilot
must demonstrate knowledge not only of safety regulations but also of relevant EU security and
privacy/data protection regulations.
2.3.1.5 Model aircraft
Model aircraft are within the scope of this NPA since, pursuant to the definition of a UA in the new Basic
Regulation, a model aircraft is a UA. A definition that could distinguish model aircraft from UAS is not
easy to be developed. Some model aircraft pilots argue that they would be reluctant to use certain UAS
technology supposed to assist them in conducting the flight (e.g. a flight control system with higher
automation than a typical radio control) since this would reduce their pleasure. Said technology instead
is widely used in UAS since in this case, a remote pilot could focus more on the payload (e.g. filming with
a camera) than in flying the UAS. Therefore, a definition of model aircraft could be based on the absence
of a flight control system that potentially allows a UAS to fly within the BVLOS range. In reality, certain
model aircraft are indeed equipped with some form of assisted flight control system. This approach was
therefore rejected. On the other hand, it is recognised that model aircraft activities have good safety
records. This is not due to the type of aircraft used but rather to the code of conduct developed by the
model club and associations. In most cases, they have related procedures, they build awareness, and in
some cases, they also provide training to their members, thus creating a safety framework.
For this reason, the NPA contains in Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX dedicated requirements for
recreational flight activities conducted in the framework of model clubs and associations, allowing
competent authorities to issue an operational authorisation in which they may define deviations from
the rules proposed in this NPA. This operational authorisation is issued based on the procedures,
management system, etc. of the club or association, without further showing of compliance. In addition
to said Article 14, this NPA offers two other possibilities to model aircraft pilots not intending to join a
model club:
— operations in specific zones designated by MSs, as described in Article 12(1)(d) of Regulation (EU)
201X/XXX, where MSs can alleviate the requirements of the rules proposed in this NPA; and
— operations in Subcategory A3 of the open category.
Operations in Subcategory A3 may be conducted with privately built UAS, or UAS Class C3 or Class C4.
This last class was developed with a minimum set of technical requirements focusing mainly on
providing the remote pilot with operational instructions issued by the manufacturer, as well as on raising
the remote pilot’s awareness of the EU regulations through a leaflet. Subcategory A3 has been designed
to offer the possibility to model aircraft pilots to operate in the open category. The only constraint is
that mass-produced model aircraft must comply with Class C4 requirements. However, this will create a
negligible additional burden for manufacturers. Indeed, model aircraft currently available on the market
are already required to display a CE marking to show compliance with the applicable regulations (e.g.
Directive 2014/53/EU14 on radio equipment). Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX will only require the
manufacturer to comply, in addition, with the following requirements:
(a) have an MTOM, including payload, of less than 25 kg;
14
Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the
Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153,
22.5.2014, p. 62) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493633541462&uri=CELEX:02014L0053-20140611).
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(b) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(c) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions; and
(d) include an awareness leaflet.
Compliance with the above requirements will be attested by the CE marking for Class C4.
According to Article 15 of Regulation 201X/XXX, all model aircraft currently in use will be able to be
operated also after the entry into force of this Regulation, still using one of the three options explained
above (be member of a model club, operate in dedicated areas, or follow the operational limitations for
Subcategory A3), without the need of any modification to the aircraft.
2.3.1.6 Boundaries of the open, specific, and certified category
The categorisation of UAS operations in the open, specific, and certified category is based on the risk of
the operation. This NPA sets the boundaries of the open-category for operations conducted:
— with a UAS with an MTOM of less than 25 kg;
— below 120-m height; and
— in VLOS.
As explained above, UAS operators may be exempted from such limits in the zones described in
Article 12(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX, or in the authorisation for model clubs and associations
described in Article 14 of said Regulation. When the intended operation exceeds one of the limits set for
the open category, then it falls into the specific category.
A UAS operation is then classified into the certified category when considering the risks involved, it
requires the certification of the UA and of its operator, as well as licensing of the flight crew.
It has been proposed that the certified category might not be needed at all as all operations not fitting
into the open category could be covered by the specific category. Although this is theoretically possible,
there would be cases with so numerous mitigation measures required that certification would be more
efficient and would allow, in addition, to cover more operations that the one described in the risk
assessment.
Recital 20(a) of the new Basic Regulation proposes the following:
‘The conditions for situations in which the design, production, maintenance and operation of unmanned
aircraft, as well as the personnel and organisations involved in these activities, should be subject to
certification, should take into account the nature and risk of the type of operation concerned. These
conditions should in particular take into account the type, scale, and complexity of the operation,
including, where relevant, the size and type of the traffic handled by the responsible organisation or
person; whether the operation is open to members of the public; the extent to which other air traffic or
persons and property on the ground could be endangered by the operation; the purpose of the flight
and type of airspace used; the complexity and performance of the unmanned aircraft involved.’
However, these criteria are quite similar to the elements of the risk assessment, thus leading to the
conclusion that an operation must be certified only after a detailed investigation (bottom-up approach).
A top-down approach defining clear-cut cases would usefully complement this bottom-up approach, and
meet the expectations at political level.
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The following have been proposed to be classified as certified-category operations:
— large or complex UAS operating continuously over open assemblies of people;
— large or complex UAS operating BVLOS in high-density airspace;
— UAS used for transport of people; and
— UAS used for the carriage of dangerous goods, which may result in high risk for third-parties in
case of crash.
This list is still under development within the JARUS Working Group 7 (WG-7) concept of operation.
Comments on the list are specifically encouraged.
2.3.1.7 Third-country UAS operators
After some debate within the expert group, Article 10 has been added to the Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
The debate was about the actual risk to have third-country UAS operators performing activities in the
EU. As it was impossible to exclude that this might happen, said Article has been added to extend the
applicability of said Regulation to them. The competent authority where a third-country operator needs
to register is the one of the MS of operations because this authority is best acquainted with the area of
operation. The difference between those rules and those for manned aircraft is due to the use of an
operation-centric concept in the UAS environment. Such third-country operators have to comply with
the proposed Regulation with the exception of certain certificates (i.e. the certificate of the remote pilot
or of the UAS operator) that may be accepted by EASA, when it has analysed the third-country
regulations and has concluded that they provide a level of safety equivalent to that ensured by the
requirements included in this NPA. EASA performing this analysis may avoid multiple recognition of
certificates by several MSs. EASA will involve experts from the MSs in the team performing this analysis.
The approach presented in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX is the one developed in Article 57(2)
of the new Basic Regulation, which allows the European Commission to lay down detailed rules with
regard to the acceptance of certificates or other documents issued by third countries. Such certificates
or documents may also be accepted using international agreements between the EU and a third country
(e.g. bilateral aviation safety agreements (BASAs) with the United States of America (USA)).
2.3.1.8 Registration
Registration is fundamental for law enforcement and unmanned aircraft traffic management (UTM) or
U-Space operations. Five options have been analysed in the IA (see sub-NPA 2017-05 (B), Chapter 5) and
they are presented below for ease of reference:
Option No Short title Description
R0 Do nothing Registration is defined at MS level.
R1 Operator Only the operator must register.
R2 Operator and UA (not Both the operator and the UA must be registered (except toys).
for toys)
R3 Operator and UA (not Both the operator and the UA must be registered (except toys
for toys and UA Class1) and UA C1).
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R4 EASA registration The registration system is designed at EU level (EASA).
The IA describes the rationale for choosing Option R3. In addition, it was considered that registration at
EU level (Option R4) could save costs and resources for authorities. Even if this Option has a certain
merit for EASA, other considerations that fall outside of EASA’s competence should be taken into
account, which are part of the current negotiations between the Council, the European Commission, and
the European Parliament.
Views of stakeholders are also sought on another option, which was identified at a later stage. Said
option would consist in requiring the operators to register (except for toys) and allowing the MSs to
decide which aircraft should be registered. Those registers would still need to be interoperable based on
EASA standards. The advantage of this option would be to allow MSs the flexibility to decide which
aircraft should be registered based on the national situation, for example in matters of security.
2.3.1.9 Link with the U-Space
The high-level conference on UAS held in Poland on 23-24 November 201615 acknowledged that the
development of the potential of the UAS service market would not only require the development of an
appropriate EU regulatory framework but also ‘… urgent action on the airspace dimension, in particular
the development of the concept of the “U-Space” on access to low level airspace especially in urban
areas’.
U-Space is a set of new services and specific procedures designed to support safe, efficient and secure
access to airspace for large numbers of UAS (e.g. registration, electronic identification, geofencing, flight
approval, tracking, etc.). A draft blueprint of the U-space concept has been presented by the Directorate
General (DG) Move of the European Commission at a workshop held on 20 April 2017 in the Hague. The
blueprint will be incorporated into an addendum relative to the integration of UAS into the European
ATM Master Plan that should be adopted by the end of 2017. The Single European Sky ATM Research
(SESAR) Joint Undertaking (SJU) is responsible for developing both the blueprint and the addendum.
As it can be derived from the U-Space description, there is a strong link between the U-Space concept
and the Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. The SJU and EASA compared the proposed requirements of this NPA
and the ones incorporated into the draft blueprint, which led to the identification of gaps/differences
listed in the Appendix to this sub-NPA 2017-05 (A). Reviewing the latest version of the blueprint, it is
evident that the requirements of the NPA and the draft blueprint are consistent with regard to the
implementation of the U-space in 2019.
The coordination to ensure consistency will continue until publication of the related opinion and of the
blueprint, taking into account comments received on the blueprint, as well as during the public
consultation of the NPA. Publication of both documents is expected towards the end of 2017.
The airspace and U-Space concept issues are discussed in more detail in the dedicated Section 1.2.4.4
‘Issue 4 — Lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations’ of sub-NPA 2017-05 (B).
2.3.1.10 Applicability
Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX addresses applicability issues. The new rules are proposed to be
applicable 2 and/or 3 years after adoption of the Regulation by the European Commission. This is due to
15
Its outcome was the ‘Warsaw Declaration’ (see Section 1.2.3.1.3 of sub-NPA 2017-05 (B)).
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the fact that there are several national rules, and it is therefore necessary to allow sufficient time to
both MSs and stakeholders to take the appropriate measures to comply with Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
2.3.2 Open-category issues
2.3.2.1 Subcategories
The main topic of the expert group discussions was the definition of subcategories in the open category,
and how to achieve the right balance between the following elements:
— development of a UAS market;
— safety (air risk and ground risk);
— security;
— privacy and data protection; and
— environmental concerns.
Subcategories are defined by a set of parameters, such as the following:
— MTOM of the UAS;
— distance of the UAS from people;
— height of the UAS above the ground;
— age and competence of the remote pilot;
— UAS technical requirements;
— UAS registration; and
— electronic identification and geofencing.
EASA’s initial proposal focused on technical requirements and remote-pilot competence, and defined
several subcategories complemented by the designation of zones by MSs. This system of zones could
allow MSs to determine which UAS subcategories are allowed in each zone. As an alternative to this
proposal, 21 MSs drafted a counterproposal that contained simpler rules focusing on remote-pilot
responsibility and on few or no technical requirements for risk mitigation.
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2. In summary — why and what
The MSs counterproposal is summarised in Table 116 below:
Table 1
UAS UAS Distance Maximum Remote- Age of the Electronic Technical
subcategory MTOM from height of the pilot remote identification/ requirements
17
(AIS ) people operation competence pilot geofencing
A0 < 250 g or No VLOS and in None Decided by No (or on a Yes, if
Fly over AIS < 3 limitation no case higher MSs voluntary AIS < 3, or
Note (a) than 30 m Note (c) basis) Directive
people
below the 2009/48/EC
18
ICAO visual
flight rules Note (b)
(VFR)
A1 250 g to More minimum Online Yes, if U-Space No
Fly close to 25 kg than altitude, training available Note (b)
Note (a) 50 m normally Note (e) Note (d)
people
away 120 m
from
crowds
A2 250 g to Less than Exam
Fly far from 3 kg 50 m, but including
Notes (a) not theoretical
people
and (b) directly and
above practical
crowds skills
Note (f)
During the 5th expert group meeting, a compromise between the initial proposal and the
counterproposal was reached, by reducing the complexity of the rule, as required by the 21 MSs, by
keeping some technical requirements, and by defining the remote-pilot competence in a more
proportionate way. The subcategorisation in the open category as well as the designation of zones
provide flexibility to the MSs, and were generally supported by the expert group.
16
Notes to Table 1:
(a) It applies to model aircraft and UAS; emergency recovery systems may be excluded up to a certain limit.
(b) Not directly over people (without EC marking, with AIS < 3): the main driver of the complexity of the draft rule is the
subcategorisation in the open category, as well as the link with the EU harmonisation legislation (CE marking). The use of CE
marking complicating the draft rule can only be justified for flights directly over people. Furthermore, US Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 14, Part 107 does not address the safety of the UAS as a product for operations that are not conducted directly
over people. Thus, the CE marking should only be used to confirm that a UAS can be operated safely directly over people (i.e. it
complies with the applicable AIS requirement).
(c) According to current experience, there is no correlation between the age of the UAS pilot and the risk to uninvolved people.
(d) Alignment of the regulatory approach with the U-Space: all electronic-identification and geofencing requirements must only
require a connection to the U-Space. Installing equipment for electronic identification or geofencing that is not compatible with
the U-Space is unjustifiable, considering the time frame set for the creation of the U-Space (2019).
(e) Online training approved by a competent authority or qualified entity: theoretical remote-pilot competence is an essential
element in ensuring safety in the open category.
(f) Exams can be provided by a competent authority or qualified entity.
17
Abbreviated injury scale (see sub-NPA 2017/05 (B) for additional information).
18
Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys (OJ L 170, 30.6.2009, p. 1)
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493656682583&uri=CELEX:02009L0048-20140721).
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2. In summary — why and what
The compromise proposal is summarised in Table 2 below:
Table 2
Maximum Main technical Electronic
UAS MTOM/ Remote-pilot Age of the UAS
UAS class Distance from people height of the requirements identification (EI),
subcategory Joule (J) competence remote pilot registration
operation (CE marking) geofencing (G)
Privately N/a
built < 250 g < 50 m Leaflet No limitation Toy regulation, No No
no sharp edges,
C0 awareness leaflet
A1
Fly over uninvolved people (not over
Fly over < 120 m or up
assemblies of people) Kinetic energy, EI if with a camera
people to 50 m above a Leaflet plus
14 years or no sharp edges, of > 5 MP or an
< 80 J or higher obstacle, online Only for
C1 with selectable height audio sensor, EI and
900 g at the request training with operator
supervisor limit, G if required by the
of the owner of a test
awareness leaflet zone of operations
the object
Leaflet plus
< 120 m or up certificate of Mechanical strength,
Fly intentionally in proximity to but at a to 50 m above a competence lost-link
A2 16 years or
safe distance from uninvolved people higher obstacle, (theoretical management, Operator and
Fly close to C2 < 4 kg with Yes
(> 20 m for rotorcraft UAS or > 50 m for at the request qualification) selectable height UA
people supervisor
fixed-wing UAS) of the owner of and exam in limit,
the object an approved awareness leaflet
centre
Lost-link
Fly in an area where it is reasonably management,
C3 expected that no uninvolved person will selectable. height
be present < 120 m or up limit,
Operator and
to 50 m above a Leaflet plus awareness leaflet
A3 16 years or UA
higher obstacle, online Operational. If required by the
Fly far from < 25 kg with
C4 at the request training with Instructions, zone of operations
people In addition to the above, keep a safety supervisor
of the owner of a test awareness leaflet
distance from the boundaries of
the object
congested areas of cities, towns or
Privately settlements, or aerodromes
N/a
built
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2. In summary — why and what
It should be noted that Table 2 includes Class C4 that was not part of the agreement reached at the 5th
expert group meeting. The rationale behind this addition is explained further below.
This proposal still allows MSs to use Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX to define zones where only
some classes of UAS are admitted.
Manufacturers are required to:
— include a leaflet in the package of the manufactured UA providing the rules of conduct as well as
the main elements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX; and
— affix a dedicated label on the UA, defining the class it belongs to; in this way, the UAS operator
will immediately know the operational limitations it needs to comply with.
Chapter 4 of sub-NPA 2017-05 (B) contains a thorough evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of the
various options. Here is only a set of key points:
— Subcategories: three subcategories have been identified:
A1 — fly over people: operations in Subcategory A1 can be conducted only with lighter UA
(Class C0 or C1 with an MTOM of less than 900 g). A remote pilot operating a UA Class C0
or a privately built UAS with an MTOM of less than 250 g is only required to read the
leaflet included in the UA package, and allowed to fly up to a maximum height of 50 m. If
operating a UA Class C1, the remote pilot is required to complete an online training as well
as an online test, and allowed to fly up to 120 m.
A2 — fly close to people: operations in Subcategory A2 are conducted with a UA Class C2.
The remote pilot is required to successfully complete a test in a centre approved by the
competent authority enabling the remote pilot to fly up to a maximum altitude of 120 m
and at a distance of 20 m from uninvolved persons, if operating a rotary-wing UAS, or up
to 50 m from uninvolved persons, if operating a fixed-wing UAS.
A3 — fly far from people: Subcategory A3 was the most contentious during the expert
group meetings; the group finally achieved a delicate balance, which was due to the
difficulty to define the condition ‘far from people’ on the one hand, and to develop an
appropriate set of technical requirements for the UAS authorised in Subcategory A3.
Different views were voiced in the group on the definition of the right balance between
operational limitations and technical requirements.
Different kinds of UAS may be operated in this Subcategory, including privately built and
model aircraft operated outside of model club and associations or outside of the areas
designated by the MSs in accordance with Article 12(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. In
addition to the class for privately built UAS and UAS Class C3, discussed with the expert
group, EASA, at the request of the European Commission, has included an additional Class
C4. This Class will ensure a proper implementation of Annex II to Regulation
(EU) 201X/XXX for all commercially produced UAS authorised in the open category, thus
preventing unfair competition. The two Classes under Subcategory A3 are defined as
follows:
o Class C3 dedicated to UAS for which the manufacturer opts not to meet the full set
of requirements defined for Class C2, but the UAS is still equipped with a small set
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of functions (i.e. loss-link management and height limitation). These UAS are
allowed to operate in areas and airspace where the remote pilot is required to
assess that, reasonably, no uninvolved person will be present during the entire time
of the operation.
o Class C4 dedicated to less complex UAS (i.e. not including a flight control system,
like certain model aircraft) for which the requirements defined in the other classes
are not practicable. UAS Class C4 are required to comply with a very limited set of
technical requirements. They focus mainly on providing the remote pilot with
operational instructions, issued by the manufacturer, on how to conduct the UAS,
as well as on raising the remote pilot’s awareness of the EU regulations through a
leaflet. UAS class C4 operations are limited outside of the boundaries of congested
areas of cities, towns or settlements, or aerodromes. The remote pilot is required to
assess that, reasonably, no uninvolved person will be present in the area and
airspace where the UA is intended to be flown, during the entire time of the
operation. In addition, the remote pilot is required to keep the UA at a safe distance
from the boundaries of the aforementioned congested areas. This supplementary
condition has been introduced to compensate for the limited technical
requirements of Class C4.The safe distance should be determined based on the
actual performance of the UA such that no third party is endangered in case of UA
loss of control.
Additionally, UAS Class C0, C1 and C2 can also be operated in this Subcategory.
This solution offers the following benefits:
o allows MSs the flexibility to designate special zones for certain classes only;
o addresses the concern raised by some MSs requiring a minimum set of technical
requirements for UAS operated in urban environment (i.e. Class C3);
o improves the remote pilots’, including model aircraft pilots’, awareness of the
regulations;
o provides for a proper oversight; and
o ensures law enforcement of the harmonisation legislation.
— Technical requirements (CE marking): the compromise proposal includes technical requirements
for all UAS except the privately built ones. This supports the development of different market
niches (e.g. hobbyist activities may develop in Subcategory A1, as training requirements are
maintained at a low level but compensated by the performance limitations of UAS Class C1,
while professional applications might better develop under Subcategory A2, using the heavier
UAS Class C2 with its high-level training requirements), and addresses the issues of ground and
air safety by providing the following:
a lost-link management in Class C2 that allows to address the issues of ground risk and air
risk; and
a selectable flight altitude limit that allows to limit the air risk (Classes C1 and C2).
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— Registration, electronic identification, and geofencing: These three elements are already
proposed in this NPA as it is assumed that that they constitute the fundament of any U-Space
concept. In addition, they are already necessary for the following reasons:
safety: geofencing reduces the air risk when zones are created for the protection of
aerodromes;
law enforcement: registration and electronic identification allow to take action against a
negligent or reckless operator;
security: electronic identification and geofencing contribute to addressing the security risk
through identification of potential threats or the designation of zones for the protection of
sensitive installations; and
privacy: electronic identification contributes to the law enforcement of privacy rights and
geofencing contributes to addressing the privacy risk through the creation of zones for the
protection of the privacy of a community.
Moreover, such requirements could act as the forerunner of analogous national requirements that
might be imposed by the MSs’ security authorities. In order to discuss how to best incorporate the
aspect of security into Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX, the European Commission and EASA collaborate with
a group of security authorities’ officials, established by the Commission, to address the security threats
related to UAS (Counter UAV Pioneer Group).
The definition of the subcategories and the corresponding classes are intended to foster the
development of a future UAS market in the open category. UAS manufacturers are kindly requested to
provide their feedback on this matter. In particular, they are invited to provide information about the
development of market niches that each open subcategory could support, as well as to indicate in
which Class (C0, C1, C2, C3 or C4) they would decide to develop and commercialise their products.
2.3.2.2 CE marking
Part-MRK together with Appendix I to Part-UAS define the new EU harmonisation legislation that UAS
operated in the open category will have to comply with, as well as with other applicable rules, such as
Directive2014/53/EU. Their aim is to ensure that UAS placed on the European market and authorised
to operate without further approval comply with the essential technical requirements of
Appendices I.1 to I.5 to Part-UAS for UAS Classes C0 to C4. Appendix I.6 contains the essential
requirements for functionalities such as geofencing and electronic identification.
Compliance is shown by affixing the CE marking and the UAS class on the UAS.
Article II.1 ‘Subject matter and scope’ of Part-MRK clarifies that this legislation applies only to UAS
designed to be operated in the open category (i.e. mass-produced UAS).
The UAS harmonisation legislation included in Part-MRK has been drafted in accordance with the
reference requirements of Decision No 768/2008/EC19 and calls upon the market surveillance activities
defined in Regulation (EC) No 765/200820. It identifies among others the following:
19
Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing
of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493654386469&uri=CELEX:02008D0768-20080709).
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— the responsibilities of the company making the product available on the market (Section 2);
— the conformity of the product with the applicable requirements (Article II.16 of Section 3), and in
particular the conformity assessment procedures (Appendices II.1 to II.3);
— the notification of, and requirements applicable to, assessment bodies that perform the
conformity assessment (Section 4); and
— the market surveillance requirements that describe for example how a UAS can be withdrawn
from the market (Section 5).
Part-MRK contains elements included in airworthiness regulations, such as technical requirements, a
conformity procedure, or market surveillance provisions. However, these regulations have not been
applied as this would require compliance with Part-21, which would not be proportionate in the case
of UAS.
2.3.3 Specific-category issues
The specific category is applicable to all operations not complying with the limits of the open category.
It basically requires the operator to perform a risk assessment that the competent authority confirms
through an authorisation.
Chapter 6 of sub-NPA 2017-05 (B) details the options analysed for the specific category, as well as the
reasons for selecting the one reflected in the NPA.
These options are presented below for ease of reference:
Option No Short title Description
S0 Do nothing The new Basic Regulation would not extend EASA’s competence
to UAS of 150 kg or less, or the specific category would still be
regulated by MSs’ rules. The regulatory framework at EU level
would remain fragmented, with some MSs having standard
scenarios and/or stricter requirements than others.
S1 Authorisation for all All UAS operations in the specific category would need an
operations authorisation.
S2 Authorisation and Two types of standard scenarios would be defined, the former
standard scenarios requiring the operator to submit a declaration, and the latter
requiring the competent authority to issue an authorisation.
S3 Authorisation, In addition to Option S2, the operator would have the possibility
standard scenarios, to apply for a light UAS operator certificate (LUC) with privileges
and LUC to authorise its operations.
Option S3 is the one selected in the NPA.
20
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for
accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218,
13.8.2008, p. 30) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493654158057&uri=CELEX:02008R0765-20080813).
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2. In summary — why and what
To limit the administrative burden for both operators and competent authorities, a system of standard
scenarios has been proposed. A standard scenario is a pre-established risk assessment and includes
mitigating measures. It may be followed by a declaration submitted by the operator (in case the
implementation of the mitigation measures is considered to be simple), or by an authorisation issued
by the competent authority (when the implementation of the mitigation measures is considered to be
more complex). Furthermore, an optional LUC has been proposed, which allows the competent
authority to issue privileges to the operator. This implies a significant investment from the operator’s
side, which should yield in the medium/long term. Indeed, the LUC privileges can ultimately allow the
operator to approve its own operations.
A methodology for performing the risk assessment and identifying the related mitigation measures is
SORA. This JARUS methodology is current under consultation, and its final version should be available
towards the end of 2017. SORA is proposed in AMC1 UAS.SPEC.40 ‘Operational risk assessment’. The
SORA mitigation measures become binding for the operator when included in its declaration or in the
authorisation issued by the competent authority.
The standard scenarios are a key to the success of the specific category. An additional NPA proposing
standard scenarios as AMC to the specific category is expected to be published by the end of 2017. The
plan to develop those scenarios may include the following steps:
— identification of the organisations that would be ready to contribute;
— decision on the priorities of the scenarios; and
— call for a kick-off meeting with the organisations that volunteered, during which SORA would be
explained, and the organisations would be requested to present their standard scenarios using a
specific template; this approach is intended to ensure consistency among the various proposals.
In addition to standard scenarios adopted at EASA level, alternative standard scenarios may be
adopted at MS level as AltMoC, defined in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
Mutual recognition of authorisations by authorities is a particular point that needs to be highlighted.
The EU general principle is that an authorisation granted in accordance with an EU regulation is
recognised by all competent authorities without providing additional documentation. However, it is
recognised that an authorisation granted by the competent authority of the operator’s principal place
of business may need to be adapted to the local conditions that may exist in another MS. An AMC has
been developed to that effect, based on the aerial work performed for cross-border operations.
2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals
The full IA of alternative options concerning the open and specific category as well as registration is
contained in Chapters 4, 6 and 5 of sub-NPA 2017-05 (B), respectively.
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3. Proposed draft rules
3.1. Draft regulation (Draft EASA opinion)
3.1.1 Draft cover regulation
DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) …/…
of XXX
laying down rules as regards unmanned aircraft operations
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114
thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX of the European Parliament and of the Council on common
rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008(21), and in particular Articles 45, 46, 47, and 51 thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending
Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing
Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC)
No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007(22),
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and
repealing Directive 94/56/EC(23),
Whereas:
(1) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX, the European Commission, assisted by the European
Aviation Safety Agency, is empowered to adopt the necessary implementing rules as regards the
design, production, maintenance and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as well as
their engines, propellers, parts, non-installed equipment and remote-pilot station.
(2) Measures taken in the framework of this Regulation should be proportionate to the nature, risk
and the type of the UAS operation and should in particular take due account of the following:
(a) the type of the operation and whether the operation is open to members of the public;
21
The OJ reference will be added when the new regulation (the new ‘Basic Regulation’) repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 is
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. For referencing purposes, Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX is used in the proposed
draft Regulation.
22
OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 18.
23
OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35.
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(b) the extent to which other air traffic, or persons and property on the ground could be
endangered by the operation;
(c) the type of airspace used and the territory overflown;
(d) the complexity and performance of the UAS involved; and
(e) the type, scale, and complexity of the operation or activity, including, where relevant, the
size and type of the traffic handled by the responsible organisation or person.
(3) The risk of operating a UAS varies as a function of the characteristics of the UAS and the type of
operation. Therefore, different rules should apply to different UAS categories, taking into
account the principles of proportionality and progressivity. Those rules should be based on risk
assessment and performance.
(4) The higher-risk UAS operations should be regulated by similar rules as for manned aircraft, which
include the certification of the aircraft. The introduction of the regulatory framework to
accommodate such certified operations should therefore be the subject of a dedicated Agency
rulemaking task.
(5) The lower-risk UAS operations, subject to this Regulation, should be regulated based on the
nature and risk of the operation or activity, using an operation-centric concept. For these
operations, which are divided into two separate categories (the open and the specific category
of UAS operations), proportionate requirements should be applicable and adapted to the level of
risks inherent to each category.
(6) Regulation (EC) No 765/2008(24) provides a framework for the market surveillance of products to
ensure that those products fulfil requirements providing a high level of protection of public
interests, such as health and safety in general, health and safety at the workplace, protection of
consumers, as well as protection of the environment, and security. This Regulation also provides
a framework for controls on products from third countries and lays down the general principles
of the CE marking.
(7) Decision No 768/2008/EC(25) sets out the common framework of general principles and
reference provisions for the drawing up of European Union legislation harmonising the
conditions for the marketing of products (‘Union harmonisation legislation’), including, in
particular, general obligations for economic operators, rules on the conformity of the products,
as well as a range of conformity assessment procedures from which the legislator can select, as
appropriate. Furthermore, reference provisions are laid down as regards the requirements for
conformity assessment bodies to be notified to the European Commission as competent to carry
out the relevant conformity assessment procedures, and as regards the notification procedures.
In addition, this Decision includes reference provisions concerning procedures for dealing with
products presenting a risk, in order to ensure the safety of the market place.
24
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for
accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218,
13.8.2008, p. 30).
25
Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing
of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82).
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(8) In order to ensure a smooth transition as regards the implementation of this Regulation,
appropriate transitional measures should be provided. In particular, it is necessary to allow
Member States and stakeholders sufficient time to adapt to the new regulatory framework, to
allow Member States the time to issue authorisations and certificates introduced by this
Regulation, and to recognise under certain conditions the validity of authorisations and
certificates issued before this Regulation applies.
(9) Taking into account the good safety record achieved, dedicated provisions for recreational flight
activities conducted in the framework of model clubs and associations should also be laid down.
(10) Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX includes requirements on accreditation of qualified entities that may
be granted a privilege to issue, revoke, and suspend certificates on behalf of the Agency or the
competent authority.
(11) Taking into account the plan of the European Commission to establish a system for unmanned
aircraft traffic management (UTM) or U-Space, this Regulation contains requirements for the
implementation of three elements required to put in place this U-Space system, namely
registration, geofencing and electronic identification.
(12) The measures provided for in this Regulation are based on Opinion No …/… issued by the
European Aviation Safety Agency in accordance with Article XX of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX.
(13) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the European
Aviation Safety Agency Committee established by Article XX of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
1. This Regulation lays down technical requirements and procedure for the operation of UAS in the
open and specific category within the airspace over the territory where the treaties of the
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply.
2. This Regulation also provides the applicable conditions for making available on the market UASs
intended to be used for operations in the open category. It also lays down requirements for
market surveillance relating to the marketing of UAS in the European Union (EU). Those
conditions and requirements shall constitute Union harmonisation legislation within the
meaning of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 and Decision No 768/2008/EC.
3. This Regulation does not apply to indoor UAS operations.
4. This Regulation does not apply to UAS operations in the certified category.
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Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purpose of this Regulation, the definitions in Article X of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX,
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, as well as the following definitions apply:
(a) ‘acceptable means of compliance (AMC)’ means non-binding standards adopted by the
Agency which may be used by persons and organisations to demonstrate compliance with
Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing rules;
(b) ‘alternative means of compliance (AltMoC)’ means non-binding standards proposed to the
Agency by an applicant or a competent authority, as an alternative to existing AMC, or as
new means to establish compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing
rules for which no associated AMC have been adopted by the Agency;
(c) ‘automatic operation’ means an operation following preprogrammed instructions that the
UAS executes while the remote pilot is able to intervene at any time;
(d) ‘autonomous operation’ means an operation during which a UA operates without the
possibility for remote-pilot intervention in the management of the flight;
(e) ‘certified category’ means a category of UAS operation that, considering the risks involved,
requires the certification of the UA and its operator, as well as licensing of the flight crew;
(f) ‘competent authorities’ means the authorities responsible for the certification and
authorisation of, as well as oversight over UAS operations in the Member State where the
UAS operator has its principal place of business, or place of residence if the UAS operator
is an individual person;
(g) ‘congested area’ means any area in a city, town or settlement, which is substantially used
for residential, commercial or recreational purposes;
(h) ‘economic operators’ means the manufacturer, the authorised representative of the
manufacturer, the importer, and the distributor of the UA;
(i) ‘electronic identification’ means the capability to identify a flying UA without direct
physical access to that aircraft;
(j) ‘first-person-view (FPV) mode’ means a mode of operation of a UAS where the remote
pilot navigates the UA through a camera installed on the UA;
(k) ‘follow-me mode’ means a mode of operation of a UAS where the UA constantly follows a
person or a device within a predetermined radius;
(l) ‘geofencing’ means a function primarily used to provide the remote pilot with information
on the UA position, as well as on the related airspace requirements and limitations;
additionally, this function may limit the access of the UA to certain areas;
(m) ‘guidance material (GM)’ means non-binding material developed by the Agency which
helps to illustrate the meaning of a requirement and is used to support the interpretation
of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX, its implementing rules and acceptable means of compliance;
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(n) ‘hazard’ means a condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries, damage, loss
of material or a reduction of the ability to perform a prescribed function;
(o) ‘light UAS operator certificate (LUC)’ means a certificate issued to a UAS operator by the
competent authority as per Subpart C of Annex I to this Regulation;
(p) ‘making available on the market’ means any supply of a product for distribution,
consumption or use in the EU market in the course of a commercial activity, whether in
exchange of payment or free of charge;
(q) ‘model aircraft club or association’ means an organisation legally established in a Member
State for the purpose of conducting leisure flights, air displays, sport or competition
activities with UAS;
(r) ‘open category’ means a category of UAS operation that, considering the risks involved,
neither requires a prior authorisation by the competent authority, nor a declaration by the
UAS operator before the operation takes place;
(s) ‘Part-UAS’ means the rules applicable to the operation of a UAS falling into the open or
specific category, as laid down in Annex I to this Regulation;
(t) ‘placing on the market’ means to make a product for the first time available on the EU
market;
(u) ‘remote pilot’ means a natural person responsible for safely conducting the flight of a UA
by operating its flight controls, either manually or, when the UA flies automatically, by
monitoring its course and remaining able to intervene and change the course at any time;
(v) ‘remote-pilot competence’ means a combination of skills, knowledge and attitudes
required for a remote pilot to perform a task to the prescribed standard;
(w) ‘remote-pilot station (RPS)’ means a component of the UAS containing the equipment
used to remotely control the UA;
(x) ‘specific category’ means a category of UAS operation that considering the risks involved,
requires an authorisation by the competent authority before the operation takes place,
taking into account the mitigation measures identified in an operational risk assessment,
except for certain standard scenarios for which a declaration by the UAS operator is
sufficient;
(y) ‘specific-operations risk assessment (SORA)’ means the methodology established by Joint
Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS) Working Group 6 (WG-6) to
assess the risks of a UAS operation in the ‘specific’ category, and determine the
corresponding mitigations measures;
(z) ‘standard scenario’ means a description of a UAS operation in the specific category, for
which mitigation measures have been determined based on a risk assessment (e.g. SORA),
and introduced by the European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Agency’) in its AMC or in AltMoC provided to the Agency by a competent authority
designated by a Member State;
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(aa) ‘unmanned aircraft (UA)’ means any aircraft operated or designed to be operated without
a pilot on board, which has the capacity to operate autonomously or to be piloted
remotely;
(bb) ‘unmanned aircraft (UA) observer’ means a natural person who, by unaided visual
observation of the UA, assists the remote pilot in safely conducting the flight;
(cc) ‘unmanned aircraft system (UAS)’ means the UA and any equipment, apparatus,
appurtenance, software or accessory necessary for the safe operation of the UA;
(dd) ‘unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator’ means any legal or natural person who
operates or intends to operate one or more UAS;
(ee) ‘Union harmonisation legislation’ means any EU legislation harmonising the conditions for
placing products on the market;
(ff) ‘visual line of sight (VLOS)’ means a type of operation in which the remote pilot maintains
continuous unobstructed and unaided visual contact with the UA, allowing them to
monitor the flight path of the UA in relation to other aircraft, persons, and obstacles for
the purpose of maintaining separation from them and avoiding collisions.
2. In addition, the definitions relating to product legislation, listed in Annex II to this Regulation,
also apply.
[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 2(1)(d) Definition of ‘autonomous operation’.]
Article 3
Principles applicable to all UAS operations
1. The UAS operator is responsible for the safe operation of the UA. The UAS operator shall comply
with the requirements laid down in this Regulation and in other relevant EU and national
regulations, in particular those related to security, privacy, data protection, liability, insurance
and environmental protection.
2. The UAS operator shall register itself and the UA, as required by this Regulation, with the entity
designated for that purpose by the Member State where the operator has its principal place of
business or place of residence, and shall display the registration information on the UA it
operates.
3. The UAS operator shall ensure that the UA is equipped with an electronic identification system,
when required by this Regulation.
4. The UAS operator shall ensure that the UA is equipped with a geofencing system, when required
by this Regulation.
5. The UAS operator shall report to the competent authority an occurrence and other safety-
related information regarding the UAS, in compliance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, when
required pursuant to Article XX of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX.
6. The Member State may designate airspace areas or special zones where UAS operations are
prohibited or restricted, in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation.
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[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 3 Responsibility of the UAS operator and remote pilot.]
Article 4
Open-category UAS operations
1. UAS operations conducted in the open category within the airspace over the territory where the
treaties of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply
shall comply with the requirements of Subpart A of Annex I to this Regulation.
2. Considering the different levels of risk of an operation conducted in the open category, the UAS
operation in this category is further divided into subcategories of operation. Each subcategory of
UAS operation is characterised by the following criteria:
(a) the use of a certain class or classes of a UAS, defined in the technical requirements of the
related appendix to Annex I to this Regulation;
(b) operational limitations; and
(c) the competence of the remote pilot.
3. The requirements in which the classes of a UAS operated or intended to be operated in the open
category are defined, together with Annex II to this Regulation, shall constitute a new Union
harmonisation legislation within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 and of Decision
No 768/2008/EC. The placing on the market of UAS of those classes shall comply with these
requirements and the conditions set out in Annex II to this Regulation.
Article 5
Specific-category UAS operations
1. UAS operations conducted in the specific category within the airspace over the territory where
the treaties of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
apply shall comply with the requirements of Subpart B of Annex I to this Regulation.
2. For UAS operations in the specific category, an operational risk assessment shall be performed
and associated mitigation measures shall be identified.
3. Before starting a UAS operation in the specific category, the UAS operator shall:
(a) have submitted to the competent authority a declaration in accordance with a standard
scenario, except when holding a LUC with privileges to authorise its own operations; or
(b) hold an authorisation issued by the competent authority, or by itself when holding a LUC
with privileges to authorise its own operations; and
(c) comply with the conditions and have applied the mitigation measures listed in the
declaration or the operational authorisation.
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Article 6
Designation of the competent authority
1. A Member State shall designate one or more competent authorities with allocated
responsibilities for the following:
(a) registration of UAS operators;
(b) authorisation of and oversight over specific-category UAS operations; and
(c) designation of airspace areas or special zones.
2. If a Member State designates more than one entity as competent authority:
(a) the areas of competence of each entity shall be clearly defined; and
(b) coordination shall be established among those entities to ensure effective implementation
of this Regulation.
3. The competent authority shall:
(a) have a suitable organisational structure, appropriate documented procedures, and
adequate resources; and
(b) employ or have access to personnel with sufficient knowledge, professional integrity, as
well as experience and training to perform their allocated tasks.
4. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority personnel do not perform activities
related to this Regulation when there is evidence that this could result, directly or indirectly, in a
conflict of interest, in particular when related to their family or financial interests.
[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 6 Designation of competent authority.]
Article 7
Responsibilities of the competent authority
1. In the framework of the competences allocated by the Member States in accordance with
Article 6(2) of this Regulation, the competent authority, or authorities, shall:
(a) examine documents, records and reports relevant to UAS operations, remote pilots or
UAS operators;
(b) develop an annual oversight programme for UAS operators holding a declaration, an
authorisation or a certificate for a UA, including audits and inspections, as appropriate and
proportionate to the identified risks;
(c) take into account the results of past oversight activities and safety priorities when defining
the scope of the oversight programme;
(d) produce training materials and other guidance for the community of UAS users, aimed at
safety promotion of UAS operations, including dissemination of any updated regulations
affecting UAS operations;
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(e) inspect, as required, the UAS, remote pilots, and UAS operators to assess their compliance
with this Regulation;
(f) have a system to detect and analyse non-compliance of declared UAS operators or UAS
operators it has authorised or certified;
(g) issue, maintain, amend, suspend, limit or revoke authorisations, and issue, suspend, or
revoke certificates required to carry out UAS operations in the open and specific category,
or impose other measures or sanctions, as necessary;
(h) establish and maintain one or more registers of operational declarations, operational
authorisations, certificates of remote-pilot competences and LUCs, and when tasked to do
so, establish and maintain a register of UAS operators and UA; and
(i) restrict or prohibit airspace areas or designate special zones, and make this information
easily accessible.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 Article 7 Oversight;
— AMC2 Article 7 Oversight programme;
— AMC3 Article 7 Oversight programme — audit and inspection;
— AMC4 Article 7 Oversight programme – follow-up; and
— GM Article 7 Oversight programme — audit and inspection.]
Article 8
Designation and responsibilities of the market surveillance authority
1. Member States shall designate one or more market surveillance authorities responsible for
carrying out market surveillance on their territory in accordance with Chapter III of Regulation
(EC) No 765/2008.
2. The market surveillance authority or authorities shall ensure that products covered by Annex II
to this Regulation comply with the requirements set out in this Regulation and do not endanger
health, safety or any other aspect of public-interest protection.
Article 9
Exchange of safety information
Competent authorities and market surveillance authorities shall cooperate on safety matters, and
establish procedures for an efficient exchange of safety information.
[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 9 Exchange of safety information.]
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Article 10
Third-country UAS operators
1. UAS operators that have their principal place of business, are established, or are resident in a
third country shall comply with this Regulation for the purpose of UAS operations within, to, and
out of the EU.
2. The competent authority for the UAS operator referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is the
competent authority of the EU Member State where the UAS operator intends to operate.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, a certificate of the remote pilot or the UAS
operator, or an equivalent document, may be recognised by the competent authority for the
purpose of operation within, to, and out of the EU provided that:
(a) they are valid documents of the State of issuance either of the remote pilot’s or the UAS
operator’s certificate; and
(b) the Agency has ensured that the requirements on the basis of which such certificates have
been issued provide the same level of safety as this Regulation.
Article 11
Means of compliance
1. The Agency shall develop AMC that may be used to comply with Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and
its implementing rules.
2. AltMoC may be used to comply with Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing rules.
3. The competent authority shall establish a system to consistently evaluate that all AltMoC used
by itself, or by organisations and persons under its oversight, allow for establishing compliance
with Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing rules.
4. The competent authority shall evaluate all AltMoC proposed by an organisation, by analysing the
documentation provided and, if considered necessary, by inspecting the organisation.
When the competent authority finds that the AltMoC are in accordance with Regulation
(EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing rules, it shall without undue delay:
(a) notify the applicant that the AltMoC may be implemented and, as appropriate, amend the
operational authorisation or certificate of the applicant accordingly;
(b) notify the Agency of the AltMoC content and provide copies of all relevant
documentation; and
(c) inform all Member States of any AltMoC that were accepted.
5. When the competent authority itself uses AltMoC to comply with Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and
its implementing rules, it shall:
(a) make those AltMoC available to all organisations and persons under its oversight; and
(b) without undue delay, notify the Agency.
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6. The competent authority shall provide the Agency with a full description of the AltMoC,
including any revisions to procedures that may be relevant, as well as an assessment
demonstrating that the implementing rules are complied with.
Article 12
Airspace areas or special zones for UAS operations
1. If an operational or other risk related to UAS operations requires mitigation measures, the
Member State may designate airspace areas or special zones:
(a) where certain UAS operations or types of UAS operations are not permitted without prior
authorisation or are not permitted at all;
(b) where access is allowed only to certain UAS classes;
(c) where access is allowed only to UAS equipped with an electronic identification and/or
geofencing system;
(d) where UAS operations shall comply with specified environmental standards; or
(e) where UAS operations are exempted from one or more of the open-category
requirements of this Regulation, and where operators are not required to hold an
authorisation or submit a declaration.
2. Member States shall publish the information on prohibited or restricted airspace and/or
designated special zones for UAS operations, as well as on the required authorisations, in a
manner and format established by the Agency.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— GM1 Article 12 Airspace areas or special zones for UAS operations; and
— AMC1 Article 12 Information on airspace areas and special zones for UAS operations.]
Article 13
Exchange of information and safety measures
1. The Agency and the competent authorities shall collect, analyse and disseminate safety
information concerning UAS operations in their territory in accordance with Regulation
(EU) 2017/XXX and its implementing rules.
2. Upon receiving the information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency or the
competent authority for their respective domain of competence shall take appropriate measures
to address any arising or latent safety issues.
3. Measures taken under paragraph 2 of this Article shall immediately be notified to all persons or
organisations that need to comply with such measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX and its
implementing rules. Competent authorities shall also notify those measures to the Agency, if not
informed, and when combined action is required, to the other Member States concerned.
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Article 14
UAS operations conducted in the framework of model clubs and associations
For UAS operations conducted in the framework of model clubs or associations, the following applies:
1. the competent authority may issue an operational authorisation to a model club or association
without further demonstration of compliance, on the basis of the model club’s or association’s
established procedures, organisational structure, and management system; and
2. operational authorisations granted under this Article shall include the conditions and limitations
of, as well as the deviations from, the requirements of Annex I to this Regulation.
[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 14 Hobbyist flights.]
Article 15
Applicability
1. As from two years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2020], economic operators
and UAS placed on the market shall comply with this Regulation.
2. As from three years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021], all UAS shall be
operated in accordance with this Regulation.
3. UAS made available on the market within three years after entry into force of this Regulation
[estimate 2021], not complying with Appendix I.1 to Annex I to this Regulation and having a
maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of less than 250 g, including payload, may continue to be
operated for three years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021] in accordance
with the operational Subcategory A1, as defined in UAS.OPEN.40.
4. UAS not complying with Appendices I.2 and I.5 to Annex I to this Regulation and having an
MTOM between 250 g and 25 kg, including payload, may continue to be operated after three
years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021] in accordance either with the
operational Subcategory A3, as defined in UAS.OPEN.60, or with the conditions of Subpart B of
Annex I to this Regulation.
5. By three years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021], all UAS operators shall
have converted their existing authorisations into authorisations or declarations as required by
this Regulation.
6. By three years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021], Member States that
choose to create airspace areas or special zones in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation,
shall have published this information.
7. For three years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2021], model clubs and
associations are not required to comply with this Regulation. By three years after entry into
force of this Regulation, [estimate 2021] model clubs and associations shall receive an
operational authorisation issued by the competent authority in compliance with Article 14 of this
Regulation unless the Member State has chosen to create airspace areas or special zones where
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UAS operations are exempted from one or more of the open-category requirements of this
Regulation in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation.
8. By two years after entry into force of this Regulation [estimate 2020], Member States shall have
established a system to convert their existing proof of competence of the remote-pilot and their
authorisations for UAS operators into those required by this Regulation.
[Note: related GM: GM1 Article 15 Recognition of competences demonstrated before the applicability
date.]
Article 16
Entry into force and application
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal
of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
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3.1.2. Part-UAS
ANNEX I
UAS operations in the open and specific category
[PART-UAS]
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SUBPART A
OPEN CATEGORY
UAS.OPEN.10 Responsibilities of the UAS operator
The UAS operator shall:
(a) develop the policy and procedures adapted to its operation and size, and designate a remote
pilot for each operation;
(b) ensure that before conducting an operation, remote pilots and all other personnel directly
involved in the operations are competent to perform their tasks, are familiar with the UAS
operator’s policy and procedures, and are in a physical and mental condition that would not
endanger the safe operation of the UAS; and
(c) ensure that before conducting an operation with a UA of one of the classes defined in this
Regulation, the EU declaration of conformity, supplied by the manufacturer or his authorised
representative, includes a reference to the appropriate class and that the related class
identification label is affixed on the UA.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(a) Policy and procedures;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(b) and UAS.SPEC.10(b) Physical and mental condition; and
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.10(c) EU declaration of conformity.]
UAS.OPEN.20 Registration
(a) Except when already registered in accordance with the specific-category requirements, UAS
operators shall register themselves and the UA, pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation, in a
manner and format established by the Agency.
(b) By way of derogation from point (a), UAS operators shall not register themselves and the UA
when that UA has an MTOM, including payload, of less than 250 g.
(c) By way of derogation from point (a), the UA may not be registered if:
(1) the MTOM, including payload, is less than 900 g; or
(2) it is a UA Class C1, as defined in Appendix I.2 to this Annex.
(d) UAS operators shall update their registration every time data is changed.
(e) UAS operators shall display the registration information on the UA and, when required by the
zone of operation, shall ensure that this information is inserted into the electronic identification
system.
(f) The registration shall remain valid for three years and shall be renewable.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(a) and UAS.SPEC.20(a)(1) Registration form;
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— GM1 UAS.OPEN.20(b) and (c) Registration;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(e) and UAS.SPEC.20(a)(3) Display of registration information; and
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(f) Renewal of registration.]
UAS.OPEN.30 Requirements applicable to all UAS operations in the open category
(a) The remote pilot shall:
(1) have the ability to take control of the UA, except in case of a lost link;
(2) have the appropriate competence for the subcategory of UAS operations (A1, A2, or A3);
and
(3) comply with UAS.OPEN.10 and UAS.OPEN.20 if the remote pilot is also the UAS operator.
(b) Except when operating a UAS Class C0, before starting a UAS operation, the remote pilot shall:
(1) obtain updated information, relevant to the intended operation, about any flight
restrictions or conditions published by the Member State;
(2) familiarise themselves with the operating environment; and
(3) ensure that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended flight.
(c) During flight, the remote pilot shall:
(1) comply with the requirements applicable to the subcategory of UAS operations;
(2) ensure the safe operation of the UA with respect to third-party activities on the ground or
in the air;
(3) give way to manned aircraft;
(4) comply with the limitations on the area, zone or airspace, defined by the Member State;
(5) operate the UAS within the performance limitations defined in the instructions provided
by the manufacturer;
(6) keep the UA in VLOS or within a range such that the remote pilot, or a UA observer
situated within the line of sight of the remote pilot, maintains VLOS; clear and effective
communication shall be established between the remote pilot and the UA observer;
(7) not use the UA to transport dangerous goods;
(8) not fly close or inside areas where an emergency response effort is ongoing unless they
have a permission from the local authority; and
(9) respect other people’s fundamental rights and operate the UAS in a considerate way to
minimise nuisance to other people due to noise emissions.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(a)(1) Ability to take control of the UA;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(1) Obtaining updated information about any flight restrictions or
conditions published by the Member State;
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— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(2) Operating environment;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(3) Ensuring that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended
flight;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(2) Ensuring the safe operation of the UA;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(6) Operations in first-person view (FPV)
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(7) Dangerous goods;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(8) Emergency response effort; and
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(9) Respect of other people’s fundamental rights.]
UAS.OPEN.35 Maximum height of UAS operations in the open category
(a) A UAS operation in the open category shall not exceed the height of 120 m above ground level.
(b) By way of derogation from point (a), when the operation involves flying over a fixed obstacle
that is higher than 120 m, the maximum height of the UAS operation may be increased up to
50 m above the height of the obstacle at the request of the owner of the object.
UAS.OPEN.40 Requirements applicable to UAS operations in Subcategory A1
UAS operations in Subcategory A1 shall be:
(a) performed with a UA:
(1) privately built, having an MTOM, including payload, of less than 250 g; or
(2) Class C0, as defined in Appendix I.1 to this Annex; or
(3) Class C1, as defined in Appendix I.2 to this Annex; and
(b) conducted:
(1) not over open assemblies of people;
(2) in follow-me mode, up to a height of 50 m above ground level, by way of derogation from
UAS.OPEN.30(c)(5);
(3) with an active electronic identification system, when using a UA Class C1 fitted with a
camera of more than 5 megapixels (MP) and a real-time video transmission link or any
other type of sensor able to record personal data;
(4) in case of a UA with an MTOM, including payload, of less than 250 g:
(i) up to a height of 50 m above ground level; and
(ii) by a remote pilot having familiarised themselves with the UAS to be operated; and
(5) in case of a UA Class C1:
(i) up to the maximum height for UAS operations in the open category; and
(ii) by a remote pilot having demonstrated the basic competence to fly the UAS, by
successfully completing an online training as well as an online test in a manner and
format established by the Agency.
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[Note: related AMC:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(a)(2)&(3) and UAS.OPEN.50(b) Modification of a UAS with a CE Class mark;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(1) Operational limitations; and
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(5)(i) and UAS.OPEN.60(e)(1) Basic competence of the remote pilot to
operate in Subcategory A1 and A3.]
UAS.OPEN.50 Requirements applicable to UAS operations in Subcategory A2
UAS operations in Subcategory A2 shall be performed:
(a) with a UA Class C2, as defined in Appendix I.3 to this Annex;
(b) in proximity to but at a safe distance from uninvolved persons;
(c) up to the maximum height for UAS operations in the open category;
(d) with an active electronic identification system and a geofencing systems; and
(e) by a remote pilot:
(1) being at least 16 years old, and holding a certificate of competence after successfully
completing a theoretical test in a manner and format established by the Agency; or
(2) of any age supervised by a person complying with point (e)(1).
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(a)(2)&(3) and UAS.OPEN.50(b) Modification of a UAS with a CE Class mark;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.50(e)(1) Competences required for the remote pilot to obtain the certificate
of competence;
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.50(e)(1) Competences required for the remote pilot to obtain the certificate of
competence;
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.50(b) and UAS.OPEN.60(b) Uninvolved persons; and
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.50(b) Safe distance from uninvolved persons.]
UAS.OPEN.60 Requirements applicable to UAS operations in Subcategory A3
UAS operations in Subcategory A3 shall be performed:
(a) with a UA:
(1) privately built, having an MTOM, including payload, of less than 25 kg; or
(2) Class C3, as defined in Appendix I.4 to this Annex; or
(3) Class C4, as defined in Appendix I.5 to this Annex;
(b) in an area where the remote pilot reasonably expects that no uninvolved person will be present
within the range where the UA will be flown, during the entire time of the operation;
(c) keeping a safety distance from the boundaries of congested areas or aerodromes when
operating a privately built UAS or UAS Class C4;
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(d) up to the maximum height for UAS operations in the open category; and
(e) by a remote pilot:
(1) being at least 16 years old and having demonstrated the basic competence by successfully
completing an online training as well as an online test in a manner and format established
by the Agency; or
(2) of any age supervised by a person complying with point (e)(1).
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.60(b) Operations in Subcategory A3;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(5)(i) and UAS.OPEN.60(e)(1) Basic competence of the remote pilot to
operate in Subcategory A1 and A3; and
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.50(b) and UAS.OPEN.60(b) Uninvolved persons.]
UAS.OPEN.70 Duration and validity of remote pilot competence
(a) The remote pilot basic competence, required by UAS.OPEN.40(b)(5)(i) and UAS.OPEN.60(b)(3)(i),
shall be valid for three years and shall be renewable in a manner and format established by the
Agency.
(b) The certificate of competence, required by UAS.OPEN.50(e)(1), shall be valid for five years and
shall be renewable in a manner and format established by the Agency.
[Note: related AMC:
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.70(a) Renewal of basic competence; and
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.70(b) Renewal of certificate of competence.]
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SUBPART B
SPECIFIC CATEGORY
UAS.SPEC.10 Responsibilities of the UAS operator
The UAS operator shall:
(a) develop the policy and procedures adapted to its operation and size, and designate a remote
pilot for each operation or, in case of autonomous operations, ensure that during any phases of
the operation, responsibilities and functions are properly defined in accordance with the policy
and procedures;
(b) ensure that before conducting operations, remote pilots and all other personnel directly
involved in the operations are competent to perform their tasks, are familiar with the UAS
operator’s policies and procedures, and are in a physical and mental condition that would not
endanger the safe operation of the UAS;
(c) carry out an operation within the limitations, conditions, and mitigation measures defined in the
standard scenario or specified in the operational authorisation;
(d) keep a record of the UAS operation information as required by the standard scenario or
operational authorisation;
(e) comply with the local conditions notified to the UAS operator by the competent authority of the
place of operations; and
(f) maintain the UAS in a safe condition and comply with UAS.SPEC.110, if required.
[Note: related AMC:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.10(a) Policy and procedures;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(b) and UAS.SPEC.10(b) Physical and mental condition; and
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.10(d) Logging of flight activities and record-keeping.]
UAS.SPEC.15 Responsibilities of model clubs and associations
Model clubs and associations holding an operational authorisation as defined in Article 14 of this
Regulation shall:
(a) make available to their registered members appropriate procedures to comply with the
conditions and limitations defined in the operational authorisation issued by the competent
authority;
(b) ensure that all members have the minimum competence required to operate the UAS safely in
accordance with the procedures defined in point (a);
(c) if an operation or flight exceeds the conditions and limitations defined in the operational
authorisation, take action and, if necessary, inform the competent authority; and
(d) provide upon request of the competent authority required documentation for oversight and
monitoring purposes.
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[Note: related AMC: AMC1 UAS.SPEC.15(c) Action in case of operations/flights exceeding the
conditions and limitations defined in the operational authorisation.]
UAS.SPEC.20 Registration
(a) Except when already registered in the open category, UAS operators shall:
(1) register themselves and their UA, pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation, in a manner and
format established by the Agency;
(2) update the registration every time data is changed;
(3) display the registration information on the UA; and
(4) ensure that this information is inserted into the electronic identification system unless
required differently by the operational authorisation or by the standard scenario involving
a declaration, as applicable.
(b) The registration shall remain valid for three years and shall be renewable.
[Note: related AMC:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20 Registration of model aircraft;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(a) and UAS.SPEC.20(a)(1) Registration form;
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20(a)(3) Display of registration information; and
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(f) and UAS.SPEC.20(b) Renewal of registration.]
UAS.SPEC.30 Requirements applicable to all UAS operations in the specific category
(a) The remote pilot shall:
(1) have the appropriate competence defined in the corresponding declaration or operational
authorisation; and
(2) comply with UAS.SPEC.10 and UAS.SPEC.20 if the remote pilot is also the UAS operator.
(b) Before starting a UAS operation, the remote pilot or, in case of autonomous operation, the UAS
operator shall:
(1) obtain updated information, relevant to the intended operation, about any flight
restrictions or conditions published by the Member State;
(2) ensure that the operating environment is compatible with the authorised or declared
limitations and conditions or with the model clubs’ and associations’ procedures; and
(3) ensure that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended flight.
(c) During flight, the remote pilot or, in case of autonomous operation, the UAS operator shall:
(1) comply with the authorised or declared limitations and conditions or with the model
clubs’ and associations’ procedures;
(2) ensure the safe operation of the UAS with respect to third-party activities on the ground
or in the air;
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(3) comply with the limitations defined by the Member State for the area, zone or airspace;
(4) operate the UAS within the performance limitations defined in the instructions provided
by the manufacturer unless the conditions defined by the operational authorisation or by
the standard scenario involving a declaration, as applicable, are more restrictive;
(5) not fly close or inside areas where an emergency response effort is ongoing unless they
have a permission from the local authority; and
(6) respect other people’s fundamental rights and operate the UAS in a considerate way to
minimise nuisance to other people due to noise emissions.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(1) Obtaining updated information about any flight restrictions or
conditions published by the Member State;
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(2) Operating environment;
— AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(3) and AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(3) Ensuring that the UAS is in a safe
condition to complete the intended flight;
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(c)(2) Ensuring the safe operation of the UA;
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(c)(5) Emergency response effort;
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.30 Level of autonomy and guidelines for human-autonomy interaction; and
— GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(9) and UAS.SPEC.30(c)(6) Respect of other people’s fundamental rights.]
UAS.SPEC.40 Operational risk assessment
(a) The Agency shall issue standard scenarios and the associated ranges of their mitigation
measures for each type of operation.
(b) The standard scenario shall define if the UAS operator shall submit an operational declaration or
apply for an operational authorisation before conducting the corresponding operation.
(c) If the intended operation is not fully addressed by a standard scenario issued by the Agency, the
UAS operator, except when holding a LUC as per Subpart C of this Annex, shall provide the
competent authority with a risk assessment of the proposed operation, and identify mitigation
measures to be put in place in order to limit the risk of operation to an acceptable level. The UAS
operator shall consider as a minimum the following:
(1) the operational area and conditions;
(2) the class of airspace and the effects on other air traffic and air traffic management (ATM)
in cooperation with the relevant air navigation service provider (ANSP);
(3) the design features and performance of the UAS;
(4) the type of operation;
(5) the level of competence of the remote pilot;
(6) organisational factors; and
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(7) effects on the environment.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.40 Operational risk assessment; and
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.40 Standard scenarios.]
UAS.SPEC.50 Operational declaration
(a) If required by the corresponding standard scenario, a UAS operator shall submit an operational
declaration to the competent authority in a manner and format established by the Agency. This
does not apply if the UAS operator holds a LUC with the appropriate privileges, as per Subpart C
of this Annex.
(b) Upon receipt of the declaration, the competent authority shall verify that the declaration
contains all required information and documents, and shall intervene in case of a safety issue.
(c) If the operation is conducted in a Member State other than the Member State of registration of
the UAS operator, the UAS operator shall submit the operational declaration, as defined in point
(a), also to the competent authority of this Member State.
(d) After submission of the operational declaration, the UAS operator shall be entitled to start the
operation if all conditions and mitigations identified in the corresponding standard scenario are
met.
(e) The UAS operator shall notify the competent authority, as well as the competent authority of the
Member State of operation, if different, without delay, of any significant change to the
statements and information submitted in the operational declaration.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.50(a) Operational-declaration form;
— AMC2 UAS.SPEC.50(a) Standard scenario requiring an operational declaration;
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.50(c) Operations conducted in a Member State other that the Member State of
registration; and
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.50(e) Significant changes to the operational declaration.]
UAS.SPEC.60 Application for an operational authorisation
(a) Except when holding a LUC with the appropriate privileges, as per Subpart C of this Annex, the
UAS operator shall submit an application for operational authorisation to the competent
authority in a manner and format established by the Agency, before starting an operation that:
(1) corresponds to a standard scenario requiring an operational authorisation; or
(2) does not correspond to a standard scenario.
(b) The UAS operator shall only start the operation after having received the operational
authorisation issued by the competent authority in a manner and format established by the
Agency.
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(c) Any significant change to the operation not covered by the received authorisation shall require
the submission of a new application for an updated operational authorisation.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(a) Operational-authorisation application form;
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.60(a) Application for an operational authorisation;
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(a)(1) Standard scenario requiring an operational authorisation; and
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(c) Significant changes to the operational authorisation.]
UAS.SPEC.70 Operations manual
If the operation does not correspond to any of the standard scenarios issued by the Agency, or if
required by the relevant standard scenario, the UAS operator shall compile an operations manual
adapted to the type of operation.
[Note: related AMC: AMC1 UAS.SPEC.70 Operations manual — minimum information.]
UAS.SPEC.80 Issuing an operational authorisation
(a) Upon receipt of an application from a UAS operator for the issue of an operational authorisation,
the competent authority shall verify that the application contains all the information and
documentation required by UAS.SPEC.60.
(b) The competent authority shall issue an authorisation to a UAS operator to conduct an operation
in the specific category:
(1) when it concludes that the operation corresponds to a standard scenario issued by the
Agency and requiring an authorisation, and that the following conditions are met:
(i) the mitigation measures required by the standard scenario have been established
by the UAS operator; and
(ii) an operations manual has been compiled, when required pursuant to UAS.SPEC.70;
or
(2) when it concludes that the type of operation does not correspond to a standard scenario,
and that the following conditions are met:
(i) an operational risk assessment provided by the UAS operator pursuant to
UAS.SPEC.50 has been performed;
(ii) the mitigation measures established by the UAS operator limit the risk of operation
to an acceptable level; and
(iii) an operations manual has been compiled, when required pursuant to UAS.SPEC.70.
(c) The conditions under which a UAS operator is authorised to conduct the intended operation
shall be specified in the authorisation.
(d) If an operation is conducted partially or totally in the airspace of a Member State other than the
Member State of registration of the UAS operator, the competent authority shall assess the
impact of local conditions on the operation, in coordination with the competent authority of the
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Member State of operation. When both competent authorities are satisfied with the risk
assessment, the competent authority of the Member State of registration shall issue the
authorisation.
(e) The authorisation shall be issued in a manner and format established by the Agency.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.SPEC.80 Operational-authorisation form; and
— GM1 UAS.SPEC.80 Recognition of an operational authorisation between EU Member States.]
UAS.SPEC.90 Duration and validity of the operational authorisation
(a) An operational authorisation shall be issued for a limited or unlimited duration. It shall be valid
subject to:
(1) the UAS operator remaining in compliance with the relevant requirements of this
Regulation and with the operational authorisation issued by the competent authority; and
(2) it not being surrendered or revoked.
(b) Upon revocation or surrender, the operational authorisation shall be returned to the competent
authority without delay.
UAS.SPEC.100 Access
For the purpose of demonstrating compliance with this Regulation, a UAS operator shall grant access
to any person authorised by the competent authority at any time to any facility, document, records,
data, procedures or any other material relevant to its activity subject to authorisation or declaration,
whether this person is contracted to do so or not.
UAS.SPEC.110 Use of certified equipment and certified UA
(a) If the UAS operation is required to be conducted with a certified UA or using certified
equipment, the UAS operator shall record the operation or service time in accordance either
with the instructions and procedures applicable to the certified equipment, or with the
organisational approval or authorisation.
(b) The UAS operator shall follow the instructions referred to in the UA certificate or equipment
certificate, as well as comply with mandatory directives issued by the Agency.
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SUBPART C
LIGHT UAS OPERATOR CERTIFICATE (LUC)
UAS.LUC.10 Responsibility of a LUC holder
In addition to the responsibilities defined in UAS.SPEC.10, a LUC holder shall:
(a) ensure that the requirements of UAS.SPEC.30 are met;
(b) comply with the scope and privileges defined in their terms of approval; and
(c) establish and maintain a system for exercising operational control over any operation conducted
under the terms of their LUC.
UAS.LUC.20 Application for a LUC
(a) Any legal person shall be eligible as an applicant for an approval under this Subpart.
(b) An application for a LUC or for an amendment to an existing LUC shall be submitted to the
competent authority in a manner and format established by the Agency. It shall contain the
information required by UAS.LUC.30 and UAS.LUC.40, as well as a statement that all the
documentation submitted to the competent authority has been verified by the applicant and
found to comply with the applicable requirements.
[Note: related AMC: AMC1 UAS.LUC.20 Application for a LUC.]
UAS.LUC.30 Management system
(a) A LUC holder shall establish, implement and maintain a management system corresponding to
the size of the UAS operator as well as the nature and complexity of its activities.
(b) The management system shall include:
(1) a safety policy and clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the
organisation, including the direct accountability for safety of the responsible personnel;
(2) an identification of safety hazards entailed by the activities of the UAS operator, the
evaluation of those hazards, as well as the management of the associated risks, including
taking action to mitigate those risks and verify the effectiveness of the action;
(3) documentation of all management system key processes, including a process for making
personnel aware of their responsibilities and of the procedure for amending this
documentation;
(4) an independent function to monitor compliance of the UAS operator with the relevant
requirements of this Regulation, including a system to provide feedback to the
accountable manager to ensure effective implementation of corrective measures; and
(5) a function to ensure that a service or product conforms to the requirements of this
Regulation whenever the UAS operator uses services or products delivered through
subcontractors.
(c) The LUC holder shall appoint at least:
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(1) the accountable manager responsible for establishing, implementing and maintaining an
effective management system;
(2) a safety manager responsible for coordinating the safety management system; and
(3) one or more persons charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the LUC holder
remains in compliance with the requirements of this Regulation.
[Note: related AMC/GM:
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(a) Management system;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(1) Management system;
— GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(1) Management system;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(2) Management system;
— AMC2 UAS.LUC.30(b)(2) Management system;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(3) Management system;
— GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(3) Management system;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(4) Management system;
— GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(4) Management system;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(5) Use of subcontractors;
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system;
— AMC2 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system;
— AMC3 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system; and
— GM1 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system.]
UAS.LUC.40 LUC manual
(a) A LUC holder shall provide a LUC manual to the competent authority describing directly or by
cross reference its organisation, the relevant procedures and the activities carried out.
(b) If any activity is carried out by partner organisations or subcontractors, the manual shall include
a relevant statement as well as written procedures on how the LUC holder shall manage the
relationship with those partner organisations or subcontractors.
(c) The manual shall be amended as necessary to retain an up-to-date description of the LUC
holder’s organisation, and copies of amendments shall be provided to the competent authority.
[Note: related AMC:
— AMC1 UAS.LUC.40 LUC Manual; and
— AMC2 UAS.LUC.40 Procedures for subcontractors.]
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UAS.LUC.50 Terms of approval of a LUC holder
(a) The competent authority shall issue a LUC in a manner and format established by the Agency
after it is satisfied that the UAS operator complies with UAS.LUC.20, UAS.LUC.30 and
UAS.LUC.40.
(b) The terms of approval shall include the UAS operator’s privileges, authorised activities and
operational limitations, as appropriate.
[Note: related AMC: AMC1 UAS.LUC.50 LUC approval form.]
UAS.LUC.60 Privileges of a LUC holder
A UAS operator holding a LUC shall be entitled to authorise its own operations, within its terms of
approval.
[Note: related GM: GM1 UAS.LUC.60 Privileges.]
UAS.LUC.70 Changes in the LUC management system
After the issue of a LUC:
(a) any change affecting the terms of approval of the UAS operator; or
(b) any significant change to the elements of the LUC holder management system as required by
UAS.LUC.30;
shall require prior approval by the competent authority.
[Note: related AMC: AMC1 UAS.LUC.70(b) Significant changes in the LUC management system.]
UAS.LUC.80 Transferability
Except in the case of a change of ownership of the organisation, which is deemed significant for the
purposes of UAS.LUC.70, a LUC is not transferable.
UAS.LUC.90 Duration and validity of a LUC
(a) A LUC shall be issued for an unlimited duration. It shall be valid subject to:
(1) the UAS operator remaining in compliance with the relevant requirements of this
Regulation; and
(2) it not being surrendered or revoked.
(b) Upon revocation or surrender, the LUC shall be returned to the competent authority without
delay.
UAS.LUC.100 Access
For the purpose of demonstrating compliance with this Regulation, the LUC holder shall grant access to
any person authorised by the competent authority at any time to any facility, document, records, data,
procedures or any other material relevant to its activity subject to certification, authorisation or
declaration, whether this person is contracted to do so or not.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I.1
Product requirements for UAS Class C0
A UAS Class C0 shall:
(a) have an MTOM, including payload, of 250 g;
(b) be safely controllable by a remote pilot following the manufacturer’s instructions;
(c) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions and warnings highlighting the risks
related to UAS operations, which shall be adapted to the age of the user;
(d) if equipped with a follow-me mode, when this function is on, keep a distance not exceeding
50 m from the remote pilot, and allow the remote pilot to regain control of the UA or to activate
an emergency procedure that terminates the flight;
(e) include an awareness leaflet with all the information required to use the UAS in accordance with
the applicable regulations on aviation safety, security, privacy and data protection, liability and
insurance;
(f) bear the following label on the UA in a visible manner:
(g) comply with Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys, or:
(1) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(2) be designed to be operated below 50 m or have an active system limiting the attainable
height of the UA to a maximum of 50 m above take-off level;
(3) be designed without sharp edges that may constitute a danger to people on the ground;
(4) if equipped with propellers, be designed in a way to limit any injury that may be inflicted
by blades;
(5) be powered by electricity of a nominal voltage not exceeding 24 V direct current (DC) or
the equivalent alternating current (AC) voltage; its accessible parts shall not exceed 24 V
DC or the equivalent AC voltage; internal voltages shall not exceed 24 V DC or the
equivalent AC voltage unless it is ensured that the voltage and current combination
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generated does not lead to any risk or harmful electric shock even when the UAS is
damaged.
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Appendix I.2
Product requirements for UAS Class C1
A UAS Class C1 shall:
(a) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(b) be made of materials and have performance and physical characteristics such as to ensure that
in the event of an impact with a human body, the energy transmitted to the human body is less
than 80 J, or, as an alternative, have an MTOM, including payload, of less than 900 g and a
maximum cruising speed of 18 m/s;
(c) have a maximum altitude performance limited to 120 m or be equipped with a system limiting
the height above the ground or above the take-off point to a value selectable by the remote
pilot; in the latter case, clear information about the UA height from the ground during flight shall
be provided to the remote pilot;
(d) be equipped with an electronic identification system as per Appendix I.6.b to this Annex when
fitted with a camera of more than 5 megapixels (MP) and a real-time video transmission link or
any other type of sensor able to record personal data;
(e) be safely controllable by a pilot following the manufacturer’s instructions;
(f) be designed without sharp edges that may constitute a danger to people on the ground;
(g) if equipped with propellers, be designed in a way to limit any injury that may be inflicted by
blades;
(h) have a sound power level not exceeding 80 dB (measured at 3 m distance from the UA);
(i) be powered by electricity of a nominal voltage not exceeding 24 V DC or the equivalent AC
voltage; its accessible parts shall not exceed 24 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage; internal
voltages shall not exceed 24 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage unless it is ensured that the
voltage and current combination generated does not lead to any risk or harmful electric shock
even when the UAS is damaged;
(j) if equipped with a follow-me mode, when this function is on, keep a distance not exceeding
50 m from the remote pilot, and allow the remote pilot to regain control of the UA or to activate
an emergency procedure that terminates the flight;
(k) if fitted with an audio sensor or optical camera of more than 5 MP or any other type of sensor
able to record personal data, as well as a real-time video transmission link, be equipped with an
electronic identification system as per Appendix I.6.b to this Annex;
(l) provide to the remote pilot clear information about the battery status of the UA and its control
station;
(m) have the requisite mechanical strength and, where appropriate, stability to withstand any stress
to which it is subjected during use without breakage or deformation, which may interfere with
its safe flight;
(n) be equipped with lights, as required for its controllability;
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(o) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions and operational limitations
(including but not limited to meteorological conditions and day/night operations) highlighting
the risks related to UAS operations;
(p) include an awareness leaflet with all the information required to use the UAS in accordance with
the applicable regulations on aviation safety, security, privacy and data protection, liability and
insurance; and
(q) bear the following label on the UA in a visible manner:
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Appendix I.3
Product requirements for UAS Class C2
A UAS Class C2 shall:
(a) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(b) have an MTOM, including payload, of less than 4 kg;
(c) have a maximum altitude performance limited to 120 m or be equipped with a system limiting
the height above the ground or above the take-off point to a value selectable by the remote
pilot; in the latter case, clear information about the UA height from the ground during flight shall
be provided to the remote pilot;
(d) be equipped with an advisory geofencing system as per Appendix I.6.a to this Annex;
(e) be equipped with an electronic identification system as per Appendix I.6.b to this Annex;
(f) be safely controllable by a pilot following the manufacturer’s instructions;
(g) provide to the pilot clear information about the battery status of the UA and its control station;
(h) have a sound power level not exceeding 80 dB (measured at a 3-m distance from the UA);
(i) be powered by electricity of a nominal voltage not exceeding 48 V DC or the equivalent AC
voltage; its accessible parts shall not exceed 48 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage; internal
voltages shall not exceed 48 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage unless it is ensured that the
voltage and current combination generated does not lead to any risk or harmful electric shock
even when the UAS is damaged;
(j) have the requisite mechanical strength and, where appropriate, stability to withstand any stress
to which it is subjected during use without breakage or deformation, which may interfere with
its safe flight;
(k) in case of loss of data link, have a reliable and predictable method for the UA to recover or
terminate the flight in a way that reduces the effect on third parties in the air or on the ground;
(l) be equipped with lights, as required for the operating conditions;
(m) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions, troubleshooting procedures, and
operational limitations (including but not limited to meteorological conditions and, day/night
operations) as well as an appropriate description of all the risks related to UAS operations;
(n) include an awareness leaflet with all the information required to use the UAS in accordance with
the applicable regulations on aviation safety, security, privacy and data protection, liability and
insurance; and
(o) bear the following label on the UA in a visible manner:
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Appendix I.4
Product requirements for UAS Class C3
A UAS Class C3 shall:
(a) have an MTOM, including payload, of less than 25 kg;
(b) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(c) have a maximum altitude performance limited to 120 m or be equipped with a system limiting
the height above the ground or above the take-off point to a value selectable by the remote
pilot; in the latter case, clear information about the UA height from the ground during flight shall
be provided to the remote pilot;
(d) be safely controllable by a pilot following the manufacturer’s instructions;
(e) provide to the pilot clear information about the battery status of the UA and its control station;
(f) in case of loss of data link, have a reliable and predictable method for the UA to recover or
terminate the flight in a way that reduces the effect on third parties in the air or on the ground;
(g) be powered by electricity of a nominal voltage not exceeding 48 V DC or the equivalent AC
voltage; its accessible parts shall not exceed 48 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage; internal
voltages shall not exceed 48 V DC or the equivalent AC voltage unless it is ensured that the
voltage and current combination generated does not lead to any risk or harmful electric shock
even when the UAS is damaged;
(h) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions, troubleshooting procedures, and
operational limitations (including but not limited to meteorological conditions and, day/night
operations) as well as an appropriate description of all the risks related to UAS operations;
(i) be equipped with lights, as required for the operating conditions;
(j) include an awareness leaflet with all the information required to use the UAS in accordance with
the applicable regulations on aviation safety, security, privacy and data protection, liability and
insurance; and
(k) bear the following label on the UA in a visible manner:
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Appendix I.5
Product requirements for UAS Class C4
A UAS Class C4 shall:
(a) have an MTOM, including payload, of less than 25 kg;
(b) be designed and manufactured to fly safely;
(c) be placed on the market with clear operational instructions;
(d) include an awareness leaflet with all the information required to use the UAS in accordance with
the applicable regulations on aviation safety, security, privacy and data protection, liability and
insurance; and
(e) bear the following label on the UA in a visible manner:
C4
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Appendix I.6
Product requirements for UAS components
This Appendix contains the product requirements for UAS systems being an integral part of a UA or
placed on the market as an independent add-on component.
I.6.a — Geofencing system
A geofencing system should include the following functionalities and performance characteristics so as
to provide:
(a) an interface to update data containing information on airspace limitations and requirements, as
well as to ensure the integrity and validity of this data;
(b) information about the airspace limitations and requirements where the UA operates, as well as
the position and movement of the UA relative to those limitations; and
(c) information on the status of the system as well as on the validity of its position or navigation
data.
If the UA has a functionality that limits its access to certain airspace areas or volumes, this functionality
shall be used in a manner that it interacts smoothly with the flight control without adversely affecting
flight safety. In addition, sufficient information shall be provided to the remote pilot when the UA
approaches areas with airspace limitations or when the geofencing system engages with the UA flight
control system.
I.6.b — Electronic identification system
An electronic identification system shall provide in real time the following information through
electronic data, which is compliant with standards acceptable to the Agency:
(a) the UAS operator and UA registration;
(b) the UAS class;
(c) the type of the UAS operation;
(d) the status of the UAS geofencing function; and
(e) the geographical position of the UA and its altitude above ground level.
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3.1.3 Part-MRK
ANNEX II
Making available on the market
[PART-MRK]
SECTION 1 — GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article II.1. Subject matter and scope
1. This Annex establishes a regulatory framework for the making available on the Union market of
UAS intended to be used in the open category, as well as UAS components defined in Appendix
I.6.a and I.6.b. The technical requirements defined in these Appendixes together with this Annex
constitute the Union Harmonization Legislation for those products.
2. At the exception of UAS falling within the scope of Appendices I.1 to I.5 and placed on the
market by the manufacturer in kit ready-to-assemble, privately-built UAS do not fall within the
scope of this Annex.
Article II.2. Definition
1. For the purpose of this Annex, product mean UAS or UAS component falling within the scope of
Article II.1.
2. For the purposes of this Annex definitions provided in Article 2 and the following ones apply:
a. ‘manufacturer’ means any natural or legal person who manufactures a product or has a
product designed or manufactured, and markets that product under his name or
trademark;
b. ‘authorised representative’ means any natural or legal person established within the
Community who has received a written mandate from a manufacturer to act on his behalf
in relation to specified tasks with regard to the latter's obligations under the relevant
Community legislation;
c. ‘importer’ means any natural or legal person established within the Community who
places a product from a third country on the Community market;
d. ‘distributor’ means any natural or legal person in the supply chain, other than the
manufacturer or the importer, who makes a product available on the market;
e. ‘technical specification’ means a document that prescribes technical requirements to be
fulfilled by a product, process or service;
f. ‘harmonised standard’ means a standard adopted by one of the European standardisation
bodies listed in Annex I to Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the
field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services
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(10) on the basis of a request made by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of that
Directive;
g. ‘accreditation’ means an attestation by a national accreditation body that a conformity
assessment body meets the requirements set by harmonised standards and, where
applicable, any additional requirements including those set out in relevant sectoral
schemes, to carry out a specific conformity assessment activity;
h. ‘national accreditation body’ means the sole body in a Member State that performs
accreditation with authority derived from the State;
i. ‘conformity assessment’ means the process demonstrating whether specified
requirements relating to a product, process, service, system, person or body have been
fulfilled;
j. ‘conformity assessment body’ means a body that performs conformity assessment
activities including calibration, testing, certification and inspection;
k. ‘recall’ means any measure aimed at achieving the return of a product that has already
been made available to the end user;
l. ‘withdrawal’ means any measure aimed at preventing a product in the supply chain from
being made available on the market;
m. ‘peer evaluation’ means a process for the assessment of a national accreditation body by
other national accreditation bodies, carried out in accordance with the requirements of
this Regulation, and, where applicable, additional sectoral technical specifications;
n. ‘market surveillance’ means the activities carried out and measures taken by public
authorities to ensure that products comply with the requirements set out in the relevant
Union harmonisation legislation and do not endanger health, safety or any other aspect of
public interest protection;
o. ‘market surveillance authority’ means an authority of a Member State responsible for
carrying out market surveillance on its territory;
p. ‘release for free circulation’ means the procedure laid down in Article 79 of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Union Customs Code
(11);
q. ‘CE marking’ means a marking by which the manufacturer indicates that the product is in
conformity with the applicable requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation
providing for its affixing.
Article II.3. Making available on the market
Products falling within the scope of this Annex shall only be made available on the Union market or put
into service if:
1. they have been designed and constructed in accordance with good engineering practice in safety
matters in force in the Union,
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2. they meet the applicable requirements set out in Annex I to this Regulation and the other
applicable Union harmonisation legislation;
3. they do not endanger the safety of persons and property or the environment when maintained
according to the instructions provided and used in accordance with the rules defined in this
Regulation.
Article II.4. Free movement of UAS and UAS components
Member States shall not prohibit, restrict or impede, for the aspects covered by this Regulation, the
making available on the market of product falling within the scope of this Annex and which complies
whit this Regulation.
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SECTION 2 — OBLIGATIONS OF ECONOMIC OPERATORS
Article II.5. Obligations of manufacturers
1. When placing their product on the market, manufacturers shall ensure that it has been designed
and manufactured in accordance with the requirements set out in Article II.3.
2. Manufacturers shall draw up the technical documentation referred to in Article II.16 and carry
out the relevant conformity assessment procedure referred to in Article II.12 or have it carried
out.
Where compliance of the product with the requirements in the relevant Appendices I.1 to I.6 has
been demonstrated by that conformity assessment procedure, manufacturers shall draw up an
EU declaration of conformity and affix the CE marking.
3. Manufacturers shall keep the technical documentation and the EU declaration of conformity for
5 years after the product has been placed on the market.
4. Manufacturers shall ensure that procedures are in place for series production to ensure that
changes in product design, characteristics or software do not alter the compliance of the product
or that relevant conformity assessment procedure is undertaken. Changes in the harmonised
standards or in technical specifications by reference to which conformity of a product is declared
shall be adequately taken into account.
When deemed appropriate with regard to the risks presented by a product, manufacturers shall,
to protect the health and safety of consumers, carry out sample testing of marketed products,
investigate, and, if necessary, keep a register of complaints, of non-conforming products and
product recalls, and shall keep distributors informed of any such monitoring.
5. Manufacturers shall ensure that procedures are in place to ensure that software upgrades taking
place after the placing on the market do not alter the compliance of the product.
6. Manufacturers shall ensure that products they have placed on the market bear a type, batch or
serial number or other element allowing their identification, or, where the size or nature of the
product does not allow it, that the required information is provided on the packaging, or in a
document accompanying it.
7. Manufacturers shall indicate their name, registered trade name or registered trade mark and the
postal address at which they can be contacted on the product or, where that is not possible, on
its packaging, or in a document accompanying it. The address shall indicate a single point at
which the manufacturer can be contacted. The contact details shall be indicated in a language
easily understood by end-users and market surveillance authorities.
8. Manufacturers shall ensure that the product they have placed on the market bears the UA class
identification label defined in the related Appendices I.1 to I.5.
9. Manufacturers shall ensure that products placed on the market are accompanied by the
instructions and information required by Appendices I.1 to I.6 in a language which can be easily
understood by consumers and other end-users, as determined by the Member State concerned.
Such instructions and information, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and
intelligible.
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10. Manufacturers shall ensure that each product is accompanied by a copy of the EU declaration of
conformity or by a simplified EU declaration of conformity. Where a simplified EU declaration of
conformity is provided, it shall contain the exact internet address where the full text of the EU
declaration of conformity can be obtained.
11. Manufacturers who consider or have reason to believe that products which they have placed on
the market are not in conformity with the applicable Union harmonisation legislation shall
immediately take the corrective measures necessary to bring that product into conformity, to
withdraw it or recall it, if appropriate. Furthermore, where the product presents a safety risk,
manufacturers shall immediately inform the market surveillance authorities of the Member
States in which they made the product available on the market to that effect, giving details, in
particular, of the non-compliance, of any corrective measures taken and of the results thereof.
12. Manufacturers shall, further to a reasoned request from a market surveillance or border control
authority, provide it with all the information and documentation in paper or electronic form
necessary to demonstrate the conformity of the product with this Regulation, in a language
which can be easily understood by that authority. They shall cooperate with that authority, at its
request, on any action taken to eliminate the risks posed by the product which they have placed
on the market.
Article II.6. Authorised representatives
1. A manufacturer may, by a written mandate, appoint an authorised representative.
2. The obligations laid down in Article II.5(1) and the obligation to draw up technical
documentation laid down in Article II.5(2) shall not form part of the authorised representative's
mandate.
3. An authorised representative shall perform the tasks specified in the mandate received from the
manufacturer. The mandate shall allow the authorised representative to do at least the
following:
a. keep the EU declaration of conformity and the technical documentation at the disposal of
national market surveillance authorities for 5 years after the product has been placed on
the market;
b. further to a reasoned request from a market surveillance or border control authority,
provide that authority with all the information and documentation necessary to
demonstrate the conformity of the product;
c. cooperate with the market surveillance or border control authorities, at their request, on
any action taken to eliminate the non-conformity of the products covered by the
authorised representative's mandate or the safety risks posed by it.
Article II.7. Obligations of importers
1. Importers shall only place on the Union market products compliant with the requirements set
out in Article II.3.
2. Before placing a product on the market importers shall ensure that:
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a. the appropriate conformity assessment procedure referred to in Article II.12 has been
carried out by the manufacturer;
b. the product is in conformity with the requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6;
c. the manufacturer has drawn up the technical documentation referred to in Article II.16;
d. the product bears the CE marking and, when relevant, the UA class identification label;
e. the product is accompanied by the documents referred to in Article II.5(9) and (10);
f. the manufacturer has complied with the requirements set out in Article II.5(6) and (7).
Where an importer considers or has reason to believe that a product is not in conformity with
the requirements set out in Article II.3, he shall not place the product on the market until it has
been brought into conformity. Furthermore, where product presents a safety risk, the importer
shall inform the manufacturer and the competent market surveillance authorities to that effect.
3. Importers shall indicate on the product their name, registered trade name or registered trade
mark and the postal address at which they can be contacted or, where that is not possible, on its
packaging or in a document accompanying the product. This includes cases where the size of the
product does not allow it, or where importers would have to open the packaging in order to
indicate their name and address on product. The contact details shall be in a language easily
understood by end-users and market surveillance authorities.
4. Importers shall ensure that the product is accompanied by the instructions and information
required by Appendices I.1 to I.6 in a language which can be easily understood by consumers and
other end-users, as determined by the Member State concerned. Such instructions and
information, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and intelligible.
5. Importers shall ensure that, while product is under their responsibility, its storage or transport
conditions do not jeopardise its compliance with the requirements set out in Article II.3 (b) and
(c).
6. When deemed appropriate with regard to the risks presented by a product, importers shall, to
protect the health and safety of end-users and third-parties, carry out sample testing of products
made available on the market, investigate, and, if necessary, keep a register of complaints, of
non-conforming of products and product system recalls, and shall keep distributors informed of
any such monitoring.
7. Importers who consider or have reason to believe that products which they have placed on the
market is not in conformity with the applicable Union harmonisation legislation shall
immediately take the corrective measures necessary to bring that product into conformity, to
withdraw it or recall it, if appropriate. Furthermore, where the product presents a safety risk,
importers shall immediately inform the market surveillance authorities of the Member States in
which they made the product available on the market to that effect, giving details, in particular,
of the non-compliance and of any corrective measures taken.
8. Importers shall, for 5 years after the product has been placed on the market, keep a copy of the
EU declaration of conformity at the disposal of the market surveillance authorities and ensure
that the technical documentation can be made available to those authorities, upon request.
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9. Importers shall, further to a reasoned request from a market surveillance or border control
authority, provide it with all the information and documentation in paper or electronic form
necessary to demonstrate the conformity of the product in a language which can be easily
understood by that authority. They shall cooperate with that authority, at its request, on any
action taken to eliminate the risks posed by the product which they have placed on the market.
Article II.8. Obligations of distributors
1. When making a product available on the market distributors shall act with due care in relation to
the requirements of this Regulation.
2. Before making a product available on the market distributors shall verify that the product bears
the CE marking and, when relevant, the class identification label, and is accompanied by the
documents referred to in Article II.5(9) and (10), and that the manufacturer and the importer
have complied with the requirements set out in Article II.5(6) and (7).
Distributors shall ensure that the product is accompanied by the instructions and information
required by Appendices I.1 to I.6 in a language which can be easily understood by consumers and
other end-users, as determined by the Member State concerned. Such instructions and
information, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and intelligible.
Where a distributor considers or has reason to believe that a product is not in conformity with
the requirements set out in Article II.3, he shall not make the product available on the market
until it has been brought into conformity. Furthermore, where the product presents a safety risk,
the distributor shall inform the manufacturer or the importer to that effect as well as the
competent market surveillance authorities.
3. Distributors shall ensure that, while a product is under their responsibility, its storage or
transport conditions do not jeopardise its compliance with the requirements set out in Article
II.3 (b) and (c).
4. Distributors who consider or have reason to believe that a product which they have made
available on the market is not in conformity with the applicable Union harmonisation legislation
shall make sure that the corrective measures necessary to bring that product into conformity, to
withdraw it or recall it, if appropriate, are taken. Furthermore, where the product presents a
safety risk, distributors shall immediately inform the market surveillance authorities of the
Member States in which they made the product available on the market to that effect, giving
details, in particular, of the non-compliance and of any corrective measures taken.
5. Distributors shall, further to a reasoned request from a market surveillance or border control
authority, provide it with all the information and documentation in paper or electronic form
necessary to demonstrate the conformity of the product. They shall cooperate with that
authority, at its request, on any action taken to eliminate the risks posed by the product which
they have made available on the market.
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Article II.9. Cases in which obligations of manufacturers apply to importers and distributors
An importer or distributor shall be considered a manufacturer for the purposes of this Regulation and
he shall be subject to the obligations of the manufacturer under Article II.6, where he places a product
on the market under his name or trade mark or modifies the product already placed on the market in
such a way that compliance with this Regulation may be affected.
Article II.10. Identification of economic operators
Economic operators shall, on request, identify the following to the market surveillance authorities:
1. any economic operator who has supplied them with a product;
2. any economic operator to whom they have supplied a product.
Economic operators shall be able to present the information referred to in the first paragraph for 5
years after they have been supplied with the product and for 5 years after they have supplied the
product.
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SECTION 3 — CONFORMITY OF THE PRODUCT
Article II.11. Presumption of conformity
Product which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof the references of which
have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union shall be presumed to be in
conformity with the relevant product's requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6 covered by those
standards or parts thereof.
Article II.12. Conformity assessment procedures
1. The manufacturer shall perform a conformity assessment of the product with a view to establish
its compliance with the relevant requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6. The conformity
assessment shall take into account all intended and foreseeable operating conditions.
2. For products compliant with Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys, manufacturers shall
demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in Appendix I.1, using the internal
production control procedure set out in see Appendix II.1.
3. Manufacturers shall demonstrate compliance of products with the requirements set out in
Appendix I.5 using the internal production control procedure set out in Appendix II.1.
4. Where, in assessing the compliance of the product with the applicable requirements set out in
Appendices I.1, I.2, I.3, I.4 or I.6, the manufacturer has applied harmonised standards, the
references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, covering
all requirements for the product he shall use the internal production control set out in Appendix
II.1.
5. Where, in assessing the compliance of the product with the applicable requirements set out in
Appendices I.1 to I.6, the manufacturer has not applied or has applied only in part harmonised
standards the references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European
Union, or where such harmonised standards do not exist, the product shall be submitted with
regard to those essential requirements to either of the following procedures:
a. EU-type examination that is followed by the conformity to type based on internal
production control set out in Appendix II.2;
b. conformity based on full quality assurance set out in Appendix II.3.
Article II.13. EU declaration of conformity
1. The EU declaration of conformity referred to in Article II.5(10) shall, when relevant, identify the
class of UA and state that the fulfilment of the corresponding requirements set out in
Appendices 1.1 to 1.5 has been demonstrated.
2. The EU declaration of conformity shall have the model structure set out in Appendix II.5, shall
contain the elements set out in that Appendix and shall be continuously updated. It shall be
translated into the language or languages required by the Member State in which market the
product is placed or made available.
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3. The simplified EU declaration of conformity referred to in Article II.5 (10) shall contain the
elements set out in Appendix II.6 and shall be continuously updated. It shall be translated into
the language or languages required by the Member State in which the product is placed or made
available on the market. The full text of the EU declaration of conformity shall be available at the
internet address referred to in the simplified EU declaration of conformity, in a language or
languages required by the Member State in which the product is placed or made available on the
market.
4. Where a product is subject to more than one Union act requiring an EU declaration of
conformity, a single EU declaration of conformity shall be drawn up in respect of all such Union
acts. That declaration shall contain the identification of the Union acts concerned including their
publication references.
5. By drawing up the EU declaration of conformity, the manufacturer shall assume responsibility for
the compliance of the product with the requirements laid down in this Regulation.
Article II.14. General principles of the CE marking
1. The CE marking shall be subject to the general principles set out in Article 30 of Regulation (EC)
No 765/2008.
2. Member States shall presume that products bearing the CE marking and, when relevant, the UA
class identification label, comply with this Regulation.
Article II.15. Rules and conditions for affixing the CE marking, the UAS class identification label and the
identification number of the notified body
1. The CE marking and, when relevant, the UA class identification label shall be affixed visibly,
legibly and indelibly to the product, unless that is not possible or not warranted on account of
the nature of the product. The CE marking and the UA class identification label shall also be
affixed visibly and legibly to the packaging.
On account of the nature of the product, the height of the CE marking and UA class identification
label affixed to the product may be lower than 5 mm, provided that it remains visible and
legible.
The class identification label will be affixed on the right of the CE marking and have a similar size.
2. The CE marking and the UA class identification label shall be affixed before the product is placed
on the market.
3. The CE marking and the UA class identification label shall be followed by the identification
number of the notified body where the conformity assessment procedure set out in Appendix
II.2 is applied. It shall have the same height as the CE marking.
The identification number of the notified body shall be affixed by the notified body itself or,
under its instructions, by the manufacturer or his authorised representative.
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4. Member States shall build upon existing mechanisms to ensure correct application of the regime
governing the CE marking and shall take appropriate action in the event of improper use of that
marking.
Article II.16. Technical documentation
1. The technical documentation shall contain all relevant data or details of the means used by the
manufacturer to ensure that the product complies with the related requirements set out in
Appendices I.1 to I.6. It shall, at least, contain the elements set out in Appendix II.4.
2. The technical documentation shall be drawn up before the product is placed on the market and
shall be continuously updated.
3. The technical documentation and correspondence relating to any EU-type examination
procedure shall be drawn up in an official language of the Member State in which the notified
body is established or in a language acceptable to that body.
4. Where the technical documentation does not comply with paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 of this Article,
and in so doing fails to present sufficient relevant data or means used to ensure compliance of
the product with the related requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6, the market
surveillance authority may ask the manufacturer or the importer to have a test performed by a
body acceptable to the market surveillance authority at the expense of the manufacturer or the
importer within a specified period in order to verify compliance with the related requirements
set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6.
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SECTION 4 — NOTIFICATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES
Article II.17. Notification
Member States shall notify the Commission and the other Member States of bodies authorised to carry
out third-party conformity assessment tasks under this Regulation.
Article II.18. Notifying authorities
1. Member States shall designate a notifying authority that shall be responsible for setting up and
carrying out the necessary procedures for the assessment and notification of conformity
assessment bodies and the monitoring of notified bodies, including compliance with the
provisions of Article II.23.
2. Member States may decide that the assessment and monitoring referred to in paragraph 1 shall
be carried out by a national accreditation body within the meaning of and in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008.
3. Where the notifying authority delegates or otherwise entrusts the assessment, notification or
monitoring referred to in paragraph 1 to a body which is not a governmental entity, that body
shall be a legal entity and shall comply mutatis mutandis with the requirements laid down in
Article II.19. In addition it shall have arrangements to cover liabilities arising out of its activities.
4. The notifying authority shall take full responsibility for the tasks performed by the body referred
to in paragraph 3.
Article II.19. Requirements relating to notifying authorities
1. A notifying authority shall be established in such a way that no conflict of interest with
conformity assessment bodies occurs.
2. A notifying authority shall be organised and operated so as to safeguard the objectivity and
impartiality of its activities.
3. A notifying authority shall be organised in such a way that each decision relating to notification
of a conformity assessment body is taken by competent persons different from those who
carried out the assessment.
4. A notifying authority shall not offer or provide any activities that conformity assessment bodies
perform or consultancy services on a commercial or competitive basis.
5. A notifying authority shall safeguard the confidentiality of the information it obtains.
6. A notifying authority shall have a sufficient number of competent personnel at its disposal for
the proper performance of its tasks.
Article II.20. Information obligation on notifying authorities
Member States shall inform the Commission of their procedures for the assessment and notification of
conformity assessment bodies and the monitoring of notified bodies, and of any changes thereto.
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The Commission shall make that information publicly available.
Article II.21. Requirements relating to notified bodies
1. For the purposes of notification, a conformity assessment body shall meet the requirements laid
down in paragraphs 2 to 11.
2. A conformity assessment body shall be established under national law of a Member State and
have legal personality.
3. A conformity assessment body shall be a third-party body independent of the organisation it
assesses.
A body belonging to a business association or professional federation representing undertakings
involved in the design, manufacturing, provision, assembly, use or maintenance of the product
which it assesses may, on condition that its independence and the absence of any conflict of
interest are demonstrated, be considered such a body.
4. A conformity assessment body, its top level management and the personnel responsible for
carrying out the conformity assessment tasks shall not be the designer, manufacturer, supplier,
installer, purchaser, owner, user or maintainer of the product which they assess, nor the
representative of any of those parties. This shall not preclude the use of assessed product that is
necessary for the operations of the conformity assessment body or the use of such product for
personal purposes.
A conformity assessment body, its top level management and the personnel responsible for
carrying out the conformity assessment tasks shall not be directly involved in the design,
manufacture or construction, the marketing, installation, use or maintenance of that product, or
represent the parties engaged in those activities. They shall not engage in any activity that may
conflict with their independence of judgement or integrity in relation to conformity assessment
activities for which they are notified. This shall in particular apply to consultancy services.
Conformity assessment bodies shall ensure that the activities of their subsidiaries or
subcontractors do not affect the confidentiality, objectivity or impartiality of their conformity
assessment activities.
5. Conformity assessment bodies and their personnel shall carry out the conformity assessment
activities with the highest degree of professional integrity and the requisite technical
competence in the specific field and shall be free from all pressures and inducements,
particularly financial, which might influence their judgement or the results of their conformity
assessment activities, especially as regards persons or groups of persons with an interest in the
results of those activities.
6. A conformity assessment body shall be capable of carrying out all the conformity assessment
tasks assigned to it by Appendix II.2 or II.3 in relation to which it has been notified, whether
those tasks are carried out by the conformity assessment body itself or on its behalf and under
its responsibility.
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At all times and for each conformity assessment procedure and each kind or category of product
in relation to which it has been notified, a conformity assessment body shall have at its disposal
the necessary:
a. personnel with technical knowledge and sufficient and appropriate experience to perform
the conformity assessment tasks;
b. descriptions of procedures in accordance with which conformity assessment is carried out,
ensuring the transparency and the ability of reproduction of those procedures. It shall
have appropriate policies and procedures in place that distinguish between tasks it carries
out as a notified body and other activities;
c. procedures for the performance of activities which take due account of the size of an
undertaking, the sector in which it operates, its structure, the degree of complexity of the
product in question and the mass or serial nature of the production process.
A conformity assessment body shall have the means necessary to perform the technical and
administrative tasks connected with the conformity assessment activities in an appropriate
manner and shall have access to all necessary equipment or facilities.
7. The personnel responsible for carrying out conformity assessment tasks shall have the following:
a. sound technical and vocational training covering all the conformity assessment activities in
relation to which the conformity assessment body has been notified;
b. satisfactory knowledge of the requirements of the assessments they carry out and
adequate authority to carry out those assessments;
c. appropriate knowledge and understanding of the essential requirements set out in Article
3, of the applicable harmonised standards and of the relevant provisions of Union
harmonisation legislation and of national legislation;
d. the ability to draw up EU-type examination certificates or quality system approvals,
records and reports demonstrating that assessments have been carried out.
8. The impartiality of the conformity assessment bodies, their top level management and of the
personnel responsible for carrying out the conformity assessment tasks shall be guaranteed.
The remuneration of the top level management and personnel responsible for carrying out the
conformity assessment tasks of a conformity assessment body shall not depend on the number
of assessments carried out or on the results of those assessments.
9. Conformity assessment bodies shall take out liability insurance unless liability is assumed by the
State in accordance with national law, or the Member State itself is directly responsible for the
conformity assessment.
10. The personnel of a conformity assessment body shall observe professional secrecy with regard
to all information obtained in carrying out their tasks under Appendixes II.2 and 3 or any
provision of national law giving effect to them, except in relation to the competent authorities of
the Member State in which its activities are carried out. Proprietary rights shall be protected.
11. Conformity assessment bodies shall participate in, or ensure that their personnel responsible for
carrying out the conformity assessment tasks are informed of, the relevant standardisation
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activities, the regulatory activities in the area of UAS and frequency planning, and the activities
of the notified body coordination group established under the relevant Union harmonisation
legislation and shall apply as general guidance the administrative decisions and documents
produced as a result of the work of that group.
Article II.22. Presumption of conformity of notified bodies
Where a conformity assessment body demonstrates its conformity with the criteria laid down in the
relevant harmonised standards or parts thereof the references of which have been published in the
Official Journal of the European Union it shall be presumed to comply with the requirements set out in
Article II.21 in so far as the applicable harmonised standards cover those requirements.
Article II.23. Subsidiaries of and subcontracting by notified bodies
1. Where a notified body subcontracts specific tasks connected with conformity assessment or has
recourse to a subsidiary, it shall ensure that the subcontractor or the subsidiary meets the
requirements set out in Article II.21 and shall inform the notifying authority accordingly.
2. Notified bodies shall take full responsibility for the tasks performed by subcontractors or
subsidiaries wherever these are established.
3. Activities may be subcontracted or carried out by a subsidiary only with the agreement of the
client.
4. Notified bodies shall keep at the disposal of the notifying authority the relevant documents
concerning the assessment of the qualifications of the subcontractor or the subsidiary and the
work carried out by them under Appendixes II.2 and 3.
Article II.24. Application for notification
1. A conformity assessment body shall submit an application for notification to the notifying
authority of the Member State in which it is established.
2. The application for notification shall be accompanied by a description of the conformity
assessment activities, the conformity assessment module or modules and the product for which
that body claims to be competent, as well as by an accreditation certificate, where one exists,
issued by a national accreditation body attesting that the conformity assessment body fulfils the
requirements laid down in Article II.21.
3. Where the conformity assessment body concerned cannot provide an accreditation certificate, it
shall provide the notifying authority with all the documentary evidence necessary for the
verification, recognition and regular monitoring of its compliance with the requirements laid
down in Article II.21.
Article II.25. Notification procedure
1. Notifying authorities may notify only conformity assessment bodies which have satisfied the
requirements laid down in Article II.21.
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2. They shall notify conformity assessment bodies to the Commission and the other Member States
using the electronic notification tool developed and managed by the Commission.
3. The notification shall include full details of the conformity assessment activities, the conformity
assessment module or modules and the product concerned and the relevant attestation of
competence.
4. Where a notification is not based on an accreditation certificate as referred to in Article II.24(2),
the notifying authority shall provide the Commission and the other Member States with
documentary evidence which attests to the conformity assessment body's competence and the
arrangements in place to ensure that that body will be monitored regularly and will continue to
satisfy the requirements laid down in Article II.21.
5. The body concerned may perform the activities of a notified body only where no objections are
raised by the Commission or the other Member States within two weeks of a notification where
an accreditation certificate is used or within two months of a notification where accreditation is
not used.
Only such a body shall be considered a notified body for the purposes of this Regulation.
6. The notifying authority shall notify the Commission and the other Member States of any
subsequent relevant changes to the notification.
Article II.26. Identification numbers and lists of notified bodies
1. The Commission shall assign an identification number to a notified body.
It shall assign a single such number even where the body is notified under several Union acts.
2. The Commission shall make publicly available the list of the bodies notified under this
Regulation, including the identification numbers that have been assigned to them and the
activities for which they have been notified.
The Commission shall ensure that the list is kept up to date.
Article II.27. Changes to notifications
1. Where a notifying authority has ascertained or has been informed that a notified body no longer
meets the requirements laid down in Article II.21, or that it is failing to fulfil its obligations, the
notifying authority shall restrict, suspend or withdraw notification as appropriate, depending on
the seriousness of the failure to meet those requirements or fulfil those obligations. It shall
immediately inform the Commission and the other Member States accordingly.
2. In the event of restriction, suspension or withdrawal of notification, or where the notified body
has ceased its activity, the notifying Member State shall take appropriate steps to ensure that
the files of that body are either processed by another notified body or kept available for the
responsible notifying and market surveillance authorities at their request.
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Article II.28. Challenge of the competence of notified bodies
1. The Commission shall investigate all cases where it doubts, or doubt is brought to its attention
regarding, the competence of a notified body or the continued fulfilment by a notified body of
the requirements and responsibilities to which it is subject.
2. The notifying Member State shall provide the Commission, on request, with all information
relating to the basis for the notification or the maintenance of the competence of the notified
body concerned.
3. The Commission shall ensure that all sensitive information obtained in the course of its
investigations is treated confidentially.
4. Where the Commission ascertains that a notified body does not meet or no longer meets the
requirements for notification, it shall inform the notifying Member State accordingly and request
it to take the necessary corrective measures, including de-notification if necessary.
Article II.29. Operational obligations of notified bodies
1. Notified bodies shall carry out conformity assessments in accordance with the conformity
assessment procedures provided for in Appendixes II.2 and 3.
2. Conformity assessments shall be carried out in a proportionate manner, avoiding unnecessary
burdens for economic operators. Conformity assessment bodies shall perform their activities
taking due account of the size of an undertaking, the sector in which it operates, its structure,
the degree of complexity of the UA or UAS technology in question and the mass or serial nature
of the production process.
In so doing they shall nevertheless respect the degree of rigour and the level of protection
required for the compliance of the UA or UAS with this Regulation.
3. Where a notified body finds that the relevant product's requirements set out in Appendices I.1
to I.6 or corresponding harmonised standards or other technical specifications have not been
met by a manufacturer, it shall require that manufacturer to take appropriate corrective
measures and shall not issue an EU-type examination certificate or a quality system approval.
4. Where, in the course of the monitoring of conformity following the issue of an EU-type
examination certificate or a quality system approval, a notified body finds that UA or UAS no
longer complies, it shall require the manufacturer to take appropriate corrective measures and
shall suspend or withdraw the EU-type examination certificate or the quality system approval if
necessary.
5. Where corrective measures are not taken or do not have the required effect, the notified body
shall restrict, suspend or withdraw any EU-type examination certificates or quality system
approvals, as appropriate.
Article II.30. Appeal against decisions of notified bodies
Member States shall ensure that an appeal procedure against decisions of the notified bodies is
available.
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Article II.31. Information obligation on notified bodies
1. Notified bodies shall inform the notifying authority of the following:
a. any refusal, restriction, suspension or withdrawal of an EU-type examination certificate or
a quality system approval in accordance with the requirements of Appendixes II.2 and 3;
b. any circumstances affecting the scope of or conditions for notification;
c. any request for information which they have received from market surveillance
authorities regarding conformity assessment activities;
d. on request, conformity assessment activities performed within the scope of their
notification and any other activity performed, including cross-border activities and
subcontracting.
2. Notified bodies shall, in accordance with the requirements of Appendices II.2 and 3, provide the
other bodies notified under this Regulation carrying out similar conformity assessment activities
covering the same categories of UA or UAS with relevant information on issues relating to
negative and, on request, positive conformity assessment results.
3. Notified bodies shall fulfil information obligations under Appendices II.2 and 3.
Article II.32. Exchange of experience
The Commission shall provide for the organisation of exchange of experience between the Member
States' national authorities responsible for notification policy.
Article II.33. Coordination of notified bodies
The Commission shall ensure that appropriate coordination and cooperation between bodies notified
under this Regulation are put in place and properly operated in the form of a sectoral group of notified
bodies.
Member States shall ensure that the bodies notified by them participate in the work of that group,
directly or by means of designated representatives.
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SECTION 5 — UNION MARKET SURVEILLANCE, CONTROL OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ENTERING THE
UNION MARKET AND UNION SAFEGUARD PROCEDURE
Article II.34. Precautionary principle
When authorities of the Member States take measures as provided for in this Annex, and in particular
those referred to in Article II.36, they shall take due account of the precautionary principle.
Article II.35. General obligation to organise market surveillance and control of products entering the Union
market
1. Member States shall organise and perform surveillance of the products falling within the scope
of this Annex and placed on the Union market in accordance with Articles 15(3) and Articles 16
to 26 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008.
2. Member States shall organise and perform control of the products falling within the scope of this
Annex and entering the Union market in accordance with Articles 15(5) and Articles 27 to 29 of
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008.
3. Special attention shall be paid to the surveillance of e-commerce and the development of
cooperation between market surveillance authorities and actors in the supply chain, such as
intermediaries and online market places.
4. Member States shall establish appropriate communication and coordination mechanisms
between their market surveillance and border control authorities and the authorities designated
under Article 7, making the best use of the information contained in the occurrence reporting
system defined under Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 and the information systems defined in
Article 22 and 23 of Regulation (EC) 765/2008.
Article II.36. Instructions to the notified body
1. Market surveillance authorities may request a notified body to provide information relating to
any EC-type examination certificate which that body has issued or withdrawn, or which relates
to any refusal to issue such a certificate, including the test reports and technical documentation.
2. If a market surveillance authority finds that a product is not in conformity with the related
requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6, it shall, where appropriate, instruct the notified
body to withdraw the EC-type examination certificate in respect of that product.
Article II.37. Procedure for dealing with products presenting a risk at national level
1. Where the market surveillance authorities of one Member State have sufficient reason to
believe that a product presents a risk to the health or safety of persons or to other aspects of
public interest protection covered by this Annex, they shall carry out an evaluation in relation to
product concerned covering all applicable requirements laid down in this Regulation. The
relevant economic operators shall cooperate as necessary with the market surveillance
authorities for that purpose.
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Where, in the course of the evaluation referred to in the first subparagraph, the market
surveillance authorities find that the product does not comply with the requirements laid down
in this Regulation, they shall without delay require the relevant economic operator to take all
appropriate corrective actions to bring the product into compliance with those requirements, to
withdraw the product from the market, or to recall it within a reasonable period, commensurate
with the nature of the risk, as they may prescribe.
The market surveillance authorities shall inform the relevant notified body accordingly.
Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 shall apply to the measures referred to in the second
subparagraph of this paragraph.
2. Where the market surveillance authorities consider that non-compliance is not restricted to their
national territory, they shall inform the Commission and the other Member States of the results
of the evaluation and of the actions which they have required the economic operator to take.
3. The economic operator shall ensure that all appropriate corrective action is taken in respect of
all products concerned that it has made available on the market throughout the Union.
4. Where the relevant economic operator does not take adequate corrective action within the
period referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the market surveillance
authorities shall take all appropriate provisional measures to prohibit or restrict the product
being made available on their national market, to withdraw the product from that market or to
recall it.
The market surveillance authorities shall inform the Commission and the other Member States,
without delay, of those measures.
5. The information referred to in paragraph 4 shall include all available details, in particular the
data necessary for the identification of the non-compliant product, the origin of the product, the
nature of the non-compliance alleged and the risk involved, the nature and duration of the
national measures taken and the arguments put forward by the relevant economic operator. In
particular, the market surveillance authorities shall indicate whether the non-compliance is due
to either of the following:
a. failure of the product to meet the requirements set out in Article II.3; or
b. shortcomings in the harmonised standards referred to in Article II.11 conferring a
presumption of conformity.
6. Member States other than the Member State initiating the procedure under this Article shall
without delay inform the Commission and the other Member States of any measures adopted
and of any additional information at their disposal relating to the non-compliance of the product
concerned, and, in the event of disagreement with the adopted national measure, of their
objections.
7. Where, within three months of receipt of the information referred to in paragraph 5, no
objection has been raised by either a Member State or the Commission in respect of a
provisional measure taken by a Member State, that measure shall be deemed justified.
8. Member States shall ensure that appropriate restrictive measures, such as withdrawal of the
product from the market, are taken in respect of the product concerned without delay.
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Article II.38. Union safeguard procedure
1. Where, on completion of the procedure set out in Article II.37(3) and (4), objections are raised
against a measure taken by a Member State, or where the Commission considers a national
measure to be contrary to Union legislation, the Commission shall without delay enter into
consultation with the Member States and the relevant economic operator or operators and shall
evaluate the national measure. On the basis of the results of that evaluation, the Commission
shall decide whether the national measure is justified or not.
The Commission shall address its decision to all Member States and shall immediately
communicate it to them and the relevant economic operator or operators.
2. If the national measure is considered justified, all Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the non-compliant product is withdrawn or recalled from their market,
and shall inform the Commission accordingly. If the national measure is considered unjustified,
the Member State concerned shall withdraw that measure.
3. Where the national measure is considered justified and the non-compliance of the product is
attributed to shortcomings in the harmonised standards referred to in point (b) of Article II.37(5)
of this Regulation, the Commission shall apply the procedure provided for in Article 11 of
Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012.
Article II.39. Compliant product which presents a risk
1. Where, having carried out an evaluation under Article II.37(1), a Member State finds that
although product is in compliance with this Regulation, it presents a risk to the health or safety
of persons or to other aspects of public interest protection covered by this Regulation, it shall
require the relevant economic operator to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the
product concerned, when placed on the market, no longer presents that risk, to withdraw the
product from the market or to recall it within a reasonable period, commensurate with the
nature of the risk, as it may prescribe.
2. The economic operator shall ensure that corrective action is taken in respect of all the products
concerned that he has made available on the market throughout the Union.
3. The Member State shall immediately inform the Commission and the other Member States. That
information shall include all available details, in particular the data necessary for the
identification of the product concerned, the origin and the supply chain of product, the nature of
the risk involved and the nature and duration of the national measures taken.
4. The Commission shall without delay enter into consultation with the Member States and the
relevant economic operator or operators and shall evaluate the national measures taken. On the
basis of the results of that evaluation, the Commission shall decide whether the national
measure is justified or not and, where necessary, propose appropriate measures.
5. The Commission shall address its decision to all Member States and shall immediately
communicate it to them and the relevant economic operator or operators.
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Article II.40. Formal non-compliance
1. Without prejudice to Article II.38, where a Member State makes one of the following findings, it
shall require the relevant economic operator to put an end to the non-compliance concerned:
a. the CE marking has been affixed in violation of Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008
or of Article II.14 or II.15 of this Regulation;
b. the CE marking has not been affixed;
c. the identification number of the notified body, where the conformity assessment
procedure set out in Appendixes II.2 or II.3 is applied, has been affixed in violation of
Article II.15 or has not been affixed;
d. the EU declaration of conformity has not been drawn up;
e. the EU declaration of conformity has not been drawn up correctly;
f. technical documentation is either not available or not complete;
2. Where the non-compliance referred to in paragraph 1 persists, the Member State concerned
shall take all appropriate measures to restrict or prohibit corresponding product system being
made available on the market or ensure that it is withdrawn or recalled from the market.
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SECTION 6 — FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article II.41. Penalties
Member States shall provide for penalties applicable to infringements by economic operators of the
provisions of this Annex and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are enforced.
The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. They may include criminal
penalties for serious infringements.
Article II.42. Transitional provisions
Member States shall not impede, for the aspects covered by this Annex, the making available on the
market or putting into service of products covered by this Annex which was placed on the market
before the date of entry into force of this Regulation.
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Appendix II.1 — CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT MODULE A — INTERNAL PRODUCTION CONTROL
as per Annex II to Decision No 768/2008/EC
1. Internal production control is the conformity assessment procedure whereby the manufacturer
fulfils the obligations laid down in points 2, 3 and 4 of this Appendix, and ensures and declares
on his sole responsibility that the products concerned satisfies the applicable requirements set
out in Appendices I.1 to I.6.
2. Technical documentation
The manufacturer shall establish the technical documentation in accordance with Article II.16 of
this Annex.
3. Manufacturing
The manufacturer shall take all measures necessary so that the manufacturing process and its
monitoring ensure compliance of the manufactured product with the technical documentation
referred to in point 2 of this Appendix and with the requirements set out in the relevant
Appendices I.1 to I.6.
4. CE marking and EU declaration of conformity
4.1. The manufacturer shall affix the CE marking and, when relevant, the UA class
identification label in accordance with Articles II.14 and 15 of this Annex to each product
that satisfies the applicable requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6.
4.2. The manufacturer shall draw up a written EU declaration of conformity for each product
and keep it together with the technical documentation at the disposal of the national
authorities for 10 years after the product has been placed on the market. The EU
declaration of conformity shall identify the product for which it has been drawn up.
A copy of the EU declaration of conformity shall be made available to the relevant
authorities upon request.
5. Authorised representative
The manufacturer's obligations set out in point 4 may be fulfilled by his authorised
representative, on his behalf and under his responsibility, provided that they are specified in the
mandate.
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Appendix II.2 — CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT MODULES B AND C —EU-TYPE EXAMINATION AND
CONFORMITY TO TYPE BASED ON INTERNAL PRODUCTION CONTROL
as per Annex II to Decision No 768/2008/EC
When reference is made to this Appendix, the conformity assessment procedure shall follow Modules
B (EU-type examination) and C (Conformity to type based on internal production control) of this
Appendix.
Module B
EU-type examination
1. EU-type examination is the part of a conformity assessment procedure in which a notified body
examines the technical design of the product and verifies and attests that the technical design of
the product meets the applicable requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6.
2. EU-type examination shall be carried out by - assessment of the adequacy of the technical design
of the product through examination of the technical documentation and supporting evidence
referred to in point 3, plus examination of specimens, representative of the production
envisaged, of one or more critical parts of the product (combination of production type and
design type).
3. The manufacturer shall lodge an application for EU-type examination with a single notified body
of his choice.
The application shall include:
a. the name and address of the manufacturer and, if the application is lodged by the
authorised representative, his name and address as well;
b. a written declaration that the same application has not been lodged with any other
notified body;
c. the technical documentation. The technical documentation shall make it possible to assess
the product's conformity with the applicable requirements of this Regulation and shall
include an adequate analysis and assessment of the risk(s). The technical documentation
shall specify the applicable requirements and cover, as far as relevant for the assessment,
the design, manufacture and operation of the product. The technical documentation shall
contain, wherever applicable, the elements set out in Article II.16 of this Annex;
d. the supporting evidence for the adequacy of the technical design solution. That supporting
evidence shall mention any documents that have been used, in particular where the
relevant harmonised standards have not been applied or have not been fully applied. The
supporting evidence shall include, where necessary, the results of tests carried out in
accordance with other relevant technical specifications by the appropriate laboratory of
the manufacturer, or by another testing laboratory on his behalf and under his
responsibility.
4. The notified body shall examine the technical documentation and supporting evidence to assess
the adequacy of the technical design of the product.
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5. The notified body shall draw up an evaluation report that records the activities undertaken in
accordance with point 4 and their outcomes. Without prejudice to its obligations as provided in
point 8, the notified body shall release the content of that report, in full or in part, only with the
agreement of the manufacturer.
6. Where the type meets the requirements of this Regulation that apply to the product concerned,
the notified body shall issue an EU-type examination certificate to the manufacturer. That
certificate shall contain the name and address of the manufacturer, the conclusions of the
examination, the product call if relevant, the aspects of the requirements covered by the
examination, the conditions (if any) for its validity and the necessary data for identification of
the assessed type. The EU-type examination certificate may have one or more annexes attached.
The EU-type examination certificate and its annexes shall contain all relevant information to
allow the conformity of the product with the examined type to be evaluated and to allow for in-
service control.
Where the type does not satisfy the applicable requirements of this Regulation, the notified
body shall refuse to issue an EU-type examination certificate and shall inform the applicant
accordingly, giving detailed reasons for its refusal.
7. The notified body shall keep itself apprised of any changes in the generally acknowledged state
of the art which indicate that the approved type may no longer comply with the applicable
requirements of this Regulation, and shall determine whether such changes require further
investigation. If so, the notified body shall inform the manufacturer accordingly.
The manufacturer shall inform the notified body that holds the technical documentation relating
to the EU-type examination certificate of all modifications to the approved type that may affect
the conformity of the product with the essential requirements of this Regulation or the
conditions for validity of that certificate. Such modifications shall require additional approval in
the form of an addition to the original EU-type examination certificate.
8. Each notified body shall inform its notifying authority concerning the EU-type examination
certificates and/or any additions thereto which it has issued or withdrawn, and shall, periodically
or upon request, make available to its notifying authority the list of such certificates and/or any
additions thereto refused, suspended or otherwise restricted.
Each notified body shall inform the other notified bodies concerning the EU-type examination
certificates and/or any additions thereto which it has refused, withdrawn, suspended or
otherwise restricted, and, upon request, concerning such certificates and/or additions thereto
which it has issued.
Each notified body shall inform the Member States of EU-type examination certificates it has
issued and/or additions thereto in those cases where harmonised standards the references of
which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union have not been applied
or not been fully applied. The Member States, the Commission and the other notified bodies
may, on request, obtain a copy of the EU-type examination certificates and/or additions thereto.
On request, the Member States and the Commission may obtain a copy of the technical
documentation and the results of the examinations carried out by the notified body. The notified
body shall keep a copy of the EU-type examination certificate, its annexes and additions, as well
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as the technical file including the documentation submitted by the manufacturer for 10 years
after the product has been assessed or until the expiry of the validity of that certificate.
9. The manufacturer shall keep a copy of the EU-type examination certificate, its annexes and
additions together with the technical documentation at the disposal of the national authorities
for 10 years after the product has been placed on the market.
10. The manufacturer's authorised representative may lodge the application referred to in point 3
and fulfil the obligations set out in points 7 and 9, provided that they are specified in the
mandate.
Module C
Conformity to type based on internal production control
1. Conformity to type based on internal production control is the part of a conformity assessment
procedure whereby the manufacturer fulfils the obligations laid down in points 2 and 3, and
ensures and declares that the product concerned is in conformity with the type described in the
EU-type examination certificate and satisfies the requirements of this Regulation that apply to it.
2. Manufacturing
The manufacturer shall take all measures necessary so that the manufacturing process and its
monitoring ensure conformity of the manufactured product with the approved type described in
the EU-type examination certificate and with the applicable requirements set out in Appendices
I.1 to I.6.
3. CE marking and EU declaration of conformity
3.1. The manufacturer shall affix the CE marking and, when relevant, the UA class
identification label in accordance with Articles II.14 and 15 of this Annex to each product
that is in conformity with the type described in the EU-type examination certificate and
satisfies the applicable requirements set out in Appendices I.1 to I.6.
3.2. The manufacturer shall draw up a written EU declaration of conformity for each product
type and keep it at the disposal of the national authorities for 10 years after the product
has been placed on the market. The EU declaration of conformity shall identify the
product type for which it has been drawn up.
A copy of the EU declaration of conformity shall be made available to the relevant
authorities upon request.
4. Authorised representative
The manufacturer's obligations set out in point 3 may be fulfilled by his authorised
representative, on his behalf and under his responsibility, provided that they are specified in the
mandate.
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Appendix II.3 — CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT MODULE H — CONFORMITY BASED ON FULL QUALITY
ASSURANCE
as per Annex II to Decision No 768/2008/EC
1. Conformity based on full quality assurance is the conformity assessment procedure whereby the
manufacturer fulfils the obligations laid down in points 2 and 5, and ensures and declares on his
sole responsibility that the product concerned satisfies the applicable requirements set out in
Appendices I.1 to I.6.
2. Manufacturing
The manufacturer shall operate an approved quality system for design, manufacture, final
inspection and testing of the product concerned as specified in point 3 and shall be subject to
surveillance as specified in point 4.
3. Quality system
3.1. The manufacturer shall lodge an application for assessment of his quality system with the
notified body of his choice, for the product concerned.
The application shall include:
a. the name and address of the manufacturer and, if the application is lodged by the
authorised representative, his name and address as well;
b. the technical documentation for each type of product intended to be manufactured. The
technical documentation shall contain, wherever applicable, the elements set out in
Appendix II.4;
c. the documentation concerning the quality system; and
d. a written declaration that the same application has not been lodged with any other
notified body.
3.2. The quality system shall ensure compliance of the product with the requirements of this
Regulation.
All the elements, requirements and provisions adopted by the manufacturer shall be
documented in a systematic and orderly manner in the form of written policies, procedures and
instructions. That quality system documentation shall permit a consistent interpretation of the
quality programmes, plans, manuals and records.
It shall, in particular, contain an adequate description of:
a. the quality objectives and the organisational structure, responsibilities and powers of the
management with regard to design and product quality;
b. the technical design specifications, including standards, that will be applied and, where
the relevant harmonised standards will not be applied in full, the means that will be used
to ensure that the requirements of this Regulation will be met;
c. the design control and design verification techniques, processes and systematic actions
that will be used when designing a product pertaining to the product type covered;
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d. the corresponding manufacturing, quality control and quality assurance techniques,
processes and systematic actions that will be used;
e. the examinations and tests that will be carried out before, during and after manufacture,
and the frequency with which they will be carried out;
f. the quality records, such as inspection reports and test data, calibration data, reports
concerning the qualifications of the personnel, etc.;
g. the means of monitoring the achievement of the required design and product quality and
the effective operation of the quality system.
3.3. The notified body shall assess the quality system to determine whether it satisfies the
requirements referred to in point 3.2.
It shall presume conformity with those requirements in respect of the elements of the quality
system that comply with the corresponding specifications of the relevant harmonised standard.
In addition to experience in quality management systems, the auditing team shall have at least
one member experienced as an assessor in the relevant product field and product technology
concerned, and knowledge of the applicable requirements of this Regulation. The audit shall
include an assessment visit to the manufacturer's premises. The auditing team shall review the
technical documentation referred to in point 3.1(b) to verify the manufacturer's ability to
identify the applicable requirements of this Regulation and to carry out the necessary
examinations with a view to ensuring compliance of the product with those requirements.
The manufacturer or his authorised representative shall be notified of the decision.
The notification shall contain the conclusions of the audit and the reasoned assessment decision.
3.4. The manufacturer shall undertake to fulfil the obligations arising out of the quality system as
approved and to maintain it so that it remains adequate and efficient.
3.5. The manufacturer shall keep the notified body that has approved the quality system informed of
any intended change to the quality system.
The notified body shall evaluate any proposed changes and decide whether the modified quality
system will continue to satisfy the requirements referred to in point 3.2 or whether a
reassessment is necessary.
It shall notify the manufacturer of its decision. The notification shall contain the conclusions of
the examination and the reasoned assessment decision.
4. Surveillance under the responsibility of the notified body
4.1. The purpose of surveillance is to make sure that the manufacturer duly fulfils the
obligations arising out of the approved quality system.
4.2. The manufacturer shall, for assessment purposes, allow the notified body access to the
design, manufacture, inspection, testing and storage sites, and shall provide it with all
necessary information, in particular:
a. the quality system documentation;
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b. the quality records as provided for by the design part of the quality system, such as
results of analyses, calculations, tests, etc.;
c. the quality records as provided for by the manufacturing part of the quality system,
such as inspection reports and test data, calibration data, reports concerning the
qualifications of the personnel, etc.
4.3 The notified body shall carry out periodic audits to make sure that the manufacturer
maintains and applies the quality system and shall provide the manufacturer with an audit
report.
4.4. In addition, the notified body may pay unexpected visits to the manufacturer. During such
visits, the notified body may, if necessary, carry out UA or UA system tests, or have them
carried out, in order to check the proper functioning of the quality system. It shall provide
the manufacturer with a visit report and, if tests have been carried out, with a test report.
5. CE marking and EU declaration of conformity
5.1. The manufacturer shall affix the CE marking and, when relevant, the UAS class
identification label in accordance with Articles II.14 and 15 of this Annex and, under the
responsibility of the notified body referred to in point 3.1 of this Appendix, the latter's
identification number to each product that satisfies the applicable requirements of this
Regulation.
5.2. The manufacturer shall draw up a written EU declaration of conformity for each product
type and keep it at the disposal of the national authorities for 5 years after the product
has been placed on the market. The EU declaration of conformity shall identify the
product type for which it has been drawn up.
A copy of the EU declaration of conformity shall be made available to the relevant authorities
upon request.
6. The manufacturer shall, for a period ending 5 years after the product has been placed on the
market, keep at the disposal of the national authorities:
a. the technical documentation referred to in point 3.1;
b. the documentation concerning the quality system referred to in point 3.1;
c. the change referred to in point 3.5, as approved;
d. the decisions and reports of the notified body referred to in points 3.5, 4.3 and 4.4.
7. Each notified body shall inform its notifying authority of quality system approvals issued or
withdrawn, and shall, periodically or upon request, make available to its notifying authority the
list of quality system approvals refused, suspended or otherwise restricted.
Each notified body shall inform the other notified bodies of quality system approvals which it has
refused, suspended or withdrawn, and, upon request, of quality system approvals which it has
issued.
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8. Authorised representative
The manufacturer's obligations set out in points 3.1, 3.5, 5 and 6 may be fulfilled by his
authorised representative, on his behalf and under his responsibility, provided that they are
specified in the mandate.
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Appendix II.4 — CONTENTS OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
The technical documentation shall, wherever applicable, contain at least the following elements:
1. a general description of the product including:
a. photographs or illustrations showing external features, marking and internal layout;
b. versions of software or firmware affecting compliance with essential requirements;
c. user information and installation instructions;
2. conceptual design and manufacturing drawings and schemes of components, sub-assemblies,
circuits and other relevant similar elements;
3. descriptions and explanations necessary for the understanding of those drawings and schemes
and the operation of the product;
4. a list of the harmonised standards applied in full or in part the references of which have been
published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and, where those harmonised standards
have not been applied, descriptions of the solutions adopted to meet the essential requirements
set out in Article 3, including a list of other relevant technical specifications applied. In the event
of partly applied harmonised standards, the technical documentation shall specify the parts
which have been applied;
5. copy of the EU declaration of conformity;
6. where the conformity assessment module in Annex III has been applied, copy of the EU-type
examination certificate and its annexes as delivered by the notified body involved;
7. results of design calculations made, examinations carried out, and other relevant similar
elements;
8. test reports;
(i) the supporting evidence for the adequacy of the technical design solution. This supporting
evidence shall mention any documents that have been used, in particular where the relevant
harmonised standards and/or technical specifications have not been applied in full. The
supporting evidence shall include, where necessary, the results of tests carried out by the
appropriate laboratory of the manufacturer, or by another testing laboratory on his behalf and
under his responsibility.
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Appendix II.5 — EU DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY
1. Product (type, batch or serial number):
2. Name and address of the manufacturer or his authorised representative:
3. This declaration of conformity is issued under the sole responsibility of the manufacturer.
4. Object of the declaration [identification of the UA or UAS allowing traceability; it may include a
colour image of sufficient clarity where necessary for the identification of the unmanned aircraft
or unmanned aircraft system].
5. The object of the declaration described above is of Class …. [include the class number of the
product as defined by Annexes I.1to I.5 to this Regulation]
6. The object of the declaration described above is in conformity with the relevant Union
harmonisation legislation Regulation:
— [include the reference to this Regulation and the Annex relevant to the class of the
Product].
— Or other Union harmonisation legislation where applicable
7. References to the relevant harmonised standards used or references to the other technical
specifications in relation to which conformity is declared. References must be listed with their
identification number and version and, where applicable, date of issue:
8. Where applicable, the notified body … [name, number] … performed … [description of
intervention] … and issued the EU-type examination certificate: …
9. Where applicable, description of accessories and components, including software, which allow
the unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system to operate as intended and covered by the
EU declaration of conformity:
10. Additional information:
Signed for and on behalf of: …
[place and date of issue]:
[name, function] [signature]:
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Appendix II.6 — SIMPLIFIED EU DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY
The simplified EU declaration of conformity referred to in Article 10(9) shall be provided as follows:
Hereby, [Name of manufacturer] declares that the UA [system] type [designation of type of UA or UA
system] is:
— of Class … …. [include the class number of the product as defined by the Annexes I.1to I.4 of this
Regulation]
— and in compliance with Regulations …[list all the Regulations the product is complying with].
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3.2. Draft acceptable means of compliance and guidance material (Draft EASA decision)
3.2.1 AMC/GM to the draft cover regulation
GM1 Article 2(1)(d) Definition of ‘autonomous operation’
The definition of ‘autonomous operation’ does not include flight phases during which the remote pilot
loses their ability to intervene in the course of the aircraft either following the implementation of
emergency procedures or due to loss of the command-and-control connection.
GM1 Article 3 Responsibilities of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator and remote pilot
The respective responsibilities of the UAS operator and its remote pilots are defined in UAS.OPEN.10,
UAS.OPEN.30, UAS.SPEC.10, and UAS.SPEC.30.
GM1 Article 6 Designation of the competent authority
Member States may designate an entity as a competent authority for specific tasks only.
AMC1 Article 7 Oversight
(a) The competent authority should verify continued compliance with the requirements of
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX26 by organisations it has authorised or certified, as well as by
organisations from which it has received a declaration.
(b) This verification should include scheduled audits and inspections in accordance with an
established and approved oversight programme. In addition, the verification should include
unscheduled inspections of specific operators where the competent authority, on the basis of an
occurrence-reporting scheme or schemes, or information received from other competent
authorities, considers that conducting such inspection is necessary to restore compliance with
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
(c) When exercising oversight, the competent authority of a Member State should take into account
the activity conducted by any UAS operator in its territory, as well as the activity conducted in
other Member States by UAS operators who have their principal place of business or are residing
in its territory. In the latter case, the competent authority should coordinate the audit and
inspection schedule with all the other competent authorities involved.
(d) The competent authority should collect and process any information deemed useful for
oversight.
(e) The competent authority should provide its inspecting personnel with all legislative acts,
standards, rules, technical publications, and related documents in order to allow them to
perform their tasks and to discharge their responsibilities.
26
This and all subsequent occurrences in this Section 3.2, refer to a new Commission Regulation amending Commission Regulation
(EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1).
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AMC2 Article 7 Oversight programme
(a) The oversight programme should be developed on a yearly basis. Any operator should be
included into the programme not later than 12 months after the date on which the competent
authority has received the operator’s first declaration or has issued an authorisation or a LUC. At
least one inspection should be performed within a further 24-month period.
(b) When establishing the oversight programme, the competent authority should select the
operators to be inspected or audited based on:
(1) for declared organisations, the results of past audits and inspections, including
unscheduled inspections, as well as the assessment of risks identified during the UAS
operations conducted in the Member State of the competent authority, or identified by
other authorities involved;
(2) for organisations holding an operational authorisation, the results and validity of past
authorisation processes, the results of past audits and inspections, including unscheduled
inspections, as well as the assessment of risks identified during the UAS operations
conducted in the Member State of the competent authority, or identified by other
authorities involved; and
(3) for organisations holding a LUC, the results of past certification processes, the results of
past audits and inspections, including unscheduled inspections, as well as the assessment
of risks identified during the UAS operations conducted in the Member State of the
competent authority, or identified by other authorities involved.
(c) The oversight programme should include a schedule of the dates when audits and inspections
are due, as well as records of the dates when such audits and inspections have been carried out.
AMC3 Article 7 Oversight programme — audit and inspection
(a) Audits and inspections may be conducted separately or in combination.
(b) For each selected operator, an inspection is a sample inspection in accordance with the
predefined inspection criteria on the basis of key risk elements and relevant requirements.
(c) At the conclusion of the audit or inspection, the inspector should complete a report where each
non-compliance should be recorded. The competent authority should provide the persons and
organisations concerned with the results of its safety oversight.
(d) The number or magnitude of cases of non-compliance identified by the competent authority
may either support that authority’s continuing confidence in the organisation’s competence, or
lead to an erosion of that confidence, and subsequently to an increase of the scale and
frequency of oversight over specific operators.
AMC4 Article 7 Oversight programme — follow-up
(a) Following an audit or inspection, the competent authority should be satisfied that the UAS
operator has identified the root cause(s) of the non-compliance and has taken the appropriate
corrective action to correct the non-compliance and to prevent reoccurrence.
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(b) The competent authority should prohibit or limit activities of the UAS operator, and, where
relevant, take action to suspend, amend or revoke an operational authorisation or a LUC
certificate, or impose other lawful measures or sanctions, where the UAS operator has failed to
implement a corrective action appropriate to the nature of the non-compliance within a
specified time frame.
(c) The time frame for the UAS operator’s implementation of a corrective action should be no
longer than three months unless this period has been extended by the competent authority
based on a corrective action plan developed by the UAS operator concerned.
GM Article 7 Oversight programme — audit and inspection
(a) ‘Audit’ means a systematic, independent and documented process performed by the competent
authority of the Member State of registration of the UAS operator for obtaining evidence and
evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the UAS operator complies with the
applicable requirements.
(b) ‘Inspection’ means an independent and documented conformity evaluation performed by the
competent authority by observation and judgement, accompanied, as appropriate, by
measurement, testing or gauging to verify compliance with the applicable requirements. It may
be performed either by the competent authority of the Member State of registration of the UAS
operator or by the competent authority of the Member State where the operation takes place.
(c) Competent authorities may perform unscheduled inspections of all UAS operators conducting
operations in their Member State. In case the inspected UAS operator is registered in a different
Member State, the competent authority performing the inspection should inform the competent
authority of the Member State of registration of the outcome of the inspection.
GM1 Article 9 Exchange of safety information
Cooperation between competent authorities should be organised pursuant to Article 61 of Regulation
(EU) 2017/XXX. Cooperation between market surveillance authorities and the exchange of
safety-related and non-compliance information should be organised pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No 765/2008. Article 9 of Regulation 201X/XXX intends to help organise the information flow and
cooperation between competent authorities on the one hand and between market surveillance
authorities on the other.
Cooperation should be organised primarily at Member State level. All competent authorities concerned
should make best use of the information systems defined in Articles 22 ‘Exchange of information —
Community Rapid Information System’ and 23 ‘General information support system’ of Regulation (EC)
No 765/2008, as well as of the occurrence-reporting system of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014.
GM1 Article 12 Airspace areas or special zones for UAS operations
Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX should be considered as a tool for Member States to allow
them flexibility to define zones over their territory where only certain categories of UAS operation may
be conducted. This includes defined areas where UAS operations are limited to commercial or leisure
ones or where some equipment, such as geofencing or electronic identification systems, is mandatory.
Moreover, Member States may define zones where:
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(a) UAS only are admitted; or
(b) UAS, remote pilot or operator may be exempted from certain requirements; or
(c) operational limitations are extended.
When defining those zones, their extent should be considered in 3D (horizontal and vertical).
It should be considered that a UAS operator may not be familiar with the aviation regulations and
procedures. Therefore, the information on zones should be made available to all UAS operators in a
manner simple to access and understand; the information on the zones of a Member State in particular
should be made all available in a single source.
Member States should ensure that aeronautical information provided through the aeronautical
information service (AIS) is consistent with the airspace areas or special zones for UAS operations.
AMC1 Article 12 Information on airspace areas and special zones for UAS operations
[To be developed.]
GM1 Article 14 Hobbyist flights
Hobbyists have the following options to conduct their operations:
— They operate as members of a model club or association that has received from the competent
authority an operational authorisation, as defined in Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. In
this case, they should comply with the procedures of the model club or association in
accordance with the operational authorisation. The operational authorisation should define all
deviations from the aforementioned Regulation allowed to the model club’s or association’s
members, including the requirement to register individual unmanned aircraft (UA).
— In accordance with Article 12 of said Regulation, Member States may define zones where UAS
are exempted from certain requirements, and/or where the operational limitations are
extended. They may also define a different height limitation for those zones.
— Operations may be conducted in Subcategory A3 where UA with no technical requirements are
allowed. In this case, hobbyists are required to comply with the limitations of, and demonstrate
the competence defined in, UAS.OPEN.60.
GM1 Article 15 Recognition of competences demonstrated before the applicability date
UAS operations are already conducted by many remote pilots (including military) in different Member
States following their national rules. Member States should define a system to accept already
demonstrated remote-pilot competence within the requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
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3.2.2 AMC to Part-UAS
SUBPART A — Open category
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(a) Policy and procedures
If a UAS operator employs more than one pilot, the UAS operator should:
— develop a safety policy and procedures for UAS operation; and
— compile and maintain a list of personnel with assigned duties.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(b) Physical and mental condition
Remote pilots and all other personnel should not operate when under the influence of psychoactive
substances or alcohol or when unfit to perform their task(s) due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness
or other similar causes.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.10(c) EU declaration of conformity
When purchasing a UAS also through online distributors, the UAS operator should verify the
conformity of the UAS with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. The verification should be
accomplished by checking that the UAS is accompanied by the EU certificate of conformity, defined in
Appendix II.5 to Annex II to said Regulation, which should contain the same CE Class mark as the one
labelled on the UA (i.e. Class C0, Class C1, or Class C2).
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(a) Registration form
The UAS operator should complete the registration process online and provide at least the following:
(a) its name or the business name, if a company, and mailing address;
(b) if it is an organisation, the statement: ‘All personnel directly involved in the operations are
competent to perform their tasks, and the UAS will be operated only by remote pilots with the
appropriate level of competence’; and
(c) when the UAS has to be registered:
(1) if the UAS is made available on the market:
(i) the name of the UAS manufacturer;
(ii) the UAS type; and
(iii) the UAS serial number, if available; and
(2) if a privately built UAS:
(i) the UA mass (maximum take-off mass (MTOM));
(ii) its main dimensions;
(iii) the frequency bandwidth and emitting power of the data link system;
(iv) the type of propulsion;
(v) the type and capacity of the battery or type and maximum quantity of fuel;
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(vi) the type of guidance, navigation, and control system (GNCS) and its main functions
(manual, semi-automatic, automatic); and
(vii) a list of other dangerous material on board.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.20(b)&(c) Registration
Registration of the UAS operator is not required when operating a UAS with an MTOM, including
payload, of less than 250 g, including:
— UA put on the market and bearing a Class C0 mark; and
— other UAS privately built or not bearing a UAS Class mark.
However, the operator has to register the UA when it operates:
— a UAS bearing a Class C2 mark; or
— other UAS privately built or not bearing a UAS Class mark, with an MTOM, including payload, of
more than 900 g.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(e) Display of registration information
(a) If the UAS operator owns the UAS, it should display on the UA the registration information
received at the end of the registration process in a way that this information is readable at least
when the UA is on the ground without the need of any devices other than eyeglasses or
corrective lenses.
(b) If the UA size does not allow displaying the mark in a visible way on the fuselage, the marking
inside the battery compartment is acceptable if the compartment is accessible. Any method to
affix the number which ensures that it remains visible may be used, including a permanent
marker, a label, or an engraving.
(c) If a company owns UAS to be rented, the owner should register each UA in accordance with
UAS.OPEN.20. The owner of the UAS should keep a record of the renter’s data at least for a
period of two years and make it available to the competent authority, if requested.
(d) If a UAS operator uses a UAS owned by a third party, the UAS operator operating the UAS:
(1) in case of a short-term lease (less than 30 days), may conduct the operation using the
owner’s registration; and
(2) in case of a long-term lease (30 days or more), should display its registration information
on the UA.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(f) Renewal of registration
The renewal of the registration is subject to the confirmation by the UAS operator of the registration’s
data.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(a)(1) Ability to take control of the UA
(a) Except in case of lost-link conditions, the remote pilot should be at any time able to take control
of the UA. Autonomous operation is not allowed in the open category.
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(b) The remote pilot should:
(1) be focused on the operation of the UA, as appropriate;
(2) not operate a UAS while they are operating a moving vehicle; and
(3) operate only one UA at a time.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(1) Obtaining updated information about any flight restrictions or conditions
published by the Member State
The remote pilot should check any condition that may affect the UAS operation, such as airspace
structure and limitations.
Information on airspace structure and limitations may be obtained from the relevant aeronautical
information publication (AIP) (usually available online), or through dedicated service providers (e.g. by
using an application or any other electronic means). Flight restrictions include limited zones for UA or
no-UA zones, as defined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(2) Operating environment
(a) The remote pilot should check any condition that might affect the UAS operation, such as
locations of people, property, vehicles, public roads, obstacles, critical infrastructures, and any
other element that may pose a risk to the safety of the UAS operation.
(b) Familiarisation with the environment and obstacles should be conducted through a survey of the
area where the operation is intended to be performed.
(c) It should be verified that the weather conditions at the time when the operation starts and
expected for the entire period of the operation are compatible with those defined in the
manufacturer’s manual.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(b)(3) Ensuring that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended
flight
(a) The remote pilot should:
(1) when required by the zone of operation, update the UAS with geofencing data;
(2) check that the UAS complies with the instructions provided by the manufacturer;
(3) check that the UA has enough power or fuel for the intended operation based on:
(i) the level of charge of the battery/batteries, or the quantity of usable fuel, as
applicable;
(ii) the planned operation; and
(iii) the need for extra energy in case of unpredictable events; and
(4) for UAS equipped with a loss-of-data-link recovery function, ensure that the recovery
function allows a safe recovery of the UAS for the envisaged operation; for programmable
loss-of-data-link recovery functions, the remote pilot may have to set up the parameters
of this function to adapt it to the envisaged operation.
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(b) When the remote pilot familiarises themselves with the operating environment, they should
consider the weather conditions (including forecast), the light conditions, and eventual sources
of electromagnetic energy, which may cause undesirable effects, such as electromagnetic
interference (EMI) or physical damage to the UAS operational equipment.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(2) Ensuring the safe operation of the UA
A safe operation of the UA should be ensured by:
(a) maintaining a safe distance of the UA from uninvolved people, property, vehicles, and other
airspace users such that they are not endangered by the UAS operation;
(b) avoiding manoeuvres that endanger the safe operation of the UAS; and
(c) discontinuing a flight when continuing the flight may pose a hazard to other aircraft, people or
properties.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(6) Operations in first-person view (FPV)
Operations in FPV can be conducted only in case the remote pilot is assisted by a UA observer
positioned in their proximity, able to provide effective directions to the remote pilot in order to keep
separation between the UA and any obstacles, including other air traffic. During FPV operations, the
remote pilot is still responsible for the safety of the flight.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(7) Dangerous goods
‘Dangerous goods’ means articles or substances capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or
the environment, included in the list of dangerous goods of the ‘Technical Instructions’, or classified as
such in accordance with said document. ‘Technical Instructions’ means the latest effective edition of
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9284 ‘Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air’, including its Supplement and any Addenda/Corrigenda thereto.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(8) Emergency response effort
(a) ‘Emergency response’ is an action taken in response to an unexpected and dangerous
occurrence in an attempt to mitigate its impact on people, property or the environment.
(b) A UA flight in the vicinity of a site where there is an emergency response should be immediately
discontinued unless explicitly authorised or requested by the responsible emergency response
services. Otherwise, a safe distance must be maintained between the UA and the emergency
response site such that the UA does not interfere with, or endanger, the activities of the
emergency response services. Particular care must be taken to protect the privacy rights of
casualties.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(9) Respect of other people’s fundamental rights
In order to respect other people's right to privacy, UA should not be flown at an altitude of less than
20 m over private property without the owner’s consent.
When the UA is equipped with a camera, the remote pilot should not continuously and/or intentionally
film a person without the person’s explicit permission.
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AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(a)(2)&(3) and UAS.OPEN.50(b) Modification of a UAS with a CE Class mark
UAS operators should not make modifications to a UAS Class C0, C1 or C2 such that breach compliance
with the product requirements. In case of modification, the UAS is considered to be without a CE Class
mark and it may only be operated in Subcategory A3, or in the specific category in accordance with
Subpart B of Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(1) Operational limitations
The remote pilot should reduce as much as possible the time of the UA overflying persons, and when
flying close to or over people, the UA should not fly below 3 m from ground level.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(5)(i) and UAS.OPEN.60(e)(1) Basic competence of the remote pilot to
operate in Subcategory A1 and A3
The acquisition of the basic competence of the remote pilot, required for UAS operation in
Subcategory A1 and A3, should be supported by an online training tool covering the following
elements:
(a) Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX and other relevant EU regulations on privacy and security with regard
to:
(1) non-reckless behaviour, important safety precautions for UAS operations, and basics on
dangerous goods.
(2) visual line of sight (VLOS), which entails:
(i) keeping a safe distance from people, property, vehicles, and other airspace users;
(ii) a specific code of conduct in case of encountering other traffic;
(iii) respecting the height limitation(s); and
(iv) using a UA observer;
(3) obtaining updated information about any flight restrictions or conditions published by the
Member State, such as:
(i) an overview of the low-level airspace structure affecting UAS operations; and
(ii) no-UA zones or limited zones for UA;
(4) familiarising themselves with the operating environment;
(5) emergency procedures (e.g. lost-data-link connection) and what to do in case of an event
causing fatal or serious injury to a person, or when an aircraft other than a UA is involved
(occurrence reporting); and
(6) weather information sources and the effect of this information on the performance of
small UA;
(b) an understanding of the privacy risks;
(c) an understanding of the security risks;
(d) an understanding of the UAS categories and their operational limitations;
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(e) familiarisation with the instructions provided by the manufacturer for the operation of a UAS,
and in particular with regard to:
(1) an overview of the main UAS parts;
(2) getting to know the remote control or transmitter;
(3) controlling the UAS;
(4) features affecting the safety of flight;
(5) the preflight checklist to verify that the UA is in a safe condition;
(6) getting the UA off the ground;
(7) hovering in mid-air, when applicable, and landing the UA;
(8) flying basic patterns with the UA; and
(f) finding a suitable area to conduct the familiarisation flights and learn how to fly the particular
UAS.
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.50(e)(1) Competences required for the remote pilot to obtain the certificate of
competence
(a) Before starting an operation in Subcategory A2, a remote pilot should hold a certificate of
competence (CoC) issued by the competent authority after they demonstrate this competence
by successfully completing a theoretical test in an entity approved by the competent authority.
In addition to the basic competence defined in AMC1 UAS.OPEN.40(b)(5)(i) and
UAS.OPEN.60(d)(1), and demonstrated through an online test, the remote pilot should
demonstrate the following:
(1) perform as the remote pilot of a UA with a degree of competence appropriate to the UAS;
(2) understand the increased safety risk linked with a UAS operation;
(3) assess the ground risk related to the environment where the operation takes place as well
as to flying in proximity to people; and
(4) understand how weather conditions may affect the UA performance, thus:
(i) operating the UA within its limitations;
(ii) completing all manoeuvres with smoothness and accuracy; and
(iii) maintaining control of the UA at all times in a manner to ensure the successful
outcome of a procedure or manoeuvre.
(b) An applicant for a CoC may receive competence-based training at a declared training
organisation (DTO) or train themselves.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.50(e)(1) Competences required for the remote pilot to obtain the certificate of
competence
The remote pilot may obtain the CoC in the following two ways:
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Competence-based training
The competence-based training covers aspects related to non-technical skills in an integrated manner,
taking into account the particular risks associated with the UAS operations.
The competence-based training should be developed using the analysis, design, development,
implementation, evaluation (ADDIE) principles.
Self-study
The remote pilot may undertake self-study in many ways for obtaining the certificate of competence.
The purpose of this self-study is to acquire some basic competence and familiarise themselves with the
UA as well as with the UA operations they want to conduct.
Examples of self-study:
(a) reading the manual or leaflet provided by the UA manufacturer;
(b) reading related information or watching instruction films; and
(c) getting information from others that have already experience in flying a UA.
The remote pilot may also undertake this study as a classroom training, e-learning or similar training at
a training organisation, including DTOs or approved training organisations (ATOs). Since this training is
not mandated by the Member States, the national aviation authorities (NAAs) are not required to
approve the training syllabus even if this training is provided by ATOs.
GM1 UAS.OPEN.50(b) and UAS.OPEN.60(b) Uninvolved persons
‘Uninvolved persons’ means anyone not directly taking part to a UAS operation. Due to the huge
variety of possible circumstances, this GM provides only general guidelines. An involved person is
someone who can reasonably be expected to follow directions and safety precautions given by the
person controlling the operation, in order to avoid unplanned interactions with the UA.
Spectators or any other people gathered for sport activities or other mass public events that do not
occur for the purpose of the UAS operation are generally considered to be ‘uninvolved persons’.
In principle, in order to be considered an ‘involved person’, one should:
— be able to decide to participate or not to participate in the UAS operation;
— broadly understand the risks involved;
— have reasonable safeguards during the UAS operations, introduced by the site manager and
aircraft operator; and
— not be restricted from taking part in the event or activity if they decide not to participate in the
UAS operation.
An example: if filming with a UAS at a large music festival or public event, it is not sufficient for the
audience or anyone present to be informed of the UAS filming via a public address system, or via a
statement on the ticket, or in advance by email or text message. Those types of communication
channels do not satisfy the points above. In order to be considered an involved person, each person
should be asked for their permission and made aware of the possible risk(s).
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AMC1 UAS.OPEN.50(b) Safe distance from uninvolved persons
The minimum horizontal distance of the UA from uninvolved persons should be defined as the distance
between the point where the UA would hit the ground in case of vertical fall and the position of the
uninvolved persons. The safe distance of the UA from uninvolved person is variable and heavily
dependent on the type of UAS operation and the UAS involved. The remote pilot is ultimately
responsible for the determination of this distance.
An rotary-wing UAS should be kept at least 20 m away from uninvolved persons, and all other UA
should be kept at least 50 m away from uninvolved persons.
remote pilot 20 m (UR) uninvolved persons
50 m (other UA)
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.60(b) Operations in Subcategory A3
(a) Operations in Subcategory A3 may be conducted with UAS:
(1) bearing a Class C0 marking, required to comply with the technical requirements of
Appendix I.1 to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
(2) bearing a Class C1 marking, required to comply with the technical requirements of
Appendix I.2 to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
(3) bearing a Class C2 marking, required to comply with the technical requirements of
Appendix I.3 to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
(4) bearing a Class C3 marking, required to comply with the technical requirements of
Appendix I.4 to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
(5) bearing a Class C4 marking, required to comply with the technical requirements of
Appendix I.5 to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX; and
(6) privately built.
(b) UAS in this Subcategory are not intended to be operated in congested areas or close to
aerodromes or over uninvolved persons.
(c) The remote pilot should assess that reasonably, no uninvolved person will be present in the area
and airspace where the UA is intended to be flown, during the entire time of the UAS operation.
(d) When the operation is conducted with a privately built UAS or UAS Class C4, the remote pilot
should keep the UA at a safe distance from the boundaries of congested areas or aerodromes
such that no third party is endangered in case of UA malfunction or loss of control. The safe
distance should be determined based on the actual performance of the UA.
(e) Should a person incidentally enter the visual range of the remote pilot, the remote pilot should
avoid overflying the person, and discontinue the operation when the safety of the UAS operation
is not ensured.
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AMC1 UAS.OPEN.70(a) Renewal of basic competence
[To be developed.]
AMC1 UAS.OPEN.70(b) Renewal of certificate of competence
[To be developed.]
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SUBPART B — Specific category
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.10(a) Policy and procedures
If a UAS operator employs more than one pilot, the UAS operator should:
— develop a safety policy and procedures for UAS operation; and
— compile and maintain a list of personnel with assigned duties.
The UAS operator should allocate functions and responsibilities in accordance with the level of
autonomy of the UAS during the operation.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.10(b) Physical and mental condition
See AMC1 UAS.OPEN.10(b).
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.10(d) Logging of flight activities and record-keeping
The logbook may be electronic.
The information to be recorded should be indicated in the standard scenario or the operational
authorisation, which may include the following:
— the identification of the UAS;
— the date, time, and location of the take-off and landing;
— the total number of flight hours/cycles;
— in case of remotely-piloted operations, the name of the remote pilot responsible for the flight;
— any significant incident or accident that occurred during the operation;
— a completed preflight inspection;
— any defects and rectifications;
— any repairs and changes to the UAS configuration; and
— the information required by UAS.SPEC.110.
Records shall be stored for two years in a manner that ensures protection from unauthorised access,
damage, alteration, and theft.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.15(c) Action in case of operations/flights exceeding the conditions and limitations
defined in the operational authorisation
When the model club and/or association is informed that a member exceeded the conditions and
limitations defined in the operational authorisation, appropriate measures should be taken,
proportionate to the risk posed, to make sure that a similar event will not happen again. Considering
the level of risk, the model club and/or association should decide if the competent authority should be
informed. In any case, occurrences that caused an injury to any person or damage to any property,
vehicle, or aircraft involved other than UA, as defined in Article 125 of Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX,
should be reported.
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AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20 Registration of model aircraft
Model club and/or associations may fulfil the UAS registration requirement on behalf of their
members, and provide the related data to the entity designated for that purpose by the Member State.
The UAS operational authorisation issued by the competent authority in accordance with Article 14 of
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX may include deviations from UAS.OPEN.20.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20(a)(1) Registration form
See AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(a).
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20(a)(3) Display of registration information
See AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(e).
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.20(b) Renewal of registration
See AMC1 UAS.OPEN.20(f).
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(1) Obtaining updated information about any flight restrictions or conditions
published by the Member State
The remote pilot, or the operator in case of autonomous operations, should check any condition that
may affect the UAS operation, such as airspace structure and limitations.
Information on airspace structure and limitations may be obtained from the relevant AIP (usually
available online), or through dedicated service providers (e.g. by using an application or any other
electronic means). Flight restrictions include limited zones for UA or no-UA zones, as defined in
Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(2) Operating environment
(a) The remote pilot, or the operator in case of autonomous operations, should check any condition
that might affect the UAS operation, such as locations of people, property, vehicles, public roads,
obstacles, critical infrastructures, and any other element that may pose a risk to the safety of the
UAS operation.
(b) Familiarisation with the environment and obstacles should be conducted through a survey of the
area where the operation is intended to be performed.
(c) It should be verified that the weather conditions at the time when the operation starts and
expected for the entire period of the operation are compatible with those defined in the
manufacturer manual as well as with the operational authorisation or declaration, as applicable.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(b)(3) Ensuring that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended
flight
(a) The remote pilot, or the operator in case of autonomous operations, should:
(1) when required by the zone of operation, update the UAS with geofencing data;
(2) ensure that the UAS complies with the instructions provided by the manufacturer;
(3) ensure that the UA has enough power or fuel for the intended operation based on:
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(i) the level of charge of the battery/batteries, or the quantity of usable fuel, as
applicable;
(ii) the planned operation; and
(iii) the need for extra energy in case of unpredictable events; and
(4) for UAS equipped with a loss-of-data-link recovery function, ensure that the recovery
function allows a safe recovery of the UAS for the envisaged operation; for programmable
loss-of-data-link recovery functions, the remote pilot may have to set up the parameters
of this function to adapt it to the envisaged operation.
(b) When the remote pilot familiarises themselves with the operating environment, they should
consider the weather conditions (including forecast), the light conditions, and eventual sources
of electromagnetic energy, which may cause undesirable effects, such as electromagnetic
interference (EMI) or physical damage to the UAS operational equipment.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(c)(2) Ensuring the safe operation of the UA
A safe operation of the UAS should be ensured by:
(a) maintaining a safe distance of the UA from uninvolved people, property, vehicles, and from
other airspace users;
(b) avoiding manoeuvres that endanger the safe operation of the UAS; and
(c) discontinuing a flight when continuing the flight may pose a hazard to other aircraft, people or
properties.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.30(c)(5) Emergency response effort
(a) ‘Emergency response’ is an action taken in response to an unexpected and dangerous
occurrence in an attempt to mitigate its impact on people, property or the environment.
(b) A UA flight in the vicinity of a site where there is an emergency response should be immediately
discontinued unless explicitly authorised or requested by the responsible emergency response
services. Otherwise, a safe distance must be maintained between the UA and the emergency
response site such that the UA does not interfere with, or endanger, the activities of the
emergency response services. Particular care must be taken to protect the privacy rights of
casualties.
(c) For autonomous operations, as soon as the UAS operator is informed of any emergency
response effort, active in the path that the UA is planned to follow, the UAS operator should
take appropriate action to modify the path of the UA in a way that the emergency response
activity or any other third party is not endangered.
GM1 UAS.SPEC.30 Level of autonomy and guidelines for human-autonomy interaction
[To be developed.]
GM1 UAS.SPEC.30(c)(6) Respect of other people’s fundamental rights
See GM1 UAS.OPEN.30(c)(9).
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AMC1 UAS.SPEC.40 Operational risk assessment
The operational risk assessment should be performed following the specific operations risk assessment
(SORA) methodology. See also the related JARUS Working Group 6 (WG-6) document under
development.
The UAS operator shall define the usage spectrum of the operational risk assessment, assess the risk,
and identify appropriate mitigation measures including but not limited to technical requirements,
operational requirements, and operational limitations, as well as remote-pilot competence
requirements and medical requirements.
GM1 UAS.SPEC.40 Standard scenarios
Standard scenarios may be proposed to the Agency by competent authorities, by UAS operators, by
manufacturers or by standardisation bodies. The operational risk should be assessed using the SORA or
an equivalent methodology. After the Agency has evaluated the standard scenario, it may issue this
standard scenario as a separate AMC to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.50(a) Operational-declaration form
The standard scenario should include the operational-declaration form that the UAS operator is
required to submit to the competent authority.
The form should include the following information:
(a) the identification of the UAS operator and of the UA (registration information);
(b) the name of the accountable manager or the owner in the case of a private UAS operation;
(c) a description of the UAS including its performance relevant for the operation;
(d) a reference to the standard scenario under which the declaration is submitted;
(e) a description of the intended use of the UAS (i.e. the concept of the operation or the type of
locations with reference to the ground and air risk);
(f) the list of mitigation measures put in place by the UAS operator, as required by the standard
scenario; and
(g) reference(s) to any document required by the standard scenario.
The standard scenario should define if the location may be generically described (e.g. dependent on
the characteristics of the area overflown, the type of airspace, etc.) based on the concept of the
operation.
The UAS operator should submit the document(s) indicated in point (f) together with the declaration
form.
The operational declaration should include the following:
— all information relevant to the intended UAS operation(s);
— a statement of compliance with the limitations and conditions applicable to the relevant
standard scenario; and
— a signed acknowledgement of the UAS operator’s responsibility under Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
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AMC2 UAS.SPEC.50(a) Standard scenario involving an operational declaration
[To be developed.]
GM1 UAS.SPEC.50(c) Operations conducted in a Member State other that the Member State of
registration
When the UAS operation subject to an operational declaration takes place in a Member State other
than the Member State of registration of the UAS operator, the UAS operator should take into account
the applicable local conditions and regulations.
The operator should submit the declaration to both the competent authority of the Member State of
registration and the competent authority of the Member State where the operation takes place.
The competent authority of the Member State of registration has the responsibility to verify that the
declaration contains all required information and documents.
GM1 UAS.SPEC.50(e) Significant changes to the operational declaration
[To be developed.]
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(a) Operational-authorisation application form
The standard scenario should include the operational-authorisation application form that the UAS
operator is required to submit to the competent authority.
The form should include the following information:
(a) the identification of the UAS operator and of the UA (registration information);
(b) the name of the accountable manager or the owner in the case of a private UAS operation;
(c) a description of the UAS including its performance relevant for the operation;
(d) a reference to the standard scenario under which the application is submitted, if applicable;
(e) a description of the proposed operation of the UAS (i.e. the concept of the operation);
(f) if the operation is included in a standard scenario, all the documentation required by the
standard scenario;
(g) if the operation is not included in a standard scenario, an operational risk assessment as per
UAS.SPEC.40;
(h) the list of mitigation measures put in place by the UAS operator, as required by the standard
scenario or proposed by the UAS operator if no standard scenario is available; and
(i) the location(s) where the operation is intended to be conducted.
The standard scenario should define if the location may be generically described (e.g. dependent on
the characteristics of the area overflown, the type of airspace, etc.) based on the concept of the
operation.
The application should include all information relevant to the operation, such as:
— the name of the Member State where the operation is intended to be conducted if it is different
from the UAS operator’s Member State of registration;
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— a statement of compliance with the limitations and conditions applicable to the relevant
standard scenario, if applicable; and
— a signed acknowledgement of the operator’s responsibility under Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
GM1 UAS.SPEC.60(a) Application for an operational authorisation
The UAS operator may submit an application for an operational authorisation of a single flight, a series
of flights or for a specific period of time.
When the operation subject to the authorisation takes place in a Member State other than the UAS
operator’s Member State of registration, before starting an operation, the operator should take into
account the applicable local conditions and regulations. Liaising with the competent authority of the
Member State of operation may be required.
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(a)(1) Standard scenario requiring an operational authorisation
[To be developed.]
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.60(c) Significant changes to the operational authorisation
[To be developed.]
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.70 Operations manual — minimum information
[To be developed.]
AMC1 UAS.SPEC.80 Operational-authorisation form
The operational-authorisation form should include the following information:
(a) the identification of the UAS operator and of the UA (registration information);
(b) the operational limitations and conditions of the Member State of operation;
(c) the mitigation measures that the UAS operator has to take;
(d) the location(s) where the operation is authorised;
(e) records necessary for the type of operation; and
(f) the type of events that should be reported in addition to those defined in Article 125 of
Regulation (EU) 2017/XXX.
GM1 UAS.SPEC.80 Recognition of an operational authorisation between EU Member States
When a UAS operation takes place in a Member State other than the UAS operator’s Member State of
registration, the UAS operator should gather information about local conditions in the area of its
operation and submit the application for the authorisation to the competent authority of its Member
State of registration.
The competent authority of the Member State of registration should evaluate the application and
coordinate with the competent authority of the Member State of operation. The UAS operator should
satisfy the mitigation requirements related to the local conditions.
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When both competent authorities are satisfied, the competent authority of the Member State of
registration should issue the authorisation to the UAS operator.
Member State A Competent authorities’ Member State B
coordination on SORA
Application Registration Authorisation Additional
(UAS.SPEC.60) (UAS.SPEC.20) (UAS.SPEC.80) conditions MS B
Zones
Environment
Security
Operator based in
Privacy
MS A
Insurance
….
Specific operation Specific operation
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SUBPART C — LIGHT UAS OPERATOR CERTIFICATE (LUC)
AMC1 UAS.LUC.20 Application for a LUC
The application for a LUC should include the following information:
(a) a description of the UAS operator’s management system including its organisational structure
and safety management system;
(b) the name(s) of the responsible UAS operator personnel including the person responsible for
authorising operations with UASs; and
(c) a statement that all documentation submitted to the competent authority has been verified by
the applicant and found to comply with the applicable requirements.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(a) Management system
COMPLEXITY OF THE ACTIVITY
A UAS operator should be considered as complex in case it operates either of the following UA:
(a) operated over congested areas of cities, towns or settlements, or over an open-air assembly of
persons;
(b) beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) at a long distance from the operator;
(c) used for the carriage of dangerous goods; and
(d) used for cargo delivery in urban areas.
The competent authority may assess the nature and complexity of an operator on a case-by-case basis.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(1) Management system
SAFETY POLICY
(a) The safety policy should state as a minimum the following:
(1) the management of safety is a primary responsibility of all managers and employees;
(2) the UAS operator is committed to comply with the relevant regulatory requirements, as
well as maintain and constantly improve its safety objectives and performance standards;
and
(3) safety reporting and internal investigations are to improve safety, not to apportion blame
to individuals.
(b) The senior management of the operator should:
(1) continually promote the operator’s safety policy to all personnel, and demonstrate their
commitment to it;
(2) provide the necessary human and financial resources for the implementation of the safety
policy; and
(3) establish safety objectives and performance standards.
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GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(1) Management system
SAFETY REPORTING AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
(a) The purpose of safety reporting and internal investigations is to use reported information to
improve the level of safety performance of the UAS operator and not to attribute blame.
(b) The specific objectives of safety reporting and internal investigations are to:
(1) enable assessments of the safety implications of each relevant incident and accident,
including previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary action can be initiated; and
(2) ensure that knowledge of relevant incidents and accidents is disseminated so that other
persons and operators may learn from them.
(c) All occurrence reports considered to be reportable by the person submitting the report should
be retained as the significance of such reports may only become obvious at a later date.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(2) Management system
NON-COMPLEX UAS OPERATORS
A non-complex UAS operator should have a management system able to perform at least the
following:
(a) identify hazards through reactive and proactive methodologies, using various data sources
including safety reporting and internal investigations;
(b) collect, record, analyse, act on and generate feedback about hazards and the associated risks
that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator;
(c) develop an operational risk assessment as required by UAS.SPEC.40;
(d) manage safety risks related to a change, using a documented process to identify any external
and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety; the management of change
should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment, and mitigation
processes; and
(e) manage the safety risks stemming from products or services delivered through subcontractors,
by using its existing hazard identification, risk assessment, and mitigation processes, or by
requiring that the subcontractors have an equivalent process for hazard identification and risk
management.
AMC2 UAS.LUC.30(b)(2) Management system
COMPLEX UAS OPERATORS
A complex UAS operator should have a management system able to perform at least the following:
(a) identify hazards through reactive, proactive, and predictive methodologies, using various data
sources including safety reporting and internal investigations;
(b) collect, record, analyse, act on and generate feedback about hazards and the associated risks
that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator;
(c) develop an operational risk assessment as required by UAS.SPEC.40;
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(d) carry out internal safety investigations that go beyond the scope of occurrences required to be
reported to the competent authority;
(e) monitor and measure safety performance through safety reports, safety reviews, in particular
during introduction and deployment of new technologies, safety audits, including periodically
assessing the status of safety risk controls, and safety surveys;
(f) manage safety risks related to a change, using a documented process to identify any external
and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety; the management of change
should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment, and mitigation
processes;
(g) manage the safety risks stemming from products or services delivered through subcontractors,
by using its existing hazard identification, risk assessment, and mitigation processes, or by
requiring that the subcontractors have an equivalent process for hazard identification and risk
management; and
(h) respond to emergencies using an emergency response plan (ERP) that:
(1) contains the action to be taken by the operator or specified individuals in an emergency;
(2) provides for a safe transition from normal to emergency operations and vice versa; and
(3) ensures coordination with the ERPs of other organisations, where appropriate.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(3) Management system
DOCUMENTATION
(a) The management system documentation of the LUC holder should be included in a safety
management manual (SMM) or in the operations manual (OM). The documentation may be
contained in more than one operator’s manual. In such case, if the documentation is not
duplicated, cross references should be provided.
(b) The SMM should include the following:
(1) scope of the activities under the UAS operator’s safety management system;
(2) safety policy and objectives;
(3) the titles and names of persons referred to in UAS.LUC.30(c) as well as a chart showing the
lines of responsibility between those persons;
(4) procedures specifying how the LUC holder ensures compliance with the requirements of
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
(5) safety accountability of the accountable manager;
(6) safety responsibilities of key safety personnel;
(7) documentation control procedures;
(8) hazard identification and risk management methodologies;
(9) safety action planning;
(10) safety performance monitoring;
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(11) incident investigation and reporting;
(12) emergency response planning;
(13) management of change; and
(14) procedures for record-keeping.
GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(3) Management system
DOCUMENTATION
(a) It is not required to duplicate information in several manuals. The information may be contained
in any of the LUC holder manuals (e.g. OM or training manual) that may also be combined.
(b) The LUC holder may also choose to document some of the information required to be
documented in separate documents (e.g. procedures). In this case, they should ensure that
manuals contain appropriate references to any document kept separately. Any such documents
are then to be considered as an integral part of the management system documentation of the
LUC holder.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(4) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING
(a) The accountable manager should designate a manager to monitor compliance of the UAS
operator with:
(1) the privileges of the LUC holder, the risk assessment, and the effectiveness of the related
mitigation measures;
(2) OMs, logbooks, and records;
(3) training standards; and
(4) management system procedures and manuals.
(b) The compliance-monitoring manager should:
(1) have knowledge of, and experience in, compliance monitoring;
(2) have direct access to the accountable manager to ensure that findings are addressed, as
necessary; and
(3) not be one of the other persons referred to in UAS.LUC.30(c)(3).
(c) If the LUC holder is a non-complex one, the tasks of the compliance-monitoring manager may be
performed by the safety manager provided that the latter has knowledge of, and experience in,
compliance monitoring.
(d) The compliance-monitoring function should include audits and inspections of the LUC holder.
The audits and inspections should be carried out by personnel not responsible for the function,
procedure or products being audited.
(e) The LUC holder should be responsible for the effectiveness of the compliance-monitoring
function, in particular for the effective implementation and follow-up of all corrective measures.
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GM1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(4) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING
(a) The compliance monitoring manager may perform all audits and inspections themselves, or
appoint one or more auditors by choosing either internal personnel with experience in
compliance monitoring or externals.
(b) If external personnel are used to perform compliance audits or inspections, any of those audits
or inspections should be performed under the responsibility of the compliance-monitoring
manager.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(b)(5) Use of subcontractors
(a) When a LUC holder uses products or services delivered through a subcontractor that is not itself
certified in accordance with this Subpart, the subcontractor should work under the LUC of the
LUC holder.
(b) Regardless of the certification status of the subcontractor, the LUC holder is responsible for
ensuring that all subcontracted products or services are subject to the hazard identification, risk
management, and compliance monitoring of the LUC holder.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS — GENERAL
(a) The accountable manager should have the authority to ensure that all activities are financed and
carried out in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
(b) The safety manager should:
(1) facilitate hazard identification, risk analysis, and risk management;
(2) monitor the implementation of risk mitigation measures;
(3) provide periodic reports on safety performance;
(4) ensure maintenance of the safety management documentation;
(5) ensure that there is safety management training available and that it meets acceptable
standards;
(6) provide all personnel involved with advice on safety matters; and
(7) ensure initiation and follow-up of internal occurrence investigations.
(c) Management and other personnel of the LUC holder should be qualified for the planned
operations in order to meet the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
(d) The LUC holder should ensure that its personnel receive appropriate training to remain in
compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
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AMC2 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS — NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS
The functions of the safety manager may be fulfilled by the accountable manager or another person
charged by the UAS operator with the responsibility of ensuring that the operator remains in
compliance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
Where the safety manager already fulfils the functions of the compliance-monitoring manager, the
accountable manager cannot be the safety manager.
AMC3 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS — COMPLEX OPERATORS
(a) A complex UAS operator should include in the organisational structure of its safety management
system a safety committee and one or more safety action groups.
(b) Safety committee
A safety committee should be established to support the accountable manager in their safety
responsibilities. The safety committee should monitor:
(1) the operator’s performance against safety objectives and performance standards;
(2) if safety action is taken in a timely manner; and
(3) the effectiveness of the operator’s safety management processes.
(c) Safety action group
(1) One or more safety action groups should be established to assist the safety manager in
their functions.
(2) The safety action group should be comprised of managers, supervisors and personnel
from operational areas, depending on the scope of the task and the specific expertise
required.
(3) The safety action group should at least perform the following:
(i) monitor operational safety and assess the impact of operational changes on safety;
and
(ii) ensure that safety measures are implemented within agreed timescales.
GM1 UAS.LUC.30(c) Management system
TRAINING
The LUC holder should perform the following:
(a) ensure that all personnel are aware of the safety management activities, as appropriate for their
safety responsibilities;
(b) communicate safety-critical information, especially relating to assessed risks and analysed
hazards;
(c) explain why particular measures are taken;
(d) explain why safety procedures are introduced or changed; and
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(e) hold regular meetings with personnel where information, measures and procedures are
discussed, and safety matters are communicated.
Appropriate records of all safety training provided should be kept.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.40 LUC Manual
The UAS operator should distribute a copy of the LUC manual to all its personnel.
AMC2 UAS.LUC.40 Procedures for subcontractors
If any activity is carried out by partner organisations or subcontractors, the LUC manual should include
a relevant statement of how the LUC holder is able to ensure compliance with UAS.LUC.30(b)(4), and
should contain, directly or by cross reference, descriptions of, and information on, the activities of
those organisations or subcontractors, as necessary to substantiate this statement.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.50 LUC approval form
[To be developed.]
GM1 UAS.LUC.60 Privileges
The competent authority may grant the following privileges to the LUC holder:
— it may conduct its operation included in a standard scenario requiring a declaration, without
submitting a declaration to the competent authority;
— it may issue the operational approval for its operation included in a standard scenario requiring
an operational authorisation, without submitting the operational authorisation to the
competent authority; and
— it may issue the operational authorisation for its operation not included in a standard scenario,
without submitting the operational authorisation to the competent authority.
AMC1 UAS.LUC.70(b) Significant changes in the LUC management system
[To be developed.]
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Appendix I.1 — Product requirements for UAS Class C0
AMC1 to Appendix I.1(e) Awareness leaflet
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Appendix I.2 — Product requirements for UAS Class C1
AMC1 to Appendix I.2(p) Awareness leaflet
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Appendix I.3 — Product requirements for UAS Class C2
AMC1 to Appendix I.3(n) Awareness leaflet
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Appendix I.4 — Product requirements for UAS Class C3
AMC1 to Appendix I.4(j) Awareness leaflet
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Appendix I.5 — Product requirements for UAS Class C4
AMC1 to Appendix I.5(d) Awareness leaflet
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
4. Impact assessment (IA)
The full IA for this NPA will be published as a separate document on 12 May 2017 (see
sub-NPA 2017-05 (B)).
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5. Proposed action to support implementation
5. Proposed action to support implementation
A workshop on the implementation of the proposed draft Regulation (Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX) and
related AMC/GM will be held on 5 July 2017 on the EASA premises.
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6. References
6. References
6.1. Affected regulations
Not applicable.
6.2. Affected decisions
Not applicable.
6.3. Other reference documents
Not applicable.
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7. Appendix
7. Appendix
7.1. Differences between the U-Space blueprint and the NPA
U-Space service providers
Strictly speaking, a service provider gap between the NPA and U-Space blueprint would be present at
the first implementation step (U1) only if geofencing would be immediately introduced in dynamic
mode. It can be reasonably assumed that there will be a gradual introduction of geofencing, starting
with a static geofencing requirement at U1. In this case, the gap would not be present at U1 as static
geofencing is included in the NPA. It would begin only at the second implementation step (U2) as the
U-Space blueprint mentions ‘airspace dynamic information’ for U2.
Operation of multiple UAS under the supervision of fleet operators
The NPA excludes that one remote pilot controls more than one UA at a time in the open category.
This is likely to be the case at U2 and/or U3.
Tracking information
Even if positioning information is included in the electronic-identification function of this NPA,
requirements such as latency and accuracy might be applied very differently in the U-Space. Therefore,
the tracking information is considered to be missing from the NPA, but is contained in U2.
Detect and avoid (DAA) function
The NPA does not assume availability of either cooperative or non-cooperative DAA. The blueprint
seems to refer to a non-cooperative DAA system. Due to UAS weight limitations and cost in the open
category, a DAA would be hardly feasible in the NPA context. Different is the case in which both
manned and unmanned aircraft are equipped with a cooperative DAA system allowing electronic
conspicuity and traffic avoidance (this would probably be an important constituent of the U-Space). As
DAA is only envisaged at U3, there would be a gap only there.
Dynamic geofencing
As explained under ‘U-Space service providers’ above, no gap is envisaged at U1.
Other differences
BVLOS operation
— The NPA explicitly excludes BVLOS in the open category. When U-Space services will be available,
EASA and national aviation authorities (NAAs) may consider that even UAS in the open category
(‘buy and fly’) could be operated BVLOS if the operators use the U-Space services.
— In accordance with the NPA, the UAS operation BVLOS in the specific category is subject to an
operational authorisation issued by the competent authority, based on a risk assessment and
the implementation of related mitigation measures. As from 2019, the U-Space service providers
might be responsible for taking some of those mitigation measures.
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7. Appendix
Model aircraft
By nature, model aircraft do not have geofencing, electronic-identification and tracking functions. The
NPA covers also model aircraft operation, allowing some distinction of operations under certain
conditions/options. U-Space seems to potentially include all UAS categories, without any distinction for
model aircraft.
Operation of UAS in urban areas
The U-Space blueprint mentions: ‘ensuring smooth operation of drones in urban areas’. The possibility
to operate in urban areas is already included in the NPA.
Conclusions
No difference between this NPA and the U-Space blueprint is envisaged at U1 in terms of operational
assumptions or services/functionalities needed.
As the blueprint does not yet explain how the U-Space services will be implemented, this aspect is not
reflected in this Appendix.
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Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (B)
Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of
drones
Unmanned aircraft system operations in the open and specific category
RMT.0230
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (hereinafter referred to at the ‘Basic Regulation’), the regulation of unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of less than 150 kg falls within the competence of the European
Union (EU) Member States (MSs). This leads to a fragmented regulatory system hampering the development of a single EU
market for UAS and cross-border UAS operations. A new proposed Basic Regulation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the new Basic
Regulation’), currently under discussion between the Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, aims to
solve this issue, by extending the competence of the EU to regulate all UAS regardless of their MTOM.
In view of the adoption of this new Regulation, the objective of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2017-05 is:
— to ensure an operation-centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-based regulatory framework for all UAS operations
conducted in the open and specific category;
— to ensure a high and uniform level of safety for UAS;
— to foster the development of the UAS market; and
— to contribute to enhancing privacy, data protection, and security.
This NPA proposes to create a new regulation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX’) defining the measures to
mitigate the risk of operations in:
— the open category through a combination of limitations, operational rules, requirements for the competence of the
remote pilot, as well as technical requirements for the UAS; and
— the specific category through a system including a risk assessment conducted by the operator before starting an
operation, or the operator complying with a standard scenario, or the operator holding a certificate with privileges.
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX will provide flexibility to MSs mainly by allowing them to create zones on their territory where the
use of UAS would be prohibited, limited or on the contrary facilitated.
Pursuant to new Basic Regulation, market product legislation (CE marking) ensures compliance with the technical requirements
for mass-produced UAS operated in the open category. A dedicated Annex (Part-MRK) to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX is proposed
to define the conditions for making UAS available on the market.
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX is expected to increase the level of safety of UAS operations, harmonise legislation among the EU
MSs, as well as create an EU market that will reduce the cost of the UAS and allow cross-border operations.
Note: sub-NPA 2017-05 (A) contains the explanatory note and the proposed draft rules, whereas sub-NPA 2017-05 (B) contains
the full impact assessment (IA) for this RMT.
Action area: Civil drones (UAS)
Affected rules: N/a
Affected stakeholders: Operators (private and commercial); competent authorities; MSs; flight crews; remote pilots;
maintenance staff; UAS manufacturers; other airspace users (manned aircraft); service providers of air
traffic management (ATM)/air navigation services (ANS) and other ATM network functions; air traffic
services (ATS) personnel; aerodromes; general public; model aircraft associations
Driver: Efficiency/proportionality; Rulemaking group: No, but expert group
safety
Impact assessment: Full Rulemaking procedure: Standard
22.12.2016 12.5.2017 2017/Q4 2018/Q1 2018/Q2
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Table of contents
Table of contents
Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 6
1. Problem definition ............................................................................................................................... 8
1.1. Overview of the issue and main principles ...............................................................................................8
1.1.1. Background ........................................................................................................................................8
1.1.1.1. UA market outlook — Important growth over the next years ........................................................................................ 8
1.1.1.2. SESAR Outlook Study .................................................................................................................................................... 12
1.1.2. Current EU framework .....................................................................................................................14
1.1.2.1. Review of the Basic Regulation ..................................................................................................................................... 14
1.1.2.2. A-NPA 2015-10 and Technical Opinion ......................................................................................................................... 14
1.1.2.3. Prototype Regulation .................................................................................................................................................... 15
1.1.2.4. Focus of this sub-NPA 2017-05 (B) ................................................................................................................................ 15
1.1.2.5. European Commission IA .............................................................................................................................................. 15
1.1.2.6. Safety promotion .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
1.1.2.7. New programmed activities .......................................................................................................................................... 16
1.1.2.8. DronesRules.eu ............................................................................................................................................................. 17
1.1.3. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) .............................................................................18
1.1.4. JARUS ...............................................................................................................................................18
1.1.5. Current regulatory framework at MS level ......................................................................................18
1.1.6. EASA consultation strategy ..............................................................................................................20
1.1.6.1. UAS questionnaire for operators .................................................................................................................................. 20
1.1.6.2. UAS Questionnaires for manufacturers ........................................................................................................................ 21
1.1.6.3. UAS Questionnaire for NAAs......................................................................................................................................... 22
1.1.6.4. Other consultations ...................................................................................................................................................... 22
1.2. Issues analysis .........................................................................................................................................22
1.2.1. Introduction to issues analysis.........................................................................................................22
1.2.2. Transversal concepts .......................................................................................................................23
1.2.3. Problem tree ....................................................................................................................................23
1.2.3.1. Drivers ........................................................................................................................................................................... 25
1.2.3.1.1 Driver 1 — Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements ............................................ 25
1.2.3.1.2 Driver 2 — New actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure) ........................... 26
1.2.3.1.3 Driver 3 — Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market ...................................................... 26
1.2.3.2. Issues ............................................................................................................................................................................ 27
1.2.3.3. Consequences ............................................................................................................................................................... 27
1.2.3.3.1 Ground risk (accidents/incidents involving persons on the ground or sensitive areas) .......................................... 27
29
1.2.3.3.2 Air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft) ........................................... 28
1.2.3.3.3 Violation of privacy, data protection, and security ................................................................................................. 28
1.2.3.3.4 Barriers to the market, burden for industry, locked potential for innovation and development ........................... 29
1.2.4. Detailed analysis of the issues .........................................................................................................29
1.2.4.1. Issue 1 — Lack of clarity and non-harmonised definition of categories of UAS boundaries (within the open, and
across the open and specific category) .......................................................................................................................................... 29
1.2.4.1.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 29
1.2.4.1.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 29
1.2.4.1.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 31
1.2.4.1.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
1.2.4.1.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 31
1.2.4.2. Issue 2 — Lack of protection of sensitive areas ............................................................................................................ 31
1.2.4.2.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 31
1.2.4.2.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 32
1.2.4.2.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 36
1.2.4.2.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 37
1.2.4.2.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 37
1.2.4.3. Issue 3 — Inadequate technical requirements ............................................................................................................. 37
1.2.4.3.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 37
1.2.4.3.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 37
1.2.4.3.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 38
1.2.4.3.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 39
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1.2.4.3.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 39
1.2.4.4. Issue 4 — Lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations ............................................................ 39
1.2.4.4.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 39
1.2.4.4.2 Description and background ................................................................................................................................... 40
1.2.4.4.3 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 42
1.2.4.4.4 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 43
1.2.4.4.5 Expected impacts .................................................................................................................................................... 43
1.2.4.5. Issue 5 — Inadequate competences of remote pilots .................................................................................................. 43
1.2.4.5.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 43
1.2.4.5.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 43
1.2.4.5.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 45
1.2.4.5.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 46
1.2.4.5.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 46
1.2.4.6. Issue 6 — Need for registration and identification ....................................................................................................... 46
1.2.4.6.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 46
1.2.4.6.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 46
1.2.4.6.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 48
1.2.4.6.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 48
1.2.4.6.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 49
1.2.4.7. Issue 7 — Disproportionate rules for special categories (privately built and model UAS) ........................................... 49
1.2.4.7.1 Drivers ..................................................................................................................................................................... 49
1.2.4.7.2 Description .............................................................................................................................................................. 49
1.2.4.7.3 Background ............................................................................................................................................................. 50
1.2.4.7.4 Consequences ......................................................................................................................................................... 52
1.2.4.7.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken ....................................................................................................... 52
1.2.5. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................53
1.2.6. Who is affected? ..............................................................................................................................54
1.2.7. Safety risk assessment .....................................................................................................................55
1.2.8. UAS in third countries ......................................................................................................................59
1.2.9. UAS operations aspects not covered in detail and issues considered to be outside of the NPA
scope 59
2. Objectives .......................................................................................................................................... 61
2.1. General objectives ..................................................................................................................................61
2.2. Specific objectives ...................................................................................................................................61
3. Introduction on options ...................................................................................................................... 62
4. Open category.................................................................................................................................... 63
4.1. Open-category options ...........................................................................................................................63
4.1.1. Option O0 — Do nothing .................................................................................................................64
4.1.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility .........................................................................66
4.1.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements ..............................................................................68
4.1.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements .............................................................................................71
4.1.5. Discarded options ............................................................................................................................75
4.1.5.1. Discarded Option 1 — only operation with negligible risk allowed in the open category ............................................ 76
4.1.5.2. Discarded Option 2 —Remote-pilot competence as main safety barrier ..................................................................... 76
4.2. Open-category impacts ...........................................................................................................................77
4.2.1. Safety impact ...................................................................................................................................77
4.2.1.1. Option O0 — Do nothing .............................................................................................................................................. 78
4.2.1.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility ...................................................................................................... 78
4.2.1.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements ............................................................................................................ 79
4.2.1.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements ........................................................................................................................... 80
4.2.2. Environmental impact .....................................................................................................................81
4.2.3. Social impact ....................................................................................................................................81
4.2.3.1. Option O0 — Do nothing .............................................................................................................................................. 81
4.2.3.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility ...................................................................................................... 82
4.2.3.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements ............................................................................................................ 82
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4.2.3.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements ........................................................................................................................... 83
4.2.4. Economic impact..............................................................................................................................83
4.2.4.1. Option O0 — Do nothing .............................................................................................................................................. 85
4.2.4.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility ...................................................................................................... 86
4.2.4.3. Option O2 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility ...................................................................................................... 88
4.2.4.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements ........................................................................................................................... 92
4.2.5. Proportionality impact .....................................................................................................................93
4.3. Comparison of options — Open category...............................................................................................94
5. Registration ....................................................................................................................................... 95
5.1. Options ....................................................................................................................................................95
5.1.1. Option R0 — Registration at MS level .............................................................................................95
5.1.2. Option R1 — Registration of the operator only (except for UAS Class C0) .....................................95
5.1.3. Option R2 — Registration of both the operator and the UAS (except for UAS Class C0) ...............96
5.1.4. Option R3 — Registration of both the operator and the UAS (except for Classes C0 and C1) .......96
5.1.5. Option R4 —EU registry (instead of a national one) .......................................................................96
5.1.6. Additional non-analysed option ......................................................................................................96
5.2. Registration impacts ...............................................................................................................................96
5.2.1. Safety impact ...................................................................................................................................96
5.2.2. Social impact ....................................................................................................................................96
5.2.3. Economic impact..............................................................................................................................97
5.3. Comparison of options — Registration .................................................................................................101
6. Specific category .............................................................................................................................. 102
6.1. Options ..................................................................................................................................................102
6.1.1. Option S0 — Do nothing ................................................................................................................102
6.1.2. Option S1 — Authorisation for all operations ...............................................................................102
6.1.3. Option S2 — Authorisation and standard scenarios .....................................................................103
6.1.4. Option S3 — Authorisation, standard scenarios and LUC .............................................................103
6.2. Specific-category impacts .....................................................................................................................104
6.2.1. Safety impact .................................................................................................................................104
6.2.1.1. Option S0 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.1.2. Option S1 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.1.3. Option S2 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.1.4. Option S3 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.2. Social impact ..................................................................................................................................104
6.2.2.1. Option S0 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.2.2. Option S1 .................................................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.2.3. Option S2 .................................................................................................................................................................... 105
6.2.2.4. Option S3 .................................................................................................................................................................... 105
6.2.3. Economic impact............................................................................................................................105
6.2.3.1. Option S0 .................................................................................................................................................................... 106
6.2.3.2. Option S1 .................................................................................................................................................................... 106
6.2.3.3. Option S2 .................................................................................................................................................................... 108
6.2.3.4. Option S3 .................................................................................................................................................................... 110
6.3. Comparison of options — Specific category .........................................................................................112
7. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 113
8. Monitoring and evaluation ............................................................................................................... 115
9. Appendices ...................................................................................................................................... 117
9.1. Appendix I — Example of UAS operations ............................................................................................117
9.2. Appendix II — Rationale behind MTOM/energy thresholds for UAS Class C0 and C1 .........................117
9.3. Appendix III — Training .........................................................................................................................121
9.4. Appendix IV — Third-country regulatory framework for UAS operations ...........................................124
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Table of contents
9.5. Appendix V — Overview of EASA MSs UAS regulatory framework ......................................................126
9.6. Appendix VI — Abbreviated injury scale (AIS) ......................................................................................128
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Summary
Summary
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) can offer a great potential in various sectors due to the services they
provide; precision agriculture, inspection, and delivery are only some of the examples of how various sectors
could be affected by UAS. The use of UAS can bring the following benefits:
— a safer way to do business without risk to human lives;
— additional business (e.g. new services);
— efficiency; and
— creation of employment opportunities.
However, operating UAS in the present aviation environment raises concerns about safety, security, privacy,
data protection, and the environment. The challenge is therefore to develop rules that will satisfactorily
address those concerns, allowing at the same time the market for UAS services to fully develop.
The purpose of this impact assessment (IA) is to provide:
— a quantitative and qualitative analysis, based on which the most beneficial rulemaking option is
selected; and
— an understanding of the various impacts of all analysed options.
As already explained, the new Basic Regulation would extend the competence of the EU to regulate all UAS
regardless of their MTOM (also UAS of < 150 kg). An IA in this regard has already been prepared by the
European Commission to support such an extension.
This IA focuses on the operation of UAS in the open and specific category1 under this Subtask (SubT) 1 of the
rulemaking task (RMT.0230).
The general issue related to this IA is outlined above. The specific issues identified and detailed in the IA are
the following:
— lack of clarity and non-harmonised definition of categories of UAS operation boundaries, including
disproportionate rules for special categories;
— lack of protection of sensitive areas;
— inadequate technical requirements;
— lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations;
— inadequate competences of remote pilots; and
— need for registration and identification.
These issues are also included in a ‘problem tree’2 with a view to clarifying their primary causes (drivers) as
well as their consequences. These consequences are grouped as follows:
— ground risk (accidents/incidents involving persons on the ground or sensitive areas);
1
The open and specific category are defined in Section 1.1.2.1.2.
2
See Section 1.2.3.
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Summary
— air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft);
— violation of privacy, data protection, and security; and
— barriers to the market, burden for industry, locked potential for innovation and development.
The first two consequences are strictly linked to safety and they have been analysed in a detailed safety risk
assessment showing an exponential increase of sightings of UAS by manned aircraft. It is evident that there is a
potential high safety risk, in particular considering the fast-developing UAS market.
In order to address the risk identified, three sets of options are proposed, together with the corresponding
analysis of impacts based on various criteria (social, economic, safety3). These sets of options that complement
but not substitute each other cover the following areas:
— open category: the aim of the analysis is to find a balance between operational limitations (UAS MTOM,
UAS distance from crowds, height of the UAS), remote-pilot competence and age, as well as technical
requirements;
— registration: the analysis is horizontal across categories, mainly addressing security and privacy risk; and
— specific category: a proportionate approach is sought for the authorisation of such operations.
The analysis of the impacts is supported by qualitative and quantitative data, making use of the input received
from a dedicated expert group as well as of the results of surveys sent out to, and responded to by, competent
authorities, manufacturers, operators, model aircraft associations and training schools.
Based on the analysis, the preferred options for each area are the following:
— Open category: Option O3, corresponding to a proportionate approach between UAS technical
requirements, operational limitations, and remote-pilot competence, strikes the best compromise
between safety and cost, having also a good social impact. Subcategorisation and definition of airspace
areas or special zones provide flexibility to the MSs. Option O3 was generally supported by the UAS
expert group4.
— Registration: through Option R3, corresponding to the registration of all operators conducting
unmanned aircraft (UA) with an MTOM greater than 250 g as well as the registration of the UA itself
when it has an MTOM greater than 900 g, a good balance between the size of the UAS, proportionate to
its potential hazard, and the related economic impact is achieved. In general, registration as an option is
mainly driven by law enforcement considerations as well as by the security and privacy risk. In that
respect, Option R3 strikes the best compromise between cost and mitigation of those risks, considering
that UAS with an MTOM of less than 900 g account for circa 50 % of the current market.
— Specific category: Option S3 follows the most cost-effective approach. It proposes to complement the
authorisation required to conduct UAS operations with standard scenarios issued by EASA, thus
substantially reducing the burden for operators and competent authorities. In addition, the operator
may choose to apply for a light UAS operator certificate (LUC) with the ultimate privilege to approve its
own operations.
3
A brief analysis of proportionality and environmental aspects has been added as well, where relevant.
4
See Section 2.3.1.1 of sub-NPA 2017-05 (A).
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1. Problem definition
1. Problem definition
1.1. Overview of the issue and main principles
1.1.1. Background
UAS are not a new phenomenon as they date back to the mid-18th century, but their development in
the civil market is relatively recent. Until a few years ago, UAS were being developed and used almost
exclusively in the military sector. Their great potential for developing innovative applications, however,
is now recognised also in the civil sector, in terms of performing useful tasks and creating new jobs.
UAS, rapidly expanding in EASA MSs5 and worldwide, are used in various areas as, for example the
following: precision agriculture, infrastructure inspection and monitoring, natural-resources
monitoring, environmental compliance, atmospheric research, media and entertainment, sport photos,
filming, wildlife protection and research, disaster relief etc. Size, configuration and complexity of the
UAS are extremely varied as well, and correspond to different types of operations and users. They are
designed and manufactured not only by classical aviation companies but also by others, in many cases
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)6.
Technology has then allowed to explore new uses of drones for civil applications. In Appendix I (see
Section 9.1), detailed examples on the uses of UAS based on a questionnaire sent by EASA to UAS
operators are presented.
1.1.1.1. UA market outlook — Important growth over the next years
Looking at the evolution of UAS for the period 2015-2020, described in a worldwide market research
focussing on UAS below 25 kg, in 2015, media and entertainment seem to account for the highest
market share with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 26 % (2020 forecast value: circa
USD 1,3 billion), followed by inspection/monitoring, and hobbyist & DIY (do-it-yourself). According to
the forecast values for 2020, media and entertainment could still be on top of the list, followed by
inspection/monitoring and precision agriculture. More details are included in Graph 1a below:
Graph 1 — Global UAS market size, by application, 2015-2020 (in USD million). Source: market research report
‘UAV Drones Market by Type (Fixed wing, Rotary Blade, Nano, Hybrid), Application (Law Enforcement, Precision
5
The 28 EU MS plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
6
See ‘Concept of Operations for Drones — A risk based approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft’, available at
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/204696_EASA_concept_drone_brochure_web.pdf.
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Agriculture, Media and Entertainment, Retail) & Geography (Americas, Europe, APAC, Row) — Analysis &
Forecast to 2020’ MarketsandMarkets, 2015.
Table 1 — Global UAS market size, by application, 2015-2020 (in USD million). Source: market research report
‘UAV Drones Market by Type (Fixed wing, Rotary Blade, Nano, Hybrid), Application (Law Enforcement, Precision
Agriculture, Media and Entertainment, Retail) & Geography (Americas, Europe, APAC, Row) — Analysis &
Forecast to 2020’ MarketsandMarkets, 2015.
UAS can vary according to several parameters such as:
— MTOM: from a few grams up to hundreds of kilograms;
— type: rotary wing, fixed wing, hybrid, nano7; and
— function: monitoring and surveillance, parcel transport, etc.
In terms of weight, in the segment of small-UAS of less than 25 kg, more than 90 % of them have an
MTOM between 0 and 4 kg, according to the replies received on an EASA questionnaire (see Section
1.1.6 ‘EASA consultation strategy’). The following diagram shows a graphical representation of these
replies and it refers only to the UAS types (production units are not considered); the MTOM categories
have been defined in a way to help analyse the impacts of the options proposed.
7
Palm-sized UAS with an MTOM of less than 30 g (approximately 1 oz), which have more capabilities than many larger UAS. They
utilise advanced navigation systems, full-authority autopilot technology, digital data links, and multi-sensor payloads. The
operational radius is more than 1.5 km, and they are flown safely in strong wind. Future development will yield even smaller and
more advanced nano UAS with indoor capability and a high level of autonomy.
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1. Problem definition
MTOM — Operators feedback
250-899 g, 39.9
%
1-249 g, 7.2 %
> 25 kg, 0.7 %
900-3999 g,
4 Kg < X < 25 Kg, 44.9 %
7.2 %
Graph 2. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Among the various types of UAS, the one with the highest number of units worldwide is the rotorcraft
type, followed by the fixed-wing type, and the nano-type. Further details are presented in Table 2
below:
Table 2 — Global UAS market size, by type, 2014-2020 (units). Source: market research report ‘UAV Drones
Market by Type (Fixed wing, Rotary Blade, Nano, Hybrid), Application (Law Enforcement, Precision Agriculture,
Media and Entertainment, Retail) & Geography (Americas, Europe, APAC, Row) — Analysis & Forecast to 2020’
MarketsandMarkets, 2015.
As regards the geographical distribution of UAS worldwide, in 2018, the Americas (USA, Canada,
Mexico, and Brazil) is the area expected to account for the largest share of the global commercial UAS
market, followed by Asia-Pacific (APAC), and Europe.
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Table 3 — Global UAS market size, by region, 2014-2020 (USD Million) Source: market research report ‘UAV
Drones Market by Type (Fixed wing, Rotary Blade, Nano, Hybrid), Application (Law Enforcement, Precision
Agriculture, Media and Entertainment, Retail) & Geography (Americas, Europe, APAC, Row) — Analysis &
Forecast to 2020’ MarketsandMarkets, 2015.
Apart from being fast-evolving, the UAS market is characterised by the presence of many actors
relatively new to the aviation sector. This relates for instance to UAS manufacturers. Indeed, as shown
in Graph 3 below, an important market share is accounted for by companies that are not familiar with
aviation regulation.
Graph 3 — Global commercial drone market share analysis by key player, 2014. Source: market research report
‘UAV Drones Market by Type (Fixed wing, Rotary Blade, Nano, Hybrid), Application (Law Enforcement, Precision
Agriculture, Media and Entertainment, Retail) & Geography (Americas, Europe, APAC, Row) — Analysis &
Forecast to 2020’ MarketsandMarkets, 2015.
Conclusions:
— The great variety of UAS MTOM/size implies different level of risks, therefore, regulation must
be risk-based.
— The importance of the development of precision agriculture and infrastructure inspection
highlights the need to have an efficient specific category, especially when important areas need
to be monitored.
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1. Problem definition
— UAS is a rapidly evolving market, as shown by the number of UAS expected in the next years8.
— Hobbyist activities account for an important market share, which should be therefore taken into
account in the regulation.
— UAS with an MTOM of less than 4 kg operated in the open category will continue to represent a
very important part of the market. This limit indicates that a subcategory of approximately 4 kg
MTOM should be also considered.
— The UAS market involves many actors that are completely new to the aviation sector9.
1.1.1.2. SESAR Outlook Study10
In November 2016, the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking (SJU) issued the
‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe’ providing insights into the use of
UAS. The forecast reaches 2050 and focuses on UAS operation within European skies, including
economic indicators reflective of European demand. The study includes the following interesting
information:
— Europe is a growing UAS marketplace with potential; European demand may exceed the value of
EUR 10 billion on an annual basis in nominal terms by 2035, and that of EUR 15 billion by 2050.
— Indirect macroeconomics and societal externalities of a potential UAS industry to be considered:
increasing the success of search and rescue (SAR) missions;
preventing chemicals impacting natural environments through precision agriculture; and
software developers creating applications for UAS.
— The UAS industry impact on the labour market could be the creation of an additional
250 000-400 000 jobs.
— Some 7 million consumer leisure UAS are expected to be operating across Europe, and a fleet of
400 000 is expected to be used for commercial and government missions in 2050.
— In the longer term, larger commercial UAS are gradually expected to be equipped with initial
versions of optionally piloted systems, estimated for some time after 2030, first impacting cargo
transport and then moving slowly towards the transport of passengers. The feasibility of such
solutions will require significant societal acceptance as well as a number of critical
advancements in technology and regulation.
— There are new aviation actors, including new ventures and industrial leaders considering the use
of UAS for their business.
— UAS technology supports the development of new solutions, such as the provision of
communication access, or of wind energy using UAS attached to the ground.
The following Figure 1 summarises the main outcomes of the study:
8
See also Section 1.2.3.1.3 ‘Driver 3 —rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market’.
9
See also Section 1.2.3.1.2 ‘Driver 2 — New actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure)’.
10
http://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/European_Drones_Outlook_Study_2016.pdf
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Figure 1. Source: SESAR Outlook Study.
As regards the evolution of the market, the following Graph 4 shows the total UAS fleet size (forecast
until 2050) for military, government, commercial and leisure operations, including some detailed
comments:
Graph 4. Source: SESAR Outlook Study.
Conclusions:
— This study confirms the conclusions drawn from Section 1.1.1.1, notably on inspection, precision
agriculture and hobbyist activities.
— Research and development (R&D) investment will identify new technologies and operations,
which justifies the need for performance-based regulations.
— The study envisages the invention of passenger-carrying UAS, which would be most likely
addressed under the certified category.
— The UAS market is rapidly evolving not only with respect to leisure operations but also for
governmental, commercial, and military uses. In addition, it involves actors that are new to the
aviation sector.
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1.1.2. Current EU framework
1.1.2.1. Review of the Basic Regulation
The Basic Regulation establishes the main principles and rules for civil aviation in the EU. It also defines
the area of competence of the EU and the MSs, listing the categories of aircraft regulated at national
level. Among them are UA with an MTOM of less than 150 kg. This has created disharmonisation across
the EU, hampering the growing business of civil unmanned aviation.
To solve this issue and foster this promising business, unmanned aviation was included into the new
European Aviation Strategy, as one of its key elements, in line with the Riga Declaration on remotely
piloted aircraft (drones)11.
A proposal for a new Basic Regulation is currently under discussion between the Council, the European
Commission, and the European Parliament.
The proposal includes the following key elements on UAS:
— extend the EU competence to regulate all UAS; and
— provide the regulatory framework for a risk-based approach allowing use of market product
regulation for enforcing technical requirements on UAS.
Even if this Regulation is still under discussion, it was agreed that EASA would issue an NPA proposing a
new implementing regulation on UAS in order to be able to issue the related opinion as soon as the
new Basic Regulation is adopted.
1.1.2.2. A-NPA 2015-10 and Technical Opinion
Further to the publication of Advance Notice of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA) 2015-1012 on
31 July 2015, EASA issued a Technical Opinion in December 201513. The Technical Opinion proposes a
risk-based, operation-centric concept, by grouping UAS operations into the following three main
categories:
— open category operations, considering the risks involved, require neither an authorisation by the
competent authority nor a declaration by the UAS operator before the operation takes place;
— specific category operations, considering the risks involved, do require an authorisation by the
competent authority before the operation takes place and take into account the mitigation
measures identified in an operational risk assessment, except for certain standard scenarios for
which a declaration by the UAS operator is sufficient.; and
— certified category operations that, considering the risks involved, require the certification of the
UAS and its operator, as well as licensing of the flight crew.
11
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/news/doc/2015-03-06-drones/2015-03-06-riga-declaration-drones.pdf
12
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/A-NPA%202015-10.pdf
13
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Introduction%20of%20a%20regulatory%20framework%20for%20the%20operation%20of%20unmanned%20aircraft.pdf
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1.1.2.3. Prototype Regulation
Further to A-NPA 2015-10 and the Technical Opinion, the European Commission published a road
map14 that included a plan for developing the operation-centric concept. In order to provide the basis
for an advance discussion, EASA developed a ‘Prototype’ Regulation15 on UAS, deviating from its
rulemaking process. Comments from stakeholders where collected and analysed, including more than
1 100 emails, 70 % of which were from hobbyists (model and privately built aircraft). Furthermore,
organisations, manufacturers and competent authorities commented on the Regulation (total number
of comments: 550 approximately). All the input received was taken into consideration for the
development of this NPA.
1.1.2.4. Focus of this sub-NPA 2017-05 (B)
This proposal and, therefore, this IA focuses on UAS operated in the open and specific category. The
UAS operation in the certified category will be the subject of future NPAs16.
1.1.2.5. European Commission IA
In support of its proposal submitted to the European Parliament and the Council in December 2015,
the European Commission published its IA17 for the new Basic Regulation. The document analysed the
following main issues:
— the current regulatory system hampers the UAS market development; and
— UAS operations cause risks not adequately addressed by existing rules.
The identified drivers of these issues are:
— the responsibilities for regulating UAS are divided between EU and MSs, which leads to diverging
requirements in the internal market;
— the individual authorisations are too costly, too time-consuming and resource-intensive;
— the existing methods of civil aviation regulation are not always suited to the specificities of UAS;
and
— the oversight and law enforcement authorities lack proper information and instruments.
This IA proposed as preferred option a risk-based EU legislation on UAS and EU product legislation for
the case of low-risk UAS operations. This would allow to tackle safety risk in a less burdensome way.
The above-mentioned document was taken into consideration as one of the key inputs for developing
this IA and is, therefore, largely reflected throughout this NPA.
More precisely, the aforementioned drivers have been addressed as follows in the NPA:
14
It was developed during three workshops held with MSs (in March, April, and May 2016, respectively), and presented to industry at
a dedicated workshop in June 2016.
15
http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf
16
For further reference, see the related Terms of Reference (ToR) RMT.0230 Issue 1 at:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20RMT.0230%20Issue%201.pdf.
17
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2015/EN/SWD-2015-262-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-2.PDF
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— divided responsibilities: the objective of this NPA is to propose a common rule for all UAS
operations;
— individual authorisations: a proportionate approach is envisaged with alternative solutions;
— not always suitable traditional methods and processes: an operation-centric approach is
followed; and
— oversight and law enforcement: a system of registration and electronic identification is
proposed.
1.1.2.6. Safety promotion
Safety promotion is a useful tool that can help to provide both the public and commercial UAS
operators with a better understanding of how to use UAS safely.
EASA has initiated so far several safety promotion activities in that respect.
Past/current activities
The following EASA safety promotion material has been published on the EASA ‘Civil drones
(Unmanned aircraft)’ webpage18:
— a poster19; and
— a video20.
1.1.2.7. New programmed activities
According to the 2017-2011 Rulemaking and Safety Promotion Programme including the European Plan
for Aviation Safety (EPAS)21, a project for coordinating activities at European level to promote the safe
operation of UAS to the general public is planned for 2018.
In addition, the following safety promotion activities might be considered:
— a ‘Single Europe’ campaign with shared materials between EASA and MSs;
— individual national campaigns with tailored material sharing as many resources as possible;
— gathering best practices on the safety promotion of UAS among the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC) MSs; in the UK, for instance, a website was designed to reach new audiences,
encourage uptake of the information, and ensure that UAS users can easily access the
information they need about how to fly their UAS safely and legally without endangering the
others22; and
18
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas and
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/safety-management/safety-promotion
19
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/EASA%20Drone%20Safety%20Leaflet_web.pdf
20
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Xs_eVx4nuw&feature=youtu.be
21
http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/RMP-EPAS_2017-2021.pdf (see p. 56).
22
http://dronesafe.uk/
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— action has been taken within the safety promotion network (SPN) to collect MSs’ best
practices23.
1.1.2.8. DronesRules.eu24
Apart from EASA initiatives on safety promotion, the European Commission (i.e. Directorate General
(DG) Growth) is developing a multilingual portal, the DronesRules.eu website, under the COSME
programme, aiming to support stakeholders’ awareness of, and access to, the regulatory framework
for UAS operations.
The programme covers both recreational and professional UAS operations, and focuses on key aspects
such as data protection and privacy, safety, as well as liability and insurance.
The website will progressively be updated with e-learning material such as a quick-start guide,
handbooks, case studies, quizzes, tutorials, etc. This material will provide (in the three domains
covered: safety, privacy, and insurance) a basic understanding of the UAS rules, concrete examples of
low- and high-risk practices, a code of conduct, tips and general principles for lowering the risk, and
specific tools such as a checklist for a privacy IA. It also aims at creating a one-stop shop providing
anybody in Europe with easy access to practical information about European authorities and NAAs,
legislation, procedures, and support material.
In the last months of the programme,
extensive promotional campaigns will be
conducted to ensure high visibility of the
website and an extensive use across Europe.
The website should become the reference for
the regulation of UAS in Europe, having the
unique feature to bring together all EU and
national rules under the aspects of safety,
privacy, and insurance.
This EUR 1-million programme started in
October 2015 and will end in December 2017.
The European Commission is the owner of
the material produced that will allow to build
future awareness and take action for training.
To reinforce the privacy and data protection dimension of the Dronerules.eu programme and support
UAS businesses in complying with their obligations, DG GROWTH launched a call for tender (end date
4 April 2017) dedicated to the development of advanced e-learning and training tools in the privacy
and data protection area.
23
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/safety-management/safety-promotion/safety-promotion-network-spn
24
http://dronerules.eu/en/
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1.1.3. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
In 2011, ICAO issued Circular 328 AN/190)25, considered as a first attempt to develop an international
regulatory framework towards global harmonisation in the regulation of UAS.
Integration will require the implementation of harmonised Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS). The ICAO Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPAS) Panel is working on these deliverables, and the first SARPS are expected to be published in 2018
(remote-pilot licence). The scope of the ICAO RPAS Panel is currently limited to certified RPAS
operating internationally under instrument flight rules (IFR) in non-segregated airspace and at
aerodromes.
Furthermore, ICAO has developed an online UAS toolkit26 to assist States in developing national
regulations for domestic UAS operations.
1.1.4. JARUS
The Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS)27 is composed of a group of
experts from national aviation authorities (NAAs) and regional aviation safety organisations. EASA is an
active participant of the group, whose aim is to develop harmonised rules for UAS, by recommending
technical, safety and operational requirements for the certification of UAS and their safe integration
into airspace and at aerodromes. JARUS has developed several documents for the development of a
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX, such as on the initial operation-centric approach for categories, and is
developing the SORA for the specific category.
1.1.5. Current regulatory framework at MS level
As the regulation of UAS with an MTOM of less than 150 kg falls within the MSs’ competence pursuant
to the Basic Regulation, at least 19 MSs have already adopted and implemented, or are currently
developing, legislation related to UAS.
Appendix V28 provides an overview of the existing UAS regulations in 19 MSs. It may not provide a full
picture of the EU market, but it contains useful information on the current situation.
The analysis shows a fragmentation at EU level in terms of categorisations, operational limitations and
remote-pilot competence required.
Some important elements of these national regulations in place are the following:
— Most regulations focus on the professional use of UAS. For recreational use, most MSs give
some basic recommendations through leaflets, educational videos, etc.
— Most regulations focus on small UAS (in most cases, the threshold is an MTOM of 25 kg). Larger
UAS usually require an authorisation on a case-by-case basis (including a certificate of
airworthiness (CofA) or permit to fly).
25
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS/Documents/Circular%20328_en.pdf
26
The UAS toolkit is accessible at www.icao.int/rpas.
27
JARUS is a cooperation of around 50 civil aviation authorities worldwide, including EASA and EUROCONTROL. JARUS published
several related documents available at http://jarus-rpas.org/
28
Main source used is the SESAR Outlook Study, but other sources have also been taken into account.
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— The operations allowed are usually in VLOS, but BVLOS operations may also be allowed or
authorised in specific cases.
— A maximum height (above ground level (AGL)) for UAS operations is established in most cases.
The most common values for operations outside segregated airspace are the following:
400 ft/120 m (e.g. Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom
(UK));
500 ft/150 m (e.g. Finland, France, Italy); and
300 ft/100 m (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic).
Height restriction, however, could significantly limit beneficial uses of UAS.
— A maximum distance of the UA to the remote pilot is established in most cases. For VLOS
operations, a number of national regulations just indicate that the UA must be within the visual
line of sight of the remote pilot.
— A minimum distance to aerodromes is also defined in most regulations. There is a variety of
values across the various national regulations. The most common value is 5 km (e.g. Denmark,
Finland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Switzerland). The reference point from which the distance is
measured is not always clearly indicated.
— Remote-pilot competence: several MSs require a pilot certificate/license based on risk for
example. In some cases, self-study or online training or an examination is required. Some MSs
mandate also a medical check.
— Definition of categories: some MSs define several subcategories while others only have one for
UAS with an MTOM of 25 kg.
— Registration and an identification (ID) plate is required in several MSs.
— Technical requirements: only in few MSs (Italy and France), technical requirements are in place.
The information included in Appendix V forms the basis for defining Option 0 (the ‘baseline scenario’)
and its impacts, and helps compare the baseline scenario with other options proposed. Overall,
Appendix V shows that there are:
— MSs with strict requirements;
— MSs following a simple and not very demanding approach; and
— MSs taking a mixed approach.
Assessing the dynamic aspect of the baseline scenario — how the situation would evolve if no action is
taken — is challenging because it is not easy to predict what each MS would decide to do.
Nevertheless, a brief analysis of this aspect of the baseline scenario is provided in several parts of
Section 1.2.4.
This Section 1.1.5 confirms the fragmentation of UAS regulation in Europe, which is further discussed in
Section 1.2.3.1.1 ‘Driver 1 — Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements’.
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1.1.6. EASA consultation strategy
EASA consulted stakeholders in several ways throughout the development of this NPA. The following is
only a brief overview:
— UAS questionnaire for operators;
— UAS questionnaire for manufacturers;
— UAS questionnaire for authorities;
— UAS questionnaire for training schools;
— feedback from expert group;
— contacts with manufacturers; and
— UAS questionnaire for model aircraft associations.
The results of the various consultations are presented throughout this NPA, e.g. in several graphs or
quoted comments from stakeholders. The following Sections contain a brief description of each
questionnaire.
1.1.6.1. UAS questionnaire for operators
A survey was sent to a group of operators (individuals and associations) with the possibility to reply
during the month of December 2016 via the EU survey tool. A total of 52 replies were received from
both commercial and non-commercial operators across several EASA MSs, Several Sections of the IA
have been developed, also based on these replies. The followings graphs show the characteristics of
the respondents to the survey:
Country of establishment of operator/association
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Graph 5 — Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
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Are you representing an association Main reason of UAS use
of operators? commerc
Yes, 4 ial, 11
non- commerc
commerc ial/non-
No, 48
ial, 39 commerc
ial, 2
Which category does your UAS fit (according to
the UAS categories in the 'Prototype' Regulation?
Model A0,
Aircraft, 18.00 %
30.00 %
A1, 13.22 %
A3,
Specific, 17.11 %
9.22 % A2, 12.44 %
Graph 6. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
1.1.6.2. UAS Questionnaires for manufacturers
A survey was sent to a group of manufacturers (individuals and associations) with the possibility to
reply during the month of December 2016 via the EU survey tool. A total of 11 replies were received
from both European and Non-European manufacturers, small and large companies. The replies
contributed to developing several Sections of the IA. Some manufacturers were also contacted via
phone to better understand their input, and to request further information. The following graphs show
the characteristics of the respondents to the survey:
EU/non-EU Number of employees
6
4 5
4
3
7
2
1
0
EU non-EU 0-50 51-250 > 250
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Graph 7. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
1.1.6.3. UAS Questionnaire for NAAs
A survey was sent to NAAs with the possibility to reply during the period October-November 2016. A
total of 16 replies were received from both small and large countries across the EU. The replies
contributed to developing several Sections of the IA, such as the resources estimate considered for
several calculations in the economic impacts of the proposed policy options.
1.1.6.4. Other consultations
Expert group
A total of five meetings were held with a group of experts. The group was composed of NAAs
representatives, members of the manned and unmanned aviation community, members of model
aircraft and sport flights associations, and manufacturers of manned and unmanned aircraft, including
toys.29
The comments received on the IA helped to further improve the text. In addition, information provided
by the group in the meetings or via email, e.g. on occurrences, was also beneficial.
Training schools
A survey was sent to a group of training schools in various MSs. The results helped to better
understand the training currently provided at EU level, including the costs for theoretical and practical
tests. This information was used in the analysis of the various IA options.
Model aircraft associations
A survey was sent to model aircraft associations. The feedback provided by 18 MSs helped to better
understand the current situation with respect to model aircraft in several MSs. Many of the graphs
included in Chapter 1 ‘Problem definition’ are based on the results of this survey.
1.2. Issues analysis
1.2.1. Introduction to issues analysis
Due to the complexity of the issues definition and in order to help the reader understand the issues,
this Section introduces a problem tree, followed by a detailed description of its key elements:
— drivers of the issues,
— issues, and
— consequences of the issues.
29
The group was composed of representatives of the following: Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA) of Switzerland, Finnish
Transport Safety Agency, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment of the Netherlands, Ente Nazionale per l’ Aviazione Civile
(ENAC) of Italy, Austro Control GmbH, Direction Générale de l’ Aviation Civile (DGAC) of France, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of the
UK, CAA of Lithuania, Ministry of Transport of Germany, European Commission (DG MOVE and DG GROWTH), EASA, European
Helicopter Association (EHA), Drone Alliance Europe, Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), Europe Air Sports, Civil Air
Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), Eurocontrol, European toy industries; UVS International, Aerospace and Defense
industry (ASD), European Cockpit Association(ECA), and Drones Manufacturers Alliance Europe (DMAE).
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1. Problem definition
However, an advance brief definition of the principles on which the issues analysis is based is provided
for better understanding.
1.2.2. Transversal concepts
The following key concepts apply to all the issues detailed below and summarised in the problem tree.
Concept of performance-based rules
The dynamism of UAS technology shall be taken into account when developing Regulation
(EU) 201X/XXX. Prescriptive rules could hamper the development of new technologies. Thus, it is
necessary to find an appropriate balance in the regulatory approach to describe the performance
required to mitigate the risk.
The UAS regulatory framework should achieve a high level of safety and have at the same time the
flexibility to allow the new industry to evolve, innovate, and mature. Therefore, the aim is not simply
to incorporate the existing rules for manned aviation into the new Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX, but to
create proportionate, progressive, and risk-based rules that include objectives to be complemented by
industry standards.
Operation-centric concept
The approach to safety for UAS operations differs considerably from the one for manned aviation. So
far, the focus was on protecting the aircraft and its occupants, considering that in this way, also the
third party would be protected.
UAS allow to follow a different approach since there are no humans on board and, therefore, the risk is
highly dependent on the area of operation (both ground and air risk should be taken into account).
Hence, the requirements and limitations can be defined using an operation-centric approach.
1.2.3. Problem tree30
The problem tree helps to better visualise the links between the drivers of the issues (green boxes), the
issues themselves (red boxes), and their consequences (yellow boxes).
The drivers are indeed the root causes of the issues, which in their turn have certain consequences.
The lines in the graph indicate the links between e.g. a driver and an issue, or an issue and its
consequence. The number of links between drivers/issues/consequences varies according to the
specific issue at stake.
The graph also includes a reference to the issues that are considered out of the scope of this RMT.
All the issues are linked to the core issue, which is the ‘lack of clarity of UAS boundaries’.
30
To ease visualisation, the issue of ‘disproportionate rules for special categories’ has been included under the core issue of lack of
clarity of UAS boundaries given the strong interlinkage between those two issues.
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Barriers to the market,
Ground risk (accidents/ Air risk (collision risk,
Violation of privacy, burden for industry,
incidents involving air proximity,
data protection, locked potential for
persons on the ground accidents and incidents
security innovation and
or sensitive areas) with manned aircraft)
development
Focus:
open Lack of clarity of
and UAS boundaries
specific (open and specific
category including special
categories such as
model and privately
built)
Need for
registration and
Lack of protection of identification
sensitive areas (e.g. Inadequate Lack of airspace
Inadequate
aerodromes, nuclear technical classification and of
competences of
plants, densely requirements rules for low-level
remote pilots
populated areas) operations
Out of scope:
1) insurance; 2) certified category; 3)
state or military operations; 4) indoor
operations; 5) counter-UAS equipment
and operations
New actors
compared to
manned aviation and
different uses
(commercial/leisure)
Aspects not covered in detail:
security, data protection, privacy aspects,
cybersecurity Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market
Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market
requirements
Graph 8 — Problem tree
—
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1.2.3.1. Drivers
Three issue drivers have been identified and analysed in this IA. These drivers are the main causes of
the issues identified and detailed in the following sections. They should be kept in mind when
considering the different options in order to understand to what extent the options represent solutions
to the issues and therefore to the drivers as well. The drivers of the issues are the following:
— the need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements;
— new actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure); and
— rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market.
1.2.3.1.1 Driver 1 — Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements
As explained above, the fragmented regulatory framework for UAS at EU level leads to a lack of clarity
and inconsistencies of rules across MSs, hampering cross-border UAS operations. ‘Cross-border’ refers
both to a UAS flying across the border and to the operation of a UAS in multiple MSs. The fragmented
rules create a substantial burden for operators and manufacturers, who need to be aware of, and
eventually comply with different national rules, by adapting their product to those national rules.
Many stakeholders confirmed that they operate in several MSs for commercial and non-commercial
purposes, which makes the need for harmonised EU rules even more urgent. Indeed, the replies
received on the questionnaire for operators31 showed the need or interest to operate in different MSs
both for business and leisure. See also Graph No 8 below:
Operating in several countries?
Y, 18
N, 34
Graph 9. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Several stakeholders expressed the importance of having EU rules: ‘it will be necessary in the future to
define common policies/guidelines so that the NAAs’ responses be coherent across Europe’. A
stakeholder from a training school stated that their country lacks detailed guidelines, which creates
confusion, the regulatory framework has several gaps, and the national authority did not deal at best
with UAS.
31
Further details on the questionnaire (e.g. number of respondents) are included in Section 1.1.6. ‘EASA consultation strategy’.
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With regard to the need for EU requirements, the EU citizens’ concern that the UAS development may
pose a risk to their security and fundamental rights (e.g. protection of personal data, privacy) should
also be taken into account.
In order to address this concern, the UAS legal framework should contribute to addressing the security
threat and support the enforcement of the existing privacy and data protection legislation.
1.2.3.1.2 Driver 2 — New actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure)
Another main driver of the issues is the fact that UAS operators and manufacturers are in often new
actors in the aviation market. Manufacturers develop UAS with automatic features that assist the
remote pilot in conducting the flight, not requiring the remote pilot to have special skills, and that
allow the remote pilot to concentrate on managing the payload. In some cases, the UA may even
automatically follow the remote pilot or track persons or objects. Therefore, the remote pilot could be
interested not primarily in flying the UA but in its image-recording capabilities for the aerial imagery
and other uses, and, therefore, in operating these products in a wide variety of locations.
This wider public interest makes drones rapidly proliferate, while the remote pilots have, on average,
less awareness of the aviation safety culture, as well as a lower level of competences than the model
aircraft community. Consequently, these newcomers are deemed to present a higher risk for sensitive
areas and zones. Compared to manned aviation:
— many remote pilots do not have sufficient skills/competences for the aviation world;
— the spectrum of UAS uses is very broad; and
— the risk of remote pilots showing reckless behaviour is higher.
1.2.3.1.3 Driver 3 — Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market
The UAS market is expected to boom over the next years as the UAS technology will evolve. Regulation
(EU) 201X/XXX needs to be drafted in a way that will not impede innovation in the following areas:
— development of new characteristics or functions of UAS;
— enhancement of already existing features (e.g. geofencing, auto-return); and
— development of new types of UAS operations and/or openings for new users.
Furthermore, the outcome of a high-level conference held in Poland was the ‘Warsaw Declaration’32
urging for further development of the significant potential of the UAS services in order to support EU’s
competitiveness and global leadership. It ‘called for a swift development of a UAS ecosystem that is
simple to use, affordable, commercially and operationally friendly, yet capable of addressing all
societal concerns such as safety, security, privacy and environmental protection’. It also ‘welcomed the
progress being made towards a flexible framework of safety regulation at EU level based on the
operation centric approach …’.
Therefore, it is important that UAS legislation is future-proofed adapting to fast-developing
technologies, and takes at the same time into consideration the key principle of guaranteeing safety,
32
‘WARSAW DECLARATION “Drones as a leverage for jobs and new business opportunities” Warsaw - 24 November 2016’.
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addressing also economic, environmental and social concerns, including the societal acceptance of
critical technological advancements.
An important aspect that affects this driver is the development of a traffic management system for
low-level UAS operations, referred to as unmanned aircraft traffic management (UTM) or U-Space (see
Section 1.2.4.4 ‘Issue 4 — Lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations’).
1.2.3.2. Issues
The problem tree shows the three drivers behind the issues listed below and analysed further in
dedicated sections. The list of issues is the result of brainstorming activity in EASA and has been
confirmed by the expert group:
— lack of clarity and non-harmonised definition of categories of UAS boundaries (within the open,
and across the open and specific category);
— lack of protection of sensitive areas;
— inadequate technical requirements;
— lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations;
— inadequate competences of remote pilots; and
— need for registration and identification.
1.2.3.3. Consequences
The aforementioned issues have four consequences:
— ground risk (accidents/Incidents involving persons on the ground or sensitive areas;
— air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft);
— violation of privacy, data protection, security; and
— barriers to the market, burden for industry, locked potential for innovation and development.
1.2.3.3.1 Ground risk (accidents/incidents involving persons on the ground or sensitive areas)33
The ground risk involves the probability of a UAS crashing into persons or property on the ground
causing injuries/fatalities or damage. The risk is highly dependent on the area overflown, in terms of
population density, or presence of properties and sensitive areas.
The risk is normally higher in urban environments not only due to the higher population density but
also the presence of obstacles during navigation (e.g. buildings, barriers, etc.).
Assessing the ground risk is a relatively new topic for the aviation community that was so far focused
on protecting the aircraft and its occupants. Such a shift in perspective can be addressed through an
operation-centric approach.
33
Further data are included in Section 1.2.7 ‘Safety risk assessment’.
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1.2.3.3.2 Air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft)29
The exponential increase in the number of UAS in the airspace raises concerns about an increased risk
of mid-air collisions with manned aircraft, and occurrences resulting in collision avoidance manoeuvres
seriously affecting traffic management. Even light UAS may cause serious incidents or accidents.
Several research projects are ongoing to better determine the consequences of a UAS collision with
various parts of a manned aircraft, such as cockpit windows, rotorcraft transmission, engines, as well
as leading edges of wings and empennages.
1.2.3.3.3 Violation of privacy, data protection, and security
Due to sensors and cameras becoming smaller and smaller, and batteries having an increasing life
duration, especially small UAS equipped with a high resolution camera are potentially more and more
intrusive as regards citizens’ privacy. Densely populated areas might suffer more from such a
phenomenon, which increases the risk of violation of privacy and data protection.
Opinion 01/2015 on Privacy and Data Protection Issues relating to the Utilisation of Drones34,
highlighted the following two elements:
— the Importance of focusing on the large-scale deployment of drone and sensor technology that
could create challenges for individuals’ privacy and civil and political liberties; and
— privacy risks with respect to processing of data, e.g. due to the difficulty to identify the UAS, its
data processing equipment on-board, for what purpose personal data are being collected, and
by whom.
Moreover, the UAS technology creates a potential security risk. The evolution of the geopolitical
environment and the recent terrorist attacks have led citizens to consider UAS as a new potential
threat to security in Europe.
In that context, the following incidents or minor attacks involving UAS misuse were recorded in the
past35:
— in 2011, a physics graduate student from Massachusetts was arrested for planning a terrorist
attack on the Pentagon and the US Capitol using a UAS;
— in 2014, UAS were flying simultaneously over several nuclear power plants in France;
— in 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified a man plotting an attack to a school
with UAS-like toy aircraft carrying bombs; and
— on 22 April 2015, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) landed on the office of Japan’s Prime
Minister in Tokyo carrying a small amount of radioactive material.
The probability that UAS (even simple consumer drones) could be used by terrorists has increased
drastically over the recent years. Hostile use of UAS could consist in attacks with improvised explosive
34
Published by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, an independent European advisory body with representatives from all
national data-protection authorities, on 16 June 2015
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2015/wp231_en.pdf).
35
Larcher M., Valsamos G., Solomos G., JRC98222 ‘Misuse of drones by terrorists as a new threat’, Ispra (Italy), European
Commission, 2016.
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devices (IEDs), chemicals, or using an intelligence-gathering system (intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR)). There are UAS available today on the market that are capable of carrying an
explosive payload equivalent to a pipe bomb of 1-4 kg or a suicide vest of 4-10 kg. Many more types of
UAS could be modified using readily available components to increase their stated payload capacity.
According to a recent risk assessment study36, the threat from terrorist organisations and insurgent
groups using UAS is high.
Some MSs, for example France, have already adopted related legislation consisting of technical
requirements on UAS in order to address this issue.
1.2.3.3.4 Barriers to the market, burden for industry, locked potential for innovation and development
Non-harmonised and/or rigid and too prescriptive UAS rules might create barriers to the market,
especially for SMEs. This implies the following:
— high investment for companies in order to adapt their products to the various regulatory
systems of the MSs;
— burden for companies required to comply with different technical requirements;
— eventually, a reduction in the amount spent on research and development; and
— a combination of the above that could prevent from advancing solutions that would improve the
level of safety or help to develop new markets.
Barriers to the UAS producers could also have negative consequences for all the actors in the UAS
services market.
1.2.4. Detailed analysis of the issues
1.2.4.1. Issue 1 — Lack of clarity and non-harmonised definition of categories of UAS boundaries (within the
open, and across the open and specific category)
1.2.4.1.1 Drivers
The main drivers of this issue are the following:
— the need for harmonised EU UAS market requirements and for cross-border UAS operations; and
— rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market, which requires a clear
definition of boundaries that fit the fast-developing market.
1.2.4.1.2 Description
As already explained above, the regulation of operations of UAS with an MTOM of less than 150 kg
currently falls within the MSs’ competence, which creates a fragmented regulatory framework. In that
context, the use of UAS promises to expand in the most disparate fields of application due to the
convergence and rapid evolution of key technologies. Consequently, the regulatory framework must:
36
HOSTILE DRONES: January 2016 THE HOSTILE USE OF DRONES BY NON-STATE ACTORS AGAINST BRITISH TARGETS, January 2016
(http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hostile-use-of-drones-report_open-briefing.pdf).
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1. Problem definition
— define a categorisation such that UAS operations with limited or no risk are allowed without
unnecessary authorisation; and
— be proportionate to the risk related to the operation; in particular, ground and air risk must be
proportionate to:
the MTOM or kinetic energy of the UA and its size;
the area/airspace in which the operation takes place (population density, presence of
manned aircraft traffic, distance from airports, etc.);
the operational limitations;
the competence of the remote pilot; and
any technical requirements for the UA.
The UAS categorisation issue is therefore the first issue to address since it is linked to all other issues
(see also Graph No 7 — Problem tree, p. 23). In particular, the following boundaries need to be
defined:
— an MTOM limit of 25 kg between the open and specific category, which corresponds to the one
already defined by several MSs; and
— various limits for the subcategories of the open category.
This categorisation (distinction between the open, specific and certified category, including the
subcategorisation of the open category) should maintain an acceptable level of risk across
categories/subcategories, while covering UAS operations and market segments to the greatest extent
possible.
To mitigate the risk of mid-air collision with manned aircraft, VLOS remains the fundamental means
until the U-Space is developed. U-Space will allow UAS to safely use airspace used by manned aircraft
on a regular basis, and will rely on a proper mix of technologies (such as electronic identification and
geo-limitation or geofencing, but possibly also detect and avoid (DAA) and/or cellular-network
technology).
The risk is proportionate to the kinetic energy of the UAS (the MTOM value is used as a proxy),
therefore, the requirement enforcing height limits should be defined in a proportionate way. Also for
the ground risk, the technical requirements should be customised to the operation (i.e. designed to
limit injury inflicted by blades or injury to people hit by a UAS). Injury criteria such as the abbreviated
injury scale (AIS) or the kinetic energy transferred to a human body through the UAS operation could
be used for categorisation. Compared to MTOM, the AIS methodology is more complex and entails
elaborate testing; on the other hand, it may be more flexible for manufacturers. More details are
provided in Appendix II37 and VI.
Boundaries based only on MTOM are not proportionate since some categories have specificities, for
example small toys and/or nano-UAS, which are both very light, but have very different performance.
37
Appendix II includes an EASA paper on the rationale behind MTOM and energy thresholds identified with regard to the danger
posed by blunt-trauma injury (non-penetrating injury) to people hit by a UAS.
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1. Problem definition
1.2.4.1.3 Background
As explained in Section 1.1.5, the current EU regulatory framework is highly fragmented.
Some MSs have defined their regulation in more details and developed scenarios for authorising
specific operations. Italy and France developed sample scenarios defining limitations for:
— overflown areas (e.g. urban areas, not over uninvolved people); and
— MTOM, height, speed, minimum distance from people, technical requirements (e.g. loss-of-data-
link recovery), and remote-pilot competence.
1.2.4.1.4 Consequences
The main consequence of this issue is the creation of barriers to economic development. Operators
willing to operate in different MSs need to comply with different technical requirements and
operational limitations, as well as understand and apply different rules and administrative processes.
This would lock the potential for further innovation in the domain of UAS technologies and operations.
Secondarily, non-harmonised EU regulation may not ensure the same level of safety.
1.2.4.1.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
If there is no clear definition of categories at EU level, the current situation might evolve as follows:
Manufacturers would need to comply with different technical requirements imposed by different MSs.
The UAS market would remain fragmented, and the cost for UA would increase.
This would seriously inhibit small manufacturers and operators from growing and investing in research
and development.
Operations would be performed at different levels of safety in different MSs, and this may give an
economic edge to some MSs with respect to others where the NAA is less restrictive (e.g. less
requirements that could facilitate the placement of products on the market).
Operators would also face barriers within the EU internal market due to the lack of mutual recognition
of authorisations, as well as the need to invest time and bear the administrative burden in order to
comply with the various national rules.
This could negatively impact the competitiveness of companies across MSs, leading to the difficulties
of having economies of scale due to the various obstacles in several markets.
Furthermore, the risk of having prescriptive, rigid and disproportionate rules in some MSs would
remain, which would lock the potential of the EU UAS market, including its related services.
1.2.4.2. Issue 2 — Lack of protection of sensitive areas
1.2.4.2.1 Drivers
The issue of requiring restricted airspace areas/special zones where UAS operations are limited or
prohibited is driven by a combination of factors, the main of which are the following:
Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements
The current MS rules on the protection of sensitive areas do not cover all types of those areas and are
non-harmonised across the different MSs.
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The regulatory gap in the protection of sensitive areas and zones creates evident safety and security
risks. Besides, the lack of harmonisation may have a significant impact on operators wishing to operate
in more than one MS, as well as on manufacturers, which may have to comply with different technical
requirements across the EU.
New actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure)
The presence of new actors, as discussed in Section 1.2.2.2.2, creates a potential treat of having
operators that are not familiar with the risks linked to flying an aircraft. In that respect, it is required to
protect sensitive areas.
Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market
A sensitive area can be protected using different technologies. The regulator should define rules in a
performance-based way to allow industry to improve its technology in order to meet the
requirements. This impacts the protection of sensitive areas and zones as the future state of the art,
even in the short-medium term, cannot be predicted due to the rapid evolution of both technology and
market. Consequently, the ability to plan for efficient and relatively future-proof protection strategies
is limited.
1.2.4.2.2 Description
Even small UAS may be equipped with advanced features that allow the user to operate the UAS out of
their VLOS, relying on the guidance and navigation control system of the UA, which usually provides
self-stabilisation and some automated functions.
Those performance capabilities, coupled with the installation of cameras or other sensors, which are
becoming more and more advanced and cost-effective, make these small UAS very attractive for both
commercial and non-commercial operations; this explains also their fast proliferation.
Even if the vast majority of UAS are expected to be safely operated by responsible operators, there are
some areas (e.g. protection of aerodromes and their associated airspace, critical infrastructure,
prisons, military facilities, densely populated areas or assemblies of people in outdoor events, concerts,
demonstrations, etc.) where uncontrolled access for UA has the potential to create severe safety,
privacy, data protection and security hazards.
Consequently, mitigation measures need to be taken to reduce the risk of intentional or unintentional
loss of control to an acceptable level.
The following elements can contribute to the protection of areas:
— UAS operators having up-to-date, accurate and easily understandable limitations information
that helps them to identify restrictions or requirements in effect at the location where they wish
to operate. Alone the provision of this information might substantially reduce unintended
infringements of those limitations. UAS operators can have such information in a more
convenient manner, by integrating it into the remote-pilot station or by making it accessible
through a stand-alone portable application device (several initiatives, as well as products based
on applications for tablets or smartphones, already exist).
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1. Problem definition
MSs are responsible for identifying sensitive areas, defining the level of required protection, and
providing up-to-date and verified information on those areas. Some of the MSs and others
outside Europe already provide such information via websites or applications.38
— Geofencing and automatic performance limitations of UAS or advisory system:
This function requires position determination (e.g. using a global navigation satellite system
(GNSS) or other means), a database of geo-limitation data, and control functions in order to
comply with any restrictions on the time and location of UAS operation. When the UA takes off
from, or approaches to, a zone subject to UAS restrictions, the remote pilot may receive an
advisory or the UAS itself may be designed not to exceed those limitations.
A number of consumer UAS are already equipped with some ‘geofencing’ and
positioning-related performance limitation capabilities39. However, it should be noted that
although technology enabling geofencing and performance limitation features already exists,
there are still a number of shortcomings in the effective implementation of these functions. In
particular, there is a lack of standards and validated data to feed these functions.
In addition, not all UAS can be fitted with such technology since they need to be equipped with a
flight control system, which in some cases, considerably increases the cost or is unfeasible with
the type of operations (e.g. model aircraft).
As mentioned above, there is currently a lack of standards applicable to positioning limitations for UAS
operations. Some standardisation aspects are the following:
— terminology and concepts;
— sensitive areas/zones: categories and main characteristics (e.g. two-dimensional
(2D)/three-dimensional (3D) definition, shapes, associated zone requirements, etc.);
— limitations data generation and management (e.g. digital-data format and quality requirements
for aeronautical and non-aeronautical limitations, geographical reference system, data
presentation and symbology, data update procedures, data service provision to operators, etc.);
— geographical and performance limitation functions (i.e. geofencing, performance limitation
functions); and
— architectures and supporting technologies, compliance with performance requirements
(including safety and security), etc.
Data on the current geo-limitation40 solutions available has been gathered via the questionnaire for
manufacturers.
38
For example France (https://www.geoportail.gouv.fr/donnees/restrictions-pour-drones-de-loisir), the Netherlands
(https://kadata.kadaster.nl/dronekaart/), and the USA (https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/).
39
Some manufacturers consider geofencing as the set-up of a cylinder resulting from the combination of limitations in distance of the
UA to the control station and UA height, which could be considered as more of a performance limitation function related to
positioning.
40
Means of implementing geographical and/or performance limitations.
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1. Problem definition
Have you developed geo-limitation functions?
5
6
No Yes
Graph 10. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
UAS manufacturers questionnaire
Which technologies are used (e.g. sensors, software functionalities, user interface (UI) and setting
capabilities)?
— Airspace and ground mapping databases for specific MSs with designated geofenced zones accessible via
the UAS. This system is already embedded in the latest UAS chipset generation, for example to geofence
UK prisons.
— Software functionality and UI.
— The geo-limitation is based on the position estimation of the UAS and the remote pilot. Position
estimation is based on GNSS technologies for the UAS, whereas for the remote pilot, a phone positioning
system may also be used. For altitude pressure, sensors are used.
— Live data feed via internet for airspace information. GNSS for aircraft position. Smartphone applications
for UI. Data link for user account verification and authorisation. Combination of hard-coded no-fly zones
and live airspace information to create actual geo-limitation zones. Data link between aircraft and
controller for UI interaction with geo limitation zones that can be self-authorised.
What main challenges do you foresee when implementing these geo-limitation functions in your products?
— Build a harmonised database at EU level.
— Define minimum operational performance standards for a geofencing system.
— A worldwide standard for accurate maps (still missing) is needed.
— What is a no-fly zone? How to unlock the limitation? Who unlocks the limitation?
— The main challenge is that the UAS manufacturer cannot guarantee geo-limitation in all conditions.
Geo-limitation requires several elements which can be missing, damaged, or spoofed, for which the UAS
manufacturer is not liable. The remote pilot is ultimately responsible for flying safely.
‘Anti-UAS’ solutions
An increasing number of solutions are proposed to detect an intruder UAS in a sensitive zone and to
disable it by various means, such as jamming or spoofing the UAS (e.g. their command and control (C2)
link and/or GNSS signal), capturing in flight the UAS (e.g. via nets carried by another UAS or using ‘UAS
falconry’ with large predatory birds), or destroying it (e.g. using firearms, electromagnetic pulse, lasers,
etc.).
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It should be noted that there are already plans to install ‘anti-UAS’ solutions in a number of
aerodromes worldwide. However jamming, and even more spoofing, may disturb aircraft avionics and
communications (CNS) systems, and thus impair aviation safety. The installation of ‘anti-UAS’ systems
near airports needs therefore careful consideration.
None of these systems have been considered in the rule text of the NPA (see sub-NPA 2017-05 (A)).
Link of lack of protection of sensitive areas with other issues
The lack of protection of sensitive areas is linked with some of the issues highlighted through the
definition of the boundaries. More precisely:
Inadequate remote-pilot competences
As already described in Section 1.2.3.5, the remote-pilot competencies of typical users of small UAS
operating under the open category are currently deemed inadequate to ensure compliance with the
requirements for protecting sensitive areas and zones.
Inadequate technical requirements
As previously explained, UAS technology is rapidly evolving, not only making small UAS more capable
and easier to use, but also enabling the remote pilot to easily enter sensitive areas and zones. As
indicated in Section 1.2.3.3, solutions like geofencing may effectively assist the user in complying with
the protection limitations; however, such solutions could be made cost effective by limiting the scope
of the requirement and by providing a period to comply.
Registration and identification
The possibility to identify the UA is another means of guaranteeing that those aircraft do not operate
in unauthorised areas.
There are not yet solutions in place in the civil market, but several initiatives are underway41. As for
geographical and performance limitations, no standards are currently available and those need to be
developed.
Lack of airspace classification and rules for low-level operations
Both geographical and performance limitations and in-flight identification are expected to be part of
the functions and services of a future UTM or U-Space system that enables safe operations of UAS in
very-low-level (VLL)42 airspace.
Therefore, a trade-off should be considered between the above issues in order to establish
requirements to effectively protect sensitive areas and zones, while respecting the principle of
proportionality.
41
For example, in France (Fédération Professionnelle du Drone Civil (FPDC) working group) and in Italy to comply with their national
requirements.
42
In this context, VLL refers to the portion of airspace below the minimum height allowed for visual flight rules (VFR) flights (typically
500 ft).
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1.2.4.2.3 Background
At EU level, the current protection of sensitive areas from an air operations perspective (in particular,
through the definition of restricted and prohibited areas) is addressed in the SERA Regulation43.
However, UAS operations and, more particularly, those conducted at VLL have specific challenges that
need specific requirements. In particular, sensitive areas to be protected from UAS operations might
be required for reasons other than safety. MSs are already considering to mandate geographical and
performance limitation functionalities, and are developing and publishing online their limitations for
the protection of sensitive areas44.
The following is a graphic representation of geo-limitations across MSs:
Are there geo-limitations defined in your country?
7 7
2
yes no reply no
Graph 11. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
In the NAAs questionnaire, detailed questions were posed on the estimated resources (full-time
equivalent (FTE)) for the definition of maps and the update of zones:
Definition of maps — FTE Updates of geo-limitations/maps — FTE
5 1.5
4
1
3
2
0.5
1
0 0
EE DK LT NO EE DK LT NO
Graph 12. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
43
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and
operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU)
No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU)
No 255/2010 (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493482858499&uri=CELEX:02012R0923-20160818).
44
For instance, see the Swiss as well as the French website, respectively:
— https://map.geo.admin.ch/?topic=aviation&bgLayer=ch.swisstopo.swissimage&layers=ch.bazl.luftfahrthindernis,ch.bafu.schutz
gebiete-aulav_jagdbanngebiete,ch.bafu.bundesinventare-vogelreservate,ch.bafu.bundesinventare-
jagdbanngebiete,ch.bazl.einschraenkungen-drohnen&lang=en&layers_opacity=1,0.75,0.75,0.75,0.6&catalogNodes=1379; and
— http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/drones-loisir-et-competition.
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1.2.4.2.4 Consequences
The consequences of the violation of sensitive areas depend on the nature of these areas:
— Air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft): a lack of
protection of aerodromes and their related airspace might lead to conflicts with other airspace
users, with the potential consequence of collision. The highest concern is about air transport
operations and, consequently, operations related to aerodrome areas (with particular emphasis
on major aerodromes) and, more generally, UAS operations taking place in the whole airspace
where manned aircraft operate.
— Ground risk: a lack of protection of densely populated areas or where critical infrastructure is
located might lead to a risk on the ground in the event of loss of control of the UA. This risk
includes areas requiring protection due to their recognised natural, ecological and/or cultural
values. Access to those areas might be linked to the risk of the operation depending on the
categorisation.
— Violation of privacy, data protection, security: there is a wide variety of areas and facilities that
are considered security-sensitive by MSs due to their particular nature (e.g. governmental,
including military and law enforcement, facilities and areas, prisons, etc.).
1.2.4.2.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
In case no action is taken at EU level, it is expected that MSs will continue developing their national
regulatory framework for the protection of sensitive areas and zones under their territory.
This is likely to further fragment MS legislation across the EU, having an adverse impact on the EU
market. Manufacturers will be required to develop different technical solutions to comply with the
national requirements, and operators would need to understand and comply with the national
regulations. Furthermore, it would not be ensured that sensitive areas are sufficiently protected
against UAS at EU level.
1.2.4.3. Issue 3 — Inadequate technical requirements
1.2.4.3.1 Drivers
The drivers of this issue are the following:
Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements
Different technical requirements in MSs impede the creation of a common UAS market and inhibit
operators from conducting operations in different MSs.
Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market
Technical requirements need to be performance-based in order to adapt to the fast-evolving UAS
technologies.
1.2.4.3.2 Description
Technical requirements are one of the main elements that can be used to achieve proportionality. Due
to the rapidly evolving technology, UAS regulation should follow a performance-based approach to
prevent obsoleteness. Therefore, the aim is to find the right balance of technical requirements.
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EU technical requirements might help mitigate the safety risk (both air and ground collision), even
though nowadays there is a lack of information on how this can be achieved. As for the other issues of
the analysis, each MS adopted a different approach.
The following is a list of the most common technical requirements that might be used to mitigate the
inherent risk of UAS operation:
— Positioning limitations include both geographical limitations (defined using geographical
coordinates) and non-geographical limitations, based on the positioning of the UA, such as
height/altitude or range (see also Section 1.2.4.2).
— Flight control technology: UA sold on the market differ from classical model aircraft particularly
because the internal flight control loop is automatically addressed by the system, and the
remote pilot does not therefore need to have skills to stabilise the aircraft during flight.
— Energy limitation: it refers to limiting the kinetic energy transmitted by the UA during a collision.
In general, this may include the global energy level and/or the energy per unit of surface of the
impacted element (a person on the ground or another aircraft). This may leverage the use of
soft/absorbing materials, special designs that facilitate the detachment of UA parts during a
collision, blades protections, technologies that stop the rotors on impact, or any other
technology that industry may develop in the future.
— Collision avoidance: it refers to systems that help to steer the UA away from an upcoming
collision (with another aircraft but also with people or infrastructure on the ground). They may
either provide to the pilot a warnings in case of an imminent collision, or automatically steer the
UA away through flight controls. DAA technology is not yet mature for small UAS.
— Automatic take-off and landing system (ATOL): it refers to the UA taking off from, or landing on,
a desired spot without the need of remote pilot intervention. A study on ATOLs has been
commissioned by the European Defence Agency (EDA).
— Loss-of-data-link management: it refers to the UA automatically following a pre-established
behavioural pattern (e.g. auto-return home) when the data link connecting the control station to
the UA is interrupted. The preprogrammed behaviour may be set by the operator based on the
characteristics of the area of operation.
— Electronic identification: it refers to making available data about the UAS operator and the UAS
itself. Although this would address security concerns, safety might be indirectly positively
affected as a remote pilot would be discouraged to show inappropriate behaviour knowing that
identification by the authorities is possible.
1.2.4.3.3 Background
The proposal for the new Basic Regulation includes the essential requirements for UAS in Annex IX,
authorising operations in the EU airspace. Especially for the open category, said Regulation introduces
the possibility to use Regulation (EC) No 765/200845 on the marketing of products (e.g. UAS), allowing
45
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for
accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L
218, 13.8.2008, p. 30) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493654158057&uri=CELEX:02008R0765-20080813).
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manufacturers to apply market product regulation processes to demonstrate compliance with the EU
requirements.
One important aspect of any market product legislation is the selection by the regulator of the
appropriate conformity assessment procedures (modules) that the manufacturer is required to comply
with. The module may range from a simple declaration of conformity submitted by the manufacturer
to a thorough verification by a notified body based on a full quality assurance provided by the
manufacturer and an assessment of the design made by a body notified by the MS. The selection of the
conformity assessment procedure depends on the type of product(s) and industry involved, the
complexity of the requirements, and the level of risk of the product(s).
In order to facilitate the implementation of the conformity assessment procedures, industry standards
may be developed under the responsibility of the European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs), such
as the Centre Européen de Normalisation (CEN), the Centre Européen de Normalisation for electrical
product (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI). ESOs may
cooperate with other Standardisation Bodies (e.g. European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
(EUROCAE), SAE, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), ASTM, etc.).
Privately built UAS and UAS with a CE marking, modified by a person other than the manufacturer, are
outside the scope of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008.
1.2.4.3.4 Consequences
The main consequences of this issue are the following:
— ground risk: risk of UA crashing due to technical failures;
— air risk: risk of losing control of the UA;
— violation of privacy, data protection, and security; and
— barriers to the market: prescriptive requirements could be obsolete due to rapidly evolving UAS
technologies.
1.2.4.3.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
If no action is taken, the number and extent of technical requirements would be different in each MS.
The way technical requirements would be drafted would have an impact on the market. Indeed, rigid
and disproportionate requirements could incur higher costs for manufacturers and, therefore,
negatively affect operators.
1.2.4.4. Issue 4 — Lack of airspace classification and of rules for low-level operations46
1.2.4.4.1 Drivers
The drivers of this issue are the following:
— Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market: the need to integrate the
UAS into the existing airspace structure is driven by the increasing number of UAS and the
subsequent potential for a higher number of occurrences.
46
This issue relates to the integration of UAS into the existing airspace structure and rules for low-level UAS operations.
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— Need for cross-border UAS operations: the aim is to provide clarity of the rules for UAS
operations across MSs.
1.2.4.4.2 Description and background
A strong increase of UAS activities and of the number of UAS in operation is forecast by the vast
majority of look-ahead studies. The SESAR outlook study, for example, envisages the following for
2035:
Figure 9 — Impact of UAS on airspace measured in flight hours and distances. Source: SESAR Outlook Study.
Figure 9 above shows very clearly the need to develop an ATM concept of operation (CONOPS) for the
integration of UAS into the airspace: the VLL airspace; the ‘classical’ airspace, and the very high level
(VHL) airspace (above flight level (FL) 600). The existing flight rules (VFR, IFR) were designed to
accommodate manned aviation and therefore they do not provide for effective mitigation against the
risks involved. Those rules may not be fully suit for the UAS operation for which a new approach should
be developed.
There is a need to provide both vertical and horizontal separation between:
— UAS and UAS;
— UAS and manned aircraft flying under IFR; and
— UAS and manned aircraft flying under VFR (this will be the case even if the UAS are not granted
access to controlled airspace since airspace infringements and conflicts will anyway be possible).
An ATM CONOPS could be defined as a basis for further development of airspace and ATM/ANS
requirements. Failure to meet the performance needed to support the ATM/ANS functions may lead to
the reduction of the capacity of that ATM system and to the need for an increased separation between
aircraft.
Consideration should be given to the level of protection that a given category of airspace users would
be entitled to. (commercial air transport (CAT), general aviation (GA), etc.).
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When defining the severity of the problem, the following aspects need to be considered:
— scale of risks to manned aviation (including CAT and GA);
— scale of risks to persons on the ground and to property; and
— risk of the current ATM/ANS technological and operational infrastructure not being able to
accommodate the increasing amount of airspace users.
EUROCONTROL has recently published a CONOPS47 addressing the entire airspace from VLL (below
500 ft) to VHL (above FL 600). Also ICAO is currently developing a CONOPS focusing on the operations
of certified UAS under international IFR.
The majority of UAS operations will be conducted at VLL especially in densely populated areas, where
risk levels will be increased. The use of UAS in all possible areas of the airspace highlights the critical
nature of ATM. UAS operations have the potential to account for the majority of total flight time across
the entire airspace.
In accordance with the Standardised European Rules of the Air (SERA), operations conducted below
150 m require a permission from the competent authority except when necessary for take-off or
landing. This means that even if less manned-aircraft operations are conducted in this layer of airspace,
this airspace cannot be considered as dedicated to UAS.
Subtask (SubT) 4 of this RMT.0230 will address the safe integration of UAS. Eventual amendments to
SERA should be done without reducing the safety level for other airspace users.
The next set of actions is to determine how UTM should be organised starting with the VLL as the UAS
traffic will be intense in certain areas (e.g. cities where the delivery of goods by UAS is expected to
develop fast). There are several ongoing activities to define such UTM around the world: in the USA,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) have established a partnership to progress the matter. They set up a Global UTM Association
(GUTMA) that recently published a CONOPS. UTM generates particular interest among the classical air
navigation service providers (ANSPs) as well as mobile telecommunication service providers.
SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU) and the Commission with the cooperation of EASA have set up an
activity to integrate UAS into the ATM Master Plan, by creating an addendum to this Plan, the
‘U-space’. This addendum should be adopted by the end of 2017.
The first draft of the U-Space (the ‘blueprint’) was presented by the Directorate General (DG) Move of
the European Commission at a workshop held on 20 April 2017 in the Hague, and has the following
characteristics:
— it is a set of services not linked to a specific part of the airspace, delivered by a set of providers;
— it relies on a high level of digitalisation and automation of functions;
— it is able to support commercial or non-commercial UAS operations in all operating
environments and in all types of airspace;
47
Available at: http://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-rpas-atm-concept-operations-conops.
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— it provides an extensive and scalable range of services, including the following three
fundamental ones: electronic registration, electronic identification, and geofencing; and
— it follows a stepped approach.
More specifically:
U1: the U-Space fundamental services provide electronic registration, electronic
identification, and geofencing.
U2: the U-Space initial services support the management of UAS operations and may
include flight planning, flight approval, tracking, airspace dynamic information, as well as
procedural interfaces with air traffic control (ATC).
U3: the U-Space advanced services support more complex operations in densely
populated areas and may include capacity management and assistance in conflict
detection. Indeed, the availability of automated DAA functionalities, in addition to more
reliable means of communication, will lead to a significant increase of UAS operations in
all environments and may require a more robust framework.
U4: the U-Space full services, particularly services providing integrated interfaces with
manned aviation, support the full operational capability of U-Space and rely on a very high
level of automation, connectivity and digitalisation of both the UAS and the U-Space
system itself.
Between U-Space, which should be further developed, and this NPA there is strong interface. For the
first step of the U-Space implementation, the blueprint considers electronic registration, electronic
identification and geofencing as foundation services, which is consistent with this NPA’s proposal. For
the subsequent steps, a list of gaps/differences has been identified (see Section 7.1 ‘Differences
between the U-Space blueprint and the NPA’ of sub-NPA 2017-05 (A). These gaps /differences will be
addressed in cooperation with the European Commission and SJU and, taking into account comments
received during the NPA and blueprint consultations.
The set-up of the U-space will of course necessitate rulemaking activities and the associated
development of industry standards, e.g. concerning service providers or rules of the air. EASA is
currently discussing those issues with the European Commission and SJU to establish a road map.
That rulemaking will not only be of a technical nature but will also need to address funding issues.
The new ATM requirements might create the need for training of the affected personnel, thus
introducing additional costs.
Regarding manufacturers, they may have to invest in the development of new technologies.
As for authorities, they will have to be able to assess, validate or accept new equipment and
procedures, as well as exercise effective oversight. This will increase both workload and the associated
costs.
1.2.4.4.3 Consequences
Air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft): a lack of safe
integration of UAS into the airspace could lead to conflicts with other airspace users, such as collisions.
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1.2.4.4.4 Development of the issue if no action is taken
The growing number of UAS will create a hazard to air traffic, persons and property if not addressed
through appropriate mitigating measures. In the absence of those, UAS operations can be allowed only
in VLOS through airspace segregation, resulting in reduced airspace capacity in controlled airspace or
limited/denied access to uncontrolled airspace for other airspace users.
The absence of a European-wide approach would result in a non-harmonised implementation or
application of national rules of, having an impact on cross-border UAS operations and a potential
safety impact on the integration of UAS operations into the manned-aviation airspace due to the use of
different procedures and technology.
1.2.4.4.5 Expected impacts
Since the U-Space concept is still under development and considering that it will be addressed by the
various initiatives mentioned above, a more detailed analysis is not possible especially when any
changes to the existing rules or the creation of new legislation are still in progress.
Overall, the issue of the safe integration of UAS into the existing airspace structure calls for a global
holistic approach, as well as the need for action. As the U-Space is still under development, it is not
taken into consideration in the analysis of the proposed policy options and their respective impacts in
this NPA.
1.2.4.5. Issue 5 — Inadequate competences of remote pilots
1.2.4.5.1 Drivers
The main drivers of this issue are the following:
— Rapidly changing UAS technologies and fast-evolving UAS market: the new characteristics and
the evolution of UAS require UAS operators and remote pilots to have an adequate level of
knowledge, especially with regard to safety, security, and privacy issues.
— New actors compared to manned aviation and different uses (commercial/leisure): this is the
key driver of this issue. The lack of knowledge in the area of UAS is much more evident
compared to manned aviation as in many cases, the operators are non-experts or even minors.
— Need for cross-border UAS operations and for EU market requirements: this is an important
driver as without a clear and consistent EU framework for the regulation of competences in the
area of UAS operations, there might be regulatory gaps across MSs. In addition, in case of
cross-border operations, the operators would need to invest more (e.g. small operator applying
for a medical certificate in more than one MSs) in order to comply with various national rules.
1.2.4.5.2 Description
As UA become more and more popular, it is important for remote pilots to be aware of and comply
with the UAS regulations, and for UAS operators to receive adequate training, when relevant, and raise
their awareness. Attractive prices make UAS easily accessible to people with little or no understanding
of the aviation system.
Not knowing how to properly set up a UA for flight can be very dangerous. If a remote pilot does not
calibrate the UA correctly, or the UAS batteries are partially charged, serious problems might arise.
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Furthermore, an inexperienced remote pilot might not be fully aware of, and knowledgeable about,
the safety risks related to collision with manned aircraft, for instance.
Age limit
The main concern is not about the skills of minors probably considering UAS operations as playing
videogames, but about the high probability of young hobbyists not being able to properly assess the
risk. Many NAAs have set age limits on licenses for commercial UAS in their national legislation.
Training types
In many MSs, several types of training, both practical and theoretical, are provided by training schools.
Practical training could also be provided using a simulator, allowing the student to show their
behaviour in case of an emergency. This would help to raise the student’s awareness of possible risks
and further develop their decision-making skills.
In order to better understand the typology of training provided across MSs, and the related costs, a
questionnaire was sent to a group of training schools across the EU. The following survey results give
some information on the trainings already provided:
— several schools offer both classroom and online training;
— in many cases, schools offer both practical and theoretical training, often as two separate
modules;
— the length of the training course varies from some hours (e.g. 8-10) to several days (e.g. 4);
— in some cases, the fee for the final test is included in the general cost;
— as regards the practical part of the training course, there are differences across schools: in some
cases, a minimum of 30 missions (10 minutes each) dispersed over several days is required; and
— the syllabus varies in several cases.
Appendix III provides further information on the cost of training courses, as well as the authorities’ and
operators’ feedback on different training types.
Providing training has an important impact on authorities. Many authorities have already started
defining the remote pilots’ competences and the way they should be checked. In this regard,
authorities were requested to provide their feedback on the resources dedicated and/or planned to
dedicate to several tasks linked with training in the EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016 (see
Graph 13 below). The following is a graphical representation of the resources (FTEs) across MSs (each
column represents an MS) related to training;
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Set-up of exam procedure — FTEs Recurrent cost of examination — FTEs
1.2 5
1 4
0.8
3
0.6
2
0.4
0.2 1
0 0
EE DK LT NO UK DE IS CZ DK LT NO UK DE IS
48
Graph 13. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
This information is good evidence for quantifying the impacts of several options proposed in this IA.
Set-up of systems and syllabi for Updating the training programme
protection, security, privacy
1.2
1.6
1.4 1
1.2
0.8
1
0.8 0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2 0.2
0
0
EE DK LT NO DE
EE DK LT NO UK DE IS
Graph 14. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
1.2.4.5.3 Background
Looking at UAS legislation across MSs, it is evident that the approach taken by different MSs varies in
several aspects (training type, need for an examination and examination type, and age limit).
The Dronerules.eu website provides the related safety promotion activities (see Section 1.1.2.1.7).
Several manufacturers provide their products with leaflets containing general guidelines for users.
Following the consultation with the manufactures (communication via telephone), it was clarified that
48
With regard to Germany (DE): a total estimate of 3-4 FTEs covering various aspects of the training program. The following
assumption was made in that context:
— 1 FTE for the set-up of examination procedures;
— 1 FTE for the recurrent cost of examinations;
— 0.5 FTE for the set-up of the training system (and syllabus); and
— 0.5 FTE for the translation of the syllabus.
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the leaflets for many products are standardised across the EU; therefore, regulatory differences across
MSs were not taken into consideration.
1.2.4.5.4 Consequences
The following is a list of the consequences of this issue:
— Violation of privacy, data protection, security: the lack of adequate knowledge of the UAS use
might lead to the violation of privacy, data protection, and security.
— Ground risk: the lack of skills (e.g. how to regain control of a UAS or how to deal with emergency
situations), or the use of UAS in prohibited areas, as next to sensitive buildings, aerodromes,
nuclear plants, poses a significant safety risk.
— Air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft): some
occurrences included in the safety risk portfolio (see Section 1.2.7 ‘Safety risk assessment’) refer
to human factors; most of these occurrences took place at a height of more than 150 m bearing
a high risk for manned aviation.
1.2.4.5.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
The increase in UAS operations and the proliferation of inexperienced remote pilots could lead to an
increase of occurrences due to lack of competences if the issue is not appropriately addressed by all
MSs.
In addition, the strict requirements laid down by some MSs might imply high costs for operators (e.g.
training costs, examination costs) with a possible duplication of those costs in case of cross-border UAS
operations. For instance, the certificate of competence issued in an MS might not be accepted in
another one, thus negatively affecting operators.
1.2.4.6. Issue 6 — Need for registration and identification
1.2.4.6.1 Drivers
The main driver of this issue is the increasing number both of the new UAS users compared to manned
aviation and of the UA themselves, which poses a potential threat. Another driver of this issue is the
need for cross-border UAS operations. The operator should be able to operate all over the EU bearing
a single registration recognised by all MSs. The law enforcement authority should have access to the
UAS operator database to extract the operator’s information when needed. In that respect, the
identification requirements should also be harmonised across the MSs.
1.2.4.6.2 Description
Registration and identification are essential elements for law enforcement. In case a UA is operated in
a way that endangers persons or property on the ground or another aircraft, the law enforcement
authority should be able to identify the responsible person and impose sanctions.
Registration
The registration can also be considered as a deterrent, knowing that a possible misbehaviour could be
identified and prosecuted.
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This is applicable not only to safety risk but also to risk for privacy, data protection, and security. In
particular, security authorities could require that not only the UAS operators but also all UA are
registered in order to have a greater awareness of the situation.
Another benefit of registration is the possibility for the authorities to be linked with the operator and
provide safety information when needed. In any case, it should be borne in mind that operator and
remote pilot could be two different persons, but the operator is responsible for the activities of the
employed remote pilot.
There are many ways to build a database and collect information for the purpose of registration. Some
MSs have already set up registration systems, mostly online, but those systems are not coordinated
across MSs. Consequently, an operator would need to register anew, when required, in each MS it
intends to operate. Moreover, a fee is often required for registration.
Furthermore, MSs may require registration of both the operator and the aircraft. This implies that
every time the operator operates a new UAS, it needs to have it registered, and possibly pay a further
fee.
Additionally, it is important that the databases are kept up to date since the life of a UAS is typically
around 30 months. The UAS operator should be required to review and update its information (both
on itself and the UA) within a defined time frame.
The registry could be set up at MS or at EU level. The economic benefit of a database at EU level is
evident, but MSs have additional considerations related to security.
A survey conducted by EASA provides the following information on registration costs for authorities:
Number of FTEs to set up a registry Maintainance of the registry — FTEs
2.5
7
6 2
5 1.5
4
3 1
2
0.5
1
0 0
EE DK EL LT LV NO UK IS IT EE DK EL ES LT NO UK IS IT
Graph 15. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Identification
Identification can be made either by labelling the UA with a registration number or through a system
broadcasting flight data, the remote pilot’s data, and their position. For the latter case, several
technologies are being developed from a simple squitter to more sophisticated systems using the
mobile network. The mobile operator could act as the intermediary between the UAS operator and the
law enforcement authority.
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According to the EASA survey, some manufacturers already equip their UAS with an electronic
identification system.
Have you developed devices that allow Is the device a separate module that
identifying UAS? can be added to a legacy UAS?
Yes, 4
No , 2 Yes, 2
No, 7
Graph 16. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
There are some privacy concerns related to the UAS operator information transmitted via the internet.
The system could broadcast only the operator’s code so that only the law enforcement authority would
be able to identify the owner; the same system is used for number plates. The system could also be
integrated with the future U-Space providing information in a centralised manner.
1.2.4.6.3 Background
Some MSs may already have a clear mandate from the security authority to require registration and
electronic identification even for the lighter UAS (with an MTOM of more than 250 g). Other MSs are
discussing which is the cost-effective MTOM threshold considering the size of the payload to be
carried. MSs are also considering the availability on the market of UAS having a camera with a
resolution high enough to collect personal images from distance, or a sensor like a microphone, which
could create a privacy or data collection risk.
1.2.4.6.4 Consequences
The main consequences of this issue refer to the need of the law enforcement authority to identify a
UAS operator conducting an unlawful operation, with regard to:
— violation of privacy, data protection, security;
— ground risk (accidents/incidents involving persons on the ground or sensitive areas, e.g. chemical
plants);
— air risk (collision risk, air proximity, accidents and incidents with manned aircraft); and
— barriers to the market; this is also considered a consequence because of the following:
the possible prescriptive requirements that impede technology innovation; and
the burdensome requirements for (multiple) registration.
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1.2.4.6.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
Individual registration at MS level requires resources from both the MSs and the UAS operators. The
latter would need to have multiple registrations to operate in more than one MSs.
Furthermore, some MSs requirements for electronic identification and registration might not ensure
full protection against the safety and security risk.
1.2.4.7. Issue 7 — Disproportionate rules for special categories (privately built and model UAS)
1.2.4.7.1 Drivers
The main driver of this issue is that new technology allows to extend hobbyist flights to other types of
aircraft apart from classic models.
1.2.4.7.2 Description
Model flying is an activity with a long history. Many of the aviation pioneers developed their designs
based on tests conducted with models, and model aircraft remain an important element of aerospace
education. They range from ‘free-flight’ aircraft weighing little more than a gram up to complex
turbine-powered aircraft with an MTOM of 150 kg.
Model aircraft activities have a good safety record due to the safety culture developed by the model
clubs as well as national and international model aircraft associations.
UAS can be considered as an evolution of model aircraft. Modern technology can greatly assist remote
pilots, thus drastically reducing the skills required to operate a UAS. Almost anyone can operate a UAS
both for leisure or commercial purposes, however, the nature of the operation does not change the
risk posed to third parties. Model aircraft have therefore lost their monopoly on leisure flights with
remotely piloted aircraft.
A definition distinguishing between model aircraft and UAS cannot be easily developed also because
some model aircraft are equipped with some form of an assisted flight control system. On the other
hand, some model pilots argue that they would be reluctant to use such a technology assisting them in
flying the aircraft (e.g. a flight control system) since this would reduce their pleasure. However, this
technology is widely used in UAS since the remote pilot in that case is likely more interested in the
payload (e.g. a camera) than in flying the UA. Therefore, a definition of UAS, to differentiate them from
model aircraft, could be based on the presence of a flight control system that allows a UAS to fly in
BVLOS range.
This approach was rejected since it was considered that automation can also be integrated with model
aircraft to a certain extent. Moreover, the code of conduct developed by the model clubs and
associations is what contributes to the safety of hobbyist operations and not the type of aircraft used.
In most cases, model clubs and associations have operating procedures and they raise awareness, and
in some cases, they also provide their members with training, thus creating a safety framework.
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Do you have a published code of conduct
that members of your club must respect?
3
15
NO YES
Graph 17. Source: EASA model aircraft associations questionnaire 2017. Elaboration: EASA.
Another category of UAS to be considered are the ‘privately built’ ones, not available on the market
but built by individuals. The risk posed by these systems is that there are no means to ensure their
reliability. Although aircraft of this type are mostly operated by model clubs, there are hobbyist UAS
operators not willing to join model clubs and/or associations.
From the above, it is clear that model aircraft operators and new UAS operators have generally a
different starting point in terms of risk awareness and remote-pilot competences as many clubs publish
the code of conduct that their members must respect. Therefore, the main issue is how to find a
balanced and proportionate approach for special categories of UAS as model aircraft.
1.2.4.7.3 Background
Model aircraft
In some MSs, model aircraft operations are clearly defined and regulated by established model clubs
and associations, in accordance with the regulatory framework of their NAA. These national
regulations are mostly considered to be fit for purpose by both the remote pilots and their NAA. Based
on the replies provided by model aircraft associations, a total number of 1.5 million model aircraft
across the EU could be estimated.
A series of detailed questions were posed to model aircraft associations in order to better map the
situation. Graph 18 shows the importance of model aircraft, considering the high number of EU
operators.
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Does your country have detailed In your country, are model aircraft
regulation for model aircraft? activities limited to authorised
airfields?
NO, 6 YES, 4
YES, 12
NO, 14
Graph 18. Source: EASA model aircraft associations questionnaire 2017. Elaboration: EASA.
How many members do you have registered?
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Graph 19. Source: EASA model aircraft associations questionnaire 2017. Elaboration: EASA.
As regards the registration of model aircraft, the following comments were received, among others:
— all models have to carry the identification of the owner/pilot; and
— the models of club members are not registered; only models for competitions bear the license
number of the competitor.
Privately built UAS
According to the replies received on the EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2017, privately built UA are
used by many operators.
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Are you operating privately built models?
No, 23
Yes, 29
Graph 20. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2017. Elaboration: EASA.
Privately built models could be used also in model aircraft associations:
What is your estimate of the percentage of privately
built models that operate in your club/association?
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Graph 21. Source: EASA model aircraft associations questionnaire 2017. Elaboration: EASA.
1.2.4.7.4 Consequences
The main consequence of this issue is the barrier to the market. If model aircraft would be required to
comply with the same requirements mandated for UAS, they could be even prohibited or at least a
disproportionate burden could be imposed on them. For this reason, some special alleviations need to
be identified for this aircraft category.
1.2.4.7.5 Development of the issue if no action is taken
In case no regulatory action is taken at EU level and MSs keep their national regulation for model
aircraft, some MSs might require clubs and associations to comply with technical requirements,
altering the nature of model flights, or mandate operators to apply for an authorisation in order to
operate in the specific category, and carry out a risk assessment.
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A technical requirement, such as an auto-return function, would require the operator to equip the
aircraft with a flight control system that would change the way and philosophy a model aircraft is
conducted. In practice, this hobby would be prohibited.
On the other hand, the requirement for an authorisation for a model aircraft to be operated in the
specific category could be not proportionate considering the current satisfactory safety framework and
records of model clubs and associations.
In some MSs, operators might be obliged to be registered with a model club to operate their UAS. This
would not only represent an additional cost as they would have to pay a membership fee, but would
also restrict their operations within specific areas.
1.2.5. Conclusions
Chapter 1 contains a selection of information on the current UAS market, showing the importance of
the three main drivers of the seven issues analysed above. Tables and graphs help visualise the
following elements:
— the fast-evolving market in terms of UAS numbers and UAS uses in various sectors over the next
years (Driver 3);
— the new actors in the market, e.g. looking at the largest manufacturers (Driver 2); and
— the need for a UAS regulatory framework at EU level (Driver 1).
Moreover, it introduced all the key horizontal activities that are already ongoing, such as safety and
awareness promotion (e.g. DronesRules.eu). Under each of the seven issues analysed, information on
the current situation is presented (e.g. on existing technologies in Section 1.2.4.3 ‘Issue 3 —
Inadequate technical requirements’). All this clarifies the past and current situation in the EU, and
helps identify the potential for further action, e.g. towards expanding the UAS market, taking into
account safety. Additionally, information on the current initiatives at international level is provided,
which might directly or indirectly affect Europe (e.g. ICAO, JARUS, or third countries).
Furthermore, information on the current regulatory framework in several EASA MSs is offered. The
cross-MS analysis clarifies the high level of regulatory fragmentation at EU level, which might pose
obstacles for e.g. cross-border UAS operations.
Each issue description has been complemented by the results of the questionnaires sent to various
stakeholders. The feedback received not only helped to further analyse the problems but it is also
considered in the quantification of the impacts of the various options proposed in this IA (e.g. the
number of FTEs for specific tasks at authority level).
Lastly, the problem tree proposed helps visualise the overall rationale behind this IA.
In summary, this Chapter identified the key issues for which solutions (options) are proposed in
Chapters 3-6. A clear and in-depth view of those issues is necessary to define the objectives (Chapter 2)
and the options, as well as to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of these options in solving
the issues (Chapters 3-6).
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1. Problem definition
1.2.6. Who is affected?
General public: all EU citizens impacted by risks related to UAS operations, either as clients of UAS
services or UAS users for private purposes. UAS could support innovative services with a high potential
for welfare and new jobs; however, they pose a safety, security, and privacy risk.
UAS manufacturers: UAS manufacturers, including many SMEs and start-ups. Manufacturers
(especially SMEs) might be impacted by additional technical requirements in the regulatory framework.
Indeed, it could be very costly to implement those requirements. Furthermore, the limitations imposed
might have a negative effect on the operators’ demand for UAS, and therefore negatively impact the
manufacturers as well. This stakeholders’ category includes manufacturers of various UAS types, such
as toys and/or models.
UAS operators: commercial and non-commercial operators. They are also affected as they would have
to comply with requirements for training or operational limitations. All this could create a barrier to
some users.
MSs: (civil aviation, aviation, data protection, market, privacy or security authorities). Authorities
would need to deal with the demands and expectations of the growing UAS sector, develop
regulations, organise UAS licensing and oversight, check declarations and authorisations, issue
certificates, address registration issues, set up training for UAS operators and train their employees. In
addition, authorities would need to enforce public policy, with regard to safety, privacy, and security
matters. The authorities concerned are at local, national and EU level (EASA).
Economy: Many businesses may include the use of UAS in their business model. This could lead to
lower costs and/or innovative services. Typical examples are the agricultural, energy, and delivery
sector.
Airspace users: they are quite affected by UAS as shown by the number of UAS occurrences above a
certain altitude. The future definition of a UTM system will definitely affect them.
The UAS market includes a list of services with a high potential for development. The following is a
graphical representation of the importance of UAS from the service market point of view:
49
Figure 2. Source: presentation of the European Commission at the Warsaw conference .
49
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/high-level-conference-%E2%80%9Cdrones-leverage-jobs-and-new-business
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/1WelcomeVioletaBulc.pdf
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1. Problem definition
1.2.7. Safety risk assessment50
The analysis of RPAS (UAS) occurrences for the period 2010-2016, extracted from the European Central
Repository (ECR), identified 2141 occurrences of all severity levels. 38 occurrences had been classified
as accidents, none of the accidents involved fatalities, and there were only 4 minor injuries inflicted to
people on the ground. The collection of data on RPAS occurrences is in its infancy and there is still work
to be done to ensure the correct application of taxonomy terminology to RPAS. The definition of RPAS
accident has improved since new definitions were provided in ICAO Annex 13. However, the ECR data
covers a period before the ICAO definitions were published; therefore, the definition of accident may
not have been correctly captured in some of the older data.
Furthermore, the aforementioned data originate in most cases from pilot reports. When judging the
reliability of this information, the following should be taken into consideration:
— the difficulty in precisely identifying a small UAS at a distance (e.g. it could be some other object
similar to a UAS);
— the fact that many of the reports refer to high-altitude occurrences, therefore, focusing rather
on air risk and not on collision with persons on the ground;
— the lack of reporting, especially in those MSs where there is little experience in UAS occurrences;
and
— the lack of data, especially on occurrences with persons on the ground.
Figure 3 below shows that there has been a very significant increase in the number of occurrences in
2016. Nevertheless, the focus should be on the occurrence data themselves and their reliability.
RPAS occurrences per year
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 3 — Reported RPAS occurrences per year. Source: ECR.
50
Sources: EASA Annual Safety Review 2016 (https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications/annual-safety-review-2016),
Report: UAS Safety Risk Portfolio And analysis (https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Safety%20Analysis.pdf), and
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications/uas-safety-risk-portfolio-and-analysis.
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1. Problem definition
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of the reported occurrences among occurrence classes. Most of
them are considered to be incidents and the rest is spread over the other classes.
UAS accidents occur mainly when the UAS crashes and is severely damaged due to loss of control,
mechanical failure, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), or mid-air collision with another aircraft. The
most common serious incidents are near mid-air collisions. This incident type includes also loss of
control and loss of data link cases.
Occurrence classes for 2010-2016
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Accident Serious incident Incident Occurrence without
safety effect
Figure 4 — Occurrence classes for 2010-2016
Figure 5 below shows the distribution of reported occurrences in the ECR over the EASA MSs. Most of
the occurrences by far were reported in the UK. Figure 5 shows also the exponential growth in the
number of reports. It is also worth noting that all data originate from operators through their NAAs.
Data on ground risk involving flying at a low altitude in sensitive areas, like in proximity to nuclear
power plants, crowds and densely populated areas are not shown in Figure 5 and no record thereof is
available. It is likely that such information will continue to be unavailable in the near future as people
might not be willing to report such occurrences.
Figure 5 — Distribution of reported occurrences over the EASA MS (2010-2016).
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1. Problem definition
Among the occurrences shown in Figure 6 below, there were 38 accidents, the majority of which
resulted from the UAS crash due to technical reasons or loss of control. None of these occurrences
involved fatalities or major injuries.
Occurrence categories — ECR data for 2010-2016
MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of…
NAV: Navigation error
UNK: Unknown or undetermined
LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight
ATM: ATM/CNS
SCF-NP: System/component failure or…
SEC: Security related
SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction
ADRM: Aerodrome
LALT: Low altitude operations
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Figure 6 — Occurrence categories of the reported RPAS occurrences (2010-2016)
Figure 7 shows the ECR-reported occurrences as well as occurrences reported directly by operators
that have encoded altitude information. Estimation is based on reports’ narrative on how close the
drone was to the aircraft. Figure 7 shows the altitude at which the UAS was encountered vs the vertical
distance from the manned aircraft. As UAS are usually relatively small, they are mostly sighted when
they are quite close to, and flying in a similar altitude as, the manned aircraft; which implies that the
actual number of flying UAS is significantly higher. However, Figure 7 shows that the frequency of
sightings varies at different altitude levels (e.g. 0-1 000 ft vs 1 000-2 000 ft from the aircraft).
2500
Distance from aircraft to UASin ft
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Aircraft altitude in ft
400ft
Incidents Serious incidents Accidents
Figure 7 — Distribution of RPAS occurrences involving manned aircraft: actual aircraft altitude vs distance to the
UAS (2010-2016).
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1. Problem definition
The UAS Safety Risk Portfolio (SRP) has been updated with the currently available data from the ECR.
The number of non-fatal accidents is 33 for the period 2012-201651. The identified safety issues (in the
far left column) have been mapped on to relevant event types of the ECR taxonomy.
RPAS
Outcome Percentage of Fatal Accidents
0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
(2012-2016)
Outcome Percentage of Non-Fatal Accidents
33 91% 13% 10% 4% 2% 1%
(2012-2016)
Total number of occurrences in
Key Risk Areas (Outcomes)
2012-2016 per safety issue
Safety Issues
Other Terrain &
Serious Airborne Aircraft Engine Third Party
Incidents Accidents System Obstacle
Incidents Conflict Upset Failure Conflict
Failures Conflict
Operational
RPAS Proximity with Other Aircraft in
505 19 15 ● ● ● ●
Uncontrolled Airspace
RPAS Handling and Flight Path Management 9 0 11 ● ●
RPAS Infringement of Controlled Airspace 373 9 2 ● ● ●
Recognition and Recovery from Abnormal
2 0 2 ● ● ●
Attitudes
Technical
Failure of Propulsion System 27 2 14 ● ● ●
Failure of Guidance and Control System 21 2 7 ● ● ●
Failure of Power Sources 10 0 0 ● ● ●
Human
RPAS Operator Knowledge of Aviation
20 0 3 ● ● ●
System
Pre-Flight Planning and Prepration 16 0 3 ● ●
Maintenance/manufacturing 13 0 2 ● ● ● ●
Figure 8 — Extract from the Safety Risk Portfolio.
Note 1: the number of accidents should take into consideration the difference in severity between UAS accidents
(e.g. only UAS crash with no fatalities) and UAS accidents with manned aircraft (involving in several cases many
fatalities).
Note 2: there are few UAS occurrences caused by human factors. This could be explained by the fact that most of
the time, the related reports are sent by the manned-aircraft pilots, and only little information is provided by the
UAS remote pilots.
Further evidence on the risk of accidents/incidents in sensitive areas as aerodromes has already been
verified and mapped by some MSs. The following is a graphical representation provided by DFS
Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH:
51
This number of accidents (33) does not coincide with the number of accidents mentioned earlier in the text (38). This is because the
first number refers to accidents with UAS registered in EASA MSs. The difference is due to UAS that are not registered in one of the
MSs. In addition, the time frame considered is shorter (2012-2016). The SRP shown is the latest available draft; further updates will
be provided in the EASA Annual Safety Review to be published soon.
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1. Problem definition
58 interferences with UAS in 2016. 91 %
occurred in the area around aerodromes.
Graph 22 — Interferences with UAS in the area of aerodromes (2015/2016/2017). Source: Drohnen Report,
January 2017, DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH.
Positive aspects of UAS in terms of safety
The safety risk assessment focused, expectedly, on the risks posed by UAS. However, these risks should
not overshadow the fact that UAS can actually save lives by replacing manned aircraft or humans in
certain activities.
For example, a UAS used for filming (news or movies) will reduce the risk for victims in case of
accidents.
In addition, using a UAS for dangerous infrastructure inspection will release people from having to
climb up the structure, thus offering a potential for accident reduction.
Overall, using UAS for dangerous missions such as gathering data from a volcanic eruption or
chemical/radioactive leak will be beneficial for safety.
Finally, UAS can be deployed quite quickly in disaster areas and enhance the efficiency of the rescue
operations.
1.2.8. UAS in third countries
UAS legislation has been or is being developed in many countries outside the EU. Appendix V provides
a brief overview of some key elements of UAS legislation developed in selected non-EU countries.
1.2.9. UAS operations aspects not covered in detail and issues considered to be outside of the NPA scope
The security, privacy, and data protection risks are aspects not detailed in this IA; they will be
addressed both at MS and EU level. Nevertheless, some elements such as registration, electronic
identification or geofencing analysed in this document are also related to these aspects.
On the other hand, the following issues were considered to be out of the scope of this NPA:
— the certified UAS category;
— state and/or military UAS operations;
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1. Problem definition
— UAS insurance;
— indoor UAS operations; and
— counter-UAS equipment and operations.
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2. Objectives
2. Objectives
2.1. General objectives
The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. The general
objectives of this RMT are the following:
— ensure an operation-centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-based regulatory framework
for UAS;
— ensure a high and uniform level of safety for UAS operations;
— foster the development of the UAS market; and
— contribute to a high level of privacy, data protection, and security.
2.2. Specific objectives
The specific objectives of the this RMT are the following:
— ensure a high level of protection of sensitive areas (e.g. nuclear plants, aerodromes);
— develop proportionate technical requirements taking into consideration the safety risk and
rapidly changing UAS technologies;
— contribute to a system for low-level UAS operations;
— ensure a proportionate and adequate level of remote-pilot competences, taking into account the
new actors in the market (vs manned aviation);
— define a clear set of boundaries between the open and specific category, and among the open
subcategories;
— clarify to what extent registration and electronic identification are needed;
— develop a proportionate regulatory framework that takes into account special categories such as
model aircraft;
— harmonise the UAS regulation across MSs especially for cross-border UAS operations; and
— contribute to the development of an EU-wide UAS services market (Riga Declaration).
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3. Introduction on options
3. Introduction on options
Further to Chapter 1 ‘Problem definition’ (defining what the problem is) and Chapter 2 ‘Objectives’
(explaining what needs to be achieved), the following Chapter 4 describes ways to achieve the
objectives in order to solve the issues.
Three sets of options were developed in the following order:
— options for the open category;
— options for registration; and
— options for the specific category.
For all options, it was considered that they would enter into force 3 years after the publication of
Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX.
The options were developed taking into consideration the following sources:
— EASA expertise (several UAS experts);
— feedback collected via consultations (e.g. questionnaires, feedback on the ‘Prototype’
Regulation); and
— expert’s input received during the expert group meetings held on the EASA premises (Option O1,
for example, was proposed by those experts).
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4. Open category
4. Open category
4.1. Open-category options
As shown in the problem tree, the issue of subcategorisation in the open category is interlinked with
the other issues. Therefore, the open-category options were developed applying a holistic approach
that takes into account all different elements in order to mitigate the safety risk (both ground and air
risk), as well as to contribute to the mitigation of the privacy and security risk. Different options are
based on different combinations of technical requirements, operational limitations, and remote-pilot
competences, with the aim of finding the right balance that better meets the objectives of this IA. A
total of three options were analysed for the open category, as described in Table 3 below.
Before exploring each option separately, the following Graph 23 is included to illustrate the link
between the issues, objectives and options (e.g. the ‘intervention logic’):
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Ensure a high
level of
Lack of protection of Subcategories A1 Subcategories A2 Subcategories A2
protection of sensitive areas and A2 with and A3 with and A3 with
sensitive areas geofencing geofencing geofencing
Maximum height for C0
Maximum height for A0
and C1; Product
Develop Injury criteria and A1; Product
Directive, for C1 and C2,
proportionate Directive for A1, A2, and
Inadequate C3, and C4; Toy
technical A3; Toy Directive for A0;
technical Directive for C0; lost-
requirements lost-link management
requirements link management for
for A2 and A3; no single
C2; kinetic energy blade
failure for A3
protection for C1
Lack of airspace Develop a
Height limitation Height limitation Height limitation
classification and system for
at 120 m at 50/150 m at 50/120 m
of rules for low-level UAS
low-level operations
operations
Online training Online training
Ensure a Awareness for A0;
for Subcategory for Class C1, C3,
proportionate low competence
Specific A1 with a for A1; medium
and C4; certificate
Issues objectives
and sufficient for C2
level of theoretical competence for
Inadequate examination (for A2, A3, and A4
remote-pilot
remote-pilot A2, also practical
competences
competences examination
Define a clear set
3 boundaries 5 boundaries 4 boundaries
of boundaries
between the open
Lack of clarity
and specific
and
category
non-harmonised
definition of Develop a
Privately built and Privately built and Privately built and
categories of UAS proportionate
model aircraft in model aircraft for model aircraft for
boundaries regulatory framework
Subcategory A2 Subcategory A4 Subcategory A3
that takes into
account special
categories
Need for Clarify to what extent For Subcategories
Subcategories A1
registration and registration and A1 and A2, once All subcategories
(C1), A2, and A3 if
identification electronic the U-space is except A0
required
identification are available
needed
Graph 23 — Intervention-logic graph showing the link between problems, objectives and options.
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4. Open category
Table 3 — Selected policy options for the open category
Option No Short title Description
O0 Do nothing No change to the rules; risk remains as outlined in the issue
analysis. The EU regulatory framework would remain
fragmented with some MSs having stricter requirements than
others.
O1 Focus on remote-pilot A ‘light’ approach in terms of technical requirements. Risk is
responsibility mitigated through remote pilot responsibility
O2 Focus on technical Detailed subcategorisation with several technical
requirements requirements and strict knowledge requirements in order to
maximize safety benefits.
O3 Balanced requirements Balanced set of technical requirements and pilot competence.
Two additional options were taken into consideration at the beginning but then discarded. (see Section
1.3.5 ‘Discarded options’ for details).
The following is a list of elements on which the proposed options are based:
— UAS MTOM, including payload;
— UAS kinetic energy (in Joule (J)) transferred to the human body, as an alternative criteria to
MTOM;
— distance from involved/uninvolved persons or crowds;
— UAS classes defining the set of requirements for UAS operation in each subcategory;
— maximum height of the operation: maximum height limitation (operational limit);
— remote-pilot competence: level of practical skills and theoretical knowledge;
— age of the remote pilot: minimum age to operate a UAS;
— applicable according to product regulation.
— applicability of the electronic-identification/geofencing requirements.
4.1.1. Option O0 — Do nothing
Pursuant to the new Basic Regulation, regulation of all UAS (irrespective of their MTOM) falls within EU
competence. This sets the course for a risk-based approach applied to the three main categories: open,
specific and certified. In addition, the new Basic Regulation requires compliance with Regulation (EC)
No 765/2008 on the marketing of products and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on occurrence reporting;
the latter applies to the open category in case of an accident ‘resulted in a fatal or serious injury to a
person or it involved aircraft other than unmanned aircraft’.
Nevertheless, it was decided to retain Option O0 for the case where no EU UAS Regulation would be
adopted and the UAS regulation would remain within the competence of the MSs (various national
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4. Open category
rules). The main reason for retaining this Option is to use it as a benchmark against which alternative
options could be compared, thus assessing the improvement (or not) achieved through those
alternative options. More details on Option O0 have been already presented in Section 1.2 ‘Issues
analysis’. Indeed, this option uses information on the regulatory framework at MS level, which,
however, is rapidly changing in order to adapt to the rapidly evolving market. Therefore, this
information might be (partially) outdated, providing mainly a general view on the trends across MSs 52.
Some key points are listed below:
Categorisation
Most MSs have incorporated into their rules a subcategorisation based on MTOM, which varies
considerably across MSs, especially with regard to the subcategorisation of the specific and the open
category. No common limits exist: e.g. 0.3 kg, 1 kg, 1.5 kg, 5 kg, 7 kg, 20 kg, 25 kg.
Distance from people
Some MSs’ rules include the concept of distance from people, or assemblies of people, or densely
populated areas, persons, congested areas, crowds, roads, or make no relevant reference.
Maximum height
In many MSs, the maximum limit is set at 120 m, in others at 150 m, 100 m or 50 m, depending on the
scenario.
Competence
Overall, some MSs have strict rules, while others have limited requirements. An example: the higher
the risk, the more the requirements: e.g. more qualifications, a medical certificate, as well as a
theoretical and/or practical test would be required.
Technical requirements
So far, almost no technical requirements have been incorporated into the MSs’ rules.
Operational limitations
Many MSs have limitations in terms of distance from aerodromes (e.g. 1.5/2.5/5/8 km) or congested
areas (50 m from buildings, persons, animals; not over densely built-up areas, camping sites, industrial
areas, railways).
52
A detailed cross-MS overview is provided in Section 1.1.5. ‘Current regulatory framework at MS level’ (see Appendix V).
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4. Open category
4.1.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility
This Option was proposed by stakeholders and analysed in detail. Its key elements are summarised in
the following table53:
Table 4
UAS UAS Distance Maximum Remote- Age of the Electronic Technical
subcategory MTOM from height of the pilot remote identification/ requirements
(AIS) people operation competence pilot geofencing
A0 < 250 g or No VLOS and in None Decided No (or on a Yes, if
Flight over AIS < 3 limitation no case higher by MSs voluntary AIS < 3, or
Note (a) than 30 m Note (c) basis) Directive
people
below the 2009/48/EC
54
ICAO visual
flight rules Note (b)
(VFR)
A1 250 g to More minimum Online Yes, if U-Space No
Fly close to 25 kg than altitude, training available Note (b)
Note (a) 50 m normally Note (e) Note (d)
people
away 120 m
from
crowds
A2 250 g to Less than Examination
Fly far from 3 kg 50 m, but including
Notes (a) not theoretical
people
and (b) directly and
above practical
crowds skills
Note (f)
53
Notes to Table 4:
(a) It applies to model aircraft and UAS; emergency recovery systems may be excluded up to a certain limit.
(b) Not directly over people (without EC marking, with AIS < 3): the main driver of the complexity of the draft rule is the
subcategorisation in the open category, as well as the link with the EU harmonisation legislation (CE marking). The use of CE
marking complicating the draft rule can only be justified for flights directly over people. Furthermore, US Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 14, Part 107 does not address the safety of the UAS as a product for operations that are not conducted
directly over people. Thus, the CE marking should only be used to confirm that a UAS can be operated safely directly over
people (i.e. it complies with the applicable AIS requirement).
(c) According to current experience, there is no correlation between the age of the UAS pilot and the risk to uninvolved people.
(d) Alignment of the regulatory approach with the U-Space: all electronic-identification and geofencing requirements must only
require a connection to the U-Space. Installing equipment for electronic identification or geofencing that is not compatible with
the U-Space is unjustifiable, considering the time frame set for the creation of the U-Space (2019).
(e) Online training approved by a competent authority or qualified entity: theoretical remote-pilot competence is an essential
element in ensuring safety in the open category.
(f) Examinations can be provided by a competent authority or qualified entity.
54
Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys (OJ L 170, 30.6.2009, p. 1)
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493656682583&uri=CELEX:02009L0048-20140721).
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4. Open category
The main elements of Option O1 are the following:
— no technical requirements and CE marking are mandated except for Subcategory A0;
— remote-pilot proof of competence, including a theoretical and practical test, is required only in
case the operation is conducted in proximity to crowds since experience showed that specific
skills are required to maintain the UA at a safe distance from people, especially in case of
failures;
— the air risk is mitigated through the height limitation of 120 m and the requirement for an online
course;
— electronic identification and geo-limitation are not mandated at this stage since they will be
incorporated in the U-Space requirements;
— the MSs should decide on the minimum age for UAS operations; and
— UAS with an MTOM greater than 3 kg are not allowed for operation in proximity to crowds.
The following list shows how each of the issues analysed in Section 1.2 is addressed by the main
elements of this Option.
(a) Lack of protection of sensitive areas (e.g. aerodromes, nuclear plants, densely populated
areas):
— MSs have limited flexibility to define zones for certain UAS operations; and
— geofencing for Subcategories A1 and A2 will be mandated only when the U-Space will be
available, providing a real-time update.
(b) Inadequate technical requirements:
— geofencing, injury criteria for Subcategory A0; and
— no other technical requirements are mandated.
(c) Inadequate remote-pilot competences (complexity of the system):
— online training for Subcategory A1 (250 g < X < 25 kg);
— exam, including theoretical and practical skills, for Subcategory A2 (250 g < X < 3 kg); and
— age limit decided by MSs.
(d) Lack of clarity of UAS boundaries (in the open and specific category, including special
categories such as model and privately built UAS):
— when MTOM > 25 kg, boundary for open/specific category, VLOS, and operational
limitations ; and
— boundaries within the open category: MTOM < 250 g, 250 g < X < 25 kg (A1),
250 g < X < 3 kg (A2).
(e) Electronic identification:
— for UAS with an MTOM of more than 250 g, only once the U-Space will be available.
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(f) Disproportionate rules for special categories:
— privately built UAS and model aircraft allowed in Subcategory A2; exemption possible for
modellers (e.g. regarding altitude) and tethered operation.
Link with the specific category
The operations are less restricted compared to those under Options 2 and 3: it is possible to fly over
people (keeping a distance of 50 m from crowds) with an MTOM of up to 25 kg. As some MSs
expressed their safety concerns in this regard, the solution would be to limit the operations by defining
zones and move some of the operations under the specific category.
4.1.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements
This Option follows to a certain extent the approach implemented in the ‘Prototype’ Regulation.
Table 5
UAS UAS Distance Maximum Remote-pilot Age of Main technical Electronic
subcategory/ MTOM from people height of competence the requirements identification,
class (AIS) the remote (CE marking) geofencing
operation pilot
First-person-
view (FPV)/
follow-me
No mode,
A0/Class 0 < 250 g None No
No flight limitation Directive
over open 2009/48/EC,
50 m maximum
assemblies
of people height 50 m
FPV/follow me
Yes, marked
< 80 J or mode,
A1/Class 1 Familiarisation 14 years with operator
900 g maximum
ID
height 50 m
Yes, marked
Geofencing,
with operator
900 g to auto-return
A2/Class 2 ID, unique
4 kg home, lost-link
20/50 m hardware
mamagement
distance number
from Certificate of
Geofencing,
uninvolved competence Yes, marked
55
auto-return
persons 150 m after 16 years with operator
home, lost-link,
A3/Class 3 < 25 kg theoretical and ID, unique
management,
practical test hardware
no critical
number
single failure
Only in Yes, marked
A4/Class 4 < 25 kg remote N/a with operator
areas ID
55
Definition: ‘uninvolved persons’ means anyone that is not directly taking part in an operation. Due to the large number of possible
circumstances, only general guidelines can be provided. An involved person is someone who can reasonably be expected to follow
directions and safety precautions provided by the person controlling the operation, to avoid unplanned interactions with the UAS.
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The main elements of Option O2 are the following:
— for each subcategory, technical requirements are mandated through Regulation (EC)
No 765/2008 (except for Subcategory A4);
— air risk is mitigated through the height limitation of 150 m, the technical requirements, and a
certificate of competence, including a theoretical and practical test;
— ground risk is mitigated through technical requirements and different levels of remote-pilot
competence based on the size and/or kinetic energy of the UAS;
— electronic identification and geofencing are mandated for UAS with an MTOM greater than
900 g;
— no technical requirements are mandated for flying in non-populated areas; and
— minimum allowed age to fly UAS other than toys is 14 years, and 16 years to receive a certificate
of competence, unless supervised by a person holding a certificate of competence.
This approach makes use of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 to mitigate risks (safety, privacy and security)
and provides tools for law enforcement and market development. It defines 5 subcategories, allowing
MSs the maximum flexibility to define zones for certain UAS classes only. Moreover, the MTOM
limitation is complemented by other design requirements based on kinetic energy.
The following list shows how each of the issues analysed in Section 1.2 is addressed by the main
elements of this Option:
(a) Lack of protection of sensitive areas (e.g. aerodromes, nuclear plants, densely populated
areas):
— advisory geofencing and electronic identification are required for Subcategories A2 and
A3; and
— MSs have the flexibility to define zones for some UAS classes only.
(b) Inadequate technical requirements:
— detailed technical requirements are defined for all subcategories based on their risk;
geofencing is mandated for Subcategories A2 and A3;
a maximum height of 50 m is allowed for Subcategories A0 and A1;
product safety legislation must be complied with for Subcategories A1, A2, and A3;
Directive 2009/48/EC must be complied with for Subcategory A0;
auto-return home/lost-link management for Subcategories A2, A3; and
no critical single failure for Subcategory A3.
(c) Inadequate competencies (complexity of the system):
The following tables provide detailed information on the level of competences required per each
subcategory:
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Table 6
Remote-pilot competence Medical check Age of the remote pilot
A0 Safety awareness No No limitation
A1 Low competence No 14 years, unless supervised (since such
(familiarisation) UAS is not compliant with
Directive 2009/48/EC)
A2 Medium competence No 16 years, unless supervised by a person
56
(certificate of competence) with a certificate of competence
A3 Medium competence No As for A2
(certificate of competence)
A4 Medium competence No As for A2
(certificate of competence)
The following are different definitions of the remot-pilot competence for each subcategory:
Table 7
Safety Low competence Medium competence
awareness (familiarisation) (certificate of competence)
Training Leaflet Self-study/online Self-study ; a declared or approved training
organisation (DTO or ATO) could provide
training (not mandatory)
Theoretical test No No Yes, in an NAA-approved organisation
Practical test
No No Yes
Proof of evidence No No Certificate of competence issued by the
NAA or a qualified entity
Medical check No No No
Limited validity N/a N/a 3 years
of certificate
Renewal N/a N/a Online training/awareness: confirmation of
theoretical knowledge
MS oversight N/a N/a Yes, i.e. request for documentation in case
over of misbehaviour
remote pilot
N/a N/a Yes
DTO/ATO
56
Consistent with the light aircraft pilot licence (LAPL) (S) and (B), balloon pilot license (BPL), and sailplane pilot license (SPL) certificates.
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(d) Lack of clarity of UAS boundaries (in the open and specific category, including special
categories such as model and privately built UAS):
— boundaries are specified both between the open and specific category
(open < 25 kg < specific) and for the various subcategories in the open category (< 250 g,
< 900 g, < 4 kg, < 25 kg).
(e) Electronic identification:
— electronic identification required for Subcategories A1, A2, A3, and A4 even before the
implementation of the U-Space.
(f) Disproportionate rules for special categories:
— subcategory A4 is dedicated to privately built UAS and model aircraft.
Link with the specific category
Option O2 would also affect the various options in the specific category: UAS with an MTOM between
4 and 25 kg could fly up to 20 or 50 m away from uninvolved persons. Based on the replies received on
the UAS operators questionnaire, not many UAS would fit in this MTOM range; however, this category
allows to develop various commercial applications. Compared to Option O1, the UAS with an MTOM
between 3 and 4 kg would be allowed to fly in proximity to people.
4.1.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements
Based on discussions during the expert group meetings, a new Option O3 was developed, including
elements from both Option O1 and Option O2. It proposes three operational UAS subcategories, to be
simple as Option O1 on the one hand, and includes some technical requirements for risk mitigation, as
Option 2 on the other. This proposal has been developed applying an operation-centric approach.
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Table 8
Maximum Main technical Electronic
UAS MTOM/ Remote-pilot Age of the UAS
UAS class Distance from people height of the requirements identification (EI),
subcategory Joule (J) competence remote pilot registration
operation (CE marking) geofencing (G)
Privately N/a
built < 250 g < 50 m Leaflet No limitation Toy regulation, No No
no sharp edges,
C0 awareness leaflet
A1
Fly over uninvolved people (not over
Fly over < 120 m or up
assemblies of people) Kinetic energy, EI if with a camera
people to 50 m above a Leaflet plus
14 years or no sharp edges, of > 5 MP or an
< 80 J or higher obstacle, online Only for
C1 with selectable height audio sensor, EI and
900 g at the request training with operator
supervisor limit, G if required by the
of the owner of a test
awareness leaflet zone of operations
the object
Leaflet plus
< 120 m or up certificate of Mechanical strength,
Fly intentionally in proximity to but at a to 50 m above a competence lost-link
A2 16 years or
safe distance from uninvolved people higher obstacle, (theoretical management, Operator and
Fly close to C2 < 4 kg with Yes
(> 20 m for rotorcraft UAS or > 50 m for at the request qualification) selectable height UA
people supervisor
fixed-wing UAS) of the owner of and exam in limit,
the object an approved awareness leaflet
centre
Lost-link
Fly in an area where it is reasonably management,
C3 expected that no uninvolved person will selectable. height
be present < 120 m or up limit,
Operator and
to 50 m above a Leaflet plus awareness leaflet
A3 16 years or UA
higher obstacle, online Operational. If required by the
Fly far from < 25 kg with
C4 at the request training with Instructions, zone of operations
people In addition to the above, keep a safety supervisor
of the owner of a test awareness leaflet
distance from the boundaries of
the object
congested areas of cities, towns or
Privately settlements, or aerodromes
N/a
built
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Within each subcategory, one or more UAS classes may be operated:
— A1 — fly over people: operations in Subcategory A1 can be conducted only with lighter UAS
(Class C0, or privately built with an MTOM of less than 250 g, or Class C1 with an MTOM of less
than 900 g).
— A2 — fly close to people: operations in Subcategory A2 can be conducted with a UAS Class C2,
having an MTOM of up to 4 kg.
— A3 — fly far from people: operations in Subcategory A3 can be conducted with a UAS Class C3,
Class C4, or privately built with an MTOM of less than 25 kg.
The requirements for the remote-pilot competence are based on a more proportionate approach.
The remote-pilot is required to successfully complete an online training and test, focused on the
following:
— the main elements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX;
— instructing the remote pilot to identify in the UAS instruction manual the main characteristic of
the UAS; and
— identifying a safe area where the remote pilot may conduct the initial flights to familiarise
themselves with the UAS.
After successful completion of the online test, the remote pilot is allowed to conduct operations at a
maximum height of 120 m in non-populated areas unless a Class C0 UAS is being operated.
Lastly, if the remote pilot is operating a UAS Class C2 in Subcategory A1 and intends to fly in proximity
to people (up to 20 m for rotary-wing and 50 m for fixed-wing UAS), it is required to obtain a certificate
of competence, by passing a theoretical examination in an approved centre.
The following list shows how each of the issues analysed in Section 1.2 is addressed by the main
elements of this Option.
(a) Lack of protection of sensitive areas (e.g. aerodromes, nuclear plants, densely populated
areas):
— advisory geofencing and electronic identification are required for Subcategory A2 or when
mandated by MSs in the zone of operation; and
— MSs have the flexibility to define zones for certain UAS classes only.
(b) Inadequate technical requirements:
for each category technical requirements are defined in balance with remote-pilot competence
and operational limitations:
— geofencing for Classes C1 and C3 (if required by the zone) or C2 is mandated;
— a maximum height of 50 meters is allowed for Class C0;
— Annex II to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX must be complied with for all UAS classes, and
Directive 2009/48/EC (the ‘Toy Directive’) for Class C0;
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— requirements for kinetic energy, blade protection, battery status, and height limitation for
Class C1 are laid down; and
— requirements for lost-link management, battery status, height limitation are laid down for
Class C3, while for Class C2, some additional technical requirements are mandated to
mitigate the risk of flying in proximity to persons, such as mechanical strength.
(c) Inadequate competences (complexity of the system):
— a leaflet to be included by the manufacture in each UAS package;
— for Class C0, reading the leaflet will be the only competence required57;
— online training, including a test for Class C1, and for operations in Subcategory A3 is
mandated;
— for Class C2, a certificate of competence (theoretical qualification) and an examination in
an approved centre is required; and
— some stakeholders (e.g. NAAs) believed that the level of training would not be sufficient,
requiring instead a license for flying in proximity to people; however, the majority of the
expert group was in favour of the training option.
(d) Lack of clarity of UAS boundaries (in the open and specific category, including special
categories such as model and privately built UAS):
boundaries are specified both between the open and specific category (open < 25 kg < specific)
and for the various subcategories in the open category (< 250 g, < 900 g, < 4 kg, < 25 kg).
(e) Electronic identification:
electronic identification mandated for Subcategories C1 and C3, if required by the zone of
operations, and in any case for Class C2, taking into account the higher risk of this Subcategory.
(f) Disproportionate rules for special categories:
Subcategory A3 has been designed to offer the possibility to model aircraft pilots not willing to
join a model club or not flying the dedicated zones defined by the MS, to operate in the open
category. Operations in Subcategory A3 may be conducted with privately built UAS, or UAS Class
C3 or Class C4. This last class was developed with a minimum set of technical requirements
focusing mainly on providing the remote pilot with operational instructions issued by the
manufacturer, as well as on raising the remote pilot’s awareness of the EU regulations through a
leaflet. The only constraint is that mass-produced model aircraft must comply with Class C4
requirements. However, this will create a negligible additional burden for manufacturers.
Indeed, model aircraft currently available on the market are already required to display a CE
57
Some stakeholders advocated for stricter requirements than a leaflet, such as for an online training even for Class C0. An
association commented the following in this regard: ‘Too many people will not read it or will not focus on what they read/see
especially when they are in the hurry of opening a gift and trying it.’
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marking to show compliance with the applicable regulations (e.g. Directive 2014/53/EU58 on
radio equipment).
Link with the specific category
Option O3 would also affect the specific category: all UA with an MTOM between 4 and 25 kg to be
operated in proximity to people would fall into the specific category. According to Graph 2 on MTOM,
this does not represent an important segment of the UAS market (many UAS would have an MTOM of
< 4 kg and therefore fit in Class C2).
4.1.5. Discarded options
The following two options were discarded following a consultation with the expert group. Both of them
would be not very proportionate and would incur more costs compared to their potential benefits.
Therefore, those options are not analysed but only represented on a three-dimensional graph showing
how risk is managed through subcategories and their operational limitation, the contribution of the
remote-pilot competence, as well as the MSs flexibility to define zones.
With regard to the remote-pilot competence, the following definitions are provided:
— ‘no competence requirements’ means that the remote pilot is only required to read the leaflet
included in the package of the manufactured UAS without any additional training;
— ‘familiarisation’ means that the remote pilot is required to instruct themselves in the use of the
UAS (minimum competence) and familiarise themselves with the UAS before the first flight;
— ‘Certificate of competence’ means that the remote pilot is required to demonstrate their skill by
successfully completing an examination; and
— ‘license’ means a full license similar to the ones issued for manned aviation.
58
Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the
Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153,
22.5.2014, p. 62) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1493633541462&uri=CELEX:02014L0053-20140611).
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4.1.5.1. Discarded Option 1 — only operation with negligible risk allowed in the open category
Figure 10 — Graphical representation of discarded Option 1
Only operations with very light UAS are authorised in the open category (toys with an MTOM of
< 250 g in Subcategory A0, low-energy UAS or UAS with an MTOM of up to 900 g in Subcategory A1).
This Option would be easy to implement, creating however a huge burden for operators and NAAs
since most of the operations would fall into the specific category59. Also for model aircraft and
privately built UAS, it would provide limited possibilities. Moreover, the MSs flexibility to define no-
UAS zones would be limited since it could be difficult to identify subcategories allowed in the different
areas. No remote-pilot competence is required to operate a Subcategory A0 UAS, whereas
familiarisation is mandated to operate a Subcategory A1 one.
4.1.5.2. Discarded Option 2 —Remote-pilot competence as main safety barrier
Two big subcategories are proposed in the open category. For the second one, a pilot proof of
competence is required without any additional technical requirements.
This Option would be easy to implement, allowing certain professional operations in the open
category. In addition, model aircraft and privately built UAS could also be operated in the open
category.
Nevertheless, this Option was also discarded by the expert group since the remote-pilot competence
as the sole safety barrier was not considered sufficient to ensure a satisfactory level of safety. Also in
this case the MSs flexibility to define zones, where certain UAS operations only are allowed, would be
limited since it could be difficult to identify subcategories allowed in the different areas.
59
The specific category would be based on SORA.
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Figure 11 — Graphical representation of discarded Option 2
4.2. Open-category impacts
The analysis of the impacts of the retained options is focused on safety, social,and economic aspects;
on the environmental aspects only some general information is provided.
The analysis is performed using quantitative data, where available, complemented by qualitative
statements. In several cases, the analysis is the outcome of the expert group input and discussions
within EASA.
As already explained, Option O0 was not analysed in-depth; a general overview per criteria has been
provided in order to ease the comparison of the various options.
4.2.1. Safety impact
Unlike classical manned aviation, safety for UAS is considered in two dimensions:
— air risk, that is the risk to other traffic, both manned and unmanned; and
— ground risk, that is the risk to people and property overflown.
Ground risk is typically not considered in the classical manned aviation since it is assumed that this risk
is indirectly mitigated by protecting the people on board the aircraft and the aircraft itself. For UAS, on
the contrary, a proportionate approach could be applied, basing risk mitigation on the risk posed in
each operation. Ground risk depends on various factors, such as the characteristics of the overflown
area (e.g. population density, critical infrastructure, etc.), or the size and energy of the UA.
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For each retained option, the analysis of safety impacts has been performed based on the two
above-mentioned dimensions. For all options, the role of competent authorities, including local ones,
in law enforcement and oversight is fundamental.
4.2.1.1. Option O0 — Do nothing
Under this Option, both air and ground risk would overall be addressed differently by the MSs. As
shown in the MSs overview, some of them have already operational limitations (e.g. distance from
aerodromes and sensitive areas), whereas only few have also technical requirements in place. Some
MSs have strict requirements for the remote-pilot competence, which could have a positive effect on
safety (especially on occurrences due to human factors).
The MSs’ perspective is expected to change in the short- and/or mid-term, therefore, it is a difficult
challenge to define the future safety impacts. The following are mere assumptions:
— MSs having less pilot/product requirements and operational limitations; or
— MSs having more stringent pilot/product requirements and stricter operational limitations.
For the first group, there might be negative safety impacts, especially considering the booming UAS
market. On the other hand, MSs with more stringent requirements would potentially benefit from the
additional safety barriers.
4.2.1.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility
The air risk would be mitigated through the VLOS requirement, an online training course, as well a
height limitation of 120 m. This limitation provides a buffer of 30 m against the minimum VFR limit of
150 m for manned aviation, as prescribed by SERA.
Ground risk is mitigated through a combination of an MTOM limitation and a population-density
criterion, as well as through the remote-pilot competence demonstrated via a theoretical and practical
test.
This Option could have the following negative safety impacts:
— There would be no strong focus on technical requirements that could help mitigate the safety
risk. For Subcategory A1, ground risk is mitigated by relying only on the skills of the remote pilot
to maintain the minimum distance of 50 m from crowds. No additional technical requirements
are required to reduce the number of failures. Furthermore, as regards air risk, the remote pilot
is not assisted by an altitude device (height limitation) that could prevent the remote pilot from
inadvertently violating the 120-m limit.
— The air risk would only be mitigated through VLOS and a buffer of 30 m below the minimum VFR
height (150 m, as prescribed by SERA for manned aviation). This mitigation measure might not
be sufficient since manned aviation and UAS define altitude using different systems (pressure vs
global positioning system (GPS) data) with limited accuracy. Many air proximity events with UAS
and manned aircraft have occurred at altitudes of much more than 150 m, as shown in Figure 7
on the occurrences according to the height limit. Additional safety barriers may be required.
— The definition of ‘assemblies of people’ could vary among MSs, making it difficult to enforce the
related requirements.
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— Electronic identification and geofencing would be in place only when the U-Space would also be
available. Considering that the U-Space will be fully defined in the short term, a gap might be
created in the meantime, where UAS operations need to be regulated and the UAS market to
grow. Therefore, UAS would operate without geofencing devices until the UTM system is in
place; this could pose a high risk in terms of safety, especially due to the lack of protection of
sensitive areas (e.g. aerodromes), as well as in terms of security.
The potential positive safety impacts of this Option are the following:
— This is a quite simple option, therefore quite straightforward to enforce. In addition, it would be
easy to apply also for UAS operators. This could have a positive impact compared to other
options where the regulation might be perceived as more complex and difficult to apply,
potentially leading to safety issues.
— This Option provides MSs with the flexibility to define limited-UA zones. These limited or no-UA
zones could ensure a high level of safety, especially when restricting sensitive areas such as
aerodromes or sensitive infrastructure (e.g. nuclear plants).
Therefore, the overall safety impact of Option O1 could be considered as neutral (both positive and
negative aspects are included).
4.2.1.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements
The air risk would be mitigated through technical requirements: height limitation and certificate of
competence obtained through a theoretical and practical test.
The ground risk would be mitigated through a combination of the following:
— technical requirements proportionate to the UAS MTOM, and to the population density; and
— the remote-pilot competence demonstrated by successfully completing a theoretical and
practical test.
Several subcategories under this Option would have a level of complexity that could make their
regulation difficult to implement (e.g. operators would have difficulties to comply with a list of
requirements), compared to the other options, which could have a negative safety impact.
Positive safety impacts of this Option could be expected through the following:
— technical requirements that help to achieve a high level of safety; more precisely:
geofencing for Subcategories A2 and A3, protecting sensitive areas such as aerodromes
and nuclear plants;
lost-link management for Subcategories A2 and A3, reducing the risk of losing control of
the UA; and
no critical single failure for Subcategory A3, reducing the number of critical technical
failures leading to a UA crash;
— detailed training needed for high-risk Subcategories A2 and A3; and
— a 50 m height limit for Subcategory A0, with no demonstration of remote-pilot competence
required.
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This option is in line with the proposals of the ‘Prototype’ Regulation. In this context, the results of the
feedback provided by several manufacturers on their perception of safety in the ‘Prototype’ Regulation
are shown below:
Do you consider that the Prototype Regulation
ensures a sufficient level of safety?
1
3
7
N/A No Yes
Graph 24 — Perception of safety according to the ‘Prototype’ Regulation. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers
questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Therefore, the overall safety impact of Option O2 could be considered as very positive.
4.2.1.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements
Since Option O3 is an evolution of Option O2, they are assessed in comparison with each other.
In addition to Option O2, the air risk under Option O3 is mitigated through an extra buffer of 30 m
between the maximum UA height allowed (120 m) and the minimum VFR height (150 m). Only the
successful completion of a theoretical test is required for obtaining the certificate of competence.
The subcategories are grouped and defined in a way to facilitate their understanding by the operators.
Remote-pilot competence is defined in a more proportionate way with respect to ground and air risk.
This Option could have negative safety impacts due to the following:
— the requirements maintain a certain level of complexity, with operators having difficulties in
complying with them, and authorities in enforcing them, with possible negative consequences
on safety; and
— the remote pilot is required to hold a certificate of competence only in case operations are
conducted in proximity to people.
Positive safety impacts of this Option could be expected through the following:
— several barriers for air risk: VLOS, pilot competence, technical requirements and 30-m buffer
from the minimum VFR height; and
— operations of UAS with an MTOM of more than 4 kg, flying in proximity to people, would fall into
the specific category; this could have positive safety impacts especially if these UAS would need
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to comply with standard scenarios including stricter requirements than the ones in the open
subcategories, or apply for authorisations.
Therefore, the overall safety impact of Option O3 could be considered as positive.
4.2.2. Environmental impact
No major differences are expected across all options.
Positive environmental impacts:
— reducing CO2 emissions: UAS will replace other heavier transportation means with higher CO2
emissions, or road vehicles, having less congested roads and less traffic incidents;
— accelerating the ability to use renewable energy, by optimising solar-panel networks, improving
wind turbine maintenance, and offering new potential forms of wind energy generation); and
— reducing the use of soil-contaminating chemicals, as well as increasing productivity, in
agriculture.
Negative environmental impacts:
— flying in proximity to people could generate very annoying noise emissions, which could be
mitigated through requirements for maximum height, distance from people, and geofencing;
and
— visual pollution, which could also impact the migratory routes and daily life of animals (e.g. birds)
living in affected areas.
4.2.3. Social impact
The following impacts are considered:
— impacts on education/knowledge (e.g. remote-pilot competences); and
— impacts on employment (including quality of work).
The impact on employment would of course depend on how quickly the UAS market would grow,
considering both small and large companies. Furthermore, the impact on employment for operators
across all options would be twofold. On the one hand, there might be a decrease in the number of jobs
as UAS would substitute people in certain tasks. On the other hand, employment could increase as UAS
would improve a company’s efficiency, resulting in a possible business expansion, and therefore
creation of new jobs. Moreover, dangerous operations performed by UAS would also lead to better
working conditions. The employment impacts on operators and manufacturers are difficult to quantify
due to lack of data, however, a general analysis of this aspect is provided below.
The analysis of social impacts also includes aspects related to security, privacy, and data protection.
4.2.3.1. Option O0 — Do nothing
The MSs focusing primarily on the remote-pilot competence could achieve a positive social impact in
terms of improvement of the remote-pilot skills (practical and theoretical).
As for employment, in the MSs where more involvement of authorities is expected (e.g. more cases of
UAS operations requiring standard scenarios, therefore, more training requirements to define),
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additional human resources might be needed, having a positive impact in terms of job creation at
authorities level. In the same MSs, there might also be negative social impacts for operators and
manufacturers in terms of employment as many requirements are imposed to them, possibly leading
to closure of their business.
Overall, the social impacts would vary across MSs, depending on their national regulatory framework.
4.2.3.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility
This Option could have the following negative social impacts:
— the focus is mainly not on the skills and knowledge of the operator: in Subcategory A1, covering
50 % of the market, only an online training is required;
— no technical requirements on security are defined, potentially leading to security threats
(geofencing and electronic identification would be included only once the UTM is in place); and
— without clear technical requirements, UAS could possibly enter areas where privacy might be
affected.
This Option could have the following positive social impacts:
— in terms of employment, authorities would also need to dedicate resources for the creation of
no-UAS zones; further quantification is provided under the economic impact;
— slight increase in employment due to the development of geofencing and
electronic-identification functionalities; however, the extent of this impact is uncertain since
many manufactures might still wait for the development of the UTM; and
— increase in employment for professional operators considering the lower cost (few technical
requirements) and therefore the possibility to expand their business; especially UAS not used
above crowds could benefit from this Option as those would be limited to Subcategories A0 and
A1.
Therefore, the overall social impact of Option O1 could be considered as neutral (both positive and
negative aspects are included).
4.2.3.3. Option O2 — Focus on technical requirements
This Option could have the following negative social impacts:
— due to burdensome technical requirements, some manufacturers might have to reduce costs
linked for example with investment for innovation, and therefore reduce personnel costs by
cutting down on jobs; and
— some operators might have to cease their activities due to the limitations of operations, e.g. for
photographers in Subcategory A1, Class 1 with a UAS MTOM of less than 900 g, or in
Subcategory A2, Class 2 with a UAS MTOM of 4 kg at least at a distance of 20 m from persons.
This Option could have the following positive social impacts:
— MS authorities would need to need to dedicated more resources to several areas; further
quantification is provided under the economic impact;
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— employment increase in training organisations;
— familiarisation required for Subcategory A1, Class 1, for higher classes, a certificate of
competence after assessment; this has a positive educational and therefore social impact on
operators; the information that operators would need to acquire in order to get the certificate of
competence is basic information on Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX about the privacy and security
risk, familiarisation with the UAS, and performing the first flights safely;
— electronic identification as well as additional skills and knowledge of the operator could have a
positive impact on both security and privacy, compared to Option O1; and
— some training elements might help in preventing privacy issues.
Under this Option, a different level of remote-pilot competence is required based on the risk of each
subcategory.
Therefore, the overall social impact of option O2 could be considered as positive.
4.2.3.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements
Option O3 is similar to Option O2 in terms of employment, but slightly less positive in terms of
education. Although an online training is required for Subcategory A1, the certificate of competence is
not anymore required for Subcategory A3. Moreover, for Subcategory A2, only a theoretical
examination is required for obtaining the certificate of competence.
4.2.4. Economic impact
The economic impacts assessed are only the major ones. Several stakeholders are taken into account:
authorities, operators, and manufacturers. In some cases, quantitative evidence was gathered also
through the various consultations. In other cases, the analysis is qualitative due to lack of data. More
details on each stakeholder are presented below:
Authorities
Further to the feedback received by authorities via the questionnaire, a model has been defined in
order to quantify the resources that authorities would need to dedicate to the tasks linked to UAS.
Assumptions and inputs for the calculations
The following assumptions and inputs were considered for the calculation. A major part of the
information used for this calculation was either provided by an MS authority or gathered via the
questionnaire (see Table 4 below). Whenever an assumption is made, this is clearly indicated.
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Table 9
Cost description Amount (FTE in EUR) in one sample MS
(M = MS feedback, Q = questionnaire, A = assumption)
60
Administrative personnel (M) 25 000 EUR per year + 40 % additional indirect cost
Technical personnel (M) 50 000 EUR per year + 40 % additional indirect cost
Examining applications (M) 2 FTEs of an administrative staff, 8 FTEs of a technical
expert per year
Issuance of a LUC (M) 4 FTEs of a technical expert per year
Oversight activity (M) 5 FTEs of a technical expert per year
Training for authorities employees (M) 2 000 EUR for a technical expert (one-off)
61
Training/update for authorities employees (A) 1 000 EUR for a technical expert (yearly)
Training set-up (syllabus, examination procedure) (Q) 2 FTEs of an administrative staff and technical expert
(one-off)
Update of training system/syllabus (Q) 1 FTE of an administrative staff (yearly)
Definition of maps (Q) 2 FTEs of a technical expert (one-off)
Update of maps (Q) 0.5 FTE of a technical expert (yearly)
The following Graph shows the distribution of replies gathered via the questionnaire on the definition
of maps, which contributed to making the above-mentioned assumptions:
Definition of maps - in FTEs
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
EE DK LT NO
Graph 25. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. X-axis: MSs, Y-axis: FTEs.
60
Indirect cost includes costs for human resources, sickness leaves, contingencies, renting and movable assets.
61
The assumption was made considering a much lower amount than the initial one-off cost.
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Considering the fact that the replies were provided to the survey on the ‘Prototype’ Regulation, and
given the similarities between the ‘Prototype’ Regulation and Option O2, the following methodology
was applied:
— impacts were quantified for Option O2 (complemented by the above-mentioned assumptions);
— the total was calculated by either multiplying the sample value per the number of MSs (when
fixed per MS) or by considering the amount of population at EU level (when the value per MS is
based on the amount of operators, for example); therefore, the total costs presented in the
tables further below show the cost for all EASA MSs authorities62; and
— the differences between Options O1 and O3 on the one hand and Option O2 on the other are
highlighted, without the need to repeat the whole analysis under each option.
Therefore, it might be advisable to go through the analysis of Option O2 first and proceed with the
analysis of Options O1 and O3 afterwards.
General remark: some of the FTEs included in this analysis might actually be temporarily redeployed to
other departments without the need to hire new personnel in the short term (so the cost would not be
visible in the first year but in the following ones). Furthermore, several MSs have already resources
dedicated to UAS; some have already started defining the framework in detail. Therefore, for several
authorities activities, the total number of FTEs has substantially decreased compared to the situation
with no FTEs currently dedicated to UAS.
Manufacturers
Information gathered via questionnaires, telephone calls and meetings was considered for estimating
the economic impacts (e.g. questionnaire replies on the cost of a specific requirement).
Operators
Information gathered via the operators questionnaire and feedback provided by authorities (e.g.
number of operators in an MS) were used to substantiate the quantitative analysis.
4.2.4.1. Option O0 — Do nothing
This Option has a very negative impact for operators as they would have to adapt to several regulatory
frameworks across the EU, combined with higher costs, e.g. for trainings, authorisations/declarations,
or for developing products with different product requirements for each MS.
Furthermore, the economic impact could be very negative for several businesses (e.g. professional
operators in agriculture or inspections, and photographers) due to the higher cost of operation in more
than one EASA MS, especially for SMEs. This would also have a negative impact for service providers
linked to the UAS business.
The impact for authorities would also be very negative as they would need to invest a high amount of
resources in setting up a detailed framework. In some MSs, UAS rules have already been developed up
to a certain extent, but in others, there might be a need to develop those rules in further detail. Some
of the following activities would need to be set up: a registration system, maintenance of said system,
62
EU-28 plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
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an authorisation system, oversight, training requirements, as well as a communication system to
gather information about the different systems in other MSs.
Finally, the impact for manufacturers would also be very negative as they would need to adapt their
products to the different technical requirements mandated in each MS. In addition, they might not be
able to satisfy part of the demand through their current production due to the operational limitations
(e.g. distance from people, maximum height, no-UAS zones, etc.).
4.2.4.2. Option O1 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility
Authorities
The costs of Option O1 for authorities would be lower than for Option O2 because much less resources
would be required to set up the training/examination procedures and their updates. The following is a
list of the expected FTEs for training set-up63and update:
Training programme Periodicity FTEs64 Total cost for EASA MSs65
Training programme one-off 8 EUR 420 000
Training programme yearly 8 EUR 280 000
Compared to Option O2, the following cost savings are estimated:
— a decrease of EUR 420 000 of the initial cost; and
— a decrease of EUR 280 000 of the recurrent cost (per year).
Manufacturers
Manufactures would not need to invest high amounts to comply with the technical requirements (only
geofencing and electronic identification is mandated in some subcategories).
On geofencing in particular, interesting input has been received through the manufacturers
questionnaire. The following Graphs 26 and 27 show the low implementation and design cost of
geofencing:
63
A description of each type of activity is provided under Option O2.
64
The one-off number of FTEs originally estimated was divided by 4 (assuming that staff is redeployed, and that some MSs have
already FTEs working on UAS, temporarily redeployed from other departments). The same reasoning applies to the calculation of
the initial one-off FTE per activity, for Options O2 and O3. For the recurrent cost (per year), the FTE originally estimated was divided
by 2 (assuming that there would not be any temporary staff deployment to cover gaps, but that some officers were originally
assigned to UAS).
65
The total cost depends also on whether administrative and/or technical experts would be involved. Different salary estimates have
been considered. See also Table 4 above.
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Geofencing cost
According to the UAS manufacturers questionnaire, the design and implementation costs of geo-limitation
functions would not represent a high percentage of the total production cost:
Geo-limitation function: implementation cost
as percentage of the total production cost
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Graph 26. Source: EASA UAS questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Geo-limitation function: design cost as
percentage of the total production cost
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Graph 27. Source: EASA UAS questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
However, some commenters stressed the difficulty of installing geo-limitation devices into UAS.
Operators
The cost of training for all UAS falling into Subcategory A1 would be low (only online training with no
test required). No training is mandated for Subcategory A0, which was supported by several
stakeholders in the questionnaire:
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Training for Subcategory A0?
16
36
No Yes
Graph 28. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Considering that there are only few technical requirements, the total cost of the products in the
market should not be largely affected.
More operations would be allowed under Option O1, compared to Option O2, allowing operators to
save capital that would otherwise need to be spent for the authorisations.
4.2.4.3. Option O2 — Focus on remote-pilot responsibility
Authorities
The assumptions of Table 4 apply also to Option O2.
Training/Examination set-up
Training set-up: the cost incurred includes resources involvement in the definition of a training
programme, an examination procedure, as well the tests content. The recurrent cost of updating the
programme is presented below (the cost per FTE is much lower in this case):
Training programme Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs66
Training programme one-off 16 EUR 840 000
Training programme yearly 16 EUR 560 000
The number of FTEs included in the assumption is higher for initial set-up than for the update of the
programme, however it was additionally assumed that several MSs already dedicate staff to the
development of training programmes.67 Therefore, the initial cost for the total number of FTEs is
considerably reduced.
66
The total amount per line is different even if the number of FTEs is the same, as the for the updates (e.g. update of maps after the
first year) the salary of administrative (and not technical) staff was considered in the calculation.
67
For this reason, the total number of FTEs: 64 (2 per 32 EASA MS) was divided by 4 (assumption explained earlier in the text). For the
following years, however, the number was divided by 2 (e.g. temporarily redeployment of staff that would be replaced by new
resources).
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Definition of zones
As highlighted by some authorities’ representatives in the expert group meetings, the definition of
zones (e.g. no-UAS zones such as aerodromes) is a key element in estimating the economic impacts.
This also implies information feeding applications/geo-limitation functions, which requires a high
number of FTEs. The following is an estimate of the cost:
Definition of zones Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Initial set-up one-off 16 EUR 1 120 000
Update of maps/zones yearly 8 EUR 560 000
As for the training programme, the total resources considered the existence of authorities already
having staff dedicated to this.
Furthermore, Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX on UAS operations requires MSs to organise the market
surveillance of consumer UAS. MSs will need to allocate specific resources to that end in line with the
strategies defined in their national market surveillance programmes. Based on a comparison with the
market surveillance activities conducted in the framework of Directive 2009/48/EC68, the estimated
necessary resources are less than 0.5 FTE per MS.
The overall economic impact for MSs would be negative. Assuming that the total budget of all MSs’
NAAs is EUR 1 billion:
the initial cost of around EUR 2 million69 would amount to approximately 0.2 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a low negative impact; it is considered that several MSs have already developed
a legal framework; and
the recurrent cost of around EUR 1 million70 would amount to approximately 0.1 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a low negative impact as well.
Operators
Regarding training cost, it is assumed that an average training lasts 2.5 days. The following example 71
of training cost is based on the feedback received by training schools:
Training length Training cost Tests cost (practical and theoretical) Total
2.5 days EUR 1 000 EUR 400 EUR 1 400
For those operators that decide to only take the examination, the fees charged by training schools,
according to the information72 received, could be the following:
68
See the related report at http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/13903/attachments/1/translations.
69
This is the sum of the costs for the training programme (EUR 840 000) and for the definition of zones (EUR 1,1 million for the initial
set-up).
70
This is the sum of the costs for the training programme (EUR 560 000) and for the definition of zones (EUR 560 000).
71
This costs varies considerably across EU training schools. For further reference, see Appendix III.
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Type of test Cost range
Theoretical test EUR 300-550
73
Practical test EUR 200-400
If for the total training cost (including the test) for professional operators the following is assumed:
— the training cost is EUR 1 400;
— 50 % of the professional operators use UAS falling into Subcategory A2 (requiring a certificate of
competence)74;
— the total number of operators is around 40 00075; and
— only half of the professional operators receive the training,
this cost would be as presented in the box below:
1 400 * (40 000 * 0.5) * 0.5 = 14 000 000 EUR
For calculating the total tests cost (without the training cost) for professional operators, similar
assumption as above were made, except that the training-courses cost was replaced by the following
tests cost:
— theoretical test: EUR 475 (average of the cost range presented in the table above); and
— practical test: EUR 300 (average of the cost range presented in the table above).
775*(40 000 * 0.5)*0.5 = 7 750 000 EUR
Operators might bear additional costs for the purchase of the UAS due to the technical requirements
that would lead to an increase of the final price of the products; this refers especially to Class C3, for
which the requirement on ‘no critical single failure’ is mandated. On the other hand, it is assumed that
UAS in Class C3 would be used by professional operators that might be more willing to invest than
other UAS operators.
Training schools/training organisations
Training is a key element for Option O2. A certificate of competence is required for Subcategories A2,
A3, and A4. Even if no training course is mandatory, many operators might decide to take it. In
addition, they would need to take an examination (the examination cost is provided above), which
would have a positive economic impact for training schools.
72
This information is based on the feedback provided by some training schools across the EU.
73
No precise information on the practical test cost could be gathered. It is assumed that the cost of just taking the test could be half
of the cost of the practical course that includes the test, equal to EUR 600 EUR, according to the feedback received.
74
This assumption is based on the distribution of UAS types according to their MTOM (source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire
2016).
75
The total number of operators is based on the stakeholders’ feedback via questionnaires/emails.
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Manufacturers
The manufacturers would bear the cost of adapting their UAS to additional technical requirements
different for each UAS class. Based on one manufacturer’s feedback:
— an active altitude limitation would need one month for engineering and one month for
validation;
— a simple low-battery warning system based on voltage only would not be very precise, and a
more reliable system would have a higher cost;
— the requirement on ‘no single critical failure’ would be very costly and would entail redundancies
that would make the system heavier as well;
— blade protection or a system to reduce the injury inflicted by a blade would cost around 5 % of
the production cost to implement it; and
— many UAS in the market are already equipped with a lost-link management system with an
auto-return home function option.
A graphical representation of the replies provided by UAS manufacturers to questions on the cost of
devices/functions is provided below:
Auto-return home Lost-link managemet
1 %, 1
1 %, 2
X> 10%, 5
X > 10 %,
3 %, 2
2
N/a, 2
Negligible, 5 %, 1
4
N/a, 1
Negligible,
2
Graph 29 and Graph 30. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment
represents a number of replies.
Some manufacturers (e.g. toy manufacturers) found the height limit of 50 m too restrictive. A toy has
typically very limited performance and autonomy, so the probability of climbing higher than 50 m is
very low. Moreover, their MTOM, normally less than 250 g, poses a very limited risk to other flights.
Toy manufacturers stated that limiting the maximum height would require the use of additional
equipment, such as a barometric sensor, making the cost prohibitive.
Use of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 (CE marking) would help to ensure market standardisation and
compliance with the essential requirements on UAS. Several manufacturers emphasised the
importance of standardisation enabling economies of scale and therefore having a positive impact on
the final cost of products. On the contrary, complying with local/fragmented requirements would incur
a high cost for manufacturers.
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Manufacturers might have a comparative disadvantage against those selling UAS outside the EU. The
additional technical requirements might incur extra UAS production costs, compared to the UAS sold
outside the EU. This might slow down the development of the EU UAS service market in case those
manufacturers would decide to invest more in production in third countries.
The technical requirements of Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX would in principle affect also UAS in use
before the Regulation enters into force. However, based on the feedback received from UAS
manufacturers, this would not have a major impact as the expected lifetime of UAS is around 30
months, which is less than the transition period indicated in said Regulation. The following is a
representation of the average expected lifetime of UAS, according to the replies received on the UAS
manufacturers questionnaire:
Expected UAS lifetime
30 Months,
104
12 Months, 36 Months,
4 9 Months, 1
5
Graph 31. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a
number of replies.
Overall, this Option O2 would have a negative economic impact, considering the high costs for
manufacturers, operators and authorities.
4.2.4.4. Option O3 — Balanced requirements
Authorities
The costs for authorities would be similar to those for Option O2, slightly reduced in respect of the
training set-up, but in general higher than those for Option O1. However, operations of UAS with an
MTOM of 4-25 kg in proximity to people would have a negative economic impact for authorities and
operators as these operations would fall into the specific category requiring either a declaration or an
authorisation (greater involvement of both authorities and operators needed due to the possible
higher number of authorisations).
Operators
Compared to Option O2:
— Operators would need to receive online training for UAS Class C1 (with an MTOM of less than
900 gr), which could increase the cost and be an additional time investment. On the other hand,
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operations in Subcategory A2 do not require a practical examination, while for Subcategory A3,
an online test is mandatory.
— Less operations would be allowed as the maximum height is lower: 120 m (150 m for Option O2).
This could negatively impact operators that need to operate their UAS higher than 120 m.
— Operators that need to operate a UAS with an MTOM of 4-25 kg in proximity to people would
need to check the standard scenario or apply for an authorisation. The resources and time spent
for preparing and applying for authorisations or complying with requirements of scenarios would
increase the incurred cost.
— Model aircraft would be required to be supplied with a manufacturer instructions manual and an
awareness leaflet. This would imply a negligible economic impact.
With respect to Option O1, operators would not need to successfully complete a practical test to
operate in Subcategory A2 (‘Fly close to people’), therefore, the cost for operators in an important
segment of the small-UAS market would be much lower.
Manufacturers
Compared to Option O2:
— Electronic identification for UAS Class C1 would be needed, if required by the zone of operations.
The cost for manufacturers would be higher (even if minor) as they would need to equip the UAS
affected with an electronic-identification system.
— The technical requirements for UAS with an MTOM of more than 4 kg, in particular the ‘no single
critical failure’ one, would be removed. This would significantly affect cost, according to the
feedback received by manufacturers.
Overall, this Option O3 would have a positive economic impact, considering the proportionate set of
requirements (both technical and on competence).
4.2.5. Proportionality impact
The proportionality impacts are already captured, directly or indirectly, under Section 1.4.4 ‘Economic
impact’. Overall, Option O2 would have a very negative impact, considering the high cost of complying
with certain requirements (e.g. ‘no critical single failure’). Options O3 and O1 would be a good
compromise also for small companies, considering the few and non-prescriptive requirements. This
would apply to both SMEs that produce UAS and to professional operators of SMEs, using UAS for their
main activities.
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4.3. Comparison of options — Open category
Table 10
Option O0 Option O1 Option O2 Option O3
Do nothing Focus on pilot Focus on technical Balanced
responsibility requirements requirements
Safety impact 0 +/– ++ +
Social impact 0 +/– + +/–
Economic impact 0 + –– +
Proportionality impact 0 + – +
Total 0 +/– +/– +
Overall, Option O3 follows a more balanced approach towards risk mitigation for third parties on the
ground and other airspace users, compared to Options O1 and O2. Option O1 provides a simple
solution that could be easily understood and implemented by operators, but does not include many
technical requirements that could help to prevent UAS occurrences (accidents and incidents) mainly
due to technical failures. Option O2 focuses on a greater number of as well as on stricter requirements
for several subcategories than Option O1, however, its approach is disproportionate, considering that
some requirements might be quite costly for manufacturers to implement (e.g. the installation of ‘no
critical single failure’ equipment).
On the contrary, Option O3 achieves a balance between a greater number of technical requirements
compared to Option O1 and a proportionate level of remote-pilot competences (e.g. obtaining a
certificate of competence does not always require a practical test that could be quite costly for
operators). Moreover, through Option O3, the general and specific objectives of this RMT are better
achieved and the issues analysed are addressed in a more effective way than through the other
options.
Furthermore, Option O3 would allow:
— authorities not to dedicate too many resources, as for Option O2;
— manufacturers to develop UAS with proportionate technical requirements, thus supporting the
development of the UAS market;
— SMEs not to have to comply with high-cost requirements; and
— operators to fly UAS in various circumstances (detailed subcategorisation according to the
distance from people).
Finally, Option O3 is widely supported by the expert group and several stakeholders.
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5. Registration
5. Registration
5.1. Options
This Chapter presents the different registration options as well as the possible ways of their
implementation. Registration could be mandated only for the operator or both the operator and the
UAS. In both cases, registration would be conducted in the MS of residence of the operator or where
the operator has its place of business, by an entity being a service provider and not necessarily by an
authority. The possibility of EASA setting up the registration database is also considered in one of the
options.
Table 11 — Selected policy options for registration
Option No Short title Description
R0 Do nothing Registration is defined at MS level.
R1 Operator Only the operator must register.
R2 Operator and UA (not for Both the operator and the UA must be registered (except
toys) toys).
R3 Operator and UA (not for Both the operator and the UA must be registered (except
toys and UA Class 1) toys and UA Class C1).
R4 EASA registration The registration system is designed at EU level (EASA).
5.1.1. Option R0 — Registration at MS level
In accordance with the current regulatory framework, not all MSs require registration of UAS, or not of
the same types of UAS (e.g. in certain MSs, registration is only required for professional use). In
addition, some MSs require registration for the operator only, while others for the UAS as well. For
example, in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, or Iceland, registration is required
for the operator. In Spain, registration is required only for UAS with an MTOM of more than 25 kg and
in Italy, for non-recreational uses of UAS and for the UAS itself.
5.1.2. Option R1 — Registration of the operator only (except for UAS Class C0)76
Under this Option, only the operator would be registered, except when using a UAS Class C0.
Therefore, in case an already registered operator would start operating a new UAS, the UAS would not
have to be registered.
76
UAS Class C0 have an MTOM of less than 250 g and are not equipped with an audio system or camera with a resolution of less than
5 MP.
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5.1.3. Option R2 — Registration of both the operator and the UAS (except for UAS Class C0)
Compared to Option R1, the operator would need to register also the UAS except in case of a UAS
Class C0. Under this Option, much more information on the UAS used in the EU market would be
available.
5.1.4. Option R3 — Registration of both the operator and the UAS (except for Classes C0 and C1)77
Compared to Option R1, the operator would need to register also the UAS except in case of a UAS
Class C0 or Class C1.
5.1.5. Option R4 —EU registry (instead of a national one)
This Option is complementary to the above ones. It proposes an EU registry that could be designed by
EASA, ensuring data consistency and a higher level of harmonisation across the EU. This Option was
added following a proposal submitted by the European Parliament.
5.1.6. Additional non-analysed option
Further to the above options, consideration was given to the possibility of requiring operators to
register (except for toys), allowing the MSs to decide which UAS should be registered. Those registers
would still need to be interoperable based on EASA standards. This possibility would provide MSs with
the flexibility to decide which UAS should be registered based on the national situation, for example in
terms of security. Nevertheless, a negative aspect of this option would be that fragmentation across
MSs would continue. Furthermore, authorities would need to invest to adapt their registration system
to local needs. As for operators, they would face difficulties as they would need to check which
conditions apply in their MSs of operation and adapt to those conditions, if needed, which could lead
to extra costs for additional local registration. This option was therefore considered to be
disproportionate and was not analysed in depth.
5.2. Registration impacts
5.2.1. Safety impact
No major impacts are expected for Options R1, R2, and R3, where law enforcement would be ensured
through the identification of the operator as the responsible entity for the operation. Therefore, this
Option would ensure a higher level of safety than Option R0, where some MSs might have
requirements for partial registration or no registration at all.
5.2.2. Social impact
Option R2 would have a positive social impact for authorities as additional employment would be
created by dedicating more resources to the set-up and maintenance of a registry containing
information on both the operator and the UAS. At the same time, a negative social impact might be
expected for operators as they would dedicate more time and perhaps resources in order to apply for
77
UAS Class C1 have an MTOM of less than 900 g or are designed in a way that the kinetic energy transferred to the human body in
case of impact with a person is less than 80 J.
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registration of a new UAS. This could lead to closure of the operator’s business and consequently to
loss of employment.
Under the social impact, there is a special focus on security, data protection, and privacy. Option R2
would have a very high positive impact as registration of all UAS with the exception of UAS Class C0
would help law enforcement for security purposes as authorities would be aware of the types of UAS
being operated. Moreover, local authorities would be aware of UAS that could pose a threat from a
security point of view. Option R3 would still ensure a higher security level, compared to Option R1, but
lower than Option R2.
Option R0 has in general a neutral social impact.
5.2.3. Economic impact
The following assumptions and inputs78 were considered for the calculation, taking also into account
the feedback received via the authorities questionnaire. Further information is provided in
Section 1.2.4.6 ‘Issue 6 — Need for registration and identification’.
Table 12
Cost description Amount (FTEs in EUR)
(M = MS feedback, Q = questionnaire)
79
Administrative personnel (M) EUR 25 000 per year + 40 % additional indirect cost
Technical experts (M) EUR 50 000 per year + 40 % additional indirect cost
Registry maintenance (Q) 2 FTEs of an administrator (yearly)
Registry set-up (Q) 2 FTEs of an administrator (one-off)
IT tools for registry and applications (M) EUR 2 500 per activity
The total number of FTEs for registration is quite low, considering also that registration will be
conducted through an online system, which seems to be the preferred option. The following is a
graphical representation of the replies of several EU NAAs:
78
The same methodology as for assessing the economic impacts of the open-category options has been applied.
79
Indirect cost includes costs for human resources, sickness leaves, contingencies, renting, and movable assets.
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5. Registration
Online registration
No
answer, 3
Yes, 13
Graph 32. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a
number of replies.
Several MSs are in favour of a simple system for registration. To quote a comment received: ‘keeping a
registration system same as for general aviation will not work anymore with UAS’. Some NAAs consider
the online registration of the UAS after purchase as the preferred registration method as a high
number of UA are purchased online. The NAAs should create an easy-to-use tool for online registration
in order to encourage people to register.
The NAAs could cover the registration cost by charging a registration fee. This is not included in the
proposed options but it is left to the MSs to decide. The registration fee could reflect the time spent by
NAAs on registration. An amount for an ‘insurance fund’ could also be part of the registration fee,
which might further increase the overall registration cost.
The differences across options reflect mainly the differences in the involvement of authorities’
resources in registration.
Option R0 has in general a neutral economic impact.
Option R1
Authorities
Considering that the above-mentioned assumptions are based on the feedback received further to the
‘Prototype’ Regulation, the information could be used to quantify the economic impact of Option R1.
Using Option R1 as starting point, the impacts of Options R2 and R3 were also calculated.
For the first year:
Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry set-up (one-off) One-off 16 EUR 560 000
Costs for consultants, registry set-up, IT One-off/yearly N/a EUR 40 000
tools, etc.
EUR 600 000
For the following years:
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Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry maintenance (yearly) Yearly 11 EUR 380 500
Operators
The cost for operators would mainly depend on the registration cost. Assuming that the fee would be
around EUR 5 for each of a total of 1.5 million consumer UAS on the current market80, 90 % of which
would require registration based on their MTOM, the total registration cost at EU level would be
EUR 7.5 million approximately. This figure could be much lower in reality, considering that several
operators might have more than one UA; however, concrete data would be needed to calculate this.
The following is a graphical representation of some MSs replies showing variations across the EU; when
no column is depicted, no registration fees are so far required in those MSs, according to the feedback
received81:
Estimate of registration fee
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
CZ DK EL NO UK IS CH DE IT 82
Graph 33. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a reply.
Option R2
Authorities
Under Option R2, operators would need to dedicate more time to registration and bear a higher cost,
which would depend on the fee imposed by the MSs, possibly higher than for registering only the
operator. The total amount spent by operators for registration would be considerably higher compared
to Option R1 (about 90 % of the UAS currently on the market would need to be registered). The
economic impact for operators would depend on the MSs registration fee.
80
SESAR Outlook Study, see also the related Section 1.1.1.2.
81
Feedback received in 2016. Possibly, the current situation in some MSs might have (slightly) changed.
82
For some replies, the fee is an estimate and/or an upper limit (e.g. 10 could stand for < 10).
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For the first year:
Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry set-up (one-off) One-off 24 EUR 840 000
Costs for consultants, registry set-up, IT One-off/yearly N/a EUR 40 000
tools, etc.
EUR 880 000
For the following years:
Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry maintenance (yearly) Yearly 16 EUR 570 700
Operators
Compared to Option R1, the cost under Option R2 would increase as both the operator and the UA
would have to be registered. However, this cost may vary depending on the number of UAS each
operator has.
An additional element to consider in that respect is whether an MS would require a registration fee
each time a new UA is operated by the same operator.
Option R3
Authorities
The cost under Option R3 would be lower, compared to Option R2. Indeed, UAS Class C1 would not
need to be registered. Taking into account Graph 2 on the distribution of UAS types based on the
operators questionnaire, many UAS would still fit in this category (about 50 % of the UAS currently on
the market would need to be registered).
For the first year:
Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry set-up (one-off) One-off 20 EUR 700 000
Costs for consultants, registry set-up, IT One-off/yearly N/a EUR 40 000
tools, etc.
EUR 740 000
For the following years:
Registration Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Registry maintenance (yearly) Yearly 14 EUR 475 500
However, this cost would be much lower in case the registration would be handled at EASA level.
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Operators
The cost would be higher than under Option R1, but lower compared to Option R2 as UAS Class C1
would not need to be registered.
Option R4
Compared to the previous options, and considering that possibly EASA would be in charge of the EU
registry, much less NAAs FTEs would be required under this Option, while EASA would invest
considerably more. However, the NAAs would be responsible for the registry maintenance. An EU UAS
register would ensure consistency and interoperability of data across MSs.
5.3. Comparison of options — Registration
Table 13
Option R0 Option R1 Option R2 Option R3 Option R4
Do nothing Operator only (not Operator and Operator and UA EU registry
for UAS Class C0) UAS (not for (not for UAS Class
UAS Class C0) C0 and C1)
Safety impact 0 + + + N/a
Social impact 0 +/– ++ + N/a
(including privacy
and security)
Economic impact 0 + –– +/– ++
Total 0 +/– +/– + ++
Option R3 is the preferred one as a good balance is achieved between the UAS MTOM and its potential
threat on the one hand and the economic impact on the other.
In addition, it was considered that registration at EU level could save cost and resources for authorities.
Even if this Option has a comparative merit, there are other considerations in this regard, currently
under discussion between the Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.
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6. Specific category
6. Specific category
6.1. Options
A set of options has been defined also for the specific category. The description and analysis of those
options is not as detailed as for the open-category ones as MSs lack experience and therefore data in
this domain. Furthermore, the standard scenarios that constitute the core of two options out of four
have not been fully developed yet.
Table 14 — Selected policy options for the specific category
Option No Short title Description
S0 Do nothing The new Basic Regulation would not extend EASA’s competence
to UAS of 150 kg or less, or the specific category would still be
regulated by MSs’ rules. The regulatory framework at EU level
would remain fragmented, with some MSs having standard
scenarios and/or stricter requirements than others.
S1 Authorisation for all All UAS operations in the specific category would need an
operations authorisation.
S2 Authorisation and Two types of standard scenarios would be defined, the former
standard scenarios requiring the operator to submit a declaration, and the latter
requiring the competent authority to issue an authorisation.
S3 Authorisation, In addition to Option S2, the operator would have the
standard scenarios, possibility to apply for a LUC with privileges to authorise its
and LUC operations.
6.1.1. Option S0 — Do nothing
Under this Option, no change to the rules at EU level is required; all MSs would continue to develop
their own regulatory framework with respect to the specific category. Some MSs might have a more
strict approach, requiring full authorisation in most, if not all, of the cases, while others might adopt a
more flexible approach, using a declaration system; certain MSs already follow this latter approach.
6.1.2. Option S1 — Authorisation for all operations
According to this Option, for all UAS not falling into the open category, an authorisation would be
required, including a risk assessment that would contain the following information:
— the operational area of the UAS and the related conditions;
— the category of airspace, as well as the effects of the UAS operation on other air traffic and ATM
in cooperation with the relevant ANSP;
— the design features and performance of the UAS;
— the type of UAS operation;
— the level of remote-pilot competence;
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— organisational factors; and
— effects of the UAS operation on the environment.
6.1.3. Option S2 — Authorisation and standard scenarios
This Option includes the possibility of having standard scenarios issued by EASA in the form of AMC to
Annex I (Part-UAS) to Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. This standard scenario would include a predefined risk
assessment for the specific type of UAS operation as well a list of mitigation measures to be taken by
the operator in order to carry out the operation. Those mitigation measures are defined in terms of:
— operational limitations,
— technical requirements, and
— remote-pilot competence.
Based on the complexity of the mitigation measures, the standard scenario determines whether the
operator is required to issue a simple declaration or has to apply for an authorisation by the competent
authority of its MS of residence. In the case of a declaration, the competent authority is only required
to examine if the data provided by the operator are complete, and inform the operator only if data is
missing. In case the operator intends to conduct an operation in another MS, the operator has to send
the declaration also to the competent authority of the MS of operation. That authority is not required
to examine the data as this is already done by the competent authority of the MS of residence.
In case the standard scenario mandates an authorisation, the competent authority is required to
review the documentation provided by the operator. When the operator intends to conduct an
operation in another MS, it has to send the authorisation to the competent authority of the MS of
residence. It is the responsibility of that authority to coordinate with the competent authority of the
MS of operation to verify if local conditions are satisfied.
6.1.4. Option S3 — Authorisation, standard scenarios and LUC
Compared to Option S2, this Option includes the additional possibility for the operator to obtain a LUC
from the competent authority. The LUC is not mandatory but it provides the operator with the
privilege to authorise its own operations. This allows more flexibility to operators performing
operations covered by standard scenarios requiring an authorisation by the competent authority, or
operations not covered by a standard scenario.
In order to obtain a LUC, the operator should demonstrate that it has the organisational structure to
assess the risk and identify appropriate mitigation measures. Finally, a LUC issued to an operator by
the competent authority of its MS of residence, would be recognised by the competent authorities of
the other MSs. The operator is not required to coordinate with the competent authority of the MS of
operation, but only check the local conditions.
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6.2. Specific-category impacts
6.2.1. Safety impact
6.2.1.1. Option S0
The safety impact of this Option depends on the measures that each MS would take. It is still too early
to assess the impact of recently defined scenarios in some MSs due to small number of occurrences so
far. However, in those MSs where both the requirements and the procedure for obtaining an
authorisation are less strict, negative safety impacts could be expected.
In addition, operators might not be fully aware of all the local conditions within a fragmented
regulatory framework, which could have a negative impact on safety.
6.2.1.2. Option S1
The safety impact of this Option depends on the way the competent authorities examine the
authorisations. The more stricter/detailed this examination is, the higher the positive impact on safety
could be.
6.2.1.3. Option S2
Compared to Option S1, this Option might have a slightly less positive safety impact. Some operators
might submit a declaration to be included in a standard scenario even if their operation would not fit
completely in this scenario, posing a potential safety risk.
6.2.1.4. Option S3
Compared to Option S2, this Option might have a slightly positive safety impact as competent
authorities could focus their resources on checking the operations carried out by operators not having
a LUC.
6.2.2. Social impact
6.2.2.1. Option S0
The social impact of this Option depends on each MS’s requirements. The competent authorities of
MSs with stricter requirements covering a higher number of UAS would need to dedicate more
resources to issuing the authorisations.
In all MSs, regardless of the stringency of their national rules, some operators could refrain from
conducting cross-border operations (e.g. professional users as photographers that could do business in
several MSs) as they would need to comply with quite different requirements across MSs even for
conducting similar operations. This might have a possible negative impact in terms of employment.
6.2.2.2. Option S1
This Option might have a social impact for the following stakeholders:
— Authorities: they would need additional resources (e.g. technical personnel) to deal with the
increased workload of reviewing the applications for authorisations. Further information on the
quantification of costs for authorities is provided under the economic impact of this Option.
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— Operators: applying for an authorisation requires additional time for preparing and following up
the application. The impact in terms of the operator’s skills/knowledge would depend on the
skills/knowledge required for obtaining the authorisation.
6.2.2.3. Option S2
Compared to Option S1, this Option might have the following social impacts for the various
stakeholders:
— Authorities would need to dedicate less resources to issuing authorisations as many operations
would fall into the standard scenarios. On the other hand, they would need to dedicate
resources to the development of these scenarios. A quantification of the costs is provided under
the economic impact of this Option.
— Operators would need to dedicate less time and resources as they would have the possibility to
conduct a UAS operation using a standard scenario without applying for an authorisation. This
could extend the use of UAS to jobs that are considered dangerous when performed by persons,
such as inspections of power plants/buildings. The impact in terms of the operator’s education
would depend on the skills/knowledge required by authorities for obtaining an authorisation as
well as on the requirements of the standard scenarios.
6.2.2.4. Option S3
Compared to Option S2, this Option might have the following social impacts for the various
stakeholders:
— Authorities would need to dedicate less resources to examining authorisations as many
authorisations would be replaced by a LUC. On the other hand, some additional resources would
be required to examine the applications for a LUC.
— The possibility to apply for a LUC to obtain an authorisation for UAS operations might encourage
more people to use UAS, leading to an increasing demand in the market. In addition, through
this new possibility, it would be less burdensome for operators to operate several UAS. All this
would have a positive impact for manufacturers in terms of business and therefore employment.
— Operators would need to dedicate some more resources to applying for a LUC, but they would
save a considerable amount of resources by avoiding authorisations, which could help the UAS
market expand. In addition, the impact on the operators’ quality of work would also be positive
as several dangerous tasks, such as inspections, would be performed by UAS.
6.2.3. Economic impact
The calculation of the authorities resources83 was based on the feedback received via the authorities
questionnaire. Considering that this feedback relates to the ‘Prototype’ Regulation, and that the
‘Prototype’ Regulation’s proposal is similar to Option S3, the main analysis of the economic impacts is
included in Option S3; for Options S1 and S2, only the differences in terms of resources were identified
83
The same methodology as for assessing the economic impacts of the open-category options has been applied.
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and presented in the analysis. Further assumptions on the resources estimates are provided under the
economic impacts of the open category (see Section 4.4.4 ‘Economic impact’).
As for oversight, no difference is expected across the various options of this category84. Therefore, no
quantification of the resources dedicated to oversight is provided even though this is an important
element for authorities.
6.2.3.1. Option S0
Like for the social impact, the economic impact of this Option depends on each MS’s requirements.
In MSs with stricter requirements for complying with a scenario and/or obtaining an authorisation,
high costs could be expected for authorities (i.e. resources needed) and operators (i.e. high cost to
comply with the requirements).
On the other hand, MSs following a less stringent approach might not bear the high costs mentioned
above.
Therefore, the overall economic impact of option S0 can be considered to be neutral.
6.2.3.2. Option S1
Authorities
Compared to Option S3, this Option has the following economic impact for authorities:
— more employees would be dedicated to preparing authorisations;
— no employees would be needed for assessing applications for a LUC; and
— higher training costs would be incurred as more employees would be needed for preparing the
authorisations.
Moreover, a higher amount of resources would need to be dedicated to reviewing the authorisations,
which could incur additional costs:
For the first year:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examination of applications and issuance One-off 54 EUR 3 423 913
of authorisations
For the following years:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examination of applications and issuance Yearly 109 EUR 6 867 826
of authorisations
84
In the open category, no oversight is foreseen.
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The main difference in terms of FTEs is due to the assumption that several MSs already have
employees dedicated to these activities, some of which could be temporarily redeployed. Therefore,
the total number of FTEs for the first year has been reduced85.
For the first year:
Horizontal costs Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Initial training One-off 4386 EUR 86 956
For the following years:
Horizontal costs Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Training updates Yearly 87 EUR 87 000
Assuming that the total budget of all MSs’ NAAs is EUR 1 billion:
the initial cost of around EUR 3.5 million would amount to approximately 0.35 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a medium negative impact; it is considered that several MSs have already
developed a legal framework; and
the recurrent cost of around EUR 7 million would amount to approximately 0.7 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a very high negative impact.
EASA
EASA would develop standard scenarios to be applied at EU level, which would entail the following:
— evaluating input from operators and MSs;
— assessing the risk of operations;
— assessing proposed mitigations; and
— issuing the standard scenario in the form of an AMC to Annex I (Part-UAS) to Regulation
(EU) 201X/XXX.
Type of cost FTEs at EU level (EASA)
Input evaluation 1 yearly
Risk assessment and mitigations 1 yearly
Total 2 yearly
EASA would bear this cost in the first years as several standard scenarios would need to be defined.
Operators
Assuming that:
85
As for the several resources calculations in the open category, the total number of FTEs has been divided by 4 (assumption
considering temporary redeployment of as well as already involved staff).
86
Less than the total number of FTEs mentioned in the previous box as training is expected to be required for technical experts only.
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there are circa 40 000 professional operators in the EU87 that would need to comply with a
standard scenario (the following is a graphical representation of the numbers of operators per
MSs); and
Number of professional operators
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
AT DK EE ES FR IT LT LU UK
Graph 34. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a
number of replies.
the average cost of an authorisation based on a standard scenario would be EUR 20088,
the total cost would be around EUR 8 million89 for obtaining authorisations for all UAS in the EU. This
amount would compensate for an important part of the costs incurred by authorities.
Additionally, operators would need to dedicate time to performing a risk assessment in order to be
able to apply for an authorisation.
Manufacturers
This Option would probably create barriers for SMEs that are new to the aviation sector, compared to
stakeholders that are familiar with the established authorisation/certification system for manned
aviation.
6.2.3.3. Option S2
Authorities
Compared to Option S3, this Option has the following economic impact for authorities:
— more employees would be dedicated to preparing authorisations, but fewer than under
Option S1;
— no employees would be needed for assessing applications for a LUC; and
87
Assumption based on feedback received from EU NAAs.
88
These figures are based on assumptions further to feedback received via the authorities questionnaire as well as from EASA
experts.
89
This was calculated assuming that each operator would obtain one authorisation only.
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— higher training costs would be incurred as more employees would be needed for preparing the
authorisations, but not as many as for Option S1.
For the first year:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examination of applications and issuance One-off 41 EUR 2 568 000
of authorisations
For the following years:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examination of applications and issuance Yearly 82 EUR 5 155 870
of authorisations
For the first year:
Horizontal costs Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Initial training One-off 32 EUR 65 200
For the following years:
Horizontal costs Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Training updates Yearly 65 EUR 65 200
The overall economic impact of this Option would be negative for MSs. Assuming that the total budget
of all MSs’ NAAs is EUR 1 billion:
the initial cost of around EUR 2.6 million would amount to approximately 0.26 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a low/medium negative impact; it is considered that several MSs have already
developed a legal framework; and
the recurrent cost of around EUR 5.2 million would amount to approximately 0.5 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a medium negative impact.
Operators
Several operators could avoid the authorisation costs, by fitting in one of the standard scenarios. There
are no clear historical data at EU level, based on which the number of operators that would fit in one of
the standard scenarios could be estimated as those scenarios are currently being developed. However,
it is clear that the operators would not in general bear a higher cost, compared to Option S1.
Manufacturers
Considering the lower cost for operators, the demand for UAS could increase, having a positive
economic impact for manufacturers, compared to the case of a full authorisation. Nevertheless, the
impact would also depend on the content of the standard scenarios as they might include burdensome
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technical requirements for manufacturers. Therefore, both positive and negative economic impacts for
manufactures are expected under this Option.
6.2.3.4. Option S3
Authorities
For the first year:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examination of applications and issuance One-off 27 EUR 1 712 000
of authorisations
Issuance of LUCs Yearly 11 EUR 760 870
Total EUR 2 472 870
For the following years:
Authorisation Periodicity FTEs Total cost for EASA MSs
Examining of applications and issuance of Yearly 54 EUR 3 423 900
authorisations
Issuance of LUCs Yearly 22 EUR 1 521 750
Total EUR 4 945 650
The training costs would be the same as for Option S2.
The overall economic impact of this Option would be negative for MSs. Assuming that the total budget
of all MSs’ NAAs is EUR 1 billion:
the initial cost of around EUR 2.5 million would amount to approximately 0.25 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a low/medium negative impact; it is considered that several MSs have already
developed a legal framework; and
the recurrent cost of around EUR 5 million would amount to approximately 0.5 % of the NAAs
turnover, having a medium negative impact.
Operators
Compared to Options S1 and S2, operators under this Option would benefit from the possibility to
apply for a LUC. Several respondents to the operators questionnaire agreed on the option to apply for
a LUC. However, it should be noted that the majority of those replies referred to non-commercial
operators that probably do not have many UAS or do not conduct various types of operations.
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6. Specific category
Do you intend to apply for a LUC?
Yes, 20
No, 32
Graph 35. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a
number of replies.
In addition, some respondents indicated how many authorisations they would yearly avoid by applying
for a LUC:
Authorisations avoided per year by having a LUC
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
10 20 50 100 200
authorizations authorizations authorizations authorizations authorizations
Graph 36. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Each segment represents a
number of replies.
Considering the above feedback, the following calculations were made comparing the cost of a LUC
and of authorisations for a sample operator:
Assuming that:
— the authorisations avoided per operator could be 5090; and
— the cost of a LUC is set at EUR 2 50091:
90
Based on many replies received from different operators.
91
Based on expert judgement.
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Authorisations LUC
Cost EUR 200 EUR 2 500
92
Total number of authorisations/LUCs per operator 50 authorisations 1 LUC
Total cost per operator Circa EUR 10 000 Circa EUR 2 500
the sample operator could save EUR 7 500.
Manufacturers
The lower cost for operators (saved cost of authorisations) under this Option could enhance the
demand for UAS, having a positive economic impact for the manufacturers’ business.
6.3. Comparison of options — Specific category
Table 15
Option S0 Option S1 Option S2 Option S3
Do nothing Authorisation for all Authorisation and Option S2 and a
operations standard scenarios non-mandatory LUC
Safety impact 0 ++ +/– +
Social impact 0 + + +
Economic impact 0 –– +/– ++
Total 0 –/+ + ++
Option S3 is the preferred one as it allows the UAS operator to apply for a LUC and/or submit a
declaration if a standard scenario is applicable. This would have the following impacts:
— authorities would not need so many resources as for Option S1; and
— operators would save the cost for the various authorisations required under Option S1, by either
applying for a LUC or by submitting a declaration based on a standard scenario.
92
It is assumed that an operator, instead of applying for 50 authorisation, would go for one LUC.
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7. Conclusions
7. Conclusions
The analysis of the impacts of the proposed options for all categories shows that the preferred ones
are the following:
— For the open category, Option O3 follows a balanced approach, taking into account both
technical requirements for the UAS and the remote-pilot competence. It strikes the best
compromise between safety and cost, having also a positive social impact.
— For registration, Option R3 requires registration of all operators conducting UA with an MTOM
greater than 250 g as well as registration of the UA itself having an MTOM greater than 900 g.
This Option is mainly driven by the security and privacy risk, striking the best compromise
between cost and risk mitigation.
— For the specific category, Option S3 proposes to complement the authorisation required to
conduct operations, with standard scenarios issued by EASA, thus substantially reducing the
burden for operators and competent authorities. In addition, the operator may choose to apply
for a LUC with the privilege to approve its own operations. This Option follows the most
cost-effective approach of all options in this category.
This set of options represents a proportionate solution for all stakeholders mostly affected by the
proposed Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX on UAS, namely authorities, manufacturers, operators, and
citizens. Overall, the options proposed would reduce the cost for manufacturers, competent
authorities and operators, maintaining at the same time a high safety level ,not only by protecting
other airspace users and uninvolved persons from the risk to be injured by a UA, but also by mitigating
the privacy and security risk.
For operators, in particular, several sectors might benefit from the options proposed. The following is a
list of the market sectors mostly affected by the proposed options, expected to have the biggest share
in the future UAS market, as highlighted in Chapter 1 ‘Issues definition’ of this sub-NPA 2017-05 (B).
— Media and entertainment: some operations in this sector could be conducted in the open
category, especially in Subcategory A2. In case the operator wishes to exceed the limitations of
the open category, the operation falls into the specific category, where the operator could
comply with a standard scenario or has the possibility to apply for a LUC, thus avoiding the cost
of multiple authorisations. The reduced cost will foster operations in this sector, having a very
positive impact in several domains, such as on the reduction of acoustic noise and noise
pollution; operations with manned rotorcraft, for example, could be partially taken over by
much smaller UAS.
— Precision agriculture: operations in this sector would be conducted in rural areas, therefore,
most of them would fit in Subcategory A3 (open category). In case the operator wishes to exceed
the limitations of the open category, it may operate in the specific category, using standard
scenarios, possibly requiring a declaration only, thus drastically reducing the related burden and
cost.
— Inspection/monitoring: there are various expected benefits for this market sector, e.g. the
possibility to conduct an operation over obstacles higher than 120 m at the request of the owner
of the object. Depending on the specific type of such operation, it can be conducted either in the
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open or in the specific category. In the latter case, a standard scenario could be developed to
reduce the burden for both the operator and the competent authority. The operator has also the
option to apply for a LUC. The proposed set of options will foster this kind of operations, by
considerably reducing the number of physical inspections performed by humans, thus mitigating
the risk to human life. Furthermore, the use of UAS reduces the time needed to reach the area
to be inspected, thus improving efficiency.
— Hobbyists: good flexibility is provided to this group, offering a variety of choices to operate UAS.
Operators in this sector may typically use several UAS types:
UAS put on the market, bearing a CE marking (for Classes C0, C1, C2, C3 or C4);
privately built UAS; and
model aircraft either privately built or put on the market without bearing a CE marking.
A dedicated Class C4 under Subcategory A3 has been developed in the open category, allowing
hobbyists and model aircraft pilots to enjoy their operations in areas where they pose limited
risk to third parties. Class C4 UAS are required to be supplied with a manufacturer instructions
manual and an awareness leaflet. As an alternative, MSs have the flexibility to define zones
dedicated to UAS hobbyist flights only, where different limitations may be established.
Moreover, MSs may recognise the ability of model clubs and associations to create a safety
culture among their members, by issuing a special authorisation to the club or association
allowing deviations from Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX. In this way, hobbyist flights may continue to
be conducted as today.
Finally, the set of options proposed in this NPA will also contribute to achieving the objectives of the
European Commission IA93, such as:
— enabling the development of UAS and UAS services in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner;
— eliminating the regulatory obstacles currently hampering the manufacture and operation of UAS
so that manufacturers may easily put their products on the market and operators may provide
their UAS services to the economy; and
— mitigate the specific risks and issues arising from the use of UAS, notably in the field of safety,
security, privacy and data protection, as well as environment.
Request to stakeholders
Stakeholders are invited to provide:
— quantified justification elements on the possible impacts (e.g. economic, social, safety) of the
options proposed, or alternatively to propose a justified solution to the issue;
— any other information they may find necessary to bring to the attention of EASA; as a result, the
relevant parts of the RIA might be modified on a case-by-case basis.
93
Further information is provided in Section 1.1.2.5 ‘European Commission IA’.
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8. Monitoring and evaluation
8. Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring
Monitoring is a continuous and systematic process of data collection and analysis with regard to the
implementation/application of a rule/activity. It generates factual information for future possible
evaluations and IAs and helps to identify actual implementation issues. Based on the preferred set of
options of this NPA, EASA proposes the following monitoring plan:
Table 16
What to monitor How to monitor Who should monitor How often to monitor
Number and main cause Reports in ECCAIRS and EASA and NAAs On a recurrent basis
of occurrences information collected at
(accidents/serious MS level
incidents) caused by UAS
and involving manned
aircraft
Number and main cause Reports in ECCAIRS and EASA and NAAs On a recurrent basis
of occurrences information collected at
(accidents/serious MS level
incidents) caused by UAS
and involving third
parties on the ground
Number of UAS in each Market analysis to monitor EASA and NAAs To be defined
subcategory how new technologies
cope with the regulatory
framework
Qualitative assessment of Survey/meetings; EASA and NAAs To be defined
the operators feedback number and qualitative
on the implementation assessment of the AltMoC
of the rules to the UAS rules
Qualitative assessment of Survey/meetings; EASA and NAAs To be defined
the authorities feedback number and qualitative
on the implementation assessment of the AltMoC
of the rules to the UAS rules;
requests for exemptions
pursuant to Article 14 of
the Basic Regulation
Qualitative assessment of Survey/meetings; EASA and NAAs To be defined
the manufacturers number and qualitative
feedback on the assessment of the AltMoC
implementation of the to the UAS rules
rules
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8. Monitoring and evaluation
Evaluation
This proposal might be subject to interim/ongoing/ex post evaluation that will assess the performance
of the adopted rules, taking into account any predictions made in this IA. The decision whether an
evaluation is necessary will also depend on the monitoring results.
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9. Appendices
9. Appendices
9.1. Appendix I — Example of UAS operations
Based on the feedback received via the UAS operators questionnaire94, the following is a sample list of
the reported types of UAS operations:
— non-commercial: landscape photography, hobby cinematography, UAS racing; and
— commercial: inspections, photography (including for marketing purposes), film, search and
rescue (SAR) (more efficient than rotorcraft as less costly and safer for operators), surveillance,
documentation, (aerial) mapping, thermal imaging for civil engineering research,
(land/geographical) surveying, videos for tourism or archaeological purposes, design,
manufacturing, media, streaming, industry, still photography for larger building sites, protection
of critical infrastructure as power plants and government buildings, aviation, land and maritime
transport (including package delivery), aerial imaging (daylight and multispectral), and
atmospheric measurement and research (meteorology, weather forecast).
9.2. Appendix II — Rationale behind MTOM/energy thresholds for UAS Class C0 and C1
MTOM/energy thresholds are one of the criteria for the subcategorisation of UAS in the open category.
These criteria are used together with others in order to define subcategories of operations and UAS
classes. This paper intends to provide the rationale behind the masses and energy thresholds defined
with regard to the risk posed by blunt-trauma injury (non-penetrating injury) inflicted on people by a
UAS. It focuses on Subcategory A1, Classes C0 and C1:
Table 17
Penetrating injuries should be prevented by a UAS design that does not expose uninvolved persons to
the risk of injury inflicted by acuminated parts or cutting edges, for example, blade protection. But this
aspect is not addressed by this paper.
Subcategory A1, Class C0
This UAS Subcategory and Class can be operated by minors, without any training required.
Occasionally, UAS might fly over assemblies of people. In view of the above, a UAS of this Subcategory
94
Further details on the questionnaire are included in Section 1.1.6. ‘EASA consultation strategy’.
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and Class must be intrinsically unable to harm people in case it collides with people due to remote-
pilot error or UA failure. The 250-g MTOM threshold is proposed as a conservative mass to prevent
significant blunt trauma. This threshold is justified by the following:
— It has been adopted for the smallest proposed category by the FAA Micro ARC of the
March 2016, aimed at making a recommendation for a future FAA rule for UA allowed to fly over
people.
— It is the MTOM threshold identified by the FAA registration task force: UA with an MTOM of less
than 250 g are not registered. To identify this MTOM, the risk equation was applied.
— Considering RCC studies-based estimates, it has been shown that a kinetic energy of 44 J
impacting a human body, averaged on the body of a person standing, would result in a
probability of fatality (PoF) of 1%. From a linearisation of the relationship between MTOM and
terminal kinetic energy, valid for small rotorcraft, this equates to about 250 g. There is some
evidence that RCC studies are overly conservative if applied to UAS collisions with people,
however, given the scope of this Subcategory and Class, it is preferred to retain a very
conservative value.
Subcategory A1, Class C1
In this case, a minimum age and a minimum level of knowledge would be required for operating the
UA, and flying over crowds, even occasionally, would be prohibited; it would be allowed to fly the UA
only over isolated people and at a safe distance. A kinetic-energy value was calculated based on
experiments that better resemble the possible UAS impact on a person.
The impact scenario considered is that of a multi-rotor UA95 falling from the maximum allowed altitude
and reaching a person’s head at a 45 ° angle with respect to the vertical.
Among available data from literature, it is proposed to consider the Gurdjian experiments96 with real
embalmed human heads being dropped from a certain height on a solid, not moving plate.
17 specimens were impacted on the anterior parietal zone, 10 on the posterior parietal zone. The
frontal zone is not considered as people would normally spot a UAS approaching, with their frontal
zone facing the UAS, and would either shift or cover themselves with their hands. Temporal data are
not available.
Figure 12
95
This is the most common configuration of UAS operated in the open category.
96
Gurdjian, E.S., ‘Studies on skull fracture with particular reference to engineering factors’, The American Journal of Surgery, Vol 78,
Issue 5, November 1949.
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From the reported terminal speeds, when the initial fracture was recorded, as well as from the weight
of the specimens, it is possible to derive the kinetic energy at impact and take the overall average. The
result is about 80 J.
A Monash University paper97 refers to computer simulation of head impacts on a flat rigid structure,
yielding energy values between 80 and 95 J, to start seeing skull fractures. This information seems to
conservatively confirm the 80 J identified through the Gurdjian experiments.
Other fracture experiments are also available in literature, where pressure was applied to various parts
of the skull:
Figure 13
In some cases, recorded data include peak forces and accelerations, but the skulls seem to have been
compressed on relatively smaller areas. It is believed that between the two kinds of experiments, those
involving collision with a flat surface have a better resemblance with the blunt trauma resulting from a
possible UAS impact.
In the Gurdjian experiments, the energy is fully transferred to the head as there is no deformation or
movement of the surface impacted. In conclusion, the value of 80 J is retained as the threshold kinetic
energy that the head of the average person would be able to absorb without the skull being
fractured.
It is difficult to associate a PoF with this threshold, but there are reasons to consider the above
estimate as conservative:
— the experiments with the skull specimens included several impacts before fracture; as a
consequence, it may be assumed that the skulls could have been weakened before reaching the
rupture threshold;
— a living person’s head should be more resistant than the embalmed heads used in the
experiments; and
— the rupture of the skull does not necessarily lead to a fatality (although it would certainly be a
major trauma).
This substantiates the 80-J threshold value of absorbed kinetic energy as an acceptable one for Class
C1. In a collision with a UA, only a fraction of the UA kinetic energy would be transferred to the head.
As described further in the text, the kinetic energy absorbed in average by a human head hit by a UA in
free fall is estimated to be 46.5 % of the terminal kinetic energy of the UA, expressed as half of the
aircraft MTOM multiplied by the square of its terminal velocity (reaching ground). This fractional value
97
https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/airworth/papers/human-injury-model-small-unmanned-aircraft-
impacts.pdf
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may have been conservatively calculated, and, given the uncertainties of collision dynamics, other
assumptions may be possible.
A terminal kinetic energy under 80/0.465 = 172 J for the UA would be therefore allowed. Using a linear
approximate relationship between terminal kinetic energy and MTOM (about 48 J for every 250 g of
MTOM of relatively small multicopter currently available on the market), the 172-J threshold equates
to an MTOM of approximately 900 g.
In conclusion, an MTOM of 900 g can be considered as a good threshold to allow a Class C1 UA to be
flown over isolated people. UAS with a greater MTOM could also qualify if the manufacturer
demonstrates that the kinetic energy transmitted to the head would be less than 80 J.
Note: on 28 April 2017, the final report of the FAA UAS Center of Excellence Task A4 ‘UAS Ground
Collision Severity Evaluation’ was published98. This very detailed and rich in information report will be
analysed by EASA during the public-consultation period of this NPA, to assess potential implications for
the thresholds established above.
Considerations on the kinetic energy transferred to a human head during a collision with a vertically
falling multicopter.
The most common mass-produced multicopter UA on the market, with an MTOM between 250 g and
2 kg, is the Phantom DJI. Its dimensions are approximately the ones provided in the following picture:
Figure 14
In general, it is assumed that if the UA hits a person’s head with one of its arms, the UA would rotate
away and a relatively small fraction (F1) of the impacting kinetic energy would be transferred during
the impact. The fraction would be much higher (F2) if the collision would occur at the center of or
within the square area of the 145-mm side in the example above. The following is an evaluation of
those values (F1 and F2):
For value F1 and based on information presented during expert meetings on the subject of small UA
and energy balances that could be considered during a collision, as well as on engineering judgment, it
98
http://www.assureuas.org/projects/deliverables/sUASGroundCollisionReport.php
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is considered that by hitting exactly in the centre, the UA would partially bend or be destroyed,
absorbing in the process about 7 % of the impacting kinetic energy:
Kinetic energy transferred = 0.93 x impacting kinetic energy
As for value F2, if the UA would hit the head with its terminal part of the arm (tip), the transferred
kinetic energy would tend to zero as the UA would most likely rotate away.
In order to simplify those two scenarios, a linear behaviour of the kinetic energy transferred to the
person’s head between the following two extremes is assumed:
— impact at the centre: 0.93 x impacting kinetic energy; and
— impact at the tip: 0.
The average would therefore be (0.93 x impacting kinetic energy + 0)/2 = 0.465 x impacting kinetic
energy.
The impacting kinetic energy of a UAS in free fall can be conservatively considered to be its terminal
kinetic energy.
In conclusion, according to the above estimates, it is considered that the kinetic energy of a UA in free
fall transmitted to a person’s head would be in average 46.5 % of the UA terminal kinetic energy.
9.3. Appendix III — Training
Training costs
The following table provides an overview on the theoretical training (including cost and length)
required for UAS operators:
MS of training school Number of days Cost (EUR) Training type Cost per day (EUR)
Italy 2.5 800 classroom 320
Spain 2.5 1 000 classroom 400
classroom and
Belgium 4 1 980 online 495
classroom and
The Netherlands 4 1 980 online 495
The following table provides an overview of the practical training required for UAS operators:
MS of training school Number of days Cost (EUR)
Belgium 6 930
The Netherlands 6 930
30 sessions of 600
Italy 10 min each
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In addition, a very detailed overview on trainings provided by training schools in France has been
provided by stakeholders. The following table provides a summary in an aggregated form:
Cost range EUR 900-6 000
Theoretical courses only 13.3 % of the training schools
Theoretical and practical courses 86.7 % of the training schools
Length of training 4-23 days
Schools providing only classroom training 69 % of the training schools
Schools providing both online and classroom training 31 % of the training schools
Authorities and operators feedback on the typology of training
EASA MSs authorities were requested to provide feedback on their preference for either classroom or
online training. The following Graph 37 provides a graphical representation of the results:
Online training Classroom training
1
3
2
1
2 10
13
yes not known no yes not known no no reply
Graph 37. Source: EASA UAS authorities questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA. Replies to the question on
training types (classroom or online).
It is expected that the preference for a specific training type will depend on the UAS type.
The same question on the preference for a training type was posed to operators as well. The following
Graph 38 provides a graphical representation of the results:
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Training: how?
Classroom
training,
14
Online
training,
38
Graph 38. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
Is should be noted that most of the replies were provided by operators of small non-commercial
UAS.99.
The following is a list of original operators comments on classroom training:
— ‘Online training would not be appropriate as it leaves more scope for operators to skip
important elements or get somebody else to fill the online assessment in with them or for them
without actually doing it themselves.’
— ‘Classroom training should be a requirements, since it allows the instructors to evaluate each
candidates performance.’
— ‘Flying a UAV is a very practical thing that needs training in the field as much as in theory. I can
be easily achieved with an instructor and supervision during 1-3 days of training.’
The following is a list of original operators comments on online training:
— ‘It would be very easy to set up an online competency test, this would make it accessible to
everyone.’
— ‘You should provide online tutorials about safety and regulations.’
— ‘The online training cut the cost and this cost can't be more than a 30% of the drone cost.’
— ‘Both online and classroom training should be provided. For an experienced pilot (e.g. model
airplane or full scale pilot) an online training should be sufficient, for a complete beginner a
classroom training is recommended.’
In addition, feedback was received on the possibility of self-study as practical training as well as on the
preferred options of self-study as practical training:
99
Further details on the questionnaire are included in Section 1.1.6. ‘EASA consultation strategy’.
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Is self-study sufficient as Preferred options of self-study as practical
practical training? training
16
14
12
10
14 8
6
4
38 2
0
Flight simulator Hands-on training Information Manual and/or
campaigns tutorials provided
by the
No Yes
manufacturer
Graph 39. Source: EASA UAS operators questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
9.4. Appendix IV — Third-country regulatory framework for UAS operations100
A regulatory framework for UAS operations has already been or is currently being developed is several
countries outside the EU. The following examples show how certain countries around the world have
addressed the issues analysed in this sub-NPA 2017-05 (B). It is highly possible that legislation in some
coutries might have changed in the meantime; therefore, the information provided might not be fully
representative of the current regulatory framework in those countries.
Overall, there are several differences across the countries selected. The following are some general
remarks based on some countries’ rules:
— different approach across countries with regard to the level of competence of the competent
authority: e.g. a local authority may decide to grant an authorisation or not;
— the level of detail regarding the required registration information and labelling varies across
countries (e.g. name and telephone number of the operator, registration number, etc.);
— different remote-pilot qualifications required (e.g. training to complete, hours of flight
experience);
— different requirements for obtaining a UAS certificate (e.g. medical check-up, insurance, etc.);
— as for VLOS, it should be maintained unless a prior authorisation is issued, or the UAS should be
operate only in daytime; and
— with respect to privacy, flights above another person’s property are considered infringement of
personal rights, or recording images are deemed to be breaching certain rules (e.g. aerial
photography/aerial surveys are prohibited without an authorisation).
100
An important source of information for this Appendix IV is the following: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/regulation-of-
drones/regulation-of-drones.pdf.
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USA101
The FAA published Part 107 for the regulation of small-UAS operations (with an MTOM of 55 lb which
is equivalent to 25 kg), which became applicable in August 2016. Some key elements are the following:
— VLOS only;
— no flying over persons not directly participating in the operation;
— daylight operations only or in civil twilight with anti-collision lighting;
— right of way to other aircraft; and
— remote-pilot certificate obtained by demonstrating aeronautical knowledge.
Compared to the EASA open-category proposal, there are some differences that are detailed in
NPA 2017-05 (A) (see p. 5-6).
Canada102
There is a clear distinction between recreational and non-recreational operations among the various
MTOM categories. Exemptions are also applicable. If a UAS’s MTOM is less than or equal to 35 kg, a
certificate is required.
A new risk-based regulatory framework is currently under development, which does not distinguish
between recreational and non-recreational operations.
South Africa
The level of technical and operational requirements depends on the type of operations. Private
operations, for instance, are exempt from several requirements (e.g. no letter of approval or operator
certificate required). There are further restrictions for operations in controlled airspace and BVLOS.
101
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515
102
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/opssvs/getting-permission-fly-drone.html
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9.5. Appendix V — Overview of EASA MSs UAS regulatory framework103
AT BE CH CZ DK FI FR DE IE IT LT MT NL PL PT SI ES SE UK
MTOM 150 kg 150 kg 150 kg 150 kg > 25 kg need 25 kg 150 kg 25 kg 150 kg As per the > 25 kg need 150 kg 150 kg 150 kg > 25 kg 150 kg 150 kg 150 kg 150 kg
limit authorisatio Basic registration authorizatio
n Regulation n; toy < 1 kg
Categories 5 kg, 25 kg < 1 kg Open: 0.91 kg; 7 kg; 1A: < 1,5 kg 7 kg over Yes: captive 2 main Yes: 1.5, 7, Yes: 0.3/2/ 1. Up to 300 no 25 kg Toy < 1 kg ; < 2; < 25, and 1A: 0-1,5 Yes,
recreational; maximum 30 20 kg 1B: < 7 kg densely RPAS and categories: and 20 kg 25 kg g; above 25 kg > 25 kg kg / max 20 kg or
< 5 kg (Class kg, 100 m 2: 7-25 kg populate RPAS < 2 below/abov 2. 300 g to with special 150 J / less
2); > 5 kg outside 3: BVLOS d areas kg, < 25 kg e 25 kg 25 kg; authorisatio VLOS > 20-150 kg
(Class 1) crowds and above 3. over 25 kg n 1B: 1,5-7
VLOS, 25 kg kg / max
specific = 1000 J/
else VLOS
2: 7-150
kg / VLOS
3: BVLOS
License More risky Yes for Class Pilot skills in RPA for For No In some Theoretical No, but Yes, pilot Yes, Medical Yes Certificate Case by case Yes < 25 kg Yes > 7 kg > 20 kg or
categories 1 (including the total professional commercial operational and practical theoretical certificate requirement declaration of > 25 kg theoretical BVLOS; <
with an LAPL hazard and use needs use in scenarios, requirement and practical for VLOS s set up in qualificatio knowledge + 20 kg
increase of medical); risk special populated theoretical s above 5 kg requirement and < 25 conditions n, including practical VLOS: pilot
pilot Class 2: assessment authorisatio areas, certificate, s kg, for medical for course on competenc
qualification practical (GALLO) n. Pilot permission and otherwise conducting commercial RPAS + LAPL; > y
examination passes is needed. practical license. commercial pilots 25 kg pilot assessment
with practical and Applicants test for Medical flights license required if
certificate theoretical need to scenario S1, class requesting
(no medical) tests deliver and S2, and S3). LAPL/3. a
have an For permission
operations scenario S4:
handbook theoretical
and pass a certificate +
practical manned
test aviation
license.
RPAS > 25
kg need a
remote-
pilot license
VLOS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (in Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
scenarios
S1 and S3)
103
An important source of information for this Appendix V is the SESAR Outlook Study: http://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/European_Drones_Outlook_Study_2016.pdf.
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BVLOS Yes, detailed Yes, Yes, GALLO Yes, only in Yes, with Yes, only Yes (in Yes, only in Yes, if DAA Yes, EVLOS Yes, in No Yes, in Yes. Yes < 2 kg Yes, in Yes with
regulation requiring required segregated special in areas scenarios segregated possible segregated segregated Segregated segregate DAA in
pending prior airspace and permission reserved S2 and S4) airspace areas airspace Airspace d airspace segregated
authorisatio over clear only inside airspace
n. It is ground controlled
immediately airspace
Class 1Aa after CAA
(high risk) authorisatio
n and ANSP
approval;
free in G
airspace up
to 120 m;
Height 150 m AGL 300 ft AGL No limit. 300 m AGL. 100 m 150 m 150 m (50 100 m 120 m for < 150 m 400 ft 400 ft 120 m 120 m; toy 120 m 120 m 400 ft
limit Depending In CTR, m, scenario 20 kg 30 m (7/20 kg); <
on GALLO. maximum S2, RPAS > maximum 7 kg VLOS
100 m AGL 2 kg) outside
controlled
airspace
Operation 4 categories: >1.5 NM > 100 m Class G > 150 m Stricter Special > 1.5 km > 8 km from > 150 m > 50 m from > 150 m from > 150 > 5 km from BLOS and Dayligh > 8 km from No flight < 20 kg not
al undevelope from away from freely. No distance condition conditions from aerodromes; from vehicles, congested m from aerodromes night flight t VFR, > aerodromes; in over or
limitation d; unsettled; aerodromes; crowds; flight within from built- s to for model aerodromes. 150 m from congested people, areas, build- ; safe allowed 300 m not over controlled within 150
settled; > 0.5 NM BVLOS predefined up areas operate aircraft Not above assemblies areas; 50 buildings; > infrastructur up enough inside above urban areas or airspace, m of 1000
densely from requires buffer zones. and major over (VLOS, day crowds of of people; m from 1.8 km from e, assemblies areas, distance segregated crowds people > 50 m + persons,
populated heliports; > authorisatio If RPA > 7 kg public densely flights, not people, not over persons airfield; 1 to of persons, > crowds from people airspace; , > 50 concentration from or from
areas. < 50 m from n; > 5 km keep > 100 roads; > 5 populate in public accident congested and 3 NM from 7.5 km from of and m from s, not at night people, congested
2500 m from buildings, from m from km from d areas space in areas, areas; > 2 property. > obstacles aerodromes, people, property roads, animals, areas; not
aerodrome persons, airfields persons and civil (e.g. populated industrial km from 8 km from > 50 m from main railway property within 50
with animals, not > 150 m aerodromes MTOW < areas, away areas. aircraft in aerodrome persons roads; s m from
permission in controlled from ; > 7 kg or 7 kg) from Model flight; > 20 s > 50 m persons,
of the owner airspace congested jet engine aerodrome aircraft > 5 kg, specific from objects. >
areas. All only allowed s, etc). kg needs approval railway 20-150 kg
RPAS should from model Professiona permission required s dependent
keep safe airfields. l users can on an
distances (2 Not over choose Operating
times the densely among 4 Safety Case
actual built-up scenarios assessment
height). areas, areas
with
weekend
cottages,
camping
sites, large
open air
assemblies
of persons.
With special
permission,
down to 15-
m distance.
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9.6. Appendix VI — Abbreviated injury scale (AIS)
AIS is an anatomy-based coding system created by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive
Medicine (AAAM) to classify and describe the severity of injuries. It grades injuries in six levels, on a
scale of 0 (minor) to 6 (fatal).
These six AIS levels can be loosely correlated with the following PoF:
AIS = 1, PoF = 0 %; AIS = 2, PoF < 1 %; AIS = 3, PoF < 10 %; AIS = 4, PoF < 30 %; AIS = 5, PoF < 50 %;
AIS = 6, PoF < 100 %.
The following is a graphical representation of the feedback received from manufacturers on AIS; the
majority of the replies were not in favour of this method:
Do you estimate that injury-based criteria (AIS level)
to define UAS classes are workable and useful to
support innovative design solutions?
Yes, 4
No, 7
Graph 40. Source: EASA UAS manufacturers questionnaire 2016. Elaboration: EASA.
AIS might be complex, time consuming and costly, but provides flexibility to manufacturers. On the
contrary, other criteria such as the MTOM could be less costly and easier to apply but more rigid.
Due to many negative comments, e.g. on the potential high cost for demonstrating compliance, AIS
was not taken into consideration anymore. The following are some manufacturers replies received via
the online questionnaire, welcoming alternative simpler criteria such as MTOM or kinetic energy:
— ‘Kinetic energy as some drone have parachute systems for system failures.’
— ‘Not sure that current testing levels would be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with a given
AIS category. In this context, developing new tests and standards will be long and costly, and the
benefit is unclear if the rules framework sufficiently protects against the likelihood of an impact.’
— ‘Possibility for Kinetic Energy Density is important as it is more realistic then using weight and
kinetic energy alone.’
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