Kaja Kallas
Peaminister
Keit Pentus-Rosimannus 02.03.2022 nr 10.1-13/222-1
Rahandusminister
Eva-Maria Liimets
Välisminister
Maris Lauri
Justiitsminister
Austatud peaminister, ministrid
Edastame teile Euroopa Komisjoni presidendi Ursula von der Leyeni 02.03.2022 kirja
('Conditionality Regulation' Guidelines).
Lugupidamisega
Aivo Orav
Alaline esindaja
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2. C(2022) 1382 - Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 2020/2092
on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (39 lk)
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 2.3.2022
C(2022) 1382 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 2020/2092 on a
general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget
EN EN
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The European Union is based on the rule of law1. Respect for the rule of law is one of
the values on which the Union is founded, which are common to the Member States, as
set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in the preambles to the
TEU and to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
2. The Union budget is one of the main instruments to express the principle of solidarity
(Article 2 TEU), one of the fundamental principles of Union law, based on the mutual
trust between the Member States to responsibly use common resources from the Union
budget. However, that mutual trust is itself based on the commitment of each and every
Member State to comply with the obligations incumbent upon it under European Union
law and to continuously respect the values contained in Article 2 TEU, which include
the value of the rule of law. Compliance by a Member State with the values contained
in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from the
application of the Treaties to that Member State2.
3. The Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union
budget3 (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’) aims at protecting the Union budget against
breaches of the principles of the rule of law that affect or seriously risk affecting its
sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union in a
sufficiently direct way. The Conditionality Regulation is a permanent instrument
applying beyond the limits of a given multiannual financial framework.4
4. The purpose of these guidelines is to explain five aspects of the Conditionality
Regulation: (i) the conditions for the adoption of measures; (ii) the relation between the
Conditionality Regulation and other instruments; (iii) the proportionality of the
measures to be proposed to the Council; (iv) the procedure and assessment process; and
(v) the protection of the rights of final recipients or beneficiaries.
5. These guidelines are not legally binding and do not create or alter any right or
obligation as compared to those laid down in the TEU and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Financial Regulation 5 , the
1
See judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament, C-294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, paragraph
23. See also the judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru, C-896/19,
ECLI:EU:C:2021:311, paragraphs 61 to 65.
2
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 126 and 129.
3
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, OJ L 433I,
22.12.2020, p. 1.
4
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 188.
5
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on
the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.
1
Conditionality Regulation, the OLAF Regulation 6 , the EPPO Regulation 7 or other
relevant Union acts, as interpreted by the Court of Justice and the General Court (the
‘Court of Justice of the European Union’8).
2. CONDITIONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES
6. The objective of the Conditionality Regulation is the protection of the Union budget in
the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a Member State. The
Conditionality Regulation sets out a series of conditions that must be fulfilled to initiate
the procedure established by it.
7. In accordance with Article 4(1) of the Conditionality Regulation, ‘[a]ppropriate
measures shall be taken where it is established in accordance with Article 6 that
breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a Member State affect or seriously risk
affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the
financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way’. Pursuant to Article 4(2),
breaches of the principles of the rule of law shall concern one or more of the situations
referred to in that Article. Where that is the case, those breaches fall within the scope of
the Conditionality Regulation.
8. The Commission will initiate the procedure set out in Article 6 of the Conditionality
Regulation where it finds that the conditions set out in Article 4 are met. The Court of
Justice has held that these conditions are met only where the Commission finds that
there are reasonable grounds to consider that (i) at least one of the rule of law principles
referred to in Article 2(a) of the Conditionality Regulation has been breached in a
Member State, (ii) the said breach concerns at least one of the situations attributable to
an authority of a Member State or at least one instance of conduct of such authorities
referred to in Article 4(2) of that Regulation, in so far as those situations or that conduct
is relevant to the sound financial management of the Union budget or for the protection
of the Union’s financial interests, (iii) the said breach affects or risks seriously affecting
that sound financial management or those financial interests, in a sufficiently direct
way, with a genuine9 or real link between those breaches and that effect or serious risk
of effect10. When the conditions of Article 4 are met, the Commission will initiate the
6
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L
248, 18.9.2013, p. 1.
7
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1.
8
See Article 19(1) TEU.
9
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 165.
10
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 288.
2
procedure unless it considers that other procedures set out in Union legislation would
allow it to protect the Union budget more effectively. That procedure ensures the
protection of the procedural rights of the Member State concerned.
9. When assessing cases under the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission will apply
a comprehensive, proactive, risk-based and targeted approach, aiming at ensuring its
effective application and thus at safeguarding the Union budget and protecting the
Union’s financial interests.
2.1. Relevant breaches of the principles of the rule of law
10. The Court of Justice has clarified that Article 2(a) of the Conditionality Regulation
‘states… that the concept of ‘the rule of law’, as defined for the purposes of the
application of the said regulation, ‘shall be understood having regard to the other
Union values and principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU’. It follows that respect for
those values and principles – in so far as they form part of the very definition of the
value of ‘the rule of law’ contained in Article 2 TEU or, as is apparent from the second
sentence of that article, are closely linked to a society that respects the rule of law –
may be required in the context of a horizontal conditionality mechanism such as that
established by the contested regulation.’11
11. Article 2(a) of the Conditionality Regulation merely sets out, for the sole purposes of
that Regulation, a number of the principles that it covers and which are the most
relevant in the light of its purpose, which is to ensure the protection of the Union
budget. 12 That provision is not intended to provide an exhaustive definition of the
concept of rule of law.
12. As regards fundamental rights, the Court has clarified that the reference to them ‘is
made only by way of illustration of the requirements of the principle of effective judicial
protection’. The principle of non-discrimination, by contrast, is part of the definition of
the rule of law in its own right: ‘it is clear that a Member State whose society is
characterised by discrimination cannot be regarded as ensuring respect for the rule of
law, within the meaning of that common value’.13
13. Recital 15 of the Conditionality Regulation refers to ‘individual breaches’ and to
‘breaches that are widespread or due to recurrent practices or omissions by public
authorities, or to general measures adopted by such authorities.’ The Conditionality
Regulation covers both individual and systemic breaches, which are covered in so far as
11
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 154.
12
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 227.
13
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 229 and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 324.
3
they are relevant for the sound financial management of the Union budget or for the
protection of the Union’s financial interests.’ Thus, the Commission can assess both
actions or failures to act by the public authorities.
14. Article 3 of the Conditionality Regulation is intended to facilitate the application of the
Conditionality Regulation by providing a list of situations that may be indicative of
breaches of the principles of the rule of law14. As this list is merely indicative, other
actions, practices or omissions of public authorities or other legal situations covered by
Article 4(1) of the Regulation may be relevant under the Conditionality Regulation.
15. The Court has held that ‘there is a clear relationship between, on the one hand, respect
for the value of the rule of law and, on the other hand, the efficient implementation of
the Union budget, in accordance with the principles of sound financial management,
and the protection of the financial interests of the Union’15. The Court has added that
‘sound financial management and those financial interests are liable to be seriously
compromised by breaches of the principles of the rule of law committed in a Member
State, since those breaches may result, inter alia, in there being no guarantee that
expenditure covered by the Union budget satisfies all the financing conditions laid
down by EU law […]’.16
16. The Court has held that compliance with those financing conditions and objectives
pursued by the Union when it finances expenditure ‘cannot be fully guaranteed in the
absence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law; the
existence of such review, both in the Member States and at EU level, by independent
courts and tribunals, is of the essence of the rule of law’17. This is without prejudice to
the requirement of a sufficiently direct link to the Union budget.
17. Breaches of the principles of the rule of law shall concern one or more of the situations
or conducts of relevant public authorities or attributable to such authorities, insofar as
they are relevant for the sound financial management of the Union budget or for the
protection of the financial interests of the Union18.
18. The Court has held that such relevance can be presumed as regards the activities of the
authorities referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 4(2) of the Conditionality
14
A list of indicative breaches of the principles of the rule of law is also included in Annex I to the
Guidelines.
15
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 130; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 148.
16
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 131; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 149.
17
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 132; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 150.
18
An indicative list of these specific situations is also included in Annex I to the Guidelines.
4
Regulation, namely the authorities implementing the Union budget and carrying out
financial control, monitoring and audit19.
19. Regarding investigation and public prosecution services, the proper functioning of those
services is caught, under point (c) of that provision, only in so far as it relates to
breaches of EU law concerning the implementation of the Union budget or the
protection of the financial interests of the Union. The same applies to the prevention
and sanctioning, by national courts or administrative authorities, of the breaches of EU
law mentioned in point (e). As regards the judicial review referred to in point (d), it is
caught only in so far as it concerns the conduct of the authorities referred to in points
(a) to (c). The recovery of funds unduly paid, provided for in point (f), covers only
funds from the Union budget, which is also the case for cooperation with OLAF and the
EPPO, mentioned in point (g). Lastly, point (h) expressly refers to any other situations
or conduct of authorities that are relevant to the sound financial management of the
Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union.20.
20. The consequence of this understanding is that, as regards national authorities whose
activities are general and not confined to the implementation or protection of the Union
budget, their conduct or situations that constitute a breach of the principles of the rule
of law will only fall within the scope of the Regulation insofar as it is relevant for the
sound financial management of the Union budget or for the protection of the Union’s
financial interests.
21. The Commission notes that, among these specific situations or conduct of public
authorities, non-effective or untimely cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitutes
a ground for action under the Conditionality Regulation21. As regards the EPPO22, the
scope of this cooperation includes the obligation for the competent national authorities
of the Member States participating in the EPPO to actively assist and support the
criminal investigations and prosecutions of the EPPO23. As regards OLAF, the scope of
this cooperation includes the right for OLAF 24 to carry out on-the-spot checks and
inspections, with the assistance needed to carry them out effectively , and to have
access to the relevant information, data and documents either to decide whether or not
to open an investigation or to carry out investigations effectively and without undue
delay. It also includes the related obligations for the Member State concerned,
19
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v. Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 143.
20
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/-21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 143.
21
See point (g) of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Conditionality Regulation.
22
See relevant provisions of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, cited above.
23
This is without prejudice to the obligations of non-participating Member States to cooperate with the
EPPO, under applicable Union rules, when it exercises its competences in participating Member States
and requires such cooperation.
24
In line with the provisions of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, cited above.
5
including 25 to: (i) inform OLAF 26 , (ii) provide OLAF with the assistance needed in
order to carry out its tasks effectively in the conduct of such investigation27, (iii) take
appropriate precautionary measures, in particular measures to safeguard relevant
evidence28, (iv) take appropriate action on the basis of information provided by OLAF,
before OLAF takes a decision whether or not to open an investigation29, and (v) ensure
appropriate and timely follow-up to OLAF reports and recommendations upon
completion of its investigations, reporting back to OLAF on the action taken30.
22. Compliance by the Member State concerned with these obligations is indeed essential
to ensure an effective protection of the financial interests of the Union. The
Commission will therefore monitor the effective and timely cooperation with OLAF, in
view of the principles established in Article 3 of the Conditionality Regulation. This is
particularly important for Member States that do not participate in the enhanced
cooperation regarding the EPPO, as in those Member States, OLAF is competent to
investigate allegations of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the
financial interests of the Union. Moreover, a systematic lack of follow-up of OLAF
recommendations may amount to conduct of public authorities that could be concerned
by a breach of the principles of the rule of law under the Conditionality Regulation.
23. Furthermore, Article 4(2)(h) covers any other situations or conduct of authorities that
are relevant to the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of
the financial interests of the Union. The Court has held that Article 4(2)(h) has to be
interpreted in conjunction with Article 4(1), which is the ‘the very core of the horizontal
conditionality mechanism established by that regulation’31 The Court has also held that
Article 4(2) of the Conditionality Regulation, ‘in particular point (h) thereof, is neither
such as to render non-exhaustive the situations covered by the conditionality
mechanism established by the contested regulation nor insufficiently precise to form
part of it’.32
24. To give one possible example, a situation or conduct of (or omissions by) authorities
within the meaning of Article 4(2)(h) of the Conditionality Regulation may cover the
proper functioning of the authorities in charge of land registries and of related controls
25
These obligations are foreseen in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. The list provided in these
Guidelines is not exhaustive.
26
Article 8 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.
27
Article 3 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.
28
Article 7(7) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.
29
Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.
30
Article 11(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.
31
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v. Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 294.
32
See judgements of 16 February 2022, Hungary v. Parliament and Council, C-156/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 301; and Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21,
ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 173.
6
on leasing and/or ownership of agricultural land (including law enforcement actions,
where appropriate), insofar as such leasing and/or ownership is relevant to the receipt of
subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy of the Union.
25. It is worth recalling that the Conditionality Regulation applies to all EU funds. In this
respect, the co-legislators have also clarified that the Conditionality Regulation may be
triggered where the proper functioning of the authorities implementing their Recovery
and Resilience Plans is not ensured, in line with Article 8 of Regulation EU) 2021/241
(‘RRF Regulation’) 33 . The Court of Justice also clarified that the Conditionality
Regulation can also relate to breaches of the principles of the rule of law affecting the
collection of the Union’s own resources34.
2.2. Effects on the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection
of the financial interests of the Union
26. According to Article 4(1) of the Conditionality Regulation, for a given conduct or
situation to fall within the scope of the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission
needs to identify a breach of the principles of the rule of law and to assess whether such
a breach (i) affects, or seriously risks affecting, the sound financial management of the
Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union, (ii) in a
sufficiently direct way. This assessment should be made on a case-by-case basis.
27. The first condition in paragraph 24 above (see point (i): ‘affects’), requires that the
identified breach of the principles of the rule of law has an effect on the sound financial
management of the Union budget or on the financial interests of the Union.
28. That effect may consist, first, in implementing the Union budget in a way that is not
compliant with the principles of sound financial management as enshrined in Article
317 TFEU and in the rules adopted for the implementation of the Union budget. In
particular, Article 2(59) of the Financial Regulation defines ‘sound financial
management’ as ‘implementation of the budget in accordance with the principles of
economy, efficiency and effectiveness’. Articles 33 to 36 of the Financial Regulation
set out in more detail the meaning, scope and consequences of those principles.
29. Second, that effect may also be established in relation to breaches of the principles of
the rule of law that are detrimental to the protection of the financial interests of the
Union, eshrined in Article 325 TFEU and in the relevant secondary legislation. In
particular, according to Article 63(2) of the Financial Regulation, this covers all
legislative, regulatory and administrative measures designed, inter alia, to prevent,
detect and correct irregularities and fraud in the implementation of the budget. The
33
Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021
establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility , OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.
34
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 186.
7
‘financial interests of the Union’ are defined in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 883/2013
as including ‘revenues, expenditures and assets covered by the budget of the European
Union and those covered by the budgets of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
and the budgets managed and monitored by them’. Moreover, according to the case law
of the Court of Justice, the concept of ‘financial interests of the Union’, within the
meaning of Article 325(1) TFEU, encompasses both revenue made available to the
Union budget but also expenditure covered by that budget35.
30. Furthermore, when determining the extent of the effect on the Union budget or the
financial interests of the Union, the Commission will duly take into account criteria
such as the nature, duration, seriousness and scope of the identified breaches of the
principles of the rule of law, which may vary depending on the characteristics of those
breaches.36 In addition, the intention of the relevant Member State to put an end to the
breach of the principles of the rule of law, including the degree of its cooperation with
the Commission under the Conditionality Regulation may be relevant, among others,
for the purpose of measuring the impact, duration and scope of the relevant breach on
the sound financial management of the Union budget or the financial interests of the
Union37.
31. As regards the situation where breaches of the principles of the rule of law entail a
‘serious risk’ affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the
protection of the financial interests of the Union, the Court has found that ‘it would be
incompatible with the requirements of sound financial management of the Union budget
and the protection of the financial interests of the Union to limit the adoption of
appropriate measures to cases of proven effects on that sound financial management or
those financial interests Such limitation would be liable to compromise the purpose of
the … Regulation.’38 The prevention of the effects referred to in Article 4(1) of the
Regulation is ‘a permanent and horizontal requirement of EU financial legislation’.39 A
“serious risk” may be established in cases where the effects of the relevant breach of the
principles of the rule of law, although not yet proven, can nevertheless be reasonably
35
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 265; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 297.
36
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 331; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 361.
37
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 332.
38
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 262.
39
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 266; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 298.
8
foreseen, since there is a high probability that they will occur40. It must therefore be
demonstrated that the risk has a high probability of occurring, in relation to the
situations or to the forms of conduct of the authorities referred to in Article 4(2) of the
Conditionality Regulation. For instance, if certain acts of national authorities
implementing Union funds through public procurement, or collecting the Union’s own
resources, or carrying out financial control, monitoring and audit of Union funds, or
investigating allegations of fraud, corruption or other breaches of Union law in the
implementation of Union funds or revenue, cannot be effectively reviewed by fully
independent courts, this may entail a serious risk insofar as the Union funds and the
financial interests of the Union are concerned.
32. Finally, it is not sufficient that a breach of the principles of the rule of law affects or
seriously risks affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the
protection of the financial interests of the Union. According to Article 4(1) of the
Conditionality Regulation, the breach of the principles of the rule of law should do that
‘in a sufficiently direct way’ (second condition in paragraph 24 above (see point (ii)).
33. Pursuant to this requirement, it should be established that there is a sufficiently direct
relation between the breach of the principles of the rule of law and its effects, or serious
risks thereof, on the sound financial management of the Union budget or on the
protection of the financial interests of the Union. The Court of Justice has considered
that the terms ‘in a sufficiently direct way’ require that the link between the breach of
the principles of the rule of law and the impact or risks for the Union budget should be
‘genuine’ or ‘real’.41 This means that the procedure of the Regulation should not be
triggered with regard to situations in which the connection is merely hypothetical, too
uncertain or too vague.
3. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CONDITIONALITY REGULATION AND
OTHER PROCEDURES SET OUT IN UNION LEGISLATION
34. Where the Commission finds that it has reasonable grounds to consider that the
conditions for the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation are
fulfilled, before starting the procedure it will consider whether appropriate measures are
necessary, i.e. whether other procedures set out in Union legislation for the protection
of the Union budget would not allow it to protect the Union budget more effectively, as
established by Article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation.
40
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v. Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 262.
41
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 288.
9
35. In effect, the Union financial legislation and the applicable sector-specific rules already
provide for other procedures to protect the Union budget.
36. For instance, the Financial Regulation provides for an early-detection and exclusion
system (‘EDES')42, allowing the Commission to detect persons or entities representing
risks threatening the protection of the financial interests of the Union early, and to
exclude them from receiving funds from the Union budget, if certain conditions are
met.
37. Moreover, the Commission may impose interruption or suspension of payments, and
shall impose financial corrections on the Member States43 if they do not comply with
applicable law and do not protect the financial interests of the Union when they
implement the Union budget under shared management44.
38. Under the RRF Regulation and the financing and loan agreements signed pursuant to it,
the Commission has the right to reduce proportionately the support and recover any
amount due to the Union budget in cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interests
affecting the interests of the Union that have not been corrected by the Member States.
In addition, a number of recovery and resilience plans include measures directly linked
to rule of law issues, whose satisfactory fulfillment is necessary for the release of
payments under the RRF.
39. Nevertheless, it might not always be possible to trigger those procedures in relation to
situations of breaches of the principles of the rule of law, such as those listed in Articles
3 and 4(2) of the Conditionality Regulation. There may also be situations where the
measures under the Conditionality Regualtion can be more effective in protecting the
Union budget than procedures of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (CPR”) or Regulation
(EU) 1306/2013 and, as from 1 January 2023 Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, as the latter
may only be launched under the specific grounds listed in those Regulations45 and may
42
See Financial Regulation, Article 135.
43
See Financial Regulation, Article 101(8); also see, for instance, Articles 96, 97 and 104 of Regulation
(EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion
Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and
financial rules for those and for the Asylum, and Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security
Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (‘CPR’) OJ L
231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, and Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common
agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No
2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 549.
44
See Financial Regulation, Article 63(2); also see, for instance, Articles 69(3) and 103 CPR, as well as
Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 and as from 1 January 2023, Article 57 of Regulation (EU)
2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing,
management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No
1306/2013, OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 187.
45
Payments may be interrupted if: (a) there is evidence to suggest a serious deficiency for which
corrective measures have not been taken; (b) the Commission has to carry out additional verifications
10
only relate to expenditure already declared by the Member State to the Commission.
For instance, the effective application and implementation of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights is a horizontal enabling condition in the meaning of Article 15
CPR. This enabling condition is a prerequisite condition for the effective and efficient
implementation of the specific objectives of a programme. Under the CPR, if a Member
State does not fulfil an enabling condition, the Commission shall not reimburse the
expenditure related to operations linked to the concerned specific objective(s), with the
exception of those expenditures that contribute to the fulfilment of the corresponding
enabling condition. This measure applies only after the relevant programme or its
amendment has been approved by the Commission. In cases of breaches of the
principles of the rule of law in relation to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that
affect the implementation of a Union programme, the Conditionality Regulation may be
more effective insofar as it also provides for the possibility to suspend the approval or
amendment of a programme and, as a consequence, further strengthen the protection of
the Union budget thanks to its preventive effect.
40. In considering whether the procedure established by the Conditionality Regulation
protects the Union budget more effectively than other procedures, the Commission,
building on the enforcement of sector-specific legislation and without prejudice to its
powers and obligations set therein, will take into account an open set of criteria, to be
applied in light of the specific circumstances of each situation. In some situations, the
Commission could apply the Conditionality Regulation alongside or following the
adoption of sector-specific or financial measures that it may be bound to take, when the
Conditionality Regulation would more effectively protect the Union budget and the
financial interests of the Union, thereby demonstrating its added value. Otherwise, the
added value and effectiveness of the Regulation, as a general and horizontal instrument
aimed at protecting the Union budget and the financial interests of the Union, would be
deprived of its useful effect.
41. The Commission considers that the following indicative criteria may be used to
determine the effectiveness of the protection provided by the Conditionality Regulation
as compared to other existing instruments to protect the Union’s financial interests.
following receipt of information that expenditure in a payment application may be linked to an
irregularity. Payments may be suspended, if: (a) the Member State has failed to take the necessary
action to remedy the situation giving rise to an interruption under Article 96 CPR; (b) there is a serious
deficiency; (c) the expenditure in payment applications is linked to an irregularity that has not been
corrected; (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure
under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the legality and regularity of expenditure.
Financial corrections shall be made, if: (a) there is a serious deficiency which has put at risk the support
from the Funds already paid to the programme; (b) expenditure contained in accepted accounts is
irregular and was not detected and reported by the Member State; (c) the Member State has not
complied with its obligations under Article 97 prior to the opening of the financial correction procedure
by the Commission.
11
42. One first criterion relates to the scope of the effect on the Union budget and/or the
extent of risk the breach of the principles of the rule of law may entail for the efficiency
of its sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the
Union. In particular, procedures under other Union financial rules may only apply to
specific spending programmes and could therefore be insufficient, in some cases, for
breaches of the principles of the rule of law that are ‘widespread or due to recurrent
practices or omissions by public authorities, or to general measures adopted by such
authorities’.46 This may also happen where breaches of the principles of the rule of law
carry a serious risk of affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or
the protection of the financial interests of the Union, whereas other Union financial
rules could instead relate to already materialised effects on the Union budget. For
instance, where national laws limit criminal liability for fraud or corruption, or weaken
the anti-fraud and anti-corruption legal framework or the prevention of conflicts of
interest, cases of fraud, corruption or conflict of interest cases might not be effectively
investigated and prosecuted, and this could give rise to serious risks for the sound
financial management of the Union budget or for the protection of the financial interests
of the Union. In the same line of reasoning, general laws precluding an effective
judicial review by independent courts of decisions of national authorities managing in
whole or in part Union funds may also entail serious risks for the sound financial
management of the Union budget. In such situations, the Commission may conclude
that the use of the Conditionality Regulation might be more effective than other Union
instruments.
43. Another relevant criterion relates to the types of remedies available and their suitability
to different situations. The Conditionality Regulation provides a large variety of
possibilities to address the specificities of the relevant breach of the principles of the
rule of law that may be applied cumulatively47. Should the remedies available pursuant
to other Union legislation be less appropriate to address the relevant breach of the
principles of the rule of law, the Conditionality Regulation could be considered more
effective. Such situations could occur where the Union budget is or risks being affected
in a wide manner, due for instance to national law precluding effective judicial review
of administrative decisions to implement the Union budget or obstructing referrals of
relevant cases to the Court of Justice of the European Union, or due to lack of
independence of national courts. In such cases, suspensive or prohibitive measures
under the Conditionality Regulation imposed cumulatively until the relevant breach of
the principles of the rule of law is brought to an end, might protect the Union budget
more effectively as they could prevent adverse effects on the sound financial
management of the Union budget and on the financial interests of the Union. This could
46
See recital 15 of the Conditionality Regulation.
47
See Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation.
12
cover situations where the overall financial risks for the Union budget and the financial
interests of the Union exceed the risks that can be adressed by the measures adressed to
a specific programme and available under one sectoral instrument.
4. MEASURES THAT COULD BE PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION -
PROPORTIONALITY
44. In line with article 5(3) of the Conditionality Regulation, once the Commission has
established that the conditions to trigger the application of the Conditionality
Regulation are fulfilled, it will propose to the Council measures that are proportionate48,
which means that they must be suitable and necessary to address the issues found and
protect the Union budget or the financial interests of the Union, without going beyond
what is required to achieve their aim.
45. The Court of Justice has held that pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Regulation the
measures should be strictly proportionate, i.e ‘limited to what is strictly necessary in the
light of the actual or potential impact of breaches of the principles of the rule of law on
the financial management of the Union budget or the financial interests of the Union’49.
46. In this context, the Commission will duly take into account the nature, duration,
seriousness and scope of the breaches of the principles of the rule of law at stake50. As
these criteria help to determine the extent of the impact, which may vary depending on
the characteristics of the breaches of the principles of the rule of law found, their
consideration influences the assessment of the proportionality of the measures51. While
it is not possible to define and weigh all the possible types of breaches of the principles
of the rule of law beforehand, as well as their exact impact on the Union budget or the
financial interests of the Union, at this stage and in the absence of experience in the
application of the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission will examine the
elements below in relation to each of these characteristics.
47. As regards the nature of a breach, all breaches of the principles of the rule of law are
relevant for the application of the Conditionality Regulation to the extent that they
affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget
or the financial interests of the Union. However, the situations mentioned in Article 3 of
the Conditionality Regulation have a particular importance, as they are expressly
mentioned therein. This, however, does not mean that other breaches of the principles
48
See Article 5(3) of the Conditionality Regulation.
49
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 112.
50
See Article 5(3) of the Conditionality Regulation.
51
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 331; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 361.
13
of the rule of law of a similar nature will be considered less important. In its
assessment, the Commission will also take due account of other features of the breach
of the principles of the rule of law, such as whether it is intrinsically or closely linked
with the process under which Union funds are used by the Member State concerned (for
instance in cases of improper functioning of the public authorities deciding on the
award of grants or contracts financed through the Union budget), in which case the
impact on the Union budget or the financial interests of the Union may be particularly
significant.
48. As regards the duration, it is likely that the longer a breach of the principles of the rule
of law lasts, or the more recurrent it is, the more it will generally adversely affect or
seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the
financial interests of the Union. Thus, this conclusion will also have a bearing on the
Commission’s assessment on the proportionality of the measures it may propose.
49. As regards the gravity of a breach of the principles of the rule of law , the Commission
considers that, when one or several breaches of the principles of the rule of law concern
important parts of the public sector of a Member State, such as the legislative branch
and/or the judiciary which may have potential negative impact on the management of
the Union budget by national authorities, or where the breach(es) of the principles of
the rule of law are systemic or widespread, these factors should be taken into account as
regards the proportionality of the measures. Concerning the scope of the breach of the
principles of the rule of law, the Commission considers that, when a breach of the
principles of the rule of law affects or risks affecting multiple programmes or funds of
the Union, its impact on the Union budget or the financial interests of the Union can be
expected to be substantial. In general, the gravity of the breach of the principles of the
rule of law under the Conditionality Regulation will tend to be reflected in the gravity
of its actual or potential impact on the sound financial management of the Union budget
or the financial interests of the Union.
50. The Commission considers that the cumulative presence or absence of the above-
mentioned elements considered in light of the actual or potential impact of the relevant
breach of the principles of the rule of law on the Union budget or on the protection of
the financial interests of the Union may guide the proportionality assessment of
measures to be proposed under the Regulation. Therefore, a systemic breach of the
principles of the rule of law affecting in a cumulative manner and/or for a significant
period of time the sound financial management of the Union budget or the financial
interests of the Union may justify proposing measures entailing a significant financial
impact for the Member State concerned.
51. In addition to these elements, the Commission may also consider other factors, in
particular, the intention of the Member State to put an end to the breach of the
14
principles of the rule of law, the degree of cooperation of the Member State
concerned52, or its refusal to cooperate sincerely with the Commission in the context of
the procedures pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation, or a possible persistence or
repetition of similar breaches of the principles of the rule of law, despite earlier
recommendations or proposals of measures made by the Commission. The intention
and the degree of cooperation of the Member State are also relevant for the purpose of
determining the duration and scope of a breach of the principles of the rule of law.53
The Commission will ensure an objective and impartial assessment when considering
these factors.
52. The Conditionality Regulation requires the measures to target, insofar as possible, the
‘Union actions affected by the breaches’. 54 In its proposal, the Commission will
indicate specific programmes or funds affected by the breaches of the principles of the
rule of law or those that risk being affected and propose, insofar as possible, measures
targeting those programmes or funds. However, in cases where this is not possible,
including in cases where the breach of the principles of the rule of law has an impact on
the collection of the Union’s own resources, the Conditionality Regulation permits the
adoption of measures relating to Union actions other than those affected by the breach
of the principles of the rule of law. The Court of Justice has held that this could relate to
situations where the latter actions cannot 55 or can no longer be targeted, or can be
targeted only inadequately, in order to achieve the objective of the Conditionality
Regulation, which consists in ensuring the protection of the Union budget as a whole,
with the result that those measures are necessary in order to achieve that objective56.
Otherwise, the Conditionality Regulation would not be able to attain its objective.
Moreover, in cases where the Conditionality Regulation is applied additionally or
subsequently to other Union legislation, the Commission will take into account the
overall impact of the measures to ensure respect for the principle of proportionality.
53. For its assessment on the proportionality of the proposed measures, the Commission,
pursuant to Article 6(8) of the Conditionality Regulation, must also take into account
the same sources used to identify breaches of the principles of the rule of law, as cited
in section 5.2 of these guidelines.
52
See Recital 18 of the Conditionality Regulation.
53
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 332.
54
See Article 5(3) of the Conditionality Regulation.
55
For instance, in cases where the effect of the breach of the principles of rule of law will be established
on revenues of the Union budget.
56
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 275.
15
5. PROCEDURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
5.1. Commission’s preliminary assessment
54. To identify and assess breaches of the principles of the rule of law under the
Conditionality Regulation, the Commission will carry out a thorough qualitative
assessment on a case-by-case basis, taking due account of the specific circumstances
and contexts, which will lie on the principles and features of the methodology set out in
the following paragraphs of these Guidelines.
55. The Commission will carry out its assessment in an objective, impartial and fair 57
manner.
56. Objectivity requires the assessment to be based on actual facts or evidence that the
Commission has at its disposal. In addition to the various contacts between the
Commission, other bodies and the Member States, Article 6(4) of the Conditionality
Regulation also makes clear that the Commission can request supplementary
information necessary to carry out its assessment and it will do so when it considers this
appropriate. For example, it may request additional information aimed at confirming the
fulfillment of the conditions for the application of the Conditionality Regulation,
assessing the extent of the impact on the Union’s budget or on the protection of the
financial interests of the Union (or risk thereof), or assessing more in detail any
remedial measures that the Member State has put in place or is planning to put in place.
Given that one of the key aims of the Conditionality Regulation is to be used as a
preventive tool to protect the Union budget and the financial interests of the Union, the
Commission endeavours to ensure a sincere dialogue and cooperation with the Member
State concerned, while keeping the procedure at the right pace.
57. Impartiality in the assessment of cases under the Conditionality Regulation implies
equal treatment among the Member States. Article 4(2) TEU also requires the Union to
respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties. In line with the consistent
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this means first and foremost
that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations
must not be treated alike, unless such treatment is objectively justified 58 on the basis of
the specific circumstances characterising each concrete situation. While the
Commission must make its assessments taking into account the particular features of
the legal system of the Member State in question and the discretion it enjoys in
implementing the principles of the rule of law, this does not mean that the obligations
as to the result to be achieved stemming from them may vary from one Member State to
57
See Recital 16 of the Conditionality Regulation.
58
See, among other cases, judgment of 20 September 1988, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European
Communities, 203/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:420, paragraph 25. For a more recent case, see judgment of 8
October 2020, Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu and Others, C-644/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:810,
paragraph 44.
16
another. The Court of Justice has held that respect for the rule of law should be assessed
on the basis of uniform criteria, and that the content of the principles of the rule of law
is clear, establishes clear and precise binding obligations of result, and are well-known
to the Member States.59 The Court of Justice held that Member States are in a position
to determine with sufficient precision the essential content and the requirements
flowing from each of the principles listed in Article 2(a) of the Regulation60.
58. As regards the fairness of the assessment under the Conditionality Regulation, the
Commission considers that it implies taking a comprehensive view on all the
circumstances under consideration to identify breaches of the principles of the rule of
law that are relevant under the Conditionality Regulation.
59. The Commission services will first check whether the relevant sources refer to a breach
of the principles of the rule of law that has already been identified, or, if not previously
identified, whether there are reasonable grounds to consider that such a breach of the
principles of the rule of law has taken place. For that purpose, the Commission
considers that final rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union are
conclusive. It will then check whether that breach of the principles of the rule of law
concerns a situation or conduct of authorities that are relevant for the sound financial
management of the Union budget or for the protection of the Union’s financial interests,
as provided for in Article 4(1) and (2) of the Regulation.
60. Secondly, as the mere finding that a breach of the principles of the rule of law exists
does not suffice to trigger the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission services will
assess whether the breach of the principles of rule of the law affects or seriously risks
affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the financial interests
of the Union, considering the criteria analysed in section 2.2 of these Guidelines. The
Commission will give particular importance to corrective measures or other remedies it
has already taken in similar cases under the procedures referred to in section 3 above or
other procedures of Union law, provided those had a link with situations that are
indicative of breaches of the principles of the rule of law pursuant to the Conditionality
Regulation.
61. The Commission services will finally assess whether the identified breach of the
principles of the rule of law has a sufficiently direct link with the effects on the sound
financial management of the Union budget or the financial interests of the Union. For
this purpose, the Commission considers that final rulings of the Court of Justice of the
European Union and previous corrective measures or other remedies it has already
59
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 233 and 235; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament
and Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 265 and 283.
60
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 240.
17
taken in similar cases under the procedures referred to in section 3 above as particularly
relevant.
5.2. Sources of information
62. The Commission endeavours to assess issues relevant for the application of the
Conditionality Regulation in a diligent and thorough manner, based on a wide range of
evidence, insofar as that is relevant to fulfil the conditions for the application of the
Conditionality Regulation. The range and scope of evidence will be considered based
on the merits of each case, taking into account all the relevant circumstances. The
Commission will ensure that the information it uses is relevant and that the sources of
that information are reliable.
5.2.1. General sources of information
63. The Commission will strive to use several sources to identify, crosscheck and assess
relevant breaches of the principles of the rule of law in order to reach its own
conclusions on whether the conditions of the Regulation are met. The Conditionality
Regulation, in its recital 16, cites specific sources such as ‘judgments of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, reports of the Court of Auditors, the Commission’s
annual Rule of Law Report and EU Justice Scoreboard, reports of the OLAF and the
EPPO and information provided by them, as relevant, and conclusions and
recommendations of any relevant international organisations and networks, including
Council of Europe bodies such as the Council of Europe Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) and the Venice Commission, in particular its rule-of-law
checklist, and the European networks of supreme courts and councils for the judiciary.’
64. In addition to those sources, which do not have a specific or absolute probative value,
the Commission will also take into account other relevant information, where
appropriate. That may include, for instance, the annual Commission reports on the
“Protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud” (“PIF
reports”) and the related annual resolutions of the European Parliament, the information
on which Commission, OLAF and EPPO relevant reports were based, information
contained in Commission services’ audit reports, as well as information received from
national authorities and stakeholders, and other information in the public domain, such
as judgments of national courts or decisions of national authorities.
65. The Commission also has the possibility to directly contact other bodies and recognised
institutions, such as the national anti-fraud coordination service (‘AFCOS’). While
recital 16 of the Conditionality Regulation states that the Commission ‘could consult
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Venice Commission if
necessary for the purpose of preparing a thorough qualitative assessment’, the
possibility of such consultations is not limited to these two bodies and the Commission
will contact any institution or body it considers necessary in view of identifying
breaches of the principles of the rule of law and enhancing the assessment of cases
under the Conditionality Regulation.
18
5.2.2. Complaints
66. Another valuable source of information is the submission of substantiated complaints
by any third party that may be aware of relevant information and evidence about
breaches of the principles of the rule of law that may affect or seriously risk affecting
the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial
interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way.
67. As a budgetary tool, the Conditionality Regulation does not afford remedies or rights of
redress that a complainant may seek 61 . Complainants seeking remedial measures
addressed to them, including damages, cannot obtain them from the Commission but
may consider filing complaints with national authorities or lodge actions before national
courts. The European Union offers means to submit complaints at EU level. In
particular, for the case of a Member State that does not comply with Union law, any
citizen, business or other stakeholder can report an infringement to the Commission62.
68. After receiving a complaint relating to the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission
services will assess whether it contains substantiated information and evidence that the
Commission may use for its assessment under the Conditionality Regulation. In this
respect, it has to be noted that complaints that refer to breaches of the principles of the
rule of law without any indication as to the effect they may have or the risks they may
present on the sound financial management of the Union budget or on the protection of
the financial interests of the Union will not be sufficient to consider that the conditions
under the Regulation are fulfilled, unless the Commission establishes this effect or these
risks on additional grounds. Depending on the circumstances of each case, the
Commission services may invite the complainant to provide additional information to
substantiate the complaint within a specific time limit. If no additional information is
provided within the set time limit, the Commission will keep record of the information
submitted but may not follow up on the complaint.
69. Where the information submitted is sufficiently substantiated and relevant for the
purposes of the Commission’s assessment, the Commission services may request
further information or evidence if needed. If considered appropriate, the Commission
services may also meet the complainant or their representatives to clarify the allegations
made and discuss specific issues related to the complaint. The Commission services
may also contact other bodies or institutions in relation to the information submitted by
the complainant to corroborate or complement the information and evidence provided
by the complainant, in line with Article 6(4) of the Conditionality Regulation.
61
This is without prejudice to the protection of the legitimate rights of final recipients and beneficiaries of
Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, see section 6 below.
62
A list of these other resources, including the complaint form for a breach of Union law, is available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/contact/problems-and-complaints/complaints-
about-breaches-eu-law/how-make-complaint-eu-level_en.
19
70. The Commission will endeavour to inform complainants of the action that it proposes to
take on a complaint within an indicative time frame of [cf. eight months] from the
receipt of the complaint. This is, however, subject to the circumstances of the individual
case and is, in particular, dependent on whether the Commission has received sufficient
information from the complainant. Should the Commission decide to initiate the
procedure established by Article 6 of the Conditionality Regulation and propose
appropriate measures to the Council, it will in principle inform the complainant (1) after
sending the notification letter to the Member State and (2) after sending its proposal to
the Council.
71. To facilitate the submission of complaints under the Conditionality Regulation, the
Commission has setup within its Central Financial Service of its Directorate General for
Budget the dedicated mailbox BUDG-CONDITIONALITY-REGIME-
[email protected] through which a third party may bring to the
Commission’s attention alleged breaches of the principles of the rule of law relevant to
the Conditionality Regulation. Annex II to the Guidelines provides the information that
may be included when contacting the Commission, as well as a recommended form that
may be used to submit such complaints. Unless agreed otherwise, the identity of the
complainant will be kept strictly confidential and the Commission will ensure that the
rules set out in Directive (EU) 2019/193763 are be complied with.
5.2.3. Preliminary contacts with the Member State concerned
72. The Commission may contact the Member State concerned before sending the written
notification pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation, if this is
necessary for its preliminary assessment. Thus, if, following a complaint or on the basis
of any other information gathered, the Commission is not yet in a position to determine
whether it has reasonable grounds to consider that the conditions set out in Article 4 of
the Regulation are fulfilled, it should be able to contact the Member State concerned to
gather the information or explanations it may need within a reasonable and appropriate
ltime limit. Within the same time limit, the Member State may use the opportunity to
remedy the situation.
73. In such cases, the Commission will endeavour to have an open dialogue with the
Member State concerned, with a view to enabling enhanced cooperation and possibly
addressing concerns at an early stage. This approach also reflects the principle of
sincere cooperation, as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, as well as that one of the key
aims of the Conditionality Regulation is prevention. Where the Commission requests
initial written clarifications from a Member State, it will set deadlines reflecting the
breadth and complexity of the clarifications requested.
63
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17.
20
74. If the Member State concerned does not react or cooperate within the timeframe set by
the Commission, the Commission will finalise its preliminary assessment on the basis
of the information it has at its disposal, without delay.
75. The Commission will apply the same principles of objectivity, impartiality and fairness
for all Member States during any preliminary contacts with the Member States, in cases
where such preliminary contacts have been considered necessary, as it will do
throughout the procedure and its assessment.
5.3. Formal procedure pursuant to Article 6 of the Conditionality Regulation
76. Where the Commission finds that it has reasonable grounds to consider that the
conditions for the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation are
fulfilled and that other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow it to
protect the Union budget more effectively, it will send a written notification to the
Member State concerned, setting out the factual elements and specific grounds on
which it has based its findings, and initiate the procedure pursuant to Article 6 of the
Conditionality Regulation (the ‘procedure’).
77. The Member State concerned should provide the required information and may propose
or adopt remedial measures to address the Commission’s findings set out in the written
notification or the request for observations in line with article 6(7) of the Conditionality
Regulation, within a time limit specified by the Commission, which shall be at least one
month and not more than three months from the date of the notification or the request
for observations.64 Following the exchanges provided by Article 6, paragraphs 1 to 7, of
the Conditionality Regulation, if the Commission finds that the conditions for the
application of the Conditionality Regulation are fulfilled and considers that the remedial
measures that may have been offered are not adequate, it will propose the adoption of
measures to the Council to protect the Union budget or the Union’s financial interests.
78. When deciding whether to propose measures, the Commission will duly assess the
information received and any observations made by the Member State concerned
throughout the procedure65, as well as the adequacy of any remedial measures proposed
in the course of the procedure. To conduct its assessment on the measures that may be
proposed, the Commission will also rely on all the information gathered in the context
of any possible preliminary contacts with the Member State concerned, including before
initiating the procedure, where relevant, as well as any relevant information from
available sources, including decisions, conclusions and recommendations of Union
institutions and bodies, other relevant international organisations and other recognised
institutions.
64
See Article 6(5) of the Conditionality Regulation.
65
See Article 6(7) of the Conditionality Regulation.
21
79. In addition to guaranteeing the procedural rights of the Member State concerned, the
procedure will also be conducted in accordance with the principles of objectivity,
non-discrimination and equal treatment of the Member State concerned, and will be
conducted according to a non-partisan and evidence-based approach66. In accordance
with recital 23 of the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission is committed to make
the most appropriate use of its rights under Article 237 TFEU and the Council’s Rules
of Procedure67 with a view to ensuring that the Council takes a timely decision on the
proposal for measures68.
5.4. Procedure for lifting measures
80. After the adoption of the measures by the Council, the Commission will regularly
monitor the situation in the Member State concerned. According to Article 7(2) of the
Conditionality Regulation, at the request of the Member State concerned, or on its own
initiative and at the latest one year after the adoption of measures by the Council, the
Commission shall reassess the situation in the Member State concerned, taking into
account the evidence submitted by it, as well as the adequacy of any remedial measures
adopted by the Member State concerned.
81. The Member State concerned may, at any time, adopt new remedial measures and
submit to the Commission a written notification including evidence to show that the
conditions for the adoption of the measures are no longer fulfilled.
82. When assessing the written notification submitted by the Member State concerned or
any other information the Commission gathered after the adoption of the measures by
the Council, the Commission will proceed in line with the methodology and principles
of objectivity, impartiality and fairness detailed in section 5.1 of these Guidelines. To
conduct its assessment, the Commission will rely on all sources of information
mentioned in section 5.2 of these Guidelines 69 , gathered after the adoption of the
measures by the Council.
83. If, following the assessment of the written notification submitted by the Member State
or the assessment of any other information the Commission gathered after the adoption
of the measures by the Council, the Commission cannot reasonably determine that the
situation leading to the adoption of measures has been remedied, it may request
additional information from the Member State concerned or any third party that may
dispose relevant information, before concluding its assessment, in line with Articles
7(2) last paragraph and 6(4) of the Conditionality Regulation.
66
See Recital 26 of the Conditionality Regulation.
67
Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, OJ L
325, 11.12.2009, p. 35.
68
See Article 6(10) of the Conditionality Regulation.
69
In line with Articles 7(2) last paragraph and 6(3) of the Conditionality Regulation.
22
84. The Member State concerned should provide the required information and may propose
or adapt the initially proposed remedial measures to address the Commission’s
concerns, within a time limit specified by the Commission, which shall be at least one
month and not more than three months from the date of the notification or the request
for observations.70 Following these exchanges and the Commission’s final assessment,
if the Commission considers that the situation leading to the adoption of the measures
has been remedied, it will submit to the Council a proposal for an implementing
decision lifting the adopted measures, in line with Article 7(2) of the Conditionality
Regulation. Where the Commission finds that the situation leading to the adoption of
the measures has been remedied in part, it will submit to the Council a proposal for an
implementing decision adapting the adopted measures.
85. Measures may be lifted or adapted where the breaches of the principles of the rule of
law, despite persisting, no longer have an impact on the Union budget or the protection
of the financial interests of the Union71. Where the Commission finds that the situation
leading to the adoption of the measures has not been remedied, it shall address to the
Member State concerned a reasoned decision and inform the Council thereof.
86. In addition to guaranteeing the procedural rights of the Member State concerned, the
procedure will also be conducted in accordance with the principles of objectivity,
non-discrimination and equal treatment of the Member State concerned, and will be
conducted according to an impartial and evidence-based approach72. In accordance with
recital 23 of the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission is committed to make the
most appropriate use of its rights under Article 237 TFEU and the Council’s Rules of
Procedure73 with a view to ensuring that the Council takes a timely decision on the
proposal for lifting or adapting the measures74.
6. PROTECTION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF FINAL RECIPIENTS AND
BENEFICIARIES OF UNION FUNDING UNDER THE CONDITIONALITY
REGULATION
87. Measures adopted under the Conditionality Regulation will have a financial or
economic impact. However, such impact should be limited to the Member State
concerned or in specific cases to certain national entities managing the funds. Unless
70
See Article last sentence of Article 7(2) in combination with Article 6(5) of the Conditionality
Regulation.
71
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 178; and judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and
Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 217.
72
See Recital 26 of the Conditionality Regulation.
73
Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, OJ L
325, 11.12.2009, p. 35.
74
See Article 6(10) of the Conditionality Regulation.
23
the decision adopting the measures provides otherwise on the basis of duly justified
grounds in line with applicable Union rules, the imposition of those measures should
not affect the pre-existing obligations of government entities or of Member States to
make payments to the final recipients or beneficiaries who are entitled to such payments
under the corresponding Union programme or Fund.
88. The measures may concern Union funds or Union programmes under all management
modes of the Union budget, i.e. implemented directly (managed by the Commission
departments, or through executive agencies 75 ), indirectly (by one of the entities
provided in Article 62(1)(c) of the Financial Regulation) or jointly with Member States
(shared management76).
89. The imposition of measures does not alter the pre-existing obligations of government
entities or Member States to implement the programme or fund under any management
mode, in particular their legal obligations to make payments towards final recipients or
beneficiaries, as provided for by the applicable Union instruments and the specific legal
acts that created such obligations, unless the decision imposing the measures provides
otherwise.
90. In other words, the government entities or Member States cannot use the appropriate
measures adopted by the Council as a justification to release themselves from their
pre-existing obligations towards the final recipients or beneficiaries, relating to
payments under the relevant applicable rules
91. Article 5(2) of the Conditionality Regulation states that the obligations of government
entities or Member States to implement the programme or fund shall not be affected by
the imposition of appropriate measures, and in particular the obligations they have
towards final recipients or beneficiaries, unless the decision adopting the measures
provides otherwise. The Commission considers that the conclusion on whether the
rights of beneficiaries or final recipients may be legitimately affected by the appropriate
measures, requires a case-by-case analysis, and the Commission will assess any
relevant information in this respect. At this stage, it considers that, in principle, when
the beneficiary or final recipient has been involved in by the breach of the principles of
the rule of law, such as in cases of corruption, systemic fraud and conflicts of interest,
the measures to be adopted under the Conditionality Regulation may also have an
impact on that beneficiary or recipient. Should the Commission be aware of such cases,
the Commission will include in its proposal to the Council (i) its conclusion on whether
particular final beneficiaries or recipients should be affected by the proposed measures,
(ii) the reasons justifying this conclusion and (iii) its specific proposal as regards those
beneficiaries or recipients.
75
See Article 62(1)(a) of Financial Regulation.
76
See Article 63 of Financial Regulation.
24
Information tools and reporting
92. Beneficiaries or final recipients of Union programmes or funds should be made aware
of their rights under the Conditionality Regulation. To this end, the Commission has set
up the dedicated webpage https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/protection-eu-
budget/rule-law-conditionality-regulation_en where citizens, including beneficiaries or
final recipients, may seek informal guidance. They may also submit information to the
Commission about issues that are relevant for the application of the Conditionality
Regulation by filling in and submitting the complaint form available at that webpage to
the dedicated mailbox BUDG-CONDITIONALITY-REGIME-
[email protected]. The Commission will publish in its webpage
information on the measures adopted by the Council upon the Commission’s proposal,
so that beneficiaries and final recipients are aware of the measures imposed to each
Member State.
93. If, following the imposition of appropriate measures by the Council under the
Conditionality Regulation, the Member State concerned refuses to honour its payments
to beneficiaries or final recipients of Union programmes or funds concerned by the
measures, the beneficiaries or final recipients concerned should first refer the matter to
the competent national authorities by availing themselves of all actions at their disposal
under the applicable national rules, including complaints to the relevant authority of the
Member State concerned. In case any such action is not available or not effective77, the
beneficiaries should inform the Commission and, when possible, provide relevant
evidence in this respect. Member States should ensure that legal actions receive
adequate follow-up, in compliance with the applicable legal framework.
94. Beneficiaries or final recipients could inform the Commission about potential breaches
of Article 5(2) of the Conditionality Regulation, in case they are directly concerned. In
their submissions, beneficiaries or final recipients should clearly state (i) the legal basis
of their right to receive payment from the Member State, (ii) the failure of the Member
State to comply with its obligation to pay under the rules of the relevant Union
programme or fund, (iii) the legal actions already undertaken and the related outcome,
if any, and provide all necessary evidence and supporting documentation to show the
launching of the relevant legal actions, as well as the failure by the Member State to
comply with its obligations under Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation (if
available). The submissions should contain all the information requested in Annex III to
these Guidelines.
95. Under Article 339 TFEU and Article 17 of the Staff Regulations, the officials and other
staff of the European Union must not disclose information covered by the obligation of
77
For instance, in cases where the national authorities unreasonably delay their reply/decision to the
beneficiary’s actions.
25
professional secrecy. The Commission will also ensure that the rules set out in
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 will be complied with78.
96. When implementing Union funds under shared management, Member States concerned
by measures adopted pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation are under the obligation
to report to the Commission on the concrete steps they have taken to comply with their
obligations to pay final recipients or beneficiaries under the Union fund or programme
affected. Such reporting should include information and evidence of that compliance
(e.g. relevant accounting records and supporting documents) and should take place
every three months from the adoption of the measures79.
97. On the basis of the reporting provided in Article 5(2) of the Conditionality Regulation
and any other proof provided by the Member State concerned or other information
gathered, including through the information received from final recipients or
beneficiaries, the Commission will verify whether the payment obligations towards
final recipients or beneficiaries set under the Conditionality Regulation and other
applicable Union law with respect to implementing funding under shared management,
have been complied with. Where necessary, it will do its utmost to ensure that any
amount due from government entities or Member States is effectively paid to final
recipients or beneficiaries in accordance with the relevant sector specific rules. This
may entail, for instance, the application of financial corrections in line with applicable
Union law 80 . The Commission may also decide to open infringement proceedings
against the Member State concerned to ensure compliance with the Member State’s
obligation enshrined in Article 5(2) of the Regulation. Before taking any measure to
ensure compliance of Member States with their obligation to pay the final recipients or
beneficiaries, the Commission will ensure that the procedural rights of the Member
State concerned are respected.
7. REVIEW OF THESE GUIDELINES
98. The Commission may review these guidelines in due course, to take into account
developments in its practice, relevant changes to Union legislation, or relevant case law
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, while ensuring legal certainty. When
reviewing the Guidelines, the Commission will consult the Member States and the
European Parliament.
78
More information about how the Commission handles complaints can be found on:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/contact/problems-and-complaints/complaints-
about-breaches-eu-law/how-make-complaint-eu-level_en
79
See Article 5(2) and Recital 19 of the Conditionality Regulation.
80
See Recital 19 of the Conditionality Regulation.
26
ANNEX I
Breaches of the principles of rule of law
Examples indicative of breaches of the principles of the rule of law (Article 3 of the Conditionality
Regulation)
(a) endangering the independence of the judiciary. On this matter, recital 10 of the
Conditionality Regulation states that ‘the independence of the judiciary presupposes, in
particular, that the judicial body concerned is able to exercise, both under the relevant rules
and in practice, its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any
hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body, and without taking orders or
instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against external interventions
or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their
decisions. The guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as
regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds
for rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the
minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its
neutrality with respect to the interests before it.’
According to ECJ case law “the concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the
body concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject
to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders
or instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external
interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to
influence their decisions”81.
(b) failing to prevent, correct or sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public
authorities, including by
- law-enforcement authorities,
- withholding financial and human resources affecting their proper functioning,
81
Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, C-
64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 44. See also among others, judgments of 24 June 2019,
Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 and of 20 April 2021 Repubblika v
Il-Prim Ministru, C-896/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:311.
27
- failing to ensure the absence of conflicts of interest.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, these ‘situations
may lead to a failure to observe the principle prohibiting the arbitrary exercise of power by
the executive or the principle of effective judicial protection’82.
(c) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through
- restrictive procedural rules,
- lack of implementation of judgments,
- limiting the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctioning of breaches of law.
In relation to the above, recitals 8 and 9 of the Conditionality Regulation state that:
‘(8) Sound financial management can only be ensured by Member States if public authorities
act in accordance with the law, if cases of fraud, including tax fraud, tax evasion,
corruption, conflict of interest or other breaches of the law are effectively pursued by
investigative and prosecution services, and if arbitrary or unlawful decisions of public
authorities, including law-enforcement authorities, can be subject to effective judicial review
by independent courts and by the Court of Justice of the European Union.’
(9) The independence and impartiality of the judiciary should always be guaranteed, and
investigation and prosecution services should be able to properly execute their functions.
(…) The judiciary, and investigation and prosecution services should be endowed with
sufficient financial and human resources and procedures to act effectively and in a manner
that fully respects the right to a fair trial, including respect for the rights of defence. Final
judgments should be implemented effectively. Those conditions are required as a minimum
guarantee against unlawful and arbitrary decisions of public authorities that could harm the
financial interests of the Union.’
Examples of specific situations or conduct of authorities83 that may be concerned by breaches of the
principles of the rule of law (Article 4(2) of the Conditionality Regulation)
(a) the proper functioning of the authorities implementing the Union budget, including loans
and other instruments guaranteed by the Union budget, in particular in the context of public
procurement or grant procedures.
(b) the proper functioning of the authorities carrying out financial control, monitoring and
82
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21
ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 245 and the case law cited therein.
83
These examples are merely indicative, as other situations or conduct of authorities that are relevant to
the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the
Union may also fall within the scope of the Conditionality Regulation (cf. point (h) of Article 4(2)).
28
audit, and of effective and transparent financial management and accountability systems –
on this point, the Court of Justice clarified that ‘the expression “effective and transparent
financial management and accountability systems” […] refers to the concept of “financial
management”, which falls within the concept of “sound financial management” found in the
Treaties themselves, in particular in Article 310(5) and the first paragraph of Article 317
TFEU, and defined in Article 2(59) of the Financial Regulation as the implementation of the
budget in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The
expression “financial accountability”, for its part, reflects in particular the financial
control, monitoring and audit obligations mentioned in […] Article 4(2)(b) [of the
Conditionality Regulation], while the expression “effective and transparent … systems”
implies the establishment of an ordered set of rules which ensure in an effective and
transparent manner the said financial management and accountability’84.
The Court of Justice also clarified that the expression ‘financial accountability’ reflects in
particular the financial control, monitoring and audit obligations mentioned in the said
Article 4(2)(b), while the ‘effective and transparent … systems’ imply the establishment of an
ordered set of rules which ensure in an effective and transparent manner the said financial
management and accountability.’85
(c) the proper functioning of investigation and public prosecution services in relation to the
investigation and prosecution of:
- fraud, including tax fraud, especially where such fraud may result in failure to collect taxes
such as VAT and custom duties directly affecting the resources necessary for the Union to
attain its objectives and carry out its policies,
- corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union
budget or to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;
(d) the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or omissions by the
authorities referred to in points (a),b) and (c) of Article 4(2) of the Conditionality
Regulation.
In particular, recital 9 of the Conditionality Regulation states that ‘the judiciary, and
investigation and prosecution services should be endowed with sufficient financial and
human resources and procedures to act effectively and in a manner that fully respects the
right to a fair trial, including respect for the rights of defence. Final judgments should be
implemented effectively. Those conditions are required as a minimum guarantee against
unlawful and arbitrary decisions of public authorities that could harm the financial interests
84
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 333.
85
See judgement of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21 ECLI:EU:C:2022:98,
paragraph 333.
29
of the Union’-
(e) the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, including tax fraud, corruption or other
breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union budget or to the
protection of the financial interests of the Union, and the imposition of effective and
dissuasive penalties on recipients by national courts or by administrative authorities;
(f) the recovery of funds unduly paid;
(g) effective and timely cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (‘OLAF’) and,
subject to the participation of the Member State concerned, with the European Public
Prosecutor’s Office (‘EPPO’) in their investigations or prosecutions pursuant to the
applicable Union acts in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation;
30
ANNEX II
Elements that should be included in the complaint about alleged breaches of the
principles of the rule of law under the Conditionality Regulation
Complainants should include the following details when contacting the Commission about
alleged breaches of the principles of the rule of law under the Conditionality Regulation:
Identity and contact details86;
Information about how the rule of law has been allegedly infringed (including which acts
or omissions by public authorities are allegedly in breach of the principles of the rule of
law) and relevant evidence;
Information on how the alleged breach is relevant for the Conditionality Regulation
(description of how it affects or seriously risk affecting the Union budget or the financial
interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way) and relevant evidence;
List of supporting documents which could – if requested – be sent to the Commission.
To facilitate the submission of information relevant for the application of the Conditionality
Regulation and ensure that the Commission receives relevant and structured information, the
below template, as available on the webpage https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-
budget/protection-eu-budget/rule-law-conditionality-regulation_en, could be used.
86
Disclosure of complainants' identities and information submitted by them to the Member State
concerned is subject to their prior agreement and must comply, inter alia, with European Parliament and
Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No
1247/2002/EC.
31
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Complaint – Breach of the principles of the rule of law
affecting the Union budget or financial interests
Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection
of the Union budget (“Conditionality Regulation”)
This complaint form serves to notify the European Commission of breaches of the principles
of the rule of law in a Member State that specifically affect or seriously risk affecting the
sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of
the Union in a sufficiently direct way.
To notify the European Commission of any other complaint related to the rule of law, please
use instead the complaint form available at https://ec.europa.eu/assets/sg/report-a-
breach/complaints_en/
All fields marked with * are mandatory. Please be concise and if necessary continue on a separate
page.
1. Identity & contact details
Your representative (if
Complainant*
applicable)
Title* Mr/Ms/Mrs
First name*
Surname*
Organisation:
Address*
Town/City *
Postcode*
Country*
Telephone
E-mail
Language*
Should we send
correspondence to you or ☐ ☐
your representative*:
2. What is the breach of the principles of the rule of law complained about?*
endangering the independence of the judiciary ☐
failing to prevent, correct or sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by ☐
32
public authorities, including by law- enforcement authorities, and including
by withholding financial and human resources affecting their proper
functioning
failing to ensure the absence of conflicts of interest ☐
limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including
through restrictive procedural rules and lack of implementation of ☐
judgments
limiting the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctioning of breaches
of law ☐
others Please specify.
3. What does the alleged breach of the principles of the rule of law indicated
in point 2 above affect in your view?*
(more than one answer possible)
the proper functioning of the authorities implementing the Union budget,
including loans and other instruments guaranteed by the Union budget, in ☐
particular in the context of public procurement or grant procedures
the proper functioning of the authorities carrying out financial control,
monitoring and audit, and the proper functioning of effective and ☐
transparent financial management and accountability systems
the proper functioning of investigation and public prosecution services in
relation to the investigation and prosecution of fraud, including tax fraud, ☐
corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation
of the Union budget or to the protection of the financial interests of the
Union
the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or omissions
by the authorities referred to above ☐
the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, including tax fraud, corruption or
other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union ☐
budget or to the protection of the financial interests of the Union, and the
imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties on recipients by national
courts or by administrative authorities
the recovery of funds unduly paid ☐
effective and timely cooperation with OLAF in its investigations or
prosecutions pursuant to the applicable Union acts in accordance with the ☐
principle of sincere cooperation
[subject to the participation of the Member State concerned,] effective and
timely cooperation with EPPO in its investigations or prosecutions ☐
pursuant to the applicable Union acts in accordance with the principle of
sincere cooperation
other situations or conduct of authorities that are relevant to the sound
financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the ☐
financial interests of the Union
4 Which national measure(s) or practice(s) do you think amount to a breach of
the principles of the rule of law under the Conditionality Regulation and why?*
33
5 Describe the problem, providing facts and reasons for your complaint* (max.
10000 characters):
6How does the alleged breach of the principles of the rule of law affect or
seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget
or the protection of the financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct
way?
34
6.1 How does the breach affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial
management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the
Union?
6.2 Is the breach an individual or a systemic one? Please specify.
6.3 Has the effect on the sound financial management of the Union budget or the
protection of the financial interests of the Union already materialised?
If yes, please explain how:
If no, please explain why there would be a serious risk for the sound financial
management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the
Union:
Please identify a sufficiently direct link between the alleged breach or breaches and the
effects or risks for the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection
of the financial interests of the Union
7. Previous action taken to solve the problem*
Have you already taken any action in the Country in question to solve the problem?*
IF YES, was it: Administrative Legal/Judicial ?
7.1 Please describe: (a) the body/authority/court that was involved and the type of decision that resulted;
(b) any other action you are aware of.
35
7.2 Was your complaint settled by the body/authority/court or is it still pending? If pending, when can a
decision be expected?*
IF NOT please specify below as appropriate
Another case on the same issue is pending before a national or EU Court
No remedy is available for the problem
A remedy exists, but is too costly or its use would be too lenghty
Time limit for action has expired
No legal standing (not legally entitled to bring an action before the Court) please indicate why:
No legal aid/no lawyer
I do not know which remedies are available for the problem
Other – specify
8. If you have already contacted any of the EU institutions dealing with
problems of this type, please give the reference for your file/correspondence:
Petition to the European Parliament – Ref:………………………………… .
European Commission – Ref:……………………………………… .
European Ombudsman – Ref:…………………………………………… .
Other – name the institution or body you contacted and the reference for your complaint (e.g.
SOLVIT, FIN-Net, European Consumer Centres)
36
9. List any additional supporting documents/evidence which you could – if
requested – send to the Commission.
Don’t enclose any documents at this stage.
10. Personal data*
Do you authorise the Commission to disclose your identity in its contacts with the authorities you
are lodging a complaint against?
Yes No
Your answer will not affect the way your complaint is handled. However, in some cases,
disclosing your identity may make it easier for us to deal with your complaint.
37
ANNEX III
Elements that should be part of the information from beneficiaries/final recipients of EU
funding
The following elements should in principle be part of the information submitted by
beneficiaries or final recipients to the Commission about potential breaches of Article 5(2) of
the Conditionality Regulation:
Identity and contact details87;
Information of the programme/fund concerned;
Information on the alleged breach of Article 5(2) of the Conditionality Regulation;
Supporting documents (including proof that the concerned final recipient or beneficiary
has lodged a formal complaint with the relevant authority of the Member State concerned
and any information and document regarding the outcome of such complaint, if available).
87
Disclosure of complainants' identities and information submitted by them to the Member State
concerned is subject to their prior agreement and must comply, inter alia, with European Parliament
and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No
1247/2002/EC.
38