dokumendiregister.ee
OtsingAsutusedMCP
Otsing›Rahandusministeerium
Sissetulev kiriAvalik

Vastus

Rahandusministeerium · 12. mai 2022
Viit
11-4.1/395-3
Registreeritud
12. mai 2022
Dokumendi liik
Sissetulev kiri
Adressaat
Finantsinspektsioon
Saabumis/saatmisviis
e-post
Funktsioon
11 RAHVUSVAHELINE SUHTLEMINE JA KOOSTÖÖ
Sari
11-4.1 Rahvusvahelise koostöö korraldamisega seotud kirjavahetus (Arhiiviväärtuslik)
Toimik
11-4.1/2022
Vastutaja
Sören Meius (Rahandusministeerium, Kantsleri vastutusvaldkond, Finants- ja maksupoliitika valdkond, Rahandusteabe poliitika osakond)

Failid

  • 📎E-kiri.pdf74 KB
  • 📎Kiri 11.05.2022 nr 4.12-2 1836-1.asice550 KB

Sisu (failidest)

Pr Keit Pentus-Rosimannus Rahandusministeerium Suur-Ameerika tn 1 Tallinn, 10122 Teie 18.03.2022 nr 11-4.1/395-2 [email protected] Meie 11.05.2022 nr 4.12-2/1836-1 [email protected] Finantsinspektsiooni vastus Euroopa Komisjoni volinikule AMLD4 efektiivsushindamise raportiga seoses Lugupeetud proua Keit Pentus-Rosimannus Rahandusministeerium edastas Finantsinspektsioonile 18.03.2022 Euroopa Komisjoni voliniku Mairead McGuiness’i pöördumise seoses täiendava informatsiooni saamisega Eesti õiguse ja kohaldamise praktika kohta rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise valdkonnas seoses Euroopa Nõukogu koostatud 4. rahapesu tõkestamise direktiivi rakendamise aruandega. Rahandusministeerium palus Finantsinspektsioonilt abi voliniku küsimustele vastamisel. Eeltoodust lähtuvalt palume volinikule esitada Finantsinspektsiooni järgnevad vastused. EFSA’s answers to the request for information The EFSA would like to thank the CoE for the Report of 4th AMLD assessment of Estonia. The EFSA appreciates any objective external and expert feedback on its systems and processes to be able to even more effectively prevent money laundering and terrorism financing in its capacity as a financial supervision and resolution authority. The EFSA has been open in its answers in this matter throughout the assessment process and will continue its openness in the future. For this purpose EFSA would kindly like to provide the following comments: i) Regarding question 1.1 – the outreach activities to introduce of the results of the NRA to the obliged entities. The EFSA has introduced the results of 2020 National Risk Assessment (NRA) on several occasions and in different ways. (i) The results of the NRA were introduced to the market at the AML PPP Forum event on 13.10.2021, presented by the representatives from the Ministry of Finance. (ii) The results of the NRA were also introduced to obliged entities during 6 annual information days held by the EFSA to all financial sectors separately – on 7.12.2021 (credit institutions and payment institutions), on 8.12.2021 (investment firms and consumer credit providers) and on 9.12.2021 (fund management companies and life insurance providers). (iii) The EFSA has added relevant questions to the annual off-site questionnaire, that reflect new ML/TF risks identified with the NRA that are applicable to each sector. The purpose of those questions is to draw attention that those areas have higher risk and should be analysed internally by the obliged entities. (iv) With annual off-site questionnaire, EFSA also asked all obliged entities to provide an analysis to compare the results of the NRA and their own risk assessment documents. That is how the EFSA guaranteed that the obliged entities have analysed the results of the NRA in context of the ML and TF risks connected to their business model. (v) Furthermore, the EFSA has conducted two off-site inspections to the credit institutions and payment institutions based on the higher risks identified with the NRA. One of them was regarding the risks related to virtual assets service providers, and the other one covering the company service providers’ risks. The purpose of those inspections was to draw attention to those high risk areas and to assess the impact of those risks to the financial sector. ii) Regarding question 1.2 – measures to address repeated deficiencies in risk understanding of entities. The EFSA has taken several steps to guarantee that the obliged entities understand ML and TF risks, including the following: (i) In 2021, the EFSA conducted a Sectorial Risk Assessment (SRA) in order to assess the ML and TF risks in the financial sector. The results of the SRA were introduced to the obliged entities during the AML PPP Forum event on 13.10.2021, during annual information days, and with a “Dear CEO” letter sent to all obliged entities under the supervision of the EFSA. (ii) The EFSA has organized an AML PPP forum for the market, where obliged entities from all financial sectors were invited to participate. During the first AML PPP forum meeting held in October, where NRA and SRA were introduced, the ministry of finance and EFSA introduced current ML/TF risks in Estonia to more than 300 participants from all financial sectors. (iii) The EFSA has introduced the current ML/TF risks each time the annual information days take place, where ML/TF risks are introduced to each financial sector separately to cover most relevant risks to each sector. (iv) The EFSA has provided the obliged entities guidelines to assist them on identifying and mitigating risks – the EFSA’s advisory guidelines “Organisational solutions and preventive measures for credit and financial institutions to take against money laundering and terrorist financing” (AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA). According to point 3.3.1 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA1, obliged entities must keep their risk assessment documents up to date. According to Section 14(6) of the MLTFPA and point 3.7.2 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, obliged entities must train their employees, including providing information about ML and TF risks related to the institution. The AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA was approved by the Management Board of the EFSA and was introduced to the market in 2018, it explains the obligations that are set by the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act (MLTFPA) and is, therefore, enforceable. EFSA checks the fulfilment of these obligations during licensing proceedings, on-site inspections and off-site inspections. (v) In Annexes 1 and 2 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has bought out risks and methods of ML and TF relevant to Estonia. According to the results of the SRA, these risks and methods are 1The AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA have been established by resolution no. 1.1-7/172 of the Management Board of EFSA of 26 November 2018. Accessible at: https://www.fi.ee/sites/default/files/2019- 01/FI%20rahapesu%20t%C3%B5kestamise%20juhend%202018%20%28EN%29_pdf.pdf 2/8 relevant also in 2021 and the obliged entities are able to improve their AML/CFT measures based on those lists. (vi) In cases of high ML/TF risks known to the EFSA, the EFSA has every time introduced any higher risk situation to the market with a relevant memorandum. In the memorandum, the EFSA has explained, what is the higher risk situation or factor, where the obliged entities need to pay special attention to and apply enhanced due diligence measures. For example, every time the Financial Action Task Force updates the list of jurisdictions that are under increased monitoring (the Gray List), the EFSA has sent a relevant memorandum to the obliged entities. The EFSA has also addressed, for example, the risks related to virtual assets service providers identified via NRA with the a relevant memorandum sent to the obliged entities. The EFSA will continue with these practices to address any higher risk situations or risk factors identified in the future to guarantee the correct and timely understanding of ML and TF risks by the obliged entities under the supervision of the EFSA. iii) Regarding question 1.3 – ensuring that the internal policies, controls and procedures and risk assessments are regularly updated and verified; contribution to the SRA. Obliged entities have an obligation to keep their internal policies, procedures, risk mitigation measures, and risk assessments up-to-date. With annual off-site questionnaire, the EFSA asks the obliged entities to provide information on when their internal policies and procedures were updated and checks from their answers whether their controls are in compliance with the relevant obligations. The obliged entities must also provide their latest risk assessment document when answering the off-site questionnaire, therefore, the EFSA has information regarding the date when the documents were last updated. In case the documents have not been updated regularly or the obliged entity does not have controls that are in compliance with the AML/CFT obligations, the EFSA will require the institution to update the relevant documents or will conduct a query, off-site inspection or on-site inspection, proportionally to the risks. The deficiencies identified based on answers to the annual off-site questionnaires are taken into account in the Risk-Based Approach model that also calculates the risk level of each financial sector and therefore affects the supervisory intensity of these institutions. The risk assessments conducted by obliged entities are based on different methodologies and are based on specific and different services provided by each institution. The results are, therefore, not strictly comparable and attributable to the whole sector or sub-sector. The methodology of the first SRA did not use the results of institutions’ own risk assessments as a source. The methodology of the first SRA focused mainly on statistical analysis. The EFSA is in a process of renewing the SRA methodology, so that the SRA is more streamlined and focused on statistical analysis of financial flows. The inclusion of deficiencies identified during the application of the Risk-Based Approach model, incl. in the effectiveness of the risk mitigating measures (including internal policies, procedures and risk assessment document) into the SRA methodology and output is under consideration. iv) Regarding question 1.4 – ensuring that sufficient guidance on the development of internal policies, controls and procedures is provided to obliged entities, and that their implementation is monitored on an ongoing basis as part of off-site inspections. The AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA gives detailed information regarding the AML/CFT obligations and, therefore, it helps the obliged entities to develop their internal procedures, controls and policies. The AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA explains the obligations of the MLTFPA and international standards. In addition, chapter 3.8 “Establishment of and requirements for rules of procedure” is dedicated to provide guidance on the development of internal policies, controls and procedures. 3/8 Before the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA entered into force, the obliged entities were given an opportunity to comment the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA and that opportunity was actively used. EFSA has encouraged the obliged entities during annual information days to turn to EFSA whenever there is a question regarding the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA or when there are questions regarding the implementation of the MLTFPA or ML/TF risks. The internal policies, controls and procedures are assessed by the EFSA continuously throughout the “lifecycle” of an obligated entity. Firstly, they are assessed (incl. their effectiveness) during the licensing procedure – in case the internal procedures are not in compliance with the requirements from the MLTFPA or effective in managing the ML/TF risks rising from the individual business model, the institution will not receive a license. With annual off-site questionnaires, the EFSA requests the obliged entities to describe the principles from their internal procedures to assess whether the procedures are in compliance with the regulations. In addition, the EFSA asks obliged entities to provide internal audit and compliance function reports with the annual off-site questionnaire – those help the EFSA to have an overview about the implementation of internal procedures by obliged entities via off-site inspections. In addition, the EFSA conducts on-site inspections, where the correctness and implementation of internal procedures is assessed each time. Therefore, the EFSA assesses regularly the correctness and implementation of the internal procedures of the obliged entities. The EFSA also assesses the internal policies, controls and procedures of obliged entities during planned or ad hoc off-site activities. v) Regarding question 2.1 – ensuring that the obliged entities are aware of their duty to verify customer information against reliable and independent sources and they know what the supervisors regard as reliable and independent source. In points 4.3.1.17–4.3.1.21 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has explained, what is a reliable and independent source and how the information should be verified. The EFSA has constantly communicated, e.g during the annual information days, to the obliged entities that it is not acceptable to rely on the information received from the commercial registers and that further verification is needed. Therefore, the EFSA has regularly given guidance regarding the obligation to verify customer information against reliable and independent sources. The EFSA has also solidified this approach in its on-site inspections, where during sample testing it is validated, whether the obliged entity has indeed fulfilled their duty to verify customer information against reliable and independent sources as described in the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA and informed by the EFSA. Based on the findings, the EFSA has issued a precept, as well as a fine to ensure the obliged entities fulfill their duty to verify customer information. vi) Regarding question 2.2 – increasing the understanding of obliged entities with regards to the steps to be taken in the onboarding of corporate clients. The EFSA has provided specific guidance on onboarding corporate clients in the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA. In chapter 4 “Due diligence measures in respect of customers and third parties” due diligence measures applied when entering into a business relationships with legal entities are separately described. Separate sub-chapters are dedicated to due diligence measures regarding legal entities, incl. risk-based approach, identification of legal entities and their representative, identification of the beneficial owner of a legal entity, verification of information, etc (sub-chapters 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 of the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA). vii) Regarding question 2.3 – informing the obliged entities on the changes made to the law regarding measures to be applied when establishing a business relationship with politically exposed persons, irrespective of them being local or foreign politically exposed persons. At the time of writing this answer, the changes in the legislation regarding politically exposed persons have not entered into force yet. Nevertheless, the EFSA would like to highlight that the EFSA has introduced changes in AML/CFT obligations to the market during the annual information days, during 4/8 AML PPP forum or via memorandums sent to the obliged entities. Regarding politically exposed persons, AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA provide specific guidelines on identification of both local and foreign politically exposed persons in sub-chapter 4.3.4. viii) Regarding question 2.4 – informing the obliged entities on the risk-based measures they need to have in place for the identification of politically exposed persons. Obliged entities must identify politically exposed persons every time when onboarding a new client and later monitor during the customer relationship whether a client has become a politically exposed person (Section 20(1) point 5 of the MLTFPA). The EFSA has informed the obliged entities on the risk-based measures they need to have in place for the identification of politically exposed persons in the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA. In points 4.3.4.4 and 4.3.4.10 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has explained, when a client with a status of politically exposed person should be considered as a high risk politically exposed person. In points 4.3.4.14–4.3.4.17 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has explained the measures that should be taken for identification of a high-risk politically exposed person, and in points 4.3.4.18–4.3.4.20 of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has explained the measures that should be taken in respect of a high-risk politically exposed person. Therefore, the guidance referred to in the question is already given to the obliged entities by the EFSA. The EFSA has introduced the AML/CFT Guidelines to obliged entities several times throughout its adoption, including through the use of a hearing process. ix) Regarding question 2.5 – verification of obliged entities’ outsourcing practices by the supervisors. The requirements set on outsourcing customer due diligence obligations are set in Section 24(2) of the MLTFPA and requirements to the relevant cooperation agreement are set in Section 24(3) of the MLTFPA. In section 4.8.1. of the AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA, the EFSA has further explained the requirements set for outsourcing the obligation to apply due diligence measures. EFSA has published the EBA Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements on its web-page, letting the obliged entities know about the requirements set on outsourcing on the European Union level. It has been established by law (Section 24(7) of the MLTFPA), that the obliged entity who relies on data gathered by another person or who has outsourced an activity to another person is responsible for compliance with requirements arising from the MLTFPA. According to Section 24(4) of the MLTFPA, information on the conclusion and termination of an outsourcing contract is made available to the competent supervisory authority in advance. Therefore the obliged entities provide the EFSA with information on their outsourcing partners. During the licensing proceedings, the EFSA asks information regarding the outsourcing and asks to provide at least the relevant internal procedure and draft cooperation agreement when the entity applying for license is planning to outsource the due diligence obligations to a third party. The EFSA then verifies, whether the internal procedures and the cooperation agreement are in compliance with the relevant obligations set in the MLTFPA. During ongoing supervision, the EFSA also collects information regarding outsourcing. For example, the EFSA asks with the annual off-site questionnaires whether the obliged entity has outsourced any AML obligations to third parties and, what are the volumes of business or number of customers onboarded via such entities, and whether the obliged entity has provided training to those entities. During one thematic on-site inspection, the EFSA was assessing the determination of customer risk rating and two of the entities had outsourced most of the AML/CFT obligations inside their financial group to the bank. The EFSA verified, whether the process of determining customers’ risk rating was done properly by the institutions assessed, since they retained the ultimate responsibility for that obligation. 5/8 Therefore, the EFSA collects information regarding outsourcing before and during the outsourcing agreement has been signed and takes further relevant supervisory actions, if necessary. x) Regarding question 3.2 – taking steps to inform obliged entities of the risks emanating from both legal entities and arrangements, the need to identify their corporate and beneficial ownership structure and report any deficiency to the authority in charge of the register. The EFSA informs obliged entities under its supervision of AML/CFT risks identified relevant to the services provided. The EFSA uses several tools for this purpose: the risks identified in the NRA and SRA were introduced to obliged entities during the PPP forum on 13.10.2022 and during sector-specific information days in the beginning of December. Additionally, a “Dear CEO” letter regarding the outcomes of the SRA was sent to CEO-s of obliged entities. More specifically, the obliged entities are informed of the risks emanating from legal entities and arrangements in the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA. Annexes 1 and 2 of the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EfSA specifically present the risks and methods on how Estonia can be misused for money laundering and terrorism financing, which in turn specifically describe the risks emanating from legal entities and arrangements and what are the relevant risk factors. Identification of corporate and beneficial ownership structure is specifically described in chapter 4 “Due diligence measures in respect of customers and third parties”. Separate sub-chapters are dedicated to identification of legal entities and their representative, identification of the beneficial owner of a legal entity, verification of information, etc (sub-chapters 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 of the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA). In relation to legal arrangements, Estonia’s legal system is person-based, meaning that legal arrangements do not exist as entities or vehicles of legal capacity, Estonia does not recognise trusts nor other arrangements according to the law and principles of law. Legal capacity capacity (as the capacity to have civil rights and perform civil obligations) is attributed only to either natural or legal persons. If a trust or a legal arrangement of another country wishes to establish a business relationship with Estonian obliged entities, the ultimate beneficial owners must be identified and they are treated as customers, who are natural persons and have representatives. Pursuant to point 4.3.1.29 of the AML/CFT Guidelines of the EFSA, if the obliged entity ascertains that transactions or actions are actually performed on behalf of a third party, and the content of the activities suggests the possible activities of a trust, the obliged entity must take all measures to identify the beneficial owner of the trust within the meaning of point 4.3.3 of these Guidelines and perform all actions to ascertain the actual purpose of the business relationship within the meaning of point 4.3.6 of these Guidelines. For the purposes of the General Part of the Civil Code Act, this may mean that a business relationship with such a trust cannot be established, as the person who actually wants to establish the business relationship or perform the act is a trust that does not have legal capacity pursuant to Estonian law. The AML/CFT Guideline of the EFSA has been introduced to obliged entities several times, including through a hearing process before its adoption. In case the name of the beneficial owner known to the obliged entity does not match with the name in the database, the legal acts foresee that the obliged entity must notify the authority in charge of the register. According to Section 50 of the Commercial Register Act, if the entry in the register is incorrect, the interested person may request the legal person to correct the incorrect entry. According to Section 9(1) of the regulation for the establishment and operation of a database of beneficial owners, an obligated entity within the meaning of Section 3(3) of the MLTFPA performs the obligation provided for in Section 20(24) of the MLTFPA by submitting a notification to the registrar in the database through the commercial register information system. This obligation has entered into force very recently – 07.03.2022. The EFSA plans to inform the obliged entities of relevant changes in legislation during PPP forum or information days. 6/8 xi) Regarding question 5.5 – steps taken by the supervisors to increase the reporting from non-financial sector obliged entities (particularly by legal professions) and supervisors, and to improve the quality of reporting by credit and financial institutions. Regarding the FIU reporting by the EFSA, the EFSA would like to clarify the way the EFSA has been sending reports to the Estonian Financial Intelligence Unit (EFIU) and to the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). There is an agreement between the EFSA, the FIU and LEAs to exchange information within and during larger supervisory cases and when suspicions detected by EFSA and those information exchanges have been the main basis for proceeding such cases by FIU and LEAs. In these supervisory cases, the EFSA has shared with the EFIU and the LEAs the full-scope on-site inspection reports of the EFSA resulting in findings of serious deficiencies in the implementation of the reporting requirements. The EFSA has sent full-case analysis (multiple times 300+ pages) to the EFIU instead of single separate STRs. Such full-case analysis may contain tens or even hundreds of STRs and will take less time for the EFIU and the LEAs to analyse and have the whole understanding of the schemes of suspicious transactions between different customer groups that were identified during the inspection. This agreement served the purpose of providing both the EFIU and LEAs with a holistic picture of the full possible ML case with all relevant actors identified and placed in these possible schemes. Providing the full-case analysis instead of hundreds of separate STRs allowed the EFIU and the LEAs to save time from connecting each transaction that would have been reported separately and react to the suspicious activities as soon as possible. Based on above, the EFSA is confident that reporting separate STRs by the EFSA would not be as efficient and does not serve the purpose of effective information exchange between authorities. Regarding the improvement of the quality of reporting by credit and financial institutions, the EFSA would like to explain that in the cooperation agreement between the EFSA and the EFIU it has been agreed that the responsibility to train the obliged entities regarding the quality of reporting is in the competence of the EFIU. The EFSA will, nevertheless, continue to assess the quality of the reporting obligation during on-site inspections, as it has done continuously so far. xii) Regarding question 6.3 – EFSA’s steps on refining the sectoral and individual risk assessment method to ensure robust conclusions and flexibility to integrate developments in the regulatory and risk context. (i) EFSA has validated its Risk-Based Approach model (individual risk assessment tool) during 2021– 2022 with the help of United States Treasury Office of Technical Assistance. The validation process will conclude with a new RBA-model starting from 2021 that will also take into account the risks and vulnerabilities identified with the NRA and the SRA that have not been covered in the RBA-model previously. It is important to note, that while the risk ratings of the institutions changed during the validation, the order of the institutions by the risk level did not change. All of the institutions that had higher risk than average have always received an on-site inspection and, therefore, appropriate supervisory activities were applied regardless of the name of the risk rating given by the unvalidated RBA-model previously. (ii) The SRA conducted by EFSA in 2021 was first of its kind and the methodology for the next SRA is under development. The EFSA is planning to conduct the next SRA during 2022. (iii) In terms of the distribution of supervisory resources, the EFSA would like to highlight that appropriate resources are given to the sectors with highest risk and biggest operating volumes. After immediately resolving the most pressing AML-risks, such as two high-risk credit institutions cases, the EFSA has indeed made, as a planned course of action, extensive efforts over the last 3–4 years in terms of taking more supervisory actions, including targeted and thematic on-site inspections to cover institutions, which entail higher risks and to determine a base line for other institutions. As a clarification on the distribution of supervisory resources between types of entities, it must be noted that the risk levels of obliged entities at the end of 2019 were established in the beginning of 2020. Therefore, the supervisory actions taken in 2020 are more appropriate as a point of connection. As 7/8 such, in 2020, in terms of all supervisory interventions (on-site inspections and off-site surveillance), the respective indicators are 57 actions with respect to banks, 5 actions with respect to investment firms, 28 actions with respect to PSPs and 10 actions in relation to life insurance companies comprising, respectively, 57%, 5%, 28% and 10 % of all supervisory interventions in the relevant year for these sectors. It must also be borne in mind that it is not always possible to achieve “digital” consistency in supervision between RBA numbers and day-to-day activities, as the weight, importance, but also length of specific procedures of different supervisory actions vary. Considering that the EFSA applies risk-based supervision, the concrete separation of resources (so that each sector would be dealt with a certain number of EFSA’s employees) would not be efficient, especially to guarantee flexibility and efficiency of supervision in the changing risk environment. Based on this, there is always room for better distribution of resources, but all areas of higher risk have always been awarded supervisory resources relatively proportionally. xiii) Regarding question 7.1 – recently applied sanctions. Most on-site inspections conducted by EFSA during 2020 and 2021 ended with an obligation to provide an action plan to remedy the shortcomings found during the inspections. From 01.01.2021 until 30.04.2022, the EFSA has applied the following sanctions for deficiencies identified regarding non-compliance with AML/CFT and TFS obligations: (i) 09.03.2021 Precept to a Credit Institution to improve its AML systems and controls related to correspondent relationships (https://www.fi.ee/en/news/finantsinspektsioon-instructed-lhv- pank-improve-its-anti-money-laundering-controls); (ii) 24.08.2021 Precept to a Credit Institution to improve its AML systems and controls (https://www.fi.ee/en/news/baltic-supervisory-authorities-are-instructing-luminor-improve- its-anti-money-laundering-systems); (iii) 11.03.2022 Precept to an Investment Firm to prohibit onboarding new customers (https://www.fi.ee/en/news/finantsinspektsioon-has-banned-kit-finance-estonia-entering- business-relations-new-clients). Täiendavate küsimuste korral oleme nendele meeleldi valmis vastama. Lugupidamisega /allkirjastatud digitaalselt/ Andre Nõmm juhatuse liige Liisi Mets 668 0573 [email protected] 8/8 Saatja: Triin Hünninen <[email protected]> Saadetud: 11.05.2022 16:49 Adressaat: RAM Info <[email protected]>; Sören Meius <[email protected]> Teema: Kiri nr 4.12-2/1836-1 Tere Saadame Teile Finantsinspektsiooni kirja nr 4.12-2/1836-1, mille leiate digiallkirjastatult manusest. Lugupidamisega Triin Hünninen Juhatuse liikme assistent | Assistant of the Member of the Management Board Finantsinspektsioon &#43; 372 668 0543 KONFIDENTSIAALSUSTEADE: Käesolev elektronkiri ja selle lisad on adresseeritud üksnes selle saajaks märgitud isikule ning on konfidentsiaalsed. Elektronkirja või selle osa avalikuks tegemine või loata kasutamine ei ole lubatud. Kiri iseseisvalt ei loo õigussuhteid ega ole käsitletav lepinguna. Juhul, kui olete saanud käesoleva teate ekslikult, siis palume teil sellest koheselt teavitada sõnumi saatjat elektronkirja teel ning kustutada elektronkiri koos kõikide selle lisadega oma arvutisüsteemist. CONFIDENTIALITY DISCLAIMER: The e-mail and its attachments are intended only for the use of the person to whom it is addressed and is confidential. Any unauthorised disclosure or dissemination, either in whole or in part, is prohibited. This e-mail does not create any legal relations nor be treated as contract. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender via e-mail and delete this e-mail and its attachments from your system.
Allikas: Rahandusministeerium dokumendiregister →
dokumendiregister.eeAsutusedEesti avalike dokumendiregistrite otsing · nimistu.ee andmetel