E T LISA KOMISJONI MÄÄRUS (EL) …/…, XXX , millega muudetakse komisjoni määrust (EL) nr 1408/2013, milles käsitletakse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklite 107 ja 108 kohaldamist vähese tähtsusega abi suhtes põllumajandussektoris EELNÕU EUROOPA KOMISJON, võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingut, eriti selle artikli 108 lõiget 4, võttes arvesse nõukogu 13. juuli 2015. aasta määrust (EL) 2015/1588, milles käsitletakse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklite 107 ja 108 kohaldamist teatavate horisontaalse riigiabi liikide suhtes , olles avaldanud käesoleva määruse eelnõu , olles konsulteerinud riigiabi nõuandekomiteega ning arvestades järgmist: Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu (edaspidi „alusleping“) artikli 107 lõike 1 kriteeriumidele vastav riigi poolt antav abi on riigiabi, millest tuleb aluslepingu artikli 108 lõike 3 kohaselt komisjoni teavitada. Aluslepingu artikli 109 kohaselt võib nõukogu siiski määrata abi liigid, mille puhul teavitamist ei nõuta. Vastavalt aluslepingu artikli 108 lõikele 4 võib komisjon võtta vastu määrusi, mis on seotud kõnealuste riigiabi liikidega. Vastavalt määrusele (EL) 2015/1588 ja kooskõlas aluslepingu artikliga 109 otsustas nõukogu, et vähese tähtsusega abi võiks olla üks sellise abi liikidest. Seega ei käsitata vähese tähtsusega abi, mida antakse ühele ettevõtjale teataval ajavahemikul ja mis ei ületa teatavat kindlat summat, kõigile aluslepingu artikli 107 lõikes 1 sätestatud tingimustele vastava abina ja sellise abi suhtes ei kohaldata seetõttu teavitamiskohustust. Liikmesriikidele tuleks siiski meelde tuletada, et isegi kui vähese tähtsusega abi ei käsitata riigiabina, ei tohiks sellise abi andmisega kaasneda ELi õiguse rikkumist. Komisjon on vastu võtnud mitu määrust, millega kehtestatakse vähese tähtsusega abi andmise eeskirjad põllumajandussektoris, viimane neist oli komisjoni määrus (EL) nr 1408/2013 . Määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 kohaldamisel saadud kogemuste põhjal ja võttes arvesse vähese tähtsusega abi eri kasutusviise liikmesriikides, on asjakohane teatavaid kõnealuses määruses sätestatud tingimusi kohandada. Abi maksimaalset summat, mis ühele ettevõtjale iga kolme aasta kohta antakse, tuleks suurendada 20 000 euroni ja riiklikku ülempiiri 1,25 %ni aastasest toodangust. Võttes arvesse kasvavat vajadust mõnes liikmesriigis vähese tähtsusega abi kasutada, on asjakohane võimaldada abi maksimumsummat ühe ettevõtja kohta suurendada veelgi kuni 25 000 euroni ja riiklikku ülempiiri 1,5 %ni aastasest toodangust, mille suhtes võib kehtestada täiendavaid tingimusi, mis on vajalikud siseturu nõuetekohase toimimise tagamiseks. Määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 kohaldamise esimeste aastate jooksul saadud kogemused on näidanud, et vähese tähtsusega abi koondamine teatavasse tootesektorisse võib põhjustada konkurentsi moonutamist. Seetõttu peaks suurema individuaalse ülemmäära ja riikliku ülempiiri kasutamise eeltingimus olema sektori ülempiiri kohaldamine, mille tõttu liikmesriigid ei saaks kolme eelarveaasta jooksul anda vähese tähtsusega abi kumulatiivse kogusummana rohkem kui 50 % selliste meetmete jaoks, millest saab kasu vaid üks tootmisvaldkond. Sektori ülempiir peaks aitama tagada, et ühtki määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 reguleerimisalasse kuuluvat meedet ei saa lugeda liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust mõjutavaks ega konkurentsi moonutavaks või moonutada ähvardavaks. Praegu on liikmesriikidel võimalus kasutada soovi korral riiklikku keskregistrit, et teha kindlaks, et vähese tähtsusega abi ülemmäära ega riiklikku ülempiiri ei ole ületatud. Samas muutuks keskregistri kasutamine vajalikuks nendes liikmesriikides, kes otsustavad kasutada kõrgemat individuaalset ülemmäära ja riiklikku ülempiiri, kuna sellise variandi eelduseks oleva sektorisisese ülempiiri puhul tuleb teha antud abi veelgi tõhusamat järelevalvet. Seetõttu peaks selliste liikmesriikide jaoks olema kohustuslik asutada keskregister ja seda pidada ning registreerida kõik antud vähese tähtsusega abid, et oleks võimalik kindlaks teha, et individuaalset ülemmäära ega riiklik k u või sektori ülempiiri ei ületata. Laenude ja tagatiste brutotoetusekvivalendi arvutamise kriteeriumeid tuleks kohandada vastavalt vähese tähtsusega abi suurendatud ülemmääradele. Vaja oleks anda liikmesriikidele, kes otsustavad kasutada kõrgemat vähese tähtsusega abi ülemmäära ning riiklikku ülempiiri, piisavalt üleminekuaega, et asutada oma keskregistrid vähese tähtsusega abi kontrollimiseks. Määrus (EL) nr 1408/2013 kaotab kehtivuse 31. detsembril 2020. Käesoleva määruse jõustumise ja määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 kohaldamisaja lõpu vahel on väga lühike ajavahemik. Menetlusökonoomia põhimõtte ja õiguskindluse huvides tuleks määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 kohaldamisaega pikendada kuni 31. detsembrini 2027. Määrust (EL) nr 1408/2013 tuleks seetõttu vastavalt muuta, ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA MÄÄRUSE: Artikkel 1 Määrust (EL) nr 1408/2013 muudetakse järgmiselt. Artiklisse 2 lisatakse järgmised lõiked. „3. Käesoleva määruse kohaldamisel tähendab „tootesektor“ Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 1308/2013 * artikli 1 lõikes 2 loetletud sektoreid. _______________________________ * Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 17. detsembri 2013. aasta määrus (EL) nr 1308/2013, millega kehtestatakse põllumajandustoodete ühine turukorraldus ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks nõukogu määrused (EMÜ) nr 922/72, (EMÜ) nr 234/79, (EÜ) nr 1037/2001 ja (EÜ) nr 1234/2007 (ELT L 347, 20.12.2013, lk 671). 4. Käesoleva määruse kohaldamisel on „sektori ülempiir“ abi suurim kumulatiivne summa keskkonnakaitseks antavate abimeetmete puhul, mis toovad kasu ainult ühele tootesektorile, mis vastab 50 %-le liikmesriigi kohta antava vähese tähtsusega abi maksimumsummale, mis on sätestatud II lisas.“ Artikkel 3 asendatakse järgmisega: „Artikkel 3 Vähese tähtsusega abi „1. Kui abimeetmed vastavad käesoleva määruse tingimustele, ei loeta neid aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 kõikidele tingimustele vastavaks ja seetõttu vabastatakse nad aluslepingu artikli 108 lõike 3 kohasest teatamiskohustusest. 2. Liikmesriigi poolt ühele ettevõtjale antava vähese tähtsusega abi kogusumma ei tohi mis tahes kolme eelarveaasta pikkuse ajavahemiku jooksul ületada 20 000 eurot. 3. Liikmesriigi poolt põllumajandustoodete esmatootmisega tegelevale ettevõtjatele kolme eelarveaasta jooksul antava vähese tähtsusega abi kumulatiivne summa ei tohi ületada I lisas sätestatud riiklikku ülempiiri. 3a. Erandina lõigetest 2 ja 3 võib liikmesriik otsustada, et ühele ettevõtjale antava vähese tähtsusega abi kogusumma ei tohi mis tahes kolme eelarveaasta jooksul ületada 25 000 eurot ning et kolme eelarveaasta jooksul antava vähese tähtsusega abi kumulatiivne kogusumma ei tohi ületada II lisas sätestatud riiklikku ülempiiri järgmistel tingimustel: abimeetmete puhul, mis toovad kasu ainult ühele tootesektorile, ei tohi kolme eelarveaasta jooksul antava abi kumulatiivne kogusumma ületada artikli 2 lõikes 4 kehtestatud sektorisisest ülempiiri; liikmesriik asutab riikliku keskregistri vastavalt artikli 6 lõike 2 sätetele. 4. Vähese tähtsusega abi andmise ajana käsitatakse aega, mil ettevõtjale on antud kohaldatavate riigi õigusaktide alusel seaduslik õigus seda abi saada, sõltumata kuupäevast, mil vähese tähtsusega abi ettevõtjale välja makstakse. 5. Lõigetes 2, 3 ja 3a sätestatud ülemmäära ning riiklikku ja sektori ülempiiri kohaldatakse sõltumata vähese tähtsusega abi liigist ja eesmärgist ning sellest, kas liikmesriigi antud abi on täielikult või osaliselt rahastatud liidu vahenditest. Kolme eelarveaasta pikkune ajavahemik määratakse kindlaks eelarveaastate järgi, mida ettevõtja asjaomases liikmesriigis kasutab. 6. Lõigetes 2, 3 ja 3a sätestatud ülemmäära ning riikliku ja sektori ülempiiri kohaldamisel on abi andmise väljund rahaline toetus. Kõik kasutatud arvud väljendavad brutomäärasid, see tähendab, et neist ei ole maha arvatud makse ega muid tasusid. Kui abi antakse muus vormis kui rahaline toetus, on abi suuruseks abi brutotoetusekvivalent. Mitmes osas makstava abi väärtus diskonteeritakse selle andmise hetke väärtuseni. Diskonteerimisel kasutatakse intressimäärana abi andmise ajal kohaldatavat diskontomäära. 7. Kui lõigetes 2, 3 ja 3a sätestatud ülemmäära ning riiklikku ja sektori ülempiiri uue vähese tähtsusega abi andmisel ületatakse, ei kohaldata selle uue abi ühegi osa suhtes käesolevast määrusest tulenevaid eeliseid. 8. Ühinemiste ja omandamiste korral võetakse arvesse kõigile ühinevatele ettevõtjatele varem antud vähese tähtsusega abi, et otsustada, kas uuele või ülevõtvale ettevõtjale antav mis tahes vähese tähtsusega abi ületab vastavaid vähese tähtsusega abi ülemmäärasid või riiklikku või sektori ülempiiri. Enne ühinemist või omandamist seaduslikult antud vähese tähtsusega abi on jätkuvalt seaduslik. 9. Kui üks ettevõtja jaguneb kaheks või enamaks eraldiseisvaks ettevõtjaks, omistatakse enne jagunemist määratud vähese tähtsusega abi sellest kasu saanud ettevõtjale, st põhimõtteliselt ettevõtjale, kes võtab üle tegevused, mille jaoks vähese tähtsusega abi kasutati. Kui selline omistamine ei ole võimalik, jagatakse vähese tähtsusega abi proportsionaalselt uute ettevõtjate omakapitali arvestusliku väärtuse alusel jagunemise tegelikul kuupäeval.“ Artiklit 4 muudetakse järgmiselt. Lõike 3 punkt b asendatakse järgmisega: „b) artikli 3 lõike 2 kohaste meetmete puhul on laen tagatud tagatisega, mis katab vähemalt 50 % laenust ning laenu summa on 100 000 eurot viieks aastaks või 50 000 eurot kümneks aastaks; või artikli 3 lõike 3a kohaste meetmete puhul on laenu summa 125 000 eurot viieks aastaks või 62 500 eurot kümneks aastaks; kui laen on nimetatud summast väiksem ja/või antakse seda vähem kui viie või kümne aasta pikkuseks ajavahemikuks, arvutatakse nimetatud laenu brutotoetusekvivalent vastava protsendina artikli 3 lõikes 2 või 3a kehtestatud ülemmääradest; või“. Lõike 6 punkt b asendatakse järgmisega: „b) artikli 3 lõike 2 kohaste meetmete puhul ei ületa tagatis 80 % asjaomasest laenust ja tagatud summa on kas 150 000 eurot ja tagatise kestus viis aastat, või tagatud summa on 75 000 eurot ja tagatise kestus kümme aastat; artikli 3 lõike 3a kohaste meetmete puhul ei ületa tagatis 80 % asjaomasest laenust ja tagatud summa on kas 187 500 eurot ja tagatise kestus viis aastat, või tagatud summa on 93 750 eurot ja tagatise kestus kümme aastat; kui tagatud summa on nimetatud summadest väiksem ja/või tagatis antakse lühemaks ajaks kui viie või kümne aasta pikkune ajavahemik, arvutatakse nimetatud tagatise brutotoetusekvivalent vastava protsendina artikli 3 lõikes 2 või 3a kehtestatud ülemmääradest; või“. Lõige 4 asendatakse järgmisega: „4. Kapitalisüstina antavat abi käsitatakse läbipaistva vähese tähtsusega abina vaid juhul, kui riigi panuse kogusumma ei ole suurem asjaomase vähese tähtsusega abi ülemmäärast.“ Lõige 5 asendatakse järgmisega: „5. Abi, mida antakse riskifinantseerimismeetmetena omakapitali- või kvaasiomakapitali investeeringutena, peetakse läbipaistvaks vähese tähtsusega abiks vaid juhul, kui ühele ettevõtjale antav kapital ei ületa asjaomase vähese tähtsusega abi ülemmäära.“ Artiklit 6 muudetakse järgmiselt. Lõikele 2 lisatakse järgmine lõik: „Iga liikmesriik, kes annab abi vastavalt artikli 3 lõikele 3a, asutab hiljemalt 1. juuliks 2022 vähese tähtsusega abi keskregistri, milles on täielik teave selle liikmesriigi ametiasutuste antud vähese tähtsusega abi kohta. Lõike 1 sätteid kohaldatakse kuni hetkeni, mil register hõlmab kolme eelarveaasta pikkust ajavahemikku. “ Lõige 3 asendatakse järgmisega: „3. Liikmesriik annab käesoleva määruse kohast uut vähese tähtsusega abi üksnes juhul, kui ta on veendunud, et see ei suurenda asjaomasele ettevõtjale antud vähese tähtsusega abi kogusummat üle artikli 3 lõigetes 2, 3 ja 3a sätestatud ülemmäära ning riikliku ja sektori ülempiiri ning et kõik käesolevas määruses sätestatud tingimused on täidetud.“ Artiklit 7 muudetakse järgmiselt. Lõige 1 asendatakse järgmisega: „1. Käesolevat määrust kohaldatakse abi suhtes, mis on antud enne määruse jõustumist, kui see abi vastab kõigile käesolevas määruses sätestatud tingimustele, välja arvatud sektori ülempiir, millele on osutatud artikli 3 lõikes 3a. Abi, mis ei vasta osutatud tingimustele, hindab komisjon vastavate raamdokumentide, suuniste, teadete ning teatiste alusel.“ Lisatakse lõige 1a: „1a . Artikli 3 lõikes 3a osutatud sektori ülempiiri kohaldatakse üksnes alates [1. jaanuarist 2019] antavale abile.“ Artikli 8 teine lõik asendatakse järgmisega: „Seda kohaldatakse kuni 31. detsembrini 2027.“ Lisa asendatakse käesoleva määruse lisas esitatud tekstiga. Artikkel 2 Käesolev määrus jõustub kahekümnendal päeval pärast selle avaldamist Euroopa Liidu Teatajas . Käesolev määrus on tervikuna siduv ja vahetult kohaldatav kõikides liikmesriikides. Brüssel, Komisjoni nimel president Jean-Claude Juncker
ET LISA EELNÕU „I LISA Põllumajandusliku esmatootmisega tegelevatele ettevõtjatele liikmesriigiti antava vähese tähtsusega abi maksimaalsed kumulatiivsed summad, millele on osutatud artikli 3 lõikes 3 (eurodes) Liikmesriik Vähese tähtsusega abi maksimaalsed summad Belgia 100 251 042 Bulgaaria 48 940 583 Tšehhi Vabariik 60 282 125 Taani 129 767 292 Saksamaa 687 676 542 Eesti 10 630 167 Iirimaa 92 612 083 Kreeka 129 441 708 Hispaania 565 246 333 Prantsusmaa 906 389 083 Horvaatia 25 705 125 Itaalia 679 716 500 Küpros 8 469 042 Läti 16 122 833 Leedu 32 505 583 Luksemburg 5 328 250 Ungari 97 979 375 Malta 1 581 667 Madalmaad 337 799 500 Austria 85 697 833 Poola 276 092 750 Portugal 84 801 750 Rumeenia 198 666 208 Sloveenia 15 523 667 Slovakkia 28 760 708 Soome 50 912 375 Rootsi 75 125 875 Ühendkuningriik 385 044 042 II LISA Põllumajandusliku esmatootmisega tegelevatele ettevõtjatele liikmesriigiti antava vähese tähtsusega abi maksimaalsed kumulatiivsed summad, millele on osutatud artikli 3 lõikes 3a (eurodes) Liikmesriik Vähese tähtsusega abi maksimaalsed summad Belgia 120 301 250 Bulgaaria 58 728 700 Tšehhi Vabariik 120 301 250 Taani 58 728 700 Saksamaa 825 211 850 Eesti 12 756 200 Iirimaa 111 134 500 Kreeka 155 330 050 Hispaania 678 295 600 Prantsusmaa 1 087 666 900 Horvaatia 30 846 150 Itaalia 815 659 800 Küpros 10 162 850 Läti 19 347 400 Leedu 39 006 700 Luksemburg 6 393 900 Ungari 117 575 250 Malta 1 898 000 Madalmaad 405 359 400 Austria 102 837 400 Poola 331 311 300 Portugal 101 762 100 Rumeenia 238 399 450 Sloveenia 18 628 400 Slovakkia 34 512 850 Soome 61 094 850 Rootsi 90 151 050 Ühendkuningriik 462 052 850 “
EN ANNEX COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) …/… of XXX amending Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector DRAFT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 108(4) thereof, Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of horizontal State aid , Having published a draft of this Regulation , After consulting the Advisory Committee on State Aid, Whereas: State funding meeting the criteria in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘the Treaty’) constitutes State aid and requires notification to the Commission pursuant to Article 108(3) of the Treaty. However, in accordance with Article 109 thereof, the Council may determine categories of aid that are exempted from this notification requirement. In accordance with Article 108(4) of the Treaty, the Commission may adopt regulations relating to those categories of State aid. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 and in accordance with Article 109 of the Treaty, the Council decided that de minimis aid could constitute one such category. On that basis, de minimis aid, being aid granted to a single undertaking over a given period of time that does not exceed a certain fixed amount, is deemed not to meet all the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty and is therefore not subject to the notification procedure. However, Member States should be reminded that, even if de minimis aid is considered not to constitute State aid, such aid should not entail a breach of EU law. The Commission has adopted a number of regulations establishing rules on de minimis aid granted in the agriculture sector, the latest of which was Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 . In the light of the experience gained in applying Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 and taking into account the variety of the use of de minimis aid in Member States, it is appropriate to adjust some of the conditions laid down therein. The maximum amount of aid to be granted to a single undertaking over a period of 3 years should be increased to EUR 20 000 and the national cap increased to 1,25 % of the annual output. Taking into account the increased need to use de minimis aid in some Member States, it is appropriate to allow for a further increase both of the maximum aid amount per single undertaking to EUR 25 000 and of the national cap to 1,5 % of the annual output, subject to additional conditions necessary to safeguard the proper functioning of the internal market. The experience gained over the first years of application of Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 has shown that the concentration of de minimis aid in a certain product sector could lead to a potential distortion of competition and trade. Therefore, the prerequisite for using the higher individual ceiling and national cap should be the application of a sector cap preventing Member States from granting more than 50 % of the total cumulative amount of de minimis aid over any period of 3 fiscal years for measures that benefit only one specific product sector. The sector cap should ensure that any measure falling under Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 can be deemed not to have any effect on trade between Member States and not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Presently, it is optional for Member States to use a national central register to verify that neither the de minimis individual ceiling, nor the national cap is exceeded. However, the use of a central register would become necessary in those Member States that opt for a higher individual ceiling and national cap, given that the sector cap which is a prerequisite for that option calls for an even closer monitoring of the aid granted. Therefore, for such Member States it should be mandatory to set up and maintain a central register in order to keep a record of all de minimis aid granted, so as to be able to verify that neither the individual ceiling, nor the national or sector cap, are exceeded. The criteria for calculating the gross grant equivalent for loans and guarantees should be adjusted according to the increased de minimis ceilings. It is necessary to allow Member States that opt to make use of the higher de minimis ceiling and national cap sufficient time for transition to set up their central registers for the monitoring of de minimis aid. Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 expires on 31 December 2020. The time span would therefore be very short between the entry into force of this Regulation and the end of the period of application of Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013. For reasons of procedural economy and legal certainty, the period of application of Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 should therefore be extended until 31 December 2027. Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 is amended as follows: in Article 2, the following paragraphs are added: ‘3. For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘product sector’ means a sector listed in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council * . _______________________________ * Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671). 4. For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘sector cap’ means a maximum cumulative aid amount applying to aid measures which benefit only one single product sector, which corresponds to 50% of the maximum amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State set out in Annex II. ’; Article 3 is replaced by the following: ‘ Article 3 De minimis aid ‘ 1. Aid measures shall be deemed not to meet all the criteria in Article 107(1) of the Treaty, and shall therefore be exempt from the notification requirement in Article 108(3) of the Treaty, if they fulfil the conditions laid down in this Regulation. 2. The total amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking shall not exceed EUR 20 000 over any period of 3 fiscal years. 3. The cumulative amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State to undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products over any period of 3 fiscal years shall not exceed the national cap set out in Annex I. 3a. By way of derogation from paragraphs 2 and 3, a Member State may decide that the total amount of de minimis aid granted to a single undertaking shall not exceed EUR 25 000 over any period of 3 fiscal years and that the total cumulative amount of de minimis aid granted over any period of 3 fiscal years shall not exceed the national cap set out in Annex II, subject to the following conditions: for aid measures which benefit only one single product sector, the total cumulative amount granted over any period of 3 fiscal years may not exceed the sector cap defined in Article 2(4); the Member State shall set up a national central register in accordance with the provisions laid down in Article 6(2). 4. De minimis aid shall be deemed granted at the moment the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the undertaking under the applicable national legal regime, irrespective of the date of payment of the de minimis aid to the undertaking. 5. The de minimis ceilings and the national and sector caps referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 3a shall apply irrespective of the form of the de minimis aid or the objective pursued and regardless of whether the aid granted by the Member State is financed entirely or partly by resources of Union origin. The period of 3 fiscal years shall be determined by reference to the fiscal years used by the undertaking in the Member State concerned. 6. For the purposes of the de minimis ceilings and the national and sector caps referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 3a, aid shall be expressed as a cash grant. All figures used shall be gross, that is, before any deduction of tax or other charge. Where aid is granted in a form other than a grant, the aid amount shall be the gross grant equivalent of the aid. Aid payable in several instalments shall be discounted to its value at the moment it is granted. The interest rate to be used for discounting purposes shall be the discount rate applicable at the time the aid is granted. 7. Where the de minimis ceilings, the national caps or the sector cap referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 3a would be exceeded by the grant of new de minimis aid, none of that new aid may benefit from this Regulation. 8. In the case of mergers or acquisitions, all prior de minimis aid granted to any of the merging undertakings shall be taken into account in determining whether any new de minimis aid to the new or the acquiring undertaking exceeds the relevant de minimis ceilings, the relevant national cap or the sector cap. De minimis aid lawfully granted before the merger or acquisition shall remain lawful. 9. If one undertaking splits into two or more separate undertakings, de minimis aid granted prior to the split shall be allocated to the undertaking that benefited from it, which is in principle the undertaking taking over the activities for which the de minimis aid was used. If such an allocation is not possible, the de minimis aid shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the book value of the equity capital of the new undertakings at the effective date of the split.’; Article 4 is amended as follows: in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following: ‘(b) for measures falling under Article 3(2), the loan is secured by collateral covering at least 50 % of the loan and the loan amounts to either EUR 100 000 over 5 years or EUR 50 000 over 10 years, or, for measures falling under Article 3(3a), to either EUR 125 000 over 5 years or EUR 62 500 over 10 years; if a loan is for less than those amounts and/or if it is granted for a period of less than 5 or 10 years respectively, the gross grant equivalent of that loan shall be calculated as a corresponding proportion of the de minimis ceilings laid down in Article 3(2) or (3a); or’; in paragraph 6, point (b) is replaced by the following: ‘(b) for measures falling under Article 3(2), the guarantee does not exceed 80 % of the underlying loan and either the amount guaranteed is EUR 150 000 and the duration of the guarantee is 5 years or the amount guaranteed is EUR 75 000 and the duration of the guarantee is 10 years, or, for measures falling under Article 3(3a), the guarantee does not exceed 80 % of the underlying loan and either the amount guaranteed is EUR 187 500 and the duration of the guarantee is 5 years or the amount guaranteed is EUR 93 750 and the duration of the guarantee is 10 years; if the amount guaranteed is lower than these amounts and/or if the guarantee is for a period of less than 5 or 10 years respectively, the gross grant equivalent of that guarantee shall be calculated as a corresponding proportion of the de minimis ceilings laid down in Article 3(2) or (3a); or’; paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: ‘4. Aid comprised in capital injections shall only be considered as transparent de minimis aid if the total amount of the public injection does not exceed the relevant de minimis ceiling.’; paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: ‘5. Aid comprised in risk finance measures taking the form of equity or quasi-equity investments shall only be considered as transparent de minimis aid if the capital provided to a single undertaking does not exceed the relevant de minimis ceiling.’; Article 6 is amended as follows: in paragraph 2 the following subparagraph is added: ‘By 1 July 2022, Member States granting aid in accordance with Article 3(3a) shall set up a central register of de minimis aid containing complete information on all de minimis aid granted by any authority within that Member State. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall cease to apply from the moment the register covers a period of 3 fiscal years. ’; paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: ‘3. A Member State shall grant new de minimis aid in accordance with this Regulation only after having checked that this will not raise the total amount of de minimis aid granted to the undertaking concerned to a level above the relevant ceilings and national caps and the sector cap referred to in Article 3(2), (3) and (3a) and that all the conditions laid down in this Regulation are complied with.’; Article 7 is amended as follows: paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘1. This Regulation shall apply to aid granted before its entry into force if the aid fulfils all the conditions laid down in this Regulation, with the exception of the sector cap referred to in Article 3(3a). Any aid which does not fulfil those conditions will be assessed by the Commission in accordance with the relevant frameworks, guidelines, communications and notices. ’ the following paragraph 1a is inserted: ‘1a. The sector cap referred to in Article 3(3a) shall apply only to aid granted from [1 January 2019]. ’; in Article 8, the second paragraph is replaced by the following: ‘It shall apply until 31 December 2027.’; the Annex is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union . This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, For the Commission The President Jean-Claude Juncker
EN ANNEX DRAFT " ANNEX I Maximum cumulative amounts of de minimis aid granted per Member State to undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products referred to in Article 3(3) (EUR) Member State Maximum amounts of de minimis aid Belgium 100 251 042 Bulgaria 48 940 583 Czech Republic 60 282 125 Denmark 129 767 292 Germany 687 676 542 Estonia 10 630 167 Ireland 92 612 083 Greece 129 441 708 Spain 565 246 333 France 906 389 083 Croatia 25 705 125 Italy 679 716 500 Cyprus 8 469 042 Latvia 16 122 833 Lithuania 32 505 583 Luxembourg 5 328 250 Hungary 97 979 375 Malta 1 581 667 Netherlands 337 799 500 Austria 85 697 833 Poland 276 092 750 Portugal 84 801 750 Romania 198 666 208 Slovenia 15 523 667 Slovakia 28 760 708 Finland 50 912 375 Sweden 75 125 875 United Kingdom 385 044 042 ANNEX II Maximum cumulative amounts of de minimis aid granted per Member State to undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products referred to in Article 3(3 a ) (EUR) Member State Maximum amounts of de minimis aid Belgium 120 301 250 Bulgaria 58 728 700 Czech Republic 120 301 250 Denmark 58 728 700 Germany 825 211 850 Estonia 12 756 200 Ireland 111 134 500 Greece 155 330 050 Spain 678 295 600 France 1 087 666 900 Croatia 30 846 150 Italy 815 659 800 Cyprus 10 162 850 Latvia 19 347 400 Lithuania 39 006 700 Luxembourg 6 393 900 Hungary 117 575 250 Malta 1 898 000 Netherlands 405 359 400 Austria 102 837 400 Poland 331 311 300 Portugal 101 762 100 Romania 238 399 450 Slovenia 18 628 400 Slovakia 34 512 850 Finland 61 094 850 Sweden 90 151 050 United Kingdom 462 052 850 "
Table of contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \t "Annex Title;1" 1. Introduction: Political and legal context PAGEREF _Toc524086250 \h 4 1.1. Legal context PAGEREF _Toc524086251 \h 4 1.2. Political context PAGEREF _Toc524086252 \h 6 1.3. Scope PAGEREF _Toc524086253 \h 7 2. Problem definition PAGEREF _Toc524086254 \h 8 2.1. Overview of the problem definition PAGEREF _Toc524086255 \h 8 2.2. What are the problems? PAGEREF _Toc524086256 \h 8 2.3. What are the problem drivers? PAGEREF _Toc524086257 \h 11 2.4. What are the impacts? PAGEREF _Toc524086258 \h 14 2.5. How will the problem evolve? PAGEREF _Toc524086259 \h 15 3. Why should the EU act? PAGEREF _Toc524086260 \h 16 3.1. Legal basis PAGEREF _Toc524086261 \h 16 3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action PAGEREF _Toc524086262 \h 16 3.3. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action PAGEREF _Toc524086263 \h 16 4. Objectives: What is to be achieved? PAGEREF _Toc524086264 \h 17 4.1. General objectives PAGEREF _Toc524086265 \h 17 4.2. Specific objectives PAGEREF _Toc524086266 \h 17 4.3. Linking the objectives to the problem PAGEREF _Toc524086267 \h 17 5. What are the available policy options? PAGEREF _Toc524086268 \h 18 5.1. What is the baseline from which the options are assessed? PAGEREF _Toc524086269 \h 18 5.2. Description of the policy options PAGEREF _Toc524086270 \h 19 5.3. Options discarded at an early stage PAGEREF _Toc524086271 \h 19 6. Impact of the options on competition and trade PAGEREF _Toc524086272 \h 19 6.1. Analytical method PAGEREF _Toc524086273 \h 20 6.2. Option 1 – Baseline scenario PAGEREF _Toc524086274 \h 21 6.3. Options 2, 3 and 4 compared to the baseline scenario PAGEREF _Toc524086275 \h 26 6.3.1. Option 2: Lesser increase of ceilings without additional conditions PAGEREF _Toc524086276 \h 27 6.3.2. Option 3: Larger increase of ceilings subject to additional conditions PAGEREF _Toc524086277 \h 28 6.3.3. Option 4: Two-tier approach PAGEREF _Toc524086278 \h 29 7. What are the impacts of the policy options? PAGEREF _Toc524086279 \h 30 7.1. Economic impacts PAGEREF _Toc524086280 \h 30 7.2. Social impacts PAGEREF _Toc524086281 \h 31 7.3. Environmental impacts PAGEREF _Toc524086282 \h 31 7.4. WTO compatibility PAGEREF _Toc524086283 \h 32 7.5. Affected parties PAGEREF _Toc524086284 \h 32 7.6. (Administrative) cost savings PAGEREF _Toc524086285 \h 33 8. How do the options compare? PAGEREF _Toc524086286 \h 34 8.1. Comparison of effectiveness PAGEREF _Toc524086287 \h 35 8.2. Comparison of efficiency PAGEREF _Toc524086288 \h 36 8.3. Comparison of coherence PAGEREF _Toc524086289 \h 37 9. Preferred option PAGEREF _Toc524086290 \h 37 9.1. Option 4 PAGEREF _Toc524086291 \h 37 9.2. REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) PAGEREF _Toc524086292 \h 37 10. How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? PAGEREF _Toc524086293 \h 38 Annex 1: Procedural information PAGEREF _Toc524086294 \h 39 1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references PAGEREF _Toc524086295 \h 39 2. Organisation and timing PAGEREF _Toc524086296 \h 39 3. Consultation of the RSB PAGEREF _Toc524086297 \h 40 4. Evidence, sources and quality PAGEREF _Toc524086298 \h 41 Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation PAGEREF _Toc524086299 \h 42 Annex 3: Who is affected and how? PAGEREF _Toc524086300 \h 46 1. Practical implications of the initiative PAGEREF _Toc524086301 \h 46 2. Summary of costs and benefits PAGEREF _Toc524086302 \h 46 Annex 4: Administrative costs – application of the standard cost model (SCM) PAGEREF _Toc524086303 \h 49 Annex 5: Analytical methods PAGEREF _Toc524086304 \h 53 Glossary Term or acronym Meaning or definition CAP Common Agricultural Policy CMO Common Market Organisation EAFRD European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development EU European Union EUR Euro FADN Farm Accountancy Data Network SME Small and Medium sized Enterprises RSB Regulatory Scrutiny Board TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union WTO World Trade Organisation Introduction: Political and legal context Legal context Under Article 107(1) TFEU, aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between MS, incompatible with the internal market. Article 108(3) TFEU lays down the principle that Member States shall notify State aid to the Commission and may not grant any aid until it has been authorised by the Commission. However, Article 109 TFEU confers powers on the Council to allow for exemptions from the notification procedure for certain categories of aid. The Council has on that basis (Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 ) empowered the Commission to exempt from notification the granting of very limited aid amounts, which because of their insignificance are considered not to risk having an impact on competition and trade and therefore do not constitute State aid as defined by Article 107(1) TFEU . Such “ non-State aid ” is known as de minimis aid. Therefore, t he objective of the rules on de minimis aid is to alleviate the Member States and the Commission of having to go through burdensome State aid procedures where this is obviously not necessary and, thus, to simplify procedures and to focus State aid control on potentially more disto rtive measures. De minimis aid is in principle av ailable to all economic sectors. H owever, different rules may apply according to the specific sector concerned. In general , de minim is aid may be granted to individual beneficiaries up to a cumulative ceiling of EUR 200 000 for three consecutive years . However, specific de minimis rules apply to fisheries and aquaculture and to primary agricultural production. Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 lays down the rules on de minimis aid applicable to primary production in the agricultural sector. According to those rules, de minimis aid may be granted under the following conditions: The total amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking shall not exceed EUR 15 000 over any period of 3 fiscal years ( known as the “individual ceiling”) . T he cumulative amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State over any period of three fiscal years shall not exceed 1 % of that Member State’s annual agricultural output (known as the “national cap”). The aid amount must not be fixed on the basis of the price or quantity of products put on the market, nor export-related, nor contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods . The aid must be transparent, in the sense that it should be possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent ex ante . Under those conditions, Member States may grant de minimis aid to farmers without having to inform the Commission, as is otherwise the defau lt procedure for the granting of aid financed by national budgets . Moreover, as the aid is considered not to fall within the definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, it can be granted with no other restrictions than those referred to above. It is thus possible for Member States to use de minimis aid for purposes that are not allowed under State aid rules (for example to simply improve the financial situation of an undertaking without any counterpart on the side of the beneficiary). Before granting new de minimis aid, the Member State must check that neither the individual ceiling, nor the national cap will be exceeded. In 14 Member States, this check is done via a central register that contains complete information on all de minimis aid granted by any authority within the Member State concerned . However, the setting up of central register s is voluntary . Member States that have not set up a central register for monitoring aid must inform the potential beneficiaries in written that aid will be granted and shall , before granting the aid, obtain a declaration from the undertakings concerned about any other de minimis aid received during the previous 2 fiscal years and the current fiscal year. Council Reg ulation (EU) 2015/1588 stipulates that t he validity of de minimis regulations shall be limited in time. The period of validity of the agricultural de minimis regulations normally corresponds to the period of validity of the Block Exemption Regulation and the State aid Guidelines applicable to the agricultural sector . Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 therefore includes a sunset clause according to which that regulation shall expire on 31 December 2020. Political context An Inception Impact Assessment was published for stakeholder feedback in 2017. The response from stakeholders (14 farmers’ associations and 2 Member States) was a unanimous request for further flexibility to use de minimis aid by way of increasing the maximum aid ceilings laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013, of which the vast majority called for an increase of the individual ceiling to EUR 30 000 and of the national cap to 2 % of the annual output. Many of the responding stakeholders also referred to the economic and financial difficulties of farm holdings as a justification for an increase. Moreover, pursuant to the procedural rules laid down in Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588, the Commission shall, when it intends to adopt a regulation, publish a draft thereof to enable all interested parties to submit their comments. That publication took place in March 2018 and received reactions from 36 stakeholders (15 public bodies, 20 stakeholder organisations and 1 private citizen), whose comments mostly echoed those already submitted in response to the Inception Impact Assessment. The comments also showed that de minimis aid is used for a wide range of purposes. A vast majority of the stakeholders were of the opinion that de minimis aid is a useful tool, which because of its flexibility allows tackling serious urgent problems fast and effectively. Hence, the aid is often used to rapidly deal with urgent problems that could otherwise plunge farmers into serious financial difficulties. It also makes it possible for Member States to provide access to finance through loans in favour of modernising and develop ing agricultural holdings. It was generally considered that micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the main beneficiaries of de minimis aid. The Commission also consulted the Advisory Committee on State aid on t he initiative, as required under Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 . Most Member States’ delegations expressed themselves in favour of increasing both de minimis ceilings and most of them also asked for an increase of the individual ceiling to EUR 30 000 and of the national cap to 2% of the annual output. A few other Member States consider the currently applicable ceilings to be sufficient but are not against rais ing them. However, Spain is against an increase of the individual ceiling , Estonia is against an increase of the national cap and Denmark advocates maintaining both ceilings as they are until the end of 2020. Further detail on the outcome of the stakeholder consultations and the consultation of the Advisory Committee is set out in Annex 2. Scope The scope of this Impact Assessment is limited to a revision of the rules for granting de minimis aid in the agriculture sector as laid down in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 . The purpose is to explore potential amendments to Regulatio n (EU) No 1408/2013 to give Member Sta tes an enlarged scope for using de minimis aid by revising the maximum aid ceilings . I t will also be assessed whether the use of a national central register to monitor de minimis aid should be mandatory for Member States . There is no link between this initiative and the legislative proposals for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 . Although d e minimis aid may be perceived as a complement to the risk management tools provided for in CAP legislation, because Member States often use it to mitigate the effects of crisis situations, it is not a risk management tool in itself but falls solely within the logics of State aid rules. Its only objective is to simplify State aid procedures and to focus State aid control on potentially more distortive national subsidies . In that sense, the de minimis regulation is not a policy in strument but a legal instrument. Problem definition Overview of the problem definition What are the problems? The purpose of the de minimis regulations is to simplify State aid procedures and allow the Commission to focus its enforcement of State aid rules on cases which could have an important impact on the internal market (“big on big, small on small”) . The key problem in relation to de minimis aid is to define the adequate maximum aid ceilings. Aid can only qualify as de minimis aid if it can be ascertained that it creates no risk of effect s on competition and trade and therefore is not State aid as defined by Article 107(1) TFEU. Therefore, the underlying driver is the difficulty of striking the right balance between two aspects that would both have negative consequences. On the one hand, if the ceiling is set too low, it will not fully achieve the objective of limiting administrative burdens and focusing State aid control on more market distortive cases. This would result in unnecessary administrative burdens for public authorities, as they would have to notif y also aid measures of minor importance to the Commission or design them in a way that they could be covered by the provisions of a block exemption regulation . On the other hand, if the ceiling is set too high , the real risk of distortive effect s on competition and trade will increase . The Commission’s margin of appreciation is limited in that regard, considering that the Union Courts have repeatedly held that even small amounts of aid can have an effect on competition and trade. The ceiling must therefore be set at such a level that it can ensure that , for every single case falling within the scope of the de minimis regulation, potential effects on competition and trade can be safely excluded . The setting of ceilings needs also to take into account the fact that de minimis aid escapes the conditionality laid down by State aid rules to promote the good use of public m oney. In addition , the cumulative effect s of de minimis aid can be harmful in sectors characterized by a large number of small undertakings . This is indeed the case with primary agricultural production, where every commodity is normally produced by a large number of very small producers, producing largely interchangeable goods within the framework of common organisations of the market. It is therefore considered that the impact of de minimis aid granted to individual producers over a given period of time should be related to the value of agricultural production at sectoral level over the same period of time. This consideration is reflected in the national cap for the overall level of aid granted to the agricultural sec tor, which is fixed in terms of a percentage of the value of production . The Commission adopted the first de minimis regulation for the agricultural sector in 2004. At the time, the individual ceiling was fixed at EUR 3 000 over any period of 3 fiscal years. Since then, the rules have been reviewed twice. In 2007, the individual ceiling was raised from EUR 3 000 to EUR 7 500 and the national cap was raised from 0,3 % to 0,75 % . In 2013, the ceilings were raised to their current levels. However, experience shows that the current ceilings might be unduly constraining. According to the figures, 9 Member States used up more tha n 50% of their national envelopes and 6 of them reached 80 % or more in the period 2014 to 2016 (see Table 1). Member States also claim that an increasing number of farm holdings have currently either reached the individual ceiling or are close to doing so. Although there are no figures to confirm this claim (the only data available are average amounts) , the below example shows that some Member States are refraining from using de minimis aid for the sole reason that the current individual ceiling is too low. In the aftermath of the severe drought that hit the agricultural sector in the Northern part of Europe in 2018, four Member States (Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Sweden) have signalled that de minimis aid would in principle be the preferred choice to address the effects of that crisis, partly because it provides for swift relief, partly because it makes it possible to subsidise purchase of fodder. However, those Member States have also highlighted that the margins for using de minimis aid are narrow ing , as many farm holdings have already received a fair share of de minimis aid in preceding years (in 2017 it was used to compensate for damage caused by heavy rain in Finland and the Baltic States). The Finnish authorities have explained that in some sectors (milk and poultry especially), the proportion o f farms close to the ceiling is almost 10 % . Therefore, a large part of the aid used to address the climatic events in 2017 and 2018 was, or will be, submitted to State aid procedures in order not to exhaust the individual ceiling for some farms and sectors. Also the Swedish authorities are concerned about the risk of exceeding the ceiling and have announced that aid in relation to the drought in 2018 will be either exempted or notified . Preparatory work is s till ongoing at national level, whereas a swifter response would have been possible with a less constraining individual ceiling. France is one of the Member States that is close to exhausting its national envelope. The French authorities have explained that de minimis aid has to a large extent been used to address crisis situations affecting the entire agricultural sector, or at least a large part of it, and that the number of beneficiaries therefore has been very high. If the number of beneficiaries is large, as is usually the case when de minimis aid is used to alleviate the effects of a crisis, the aid amount granted to each farm holding must be kept very limited so as to avoid that the accumulated amounts exceed the national cap. A number of Member States have repeatedly called for a more flexible approach. The question was raised numerous times in the AGRIFISH Council , in the context of which nine Member States (CZ, FI, FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, LU and PL) did in 2016 s ubmit a joint declaration questioning in particular the national cap as being unnecessarily restrictive . The declaration referred in particular to the fact that, whereas the individual ceiling was doubled in 2013, national ceilings were only very marginally adjusted. Th e constraints of the current national cap therefore limit Member States' response capacity in terms of the number of holdings which can be supported. The declaration also highlighted that, with one crisis following another in quick succession, the limited scope for using de minimis aid had led to unequal treatment between domestic farmers in various sectors. When consulted on th e ceilings , several stakeholders put into question the large difference in the maximum levels between the agricultural sector and other sectors . T he individual de minimis ceiling for fisheries and aquaculture is set at EUR 30 000 , with a national cap of 2,5 % of the annual fisheries turnover , whereas the rules applicable to all other sectors set the individual ceiling at EUR 200 000 ( with exception of the road freight and passenger transport sector, for which the ceiling is EUR 100 000 ) without limiting the cumulative effects by a national cap. The outcome of the consultation also showed that neither stakeholders, nor Member States had experienced any negative effects on competition and trade resulting from the application of the current de minimis ceilings for the agriculture sector. Nor has the Commission received any complaint s about such effects. The monitoring of de minimis aid in the agriculture sector appears to be weak in some Member States , as was illustrated by the difficulties that certain Member States had to provide complete data on the actual use of de minimis aid in the context of this Impact Assessment . Member States that have not set up central aid registers rely solely on beneficiaries’ declarations to ensure that the maximum aid ceilings are not reached. What are the problem drivers? The use of de minimis aid has been ste adily increasing in recent years , as shown by the information collected from Member States on the amounts of de minimis aid granted in the period 2011 to 2016 (see F igure 1). Figure 1: Use of de minimis aid in the period 2011 to 2016 However, there are significant differences across Member States , as shown by T able 1 . In 6 Member States , the 3-year cumulative expenditure was well above 50% of the national envelope (as limited by the national cap) in the period 2011 to 2013 . In the period 2014 to 2016, 9 Member States used up more that 50% of the ir national envelope s and 6 of them reach ed 80 % or more . However, o ther Member States used de minimis aid only to a very limited extent. Table 1: Use of de minimi s aid as percentage of the national envelope De minimis use as % of country limit 2011 to 2013 2014 to 2016 FR 64% 96% PL 89% 93% BG 99% 87% LT 22% 84% LV 72% 83% HU 80% 80% LU 5% 75% AT 70% 73% IE 40% 57% CZ 8% 46% FI 14% 45% PT 48% 41% EE 35% 38% MT 17% 31% EL 33% 30% CY 5% 20% HR 0% 18% SI 22% 17% RO 40% 15% IT 16% 14% DK 0% 12% ES 15% 9% DE 30% 6% SE 6% 5% NL 1% 3% UK 4% 3% BE 15% 1% SK 0% 0% EU avg. 33% 36% As regards the granting of aid per single undertaking, the availability of quantitative data is scarce and only allows for providing an overview of the average aid amounts per beneficiary (see table 2). Table 2 – A verage amount of de minimis aid per beneficiary (€) De minimis : average amount of aid per beneficiary (€) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 BE 1,634 493 315 207 250 167 BG 792 902 373 479 849 426 CY 45 57 51 530 2,946 CZ 660 619 2,029 3,268 3,831 8,261 DK 938 913 1,296 356 307 35 DE 846 563 388 415 568 483 EL 1,291 1,061 2,239 ES 378 323 268 482 557 491 EE 1,498 1,779 1,691 2,146 1,922 1,909 FR 1,940 1,329 1,500 1,210 549 868 HR 1,828 838 229 595 HU 587 657 641 705 753 1,326 IE 397 869 624 506 488 382 IT 270 216 289 259 1,091 1,564 LT 128 130 107 107 126 423 LU 1,278 1,384 1,294 1,727 721 335 LV 1,362 1,849 1,362 1,849 1,171 1,171 MT 801 916 599 1,316 653 772 NL 4,878 2,418 987 3,338 3,933 AT 318 448 358 386 480 676 PL 267 419 355 448 PT 2,370 548 1,453 1,233 1,039 1,173 RO 78 454 821 5,803 FI 656 640 633 649 1,891 2,462 SE 101 112 120 143 200 205 SK 340 280 347 390 808 SI 1,458 1,213 313 350 468 616 UK 2,396 10,854 2,014 974 477 224 On the average, beneficiaries received amounts well below the individual ceilings (EUR 7 500 in 2011 t o 2013 ; EUR 15 000 from 2014 and onwards) , but it should be kept in mind that average values can hide large differences with regard to the actual aid amount received by a given undertaking . Table 2 also shows that there were strong variations in aid level s across the years. The re could be various reasons behind the increas ed use of de minimis aid in recent years. The most obvious explanation is that s ome Member States prefer using de minimis aid rather than having to go through the less flexible and sometimes lengthy State aid procedures. In addition , the increase partly reflects the numerous crises that hit the farm sector in the period 2014 to 2016 (e.g. the Russian ban on imports of agricultural pro ducts, the market crises in the sectors of milk , pig meat and fruit & vegetables , weather related events and phytosanitary crises such as Avian influenza and African Swine Fever). There are several examples of how Member States have used de minimis aid in order to mitigate the effects of such emergency events , even if there are no specific figures available on the amounts granted or the number of beneficiaries . This was also reflected in the stakeholder consultation, which highlighted de minimis aid as being a useful tool to tackle urgent problems fast and effectively. Stakeholders also pointed out that de minimis aid can be used to bridge the gap between the occurrence of a crisis event and the establishment of a more long term crisis management tool to address the effects of that event. Moreover , some stakeholders stressed that de minimis aid is often used to provide farmers with access to finance (loans or guarantees) that otherwise cannot be provided under either CAP legislation or State aid rules. Member States can in fact use de minimis aid for almost any purpose, as long as they respect the (very few) restrictions laid down in the de minimis regulation. The setting up and keeping of central registers of de minimis aid is currently optional for Member States. In Member States where no central register s exist , the granting authorities have to obtain declarations from the undertakings concerned about any other de minimis aid received during the previous two fiscal years and the current year , before granting any further aid . On the basis of th ose declarations , Member Sta tes shall determine whether the de minimis ceilings are respected. That approach is a less efficient monitoring tool than a central register, in particular in those Member States where aid is granted at several administrative levels. What are the impacts? If the maximum levels for granting de minimis aid are more constraining than they necessarily have to be, the main impact would be that aid going beyond those levels will be subject to State aid control mechanisms , even if it is of minor importance . Even though State aid control has been simplified to a certain extent by B lock E xemption R egulation (EU) No 702/2014, Member States still have to notify a large number of aid measures to the Commission and cannot implement them until they have been authorised by a Commission decision. Moreover, notwithstanding the State aid procedures as such, the setting up of State aid schemes also requires procedures at national level in terms of both legislative measures and implementation. An overly narrow scope for granting de minimis aid therefore has an impact on the administrative burden s for the national authorities. Lengthier procedures also mean that it takes longer before aid payments reach the beneficiaries. This can be a particular problem in emergency situations such as a severe adverse climat ic event or a phytosanitary crisis, where d e minimis aid is sometimes the only instrument that makes it possible to provide financial relief with sufficient speed. A n overly narrow scope for granting d e minimis aid also limits the possibility to use such aid for provid ing farmers with access to finance (loans or guarantees) that otherwise cannot be provided under State aid rules . Monitoring re lying on beneficiaries’ declarations increases the risk of errors and mistakes. That could result in a lack of comprehensive and comparable data, in particular in Member States which make a wide use of de minimis aid and where aid is granted at several administrative levels. Moreover, as highlighted in the stakeholder consultation, the absence of a central register means that the administrative burden of keeping track of granted aid is shifted to the recipient farmer. However, the magnitude of the problem is limited at present. It only became visible because a few Member States had difficulties providing all the information asked for the purpose of this impact assessment . How will the problem evolve? The validity of de minimis regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 expires on 31 December 2020. If that regulation is not replaced by a new de minimis regulation, national aid which presently falls within the scope of that regulation would as from 1 January 2021 become subject to State aid control mechanisms . The Commission would have to use its resources on checking also aid of minor importance and the national authorities would have to face increased administrative costs resulting from the required procedures. I f the de minimis regulation is renewed as it is with the same aid ceili ngs as today, the scope for granting de minimis aid will most likely become even more restrictive as time goes on , taking into account expected future inflation. Moreover , the current national cap is calculated on the basis of data on annual agricultural output in 2011. The aid ceilings have thus become less adequate over time and will become even more estranged from reality in the future . It is not likely that Member States which have not until now set up a central register will do so unless it becomes a legal obligation . The risk of weak monitoring would therefore remain . However, the magnitude of the problem will depend on whether Member States are making a broad use of de minimis aid or not. The problem will be limited if the aid is used only rarely . Why should the EU act? Legal basis The legal basis is Article 108(4) TFEU and Article 2 of Council Regulation (E U ) 2015/1588. Article 108(4) TFEU provides that the Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of State aid that the Council has determined may be exempted from the notification procedure. Article 2 of Regulation (E U ) 2015/1588 lays down the conditions for de minimis aid, as follows: "The Commission may, by means of a Regulation adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 8 of this Regulation, decide that, having regard to the development and functioning of the common market, certain aids do not meet all the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and that they are therefore exempted from the notification procedure provided for in Article 108(3) TFEU , provided that aid granted to the same undertaking over a given period of time does not exceed a certain fixed amount ." Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action Articles 107 and 108 TFEU establish the State aid rules. State aid rules are part of the rules on competition law and thus fall under the exclusive competence of the EU according to Article 3 (1)(b) TFEU. He nce, the only possibility to review the rules on de minimis aid is to take action at EU level. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action A review of the de minimis rules could further simplify State aid procedures and strengthen the monitoring of aid . Only the European Commission has the competence to make that review . If the Commission does not act, the only alternative is status quo until 31 December 2020. Thereafter there would be no rules concerning de minimis aid so that Member States would have to notify or block exempt even the smallest amounts of aid. Objectives: What is to be achieved? General objectives S implif ication and reduc tion of administrative burdens Focus State aid control on potentially more distortive measures S afeguard the functioning of the internal market Safeguard transparency Safeguard legal certainty Specific objectives Ensure the continuity of the de minimis aid instrument beyond 2020. Simplify procedures by enlarging the scope for granting de minimis aid Prevent potential distortive effects on competition or trade Safeguard a proper monitoring of de minimis aid Linking the objectives to the problem Specific objectives Link to the problems and criteria for reaching a solution Ensure the continuity of the de minimis aid instrument beyond 2020. Addresses the problem that the validity of Regulation (EU) No 1408 /2013 expires on 31 December 2020. Meets the following general objectives: Simplifies State aid procedures and reduces administrative burdens Focuses State aid control on potentially more distortive measures Safeguards legal certainty Simplify procedures by enlarging the scope for granting de minimis aid Addresses the problem that the current de minimis ceilings are too constraining: Meets the following general objectives: Simplifi cation and reduction of administrative burdens Focuses State aid control on potentially more distortive measures Prevent potential distortive effects on competition or trade Addresses the problem that de minimis aid must per definition not have any potential impact on competition and trade. Meets the following general objective s : Safeguards the functioning of the internal market Safeguards legal certainty Safeguard a proper monitoring of de minimis aid Addresses the problem of weak monitoring of de minimis aid in certain Member States , Meets the following general objective s : Safeguards transparency Safeguards legal certainty What are the available policy options? The available policy options addressing the objectives outlined in Section 4 are as follows : Baseline scenario: The de minimis rules are maintained beyond 2020 without changes . The de minimis rules are maintained beyond 2020 with an enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid, combined with the mandatory use of central aid register s as the case may be . Under both options, the next review of the de minimis rules would be integrated in the review of the overall framework of State aid rules that is to take place before the end of 2027 . What is the baseline from which the options are assessed? The baseline scenario is to maintain the de minimis rules beyond 2020 without changing them (Option 1 ) . That sta t us quo scenario would imply: maintaining the individual ceiling of EUR 15 000 per single undertaking over three consecutive fiscal years ; maintaining the national cap of 1% of the value of the annual agricultural output; maintaining the voluntary use of national central aid register and the alternative system o f beneficiaries’ declarations of aid received. Maintaining the national cap without changes also mean s that it would not be recalculated on the basis of more recent data on the annual agricultural output. The current national cap was calculated on the basis of the annual output in 2011. The most recent data presently a vailable are from 2016. Description of the policy options An overview of the available policy options is set out in the table below. The option of enlarging the scope for granting de minimis aid is divided into two sub- options, where the increase of the aid ceilings could be either lesser or larger. The lesser increase (Option 2 ) brings no other changes to the current rules than a limited change to the ceilings and the extension of the validity of R egulation (EU) No 1408/2013 beyond 2020. The larger increase (Option 3 ) is subject to additional conditions to prevent potential threats of distortive effects. The first condition is the application of a sector cap to ensure that not more than a certain portion of the national envelopes is spent on one single product sector (for reasons explained in Section 6). The second condition is the mandatory use of a central aid register, so as to ensure a proper monitoring of the sector cap. Option 4 gives Member States a choice between the lesser or larger increase envisaged under options 2 and 3 , respectively . All of the o ptions 2 to 4 imply a recalculation of the nati onal cap on the basis of more recent figures on the annual output. Overview of Policy o ptions Option 1 Baseline scenario: Maintain the rules without changes Option 2 Lesser increase of aid ceilings without additional conditions Option 3 Larger increase of aid ceilings , subject to a sector cap and a mandatory central aid register Option 4 Two-tier approach, leaving Member States the choice between Options 2 and 3 Options discarded at an early stage The possibility of discontinuing the application of the de minimis regulation after its expiration on 31 December 2020 is discarded, as this would go against an already well established policy serving the objectives of simplification and reduction of administrative burdens . Impact of the options on competition and trade The Commission’s powers to change the maximum ceilings for de minimis aid are circumscribed by the condition that those ceilings cannot go beyond a level where the aid could threaten competition and trade (cf. Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588). The aid would otherwise fall within the definition of Article 107(1) TFEU and should as such be subject to Stat e aid control . The assessment of any option going beyond the baseline scenario must therefore take its starting point in an economic analysis of the potential impact on competition and trade. The potential impact of the proposed options is compared to the baseline scenario by analysing t he possible effects of de minimis aid on the profitability of farm holdings. Analytical method The analytical method is the same as the one used in 2012 in the context of the impact assessment preceding the adoption of the current de minimis rules. As in 2012, the present analysis is performed by mea ns of data modelling in the database Farm A ccountancy Data Network (FADN). The analytical method takes into account the fact that farmers most often do not trade internationally and that only a part of primary agricultural products can be subject of such trade. It therefore does not focus directly on actual trade flows or product markets but on the profitability of production in specialised farms and the impact of de minimis aid on that profitability. T he logic is that in cases where de minimis aid can durably and significantly increase relative profitability , there would be more production and supply of profitable products, with subsequent effects on prices and trade. The analytical method is thus based on the assumption that when the granting of de minimis aid in a given scenario increases the profitability in a holdi ng by 20% , it is considered as a single case that may create a potential risk of distorting competition and trade. The single cases of potential risk are added up for each scenario , where t he total number of cases per scenario gives the ranking of the policy options in respect of the ir potential for creating distortive effects. In order to further refine the analysis, the number of potentially distortive cases is weighted with three different factors: the farms’ economic size, the production value and the value of farms’ sales. The unweighted figure gives the lowest risk value and the figure weighted by the value of farms’ sales gives the highest risk value in all cases. The 20% threshold was chosen because it is sufficiently higher than the usual annual changes in income to differ from these, but low enough to allow distinguishing results of over 20 tested different combinations of individual and national ceilings for de minimis aid. Moreover, t he testing of scenarios is based on the assumption of the total national aid envelope being used for one single product sector and spent to the limit . It thus targets the potentially most distortive scenario. That scenario is unlikely, because – as was shown in the stakeholder consultation – Member States tend to use de minimis aid to finance a large range of measures spread over various sectors. The assumption is therefore artificial but is nevertheless necessary in order to obtain a clear and contrasted picture showing the whole spectrum of possibilities. The main part of the FADN-based analysis was carried out in 2016, when the latest FADN dataset available was from 2013. However, average data from the longer period 2011 to 2013 were taken into account to provide a wider basis, largely independent from annual variations of farms' incomes. Moreover, the analysis in its essence relied on a comparison of the volume of de minimis aid with the volume of income. These proportions are quite stable over time, as shown in Table 3 . Table 3: Average data for the period 2011 to 2017 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 O utput of the agricultural industry (€ million at producer prices) 399 795 412 508 424 146 419 255 412 641 401 001 422 654 Average (annual) volume of de minimis aid for a 3 -ye ar envelope equivalent to 1.5% of the above output (€ m) 1 999 2 063 2 121 2 096 2 063 2 005 2 113 Factor income (€ m at basic prices) 153 632 153 005 158 466 159 359 153 336 153 937 169 318 D e minimis aid compared to factor income, % 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% Source: Economic accounts for agriculture (EAA) - values at current prices NB: "factor income" in EAA is an equivalent of "farm net value added" in FADN In addition, the calculation s took into account the structural information about farm numbers, areas and livestock units. The structural changes in the farm populations take place relatively slowly. Consequently, the EU farm censuses to collect such information are carried out only every 10 years (most recently in 2010), with 2-3 sample survey updates in between. According to the just released first figures of the 2016 update of the farm structure survey, the average annual reduction of EU farm numbers in the period 2010-2016 was 2.6%, of utilised agricultural area 0.2%, and of animal numbers 0.5%. T he full economic analysis is included in Annex 5 : "Analysis of options to increase the de minimis limits based on farm profitability data from FADN" . Option 1 – Baseline scenario The Impact Assessment of 2012 that preceded the fixing of the current de minimis ceilings was based on the same analytic al method as the one presently used ( see section 6.1) . That Impact Assessment led to the general conclusion that the main risk of p otential distortive effects lies in the possibility that the aid is focused on one single sector and applied to the limit. It was at the same time concluded that this is an unlikely scenario, because it would leave the Member States with no room to intervene in other sectors, but that it cannot be entirely excluded. The current de minimis ceilings w ere fixed at a level for which the Commission could be reasonably assured that the r isk of distortive effects would be low , based on the information available at the time . The national cap was only slightly raised (from 0,75% to 1%), since it was considered to have generally more potential for creating significant changes in relative competitiveness of production than the individual ceiling. The individual ceiling, on the other hand, was doubled (from EUR 7 500 to EUR 15 000). The 2012 Impact Assessment was based on FADN- data from 2007 - 2009 . The below tables , which comprise data collected from Member States for the purpose of the present Impact Assessment, illustrate the actual use and effects of the baseline scenario up to year 2016. The general conclusion that can be drawn from those figures is that Member States’ policy choices made under the current de minimis rules have not led to a concentration of aid to one single product sector. . The available data show a broad variety in Member States ’ use of de minimis aid . As illustrated by the percentages in Table 4 , some Member States spend a larger share of the total amount of de minimis aid on sector specific aid . Other Member States rather use the aid for measures that cannot be attributed to any specific sector (e.g. environmental measures, tax relief or preferential loans available to all farmers ). There are also Member States where the use v a ries from year to year ( N.B.: The percentages in Table 4 represent sector specific aid out of the total amount of de minimis a id that a Member State has spent in a given year). Table 4 – Sector specific de minimis aid 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 BE 98% 44% 42% 14% 29% 3% BG 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% CY 42% 48% 13% 1% 0% CZ DK 35% 34% 33% 0% 0% 100% DE 93% 15% 5% 5% 1% 1% EL 100% 100% 100% ES 58% 49% 35% 16% 28% 39% EE 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 2% FR 3% 3% 4% 5% 1% HR 0% 19% 12% 44% HU 5% 7% 17% 17% 18% 47% IE 53% 99% 77% 95% 100% 17% IT 17% 25% 29% 24% 57% 22% LT 91% 87% 84% 82% 60% 42% LU 100% 100% 100% 100% 4% 4% LV MT 0% 0% 0% 80% 40% 53% NL 0% 1% 4% 1% 0% AT 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 0% PL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% PT 52% 6% 50% 54% 40% 32% RO 0% 19% 0% 0% FI 71% 65% 76% 72% 97% 4% SE 0% 0% 5% 16% 18% 25% SK 44% 100% 100% 100% 29% SI 5% 4% 1% 0% 0% 5% UK 19% 69% 0% 23% 12% 12% Note s : CZ and LV – no data given about sector specific aid ; FR – data on beneficiaries not available for all sectors, partial results only The percentages indicated in Table 5 show sector specific aid in relation to t he national cap, which reveals that the use of de minimis aid for sector specific support is insignificant. Of the 9 Member States that have used up a large share of their national envelopes (see Table 1), only Bulgaria has spent a significant part of it on sector specific aid. Table 5 : Spending of national envelopes on a single sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 BE 8% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% BG 25% 24% 4% 30% 37% 20% CY 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% CZ 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% DK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% DE 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% EL 0% 0% 23% 0% 29% 0% ES 2% 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% EE 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% FR 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% HR 0% 0% 7% HU 1% 1% 3% 3% 4% 18% IE 0% 7% 14% 41% 12% 0% IT 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% LT 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 32% LU 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% LV 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% MT 0% 0% 0% 14% 3% 4% NL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% AT 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% PL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% PT 4% 1% 4% 4% 7% 5% RO 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% FI 2% 2% 2% 2% 9% 1% SE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% SK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% SI 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% UK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Note: CZ and LV – no data given about sector specific aid Furthermore, o nly a few Member State have systematically spent a significant amount of its national envelope on the same sector throughout the years (see Table 6) . Table 6 : Spending of national envelopes on a single sector Sector MS Average 2011-2016 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Milk and milk products BG 21% 46% 11% 0% 23% 32% 15% Beef and veal IE 11% 0% 11% 13% 36% 4% 0% Apiculture products LT 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 2% 3% Table 7 shows the number of beneficiaries of de minimis aid. The figures fluctuate significantly across the years in most Member States. This also indicates that much of the de minimis aid is used for ad hoc measures that affect different part s of the farming population from year to year . Table 7 – Number of beneficiaries of de minimis aid. 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 BE 3,876 2,021 1,552 1,370 1,452 836 BG 13,652 11,527 4,254 27,445 18,836 20,746 CY 1,510 2,191 367 70 478 0 CZ 803 449 625 1,335 1,139 1,654 DK 41 50 31 28,179 9,935 1,929 DE 90,580 13,535 13,791 13,483 22,432 28,595 EL 0 0 19,263 471 14,186 0 ES 42,572 46,562 34,495 20,835 19,526 29,334 EE 223 274 230 302 650 613 FR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A HR 0 0 1 295 2,516 7,061 HU 19,025 15,058 22,628 21,772 21,557 23,045 IE 406 5,240 18,533 55,616 15,781 4,609 IT 78,142 80,802 47,117 79,155 21,519 12,901 LT 6,077 6,292 8,788 10,045 11,275 45,442 LU 23 23 28 27 1,892 3,707 LV 5 27 567 1,316 2,778 3,181 MT 65 61 69 172 126 123 NL 0 4 676 2,622 1,468 66 AT 25,552 26,235 23,280 25,252 53,417 24,465 PL N/A N/A 90,165 188,824 182,208 149,109 PT 2,236 24,028 3,053 3,780 9,969 8,950 RO 0 510,289 0 16,002 7,744 2,212 FI 2,073 2,086 1,614 1,672 2,248 6,384 SE 5,862 5,403 5,109 4,746 5,387 5,422 SK 71 25 17 11 0 6 SI 649 181 2,053 3,287 808 824 UK 750 4 2,217 700 6,508 13,912 Notes : PL – no data on the number of beneficiaries for 2011, 2012 Options 2, 3 and 4 compared to the baseline scenario Given the pattern of the use of de minimis aid, as described in Section 6.2, it can be concluded that there is some scope for incre asing both the individual ceiling and the national cap. The question is to which extent those ceilings could be raised, while still keeping a prudent approach in the sense that the Commission must be safely assured that the ris k of distortive effects remains at a low level . While it is clear that a combined increase of both the individual ceiling and the national cap entails a higher level of risk tha n raising just one of the ceilings, the main risk factor is still the national cap. Whereas the pattern s described in Section 6.2 show that the actual use of sector specific aid has until now been limited, the risk that larger shares of aid could be devoted to one single product sector increases with a higher national cap. A significantly enlarged national envelope means that Member States can spend a fair share of de minimis aid on a specific sector without necessarily having to disrupt the use of such aid for beneficiaries in other sectors. Hence, the higher the national cap, the larger the risk of distortive effects. The potential effects of a wide range of scenarios for raising the current de minimis ceilings were tested in relation to the baseline scenario, with the extreme scenario of doubling both the individual ceiling and the national cap . As already explained in Section 6.1, th e testing of these scenarios is based on the theoretical assumption that the total aid amount available within the national cap is used for one single product sector and spent to the limit. With that assumption, the theoretical risk level cannot be zero for any scenario, not even for the baseline scenario. To compare the scenarios , the risk level for the baseline scenario is therefore set at 100 % for reasons of convenience (any value beyo nd 0 % could have been chosen). T he number of potentially distortive cases is weighted with three different factors: the farms’ economic size, the production value and the value of farms’ sales. The unweighted figure gives the lowest risk value and the figure weighted by the value of farms’ sales gives the highest risk value in all cases (see Annex 5 for further detail) . The outcome of the testing of scenarios is shown in Figure 2. As the graph indicates, the theoretical risk of distortive effects compared to the baseline ranges from minor for the lowest scenario to significant for the highest scenario . Figure 2: Risk of distortive effects in relation to scale of increased ceilings 2862126 1179 0 Mo r e precisely, a doubling of the individual ceiling to EUR 30 000 would raise the potential risk level to approximately 150 % based on the number of cases and 200 % as weighted by the value of farms’ sales. A doubling of the national cap would raise the potential risk level to approximately 175% based on the number of cases and 240% as weighted by the value of farms’ sales. A combined doubling of both ceilings would raise the potential risk level to almost 300 % based on the number of cases and to almost 600 % as weighted by the value of farms’ sales. However, the analysis do es not suggest a ny specific “safe” limit. It only differentiates the options by the theoretical level of potential risk of distortive effects. Given that ther e is no model that could predict when or where the potential risk would become a real distortion, one must also balance the theoretical risk level against the likelihood of a policy change in the Member States compared to how de minimis aid is currently being used (cf. Section 6.2). As regards the baseline scenario, the consultation of stakeholders and Member States did not point towards any negative effects on competition and trade resulting from the current use of de minimis aid . Nor has the Commission received any complaints about such effects. Options 2 , 3 and 4 are further assessed on that basis . Option 2 : Lesser increase of ceilings without additional conditions Most stakeholders and Member States are calling for an increase of both the individual ceiling and the national cap. As shown by F igure 2, a combined increase of those ceilings to respectively EUR 20 000 and 1,25 % would result in a theoretical risk level of approximately 160 % based on the number of cases and 2 30 % as weighed by the value of farms’ sales . As concluded already in the Impact Assessment of 2012, raising the national cap has a higher potential for distortion than raising the individual ceiling. If the national cap is increased by 0,25 percentage points compared to the baseline scenario (from 1 % to 1,25 %) , it still limits Member States ’ possibilities to start concentrating the additional margin on certain sectors. A national cap set at 1,25 % is therefore not expected to lead to a policy change in the Member States’ use of de minimis aid. An increase of the individual ceiling to EUR 20 000 might have some financial importance for micro and small undertakings (mostly semi-subsistence or part-time farmers, which are generally less competitive) but otherwise makes no particular difference in terms of real effects on the profitability of farm holdings . T he risk of distortive effects is therefore expected to be negligible also at a micro economic level . T h e overall risk level resulting from a combined increase of the individual ceiling to EUR 20 000 and the national cap to 1,25 % would therefore not make any difference in terms of real risk compared to the baseline scenario . Option 3 : Larger increase of ceilings subject to additional conditions A majority of the sta keholders and Member States are calling for a doubling of both the individual ceiling ( to EUR 30 000 ) and the national cap ( to 2 % of the annual output ) . However, as figure 2 shows, a combined increase of that magnitude would bring the potential risk level to almost 300 % based on the number of cases and almost 600 % as weighted by the value of farms’ sales. Even a slightly lesser increase would result in significantly higher risk levels compared to the baseline scenario. Moreover, the risk is not only theoretical but could result in real market distortion. A national cap set a 2 % would mean that Member States could start using the same national envelope as the y have today for pure sector sp ecific aid without having to disrupt the use of de minimis aid for other purposes. In that context, a lso the higher individual ceiling could have a real impact at microeconomic level , especially in Member States where the production value per farm is low. The potential distortive effects of a larger increase of both d e minimis ceilings would therefore have to be mitigated by additional conditions. Option 3 thus comprises t he possibility of introducing a sector spending cap in order to prevent Member States from spending more than a certain portion of their national envelopes on one single product sector. The ‘product sectors’ would be identical to those listed in Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 on the CMO in agricultural products (cereals, sugar, fruit and vegetables, processed fruit and vegetables, beef and veal, milk and milk products, etc.). The sector cap should be fixed at a percentage where the risk of distortive effects is kept more or less at the same level as under the baseline scenario. Calculations show that this would be the case with a sector cap representing 50 % of the national envelope (see Figure 3 ) , if the aid ceilings are increased to not more than EUR 25 000 and 1,5 % . Figure 3: Risk of distortive effects as mitigated by a 50 % sector cap A 50 % sector cap is also proportionate in the sense that it does not limit Member States’ choices in comparison to their current use of de minimis aid, given that no Member State has so far granted more than 50% of its national envelope to a given sector in a given year. However, it would no longer be possible for Member States to rely on a system of farmers’ declarations , if they also have to monitor a sector cap. Such monitoring would be difficult, or even impossible , without the use of a central register , especially in Member States where aid is granted at several different administrative levels. Therefore , not only a sector cap but also the mandatory use of a c entral register , containing complete information on all de minimis aid granted by any authority within the Member State, are indispensable prerequisites for Option 3 . Option 4 : Two-tier approach In the stakeholder consultation, several farm organisations expressed themselves in favour of making central registers mandatory as that would relieve beneficiaries from the obligation to declare aid already received . Member States gav e a more mixed response. Although some Member States acknowledge the usefulness of central registers as a monitoring tool , the introduction of an obligation to use them is generally perceived as being unnecessarily burdensome and costly in terms of staff and IT- support . In the light of Member States ’ concerns, and for the sake of proportionality, the assessment should take into account that the use of a central register for monitoring is less crucial if the de minimis aid ceilings are kept at a level where no sector cap is required. Without a sector cap, the system of d eclarations could still be relied on , provided it is subject to proper coordination in Member States where aid is granted at different administrative levels . Option 4 therefore consists of giving Member States a choice betwee n Options 2 and 3 , in order offer a proportionate approach for those Member States that use de minimis aid to only a limited extent. The latter Member States could thus opt for a slightly enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid without being subject to a sector cap, given the limited likelihood of an increased use of sector specific aid. Although the Commission considers that a central aid register is the preferred monitoring tool, it sees no need to make it mandatory other than in relation to the sector cap . The Member States that wish to have a larger scope for using de minimis aid can opt for higher ceilings combined with the additional conditions of a sector cap and a mandatory central register. Hence, the two-tier approach would allow a Member State to either grant aid within an individual ceiling of EUR 20 000 and a national cap of 1.25%, without further conditions, or to grant aid beyond those limits , subject to the application of a 50 % sector spending cap and the use of a central aid register . If the maximum aid ceilings for the second approach are fixed at EUR 25 000 and 1.5 % respectively, the risk of distortive effects will remain at the same risk level as the baseline scenario . What are the impacts of the policy options? The policy options have been analysed with a particular view to the possibilities to enlarge the scope for granting de minimis aid . The likely economic, social and environmental impacts could not be analysed in detail for each of the options listed. However, with a view to the relatively simple mechanisms used for applying de minimis aid, the below considerations outline the likely impacts . Economic impacts The d e minimis rules can legally cover only measures for which it can be safely presumed that they do not have any effect on trade and competition. Provided the level of de minimis aid is set at the right level, the envisaged initiative would not have any significant economic impact at EU level , even where the extent of the use of de minimis aid differ s between Member States . With the ceiling set appropriately, and in view of the fact that the de minimis rules exclude granting of de minimis aid fixed on the basis of price or quantity, or to export-related activities, it is reasonable to assume that granting of de minimis aid would affect neither cost/price competitiveness nor innovative competitiveness of undertakings. Nor would it affect t he effective market competition or the market shares on international markets of the sector/undertakings. Thus, no significant impacts on competitiveness have been identified. The data available (see Section 6.2) show a broad variety in the Member States’ use of de minimis . Most of it is used for ad hoc measures that affect different parts of the farming population. The data also demonstrate that the value of de minimis aid is only a small part of the production value of average size d farms in many Member States. De minimis aid may be granted to all undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products irrespective of their size. However, as the ceiling for de minimis aid is set at the level of the undertaking, it can be reasonably assumed that the smaller the undertaking the bigger the relative (positive) impact would be. Thus, in relative terms, micro and small undertakings would benefit more, all else equal. A positive economic impact that could result from an increase of the de minimis ceilings is that it would give Member States some further room for manoeuvre to provide access to finance or to rapidly deal with urgent problems that could otherwise plunge farmers into serious financial difficulties. This could in particular help keeping SMEs in a viable state. Therefore, a priori only a positive economic impact on SMEs can be identified, provided ceilings are set at a level where they do not threaten to impact on competition and trade. Social impacts Social impacts are difficult to identify, given that de minimis aid can be used for an infinite number of different measures, with no particular pattern, and can have a broad variety of objectives which are not necessarily social objectives. A potential social impact would mainly result from the fact that the aid could possibly be used to alleviate farmers' financial difficulties or even save certain holdings from bankruptcy. The stakeholder consultation also showed that de minimis aid is often used to provide access to finance through loans for investments in modernisation and development of agricultural holdings. The aid could in that sense have an impact on the social fabric in rural areas. Environmental impacts T he use of de minimis aid is not subject to any other condition than the maximum aid ceilings and the exclusion of aid that would interfere with the common market organisation in agriculture . It is therefore not excluded that Member States could grant de minimis aid for measures with less ambitious environmental objectives than those that would otherwise be assessed under EU State aid rules when financed by national budgets. However, it is in practice less likely that Member States w ould use de minimis aid to finance environmental measures, as State aid rules allow for significantly higher aid amounts than those allowed under the de minimis regulation. As for potential negative impacts on environment, it goes without saying that de minimis aid must be compatible with EU law and cannot be used for measures that could result in infringements on Union environmental protection legislation. A potential raise of the de minimis ceilings should highlight this (e.g. in a recital of the amending regulation) . Otherwise, t he e nvi ronmental impacts are expected to be minor. WTO compatibility There is no detailed data on Member States' use of de minimis aid (as such aid is exempted from notification requirements), but it may be presume d that at least part of it could be considered to be trade-distorting domestic support in the sense of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (“WTO Amber Box”). Typical examples of de minimis aid are interest free loans or guarantees or tax reductions used to help farmers out of temporary liquidity gaps. This type of support would in most cases be classified as trade distorting support falling within the WTO Amber Box . Current WTO rules limit spending in the Amber Box. All spending – EU, Member State co-financing and purely national aid – needs to be counted against that limit. A prudent estimate for the amount to be notified under the current CAP by 2019 would be around EUR 8 to 8.5 billion. Currently, the EU has a wide margin for spending under the Amber Box as the limit is set at EUR 72 billion plus allowances of 5% for product specific support and 5% of the value of production for non-product specific support. Particular issues with regard to WTO compatibility are thus not envisaged. Affected parties The measure affects only national authorities granting de minimis aid and undertakings benefitting from de minimis aid. Therefore, for undertakings no additional burden is envisaged as the criteria for benefitting from de minimis aid have not changed. However, the administrative burden for undertakings would be reduced if the Member States that do not use a central aid register would do so, since the presence of a central register relieve s beneficiaries from the obligation to send declarations of aid already obtained. For the national authorities, a reduction of the administrative burden can be expected as the increase of the ceiling provides more opportunity to grant de minimis aid as an alternative to block exempting or notifying a State aid scheme. The introduction of central registers would allow Member States to waive the procedure for obtaining and checking declarations from undertakings and thus further reduce the administrative burden. Several Member States that already have central registers, which are either earmarked for de minimis aid or part of a larger register for recording public aid in general, have acknowledged the usefulness of such a tool (e.g. Estonia, Ireland and Italy). The benefits are however offset to some extent by the cost of setting up the central register in terms of staff and IT-support . (Administrative) cost savings Savings in administrative costs are expected both at the level of national authorities and at the level of the undertakings receiving de minimis aid (beneficiaries) , as further detailed in Annex 3 and summarised in Section 9.2 . The following cost-benefit analysis is supported by the standard cost model (SCM) through application of the methodology, basic data and assumptions outlined in Annex 4 . Option 2: Enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid For national administrations: An enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid is exp ected to cause savings through the reduction in the number of State aid notifications and exemptions under the block exemption regulation. For option 2 , which provides for a lesser increase of the aid ceilings, t he estimates show a decrease of total annual administrative costs o f EUR 252 000. The lesser increase of aid ceilings under Option 2 is not subject to a sector cap and mandatory use of central registers to monitor aid. It therefore does not entail either increased costs or saving in terms of setting up and running a central register . For busi nesses: Time savings through simpler procedures under the de minimis rules compared to the block exempted measures or/and notified measures Option 3: Enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid, subje ct to additional conditions to p revent potentia l threats of distortive effects For national administrations: Savings in terms of reduction in the number of State aid notifications and exemptions under the block exemption regulation are expected to be significantly more important under Opt ion 3 than under Option 2. The estimates show a general decrease of total annual administrative costs of EUR 628 992 . For those Member States that do not yet have a central register, the setting up of a register will entail costs in terms of staff resources and IT-support. The average annual costs per Member State for setting up the register are estimated to approximately EUR 8 7 00 , amounting to a total of EUR 121 800 at EU level . The average a dministrative costs for running the register are estimated at EUR 330 750. At longer term, the use of central registers will lead to savings through the elimination of the procedure for sending letters to potential beneficiaries and obtaining declarations of de minimis aid already received. The elimination of letters/declarations is estimated to save EUR 120 866 at national level . For busi nesses: Time savings through simpler procedures under the de minimis rules compared to block exempted me asures or/and notified measures. The elimination of the procedure for providing declarations of received aid is expected to bring total savings of EUR 10 764 000 at EU level . Option 4: Two-tier approach, leaving Member States a choice between Options 2 and 3 Costs and savings will depend on the policy choices made by Member States as to whether extend or not the use of the minimis aid beyond the maximum aid ceilings envisaged under Option 2. If a large number of Member States opt for the higher aid ceilings, the size of costs and savings will be close to the figures indicated under Option 3. However, the outcome of future policy choices is unknown and it is therefore not possible to make an estimate. How do the options compare? The comparison of the options outlined in Section 5 is mainly done with a view to the variation s of the individual and national de minimis ceilings in terms of achieving objectives. Options 2 to 4 are compared to the baseline scenario (Option 1) on the basis on the following parameters: 1. Effectiveness – the extent to which they would achieve the specific objectives 2. Efficiency – in terms of cost-effectiveness 3. Coherence – with other EU policy objectives The ratings of each option as being “more effective” / “more efficient” / “more coherent” to “less effective” / “less efficient” / “less coherent” c ompa red to the baseline option (0) is expressed as neutral/no significant change (0), slightly positive (+), positive (++), very positive (+++), slightly negative (-), negative (--) and very negative (---). S cores separated by th e sign / means that the options ranks in between more than one score. Option 1 Baseline Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Effectiveness Ensure the continuity of the de minimis instrument 0 + + + Simplify procedures by e nlarg ing the scope for granting de minimis aid 0 + + ++ + + +/++ + Prevent potential distortive effects on competition and trade 0 0 0 -/ 0 Safeguard a proper monitoring of de minimis aid 0 0 ++ + 0/++ + Efficiency Proportionate administrative costs for Member States 0 0 -/+ 0/-/+ Coherence 0 0 0 0 Comparison of effectiveness Ensure the continuity of de minimis aid beyond 2020 Options 1 to 4 are given the same rating, because they all imply an extension of the period of validity of Regulation (EU) No 1408 /2013 , which would otherwise expire on 31 December 2020. T he ne xt review of the de minimis rules would take place before the end of 2027. Simplify procedures by e nlarg ing the scope for granting de minimis aid to farmers Option 3 scores h igher than Option 2 because it involves a more substantial increase of both the individual ceiling and the national cap and therefore offers Member States significantly more flexibility in their use of de minimis aid. Option 4 reflects the ratings of Options 2 and 3 , because it offers Member States a choice between th ose two options . Prevent potential effects on competition and trade The rating is the same for Options 1 and 3, because the sector cap under Option 3 makes it possible to keep the risk at the same level as in the baseline scenario. Option 2 scores slightly lower, because of the theoretical risk, but no change in practice is expected as the national cap still limits Member States’ possibilities to start concentrating aid on certain sectors. Ensure proper monitoring of aid Option 3 scores higher than Opti on 2 because it is subject to the mandatory use of a central aid register for the monitoring de minimis aid. A central register is a more effective monitoring tool than the alternative system of relying on beneficiaries’ declarat ions . Option 4 reflects the ratings of Options 2 and 3 . Comparison of efficiency In respect of efficiency, the comparison takes into account costs and benefits for both Member States and businesses . The options have different impacts on administrative costs incurred and savings obtained T he enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid is expected to cause savings for national administrations in terms of a larger scope for putting measures under the de minimis rules rather than submitting them to the more administratively burdensome State aid procedures (i.e. notification of aid or compliance with block exemption requirements) . Option 2 would not incur any additional administrative costs for M ember States , whereas Option 3 is subject to the requirements of managing a sector cap and keeping a central aid register. T he use of central aid registers would in the long run facilitate the granting and monitoring of de minimis aid and would also reduce the administrative burden for the recipient farmers. The overall effect on efficiency is therefore considered to be positive. However, the setting up of the register would imply an initial increase in administrative costs in terms of staff resources and IT-support for those Member States where no such registers exists . Moreover, the introduction of a sector spending cap would have an impact on costs also in the Member States where central registers already exist, as they would have to adapt those registers to th e additional ceiling . Whereas a sector spending cap and a central register are absolute prerequisites for Option 3 , they could in Member States with a limited use of de minimis aid result in administrative costs that go beyond what is proportionate. Option 4 therefore seeks to strike a balance by combining Options 2 and 3 in a two-tier approach , so as to give Member States a choice between a larger increase of the scope for granting aid subject to additional c onditions and a lesser increase wi thout additional conditions. Comparison of coherence N one of the options is considered to go beyond what is necessary to achieve the specific objectives and to maintain a level playing field. The options are simple and well-known as they are based on the same mechanisms as the existing legislation , including conditions to safeguard the integrity of the common market organisation in agricultural products. None of the options is deemed to have any adverse impact on other EU policies. De minimis aid remains subject to the respect of EU law and cannot be used in violation of legislation in any policy field. Preferred option Option 4 The two-tier approach offered under Option 4 is the preferred option , as it strikes a fair balance between Member State s ’ increased flexibility and the maintenance of a level playing field for farmers, while keeping administrative costs at a proportionate level for those Member States that use de minimis aid only to a limited extent. Even though t he use of a central aid register is preferred as a monitoring tool, most Member States seem to be able to ensure a proper monitoring also without a register, at least under the current set of de minimis rules. REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) REFIT Cost Savings – Preferred Option – (sub-)option 2 Description Amount Comments Reduction of administrative burden (notifications, block exemptions) EUR 252 000 Authorities REFIT Cost Savings – Preferred Option – (sub-)option 3 Description Amount Comments Reduction of administrative burden (notifications, block exemptions) EUR 628 992 Authorities Reduction of administrative burden (elimination of "declaration" procedure) EUR 120 886 Authorities Reduction of administrative burden (elimination of "declaration" procedure) EUR 10 764 000 Businesses/beneficiaries (1) Estimates are with respect to the baseline of the unchanged legislation; ( 2) Please indicate which stakeholder group is the recipient of the cost saving in the comment section; (3) For reductions in regulatory costs please describe the measure/action which gives rise to t he cost saving (e.g. actions to reduc e compliance costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, etc.) and whether it is a recurrent cost saving. How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? The Commission will follow more closely Member States’ keeping of records of the granting of de minimis aid, in particular those Member States that choose not to make use of a central aid register but continue to rely on a system of farmers’ declarations. To that end, it will make more frequent use of its prerogative to ask for information relating to the compliance with the conditions for granting de minimis aid (cf. Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 and Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013). Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 will expire on 31 December 2027. T he Commission will continue collect ing information from Member States on the use of de minimis aid. The data to be collected and evaluated should cover the use of de minimis aid at both individual level ( i.e. the numbers of holdings reaching the individual ceiling over any period of 3 fiscal years ) and at national level ( i.e. the relevance of national caps in relation to the actual concentration of aid on single product sectors ). The evaluation should also address the cost-benefits of the use of central registers for monitoring of de minimis aid at national level. Annex 1: Procedural information Lead DG, D e cide Planning/CWP references The lead DG behind the initiative is DG Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) The Roadmap (Inception IA) was published on the Better Regulation Portal on 13 July DECIDE ref.: 2017 (P LAN/201 7/1090 ) - AGRI - a gricultural de minimis aid Organisation and timing Tentative time frame for amending Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 Adoption procedure/Impact Assessment May 2017 1 st ISG meeting ( 11/5 ) June/July 2017 FVP validation of entry into Decide (29/6) 2 nd ISG meeting ( 12/7 ) ISG endorsement of Inception IA Publication of Inception IA on Commission web-site ( 3/7, followed by 4 weeks stakeholder feedback) December 2017 Finalised economic analysis of options to increase the de minimis levels Finalisation of draft regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 January 2018 3 rd ISG meeting ( 24/1 ) February 2018 ISC on the draft amending regulation ( from 5/2 to 16/2) Finalisation of draft following ISC Draft amending regulation sent to DGT for translation Invitation to the 1 st meeting of the Advisory Committee and notification of the draft regulation to MS (mandatory 2 months before the 1 st Advisory Committee meeting] Publication of the draft amending regulation for stakeholder consultation ( from 1/3/ to 16/4) April 2018 1 st meeting of the Advisory Committee on State aid ( 23/4 ) May 2018 Finalisation of IA report (taking into account the outcome of the stakeholder consultation and of t he Advisory Committee) Submission of IA report to the R SB ( 30/5 ) Adaptation of draft amending regulation following Advisory Committee/ stakeholder consultation June 2018 Meeting with R SB (27/6) RSB O pinion (29/6) July – August 2018 Adaptation of draft IA report in line with RSB Opinion September – October 2018 Submission of the revised draft regulation and IA report to ISC (15 working days) Submission of the file for written procedure Adoption en principe by the College Invitation to the 2 nd meeting of the Advisory Committee November – December 2018 2 nd meeting of the Advisory Committee State aid [ Adaptation of draft following the Advisory Committee , if necessary ISC on the revised draft amending regulation , if necessary (10 working days) Finalisation of draft following ISC , if necessary] Submission of the file for written procedure Adoption Publication and entry into force Consultation of the RSB The R egulatory Scrutiny Board gave its opinion on the draft impact assessment report on 29 June 2018. The overall opinion is 'positive with reservations' . The Board pointed out a number of shortcomings and made its positive opinion subject to adjustments of the draft report in order to integrate the Board's recommendations , in particular with regard to the following key aspects : The report is not clear on the rationale for increasing the thresholds for de minimis aid and setting the sectoral cap at 50%. The report does not explain the criteria used to select the preferred option. It does not specify which level of theoretical risk is considered to be ‘negligible’ or ‘acceptable’ according to the rules on de minimis aid. DG AGRI amended the draft report along the lines of the Board’s recommendations. The problem definition was revised to clarify why the current de minimis ceilings are considered to be unduly constraining and need to be increased . The criteria used to compare the p olicy options and the underlying analytical method were developed to better explain the risk analysis, the reasons for fixing a sector cap at 50 % selection and the selection of the preferred option . The relationship between de minimis aid and the CAP was clarified and t he impacts of a possible weak monitoring were further assessed . The estimation of cost/benefits was adjusted to take into account the fact that the preferred option gives Member States a choice as regards the use of central aid registers. Evidence, sources and quality Sources of data: Analysis of options to increase the de minimis limits based on farm profitabilit y data from FADN (document enclosed in Annex 6 ) Data on the use of de minimis aid submitted by Member States upon the Commission ’s request, pursuant to Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 . https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/facts-and-figures_en Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation It was agreed not to c onduct a public consultation a required under Better Regulation, because Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 already requires a hearing of interested parties which must run for a minimum of one month following the publication of the draft regulat ion. The draft regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 was published accordingly and the hearin g ran for 7 weeks (see point 2) Publication of Inception Impact assessment The Inception Impact Assessment was published for stakeholder feedback from 13 July to 10 August 2017 . 14 farmers’ associations and 2 Member States submitted comments, of which the vast majority called for an increase of the individual aid ceiling to EUR 30 000 and of the national cap to 2 % of the annual output. Publication of d raft amending regulation T he draft amending regulation was published on the Commission web site http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/stateaid_en , from 1 March to 16 April 2018 to enable all interested parties and their organisations to submit comments on the draft , as required by Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588. The consultation generated contributions from 36 interested parties, of which 15 were public bodies (mainly ministries at federal or regional level), 20 were stakeholder organisations (mainly farmers’ associations) and 1 was a private citizen. The comments made by those interested parties can be summarised as follows. Use of de minimis aid : The submitted comments show that de minimis aid is used for a wide range of purposes. Some Member States use it for measures that could have been financed also under the ordinary State aid instruments applicable to the agricultural sector . This concerns in particular aid to make good damage caused by natural disasters, adverse weather conditions and animal diseases. However, several interested parties indicated that de minimis aid is also used for measures that would otherwise not have been eligible for aid under either CAP support schemes or the EU State aid rules, such as various types of operating aid (e.g. working capital, tax relief, short time subsidised loans or compensation for price and income volatility) or compensation for damage falling outside the scope of State aid rules (e.g. damage caused by wild animals that are not protected under legislation or damage caused by adverse climatic events that cannot be assimilated to natural disasters) or recovery of unlawful aid. Beneficiaries : Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises are considered to be the main beneficiaries of de minimis aid. This reflects the structure of the agricultural sector, where many farms are of small size, and also the fact that de minimis aid has a larger financial impact on SMEs than on larger undertakings. Main positive effects : A vast majority of the interested parties consider that de minimis aid is a useful tool, which because of its flexibility and simple procedure allows tackling serious urgent problems fast and effectively. Other instruments for providing aid (CAP or State aid rules) are less flexible and require longer procedures and they are thus less useful when urgent measures are needed to help farmers out of emergency situations. De minimis aid can also be used for immediate relief to bridge the gap until a State aid scheme is established and authorised. Another positive effect is the possibility to provide access to finance through loans, in particular for SMEs , and the concomitant modernisation, reduction in costs and development of agricultural holdings. Main negative effects : Most interested parties consider that the current de minimis rules have had no negative effects on competition and trade. However, one Member State points out that de minimis aid can be used only by those Member States that have the availability of the relevant budget and the o ne citizen reply refers to de minimis aid as "pure helicopter money" that does not improve any structures. Maximum aid amount per single undertaking : Most of the interested parties advocate an increase of the maximum aid amount per single undertaking. CZ, FI, LV and about 1/4 of the stakeholder organisations favour an increase to EUR 25 000 per 3 fiscal years. FR, LT and 3 German Länder as well as almost half of the stakeholder organisations call for an increase to EUR 30 000 or beyond. 2 farmers’ associations even ask for an increase to EUR 50 000. Several farmers’ associations also question the large difference in maximum aid levels between agricultural and general de minimis aid. National cap : Most of the interested parties are less explicit about the national cap than about the individual ceiling. FR and LV argue that the national cap should be removed entirely. Alternatively, FR together with 2 German Länder and a few stakeholder organisations call for an increase to 2 %. CZ, FI, LT and 3 stakeholder organisations favour an increase to 1,5 %, whereas the Åland government refers to an increase beyond 1,5 %. A few other stakeholders would like to see a higher national cap but without being more precise. EE is against any increase beyond the current level. Sector spending cap : Most of the interested parties which take position on the sector spending cap consider such an additional ceiling to be overly limiting and administratively burdensome. Some are firmly opposed (EE, 3 German Länder, the Åland government and several stakeholder organisations). Others (e.g. FI and FR) are cautiously asking for clarifications as regards the design of the sector spending cap and its implementation. 2 interested parties speak in favour of a sector spending cap but suggest alternative ways to calculate it. Several Member State authorities also point out that a sector spending cap cannot be applied retroactively and that the wording of the draft regulation needs to be changed in that regard. Central aid register : It is known that 14 Member States have established central aid registers, which are either earmarked for de minimis aid or part of a larger register for recording public aid in general. Most of the Member States that replied to the consultation consider the central register to be an effective monitoring tool (CY, CZ, EE, IE, IT, LT, LV, HU), albeit associated with administrative costs in terms of staff resources and IT-support. CY and IT have had some teething problems and are currently redesigning their systems. FR and FI let cautiously understand that they could consider setting up central registers but called for a sufficiently long transitional period (i.e. at least until 1.1.2023). The Member States that already have a central register echoed that a sufficient transitional period would be necessary also for adapting those registers to the introduction of a sector spending cap (if any). On the side of those explicitly opposed to a mandatory central register are AT, 3 German Länder and a few stakeholder organisations. However, most of the stakeholder organisations, and in particular the farmers’ associations (including COPA-Cogeca), are strongly in favour of making central registers mandatory and emphasise that this would significantly reduce administrative burdens for farmers (who would no longer have to provide declarations of aid received in the past) and reduce the risk of exceeding ceilings. Other general remarks : It is important to keep the use of de minimis aid flexible and simple. There should be one single de minimis regulation for all sectors. Advisory Committee on State aid The Member States were further consulted on the draft amending regulation in the framework of the Advisory Committee on State aid, as required by Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588. All Member States’ delegations but DK, LT and SK took the floor. The discussion can be summarised as follows Most delegations expressed themselves in favour of increasing both de minimis ceilings and most of them also asked for an increase of the individual ceiling to EUR 30 000 and of the national cap to 2% of the annual output. Only Spain is against a raise of the individual ceiling and only EE is against a raise of the national cap. A few other Member States (PT, BE, HR, FI, EL) consider the currently applicable ceilings to be sufficient but are not against raising them. All delegations argued against the introduction of a sector spending cap, which they consider to be administratively burdensome. Several delegations pointed towards difficulties to apply a sector spending cap to multi-sectoral aid, but it was explained to them that the cap would be applied only to aid which is earmarked for a given product sector. It was further explained that the sector list would be the one defined in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 on the CMO . Many delegations emphasised that, if a sector spending cap was to be introduced, it must not be retroactively applicable. As regards the central aid register, 14 Member States already ha ve such a register, 10 Member States do not have a register and a few Member States are in the process of setting up a register. Most Member States that do not already have a central aid register are against the obligation to have one (DE, SE, UK, NL, AT) because of the costs of setting it up and the difficulties that decentralised States would be facing due to the multitude of public granting authorities. The delegations also emphasised that, if a central aid register and a sector spending cap would become obligatory, there must be a sufficiently long transitional period for setting up the registers and/or adapting them to the sector spending cap. They also asked for further guidance on how to design the register. FR asked for more details on the Commission’s economic analysis and it was agreed to circulate the Impact Assessment report containing that analysis as soon as it has been approved by the RSB. The 2 nd consultation of the Advisory Committee will take place at a meeting currently scheduled for November 2018. Annex 3: Who is affected and how? Practical implications of the initiative The initiative would have the following practical implications: For the national administrations: The enlarged scope for granting de minimis aid is expected to cause savings through a reduction in the number of State aid notifications and exemptions under the block exemption regulation. For national administrations in Member States opting for a larger scope for granting de minimis aid (sub-option 3 ): S et ting up of central aid registers , unless such a register exists already . Adaptation of a lready existing central aid registers to take into account the application of a sector spending cap in Member States opting for a larger scope for granting de minimis aid . The obligation to obtain declarations from undertakings of aid received, which currently apply to all Member States that do not have a central register, will cease to apply at the moment when a register has been set up and covers a period of 3 fiscal years. For businesses: Time savings through simpler procedures under the de minimis rules compared to the block exempted measures or/and notified measures In Member States where central registers are set up, aid beneficiaries will no longer have to send declarations of aid received. Summary of costs and benefits Savings in administrative costs are expected both at the level of national authorities and at the level of the undertakings receiving de minimis aid . The following cost-benefit analysis is supported by the standard cost model. Increase of the scope for granting de minimis aid and setting up a central register ( specified for the two (sub-)options in the two-tier approach of the preferred option 4 ) : For the national administrations: The increased scope for granting de minimis aid is expected to cause savings through a reduction in the number of State aid notifications and exemptions under the block exemption regulation . State aid procedures as such (i.e. notification of aid or compliance with blo ck exemption requirements) involve several working steps. Establishing State aid schemes requires procedures at national level in terms of both legislative measures and implementation. The estimates show a general decrease of total annual administrative costs of EUR 252 000 for (sub-)option 2 and EUR 628 992 for (sub-)option 3 . Member States which opt for (sub-)option 3 a nd set up central registers will make savings due to the elimination of the procedure for sending letters to potential beneficiaries and obtaining declarations of de minimis aid already received. The elimination of letters/declarations is estimated to save EUR 120 866 at national level. Setting up the central register will however entail costs in terms of staff resources and IT-support. The average annual costs for setting u p the register are estimated to approximately EUR 8 7 00 , amounting to a total of EUR 121 800 at EU level. The average costs of running the register are estimated to approximately EUR 330 750 . At longer term, the savings will be higher than the costs of setting-up and maintain ing the r egister. For businesses: all sizes of undertakings: Time savings through simpler procedures under the de minimis rules compared to notified and/or exempted State aid measures. Elimination of the procedure for providing declarations of received aid in Member States which set up central aid registers. I. Overview of Benefits (total for all p rovisions) – Preferred Option - (sub-)option 2 Description Amount Comments Direct benefits Administrative cost reduction EUR 252 000 MS administrat i on Indirect benefits - - - I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – P referred Option – (sub-)option 3 Description Amount Comments Direct benefits Administrative cost reduction EUR 628 992 MS administration Administrative cost reduction EUR 120 886 MS administration Administrative cost reduction EUR 10 764 000 Businesses Indirect benefits - - - (1) Estimates are relative to the baseline for the preferred option as a whole (i.e. the impact of individual actions/obligations of the preferred option are aggregated together); (2) Please indicate which stakeholder group is the main recipient of the benefit in the comment section;(3) For reductions in regulatory costs, please describe details as to how the saving arises (e.g. reductions in compliance costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, etc.; see section 6 of the attached guidance). I I . Overview of c osts – Preferred o ption – (sub-)option 3 Citizens/Consumers Businesses Administrations One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent Setting up central register D irect costs EUR 121 800 Indirect costs EUR 330 750 Action (b) D irect costs Indirect costs (1) Estimates to be provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the standard typology of costs (compliance costs, regulatory charges, hassle costs, administrative costs, enforcement costs, indirect costs; see section 6 of the attached guidance). Annex 4: Administrative costs – application of the standard cost model (SCM) Methodology, basic data and assumptions Elements having an impact on the administrative costs. Central aid registers Exchange of information Before granting de minimis aid Member States shall inform undertakings in writing of prospective amount of de minimis aid, and obtain a declaration from undertakings of any de minimis aid received in the previous 2 fiscal years and the current fiscal year. This implies that undertakings are obliged to keep track of any de minimis aid received. However, above procedure does not apply where Member States keep a central register of de minimis aid granted. In that case the undertakings are relieved from the obligation to keep records, and give declarations to the granting authority, and Member States are relieved from sending out the notice in writing, as well as collecting and processing the declarations received. Presently 14 Member States have set up central registers. For the other 14 Member States the introduction of central registers would reduce the administrative burden for undertakings, and also for the national administrations. The administrative cost savings of the reduced administrative burden are estimated in the SCM. Setting up central registers The setting up of central register will likely entail significant one-off administrative costs. These costs are included and estimated in the SCM. Running the central register Running the central register will likely entail recurring administrative costs. These costs are included and estimated in the SCM. Increase of ceilings The increase of ceilings enables Member States to implement more measures under the rules for de minimis aid, thus without notifying or block exempting measures. As the formal requirements for de minimis aid measures are much lighter, there will be less administrative burden for Member States. The administrative cost savings of the reduced administrative burden are estimated in the SCM. Elements considered not having a significant impact on administrative costs. Sector spending cap The introduction of a sector spending cap will only apply for Member States which have set up central registers. Although setting up the central register is expected to entail administrative costs the checks necessary to apply the sector spending cap should be possible without significant additional costs. The sector spending cap applies only to measures targeting a specific sector, and thus not de minimis aid measures that cannot be attributed to a single sector. More specifically, the sector spending does not apply at the level of individual beneficiaries. Extending period of application of Reg. 1408/2013 The extension of the period of application of the Regulation on de minimis aid in agriculture is not considered to entail any additional administrative costs, and it would not appear reasonable to consider cost savings from continuing a known measure (as opposed to additional costs of implementing a substantially new measure). Parameters in the estimation of administrative costs Assumptions Number of de minimis aid measures The information received from Member States on the actual use of de minimis aid showed the amount and number of beneficiaries broken down by product sector. This allowed to estimate a minimum number of existing measures, by assuming that minimum one measure exists per sector for which de minimis aid was actually paid. Administrative bodies per Member State It is assumed that one administrative body is responsible in each Member State for the handling of de minimis aid. Cost of setting up and running the central register In the public consultation national authorities were asked to provide information on the costs of setting up and running of a central register. There was only little feedback to this question, and the information given was not precise or quantitative. In the feedback to the public consultation of 2013 for the previous modification of de minimis rules the estimated cost of setting up of the central register varied from EUR 6.500 to EUR 150.000, and the cost of running it from 10 working days per year up to one full-time employee. In the absence of more precise information the average of above values will be applied for the purpose of assessment of costs. Cost of setting up register = EUR (6.500 + 150.000) / 2 = EUR 78.250, for the period of validity of the measure, which is until 2027, i.e. 9 years. This would amount to an annual average cost of EUR 8.700. Cost of running the register will be the average of 10 working days and 200 working days (appr. one full-time employee: 10 + 200 workings days / 2 = 105 working days. Items in the table of cost estimates The item numbers below refer the numbered item in column "No." of the SCM table Item 1: administrative cost reduction for Member States from increase of de minimis ceilings (ref. REF _Ref515210286 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT 1.2 above). Tariff per hour: tariff given by the SCM tool Time: time spent by national administration for handling of notified or block exempted measure. Estimation done on the basis of workload experienced when handling. Freq: number of additional measures that may be implemented under rules for de minimis aid. The additional number of measures is estimated to be 67% of the existing number of measures. The 67% increase is derived from the increase in the “volume” of de minimis aid available from the lower of the options considered. Nbr. of entities: Number of administrative bodies concerned. Item 2: administrative cost reduction for Member States from elimination of the procedure for exchange of information with undertakings (ref. REF _Ref515210890 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT 1.1 REF _Ref515210879 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT a) above). Tariff per hour: tariff given by the SCM tool. Time: time spent by national administration for sending notices and checking declarations. Best - guess estimate. Freq: number of de minimis aid measures in Member States not already running a central register. Nbr. of entities: Number of administrative bodies concerned in Member States not running a central register. Item 3: administrative cost for Member States of setting up central register (ref. REF _Ref515210890 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT 1.1 REF _Ref515211580 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT b) above). Cost estimated on the basis of information provided by Member States, given as total cost without further breakdown. Item 4: administrative cost for Member States of running central register (ref. REF _Ref515210890 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT 1.1 REF _Ref515212097 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT c) above). Tariff per hour: tariff given by the SCM tool. Time: time spent by national administration for running registers. Estimation done on the basis of information given by Member State administration. Freq: number of de minimis aid measures. Nbr. of entities: Number of administrative bodies concerned. Item 5: administrative cost reduction for businesses from elimination of procedure for declarations (ref. REF _Ref515210890 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT 1.1 REF _Ref515210879 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT a) REF _Ref515212097 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT c) above). Tariff per hour: tariff given by the SCM tool. Time: time spent by undertakings for keeping own register and submitting declarations. Best -guess estimate. Freq: number of de mini mis aid measures. Nbr. of entities: Number of undertakings (beneficiaries) concerned. Estimation done on the basis of information received from Member States on actual use of de min imis aid. Data Data for the period 2013-2015 collected on actual use of de minimis aid the serves as reference, in respect of estimation of number of beneficiaries, number of de minimis measures and de minimis aid granted. This time frame includes the period prior to and after two significant events, the Russian ban and the end of the milk quota regime, which both have had an impact on agricultural markets. -175895 238760 0 0 Annex 5 : Analytical methods The analysis of the options is performed by means of data modelling in the FADN. The analysis in FADN targets the effects on profitability of the holdings from increase in de minimis aid. Where the data model indicates that profitability in a holding is increased by 20% or more this is considered as a single case that may create a risk of distorti ng competition and trade. The single cases that may cause a potential risk of distortive effects are added up for each policy option. The total number of cases per policy option then gives the "ranking" of the policy options in respect of the potential for creating distortive effects. In order to further refine the analysis, the number of potentially distortive cases was weighted with three different factors: the farms’ economic size, the production value and the value of farms’ sales. The unweighted figure gives the lowest risk value and the figure weighted by the value of farms’ sales gives the highest risk value in all cases. The complete analysis " Analysis of options to increase the de minimis limits based on farm profitability data from FADN " is attached below. \s EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT Directorate C. Strategy, simplification and Policy Analysis C.3. Farm economics Brussels, 25/01/2017 Analysis of options to increase the de minimis limits based on farm profitability data from FADN Analysis of options to increase the de minimis limits Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Summary PAGEREF _Toc473127820 \h 55 Introduction PAGEREF _Toc473127821 \h 55 Limitations of this analysis PAGEREF _Toc473127822 \h 56 Description of the results PAGEREF _Toc473127823 \h 58 Number of triggered potentially distortive cases PAGEREF _Toc473127824 \h 58 Comparison of the triggered, potentially distortive cases PAGEREF _Toc473127825 \h 61 Ranking the options PAGEREF _Toc473127826 \h 63 Conclusions PAGEREF _Toc473127827 \h 65 Annexes PAGEREF _Toc473127828 \h 68 1. Notes on the applied method PAGEREF _Toc473127829 \h 68 2. Tables by type of farming and by Member State PAGEREF _Toc473127830 \h 72 3. Charts by type of farming and tables with more details PAGEREF _Toc473127831 \h 76 Summary De minimis aid in agriculture is the support small enough not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Following requests from several Member States, the Commission committed to contemplate the circumstances in which some increase in the de minimis ceiling could be considered, subject to a full economic analysis of any potential distortive effects. DG Agri is considering a wide range of options of raising the current levels of de minimis limits, with the extreme option of doubling the current ones both in terms of the farm limits and the country envelopes. Calculations have been made to attribute the funds offered by those options to specialised populations of farms represented in the FADN database. The resulting, significantly changed relative profitability in these specialised farms was a metric to compare and rank the distortive potential of particular options. The impact of particular options ranged from no additional potentially distortive effect to almost 6 times the current potential for distortion. While within this analysis it is impossible to conclude if, when and where that potential would become a real distortion, it would make sense to limit the risk by consciously limiting the potential for it. This analysis offers a helpful tool for that. Introduction De minimis aid in agriculture is the national support small enough not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Such support is not considered as state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Following requests from several Member States, the Commission committed to contemplate the circumstances in which some increase in the de minimis ceiling could be considered, subject to a full economic analysis of any potential distortive effects . DG Agri is considering a wide range of options for raising the current levels of de minimis limits. The new limits, however, should maintain their non-distortive character . In order to inform the choice of appropriate de minimis limits, an analysis of impact of several options of those limits on farm profitability has been made. It is very important to keep in mind that in the analysis we study mainly the extreme scenarios and try to maximize the impact of the aid on profitability of production in order to capture the full range of possible effects. Therefore, in almost all scenarios we considered concentration of maximum aid on one chosen sector at a time. With such condition, supporting one sector and possibly gaining a competitive advantage over other Member States in that sector, the Member state concerned would very often be left with little or no de minimis funds available to support other sectors. Such possibility cannot be excluded but it is not a very likely policy by Member States since it deprives them of any flexibility with de minimis aid. Nevertheless such set-up provides analytically useful extreme-case options. More information on the applied method is in the annex to this text. Limitations of this analysis This analysis is based on farm data concerning potential changes in profitability of farming that may influence competitive advantage of particular types of agricultural production. The note does not analyse directly the markets which might be affected by the proposed new limits of de minimis aid, nor are data on application of de minimis aid taken into account in the calculations. According to the regulation 1408/2013, Member States collect such information but they do not systematically share it with the Commission. In particular, no agricultural production and trade model was used in the sense of a system of simultaneous equations that are characterized by a number of data and behavioural relationships designed to simulate the real world. The analysis does not focus on actual trade flows or markets of agricultural products but on the profitability of specialised farms which produce those. Thus the analysis does not suggest a certain “safe” threshold of aid. Instead, it differentiates the options by their potential to be a basis for a distortive use of this aid. In other words, it differentiates the options by the level of potential risk for distorting the competition. If and to which degree that potential would be used is beyond reach of this analysis. Fig. 1. Comparison s of levels of EU and nation al support in 2014, and a 2% de minimis envelope scenario, in absolute and relative terms Sources of data for the above charts: Financial reports: EAGF and EAFRD http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/financial-reports_en State Aid Scoreboard (country fiches) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 (annex) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1408 Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture - values at current prices [ series aact_eaa01] OUTPUT OF THE AGRICULTURAL 'INDUSTRY' , Production value at producer price Description of the results The current de minimis limits are based on the values of 1% of countries’ annual agricultural production and EUR 15 000 per farm, applicable in the period of 3 fiscal years. On the EU scale, this amount expressed annually (i.e. the 3-year limit divided by 3) compares to a half of the 2014 EU expenditure on market intervention. A range of scenarios of raised de minimis limits have been tested, with the extreme one being 2% of countries’ annual agricultural production and a farm limit of EUR 30 000. Such amount expressed annually exceeds the 2014 EU expenditure on market intervention , and is comparable to the sum of EU coupled payments . For some Member States the annual de minimis envelopes can exceed the EU coupled payment or intervention expenditure even several times (see Fig.1 above). Consequently, judging by its scale alone , such sum s has a potential to influence the markets. Whether it would depends on the way that de minimis aid is applied. The twenty-four tested scenarios differ in the degree in which the country limit and the farm limit are raised. Accordingly, the results that they lead to differ primarily in the degree of the effect produced and not much in the pattern of that effect. Number of triggered potentially distortive cases When profitability in a sector in a Member State becomes by more than 20% higher than in another thanks to the “ de minimis ” aid in a given scenario, it is considered as a potentially distortive case triggered by that scenario. When the country's sector gets such advantage over two or more countries, that represents two or more such cases of a new and significant advantage. The numbers of potentially distortive cases serve as measures of a potential of distortion associated with particular tested scenarios of higher de minimis limits. In all scenarios, if the additional aid is spread equally to all types of farms then no potentially distortive cases are triggered. The situation is quite different if the aid is concentrated on a single sector: in all scenarios there are potentially distortive cases then, even in the current situation (baseline) scenario. Overall, the more money is distributed as aid the more distortive cases are triggered, although that relationship is not exactly linear. Doubling the country aid limit increases the number of potential distortions by 66% to 94%, depending on the farm limit. Doubling the farm aid limit increases the number of potential distortions by 41% to 65%, depending on the country limit. That suggests that increasing the country envelopes has a higher distortive potential than increasing the farm level limits. The emerging pattern in terms of types of farms shows a higher influence of additional aid on the shifts in profitability of the cattle production (other than milk) and the sheep - and - goat sectors. These two sectors stand out from other specialised types of farms in the number of cases of significantly changed relative profitability. They are followed in a distance by field crops other than COP (cereals, oilseeds and protein crops), orchard crops and other farm types. The most resistant to change, for various reasons, seem milk and olive specialist producers. Fig. 3. Scenarios of limits and the number of potentially distortive cases , by types of farms Similarly, the impact differs in scale by particular Member States (Fig.4.) . Increasing the farm limit alone with in the current 1% country envelope already trigger s new cases of possible imbalance . A t this level Poland, Slovenia and Malta stand out, followed by Bulgaria and Hungary . Large agricultural producers like France, Germany, Italy or Spain are relatively little exposed at these levels of aid , although they may also count given their size . For the sector most prone to profitability changes, that is the cattle producers, Bulgaria, Malta, Lithuania and Poland scored the highest for the distortion risk. However, these countries are not important cattle producers in the EU. Of those important, the distortion risk indicator mostly stays low , but even then it may remain significant (e.g. Germany possibly gaining significant advantage over the Netherlands and Poland) . A similar situation is for the sheep sector which is the second most exposed to significant changes in relative profitability. I n the main producing countries raising the farm limit within the 1% country envelope does not prompt the risk indicator or it stays very low. Still, the possibility of France gaining a significant advantage over Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania may matter. Fig.4. Scenarios of limits and the number of triggered potentially distortive cases (sectors gaining a significant profitability advantage) , by countries Raising the countries’ envelopes stepwise to 1.25, 1.50%, 1.75% and 2.00% increased the number of significant shifts in relative profitability in specialised production by 2-3 times in comparison with the starting option (1.00%, €15000) . That additional result was distributed differently among countries, as can be seen on the chart above. Also more sectors in the main agricultural producers were affected, especially in Spain and Italy. The potential for distortions increased also in all those countries where it was indicated already at the 1.00% envelope level. The effect on the particular farming sectors increased proportionally more for the cattle than for the sheep and goat sector. Among the less affected sectors, the ones of orchard fruit specialists and field crops other than COP stood out. Comparison of the triggered, potentially distortive cases The numbers of important relative shifts in profitability cannot be easily compared, because their significance and potential vary. Thus, in an attempt to reflect that variation, each triggered case was first weighted by an economic size indicator, i.e. by the proportion of standard output of the farm type in question in a particular country to the sum of standard output of all farm types concerned in this analysis. The resulting picture of the weighted potential for distortions (Fig.5.) is different from the previous one. It is because it combines the number of triggered cases and the economic weight of the concerned types of farms by country. In result, the distortion risk is reduced for smaller sectors and exposed for bigger ones. Now Poland, Spain, Italy and Germany show higher risk, with its clear progression with increasing the limits of aid. Fig.5. Scenarios of limits and an index of potential for distortions, weighted by economic size of the types of farm concerned, by countries A similar comparison can be made with another weighting factor. Since the interest of this analysis is eventually in possible distortions of products’ markets, it would be useful to use the value of products as a weighting factor. For that purpose, the value of production of products mainly associated with the analyses types of farming was used, based on Eurostat’s EAA data - namely the value of milk production for specialised milk farms, of grapes and wine for wine specialist farms, etc. The specialised farms are not the only ones which produce such associated products, but they provide the bulk of them and they are normally very much market-oriented. The following chart (Fig.6.) provides the indexed results weighted by relative importance of value of the products associated with each type of farm in each Member State. From this perspective, Spain and Italy stand out with the combined effect of raised farm and country limits, and thanks to their high production value. Also the potential for distortion in Romania and France seems more important. By contrast, those in Germany and Poland appear smaller. Fig.6. Scenarios of limits and an index of potential for distortions, weighted by value of production associated with the types of farm concerned, by countries Since the potentially distorted competition could be disruptive by means of the traded products, it would be relevant to weight the potentially distortive cases with their associated value of sales, and then compare. The estimated value of sales from the particular specialised farms is available from the FADN data. The results (Fig.7) are even more contrasted than with the previous indexes. That probably stems from different market (sales) orientation of farms in particular countries and sectors, as well from different levels of prices and values of respective production. In effect, the high de minimis options appear to generate the most risk for distortions from Spain and Italy, and even for the lower options from France and Germany. With the value of sales apparently lower in Romania in Poland, these two seem less risky in this optic. Certainly, the conceivable possibilities of useful comparisons do not end here. One could think of such weighting factors as the volumes (quantities) of production or sales, or of value/volumes of trade (imports and exports) for the particular countries and sectors. All these would alter the picture of a potential for distortion drawn in figures 4 to 7, but they would not answer the question if and to which extent that potential would actually be used by Member States. Fig.7. Scenarios of limits and an index of potential for distortions, weighted by value of sales in the types of farm specialisations concerned, by countries Ranking the options The above number of cases and the weighted index es may be used to rank the effects of the particular scenarios of raising the de minimis aid of each combination of tested limits. Such ranking is presented on the chart s below. First, the options are ordered by the number of potentially distortive cases they generate (Fig.8.). The accompanying values of the weighted indicators are also added to the chart. As indicated, keeping the country envelope unchanged (at 1.00%) and raising the farm limits even twice (up to 30k, i.e. €30000) provides relatively additional room for distortion – results for these options are all in the left, the lowest part of the chart. Not surprisingly, the highest aid rise option (2.00% 30k) is the riskiest, almost tripling (274%) the number of potentially distortive cases. The ranking of in-between options reflects rises in farm and country limit levels. As we can see from the added weighted indexes (Fig.9), the highest aid rise option exposes the highest distortion potential also if the triggered cases are weighted in the contexts of farm size, production or sales values. However, as some cases are given more weight than others in the weighted indexes, these values differentiate the options more clearly. The weighted indexes follow a rising path with the higher number of cases, however they suggest a partly different ranking of the distortive potential of the options. In particular, in comparison with the non-weighted number of cases, they expose a higher potential for distortion of particular options. Fig.8. Scenarios of de minimis limits ranked by the number potentially distortive cases Fig.9. Scenarios of de minimis limits with the potential potential distortion expressed in index-weighted number of cases Conclusions De minimis aid in agriculture is the support small enough not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Following requests from several Member States, the Commission committed to contemplate the circumstances in which some increase in the de minimis ceiling could be considered, subject to a full economic analysis of any potential distortive effects. The current de minimis limits are based on the values of 1% of countries’ annual agricultural production and EUR 15 000 per farm, applicable in a period of 3 fiscal years . For this analysis a wide range of scenarios of raised de minimis limits were tested , with the extreme one being 2% of the countries’ annual agricultural production and a farm limit of EUR 30 000. Such amount expressed annually exceeds the 2014 EU expenditure on market intervention , and is comparable to the sum of EU coupled payments . Consequently, judging by its scale alone , such sum s have a potential to influence the markets. Whether it would depends on the way that de minimis aid is applied by the Member States . Calculations have been made to attribute the funds offered by the above options to specialised populations of farms represented in the FADN database. The resulting, significantly changed relative profitability in these specialised farms was a metric to compare and rank the distortive p otential of particular options. The numbers of important relative shifts in profitability cannot be easily compared, because their significance and potential vary. Thus, in an attempt to reflect that variation, each triggered case was first weighted by the following factors: Farms’ economic size: the proportion of standard output of the farm type in question in a particular country to the sum of standard output of all farm types concerned in this analysis. Production value: the value of production of products mainly associated with the analyses types of farming was used, based on Eurostat’s EAA data (e.g. the value of milk production for specialised milk farms, of grapes and wine for wine specialist farms, etc.) Farms’ sales: The estimated value of sales from the particular groups of specialised farms is available from FADN. This analysis concludes that i n all scenarios, if the additional aid is spread equally to all types of farms in a country then no potentially distortive cases are triggered. The situation is quite different in unlikely but not impossible cases when the aid is concentrated , up to the respective limits, on a single sector. Then in all scenarios there are potentially distortive cases, even in the current situation (baseline) scenario. The impact of particular options with concentrated aid ranged from additional 19-38% of potentially distortive effect for the lowest rise option to almost 6 times the current potential for distortion for the highest rise option. While within this analysis it is impossible to conclude if, when and where that potential would become a real distortion, it would make sense to limit the risk by consciously limiting the potential for it. The current limit ( 1% of the Member States’ annual agricultural production value and € 15 000 per farm ) with aid concentrated on particular sectors was taken as the baseline, reference scenario, with its effect shown as 100% on the graph below. It should be underlined that even within the current limits a potential for distortion exists, and it could become reality if Member States systematically concentrate maximum of the possible aid on selected sectors. Fig.10. Scenarios of de minimis limits ranked by the number potentially distortive cases As the graph shows, the risk of market distortion increases already to 150% if the farm limits are left at € 15 000 and the country envelope is increased to 1.25% of the value of agricultural production. Should the farm limit increase to € 20 000 and the country envelope to 1.25%, the potential for market distortion increases already to 150-250% of the current level. Generally, r aising the country limit has a higher potential for distortion than raising the farm limits. Given such increases of the potential for distortions with increasing the de minimis limits from the current levels, it would be worthwhile extending the analyses of the issue to the area of actual application of de minimis aid in particular Member States. That would help understand the reality of de minimis aid application and consequently improve the possibilities of analysing it. Annexes 1. Notes on the applied method The aim of this note is to check if certain levels of de minimis aid for specialised farms (farm sectors) can have a distortive impact on relative profitability in these sectors between Member States, and thus possibly lead to shifts and disturbance on agricultural markets. Farmers most often do not trade internationally and only a part of primary agricultural products can be subject of such trade directly (grains, fresh fruit and vegetables, certain live animals). So the impact of de minimis aid on trade and markets of all crop and animal sectors is approximated through profitability of production and the impact of de minimis aid on that profitability. The logic is that in cases where de minimis aid can durably and significantly increase relative profitability there would be more production and supply of profitable products, with subsequent effects on prices and trade. In order to capture the full range of possible effects, extreme scenarios are studied with concentration of maximum aid (up to a full country envelope) on one sector at a time. However, spending most of de minimis envelope on one sector only would leave the Member State concerned with little funds available to support other sectors. Such policy is not excluded but not very likely, too, as leaving little flexibility to Member States. So also a scenario is tested where the aid is distributed among all farms in a MS – an extreme case at the other end of the spectrum. More specifically, we analyse the current de minimis level as a baseline and several scenarios of its raised value. The current de minimis limits are based on the values of 1.00% of countries’ annual agricultural production and EUR 15 000 per farm, applicable in the period of 3 fiscal years. They are given by country in the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, as follows: Country limits of de minimis aid in Regulation 1408/2013 applicable from 2014 year, in € million BE 76.07 EL 109.26 LT 25.86 PT 62.98 BG 43.49 ES 413.75 LU 3.52 RO 180.48 CZ 48.34 FR 722.24 HU 77.6 SI 12.32 DK 105.75 HR 28.61 MT 1.29 SK 22.95 DE 522.89 IT 475.08 NL 254.33 FI 46.33 EE 8.11 CY 7.06 AT 71.54 SE 57.89 IE 66.28 LV 10.78 PL 225.7 UK 270.17 Yet the latest FADN data available for making this analysis relates to year 2013 when the previous, lower limits were applied, those based on 0.75% of annual agricultural output and € 15 000 per farm. They were contained in the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1535/2007 of 20 December 2007 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid in the sector of agricultural production, and the country envelopes were as follows: Country limits of de minimis aid in Regulation 1535/2007 applicable till 2013 year, in € million BE 51.53 EL 75.38 LT 11.57 PT 47.78 BG 23.12 ES 274.67 LU 1.78 RO 98.69 CZ 26.26 FR 438.34 HU 44.50 SI 8.17 DK 59.45 HR MT 0.87 SK 11.96 DE 297.84 IT 320.51 NL 165.32 FI 26.75 EE 3.50 CY 4.33 AT 40.35 SE 30.22 IE 40.28 LV 5.55 PL 119.54 UK 152.84 The above 2007 regulation did not include value for Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. So for the purpose of calculations explained further, the 2005 production value at producer price of output of the agricultural 'industry' in Croatia was taken from the Eurostat Economic accounts for agriculture - values at current prices [aact_eaa01]. Because the pre-2014 FADN data used in the analysis did not contain the de minimis aid based on the current de minimis limits, the difference between the current and the previous limits was calculated and spread evenly to all farms used for the analysis, to create the baseline. It served to obtain the initial ranking of profitability level without the new scenarios below. The tested new scenarios were as follows. Scenarios with de minimis concentrated on one farm sector at a time: country limit 1.00% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 1.00% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 1.00% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 1.00% + farm limit € 30 000 country limit 1.25% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 1.25% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 1.25% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 1.25% + farm limit € 30 000 country limit 1.50% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 1.50% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 1.50% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 1.50% + farm limit € 30 000 country limit 1.75% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 1.75% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 1.75% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 1.75% + farm limit € 30 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 30 000 Scenarios with de minimis spread to all farms in the Member State: country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 15 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 20 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 25 000 country limit 2.00% + farm limit € 30 000 The maximum available aid in the particular scenarios was added to farm income without deducting the actual de minimis aid received by those farms, because such actual aid level is not known - it is neither reported to the Commission by Member States nor is it distinguished in FADN data. Farm data used for this analysis relate to years 2011, 2012 and 2013. Averaged data are used in order to represent more than just one particular year. Country envelopes were calculated based on Eurostat's data on output of the agricultural 'industry' (production value at producer price, millions of euro ), from average 2011-2013 data, as presented in the table below. 2011 2012 2013 avg. 2011-2013 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% Belgium 7 864.97 8 706.09 8 530.36 8 367.14 83.67 104.59 125.51 146.42 167.34 Bulgaria 4 261.18 4 303.47 4 262.09 4 275.58 42.76 53.44 64.13 74.82 85.51 Czech Republic 4 781.17 4 835.55 4 919.19 4 845.30 48.45 60.57 72.68 84.79 96.91 Denmark 10 704.52 11 803.91 10 958.87 11 155.77 111.56 139.45 167.34 195.23 223.12 Germany 54 903.00 54 738.00 57 252.00 55 631.00 556.31 695.39 834.47 973.54 1 112.62 Estonia 806.85 894.05 920.00 873.63 8.74 10.92 13.10 15.29 17.47 Ireland 6 599.66 6 866.25 7 755.85 7 073.92 70.74 88.42 106.11 123.79 141.48 Greece 10 243.33 10 402.83 10 331.37 10 325.84 103.26 129.07 154.89 180.70 206.52 Spain 40 281.02 41 404.55 43 566.20 41 750.59 417.51 521.88 626.26 730.64 835.01 France 71 925.40 75 536.60 73 194.00 73 552.00 735.52 919.40 1 103.28 1 287.16 1 471.04 Croatia 2 530.67 2 479.80 2 335.20 2 448.56 24.49 30.61 36.73 42.85 48.97 Italy 52 156.06 54 142.95 57 329.79 54 542.93 545.43 681.79 818.14 954.50 1 090.86 Cyprus 706.28 719.56 724.46 716.77 7.17 8.96 10.75 12.54 14.34 Latvia 1 070.30 1 317.72 1 295.14 1 227.72 12.28 15.35 18.42 21.49 24.55 Lithuania 2 407.50 2 792.40 2 646.70 2 615.53 26.16 32.69 39.23 45.77 52.31 Luxembourg 348.55 430.46 445.39 408.13 4.08 5.10 6.12 7.14 8.16 Hungary 7 658.12 7 402.10 7 708.64 7 589.62 75.90 94.87 113.84 132.82 151.79 Malta 124.09 125.42 130.37 126.63 1.27 1.58 1.90 2.22 2.53 Netherlands 25 867.18 26 803.29 28 185.95 26 952.14 269.52 336.90 404.28 471.66 539.04 Austria 7 107.81 7 194.28 6 974.32 7 092.14 70.92 88.65 106.38 124.11 141.84 Poland 21 711.58 22 407.35 23 080.59 22 399.84 224.00 280.00 336.00 392.00 448.00 Portugal 6 162.73 6 340.11 6 624.15 6 375.66 63.76 79.70 95.63 111.57 127.51 Romania 18 048.33 14 410.22 17 756.15 16 738.23 167.38 209.23 251.07 292.92 334.76 Slovenia 1 230.32 1 148.67 1 158.60 1 179.20 11.79 14.74 17.69 20.64 23.58 Slovakia 2 246.37 2 395.65 2 405.81 2 349.28 23.49 29.37 35.24 41.11 46.99 Finland 4 489.71 4 718.94 4 647.64 4 618.76 46.19 57.73 69.28 80.83 92.38 Sweden 5 838.44 6 290.91 6 379.81 6 169.72 61.70 77.12 92.55 107.97 123.39 United Kingdom 27 007.11 29 538.93 30 292.96 28 946.33 289.46 361.83 434.20 506.56 578.93 We assumed that an occasional, non-systematic application of de minimis aid serves mainly to help farms overcome their difficulties rather than as a basis for boosting their production. So an occasional use of de minimis aid is not analysed in this note as it is regarded as not affecting trade or disturbing the markets. It is only a systematic and long-term de minimis aid which can possibly make a durable change to production patterns. In order to express that systematic character of aid we used for calculations an annual average of the 3 year limit of the aid, that is farm limits and country envelopes divided by three. Income indicator Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) , without and with various levels of de minimis aid, were calculated first for farms in 10 types of specialised farming representing all major agricultural sectors. Average data from the FADN database were used to represent possibly typical situation in farms. As a profitability indicator and for comparability, the data was then expressed by hectares or livestock units, and ordered according to increasing level of profitability without de minimis aid. On that background the effect of aid on changing relative profitability was studied. The basic indication of changed competitive position is a change in the rank of profitability in consequence of the de minimis aid. In particular it is checked if the profitability with aid allows production in a MS to become significantly more profitable than in its close competitor market. Changing the profitability relationships between important markets is regarded as a stimulus for subsequent changes in production, prices, trade and on the agricultural markets. “Significantly more profitable” has been defined, and such cases are a basis for further analysis. The actual trigger is the "jump" in the profitability advantage from less than 10% to more than 20%. The change is “significant” where the FNVA indicators change from originally being smaller or not much (max. 10%) higher than in another Member State into being higher by more than 20% in consequence of the tested scenarios. So actually, we pick up cases of country to country advantage gains of at least 10% (i.e. 20% - 10%) provided that the situation of the resulting significant advantage (>20%) is new. Focussing on the new cases, we do not flag situations where the existing advantage of >10% is expanded, or where the existing gap is narrowed or turned into a small advantage only of up to 20%. The identified cases of new and significant profitability advantage in one country’s sector versus another country’s sector are not automatically bound to distort competition in products of that sector. There are a number of reasons for that. Concluding if each particular case would result in actual distortion is not possible. But, definitely, a limited potential for distortion also limits the risk for actual distortion. So comparing the potential for distortion associated with each tested option should be helpful in choosing the option according to an negligible level of its risk or potential for distortion. 2. Tables by type of farming and by Member State Tables with the number of significant changes in relative profitability and, further, charts illustrating them. Farm limit € 15 000 All Member States 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms Total (15) Specialist COP 8 13 13 14 16 0 64 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 10 15 19 22 23 0 89 (20) Specialist horticulture 9 11 12 12 12 0 56 (35) Specialist wine 8 11 13 14 15 0 61 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 10 12 13 13 14 0 62 (37) Specialist olives 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 (45) Specialist milk 0 1 2 3 3 0 9 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 30 37 45 46 50 0 208 (49) Specialist cattle 46 55 62 66 71 0 300 (50) Specialist granivores 7 7 7 8 9 0 38 Total 129 163 187 199 214 0 892 All types of farms 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms Total BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BG 10 12 15 17 17 0 71 CY 6 6 8 10 11 0 41 CZ 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EL 5 6 6 6 7 0 30 ES 3 6 6 6 6 0 27 EE 5 7 9 10 10 0 41 FR 2 2 2 2 2 0 10 HR 10 13 15 16 16 0 70 HU 5 5 5 5 5 0 25 IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IT 2 2 4 4 5 0 17 LT 3 6 7 7 9 0 32 LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LV 4 6 7 7 7 0 31 MT 15 15 16 16 16 0 78 NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AT 2 4 4 5 5 0 20 PL 17 20 20 21 22 0 100 PT 6 12 17 17 18 0 70 RO 8 10 11 13 14 0 56 FI 7 7 7 7 7 0 35 SE 0 0 1 1 3 0 5 SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SI 18 23 26 28 33 0 128 UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total MS 129 163 187 199 214 0 892 Farm limit € 20 000 All Member States 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (15) Specialist COP 9 14 14 15 17 0 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 12 17 21 25 28 0 (20) Specialist horticulture 10 13 17 17 17 0 (35) Specialist wine 9 12 14 15 16 0 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 14 19 23 24 26 0 (37) Specialist olives 2 2 2 2 2 0 (45) Specialist milk 1 4 5 6 6 0 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 41 49 57 59 63 0 (49) Specialist cattle 51 65 74 80 94 0 (50) Specialist granivores 8 8 8 9 10 0 Total 157 203 235 252 279 0 All types of farms 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms BE 0 0 2 2 2 0 BG 13 21 24 26 26 0 CY 8 8 10 12 13 0 CZ 2 2 2 2 2 0 DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 DE 1 1 1 1 1 0 EL 6 7 7 7 8 0 ES 4 8 8 11 14 0 EE 5 7 9 11 15 0 FR 4 5 5 5 5 0 HR 11 16 20 21 21 0 HU 9 10 11 11 11 0 IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 IT 2 3 5 5 6 0 LT 3 6 7 7 9 0 LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 LV 6 8 9 9 11 0 MT 15 15 16 16 16 0 NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 AT 2 4 4 5 5 0 PL 19 22 22 23 24 0 PT 6 12 17 17 20 0 RO 9 11 15 18 19 0 FI 10 10 10 10 10 0 SE 0 0 1 1 3 0 SK 2 2 2 2 2 0 SI 20 25 28 30 36 0 UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total MS 157 203 235 252 279 0 Farm limit € 25 000 All Member States 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (15) Specialist COP 11 16 16 18 20 0 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 12 17 21 26 31 0 (20) Specialist horticulture 10 15 21 22 22 0 (35) Specialist wine 10 13 15 16 17 0 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 17 22 28 30 32 0 (37) Specialist olives 2 2 2 2 2 0 (45) Specialist milk 1 5 7 8 8 0 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 46 54 62 65 70 0 (49) Specialist cattle 56 72 87 94 110 0 (50) Specialist granivores 9 9 10 11 12 0 Total 174 225 269 292 324 0 All types of farms 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms BE 0 0 3 3 4 0 BG 13 21 26 28 28 0 CY 9 9 11 13 14 0 CZ 2 3 3 3 3 0 DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 DE 5 5 5 5 5 0 EL 7 9 11 11 12 0 ES 4 9 9 12 17 0 EE 5 7 9 11 15 0 FR 4 5 5 5 5 0 HR 11 17 22 24 24 0 HU 12 13 16 17 17 0 IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 IT 2 4 8 9 10 0 LT 5 8 9 9 11 0 LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 LV 6 8 9 9 11 0 MT 15 15 17 18 18 0 NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 AT 3 5 5 6 7 0 PL 20 23 23 24 25 0 PT 7 13 18 18 21 0 RO 10 12 16 20 21 0 FI 12 12 12 12 13 0 SE 0 0 1 2 4 0 SK 2 2 2 2 2 0 SI 20 25 29 31 37 0 UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total MS 174 225 269 292 324 0 Farm limit € 30 000 All Member States 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms (15) Specialist COP 13 20 21 23 25 0 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 12 18 23 28 34 0 (20) Specialist horticulture 10 15 22 24 24 0 (35) Specialist wine 10 13 16 17 18 0 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 18 23 29 32 35 0 (37) Specialist olives 2 2 2 2 2 0 (45) Specialist milk 1 5 7 8 8 0 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 50 58 66 69 74 0 (49) Specialist cattle 57 74 89 100 118 0 (50) Specialist granivores 9 10 12 14 15 0 Total 182 238 287 317 353 0 All types of farms 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms BE 0 2 5 5 6 0 BG 13 21 26 29 30 0 CY 11 11 13 15 16 0 CZ 2 3 3 4 4 0 DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 DE 5 6 6 6 6 0 EL 7 9 11 11 12 0 ES 4 9 10 13 18 0 EE 5 7 9 11 15 0 FR 5 6 6 6 6 0 HR 11 17 23 26 26 0 HU 13 14 18 20 21 0 IE 0 0 1 1 1 0 IT 2 4 8 10 11 0 LT 6 9 10 10 12 0 LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 LV 6 8 9 9 11 0 MT 15 15 17 19 20 0 NL 1 1 1 1 1 0 AT 3 5 5 6 7 0 PL 21 24 24 25 26 0 PT 7 15 20 20 23 0 RO 10 12 16 20 21 0 FI 12 12 12 12 13 0 SE 0 0 2 3 5 0 SK 3 3 3 3 3 0 SI 20 25 29 32 38 0 UK 0 0 0 0 1 0 Total MS 182 238 287 317 353 0 3. Charts by type of farming and tables with more details The chart on the left highlights instances where a country’s sector could get a significant profitability advantage if it received de minimis aid up to the tested limits in a scenario. Profitability level is marked on the left axis. Columns on the chart represent sizes of the sectors in the countries, with their measure on the right axis. The table below shows over which countries’ sectors those new cases of significant profitability advantage appear. (15) Specialist COP 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms EE LV 0 HR EE, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, 0 FI 0 LT 0 SK 0 CY 0 ES 0 BG 0 RO 0 SI BG, RO, SE, CZ, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, 0 SE 0 CZ 0 PT PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, 0 PL 0 HU 0 FR 0 EL FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, 0 UK 0 IT 0 IE 0 DE 0 AT 0 DK 0 8 13 13 14 16 0 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms LV FI LT EE SK PL HU SI PL , HU , PT , ES , CZ , SE , HR , BG , PL , HU , PT , ES , CZ , SE , HR , BG , PL , HU , PT , ES , CZ , SE , HR , BG , PL , HU , PT , ES , CZ , SE , HR , BG , PL , HU , PT , ES , CZ , SE , HR , BG , PT PL , PL , HU , SI , PL , HU , SI , PL , HU , SI , PL , HU , SI , ES PT , PT , PT , PT , CZ SE HR PT , PT , PT , PT , BG ES , CZ , ES , CZ , SE , HR , ES , CZ , SE , HR , UK RO UK , UK , UK , UK , DE FR AT EL CY FR , FR , FR , AT , FR , AT , EL , FR , AT , EL , DK IT AT , AT , AT , EL , BE NL MT 10 15 19 22 23 0 (20) Specialist horticulture 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms EE HR LT , RO , BG , LT , RO , BG , LT , RO , BG , LT , RO , BG , LT , RO , BG , LT RO LT , BG , LV , HU , LT , BG , LV , HU , PL , LT , BG , LV , HU , PL , LT , BG , LV , HU , PL , LT , BG , LV , HU , PL , BG RO , RO , RO , RO , RO , LV HU PL HU , HU , HU , HU , PT ES , ES , ES , MT , ES , MT , ES , MT , ES MT EL CZ FR DK FI UK BE DE IT SE NL 9 11 12 12 12 0 (35) Specialist wine 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms BG RO HR ES , ES , ES , CY , PT , ES , CY , PT , HU , ES , CY , PT , HU , ES HR , HR , HR , HR , CY PT , HU , SI , CZ , PT , HU , SI , CZ , PT , HU , SI , CZ , PT , HU , SI , CZ , PT , HU , SI , CZ , PT CY , HU CY , PT , CY , PT , CY , PT , CY , PT , CY , PT , SI CZ , CZ , CZ , CZ , CZ SI , SI , SI , SI , SI , EL IT FR AT IT , IT , IT , IT , DE LU 8 11 13 14 15 0 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms BG LV , LV , LV , LV , LV , LV BG , BG , BG , BG , BG , CZ HR CZ , HU , CZ , HU , LT , CZ , HU , LT , CZ , HU , LT , CZ , HU , LT , HU LT RO LT , ES , PL , PT , LT , ES , PL , PT , LT , ES , PL , PT , LT , ES , PL , PT , LT , ES , PL , PT , ES PL LT , RO , LT , RO , ES , LT , RO , ES , LT , RO , ES , LT , RO , ES , PT CY SI , SI DK EL IT EL , EL , EL , DE UK FR AT BE NL 10 12 13 13 14 0 (37) Specialist olives 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms PT CY ES , ES , ES , ES , ES , ES EL IT 1 1 1 1 1 0 (45) Specialist milk 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms MT BG SI LV SK FR UK PT FR , FR , UK , FR , UK , FR , UK , LU IE ES PL SE LT BE EE DE RO LT , LT , HR DK NL HU CZ AT FI IT 0 1 2 3 3 0 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms UK IE HR SI HR , RO , HU , HR , RO , HU , FR , HR , RO , HU , FR , BG , SK , CY , HR , RO , HU , FR , BG , SK , CY , HR , RO , HU , FR , BG , SK , CY , PT , FI , PL , RO HU SI , RO , FR , SI , RO , FR , SI , RO , FR , SI , RO , FR , SI , RO , FR , FR SI , SI , SI , SI , SI , BG RO , HU , RO , HU , FR , RO , HU , FR , RO , HU , FR , SK CY BG , BG , SK , BG , SK , PT SK , SK , CY , SK , CY , SK , CY , SK , CY , FI CY , PT , PL , ES , EL , EE , CY , PT , PL , ES , EL , EE , CY , PT , PL , ES , EL , EE , CY , PT , PL , ES , EL , EE , CY , PT , PL , ES , EL , EE , PL PT , FI , ES , EL , EE , NL , IT , PT , FI , ES , EL , EE , NL , IT , PT , FI , ES , EL , EE , NL , IT , PT , FI , ES , EL , EE , NL , IT , PT , FI , ES , EL , EE , NL , IT , ES FI , FI , PL , FI , PL , FI , PL , FI , PL , EL FI , EE PL , ES , EL , PL , ES , EL , NL , PL , ES , EL , NL , IT , AT , PL , ES , EL , NL , IT , AT , PL , ES , EL , NL , IT , AT , NL IT NL , NL , NL , NL , NL , AT NL , IT , NL , IT , MT , NL , IT , MT , NL , IT , MT , NL , IT , MT , MT IT , AT , IT , AT , IT , AT , DE , IT , AT , DE , IT , AT , DE , DE CZ DK 30 37 45 46 50 0 (49) Specialist cattle 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms UK SI UK , UK , FR SI , SI , SI , SI , SI , BG IE , EL , SE , LU , BE , EE , MT , IE , EL , SE , LU , BE , EE , MT , IE , EL , SE , LU , BE , EE , MT , IE , EL , SE , LU , BE , EE , MT , IE , EL , SE , LU , BE , EE , MT , IE EL BG , IE , SE , BG , IE , SE , BG , IE , SE , BG , IE , SE , BG , IE , SE , SE BG , BG , BG , IE , EL , LU BE EE LU , BE , LU , BE , MT , LU , BE , MT , LU , BE , MT , ES , LU , BE , MT , ES , MT LU , BE , EE , ES , LT , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , FI , SK , HR , LU , BE , EE , ES , LT , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , FI , SK , HR , LU , BE , EE , ES , LT , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , FI , SK , HR , LU , BE , EE , ES , LT , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , FI , SK , HR , LU , BE , EE , ES , LT , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , FI , SK , HR , ES EE , MT , EE , MT , EE , MT , EE , MT , EE , MT , LT MT , ES , NL , MT , ES , NL , LV , PL , DE , MT , ES , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , MT , ES , NL , LV , PL , DE , PT , MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, NL LV ES , LT , NL , ES , LT , NL , PL , DE , ES , LT , NL , PL , DE , PT , ES , LT , NL , PL , DE , PT , ES , LT , NL , PL , DE , PT , PL ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, DE PT LT , NL , LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, FI PT , PT , PT , PT , PT , SK HR FI , SK , FI , SK , FI , SK , FI , SK , FI , SK , RO IT , IT , HU , IT , HU , CZ , IT RO , RO , RO , RO , RO , HU CZ AT DK 46 55 62 66 71 0 (50) Specialist granivores 1.00% €15000 1.25% €15000 1.50% €15000 1.75% €15000 2.00% €15000 2.00% €15000, all farms MT PT HR , HR , HR , HR , HR , HR PT , PT , PT , PT , PT , EE FR NL CZ BE ES BG ES , ES , ES , ES , ES , SE LT LV SI SE , LT , LV , SE , LT , LV , SE , LT , LV , SE , LT , LV , SE , LT , LV , FI UK HU IT DE DK PL DK , EL DK , DK , DK , DK , DK , RO AT RO , RO , 7 7 7 8 9 0 The tables below are equivalent of the tables accompanying the charts on the previous pages for the f arm limit €15000, but they are for options with the other farm level limits (€20000, €25000 and €30000). Specialist COP € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (15) Specialist COP 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (15) Specialist COP 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (15) Specialist COP 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms EE EE EE LV LV LV HR EE, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, HR EE, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, HR EE, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, EE, LV, FI FI FI LT LT LT SK SK SK CY ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, CY ES, BG, ES, BG, ES, BG, ES, BG, ES, BG, CY ES, BG, RO, SI, ES, BG, RO, SI, ES, BG, RO, SI, ES, BG, RO, SI, ES, BG, RO, SI, ES ES ES BG BG BG RO RO RO SI BG, RO, SE, CZ, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, SI BG, RO, SE, CZ, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, SI BG, RO, SE, CZ, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, BG, RO, SE, CZ, PT, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, SE SE RO, RO, SE RO, RO, CZ CZ CZ PT PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, PL, HU, PT PL, HU, FR, PL, HU, FR, PL, HU, FR, PL, HU, FR, PL, HU, FR, PT PL, HU, FR, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, PL, HU, FR, EL, UK, PL PL PL HU HU HU FR FR FR EL FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, EL FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, EL FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, UK UK UK IT IT IT IE IE IE IT, IT, IT, DE DE DE AT AT AT DK DK DK 9 14 14 15 17 0 11 16 16 18 20 0 13 20 21 23 25 0 Specialist other fieldcrops € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (16) Specialist other fieldcrops 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms LV LV LV FI FI FI LT LT LT EE EE EE SK SK SK PL PL PL HU HU PL, PL, HU PL, PL, SI, SI PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, SI PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, SI PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PL, HU, PT, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG, UK, RO, PT PL, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, ES, CZ, PT PL, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, ES, CZ, PT PL, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, PL, HU, SI, ES, CZ, ES PT, PT, PT, CZ, PT, CZ, ES PT, PT, PT, CZ, PT, CZ, SE, HR, ES PT, PT, PT, CZ, PT, CZ, SE, HR, CZ CZ CZ SE SE SE PT, PT, PT, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, BG ES, CZ, ES, CZ, SE, HR, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG ES, CZ, ES, CZ, SE, HR, ES, CZ, SE, HR, BG ES, CZ, ES, CZ, SE, HR, ES, CZ, SE, HR, UK UK UK RO UK, UK, UK, UK, RO UK, UK, UK, UK, RO UK, UK, UK, UK, DE DE DE FR FR FR AT AT AT EL EL EL CY FR, FR, FR, AT, FR, AT, EL, FR, AT, EL, CY FR, FR, FR, AT, FR, AT, EL, FR, AT, EL, CY FR, FR, FR, AT, FR, AT, EL, FR, AT, EL, DK DK DK IT AT, AT, AT, EL, IT AT, AT, AT, EL, IT AT, AT, AT, EL, BE BE BE DK, DK, DK, DK, NL NL NL MT MT MT 12 17 21 25 28 0 12 17 21 26 31 0 12 18 23 28 34 0 Specialist horticulture € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (20) Specialist horticulture 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (20) Specialist horticulture 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (20) Specialist horticulture 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms EE EE EE HR LT, RO, BG, LV, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, HR LT, RO, BG, LV, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, HR LT, RO, BG, LV, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, LT, RO, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, LT LT LT RO LT, BG, LV, HU, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, RO LT, BG, LV, HU, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, RO LT, BG, LV, HU, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, LT, BG, LV, HU, PL, PT, ES, MT, BG RO, RO, RO, RO, RO, BG RO, RO, RO, RO, RO, BG RO, RO, RO, RO, RO, LV LV LV HU LV, LV, LV, HU LV, LV, LV, HU LV, LV, LV, PL HU, HU, HU, HU, PL HU, HU, HU, HU, PL HU, HU, HU, HU, PT ES, ES, ES, MT, ES, MT, ES, MT, PT ES, ES, ES, MT, ES, MT, ES, MT, PT ES, ES, ES, MT, ES, MT, ES, MT, ES ES ES MT MT MT EL EL EL CZ CZ CZ FR FR FR DK DK DK FI FI FI UK UK UK BE BE BE DE DE DE IT IT UK, UK, BE, UK, BE, UK, BE, IT UK, UK, BE, UK, BE, UK, BE, SE SE SE NL NL NL 10 13 17 17 17 0 10 15 21 22 22 0 10 15 22 24 24 0 Specialist wine € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (35) Specialist wine 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (35) Specialist wine 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (35) Specialist wine 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms BG BG BG RO HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, RO HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, RO HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, HR, ES, HR ES, ES, ES, CY, PT, ES, CY, PT, HU, ES, CY, PT, HU, HR ES, ES, ES, CY, PT, ES, CY, PT, HU, ES, CY, PT, HU, HR ES, ES, ES, CY, PT, ES, CY, PT, HU, ES, CY, PT, HU, ES HR, HR, HR, HR, ES HR, HR, HR, HR, ES HR, HR, HR, HR, CY PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, CY PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, CY PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT, HU, SI, CZ, PT CY, PT CY, PT CY, HU CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, HU CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, HU CY, PT, CY, PT, CY, PT, SI, CY, PT, SI, CY, PT, SI, SI CZ, CZ, CZ, CZ, SI CZ, CZ, CZ, CZ, SI CZ, CZ, CZ, CZ, CZ SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, CZ SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, CZ SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, EL EL EL IT IT IT FR FR FR AT IT, IT, IT, IT, AT IT, IT, IT, IT, AT IT, IT, IT, IT, DE DE DE LU LU LU 9 12 14 15 16 0 10 13 15 16 17 0 10 13 16 17 18 0 Specialist orchards - fruits € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (36) Specialist orchards - fruits 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms BG LV, CZ, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, BG LV, CZ, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, BG LV, CZ, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, LV, CZ, HR, HU, LV BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, LV BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, LV BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, BG, CZ, HR, CZ HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, CZ HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, CZ HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, HR CZ, HU, CZ, HU, LT, RO, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, HR CZ, HU, CZ, HU, LT, RO, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, PT, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, PT, HR CZ, HU, CZ, HU, LT, RO, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, PT, CZ, HU, LT, RO, ES, PL, PT, HU LT, LT, LT, LT, HU LT, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, HU LT, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, PL, LT, RO, ES, PL, LT LT RO, ES, RO, ES, RO, ES, RO, ES, RO, ES, LT RO, ES, PL, RO, ES, PL, RO, ES, PL, RO, ES, PL, RO, ES, PL, RO LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, RO LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, RO LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, LT, ES, PL, PT, CY, SI, ES ES ES PL LT, RO, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, PL LT, RO, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, PL LT, RO, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, LT, RO, ES, PT PT PT CY SI, CY SI, CY SI, SI DK, SI DK, SI DK, DK DK DK EL EL EL IT EL, EL, EL, IT EL, EL, EL, IT EL, EL, EL, DE DE DE UK UK UK FR FR FR AT AT FR, FR, FR, FR, FR, AT FR, FR, FR, FR, FR, BE BE BE NL NL NL 14 19 23 24 26 0 17 22 28 30 32 0 18 23 29 32 35 0 Specialist olives € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (37) Specialist olives 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (37) Specialist olives 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (37) Specialist olives 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms PT PT PT CY ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, CY ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, CY ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES, EL, ES ES ES EL EL EL IT IT IT 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 Specialist milk € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (45) Specialist milk 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (45) Specialist milk 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (45) Specialist milk 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms MT MT MT BG BG BG SI SI SI LV LV LV SK SK SK FR SK, SK, SK, SK, FR SK, SK, SK, SK, FR SK, SK, SK, SK, UK UK UK PT FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, PT FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, PT FR, FR, UK, FR, UK, FR, UK, LU LU LU IE IE IE ES PT, PT, LU, PT, LU, PT, LU, PT, LU, ES PT, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, ES PT, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, PT, LU, IE, PL PL PL SE SE SE LT LT LT BE BE PL, PL, PL, BE PL, PL, PL, EE EE EE DE DE DE RO LT, LT, RO LT, LT, RO LT, LT, HR HR HR DK DK DK NL NL NL HU HU HU CZ CZ CZ AT AT AT FI FI FI IT IT IT 1 4 5 6 6 0 1 5 7 8 8 0 1 5 7 8 8 0 Specialist sheep and goats € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (48) Specialist sheep and goats 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (48) Specialist sheep and goats 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (48) Specialist sheep and goats 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms UK UK UK IE IE IE HR HR HR SI HR, RO, HU, HR, RO, HU, FR, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI HR, RO, HU, HR, RO, HU, FR, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI HR, RO, HU, HR, RO, HU, FR, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, HR, RO, HU, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, RO RO RO HU SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, HU SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, HU SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, SI, RO, FR, BG, SK, CY, PT, FI, PL, FR SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, FR SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, SI, RO, HU, FR SI, RO, HU, BG, SI, RO, HU, BG, SI, RO, HU, BG, SI, RO, HU, BG, SI, RO, HU, BG, BG RO, HU, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, BG RO, HU, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, BG RO, HU, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, RO, HU, FR, SK HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, SK HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, HU, FR, SK HU, FR, BG, HU, FR, BG, HU, FR, BG, HU, FR, BG, HU, FR, BG, CY BG, BG, SK, BG, SK, CY BG, BG, SK, BG, SK, CY BG, BG, SK, BG, SK, PT SK, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, PT SK, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, PT SK, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, SK, CY, FI CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, FI CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, FI CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, CY, PT, PL, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PL PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, PL PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, PL PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, CZ, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, CZ, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, CZ, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, CZ, PT, FI, ES, EL, EE, NL, IT, AT, MT, DE, CZ, ES FI, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, ES FI, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, ES FI, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, FI, PL, EL FI, EL FI, EL FI, EE PL, ES, EL, PL, ES, EL, NL, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, EE PL, ES, EL, PL, ES, EL, NL, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, EE PL, ES, EL, PL, ES, EL, NL, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, PL, ES, EL, NL, IT, AT, MT, NL NL NL IT NL, NL, AT, NL, AT, NL, AT, NL, AT, IT NL, NL, AT, NL, AT, NL, AT, MT, NL, AT, MT, IT NL, NL, AT, NL, AT, NL, AT, MT, NL, AT, MT, AT NL, IT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, AT NL, IT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, DE, AT NL, IT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, NL, IT, MT, DE, MT IT, AT, IT, AT, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, MT IT, AT, IT, AT, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, MT IT, AT, IT, AT, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, IT, AT, DE, DE DE DE CZ CZ CZ DK DK DK 41 49 57 59 63 0 46 54 62 65 70 0 50 58 66 69 74 0 Specialist cattle € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (49) cattle 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2.00% , all (49) cattle 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2.00% , all (49) cattle 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2.00% , all UK UK UK SI, SI UK, UK, SI UK, UK, SI UK, UK, FR SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, FR SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, FR SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, BG IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, BG IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, BG IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, IE, EL, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, IE IE IE EL BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, EL BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, EL BG, IE, SE, LU, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, BG, IE, SE, LU, BE, EE, MT, SE BG, BG, BG, IE, EL, SE BG, BG, BG, IE, EL, SE BG, BG, BG, IE, EL, LU LU LU BE EL, SE, EL, SE, EL, SE, BE EL, SE, EL, SE, EL, SE, LU, BE EL, SE, EL, SE, EL, SE, LU, EE LU, BE, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, ES, LU, BE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, EE LU, BE, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, ES, LU, BE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, EE LU, BE, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, LU, BE, MT, ES, LU, BE, MT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, MT LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, MT LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, IT, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, IT, MT LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, IT, HU, LU, BE, EE, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, IT, HU, CZ, ES EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, LT, NL, EE, MT, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, ES EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, LT, NL, EE, MT, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, ES EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, EE, MT, LT, NL, EE, MT, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT MT, ES, NL, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, LT MT, ES, NL, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, LT MT, ES, NL, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, MT, ES, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, NL NL NL ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, LV ES, LT, NL, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, LV ES, LT, NL, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, LV ES, LT, NL, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, ES, LT, NL, PL, DE, PT, FI, SK, PL ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, PL ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, PL ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, ES, LT, NL, LV, DE, PT, FI, SK, HR, RO, DE ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, DE ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, PT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, PT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, PT, ES, LT, NL, LV, PL, PT, PT LT, NL, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT LT, NL, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, PT LT, NL, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, LT, NL, LV, PL, DE, FI PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, FI PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, SK, FI PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, SK, SK SK SK HR FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, HR FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, HR FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, FI, SK, RO IT, IT, HU, IT, HU, CZ, RO IT, IT, HU, IT, HU, CZ, RO IT, IT, HU, IT, HU, CZ, IT RO, RO, RO, RO, RO, IT RO, RO, RO, HU, RO, HU, RO, HU, IT RO, RO, RO, HU, RO, HU, CZ, RO, HU, CZ, HU IT, IT, IT, IT, IT, HU IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, HU IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, IT, CZ, CZ CZ IT, IT, IT, IT, CZ IT, IT, IT, HU, IT, HU, AT AT AT DK DK DK 51 65 74 80 94 0 56 72 87 94 110 0 57 74 89 100 118 0 Specialist granivores € 20000 € 25000 € 30000 (50) Specialist granivores 1.00% €20000 1.25% €20000 1.50% €20000 1.75% €20000 2.00% €20000 2.00% €20000, all farms (50) Specialist granivores 1.00% €25000 1.25% €25000 1.50% €25000 1.75% €25000 2.00% €25000 2.00% €25000, all farms (50) Specialist granivores 1.00% €30000 1.25% €30000 1.50% €30000 1.75% €30000 2.00% €30000 2.00% €30000, all farms MT MT MT PT HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, PT HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, PT HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, HR PT, PT, PT, PT, PT, EE EE EE FR FR FR NL NL NL CZ CZ CZ BE BE BE NL, NL, NL, NL, ES ES ES BE, BE, BE, BG ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, BG ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, BG ES, ES, ES, ES, ES, SE SE SE LT LT LT LV LV LV SI SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SI SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, FI, SE, LT, LV, FI, SE, LT, LV, FI, SI SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, SE, LT, LV, FI, SE, LT, LV, FI, UK, SE, LT, LV, FI, UK, FI SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, FI SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, FI SI, SI, SI, SI, SI, UK UK UK HU HU HU IT IT IT DE DE DE DK DK DK PL DK, PL DK, PL DK, EL DK, DK, DK, DK, DK, EL DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, EL DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, DK, PL, RO RO RO AT RO, RO, AT RO, RO, AT RO, RO, 8 8 8 9 10 0 9 9 10 11 12 0 9 10 12 14 15 0
Executive Summary Impact assessment on the initiative to amend Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture secto r A. Need for action What is the problem and why is it a problem at EU level? The key problem in relation to de minimis aid is setting adequate aid ceilings. The current ceilings are unduly constraining and do not allow for the de minimis rules to fully achieve their objective of simplification and more focused State aid control. An a dditional issue is the monitoring of aid. These are problem s at EU level because they affect the logic of State aid control. What should be achieved? I mprovement of a well - established policy serving the objectives of simplification and foc us ing State aid control on more distortive subsidies . What is the value added of action at the EU level (subsidiarity)? The Union has exclusive competence in the area of State aid and only the Commission can review the de minimis rules. The only alternative is to postpone the review until 2020 when the validity of the current rules expire s . B. Solutions What are the various options to achieve the objectives? Is there a preferred option? The options relate mainly to variations in scale of possible changes to ceilings that define the concept of de minimis aid . The p referred option is a two-tier approach allowing Member States a choice between a larger increase of the ceilings, subject to a sector cap and mandatory use of central aid registers, or a lesser increase without further cond itions . What are different stakeholders' views? Who supports which option? Almost all s takeholders (mostly farmers’ associations and Member States’ authorities ) call for significantly higher aid ceilings . F armers’ associations are generally in favour of mandatory aid registers, whereas most Member States are against. C. Impacts of the preferred option What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)? It strikes a fair balance between greater flexibility and maintaining a level - playing field for farmers, while keeping administrative costs at a proportionate level . What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)? Costs are incur red only by Member States that opt for a larger increase , which requires central aid registers , and have not already set up such a register . Costs of setting up a register : A nnual average cost of EUR 8 700. Costs of running a register: on average 105 working days per year . What are the impacts on SMEs and competitiveness? T he beneficiaries of de minimis aid are mainly SMEs ; this reflects the structure of the agriculture sector . The initiative has an overall positive i mpact for SMEs , as it facilitates a rapid granting of aid . Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations? No significant impacts , other than the costs of the staff resources and IT-support needed to set up central aid registers . Extending the scope for granting de minimis aid is exp ected to result in cost savings in terms of a reduced need for State aid procedures . Will there be other significant impacts? No . Proportionality? The preferred option ensures proportionality by offering a a two-tier approach. D. Follow up When will the policy be reviewed? If Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 is amended, its period of application will be set to expire on 31 December 2027. T he next review would take place in the two to three years preceding that expiry .
Rahandusministeerium Meie 29.11.2018 nr 5.4-2/1540
Komisjoni (EL) määruse nr 1408/2013 muutmise eelnõu
Austatud kolleegid ja koostööpartnerid
Euroopa Komisjoni põllumajanduse ja maaelu arengu peadirektoraat on saatnud liikmesriikidele
eelnõu põllumajandusliku vähese tähtsusega abi määruse ehk komisjoni (EL) määruse nr
1408/2013 võimaliku muutmise kohta. Eelkõige puudutavad muudatused piirmääradega
seonduvat, sh ettevõtja piirmäär, riigi piirmäär ja kehtiva määrusega võrreldes uue nõudena
sektoraalne piirmäär.
Tegemist on teise (ehk eeldatavalt viimase eelnõuga), ning esimese eelnõu saatsime arvamuse
esitamiseks 09.03.2018 kirjaga nr 5.4-2/353. Eelnõule on lisatud ka komisjoni mõjuhinnang ja
selle kokkuvõte.
Eelnõuga seonduvalt koondame arvamusi vajadusel komisjonile edastamiseks ning 17.
detsembril 2018 toimuva komisjoni ja liikmesriikide vahelise nõuandva komitee kohtumisel
esitamiseks.
Palume teie arvamust eelnõu kohta hiljemalt 7. detsembriks 2018.
Lugupidamisega
(allkirjastatud digitaalselt)
Marko Gorban
Põllumajandus- ja maaelupoliitika asekantsler
Lisad:
1. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse eelnõu eesti keeles
2. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse eelnõu lisa I ja II eesti keeles
3. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse eelnõu inglise keeles
Lai tn 39 // Lai tn 41 / 15056 Tallinn / 625 6101/
[email protected]/ www.agri.ee / Registrikood: 70000734
4. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse eelnõu lisa I ja II inglise keeles
5. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse mõjuhinnang inglise keeles
6. Komisjoni määruse (EL) nr 1408/2013 muutmise määruse mõjuhinnangu kokkuvõte
inglise keeles
Sama: Keskkonnaministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooni-
ministeerium, Keskkonnaamet, Eesti Töötukassa, SA Keskkonnainvesteeringute Keskus,
Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet, Maaelu Edendamise Sihtasutus, Ettevõtluse
Arendamise Sihtasutus, Riigi Tugiteenuste Keskus, põllumajanduse ja maaelu arengu nõukogu
Peegi Kaibald, +372 625 6534,
[email protected]
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