Eelnõude infosüsteemis (EIS) on antud täitmiseks ülesanne.
Eelnõu toimik: 9.4.1/21-1323 - COM(2021) 782 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
Eelnõu kohta seisukoha esitamine Vabariigi Valitsuse istungile vastavalt Riigikantselei 20.12.2021 resolutsioonile.
Osapooled: Siseministeerium
Tähtaeg: 24.01.2022 23:59
Link eelnõu toimiku vaatele: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a70e2376-23c5-4d41-a929-daea73dc9230
Link menetlusetapile: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a70e2376-23c5-4d41-a929-daea73dc9230?activity=1
Eelnõude infosüsteem (EIS)
https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main
Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon
Viide: Siseministeerium / / ; Riigikantselei / / 2-5/21-02866
Resolutsiooni teema: Politseikoostöö seadustik
Adressaat: Siseministeerium
Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse
reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukoha ja otsuse eelnõu järgnevate
algatuste kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli:
- Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on
information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, COM(2021) 782
- Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation, COM(2021)
780
EISi toimiku nr: 21-1323
Tähtaeg: 24.01.2022
Adressaat: Justiitsministeerium, Rahandusministeerium
Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Siseministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu
kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu).
Tähtaeg: 14.01.2022
Lisainfo: Eelnõu on kavas arutada valitsuse 03.02.2022 istungil ja Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi §
6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (26.01.2022) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid
EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 24.01.2022.
Kinnitaja: Merli Vahar, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja
Kinnitamise kuupäev: 20.12.2021
Resolutsiooni koostaja: Ann Saks
[email protected], 693 5201
Politseikoostöö seadustik:
- Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
Nimetus
COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of
ANDMED Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
ALGATUSE
KOHTA - Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation
Eelnõu nr
COM(2021)782 Esitamise kuupäev: 08.12.2021 Menetluskord EL-is:
Direktiivi puhul
COM(2021)780 kaasotsustus
RKKTS § 1521 lg 1
1. p1
- algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist
RKKTS § 1521 lg 1
SEISUKOHA 2. - algatuse/ vastuvõtmisega või teatises toodud meetmete rakendamisega kaasneb oluline majanduslik , sotsiaalne või muu mõju
p2
VALITSUSSE
TOOMISE ALUS 3. RKKTS § 1521 lg 2 - Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjoni või väliskomisjoni nõue
4. VVS § 201 lg 1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab VV pädevusse kuuluva otsuse vastuvõtmist (määruse vastuvõtmine, muutmine, tühistamine)
5. VVS § 201 lg 2 - seisukoha võtmist algatuse/teatise osas peab oluliseks peaminister või minister (on poliitiliselt oluline või tundlik (Eestis või EL-is))
03.02.2022 VV,
VALITSUSELE
Kuupäev
26.01 KOKi, EL menetluse
ESITAMINE kaasvastutajate ajakava
sisend 14.01
SISERIIKLIK Vastutav Kaasatud JUM, RaM Sotsiaalpartnerid,
MENETLUS min SiM ministeeriumid (tollikoostöö) huvigrupid
EELNÕU ÜLEVAADE
KOKKUVÕTE
EELÕU SISUST JA 8. detsembril 2021 a. avaldas komisjon politseikoodeksi nime all kolm ettepanekut: politsei
EESMÄRKIDEST infovahetuse direktiiv; operatiivse politseikoostöö nõukogu soovitus ja nn Prüm II määrus
(viimase kohta kujundatakse seisukohad eraldi).
Politsei infovahetuse direktiiv ühtlustab liikmesriikide operatiivteabe infovahetuse
kanaleid ja päringutele vastamise aega: Infovahetuse direktiiviga muudetakse Rootsi
raamotsust, mis on tänaseni reguleerinud operatiivteabe vahetust. Direktiivi kohaselt peavad
liikmesriikide infovahetuse kontaktpunktid (SPOC) muutuma 24/7 nö one stop shop’iks. Paika
pannakse ühtsed reeglid nende ülesannetele ja ajaraam, mille jooksul tuleb teise liikmesriigi
päringule vastata. Samuti peavad liikmesriigid direktiivi kohaselt kindlustama, et infovahetus
toimub ainult selleks ette nähtud kanali kaudu (Europoli infokanal SIENA) ning et vahetatav
info jõuab ka Europolini, kes saab seda kasutada oma analüüsitoodete koostamisel. Varasemalt
on liikmesriikidel olnud suurem võimalus valida ise infovahetuseks sobivaimad kanalid ning
päringutele vastamise aeg.
Operatiivse politseikoostöö nõukogu soovitus loob selgema reeglistiku politseiametnike
tegutsemiseks teise riigi territooriumil: Politsei operatiivtöö on poliitiliselt tundlik valdkond,
mida puudutav seadusandlus nõuab ELTL artikkel 87 kohaselt vastuvõtmiseks ühehäälsust.
Komisjon otsustas menetluslike probleemide vältimiseks juriidiliselt mittesiduva soovituse
kasuks. Ennekõike loob ettepanek ühise selgema reeglistiku nendeks olukordadeks, kui
politseiametnikud tegutsevad teise riigi territooriumil. See puudutab varjatud jälgimist,
jälitustegevust, ühispatrulle ja -operatsioone. Samuti luuakse soovituse kohaselt EL
koordinatsiooniplatvorm piiriüleste operatsioonide toetamiseks. Ettepanek puudutab ka
töövahendite ühtlustamist (pardaarvutid, sõnumirakendused omavaheliseks suhtluseks) ning
ühist politseikultuuri, mis on plaanis saavutada näiteks läbi õppuste ja koolituste. Muus osas
üldine soovitus teeb erandi migrantide smugeldamise ja inimkaubanduse vallas tehtavale
koostööle ja kutsub üles kasutama ühisoperatsioone smugeldajate ning illegaalsete
sisserändajate tuvastamiseks.
VÕIMALIKUD
SOTS-MAJ.
MÕJUD Positiivne mõju sisejulgeolekule Schengeni alal.
VÕIMALIKUD
ÕIGUSLIKUD Vajab analüüsi.
MUUDATUSED
MÕJU
EELARVELE Vajab analüüsi.
KOMMENTAARID
1/2 Alustatud: 15.12.2021 Muudetud: 20.12.2021
SEISUKOHAD
EESTI
SEISUKOHT ELPOL 2022-23 prioriteet: Loodav ELi politseikoostöö seadustik peab lihtsustama piiriülest
politseikoostööd, tõhustades muu hulgas ühiste uurimisrühmade potentsiaali ning arvestades seniste
kahe- ja mitmepoolsete koostöökokkulepete parimaid kogemusi. Soovime lisaks ELi tasandil
täpsustada politseivabatahtlike kaasamise võimalusi. Piiriülese politseikoostöö tõhustamiseks on
vaja edasi arendada pädevate asutuste infovahetust.
Politseikoostöö soovitusega seoses on meile oluline, et soovitus käsitleb järgmisi küsimusi:
1) hot pursuit võimaldamine merel ja teistel veekogudel;
2) jälitustoimingute puhul teatud tingimustel isiku lihtsustatud kinnipidamine ja väljaandmine;
3) politseiametnike õigus piiriüleselt reageerida, kandes muuhulgas teenistusvormi ja –relva (näiteks
maastikuotsingul);
4) droonide kasutamisega seonduvate küsimuste selgitamine.
TEISTE RIIKIDE
SEISUKOHAD
KOMMENTAARID
2/2 Alustatud: 15.12.2021 Muudetud: 20.12.2021
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.12.2021
COM(2021) 782 final
2021/0411 (COD)
Proposal for a
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States,
repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
{SEC(2021) 420 final} - {SWD(2021) 374 final} - {SWD(2021) 377 final}
EN EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• General context
As set out in the EU Security Union Strategy1, the new Counter-terrorism agenda for the EU2
and the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-20253, transnational threats call for a
coordinated, more targeted and adapted response. While national authorities operating on the
ground are on the frontline in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, action at Union
level and global partnerships are paramount to ensure effective cooperation as well as
information and knowledge exchange among national authorities, supported by a common
criminal law framework and effective financial means. Furthermore, organised crime and
terrorism are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. These threats
spread across borders and manifest themselves in organised crime and terrorist groups that
engage in a wide range of criminal activities.
In an area without internal border controls ('the Schengen area'4), police officers in one
Member State should have equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues
in another Member State (subject to the same conditions). They should cooperate effectively
and by default across the Union. Exchange of information on criminal matters is thus a key
enabler to safeguarding security in the Schengen area.
Together with the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area, a set of rules
for information exchange and police cooperation were agreed upon in the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). In addition, the Schengen Information
System (SIS) was established, creating a common EU security and border database containing
information on wanted and missing persons and objects in the forms of alerts.
According to the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (EU SOCTA),
more than 70% of organised crime groups are present in more than three Member States5. The
2021 EU SOCTA and the EMCDDA European Drug report6 outline a number of areas where
serious and organised crime appears to be on the rise. At the same time, as set out in the
December 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda7, the EU remains on high terrorist alert.
The Schengen area is the largest free travel area in the world. It allows more than 420 million
people to move freely and goods and services to flow unhindered. By removing border
controls between Member States, the Schengen area has become part of our European way of
life. It is a symbol of Europe's interconnectedness and of the ties between European citizens 8.
The Schengen area also contributes to the efficient functioning of the Single Market, and thus
to the growth of the Union's economy9.
1
COM(2020) 605 final.
2
COM(2020) 795 final.
3
COM(2021) 170 final.
4
The Schengen area is composed of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
5
Europol (2021), European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA).
6
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European drug report 2021.
7
COM(2020) 795 final.
8
Eurobarometer 474: The Schengen Area.
9
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021.
EN 1 EN
However, the growing mobility of people within the EU also creates additional challenges in
preventing and fighting criminal threats, and in ensuring public safety. Almost 2 million
people commuted across borders, including 1.3 million cross-border workers10. Despite the
COVID-19 pandemic having reduced intra-EU mobility, flows of people will likely continue
to be important in the future.
In recent years, the Schengen area has been repeatedly put to the test by a series of crises and
challenges which have led several Member States to reintroduce internal border controls. One
reason Member States have given for such a decision has been the uncontrolled secondary
movements11 of irregular migrants, which these Member States consider to pose a serious
threat to public policy or internal security, justifying the need to reintroduce border controls.
Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/39912 ('Schengen Borders Code'), the temporary
reintroduction of border controls may be used only for a limited period of time, in exceptional
circumstances (such as the migratory crisis observed in 2015/2016), as a last resort measure.
In particular, there is room for improvement as regards the use of police checks and
cooperation, including of course with regard to information exchange and communication.
These measures, in particular if combined, have the potential to yield the same results in
controlling secondary movements as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive
when it comes to the free movement of persons, goods and services.
The rapidly evolving criminal landscape and the mobility of people suggest that cross-border
cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the EU and the Schengen area is crucial
to tackle criminal offences, and allow citizens and third country nationals legally staying on
the territory to safely use their free movement. However, important challenges remain for law
enforcement authorities' ability to exchange information with their counterparts in other
Member States in an effective and efficient manner. This capability still varies greatly among
the Member States highlighting a degree of fragmentation detrimental to the effectiveness and
efficiency of information exchange. As a result, criminals and groups of criminals continue to
take advantage of these inefficiencies to operate across borders, and secondary movements of
irregular migrants will continue to pose a problem.
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The overall objective of this proposal is to legislate on organisational and procedural aspects
of information exchange between law enforcement authorities in the EU with a view to
contributing to the effective and efficient exchange of such information, hence protecting a
fully functioning and resilient Schengen area. The proposal is (notably) without prejudice to
the rules regulating the information exchange on alerts in the SIS via the Supplementary
Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) Bureaux.
This proposal for a Directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities
of Member States forms part of a coherent package also comprising a proposal for a Council
Recommendation reinforcing operational cross-border police cooperation, a proposal for a
Regulation revising the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm
II") as well as a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code as set out in the Commission
Communication of June 2021 "A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen
area"13. Together, these proposals seek to establish a Police Cooperation Code with the
10
European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions.
11
Other most frequent reasons notified by the Member States included the migratory crisis of 2015/2016,
persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic.
12
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).
13
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021.
EN 2 EN
objective of streamlining, enhancing, developing, modernising and facilitating law
enforcement cooperation between relevant national agencies, thus supporting Member States
in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism.
Taking full account of the opinion expressed by the co-legislator, this proposal is based on the
findings presented in the accompanying Impact Assessment. These findings also cover
information, analyses and recommendations stemming from the Schengen evaluations in the
field of police cooperation carried out in the past six years, the Communiction from the
Commission on the way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data
protection rules14, the extensive consultations with relevant stakeholders in the past two years,
and the important body of Council guidance papers developed for the last 15 years. Based on
this combined analysis, three main objectives were identified. The present proposal seeks to
achieve them by addressing three underlying problems.
(1) Lack of clear and robust common rules on information exchange
The first objective of this proposal is to ensure, under precise, consistent and common
rules, the equivalent access for any Member State's law enforcement authorities to
information available in other Member States for the purpose of preventing and detecting
criminal offences, conducting criminal investigations or criminal operations, while
complying with fundamental rights, including data protection requirements.
Member States' Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) are involved in daily cross-border
information exchanges related to operations against criminal offences. Yet, rules at national
level impede the effective and efficient flow of information. The general rules for the
exchange of law enforcement information which has cross-border relevance among Member
States' law enforcement authorities are laid down in Council Framework Decision
2006/960/JHA simplifying the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities
of the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'Swedish Framework
Decision' or 'SFD'15), adopted in 2006 before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The
Swedish Framework Decision partially superseded the police cooperation Chapter of the 1990
Convention Implementation the Schengen Agreement16.
The Swedish Framework Decision lays down the principles according to which information
should be shared (principles of availability and equivalent access), the timeframe within
which a request for information should be replied to, the forms that should be used to lodge
and reply to such requests, as well as the data protection safeguards to be ensured when
handling these information.
In practice, however, the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision is unclear, thereby hampering
the full implementation of the principles of availability/equivalent access of relevant
information in a cross-border context17. As a consequence, rules at national level continue to
impede the flow of information despite the efforts made to complement the Swedish
Framework Decision requirements by means of Council non-binding guidance18.
14
COM(2020) 262 final, 24.6.2020.
15
OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89–100.
16
OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19–62.
17
These outstanding issues have notably been highlighted in the Schengen evaluations in the field of
police cooperation. These country report evaluations underline the existence of diverging practices
depending on the other State party. They also cover relevant Council guidance papers and the police
cooperation chapter of the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and their related
bi/multilateral agreements.
18
For example: Council doc. 5825/20 of 2/12/2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange.
EN 3 EN
Consequently, the current uncertainties would remain and continue to negatively affect the
effective and efficient sharing of information, thereby leaving the impacts in the evolution of
the EU security landscape and in the increased cross-border mobility essentially unaddressed.
For this reason, establishing a legal framework by means of a Directive for these purposes
will allow a better monitoring and enforcement of rules at EU and national levels, while
ensuring a convergence of national practices, thereby improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of information flows between Member States.
(2) Lack of common structures and efficient management tools for exchanging
information
The second objective of this proposal for a Directive is to approximate common
minimum standards with a view to ensuring an efficient and effective functioning of the
Single Points of Contact. These common minimum requirements cover the composition,
structures, responsibilities, staffing and technical capabilities.
Member States are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of
internal security19. They are in principle free to organise their law enforcement authorities and
services as they see fit. When it comes to law enforcement cooperation structures, all Member
States have set up or are in the process of setting up a Single Point of Contact20 competent for
channelling as much information exchange as possible. Based on national law or internal
rules, law enforcement authorities may also exchange information directly between
themselves. Although different manuals and national factsheets have been produced in order
to facilitate a harmonised approach to the way national Single Points of Contact are organised,
there are still significant differences across Member States as regards their structures,
functions, means and capabilities.
As a result, Member States do not always have the necessary structures in place to
exchange information effectively and efficiently with other Member States. National
Single Points of Contact do not always play their coordination role and can lack resources to
face the increasing number of requests.
Notably, they are not always equipped with the necessary information management tools (for
example, a case management system with a common dashboard and automatic data upload
and cross-check). Additionally, the Single Points of Contact do not always have direct and
user-friendly access to all relevant EU and international databases and platforms.
Moreover, some Single Points of Contact have limited access to relevant national databases,
which further delays the overall information exchange process. Furthermore, the Single Points
of Contact can lack resources to timely and effectively address the increasing number of
requests received. Indeed, this rising trend has not always been accompanied by a
proportionate increase of human and IT resources.
A modern information management architecture, already in use in some 'advanced' Single
Points of Contact, can alleviate tensions on limited human resources through the integration
of information held by competent authorities in their respective databases, thereby also
monitoring and tracking the deadline for answers to information requests21. Databases
19
Article 72 TFEU.
20
The Single Point of Contact is the national information hub centralising the reception, processing and
the sending of the information to other countries. It gathers under the same management structure all
main international and EU law enforcement communication channels (INTERPOL, Europol and
SIRENE).
21
See the Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal.
EN 4 EN
available at Single Points of Contact are not always used to their full potential either because
of rudimentary search tools, preventing the adoption of transliteration22 techniques and
"fuzzy logic"23 search functions. The lack of transliteration and fuzzy logic search options
within information systems prevents officials from getting exhaustive results (hits) through a
unique query. As a result, officials have to carry out a new search for each personal detail they
are investigating, resulting in an increased workload, which slows down the search process
(for example, inversion of first and last name, different spelling used for the same individual
notably stemming from different languages, alphabets and diacritic accents).
At present, deadlines are almost always exceeded when a judicial authorisation is required.
The functional availability of a judicial authority, as it is already the case in more effective
and efficient Single Points of Contact, will contribute to alleviate undue delays. Indeed, cases
requiring a judicial authorisation can be handled more swiftly than what is currently the case,
meaning that deadlines can be more readily met also in these cases.
(3) Lack of common practice in the use of existing communication channel(s) to
exchange information within the EU
The third objective of this proposal for a Directive is to remedy the proliferation of
communication channels used for law enforcement information exchange between
Member States while reinforcing Europol’s role as the EU criminal information hub for
offences falling within its mandate.
Besides a number of system-specific cases regulated by EU law (i.e. requests for
supplementary information related to SIS alerts must be made via SIRENE Bureaux24, and
information exchange with Europol usually via ENUs25), Member States have not agreed on a
single channel of information exchange between their law enforcement authorities for cases
with an EU dimension, leading to duplication of requests, undue delays and occasional
information loss.
As a result, Member States use different channels to different extents to request, send
and receive information, often without any clear, pre-defined rationale26, which hampers
effective and efficient exchange of information. This also deprives national authorities from
Europol's support even though Member States call on the Agency to be an EU criminal
information hub able to deliver qualitative information-led products.
Single Points of Contact do not always ensure the monitoring of existing channels 24/7
resulting in possible negative impacts on cross-border cases requiring urgent information
sharing. At the same time, Europol's Secure Information Exchange Network Application
(hereinafter 'SIENA') is being underused in spite of its tailored features and strong data
security infrastructure. Even when Member States do use SIENA, they do not always involve
22
Transliteration is the process of representing words/names from one language using the alphabet or
writing system of another language (multilingual name recognition). E.g. the letter "o" can be 'ò', 'ó', 'ô,
'õ', 'ö', 'ø' depending on the language/alphabet used.
23
A fuzzy database is a database which is able to deal with uncertain or incomplete information using
fuzzy logic. i.e. the ability to find matches even when a person' name is misspelled.
24
The exchange of supplementary information related to SIS alerts must be done via a single network of
national offices called SIRENE Bureaux.
25
Europol National Unit. Information exchange with Europol must be done via ENUs using SIENA.
26
A number of national SPOCs use internal guidelines recommending or requiring the specific use of a
communication channel for specific purpose, thereby ensuring consistency and avoiding duplication of
requests. However, other SPOCs rely on officers' habits and preferences, such leeway resulting in
inefficiencies in a cross-border investigation context.
EN 5 EN
(by copying in) Europol, even though the information exchanged falls within its mandate.
This can create significant information gaps at EU level.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The present proposal is consistent with existing and upcoming policy provisions in the
domain of law enforcement cooperation. Law enforcement cooperation is an area of shared
competence between the EU and the Member States. In recent years, progress was made to
improve the exchange of information cooperation between Member States and to close down
the space in which terrorists and serious criminals operate. The legislative framework on
counterterrorism and information exchange was strengthened in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks in Europe. Following the migration crisis of 2015, the general architecture of Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) information systems and databases was overhauled with a focus on
interoperability27 and dynamic convergence between security, borders and migration
management. Moreover, greater cooperation between law enforcement bodies was promoted
at EU level through the publication of (non-binding) Council recommendations and guidelines
seeking to facilitate the convergence of national practices.
As the two legs of law enforcement cooperation essentially relate to (i) information exchange
(which is the focus of the present proposal), and (ii) operational cross-border cooperation, the
present proposal will form part of a coherent package with the accompanying proposal for a
Council Recommendation on aspects of cross-border operational police cooperation. This
package is complemented with the parallel proposal for a Regulation revising the Automated
Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm II"). The "Prüm II" proposal will
aim at strengthening the technical architecture of the Prüm exchange, broadening its scope of
data categories and streamlining and accelarating its post-hit data exchange. The reinforced
"Prüm II" proposal would provide specific rules and possibilities for the automated exchange
of specific – and particularly important – data categories (for example, fingerprints, DNA,
facial images) within the overall framework and general rules for general information
exchange that this Directive will provide.
As an important measure to enhance security within the EU, the present proposal will also
contribute to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area as set out in the Schengen
Strategy. This proposal is also in full coherence with the 2020 proposal revising the Europol
mandate28 with a view to strenghening the agency's mandate on processing large and complex
datasets as well as with the European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic
evidence in criminal matters29. The proposal complements the legal framework30 on the
27
Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on
establishing a framework for interoperability between the EU information systems in the field of
borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU)
2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA [2019] OJ L 135/27; Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for
interoperability between the EU information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation,
asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816
[2019] OJ L 135/85.
28
COM/2020/796 final.
29
COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD).
30
OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use of the Schengen Information System
for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment,
operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and
amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing
Regulation No 1987/2006; Regulation 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the
Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in
EN 6 EN
exchange of information on alerts in the SIS through the SIRENE Bureaux. This proposal is
without prejudice to all those other acts of Union law, as well as other ones such as Directive
2019/1153 of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other
information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal
offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA for the purpose of facilitating access
to and the use of financial information and bank account information by competent authorities
for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences31.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The present proposal aims to contribute positively to a fully functioning and resilient
Schengen area, allowing more people to move freely, and goods and services to flow
unhindered, which in turn contributes to the efficient functioning of the Single Market, and
thus to the growth of the Union's economy. The present proposal is therefore fully consistent
with other Union policies in the field of employment, transport, and ultimately economic
growth in intra-EU border regions, but also across the entire EU.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The legal basis for EU action in the field of intra-EU law enforcement cooperation is Title V,
Chapter 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Pursuant to
Article 87 TFEU: "the Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member
States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law
enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal
offences". More specifically, Article 87(2)(a) TFEU relates to measures concerning the
collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information relevant for the
prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. The present legal proposal is to
be adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
EU action is needed to properly address the problems identified in the first section of this
explanatory memorandum. The objective of improving information flows between relevant
law enforcement authorities and with Europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States acting alone. Owing to the cross-border nature of crime and terrorism, the Member
States are obliged to rely on one another. Hence, the establishment of common rules for the
exchange of information can be better achieved at the Union level. Despite the existence of a
number of national and regional measures in place, Member States alone would not be able to
ensure the full implementation of the principles of availability and of equivalent access to
information. If acting alone and on the basis of national schemes, Member States would not
overcome current differences among Single Points of Contact, which hinder the efficient and
effective exchange of relevant information across borders. They would not ensure an
appropriate and uniform level of knowledge of, and capacity in, the use of relevant databases
and communication channels.
The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions
taken at national level, address the divergence of national practices, prevent duplications,
overlaps and uncertainties and eventually facilitate an efficient counter-action to cross-border
criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation
No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended.
31
OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122–137.
EN 7 EN
crime and terrorism. EU action, in response to the identified problems, is expected to bring
added value for the entire EU, and therefore to its citizens, as it will render more resilient and
robust the Schengen area, with a ripple effect on Schengen Associated Countries32. Common
EU level rules, standards and requirements facilitating information exchange on cross-border
crime between law enforcement authorities will generate significant economies of scale while
ensuring high-level data security and data protection standards.
Law enforcement cooperation at EU level does not replace national policies on internal
security. It does not substitute the work of national law enforcement authorities. Instead, EU
level action supports and reinforces national security policies and the work of national law
enforcement authorities against cross-border crime and terrorism.
• Proportionality
The present proposal aims to consolidate the EU legal framework in a single legal instrument
on information exchange through the 'lisbonisation' of the Swedish Framework Decision. It
also contains provisions stemming from a set of Council non-binding guidelines adopted over
the past 15 years. Considering the call of the co-legislator and the willingness expressed by
Member States in the consultation phase, this proposal for a Directive addresses the identified
problems without going beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring
effective and efficient information flows between Member States.
• Choice of the instrument
Building on previous relevant Council Conclusions33, the present Commission proposal for a
Directive aims to achieve effective and efficient information flows between law enforcement
authorities of the Member States, by means of a substantial approximation of Member States'
legislation concerning information exchange and communication. Its provisions ensure the
respect of the conferral of powers as well as the differences in the legal systems and traditions
of the Member States, as acknowledged by the Treaties. In light of the above, the proposed
legal proposal takes the form of a Directive.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Stakeholder consultations
The consultation involved relevant stakeholders from a wide range of subject matters,
national police, customs, judicial and data protection authorities, civil society organisations,
academia, and from members of the public on their expectations and concerns relating to
strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU34.
The Commission used different means of engagement such as targeted questionnaires,
experts' interviews, focus groups, case-studies, and organised thematic workshops with
Member States and Schengen Associated Countries' representatives. The subject matters and
the policy options presented in the Impact Assessment accompanying the present proposal
were also discussed within the relevant Council's Working Parties (for example, Law
Enforcement Working Party/Police, Law Enforcement Working Party/Customs, Standing
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security).
32
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
33
Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20.
34
An exhaustive presentation of the stakeholder consultations is found in the Impact Assessment
accompanying the present proposal.
EN 8 EN
In addition, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines35, the Commission launched a
Public Consultation. The results of the consultation activities (20 answers) have been duly
taken into account in the preparation of the present proposal36.
• Collection and use of expertise
Numerous consultation activities – such as scoping interviews, questionnaires and online
surveys, semi-structured interviews, case-studies and focus groups – were also conducted by
the contractor during the preparation of a 'Study to support the preparation of an impact
assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation'.
• Impact assessment
In line with the Better Regulation guidelines, an Impact Assessment was carried out for the
preparation of the present legislative proposal. Based on its findings, the Commission
identified three main problems which corresponds to three main specific objectives of the
present proposal (as mentioned above). Correspondingly, three policy options with different
degrees of intervention were considered for potentially achieving each of the specific
objectives37.
Specific objective 1: Facilitate equivalent access for law enforcement authorities to
information held in another Member State, while complying with fundamental rights,
including data protection requirements.
Through:
(1) ensuring alignment of the provisions currently contained in the 2006 SFD with the
2016 Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive;
(2) developing a set of new flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training and Commission
guidance on specific aspects law enforcement information exchange, as appropriate;
(3) improving the clarity of the SFD provisions. This is done through a clarification on
the SFD scope and a simplification of its use. Commission guidance on the national
datasets available in each Member States for possible exchange may also be
developed to further improve implementation, as appropriate;
(4) facilitating compliance with deadlines requirements by which information is to be
made available to another Member State, including when a judicial authorisation is
required.
Specific objective 2: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point
of Contact, including when a judicial authorisation is required to provide information upon
request of another Member State.
Through:
(1) developing a new set of flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training, financial support
and Commission guidance of relevance, as appropriate;
(2) establishing minimum common requirements on the composition of the Single Points
of Contact (including when a judicial authorisation is required), their functions,
staffing, capabilities.
35
SWD (2017) 350, 7.7.2017.
36
EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu)
37
See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal.
EN 9 EN
Specific objective 3: Remedy the proliferation of communication channels used for law
enforcement information exchange between Member States, while reinforcing Europol’s role
as the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate.
Through:
(1) developing new set of flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training, financial support
and Commission guidance on information sharing, as appropriate;
(2) requiring Member States to use SIENA for all bi- and multilateral information
exchanges under the proposed Directive after a necessary transition period ensuring
the full roll-out of SIENA.
These measures will streamline, clarify, develop and modernise cross-border law
enforcement cooperation, while better safeguarding fundamental rights in particular as
regards the protection of personal data (as explained below). It will also step up Europol
support to Member States in countering evolving threats. The preferred policy option will
ensure a strong convergence of national practices regarding the effective and efficient
functionning of Single Point of Contact, through common minimum standards.
The most positive impacts of the preferred policy option are expected to stem from
establishing the Single Point of Contact as a "one-stop shop" for law enforcement cooperation
in all Member States. The establishment of Europol SIENA as the default channel of
communication will add to the streamlining of law enforcement information exchange, while
ensuring the convergence of information at Europol, and the security of such information (and
personal data). The preferred policy option also contains flanking measures such as relevant
trainings and financial support, key enablers to achieving the specific objectives presented
above. The preferred option reflects the best cumulative impacts as regards to relevance,
added value, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality. It draws lessons from
the past and, at the same time, is sufficiently ambitious. The preferred option takes duly
account of the views expressed by the Member States while responding to the legitimate
expectations of the EU citizens and businesses. In doing so, the preferred option contributes to
the effective and efficient functioning of the Schengen area.
• Fundamental rights
The Impact Assessment accompanying the present proposal analysed the effects that each
policy options, including the measures envisaged by this proposal for a Directive, potentially
have on fundamental rights of citizens. By definition, any policy options addressing
information sharing between law enforcement authorities, have an impact on the right to
protection of personal data, as provided for by Article 8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the EU (hereinafter: Charter) and Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
The policy options also have a potential impact on other fundamental rights, such as those
protected by Articles 2 (Right to life), 3 (Right to the integrity of the person), 6 (Right to
liberty and security), 17 (Right to property) and 45 (Freedom of movement and of residence)
of the Charter. The Impact Assessment considered that the chosen policy options are
proportionate since they are limited to what is strictly necessary to meet the objective of
safeguarding the internal security in the Schengen area while protecting the free movement of
persons38.
38
See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal.
EN 10 EN
Furthermore, the alignment of the relevant rules on exchanges of information for law
enforcement purposes with the subsequently adopted and applicable rules on processing
personal data for law enforcement purposes (pursuant to the 2016 Law Enforcement Data
Protection Directive; hereinafter: LED39) are expected to positively impact safeguarding
citizens' fundamental rights. The use of SIENA as the communication channel will also
enhance the security of the personal data processing systems and their overall protection
against possible abuses. As the LED provides and ensures the required level of personal data
protection in the Union, there is no need to go beyond it. Instead, the alignment will ensure
full consistency with the EU personal data protection rules, including those contained in the
LED. In this manner, effect is given to the Commission’s commitment contained in a 2020
Communication to "make a legislative proposal, which as a minimum will entail an
amendment of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA to ensure the necessary data
protection alignment, in the last quarter of 2021"40.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
While highly depending from the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters,
an estimation of possible costs has been provided by Europol and reported in the Impact
Assessment accompanying this proposal. The necessary IT upgrades in both Single Points of
Contact and Police and Customs Cooperation Centres41 were estimated to amount to a
maximum one-off total of EUR 11,5 million. These are deemed to be divided as follows:
– 1,5 million to set-up Case Management Systems (CMS) in 10 MS (not yet equipped);
– 1 million to integrate SIENA in the CMS of the Single Points of Contacts of 20 MS
(not yet equipped);
– 2,25 million to establish connection of Police and Customs Cooperation Centres with
SIENA in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (14 out of 59
are already connected);
– 6,75 million to set-up CMSs in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation
Centres (45x EUR 150.000).
These costs (one-off investment) are deemed acceptable and proportionate to the identified
problem and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the specific objectives set out by
this proposal for a Directive. It should be noted that Member States are in any case pursuing a
modernisation of their IT systems (also in the context of the interoperability of EU
information systems). This provides a good opportunity for cost effective implementation of
the changes envisaged by the provision of this proposal. These estimations do not cover
training needs since, especially for IT upgrades, the training costs are highly depending from
the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters.
In any event, the costs at national level should be covered by Member States' programmes
under the Internal Security Fund42. The Internal Security Fund includes the specific objective
to "improve and facilitate the exchange of information" and to "improve and intensify cross-
border cooperation"43. When preparing their national programmes, Member States are thus
39
Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.
40
COM(2020)262, Way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data protection rules.
41
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres are regional information hubs set up in border regions of two
or more Member States. They are composed by personnel of law enforcement authorities from these
Member States. So far, 59 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres have been set up across Europe.
42
Regulation (EU) 2021/1149.
43
See Articles 3(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149.
EN 11 EN
invited to include activities relevant for the implementation of the envisaged Directive, with
explicit reference to Single Points of Contact and Police and Customs Cooperation Centres,
and the connection to SIENA. As some Member States are more advanced than others in their
level of cooperation, the cost of implementing the proposed Directive will vary between
Member States.
Apart from the costs potentially covered by Member States’ programmes under the Internal
Security Fund, there will be no other costs borne at EU level.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
The evaluation of impacts of the proposed measures depends on the information to be
received from the Member States. For this reason, the present proposal contains provisions
on collection of data indicators. The responsibility for the collection of the relevant
monitoring data should be in the remit of national authorities, ideally the Single Points of
Contact. Subsequently, the monitoring of these activity indicators will be used to inform on
the application of the proposed measures.
In this connection, the present proposal requires the Commission to submit a report to the
European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the extent to which the Member States
have taken the necessary measures to comply with this proposed Directive. The relevant
article also requires the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the
Council assessing the added value of the Directive, 5 years after the entry into force, and
consider a possible review of the Directive upon relevance.
Aside from this legal proposal, the Commission, acting by virtue of its administrative
autonomy, will set up an informal expert group composed of experts from each Member
State, to advise and support the Commission in the monitoring and application of the
Directive, including in the preparation of Commission guidance papers. This expert group
could be built upon the existing informal Head of the Single Points of Contact' network. Last
but not least, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the
Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation will continue to be carried out, in line with
the current Council Regulation44, and eventually in line with its possible amendment45. These
evaluation reports have so far covered the implementation of the Swedish Framework
Decision. Future evaluations will encompass the application of the envisaged new Directive.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
This legislative proposal for a Directive is structured in six chapters:
(1) General provisions for information exchange between Member States' law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating
criminal offences (Art. 1 to Art. 3)
The first block of provisions builds on the structure and substance of the Swedish Framework
Decision in force since 2006. In addition, it brings its scope and contents in line with the
provisions concerning police cooperation (Title V, Chapter 4) as introduced by the Treaty of
Lisbon in force since 2009.
44
OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27–37.
45
Commission proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing Regulation (EU)
1053/2013, 2 June 2021.
EN 12 EN
Article 1 defines the scope of application of the horizontal rules for exchanging information
for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. The provisions of
this Directive apply unless otherwise regulated by other, specific acts of EU law.
Article 2 defines a number of key terms, such as the authorities subject to the horizontal rules
on information exchange, the criminal offences concerned and the type of information
available to law enforcement authorities.
Article 3 outlines three principles that must be respected when exchanging information
between the Member States under the Directive: the principle of equivalent access
establishing that substantially the same conditions must exist for information exchanges
within a Member State and between Member States; the principle of availability stating that if
information is available concerning a criminal offence in a Member State, this must, as a
general rule, be made available to other Member States as well; and the principle of
confidentiality guaranteeing that Member States respect each other’s confidentiality
requirements when treating such information by ensuring a similar level of protection.
(2) Exchange of information through the Single Point of Contact (Art. 4 to Art. 6)
Article 4 sets out a number of requirements regarding requests for information sent to the
Single Point of Contact. This notably concerns criteria justifying the request and qualifying
urgency. The request is to be submitted by the Single Point of Contact of other Member States
or, where a Member State decides so, by other law enforcement authorities. The language
used for the request must be chosen among a list of languages that each Member States is
obliged to establish and that is to be published in the Official Journal of the EU.
Article 5 establishes the obligation for the Single Point of Contact receiving the requests for
information referred to in Article 4 to process and respond to the requests within precise time
limits, which may be derogated from only in certain narrowly specified circumstances,
namely, when a judicial authorisation is required. Such provision of information will have to
be done in the same language used for the request.
Article 6 lays down an exhaustive list of grounds that the Single Point of Contact may invoke,
where objectively justified, to refuse the disclosure of the requested information, of which the
relevant authority of the requesting Member State must be promptly informed. The possibility
for the Single Point of Contact to seek clarifications as to the content of the requests is
foreseen, which will suspend the applicable time limits, yet only if the clarifications are
objectively necessary to avoid the request being refused. In respect of other clarifications that
may be deemed necessary, there will be no such suspension.
(3) Other exchanges of information (Art. 7 to Art. 8)
Article 7 establishes the obligation for Member States to share information with another
(other) Member State(s) spontaneously, i.e. on the relevant authority’s own initiative without
a request for information having been submitted, when that information is likely to assist in
achieving one of the purposes specified in the Directive.
Article 8 ensures that the relevant Single Points of Contact are kept informed of any exchange
of information upon request, other than requests submitted to the Single Point of Contact, i.e.
either information exchanges upon request handled directly between law enforcement
authorities of different Member States or upon requests for information submitted by a Single
Point of Contact to a law enforcement authority of another Member State. This includes
relevant information exchanges by Police and Customs Cooperation Centres and any other
equivalent bodies, in as far as they qualify as law enforcement authorities under the proposed
Directive.
EN 13 EN
(4) Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapter II and III (Art. 9 to
Art. 13)
Article 9 addresses situations where, under the national law of the Member State to which
relevant information is available, a judicial authorisation is required for the provision of that
information, either upon request or spontaneously and either by the Single Point of Contact or
by a law enforcement authority. This provision gives effect to and further specifies the
principle of equivalent access, meaning that substantially the same conditions must apply
when the requested information is subject to judicial authorisation, regardless of the fact that
the information is to be provided to an authority of another Member State rather than to an
authority of the same Member State. This article also establishes that the authority concerned
must immediately take all necessary steps, both practically and legally, in accordance with
their national law, to obtain such judicial authorisation as soon as possible.
Article 10 sets out certain requirements aimed at ensuring adequate protection of personal
data, resulting in particular from the alignment with the rules of the LED.
Article 11 regulates the language to be used by Single Points of Contact and law enforcement
authorities in the situations specified in this Directive, both as regards the actual provision of
information and any other communications related thereto. No such language requirements
apply to the direct information exchanges and other communications referred to in Article 8.
Member States are to establish a list of languages acceptable to them, which should also
include English. Such lists must be published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the
EU.
Article 12 introduces the obligation for the Single Point Contact as well as all other law
enforcement authorities to systematically keep informed Europol (meaning 'put in copy'),
insofar as the exchanges concern crimes falling under the scope of Europol’s mandate as
specified in its basic act. This obligation ensures that Europol can fulfil its role of information
hub in the EU in relation to information relevant for law enforcement purposes.
Article 13 requires all relevant authorities to use – and, to that aim, be directly connected to –
the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), managed by Europol, for all
exchanges of information and related communications covered by the Directive. These rules
on the mandatory use of SIENA do not apply where specific acts of Union law contain
different requirements on the communication channel to be used, for instance for information
exchanges governed by the SIS Regulation46, given that exchanges under such specific acts
are excluded from the scope of this Directive.
(5) Minimum requirements on establishing a Single Point of Contact as a central entity
to coordinate information exchange between Member States (Art. 14 to Art. 16)
The fifth block of provisions sets out and builds on the obligation for each Member State to
establish or designate a Single Point of Contact as the central entity coordinating information
exchanges between its law enforcement authorities and those of other Member States within
46
OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use of the Schengen Information System
for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment,
operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and
amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing
Regulation No 1987/2006; Regulation 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the
Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation
No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended.
EN 14 EN
the scope of the Directive. It lays out a number of minimum requirements that any Single
Point of Contact must comply with.
Article 14 sets out the tasks and capabilities of the Single Point of Contact. In order to carry
out its functions, the Single Point of Contact is to have access to the necessary information
and be kept systematically informed of all direct information exchanges between its national
authorities and those of the other Member States. The actual establishment or designation of
the Single Points of Contact must be notified, within a set time period, to the Commission,
which must then publish such notifications in the Official Journal of the EU.
Article 15 establishes minimum requirements regarding the composition of the Single Point of
Contact, leaving a degree of flexibility to each Member State to determine its precise
organisation and composition as deemed most appropriate depending on its national
circumstances, provided the requirements of the Directive are met.
Article 16 defines minimum requirements for the Case Management System of the Single
Points of Contact.
(6) Final provisions
The final provisions ensure that the implementation of the proposed Directive is properly
monitored. Firstly, by the Member States, through the obligation to collect and provide a
minimum set of statistical data on a yearly basis (Article 17). Secondly, by the Commission,
through the obligation to report to the European Parliament and the Council, having regard
inter alia to the data provided by Member States, thus allowing, thirdly, those two institutions
to monitor the Directive’s implementation as well (Article 18).
Finally, Articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 deal with a number of necessary legal-technical issues,
namely, the deletion or repeal of pre-existing rules which the rules of the proposed Directive
replace, transposition into national law, as well as entry into force and addressees. As regards
the existing rules contained in the CISA (Article 19), Article 39 thereof is replaced only
insofar as it relates to information exchange for the purpose specified in the proposed
Directive. Article 39 continues to be applicable to other forms of police cooperation covered
by that article. In contrast, Article 46 of the CISA, which specifically relates to such
information exchange, is fully superseded by the proposed Directive and is therefore deleted.
EN 15 EN
2021/0411 (COD)
Proposal for a
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States,
repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 87(2), point (a), thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1) Transnational threats involving criminal activities call for a coordinated, targeted and
adapted response. While national authorities operating on the ground are on the
frontline in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, action at Union level is
paramount to ensure efficient and effective cooperation, including as regards the
exchange of information. Furthermore, organised crime and terrorism, in particular,
are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. Those threats spread
across borders and manifest themselves in organised crime and terrorist groups that
engage in a wide range of criminal activities.
(2) In an area without internal border controls, police officers in one Member State should
have, within the framework of the applicable Union and national law, the possibility to
obtain equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues in another
Member State. In this regard, law enforcement authorities should cooperate effectively
and by default across the Union. Therefore, an essential component of the measures
that underpin public security in an interdependent area without internal border controls
is police cooperation on the exchange of relevant information for law enforcement
purposes. Exchange of information on crime and criminal activities, including
terrorism, serves the overall objective of protecting the security of natural persons.
(3) Exchange of information between Member States for the purposes of preventing and
detecting criminal offences is regulated by the Convention Implementing the
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 198547, adopted on 19 June 1990, notably in its
Articles 39 and 46. Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA48 partially replaced
47
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19).
48
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the
European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89).
EN 16 EN
those provisions and introduced new rules for the exchange of information and
intelligence between Member States' law enforcement authorities.
(4) Evaluations, including those carried under Council Regulation (EU) 1053/201349,
indicated that Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is not sufficiently clear and does
not ensure adequate and rapid exchange of relevant information between Member
States. Evaluations also indicated that that Framework Decision is scarcely used in
practice, in part due to the lack of clarity experienced in practice between the scope of
the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and of that Framework
Decision.
(5) Therefore, the existing legal framework consisting of the relevant provisions of the
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Framework Decision
2006/960/JHA should be updated and replaced, so as to facilitate and ensure, through
the establishment of clear and harmonised rules, the adequate and rapid exchange of
information between the competent law enforcement authorities of different Member
States.
(6) In particular, the discrepancies between the relevant provisions of the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
should be addressed by covering information exchanges for the purpose of preventing,
detecting or investigating criminal offences, thereby fully superseding, insofar as such
exchanges are concerned, Articles 39 and 46 of that Convention and hence providing
the necessary legal certainty. In addition, the relevant rules should be simplified and
clarified, so as to facilitate their effective application in practice.
(7) It is necessary to lay down rules governing the cross-cutting aspects of such
information exchange between Member States. The rules of this Directive should not
affect the application of rules of Union law on specific systems or frameworks for
such exchanges, such as under Regulations (EU) 2018/186050, (EU) 2018/186151,
(EU) 2018/186252, and (EU) 2016/79453 of the European Parliament and of the
49
Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring
mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive
Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and
implementation of Schengen (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27).
50
Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals
(OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1).
51
Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border
checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and
repealing Regulation No 1987/2006 (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 14).
52
Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision
2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L
312, 7.12.2018, p. 56).
53
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing
Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA
(OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53).
EN 17 EN
Council, Directives (EU) 2016/68154 and 2019/115355 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, and Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA56 and 2008/616/JHA57.
(8) This Directive does not govern the provision and use of information as evidence in
judicial proceedings. In particular, it should not be understood as establishing a right
to use the information provided under this Directive as evidence and, consequently, it
leaves unaffected any requirement provided for in the applicable law to obtain the
consent from the Member State providing the information for such use. This Directive
leaves acts of Union law on evidence, such as Regulation (EU) …/…58 [on European
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters] and
Directive (EU) …/…59 [laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal
representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings],
unaffected.
(9) All exchanges of information under this Directive should be subject to three general
principles, namely those of availability, equivalent access and confidentiality. While
those principles are without prejudice to the more specific provisions of this Directive,
they should guide its interpretation and application where relevant. For example, the
principle of availability should be understood as indicating that relevant information
available to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of one
Member State should also be available, to the largest extent possible, to those of other
Member States. However, the principle should not affect the application, where
justified, of specific provisions of this Directive restricting the availability of
information, such as those on the grounds for refusal of requests for information and
judicial authorisation. In addition, pursuant to the principle of equivalent access, the
access of the Single Point of Contact and the law enforcement authorities of other
Member States to relevant information should be substantially the same as, and thus be
neither stricter nor less strict than, the access of those of one and the same Member
State, subject to the Directive’s more specific provisions.
(10) In order to achieve the objective to facilitate and ensure the adequate and rapid
exchange of information between Member States, provision should be made for
obtaining such information by addressing a request for information to the Single Point
of Contact of the other Member State concerned, in accordance with certain clear,
simplified and harmonised requirements. Concerning the content of such requests for
information, it should in particular be specified, in an exhaustive and sufficiently
detailed manner and without prejudice to the need for a case-by-case assessment, when
54
Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of
terrorist offences and serious crime (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132).
55
Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down
rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or
prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (OJ L 186,
11.7.2019, p. 122).
56
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation,
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).
57
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on
the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime
(OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12). A proposal for a Regulation on automated data exchange for police
cooperation ("Prüm II"), intends to repeal parts of those Council Decisions.
58
Regulation proposal, COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD).
59
Directive proposal, COM/2018/226 final - 2018/0107 (COD).
EN 18 EN
they are to be considered as urgent and which explanations they are to contain as
minimum.
(11) Whilst the Single Points of Contact of each Member State should in any event have
the possibility to submit requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of
another Member State, in the interest of flexibility, Member States should be allowed
to decide that, in addition, their law enforcement authorities may also submit such
requests. In order for Single Points of Contact to be able to perform their coordinating
functions under this Directive, it is however necessary that, where a Member State
takes such a decision, its Single Point of Contact is made aware of all such outgoing
requests, as well as of any communications relating thereto, by always being put in
copy.
(12) Time limits are necessary to ensure rapid processing of requests for information
submitted to a Single Point of Contact. Such time limits should be clear and
proportionate and take into account whether the request for information is urgent and
whether a prior judicial authorisation is required. In order to ensure compliance with
the applicable time limits whilst nonetheless allowing for a degree of flexibility where
objectively justified, it is necessary to allow, on an exceptional basis, for deviations
only where, and in as far as, the competent judicial authority of the requested Member
State needs additional time to decide on granting the necessary judicial authorisation.
Such a need could arise, for example, because of the broad scope or the complexity of
the matters raised by the request for information.
(13) In exceptional cases, it may be objectively justified for a Member State to refuse a
request for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact. In order to ensure the
effective functioning of the system created by this Directive, those cases should be
exhaustively specified and interpreted restrictively. When only parts of the information
concerned by such a request for information relate to the reasons for refusing the
request, the remaining information is to be provided within the time limits set by this
Directive. Provision should be made for the possibility to ask for clarifications, which
should suspend the applicable time limits. However, such possibility should only exist
where the clarifications are objectively necessary and proportionate, in that the request
for information would otherwise have to be refused for one of the reasons listed in this
Directive. In the interest of effective cooperation, it should remain possible to request
necessary clarifications also in other situations, without this however leading to
suspension of the time limits.
(14) In order to allow for the necessary flexibility in view of operational needs that may
vary in practice, provision should be made for two other means of exchanging
information, in addition to requests for information submitted to the Single Points of
Contact. The first one is the spontaneous provision of information, that is, on the own
initiative of either the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities
without a prior request. The second one is the provision of information upon requests
for information submitted either by Single Points of Contact or by law enforcement
authorities not to the Single Point of Contact, but rather directly to the law
enforcement authorities of another Member State. In respect of both means, only a
limited number of minimum requirements should be set, in particular on keeping the
Single Points of Contact informed and, as regards own-initiative provision of
information, the situations in which information is to be provided and the language to
be used.
EN 19 EN
(15) The requirement of a prior judicial authorisation for the provision of information can
be an important safeguard. The Member States' legal systems are different in this
respect and this Directive should not be understood as affecting such requirements
established under national law, other than subjecting them to the condition that
domestic exchanges and exchanges between Member States are treated in an
equivalent manner, both on the substance and procedurally. Furthermore, in order to
keep any delays and complications relating to the application of such a requirement to
a minimum, the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities, as
applicable, of the Member State of the competent judicial authority should take all
practical and legal steps, where relevant in cooperation with the Single Point of
Contact or the law enforcement authority of another Member State that requested the
information, to obtain the judicial authorisation as soon as possible.
(16) It is particularly important that the protection of personal data, in accordance with
Union law, is ensured in connection to all exchanges of information under this
Directive. To that aim, the rules of this Directive should be aligned with Directive
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council 60. In particular, it
should be specified that any personal data exchanged by Single Points of Contacts and
law enforcement authorities is to remain limited to the categories of data listed in
Section B point 2, of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European
Parliament and of the Council61. Furthermore, as far as possible, any such personal
data should be distinguished according to their degree of accuracy and reliability,
whereby facts should be distinguished from personal assessments, in order to ensure
both the protection of individuals and the quality and reliability of the information
exchanged. If it appears that the personal data are incorrect, they should be rectified or
erased without delay. Such rectification or erasure, as well as any other processing of
personal data in connection to the activities under this Directive, should be carried out
in compliance with the applicable rules of Union law, in particular Directive (EU)
2016/680 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council62, which rules this Directive leaves unaffected.
(17) In order to allow for adequate and rapid provision of information by Single Points of
Contact, either upon request or on their own initiative, it is important that the relevant
officials of the Member States concerned understand each other. Language barriers
often hamper the cross-border exchange of information. For this reason, rules should
be established on the use of languages in which requests for information submitted to
the Single Points of Contact, the information to be provided by Single Points of
Contact as well as any other communications relating thereto, such as on refusals and
clarifications, are to be provided. Those rules should strike a balance between, on the
60
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 89).
61
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing
Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA
(OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53).
62
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016,
p. 1).
EN 20 EN
one hand, respecting the linguistic diversity within the Union and keeping costs of
translation as limited as possible and, on the other hand, operational needs associated
with adequate and rapid exchanges of information across borders. Therefore, Member
States should establish a list containing one or more official languages of the Union of
their choice, but containing also one language that is broadly understood and used in
practice, namely, English.
(18) The further development of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement
Cooperation (Europol) as the Union’s criminal information hub is a priority. That is
why, when information or any related communications are exchanged, irrespective of
whether that is done pursuant to a request for information submitted to a Single Point
of Contact or law enforcement authority, or on their own-imitative, a copy should be
sent to Europol, however only insofar as it concerns offences falling within the scope
of the objectives of Europol. In practice, this can be done through the ticking by
default of the corresponding SIENA box.
(19) The proliferation of communication channels used for the transmission of law
enforcement information between Member States and of communications relating
thereto should be remedied, as it hinders the adequate and rapid exchange of such
information. Therefore, the use of the secure information exchange network
application called SIENA, managed by Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2016/794, should be made mandatory for all such transmissions and communications
under this Directive, including the sending of requests for information submitted to
Single Points of Contact and directly to law enforcement authorities, the provision of
information upon such requests and on their own initiative, communications on
refusals and clarifications, as well as copies to Single Points of Contact and Europol.
To that aim, all Single Points of Contact, as well as all law enforcement authorities
that may be involved in such exchanges, should be directly connected to SIENA. In
this regard, a transition period should be provided for, however, in order to allow for
the full roll-out of SIENA.
(20) In order to simplify, facilitate and better manage information flows, Member States
should each establish or designate one Single Point of Contact competent for
coordinating information exchanges under this Directive. The Single Points of Contact
should, in particular, contribute to mitigating the fragmentation of the law enforcement
authorities' landscape, specifically in relation to information flows, in response to the
growing need to jointly tackle cross-border crime, such as drug trafficking and
terrorism. For the Single Points of Contact to be able to effectively fulfil their
coordinating functions in respect of the cross-border exchange of information for law
enforcement purposes under this Directive, they should be assigned a number of
specific, minimum tasks and also have certain minimum capabilities.
(21) Those capabilities of the Single Points of Contact should include having access to all
information available within its own Member State, including by having user-friendly
access to all relevant Union and international databases and platforms, in accordance
with the modalities specified in the applicable Union and national law. In order to be
able to meet the requirements of this Directive, especially those on the time limits, the
Single Points of Contact should be provided with adequate resources, including
adequate translation capabilities, and function around the clock. In that regard, having
a front desk that is able to screen, process and channel incoming requests for
information may increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Those capabilities should
also include having at their disposition, at all times, judicial authorities competent to
grant necessary judicial authorisations. In practice, this can be done, for example, by
EN 21 EN
ensuring the physical presence or the functional availability of such judicial
authorities, either within the premises of the Single Point of Contact or directly
available on call.
(22) In order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under
this Directive, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of representatives of
national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate
and rapid exchange of information under this Directive. While it is for each Member
State to decide on the precise organisation and composition needed to meet that
requirement, such representatives may include police, customs and other law
enforcement authorities competent for preventing, detecting or investigating criminal
offences, as well as possible contact points for the regional and bilateral offices, such
as liaison officers and attachés seconded or posted in other Member States and
relevant Union law enforcement agencies, such as Europol. However, in the interest of
effective coordination, at minimum, the Single Points of Contact should be composed
of representatives of the Europol national unit, the SIRENE Bureau, the passenger
information unit and the Interpol National Central Bureau, as established under the
relevant legislation and notwithstanding this Directive not being applicable to
information exchanges specifically regulated by such Union legislation.
(23) The deployment and operation of an electronic single Case Management System
having certain minimum functions and capabilities by the Single Points of Contact is
necessary to allow them to carry out their tasks under this Directive in an effective and
efficient manner, in particular as regards information management.
(24) To enable the necessary monitoring and evaluation of the application of this Directive,
Member States should be required to collect and annually provide to the Commission
certain data. This requirement is necessary, in particular, to remedy the lack of
comparable data quantifying relevant information exchanges and also facilitates the
reporting obligation of the Commission.
(25) The cross-border nature of crime and terrorism requires Member States to rely on one
another to tackle such criminal offences. Adequate and rapid information flows
between relevant law enforcement authorities and to Europol cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States acting alone. Due to the scale and effects of the action,
this can be better achieved at Union level through the establishment of common rules
on the exchange of information. Thus, the Union may adopt measures in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European
Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article,
this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those
objectives.
(26) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark,
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is
not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Directive builds upon the
Schengen acquis, Denmark should, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol,
decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Directive
whether it will implement it in its national law.
EN 22 EN
(27) This Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in
which Ireland takes part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC63; Ireland
is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is bound by it.
(28) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Directive constitutes a development of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by
the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of
Norway concerning the latter's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis64 which fall within the area referred to in Article
1, point H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC65.
(29) As regards Switzerland, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European
Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of
the Schengen acquis66 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H of
Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision
2008/146/EC67 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA68.
(30) As regards Liechtenstein, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union,
the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of
Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis69 which fall within the area referred to in Article
1, point H of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council
Decision 2011/350/EU70 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU71,
63
Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of
the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002).
64
OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36.
65
Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the
Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999).
66
OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52.
67
Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008).
68
Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union
of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008).
69
OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21.
70
Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union,
of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and
the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L
160, 18.6.2011).
71
Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of
the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the
EN 23 EN
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Chapter I
General provisions
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
1. This Directive establishes rules for the exchange of information between the law
enforcement authorities of the Member States where necessary for the purpose of
preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences.
In particular, this Directive establishes rules on:
(a) requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact established
or designated by the Member States, in particular on the content of such
requests, mandatory time limits for providing the requested information,
reasons for refusals of such requests and the channel of communication to be
used in connection to such requests;
(b) the own-initiative provision of relevant information to Single Points of Contact
or to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, in particular the
situations and the manner in which such information is to be provided;
(c) the channel of communication to be used for all exchanges of information and
the information to be provided to the Single Points of Contact in relation to
exchanges of information directly between the law enforcement authorities of
the Member States;
(d) the establishment, tasks, composition and capabilities of the Single Point of
Contact, including on the deployment of a single electronic Case Management
System for the fulfilment of its tasks.
2. This Directive shall not apply to exchanges of information between the law
enforcement authorities of the Member States for the purpose of preventing,
detecting or investigating criminal offences that are specifically regulated by other
acts of Union law.
3. This Directive does not impose any obligation on Member States to:
(a) obtain information by means of coercive measures, taken in accordance with
national law, for the purpose of providing it to the law enforcement authorities
of other Member States;
(b) store information for the purpose referred to in point (a);
(c) provide information to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States
to be used as evidence in judicial proceedings
Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community
and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis relating in particular to judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011).
EN 24 EN
4. This Directive does not establish any right to use the information provided in
accordance with this Directive as evidence in judicial proceedings.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purpose of this Directive:
(1) 'law enforcement authority' means any authority of the Member States
competent under national law for the purpose of preventing, detecting or
investigating criminal offences;
(2) 'criminal offences' means any of the following:
(a) offences referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision
2002/584/JHA72;
(b) offences referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794;
(c) tax crimes relating to direct and indirect taxes, as laid down in national law;
(3) 'information' means any content concerning one or more natural persons, facts
or circumstances relevant to law enforcement authorities in connection to the
exercise of their tasks under national law of preventing, detecting or
investigating criminal offences;
(4) 'available' information means information that is either held by the Single Point
of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State,
or information that those Single Points of Contact or those law enforcement
authorities can obtain from other public authorities or from private parties
established in that Member State without coercive measures;
(5) ‘SIENA’ means the secure information exchange network application,
managed by Europol, aimed at facilitating the exchange of information
between Member States and Europol;
(6) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in Article 4, point (1) of
Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Article 3
Principles of information exchange
Member States shall, in connection to all exchanges of information under this Directive,
ensure that:
(a) any relevant information available to the Single Point of Contact or the law
enforcement authorities of Member States is provided to the Single Point of
Contact or the law enforcement authorities of other Member States (‘principle
of availability’);
(b) the conditions for requesting information from the Single Point of Contact or
the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, and those for
providing information to the Single Points of Contact and the law enforcement
authorities of other Member States, are equivalent to those applicable for
72
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).
EN 25 EN
requesting and providing similar information from and to their own law
enforcement authorities (‘principle of equivalent access’);
(c) information provided to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement
authorities of another Member State that is marked as confidential is protected
by those law enforcement authorities in accordance with the requirements set
out in the national law of that Member State offering a similar level of
confidentiality (‘principle of confidentiality’).
Chapter II
Exchanges of information through Single Points of Contact
Article 4
Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact
1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact and, where they have
so decided, their law enforcement authorities submit requests for information to the
Single Points of Contact of other Member States in accordance with the conditions
set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.
Where a Member State has decided that, in addition to its Single Point of Contact, its
law enforcement authorities may also submit requests for information to the Single
Points of Contact of other Member States, it shall ensure that those authorities send,
at the same time as submitting such requests, a copy of those requests, and of any
other communication relating thereto, to the Single Point of Contact of that Member
State.
2. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State
shall be submitted only where there are objective reasons to believe that:
(a) the requested information is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose
referred to in Article 1(1);
(b) the requested information is available to the law enforcement authorities of the
requested Member State.
3. Any request for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State
shall specify whether or not it is urgent.
Those requests for information shall be considered urgent if, having regard to all
relevant facts and circumstances of the case at hand, there are objective reasons to
believe that the requested information is one or more of the following:
(a) essential for the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to the public
security of a Member State;
(b) necessary in order to protect a person’s vital interests which are at imminent
risk;
(c) necessary to adopt a decision that may involve the maintenance of restrictive
measures amounting to a deprivation of liberty;
(d) at imminent risk of losing relevance if not provided urgently.
EN 26 EN
4. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State
shall contain all necessary explanations to allow for their adequate and rapid
processing in accordance with this Directive, including at least the following:
(a) a specification of the requested information that is as detailed as reasonably
possible under the given circumstances;
(b) a description of the purpose for which the information is requested;
(c) the objective reasons according to which it is believed that the requested
information is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested
Member State;
(d) an explanation of the connection between the purpose and the person or
persons to whom the information relates, where applicable;
(e) the reasons for which the request is considered urgent, where applicable.
5. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State
shall be submitted in one of the languages included in the list established by the
requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11.
Article 5
Provision of information pursuant to requests to the Single Point of Contact
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article and to Article 6(3), Member States shall ensure
that their Single Point of Contact provides the information requested in accordance
with Article 4 as soon as possible and in any event within the following time limits,
as applicable:
(a) eight hours, for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the
law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State without having to
obtain a judicial authorisation;
(b) three calendar days, for urgent requests relating to information that is available
to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State subject to a
requirement to obtain a judicial authorisation;
(c) seven calendar days, for all requests that are not urgent.
The time periods laid down in the first subparagraph shall commence at the moment
of the reception of the request for information.
2. Where under its national law in accordance with Article 9 the requested information
is available only after having obtained a judicial authorisation, the requested Member
State may deviate from the time limits referred to paragraph 1 insofar as necessary
for obtaining such authorisation.
In such cases, Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact does
both of the following:
(i) immediately inform the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the
law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State of the
expected delay, specifying the length of the expected delay and the
reasons therefore;
(ii) subsequently keep it updated and provide the requested information as
soon as possible after obtaining the judicial authorisation.
EN 27 EN
3. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact provides the
information requested in accordance with Article 4 to the Single Point of Contact or,
where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, in
the language in which that request for information was submitted in accordance with
Article 4(5).
Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact provides the
requested information to the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member
State, it also sends, at the same time, a copy of the information to the Single Point of
Contact of that Member State.
Article 6
Refusals of requests for information
1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact only refuses to provide
the information requested in accordance with Article 4 insofar as any of the
following reasons applies:
(a) the requested information is not available to the Single Point of Contact and
the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State;
(b) the request for information does not meet the requirements set out in Article 4;
(c) the judicial authorisation required under the national law of the requested
Member State in accordance with Article 9 was refused;
(d) the requested information constitutes personal data other than that falling
within the categories of personal data referred to in Article 10, point (i);
(e) there are objective reasons to believe that the provision of the requested
information would:
(i) be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the requested
Member State;
(ii) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation of a criminal offence;
or;
(iii) unduly harm the vital interests of a natural or legal person.
Any refusal shall only affect the part of the requested information to which the
reasons set out in the first subparagraph relate and shall, where applicable, leave the
obligation to provide the other parts of the information in accordance with this
Directive unaffected.
2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact informs the Single
Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the
requesting Member State of the refusal, specifying the reasons for the refusal, within
the time limits provided for in Article 5(1).
3. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact immediately requests
additional clarifications needed to process a request for information that otherwise
would have to be refused from the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the
law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State.
The time limits referred to in Article 5(1) shall be suspended from the moment that
the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of
the requesting Member State receives the request for clarifications, until the moment
EN 28 EN
that the Single Point of Contact of the requested Member State receives the
clarifications.
4. The refusals, reasons for the refusals, requests for clarifications and clarifications
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as any other communications relating to the
requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State,
shall be transmitted in the language in which that request was submitted in
accordance with Article 4(5).
Chapter III
Other exchanges of information
Article 7
Own-initiative provision of information
1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact or their law
enforcement authorities provide, on their own initiative, any information available to
them to the Single Points of Contact or to the law enforcement authorities of other
Member States, where there are objective reasons to believe that such information
could be relevant to that Member State for the purpose referred to in Article 1(1).
However, no such obligation shall exist insofar as the reasons referred to in points
(c), (d) or (e) of Article 6(1) apply in respect of such information.
2. Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law
enforcement authorities provide information on their own-initiative in accordance
with paragraph 1, they do so in one of the languages included in the list established
by the requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11.
Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law
enforcement authorities provide such information to the law enforcement authority of
another Member State, they also send, at the same time, a copy of that information to
the Single Point of Contact of that other Member State.
Article 8
Exchanges of information upon requests submitted directly to law enforcement authorities
Member States shall ensure that, where Single Points of Contact or law enforcement
authorities submit requests for information directly to the law enforcement authorities of
another Member State, their Single Points of Contact or their law enforcement authorities
send, at the same time as they send such requests, provide information pursuant to such
requests or send any other communications relating thereto, a copy thereof to the Single Point
of Contact of that other Member State and, where the sender is a law enforcement authority,
also to the Single Point of Contact of its own Member State.
Chapter IV
Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapters II and III
Article 9
Judicial authorisation
EN 29 EN
1. Member States shall not require any judicial authorisation for the provision of
information to the Single Points of Contact or law enforcement authority of another
Member State under Chapters II and III, where no such requirement applies in
respect of similar provision of information to their own Single Point of Contact or
their own law enforcement authorities.
2. Member States shall ensure that, where their national law requires a judicial
authorisation for the provision of information to the Single Points of Contact or the
law enforcement authority of another Member State in accordance with paragraph 1,
their Single Points of Contact or their law enforcement authorities immediately take
all necessary steps, in accordance with their national law, to obtain such judicial
authorisation as soon as possible.
3. The requests for judicial authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be assessed
and decided upon in accordance with the national law of the Member State of the
competent judicial authority.
Article 10
Additional rules for information constituting personal data
Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement
authorities provide information under Chapters II and III that constitutes personal data:
(i) the categories of personal data provided remain limited to those listed in
Section B, point 2, of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794;
(ii) their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities also
provide, at the same time and insofar as possible, the necessary elements
enabling the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authority of
the other Member State to assess the degree of accuracy, completeness
and reliability of the personal data, as well as the extent to which the
personal data are up to date.
Article 11
List of languages
1. Member States shall establish and keep up to date a list with one or more of the
official languages of the Union in which their Single Point of Contact is able to
provide information upon a request for information or on its own initiative. That list
shall include English.
2. Member States shall provide those lists, as well as any updates thereof, to the
Commission. The Commission shall publish those lists, as well as any updates
thereof, in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 12
Provision of information to Europol
Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement
authorities send requests for information, provide information pursuant to such requests,
provide information on their own initiative or send other communications relating thereto
under Chapters II and III, they also send, at the same time, a copy thereof to Europol, insofar
as the information to which the communication relates concerns offences falling within the
scope of the objectives of Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794.
EN 30 EN
Article 13
Use of SIENA
1. Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law
enforcement authorities send requests for information, provide information pursuant
to such requests, provide information on their own initiative or send other
communications relating thereto under Chapters II and III or under Article 12, they
do so through SIENA.
2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact, as well as all their law
enforcement authorities that may be involved in the exchange of information under
this Directive, are directly connected to SIENA.
Chapter V
Single Point of Contact for information exchange between Member States
Article 14
Establishment, tasks and capabilities
1. Each Member State shall establish or designate one national Single Point of Contact,
which shall be the central entity responsible for coordinating exchanges of
information under this Directive.
2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact is empowered to carry
out at least all of the following tasks:
(a) receive and evaluate requests for information;
(b) channel requests for information to the appropriate national law enforcement
authority or authorities and, where necessary, coordinate among them the
processing of such requests and the provision of information upon such
requests;
(c) analyse and structure information with a view to providing it to the Single
Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of
other Member States;
(d) provide, upon request or upon its own initiative, information to the Single
Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of
other Member States in accordance with Articles 5 and 7;
(e) refuse to provide information in accordance with Article 6 and, where
necessary, request clarifications in accordance with Article 6(3);
(f) send requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member
States in accordance with Article 4 and, where necessary, provide clarifications
in accordance with Article 6(3).
3. Member States shall ensure that:
(a) their Single Point of Contact has access to all information available to their law
enforcement authorities, insofar as necessary to carry out its tasks under this
Directive;
(b) their Single Point of Contact carries out its tasks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
EN 31 EN
(c) their Single Point of Contact is provided with the staff, resources and
capabilities, including for translation, necessary to carry out its tasks in an
adequate and rapid manner in accordance with this Directive and in particular
the time limits set out in Article 5(1);
(d) the judicial authorities competent to grant the judicial authorisations required
under national law in accordance with Article 9 are available to the Single
Point of Contact 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
4. Within one month of the establishment or designation of their Single Point of
Contact, Member States shall notify the Commission thereof. They shall update that
information where necessary.
The Commission shall publish those notifications, as well as any updates thereof, in
the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 15
Composition
1. Member States shall determine the organisation and the composition of its Single
Point of Contact in such a manner that it can carry out its tasks under this Directive
in an efficient and effective manner.
2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact is composed of
representatives of national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is
necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this Directive,
including at least the following insofar as the Member State concerned is bound by
the relevant legislation to establish or designate such units or bureaux:
(a) the Europol national unit established by Article 7 of Regulation (EU)
2016/794;
(b) the SIRENE Bureau established by Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862
of the European Parliament and of the Council73;
(c) the passenger information unit established under Article 4 of Directive (EU)
2016/681;
(d) the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) established by Article 32 of
Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL.
Article 16
Case Management System
1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact deploys and operates
an electronic single Case Management System as the repository that allows the
Single Point of Contact to carry out its tasks under this Directive. The Case
Management System shall have at least all of the following functions and
capabilities:
73
Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council
Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and
of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 312 7.12.2018, p. 56).
EN 32 EN
(a) recording incoming and outgoing requests for information referred to in
Articles 5 and 8, as well as any other communications with Single Points of
Contact and, where applicable, law enforcement authorities of other Member
States relating to such requests, including the information about refusals and
the requests for and provision of clarifications referred to in Article 6(2) and
(3) respectively;
(b) recording communications between the Single Point of Contact and national
law enforcement authorities, pursuant to Article 15(2), point (b);
(c) recording provisions of information to the Single Point of Contact and, where
applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States in
accordance with Articles 5, 7 and 8;
(d) cross-checking incoming requests for information referred to in Articles 5 and
8, against information available to the Single Point of Contact, including
information provided in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article
5(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 7(2) and other relevant
information recorded in the Case Management System;
(e) ensuring adequate and rapid follow-up to incoming requests for information
referred to in Article 4, in particular with a view to respecting the time limits
for the provision of the requested information set out in Article 5;
(f) be interoperable with SIENA, ensuring in particular that incoming
communications through SIENA can be directly recorded in, and that outgoing
communications through SIENA can be directly sent from, the Case
Management System;
(g) generating statistics in respect of exchanges of information under this Directive
for evaluation and monitoring purposes, in particular for the purpose of Article
17;
(h) logging of access and of other processing activities in relation to the
information contained in the Case Management System, for accountability and
cybersecurity purposes.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all cybersecurity
risks relating to the Case Management System, in particular as regards its
architecture, governance and control, are managed and addressed in a prudent and
effective manner and that adequate safeguards against unauthorised access and abuse
are provided for.
3. Member States shall ensure that any personal data processed by their Single Point of
Contact are contained in the Case Management System only for as long as is
necessary and proportionate for the purposes for which the personal data are
processed and are subsequently irrevocably deleted.
Chapter VI
Final provisions
Article 17
Statistics
EN 33 EN
1. Member States shall provide the Commission with statistics on the exchanges of
information with other Member States under this Directive, by 1 March of each year.
2. The statistics shall cover, as a minimum:
(a) the number of requests for information submitted by their Single Point of
Contact and by their law enforcement authorities;
(b) the number of requests for information received and replied to by the Single
Point of Contact and by their law enforcement authorities, broken down by
urgent and non-urgent, and broken down by the other Member States receiving
the information;
(c) the number of requests for information refused pursuant to Article 6, broken
down per requesting Member States and per grounds of refusal;
(d) the number of cases where the time limits referred to in Article 5(1) were
deviated from due to having to obtain a judicial authorisation in accordance
with Article 5(2), broken down by the Member States having submitted the
requests for information concerned.
Article 18
Reporting
1. The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 3 years], submit a report to the
European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the implementation of this
Directive.
2. The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 5 years], submit a report to the
European Parliament and to the Council assessing the effectivity and effectiveness of
this Directive. The Commission shall take into account the information provided by
Member States and any other relevant information related to the transposition and
implementation of this Directive. On the basis of this evaluation, the Commission
shall decide on appropriate follow-up actions, including, if necessary, a legislative
proposal.
Article 19
Amendments to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement
From [the date referred to in Article 21(1), the first subparagraph], the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement is amended as follows:
(i) Article 39 is replaced by this Directive insofar as that article relates to the
exchange of information for the purpose referred to in Article 1(1) of this
Directive;
(ii) Article 46 is deleted.
Article 20
Repeal
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is repealed from [the date referred to in Article 21(1), the
first subparagraph].
References to that Framework Decision shall be construed as references to the corresponding
provisions of this Directive.
EN 34 EN
Article 21
Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [date of entry into force + 2
years]. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those
provisions.
They shall apply those provisions from that date. However, they shall apply Article
13 from [date of entry into force + 4 years].
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this
Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 22
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 23
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
EN 35 EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.12.2021
SWD(2021) 375 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT
Accompanying the
Proposal for a Council Recommendation
on operational police cooperation
{COM(2021) 780 final}
EN EN
SYNOPSIS REPORT
This report provides a summary of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken while
preparing the Commission proposal for a Council Recommendation on operational police
cooperation.
1. CONSULTATION STRATEGY
The aim of the consultation was to receive relevant input from stakeholders to enable an
evidence-based preparation of future Commission initiatives on improving law enforcement
cooperation between Member States.
Stakeholders were consulted between July 2019 and July 2021. This consisted of expert
workshops in 2019 followed by expert and policy discussions in relevant Council working
parties, which led to Council Conclusions on issues covered by this proposal.
The Commission also gained extensive knowledge of the issues at hand from the ongoing
Schengen evaluations on police evaluation that have been carried out in all Schengen States
since 2019 and are still ongoing. In addition, it conducted targeted stakeholder consultations
by way of an external study and two workshops it hosted with Member States and Schengen
Associated Countries’ representatives.
The Commission identified relevant stakeholders and consulted them throughout the
development of this proposal. It sought views from a range of subject matter experts, national
authorities, civil society organisations and from members of the public on their expectations
and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU.
2. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES (SUMMARY)
2.1. Feedback on the inception impact assessment
As part of the inception impact assessment on an ‘EU police cooperation code – tackling
cross-border serious & organised crime’, the Commmission organised a call for feedback,
seeking views from interested stakeholders, from 28 September to 16 November 2020. The
consultation, which sought feedback from public authorities, businesses, civil society
organisations and the public, was open from 4 May 2020 to 9 July 2020. Respondents were
able to provide online comments and submit position papers to provide more background on
their views. The Commission received four contributions1, which were integrated as part of
the study’s findings.
2.2. Consultations during the study to support the preparation of an impact assessment
on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation
2.3.1. Feedback on the public consultation
The public consultation was carried out from 19 April to 14 June 2021. The Commission
received 20 contributions, which it integrated as part of the study’s findings.
2.3.2. Targeted consultation – questionnaires
The Commission also held an online survey in the form of questionnaires made accessible to
targeted stakeholders via the EUSurvey tool as part of the study. This consultation aimed to
receive feedback, comments and observations on the challenges identified in the legal
proposal. The questionnaires were tailored to different stakeholders. The Commission
received 239 contributions, which served as the basis for the study’s findings.
1
EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu)
1
2.3.3. Consultation of Member State experts by way of meetings
In the course of the consultation undertaken as part of the study, the contractor organised two
workshops on 24 March and 25 May 2021. Representatives of the Member States, the
Council Secretariat and the Commission were invited. The first workshop aimed to exchange
views with and between Member States and Schengen Associated Countries on their current
challenges when engaging in cross-border law enforcement cooperation and on possible
options addressing them and their respective impacts.
The Commission also made use of the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP)2 meetings
of 22 February and 16 March 2021 to brief Member States on its preparatory work and
relevant technical deliberations, in the context of strengthening law enforcement cooperation,
and to explore Member States’ views on the problems and potential solutions. The same was
done at the Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP)3 on 23 March 2021. On 26 May
2021, the contractor carrying out the study presented the findings from the questionnaire sent
to national Single Points of Contact to gather additional information.
2.3.4. Semi-structured interviews
The consultation conducted as part of the study included targeted bilateral and multilateral
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders on the basis of formalised and open-ended
questions allowing for open and in-depth discussions. These interviews were conducted from
March to June 2020 via teleconferencing. They included in particular relevant EU agencies,
services and Commission Directorates-General, national experts and academics.
3. STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION
A large number of stakeholders were consulted either directly by the Commission, during the
study or during the discussions in the relevant Council working parties that addressed the
issues covered by the present proposal.
The stakeholders included:
EU institutions, agencies and bodies (e.g. Europol, Frontex, eu-LISA, Eurojust, EU
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training
(CEPOL), the General Secretariat of the Council);
law enforcement and judicial authorities in the Member States and Schengen
Associated Countries (e.g. police, customs);
data protection authorities;
non-governmental organisations, academia, civil society organisations.
Feedback on the inception impact assessment included responses from members of the public
and non-governmental organisations with an interest in this field.
4. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS
During the consultation process, the Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of
consultation. They included:
2
This is a Council preparatory body that handles work relating to legislative activities as well as cross-
border policing and related operational issues.
3
This is a Council preparatory body that handles work relating to operational cooperation among
national customs administrations. LEWP and CCWP are now referred to as LEWP-Police and LEWP-
Customs in the Council.
2
• open consultation on the inception impact assessment, which sought views from
all interested parties;
• targeted stakeholder workshops that focused on subject matter experts, including
practitioners at national level. Taking into account the technicalities and specific
requirements and characteristics of the subject, the Commission focused on
targeted consultations, addressing a broad range of stakeholders at national and
EU level.
The Commission took into account the findings of the ‘Study to support the preparation of an
impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement
cooperation’. This was commissioned by DG HOME and developed by a consortium of
contractors based on desk research and the following stakeholder consultation methods:
scoping interviews, questionnaire and online survey (open public consultation), semi-
structured interviews, case studies and two online workshops.
The Commission also took into account the findings of the Schengen evaluations on police
cooperation carried out by the Commission and Member State experts, which included
adetailed questionnaire, planned and unplanned on-site visits and interviews. The
Commission participated in the following evaluations in the field of police cooperation: 2015
– Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Liechtenstein; 2016 – Luxembourg, Italy,
Greece, Croatia, Malta, France; 2017 – Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain;
2018 – Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Switzerland; 2019 – Czechia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia; 2020 – Germany, Austria, Lichtenstein; 2021 – Belgium, the
Netherlands, Cyprus, France, Italy, Malta.
In addition, the Commission took into account the expert discussions that took place in the
Council for the preparation of Council Conclusions on the subject. These included replies to
written questionnaires together with expert and policy discussions in the relevant Council
working parties.
The aforementioned range of viewpoints ensured that the Commission proposal addressed the
needs and took account of the concerns of a wide range of stakeholders. Moreover, it allowed
the Commission to gather necessary data, facts and views on the relevance, effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence and EU added value of the proposal.
Taking into consideration the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions and inability to
interact in person with relevant stakeholders, the consultation activities focused on
alternatives such as online surveys, semi-structured phone interviews as well as meetings via
video conference.
5. RESULTS
5.1. CONSULTATION ON THE INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT
This public consultation on the inception impact assessment received four answers. Two were
from members of the public, one from a private company and one from a European police
trade union association. All the responses have been published in full online.
The European Confederation of Police (EuroCOP) indicated the need to improve police
cooperation, which is particularly relevant for border territories. They should be allowed to
develop direct cooperation between corresponding police forces under Article 40 of the 1990
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). EuroCOP supported
streamlining and developing the different EU legal texts and non-binding guidelines on police
3
cooperation into one consolidated legal text and turning some of the most advanced types of
police cooperation included in recent bilateral cooperation agreements between Member
States into EU law. This includes the creation of a comprehensive list of investigative tools
for effectively fighting serious and organised crime.
5.2. STUDY TO SUPPORT THE PREPARATION OF AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON EU
POLICY INITIATIVES FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION
The study highlighted specific areas where there is scope for improvement on cross-border
cooperation. This includes the use of joint patrols at border regions. While recognised as
good practice and despite the existence of specific EU measures aimed at regulating their use,
there is evidence that they are underused. Besides joint patrols, mutual assistance during
large-scale events has also proved to be limited.
Three main drivers contribute towards an insufficient deployment of joint operations: a) the
legal driver, namely the limited and at times asymmetric conferral of executive powers of law
enforcement officials operating in the respective host countries, as well as limited awareness
of these powers on the ground; b) the technical driver, namely that officials on the ground
have limited remote access to relevant law enforcement databases; c) structural drivers,
namely that specialised national analytical departments rarely cooperate with similar
departments in other countries to design actionable joint cross-border threat assessments/risk
analysis and the limited integration of police and customs information and analysis.
With respect to hot pursuits, the study identified inconsistencies that hamper the efficient use
of this tool during cross-border operations. Even though the use of CISA as the legal basis
ensures a certain degree of consistency, bilateral agreements often add a number of more
specific and operational rules for the implementation of the tool in the different regional
contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated differently depending on the regional
agreement under which it is applied. Issues mainly relate to differences in the right granted by
the national law to foreign officials to arrest/apprehend a suspect. Differences in territorial
and time restrictions represent another barrier to the use of cross-border hot pursuits, with
countries applying different restrictions to foreign officials when implementing these tools.
On surveillance, besides differences in the surveillance methods adopted at national level,
there are also differences in the maximum time allowed by different Member States or
Schengen associated countries to carry out surveillance activities. This leads to cases (in
countries where this period is comparatively shorter) in which the timeframe might not be
sufficient to get evidence about a criminal activity or organisation.
The study also identified the limited availability of training for law enforcement staff
involved in cross-border cooperation. Training is not conducted on a regular basis and does
not always take into account the latest developments. There is also a limited awareness and
knowledge of relevant databases and about the executive powers conferred by different
Member States. Language barriers also hamper effective cross-border operational police
cooperation.
5.3. WORKSHOPS ON THE FUTURE OF EU LAW ENFORCEMENT.
Given the sensitivities relating to police cooperation between Member States, the
Commission launched a series of consultations with external stakeholders as early as 2019 as
part of the ‘future of EU law enforcement’ initiative. It gathered experts from the Member
States and relevant Justice and Home Affairs agencies in a series of workshops to discuss the
current challenges and outlook on different topics relating to police cooperation and
information exchange. Participants included all 27 Member States, Schengen Associated
4
Countries, relevant EU agencies such as Europol, Frontex, eu-LISA, Eurojust and FRA, and
the General Secretariat of the Council.
In July 2019, the Commission organised a first expert workshop that covered topics on best
practices and challenges of the Police Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs), joint police
stations, and cross-border investigations. The workshop also discussed the need to review the
current legal framework on cross-border operational police cooperation. The majority of
Member States supported the consolidation and modernisation of the EU legal framework on
police cooperation. There was agreement that the different EU texts and
bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements on police cooperation leave officers confused as to
what they can or cannot do, which often significantly limits their actions. A number of
Member States called for the need to reinvent the PCCC model and strengthen it. The
presentation on the permanent joint Franco-Swiss operational brigade carrying out cross-
border investigations in France and Switzerland garnered interest from other Member States.
The first workshop concluded with a broad consensus among Member States on the need to
develop a national risk analysis structure in each Member State. This would better target
operations involving police, customs and border guards. National risk analysis should fully
cover the cross-border dimension and be translated at tactical and operational levels.
Importantly, PCCCs could contribute to the development of a more precise local/regional
crime threat picture. Participants agreed with the need to develop permanent structures for
joint cross-border investigation at local/regional level, possibly by setting up mixed
investigator teams inspired by the Franco-Swiss and German-Czech permanent police
stations. In addition, there was broad agreement on the need to:
simplify and consolidate the EU legal framework on police cooperation so as to
facilitate and broaden the use of cross-border operational tools, in particular cross-
border hot pursuits and surveillance operation;
clarify the powers of police officers when acting on a foreign territory (same power
to arrest, detain, use his firearms, liability);
facilitate action in a neighbouring country.
In October 2019, the Commission organised a second expert workshop that covered topics
on police cooperation training. It aimed to identify good practices and concrete measures to
boost the added value of EU support to law enforcement training in a cross-border context.
The workshop discussed the role of CEPOL and Member States in providing training and the
opportunity to create an ‘Erasmus of Police’ large-scale exchange programme in order to
foster a true culture of European policing. The presentation on the integrated joint training of
police cadets between the French gendarmerie and Spanish Guardia Civil garnered interest
from other Member States.
In December 2019, the Commission organised a third expert workshop that covered topics
on information management (access to, exchange of and analysis of information for law
enforcement purposes), notably the role of national Single Points of Contact. The workshop
also addressed the impact of new technologies and innovation on law enforcement, in
particular the development of the Europol Innovation Lab.
In January 2020, the Commission organised a fourth and final expert workshop on the
future of EU law enforcement. It focused on improving EU information systems in the area of
5
law enforcement. The topics discussed related to IT systems such as Prüm, API or ETIAS,
which are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
5.4. SCHENGEN EVALUATIONS ON POLICE COOPERATION
The Schengen acquis includes rules and compensatory measures to counterbalance the
absence of internal border controls. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism
monitors the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the countries that apply it in part or
in full4. It also assesses:
the capacity of those countries where internal border controls have not yet been lifted
to implement the Schengen acquis in full5;
the implementation of measures in the areas of external borders, return, visa policy,
police cooperation, the Schengen Information System, data protection, and the
absence of internal border controls.
The Commission carries out evaluations over a five-year cycle following multiannual and
annual programmes, together with experts from Member States and EU agencies
participating as observers. Each country is evaluated at least once every 5 years. These
evaluations provide extremely important evidence of obstacles that hamper police
cooperation and good practices deployed in some Member States. The following paragraph
summarises the main findings of these evaluations.
CISA introduced provisions to increase cooperation and information exchange between the
police forces of Member States as a compensatory measure to the abolition of internal border
controls. These cover:
cooperation to prevent and detect crime;
operational cooperation, e.g. the possibility to extend surveillance or to pursue
criminals across internal borders;
the sharing of information to prevent and repress crime or threats to public order and
safety.6
The Schengen evaluations carried out by the Commission in relation to police cooperation 7
between 2015-2021 led to the conclusion that Member States are generally compliant with
the Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation. However, a number of recurring
deficiencies prevent Member States from reaching the full potential of some of the existing
police cooperation and information exchange tools. The improvements most needed include:
4
Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of
the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and
implementation of Schengen.
5
This applies to Cyprus and Croatia. As specified in recital 28 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation, the
evaluation of Bulgaria and Romania has already been completed pursuant to Article 4(2) of the 2005
Act of Accession. No evaluation would be carried out under Article 1(b) of the SCH-EVAL
Regulation.
6
Articles 39-41 and Article 46 of the CISA.
7
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Functioning of the
Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism pursuant to Article 22 of Council Regulation (EU)
No 1053/2013 First Multiannual Evaluation Programme (2015-2019), SWD/2020/327 final.
6
developing and sharing strategic crime threat assessments and risk analyses to allow
a better joint response to cross-border crime ;
revising the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by the Member States to
extend and facilitate the possibilities for operational cross-border cooperation (in
particular cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits);
the need for sufficient collection and analysis of statistics and radio communication
interoperability.
Cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit
CISA provides the legal bases for cross-border surveillance (Article 40 CISA) and hot pursuit
(Articles 41 to 43 CISA). The evaluations confirmed that the regulatory structure of Article
41 CISA, namely the different options to choose from by way of unilateral declaration, leads
to a scattered regulatory framework for hot pursuits. Moreover, the notion of ‘caught in the
act’ as a prerequisite for cross-border hot pursuits can lead to uncertainties and different
interpretations if suspected criminals are not directly caught in the act, but detected during
controls away from the scene of crime, i.e. in the immediate border area.
The evaluations also revealed that even though the use of CISA as the legal basis for
conducting hot pursuits or surveillance ensures a certain degree of consistency, bilateral
agreements often add a number of more specific and operational rules for the implementation
of these tools in the different regional contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated
differently depending on the regional agreement under which it is applied. Issues identified
mainly relate to differences in the right granted by the national law to foreign officials to
arrest/apprehend a suspect. Some agreements grant foreign officials only the right to
arrest/apprehend a suspect, while others do not.
Territorial and time restrictions represent another barrier to the use of cross-border hot
pursuits, with countries applying different restrictions to foreign officials when implementing
these tools. The evaluations identified in particular that the majority of Schengen States
impose a too narrow geographical limit or time limit for hot pursuits. The majority of
Schengen States were also found to apply other rules that discourage hot pursuits in practice,
for instance by prohibiting the right to stop, interrogate or detain a person and to use firearms
for legitimate self-defence or the defence of others. Besides differences in
bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements, issues were also identified in relation to the
relevance of EU provisions on cross-border hot pursuits. Since the definition included in
Article 41 CISA only covers land borders, countries having sea or river borders cannot use
cross-border hot pursuits unless covered in bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements.
The evaluations revealed other difficulties that arise when pursuing officers use different
classes of service weapons than the officers in the country where the pursuit takes place. The
evaluation teams found that a police force that is prevented from performing identity checks
or from using its service weapons to stop, question and apprehend a suspect or protect
themselves is likely to simply avoid engaging in a hot pursuit.
On cross-border surveillance operations, the evaluations revealed that some Schengen States
impose heavy procedural conditions and/or impose additional restrictions on officers from
other Schengen States, for instance prohibiting them from carrying service weapons. Apart
from differences in the surveillance methods adopted at national level, there are also
differences in the maximum time allowed among Schengen States to carry out surveillance
7
activities. This leads to cases in which the timeframe is not sufficient to collect evidence on a
criminal activity or organisation. Similarly, the different rules applied nationally to the use of
audio and technical surveillance, including voice bugging and GPS tracking, and the fact that
it is allowed in some but not all countries, hamper their use during cross-border operations.
Furthermore, the differences in the types of institutions responsible for overseeing the cross-
border implementation of investigative tools or the absence of a central authority in charge of
coordination create additional obstacles to cooperation needed to conduct cross-border
operations.
Joint police patrols and other joint operations
The evaluations found that joint patrols are not used to their full potential. They are often a
random and routine exercise led only by quantitative indicators (for instance the requirement
to perform two joint patrols per week), depending on bilateral agreements and/or practice,
and are not deployed based on prior joint threat analysis. As a result, their benefit is
questioned.
In addition, deployed police officers do not usually have police powers in the hosting
Member State and struggle to access relevant databases and use communication tools
effectively. As for hot pursuits, the limitations affecting the right to stop, question and
apprehend suspects and the use of service weapons in legitimate self-defence or the defence
of others are hindering factors. Moreover, there is a lack of centralised statistics on joint
operations carried out, which prevents further assessment on their use.
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs)
Schengen States have set up permanent structures to ensure cross-border police cooperation
in intra-EU border areas, in particular PCCCs. There are currently 59 PCCCs across the
Schengen Area, mostly located at Schengen internal borders in order to address the security
needs in border regions. Police, customs and border officers of two, three or even four
Schengen States work together in PCCCs and exchange data and information by accessing
their own national databases and communication systems. The evaluations noted that only
some PCCCs support cross-border operations, such as joint patrols and hot pursuits. PCCCs
can also engage in a ‘chain request’, whereby an information request is passed from one
PCCC to the next until it reaches its final recipient. This practice slows down the exchange of
information and can create information gaps.
Training
The evaluations found that initial national training on cross-border police cooperation is
provided to newly recruited police officers in the Schengen Area. However, joint training
between the relevant national authorities and neighbouring countries on the use of police
cooperation tools has been assessed as insufficient as it can cause discrepancies and different
interpretations of the rules that can be applied in the field. Furthermore, life-long and
specialised training is usually less common than initial training. Online training also remains
underused by officers said to be ‘absorbed by their daily tasks’. As a result, both a poor level
of awareness on the availability of such training materials and on the use of various
international police cooperation instruments was noted. This, depending on the country
evaluated, is extended to CEPOL training. There is often a lack of incentives for staff to
8
commit to specialised training. In addition, certification processes are often not in place. This
finding applies to the majority of the Schengen States evaluated.
Radio telecommunication tools and mobile access to databases
Cross-border radio communications between Schengen States are hindered by the lack of
interoperability between radio equipment. As a result, the majority of Schengen States
evaluated resort to non-secure radio communication tools or mobile phones in order to
contact their respective dispatch unit for background checks when operating abroad. This
carries a risk of communication failures (frequent in mountainous areas), misunderstandings
(e.g. in the case of transliteration issues) or undue delays with alerts for discrete checks.
Moreover, as part of hot pursuits for instance, the evaluations noted that national radio
communication systems are interoperable only to a limited extent. In practice, this can lead to
situations in which officials from one Member State cross the border to another Member
State as part of a hot pursuit, but lose the radio connection to their operations centre. This can
lead to a higher likelihood of suspects evading police forces. The evaluation also identified
the absence of mobile access to databases, which entails similar risks to the lack of
interoperability of communications.
5.5. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS
Under the German Presidency, the Council adopted conclusions on internal security and
European police partnership on 14 December 2020. The Conclusions – which were the object
of discussions between Member States in the Council’s Law Enforcement Working Party
(LEWP-Police) and the Council’s Standing Committee on Internal Security – reiterate a
number of political priorities to be achieved between 2020 and 2025. These include
establishing an upgraded acquis on cross-border police cooperation including, for example,
adequate powers for cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit. The Conclusions emphasise
the need to take all necessary steps to further strengthen operational cross-border cooperation
by effectively implementing existing instruments and, where appropriate, by strengthening,
consolidating and simplifying the legal foundations in order to keep the EU safe.
The Conclusions observed growing discrepancies between CISA and the Prüm decisions on
the one hand, and the dynamically evolving practice based on bilateral, trilateral and
multilateral treaties and the practical requirements of contemporary law enforcement work on
the other. This results in uncertainty over the applicability and scope of existing forms of
cooperation in certain cases. As a result, they stressed the need to evaluate the legal
requirements of cross-border cooperation instruments that enable activities such as cross-
border surveillance and cross-border hot pursuits against the necessities of contemporary law
enforcement work. They underlined the role of joint police patrols, units and offices, joint
operation points, joint action days and joint investigations. These (i) strengthen the
maintenance of public order, crime prevention and the fight against crime particularly in
border regions; (ii) increase the subjective sense of security of citizens; and (iii) allow for
cooperation between law enforcement authorities from different Member States to enable
regular joint services, thereby creating the basis for mutual trust.
In particular, the Conclusions called on the Member States to take all necessary steps to
further strengthen operational cross-border law enforcement cooperation by (…)
consolidating, simplifying and extending the legal foundations, including joint patrols, units,
offices and operation points, and to further increase the use of these instruments and their
effectiveness and cost efficiency. They also called on Member States to extend in certain
clearly defined circumstances the allocation of mutually agreed and balanced executive
9
powers to foreign officers operating outside the territory of their home country so they can
fulfil their duties.
On cross-border surveillance, the Conclusions called on Member States to clarify and
consider simplifying the legal requirements for conducting such surveillance, while
upholding the principle of national sovereignty, the existing standards for the protection of
fundamental rights, existing legal systems in Member States and the decisive role of the host
country to assess the standardisation of the measures that may be approved and the technical
means that may be deployed, e.g. drones and localisation devices. They also called for
improved authorisation procedures, including by:
redefining the distinction between urgent and non-urgent surveillance;
extending the required timeframe for obtaining authorisation for urgent surveillance
as appropriate;
considering, where necessary and proportionate under strict conditions and without
affecting the existing instruments, including mutual legal assistance agreements
where applicable, allowing surveillance to be launched in the territory of another
country before it continues in the home country of the officers involved.
On hot pursuits, the Conclusions called on Member States to clarify, while upholding the
principle of national sovereignty, the existing standards for the protection of fundamental
rights, existing legal systems in the Member States and the decisive role of the host country,
the legal conditions for hot pursuits to adapt the legal requirements to the needs of the
practitioners. This could be achieved by broadening both the scope for hot pursuits and the
competences of officers operating across borders. This includes improving the sharing of
localisation data, enabling hot pursuits whenever a person attempts to evade law enforcement
procedures and allowing for hot pursuits to be carried out by land, air, sea and waterways.
The Conclusions also called on Member States to (i) increase efforts to foster recourse to
cross-border cooperation, in particular for mass gatherings, disasters and serious accidents
with joint operational planning and exercises; (ii) swiftly improve the means for the regular
or ad hoc exchange of information and direct communication, including common structures
such as intranet platforms, operation control systems or radio communication networks; and
(iii) continue developing a common European culture for law enforcement authorities and,
depending on the operational and pedagogical adherence observed, (gradually) set up a
national mechanism for the recognition of knowledge acquired in other Member States or
even a common standard leading to European certification.
Moreover, the Conclusions called on the Commission to consider consolidating the EU legal
framework in order to further strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation. This
includes (i) guaranteeing data protection and fundamental rights; (ii) addressing current
operational needs; (iii) reviewing in particular the provisions in CISA Title III, Chapter 1 on
Police Cooperation, (…) Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA, 2008/616/JHA (Prüm decision)
(…) especially on hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance, which should be fully functional
across Europe; (iv) respecting the possibility for Member States to work out the details of
such cooperation and provide for even closer cooperation bilaterally. The Conclusions also
called on the Commission to step up its support for improved regional forms (structures) of
cooperation such as the PCCCs, joint police stations and joint training sessions, while
ensuring their efficient cooperation with Single Points of Contact.
6. HOW THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
The results of all these consultation activities have been duly taken into account in the
preparation of this proposal. It recommends actions to address the problems identified during
10
the consultation and based on the feedback received. It aims to remove existing legal,
technical and operational obstacles to operational cooperation between Member States and to
implement across the EU a number of best practices stemming from the more modern
bilateral agreements between Member States. The proposal puts forward a number of
recommendations that directly follow up on the Council Conclusions. In this context, the
proposal:
clarifies and aligns the rules of engagement in cross-border law enforcement
operations to be able to monitor and arrest criminals and terrorists under surveillance
or involving hot pursuit, joint patrols and other joint operations across national
territories as necessary;
allows remote access to their own databases in neighbouring Member States and the
use of secure communications that can continue to function across borders;
expands the role of existing PCCCs to become joint police stations capable of not
only exchanging information, but also of planning, supporting and coordinating joint
patrols and operations based on shared risk analysis;
uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas,
based on prior analysis, to counter migrant smuggling as well as to prevent and detect
illegal stays and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration;
uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas,
based on prior analysis, to counter human trafficking and to identify and protect
victims;
creates a coordination platform, together with the Commission and Europol, to
support and target joint operations and patrols across the EU in order to maintain and
strengthen public order and safety, prevent criminal offences or help address specific
crime waves in key locations or during specific times (e.g. tourist regions, key
criminal hubs, holiday season), during mass gatherings (e.g. large sport events,
international summits), or in case of disasters and serious accidents;
expands joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and the lifelong
training of officers involved in operational cross-border cooperation, and reflects on
the creation of a large-scale pan-European joint training programme on operational
cross-border cooperation to create a true EU culture of policing.
11
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.12.2021
COM(2021) 780 final
2021/0415 (CNS)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on operational police cooperation
{SWD(2021) 375 final}
EN EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal1
Article 3(2) of the Treaty of the European Union (‘TEU’) provides that the EU must offer its
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free
movement of persons is ensured, together with appropriate measures for external border
controls, asylum, immigration and preventing and combating of crime.
The area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers can be ensured, inter alia,
through robust police and judicial cooperation across Member States. 2 Police officers in one
Member State, therefore, should cooperate effectively and systematically across the EU.
However, police cooperation between Member States still varies greatly. Without a sufficient
level of cooperation between the police forces in the Member States, criminals will continue
to operate across Member States unabated, taking advantage of the different national
jurisdictions, and unauthorised movements of irregular migrants will continue to pose a
challenge.
The recent tragic events in the Channel highlighted once more the need for a strong police
cooperation, which is reflected in the decision by France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Germany on 28 November 2021 to reinforce operational police cooperation to counter
migrant smuggling.
Cross-border crime and the security threats connected with it have, by definition, an
international context. As set out in the EU Security Union strategy3, the EU faces evolving
and increasingly complex security threats. These threats spread across borders, and manifest
themselves in criminals and organised crime groups that engage in a wide range of criminal
activities. As highlighted in the 2021-2025 EU strategy to tackle organised crime4, organised
crime is a significant threat to Europeans, businesses, and national institutions, as well as to
the economy as a whole. By operating across different jurisdictions, criminal groups avoid
detection and exploit the differences in national laws. Along with the accompanying proposal
on a Directive on information exchange, this proposal seeks to establish a Police Cooperation
Code with the objective of streamlining, enhancing, developing, modernising and facilitating
law enforcement cooperation between relevant national agencies, thus supporting Member
States in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism.
According to the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (EU SOCTA),
the organised crime landscape is characterised by a networked environment where
cooperation between criminals is fluid, systematic and driven by profit. Almost 70% of
criminal networks are active in more than three Member States. Around 65% of the criminal
networks active in the EU are composed of members of multiple nationalities. Over 80% of
1
For this Recommendation, ‘police cooperation’ means cooperation involving all the Member States'
competent law enforcement authorities, including police, gendarmes, border guards, customs and other
specialised law enforcement services to prevent, detect and investigate criminal offences. Unless
specified otherwise, ‘cross-border’ covers (i) cross-border actions between two or more neighbouring
Member States (e.g. during a hot pursuit) and (ii) trans-national actions between non-neighbouring
Member States (e.g. the deployment of police officers in another Member State during touristic season
or a mass-event) or neighbouring Member States in a non-border area.
2
COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021.
3
COM(2020) 605 final, 24.7.2020.
4
COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021.
EN 1 EN
the reported criminal networks are involved in major types of cross-border crimes, covering
trade in drugs, property crime, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling.5 The 2021
EU SOCTA and EMCDDA European Drug report6 identifies areas where serious and
organised crime appears to be on the rise. Key locations such as border regions, airports,
motorways, or ferry connections in the EU attract criminals, including because of their
geographic position. In border regions, criminals take advantage of the natural delineations of
individual law enforcement jurisdictions, which create options to evade law enforcement and
provide proximity to multiple markets.7 The mobility of criminals within the EU creates
challenges in preventing and fighting criminal threats8, and in ensuring public safety.
At the same time, as set out in the December 2020 Counter-terrorism agenda9, the EU remains
on high terrorist alert. Criminals and terrorists use information and communications
technology to communicate among themselves and to prepare and conduct their criminal
activities.10
The area without controls at internal borders (‘the Schengen area’11) is the largest free travel
area in the world. It allows more than 420 million people to move freely and goods and
services to flow unhindered. Intra-EU border areas cover approximately 40% of the EU's
territory and they were home in 2017 to 30% of the population, some 150 million people. In
2017, almost 2 million people commuted across borders, including 1.3 million cross-border
workers12. In 2018, EU residents made 1.1 billion trips, either for professional or personal
reasons – an increase of 11% since 2014. The COVID-19 pandemic has reduced intra-EU
mobility because of quarantine measures, travel restrictions, limitations to public life and
lockdowns13. However, flows of people will likely continue to be significant in the future,
especially as life returns to normal. The Schengen area is a symbol of the EU’s
interconnectedness and of the ties between Europeans.14 It also contributes to the efficient
functioning of the single market, and therefore to the growth of the EU’s economy.15
5
Europol (2021), European Union serious and organised crime threat assessment, a corrupting influence:
the infiltration and undermining of Europe's economy and society by organised crime, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
6
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2021), European Drug Report 2021:
Trends and Developments, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
7
Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021.
8
International mobility is a defining characteristic of criminal networks. For instance, organised property
crime carried out in the EU is perpetrated primarily by MOCGS (Mobile Organised Crime Groups) and
mobility remains their main characteristic to avoid detection and minimise the risk of apprehension.
Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021.
9
COM(2020) 795 final, 9.12.2020.
10
Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying Regulation of The European
Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, as regards Europol’s cooperation
with private parties, the processing of personal data by Europol in support of criminal investigations,
and Europol’s role on research and innovation. (SWD(2020) 543 final, 9.12.2020).
11
The Schengen Area consists of 26 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland.
12
European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions. link.
13
Pandemic profiteering. How_criminals_exploit_the_COVID-19_crisis, Europol, March 2020.
14
Special Eurobarometer 474: The Schengen Area,
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/nl/data/dataset/S2218_89_3_474_ENG
15
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A strategy towards
a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area,’ COM/2021/277 final.
EN 2 EN
In recent years, the Schengen area has been repeatedly put to the test by a series of crises and
challenges. Several Member States have reintroduced internal border controls, notably
because of the unauthorised movements16 of irregular migrants, which they consider to pose a
serious threat to public policy or internal security. Unauthorised movements within the
Schengen area, which are not related to a major migratory crisis or structural deficiencies in
the management of the external borders17, should be addressed by means other than internal
border controls, which can be used only as a last resort measure, to address the concrete
threats to internal security or public policy. These persisting internal border controls have
revealed that there is room for improvement as regards the use of police checks and
cooperation, procedures allowing for simplified readmission between the Member States and
the application of bilateral agreements and arrangements in that context, in line with Article
6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC.18 It is noted that, in line with recital 8 of the Commission
Recommendation (EU) 2017/43219, an effective Union return policy requires efficient and
proportionate measures for the apprehension and identification of irregular migrants. These
measures, if combined, have the potential to yield the same results in controlling unauthorised
movements as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive when it comes to the
free movement of persons, goods and services.
Police cooperation tools as a development of the Schengen acquis
The recommendations on operational police cooperation as set out in this Recommendation
contribute to the development of the Schengen rules.
First, one of the pillars of the EU legal framework underpinning police cooperation was
designed 30 years ago through the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement
(CISA)20, well before the above-mentioned crises and challenges that have transformed the
realities of the Schengen area. The CISA sets out a number of obligations for contracting
parties on police cooperation, to counteract any security deficit caused by the abolition of
checks at the internal borders. Notably, the CISA sets a number of baseline rules on the
conduct of cross-border hot pursuits and cross-border surveillance operations.
Second, joint patrols and other operations are directly linked to the development of the
Schengen acquis, including Article 39(1) of the CISA on assistance between authorities,
which enables the policies covered by Schengen. Joint patrols and joint operations are
addressed by cross-border cooperation agreements between Member States. The Prüm
Decisions21 of 2008 set out a number of baseline rules on how to conduct joint patrols and
16
Other most frequent reasons notified by the Member States included the migratory crisis of 2015/2016,
persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic.
17
Under Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)
(OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1), the temporary reintroduction of border controls can only be put in place for a
limited period, in exceptional circumstances (such as the migratory crisis of 2015/2016), and as a last
resort measure.
18
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98).
19
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432 of 7 March 2017 on making returns more effective when
implementing the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
20
Official Journal L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062.
21
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in
combating terrorism and cross-border crime, and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the
implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA (Prüm Council Decision). Article 17 of Council Decision
2008/615/JHA addresses joint operations, and Article 18 addresses assistance in connection with mass
gatherings, disasters and serious accidents.
EN 3 EN
other joint operations across EU internal borders, as well as cross-border assistance in case of
disaster and serious accidents. While the centre of gravity of the Prüm Decisions was the
automated exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data, and the sections on
joint patrols and operations were consequently not labelled as a development of Schengen, it
is likely that they would constitute a development of the Schengen acquis, had they been
adopted separately, given their cross-border nature.
Third, operational police cooperation between Member States is also taking place under
national law, taking account of non-binding Council documents, including good practice
(‘Schengen Catalogue’22) and guidelines (‘Single Points of Contact’ (SPOC)) Guidelines,
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC) Guidelines, Manuals on law enforcement
information exchange and cross-border operations). SPOCs23 and PCCCs24 have been created
as a direct consequence of the need to exchange relevant information following the removal
of internal borders. Schengen associated countries25 have also set up PCCCs and have
established national SPOCs.
Fourth, Member States have systematically complemented and extended this Schengen
‘baseline’ legal framework with bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements between
themselves. The Commission has identified at least 60 of them across the EU, all different
from one another. Schengen associated countries have also concluded such operational
cooperation agreements with Member States.
Issues identified
First, the current EU legal framework provides a number of options that Member States can
choose from when cooperating with other Member States (e.g. the CISA allows Member
States either to set or not to set kilometre distance limitations when hot pursuits take place on
their territory26). This creates uncertainty and lack of clarity as to which rules police officers
have to follow when intervening in another Member State. Moreover, some of the choices
made in this regard lead to obstacles, which would not have existed if other choices were
made as permitted by the EU legal framework.
Second, the bi- and multilateral police cooperation agreements between Member States, while
allowing regional specificities when cooperating with neighbouring Member States, are very
time-consuming for Member States to negotiate, sign and ratify. The proliferation of these
bilateral agreements has created a complex web of several different arrangements, containing
different applicable rules, which have led to fragmentation and obstacles to cooperation. For
22
Schengen Catalogue. Recommendations and best practices. Police cooperation, 15785/3/10 REV 3,
Brussels 15.11.2011.
23
The Single Point of Contact (SPOC) means the national central body responsible for international
police cooperation referred to in Article 39(3) of the CISA. Pursuant to the Commission proposal for a
Directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, put forward
together with the present proposal for a Council Recommendation, Member States would become
legally bound to designate a SPOC, which is to be attributed certain minimum tasks relating to
information exchange. Once Member States have done so, the reference to the SPOC in this
Recommendation should be understood as referring to the SPOC as designated under that Directive.
24
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres bring together, in a single physical location, different law
enforcement authorities of the participating Member States and are closely linked to the national central
authority dealing with international cooperation – Single Point of Contact (SPOC).
25
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein are associate members of the Schengen Area.
26
Article 41(3) of the CISA provides that: ‘Hot pursuit shall be carried out in accordance with
paragraphs 1 and 2 and in one of the following ways as defined by the declaration provided for in
paragraph 9: (a) in an area or during a period as from the crossing of the border, to be established in
the declaration; (b) without limit in space or time’.
EN 4 EN
instance, in smaller or landlocked countries, law enforcement officers working across borders
have to carry out operational actions following, in some cases, up to seven different sets of
rules.27 As a result, some operations such as hot pursuits of suspects over internal borders are
not allowed or take place in an uncoordinated sub-optimal way, which criminals use to their
advantage. Operational cooperation making use of new technologies such as drones is also
insufficiently covered by the current rules.
Third, the Schengen evaluations28 in police cooperation conducted over the past six years
confirmed that some of the bi- or multilateral agreements between Member States are
outdated or underused. Others go much further than the rules on cross-border cooperation,
allowing the establishment of what could be considered good practice to more effectively
fight cross-border crimes (e.g. joint police stations with cross-border criminal investigative
powers, or joint trainings) but these are not systematically replicated across the EU.
Fourth, because of the incompatibility of secured communication equipment used between
different Member States, the communication equipment of some police officers engaged for
instance in hot pursuits, stops functioning when they cross the border. This makes it
impossible to liaise with their own authorities, or the authorities of the Member State in which
they enter. Furthermore, officers deployed in joint patrols or operations in other Member
States are often not provided with mobile equipment that allows them to access remotely and
securely their own national, EU and international databases.
Fifth, joint patrols and other joint operations often take place in intra-EU border areas and in
other areas within the EU on an ad hoc basis. They often lack coordination and take place
without prior risk analysis that would allow for their better targeted deployment. No forum for
Member States to exchange such risk analysis or inform other Member States of their needs
and priority areas exists. For example, in order to better target joint patrols or other joint
operations taking place across the EU during large events (e.g. large sports events,
international summits), at specific times (e.g. holiday seasons), or in the face of specific
crimes waves (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, match-fixing, trafficking in counterfeit goods,
credit card fraud, pickpocketing and other property crimes).
Sixth, criminal networks active in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings
facilitate the unauthorised movements of irregular migrants and exploit the vulnerable
situation of victims, treating people as commodities. Organised migrant smuggling is a key
criminal activity and facilitated unauthorised movements are a major concern for the EU’s
security. Trafficking in human beings constitutes another core activity of serious and
organised crime, set to remain a threat for the foreseeable future.29 Nearly half of the victims
of trafficking within the EU are EU nationals, and most traffickers are EU citizens.30 Such
crimes have a high cross-border nature and their detection and investigation requires targeted
police action on the ground in intra-EU border areas. Notably, coordinated joint patrols and
27
For instance neighbouring country 1 allowing cross-border hot pursuits but only within 5 km after the
border and with no possibility to stop or apprehend the suspect, neighbouring country 2 allowing hot
pursuits within 10 km of the border but without the right to carry different (possibly heavier) classes of
service weapons; neighbouring country 3 allowing hot pursuits for only 1 hour, etc. Faced with the
complexity of such a wide range of different restrictions, even though hot pursuits are in principle
permitted, some Member States instruct their police officers to always abandon a hot pursuit when the
suspect crosses the border to any of these Member States. Criminals know this and use this to escape
almost systematically the police.
28
Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring
mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis (…).
29
Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021.
30
Data Collection on Trafficking in Human beings in the EU (2020); COM(2020) 661 final, 20.10.2020
EN 5 EN
other joint operations, based on risk analysis, where officers from Member States operating
together (e.g. in a patrol car) should focus where appropriate on detecting migrant smuggling
and trafficking in human beings.
Seventh, officials involved in cross-border law enforcement cooperation in the EU are not
always properly trained to have the necessary knowledge and operational skills to fulfil the
tasks at hand in the most effective and efficient manner. The 2021 study carried out for the
Commission identified a limited availability of training for law enforcement staff involved in
cross-border cooperation. Training is not conducted on a regular basis and does not always
take into account the latest developments. There is also a limited awareness and knowledge of
relevant databases and about the executive powers conferred by different Member States.
Language barriers also hamper effective cross-border operational police cooperation.
The way forward
As set out in the Commission’s Communication of June 2021 ‘A strategy towards a fully
functioning and resilient Schengen area31,’ this Recommendation aims to contribute to the
creation of common standards to allow police officers to cooperate effectively with their
colleagues in other Member States. Respecting existing EU legislation, and building on good
practice in bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements between Member States, police
officers should carry out targeted joint operations, including joint patrols32, in particular in
intra-EU border areas. As terrorists and other criminals operate across Member States, police
authorities should be able to better monitor them, and when engaging in hot pursuits across
national territories, be able to detain them as necessary, or conduct surveillance operations in
respect of them. Furthermore, joint operations can help in addressing effectively the issue of
unauthorised movements of irregular migrants.
Respecting the role of Member States in internal security and the need for flexibility to
cooperate regionally, this Recommendation sets out actions in operational police cooperation
that aim to:
– Clarify and align the rules of engagement in cross-border law enforcement operations
to monitor and arrest criminals and terrorists in surveillance, hot pursuit, joint patrols
and other joint operations across national territories.
– Enable remote access by police officers to their own databases when operating in
other Member States, and the use of secure communications that can continue to
function in a cross-border context.
– Broaden the role of existing Police Customs Cooperation Centres to become joint
police stations capable of not only exchanging information, but of planning,
supporting and coordinating joint patrols and other joint operations based on shared
risk analysis.
– Use targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas,
based on prior analysis, to counter migrant smuggling as well as to prevent and
detect illegally staying migrants and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration.
31
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021.
32
According to Article 17 of the Prüm Council Decision, “In order to step up police cooperation, the
competent authorities designated by the Member States may, in maintaining public order and security
and preventing criminal offences, introduce joint patrols and other joint operations in which designated
officers or other officials (officers) from other Member States participate in operations within a
Member State's territory.”
EN 6 EN
– Use targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas,
based on prior analysis, to counter trafficking in human beings and to identify and
protect victims.
– Create a coordination platform, together with the Commission and Europol33, to
support and target joint operations and patrols across the EU to maintain and improve
public order and safety, prevent criminal offences or help address specific crime
waves in key locations or during specific times (e.g. tourist areas, key criminal hubs,
holiday season), during mass gatherings (e.g. large sport events, international
summits), or in case of disasters and serious accidents.
– Broaden joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and lifelong
training of officers involved in operational cross-border cooperation, and reflecting
on the creation of a large-scale pan-European joint training programme on
operational cross-border cooperation to create a true EU culture of policing.
As set out in the proposed Recommendation, Member States should change their national
rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States, where appropriate, in
order to implement the measures contained therein.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
This Recommendation is consistent with existing and upcoming policy provisions in law
enforcement cooperation.
As highlighted under the ‘reasons for and objectives of the proposal’ section, existing
Commission strategic documents underpin the Commission’s efforts to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of law enforcement cooperation in the EU. These include the Security
Union strategy34, the Counter-terrorism agenda for the EU35, the EU 2021-2025 strategy to
tackle organised crime36, the EU 2021-2025 strategy on combating trafficking in human
beings37, the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse38, the EU 2021-
2025 drugs strategy39, and the new Schengen strategy.40
The Council takes a comparable stance, notably most recently in the Council Conclusions of
November 2020 on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, which ask the
Commission “to consider consolidating the EU legal framework to further strengthen cross-
border law enforcement cooperation41. ”
This Recommendation will also contribute to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area
as set out in the Schengen strategy, which reiterates “the need for common standards to allow
police officers to cooperate effectively with their colleagues in neighbouring countries.” It
33
The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, as established by the Regulation
(EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council
Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA. OJ L
135, 24.5.2016, p. 53–114.
34
COM(2020) 605 final, 24.7.2020.
35
COM(2020) 795 final, 9.12.2020.
36
COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021.
37
COM(2021) 171 final, 14.4.2021.
38
COM(2020) 607 final, 24.7.2020.
39
Council Conclusions on EU 2021-2025 drugs strategy, 14178/20, 18 December 2020.
40
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021.
41
Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20, 24 November
2020.
EN 7 EN
will help to ensure a high level of security within the territory of Member States and therefore
support a Schengen area without controls at internal borders. It will also complement the
proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code.
As the two legs of law enforcement cooperation essentially relate to (i) operational cross-
border cooperation (which is the focus of this proposal), and (ii) information exchange, this
Recommendation will form part of a coherent package together with the proposal for a
Directive on information exchange and communication between law enforcement authorities
of Member States, and the proposal to revise the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for
Police Cooperation (‘Prüm II Regulation’).
• Consistency with other Union policies
This Recommendation aims to contribute positively to a fully functioning and resilient
Schengen area, allowing more than 420 million people to move freely, and goods and services
to flow unhindered. This will in turn contribute to the efficient functioning of the single
market, and therefore to the growth of the EU’s economy. This Recommendation is therefore
fully consistent with other EU policies in employment, transport, and ultimately economic
growth in intra-EU border areas, but also across the whole of the EU.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The legal basis for EU action in law enforcement cooperation is Title V, Chapter 5 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).
Under Article 87 of the TFEU, “the Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the
Member States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law
enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal
offences.”
More specifically, Article 87(3) of the TFEU relates to measures concerning operational
cooperation between law enforcement authorities. Such measures are provided for in this
Recommendation. It also contains measures covered by Article 89 of the TFEU relating to
conditions and limitations under which Member States' law enforcement authorities may
operate on the territory of another Member State. To the extent that the Recommendation also
contains measures potentially covered by Article 87(2) of the TFEU (e.g. on information
exchange and training), those measures are in this case ancillary to the measures based on
Article 87(3) and 89 of the TFEU.
This Recommendation is therefore based on Articles 87(3) and 89 of the TFEU, read in
conjunction with Article 292 of the TFEU, which states “The Council shall adopt
recommendations […] on a proposal from the Commission in all cases where the Treaties
provide that it shall adopt acts on a proposal from the Commission. It shall act unanimously
in those areas in which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act.”
• Choice of the instrument
Stepping-up operational police cooperation in the EU requires strong political engagement by
all relevant actors, notably in the Member States.
Cross-border operational police cooperation typically involves the physical intervention of
uniformed and armed police forces from one Member State in the territory of other Member
States. The intervention is to conduct preventive and repressive missions that may lead to the
EN 8 EN
provisional arrest and detention of individuals until the arrival of the authorities of the other
Member State.
These types of operations touch upon the core of Member States’ sovereignty, and can lead to
constitutional issues, rendering any new EU legislation in this area a very sensitive issue.
This is the reason why unanimity tends to be required in the Council when voting on EU
legislation in operational cooperation.
The Commission considers that a proposal for EU legislation with binding force to harmonise
this type of operational police cooperation is premature at this stage. Nonetheless, it can be
noted that, although not legally binding, under the TFEU, as interpreted by the Court of
Justice of the EU, Recommendations are legal acts and, as such, cannot be regarded as having
no legal effect and are to be taken into account at national level where appropriate.
Building on previous relevant Council Conclusions42 and good practice that some Member
States have already implemented, the Commission decided to propose a Council
Recommendation, which puts forward a number of recommended actions that aim to improve
the way in which Member States cooperate operationally. The Commission plans to monitor
the implementation of this Recommendation and assess the need for an EU legislation with
binding force on cross-border operational police cooperation in the future.
• Subsidiarity
EU action is needed to properly address the problems identified in the first section of this
explanatory memorandum. Without action at EU level, Member States alone will continue to
face uncertainties and obstacles stemming from different rules on the rights of officials when
operating in other Member States. Also, to solve long-standing technical interconnectivity
issues that contribute to reducing the appeal of joint operations, an approach at EU level is
needed. Given the transnational nature of serious and organised crime, it is essential to ensure
swift cooperation between police and judicial authorities in relation to the operational
measures at issue in a cross-border context.
The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions
taken at the national level, address the divergence of practices, prevent duplications and
uncertainties and eventually ensure an efficient counter-action to cross-border crime. EU
action in response to the identified problems is expected to bring added value for the EU and
therefore to its citizens.
• Proportionality
This proposal recommends that Member States take a number of measures to address
obstacles and strengthen existing relevant cross-border cooperation mechanisms and tools. It
does not contain recommendations that go against what existing EU legislation provides for.
Instead, Member States should take the recommended measures in compliance with that EU
legislation. In addition, Member States are not expected to alter, and indeed to continue to
apply, conditions and safeguards contained in national law relating to the operational
activities covered, insofar as they are compliant with EU legislation and not specifically
addressed in this Recommendation.
Given the sensitivity of measures on operational cross-border police cooperation, and the
willingness expressed by Member States to engage in a further dialogue on what measures
42
Council conclusions on certain aspects of European preventive policing, 10062/19, 6 June 2019;
Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20, 24 November
2020.
EN 9 EN
should be put in place to strengthen operational police cooperation, a proposal for a Council
Recommendation is the most appropriate and proportionate choice. The reason being is that it
does not go beyond what is necessary, at this stage, to achieve the objectives of improving
operational police cooperation across the EU.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
No fitness check of existing legislation in operational cooperation was conducted for this
proposal. This is because the EU baseline legislation is very limited, and systematically
complemented by bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements between Member States.
• Stakeholder consultations
The period of time during which the stakeholders' consultation took place was between July
2019 and July 2021. The consultation involved targeting stakeholders from a wide range of
subject matter experts, national authorities, civil society organisations, and from members of
the public on their expectations and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement
cooperation in the EU.
The Commission used different means of engagement such as targeted questionnaires,
conducted experts’ interviews and organised several thematic workshops with Member States
and Schengen associated countries' representatives. The subject matters of this
Recommendation were also discussed in the Council’s Working Parties (e.g. Law
Enforcement Working Party – Police and Customs subgroups, Standing Committee on
Operational Cooperation on Internal Security).
The Commission also launched a public consultation, hosted on the Commission’s website
in all EU official languages for eight weeks, from 19 April 2021 to 14 June 2021.
Numerous consultation activities were also conducted by the contractor during the
preparation of an external ‘Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU
policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation.’
The aim of the consultation was to receive relevant input from stakeholders to enable an
evidence-based approach to preparing the proposed measures to improve law enforcement
cooperation between Member States.
The results of all these consultation activities have been duly taken into account in
preparing this Recommendation.43 The consultation activities used the main elements of the
methodology used in an impact assessment, starting with the problem definition and exploring
the most suitable options.
• Impact assessment
The proposed recommendations will, if adopted in their current form and effectively acted
upon, improve cross-border operational police cooperation and will have a significant positive
impact on preventing and detecting crimes in the Member States.
However, given the unanimity principle covering the relevant operational police cooperation
measures, and sovereignty concerns expressed by some Member States in the consultation
43
SWD(2021) 375, Stakeholder consultation, synopsis report.
EN 10 EN
phase, as noted above, the Commission considers that a proposal for EU legislation with
binding force to govern such cooperation is premature at this stage.
Instead, this Recommendation calls upon Member States to strengthen existing aspects of
cross-border operational police cooperation, building on good practice which have already
been implemented and tested by Member States, including in a bilateral and a multilateral
contexts.
This proposal for a Council Recommendation on cross-border operational police cooperation
is therefore not supported by an impact assessment.
4. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
By improving Member States competent authorities' ability to cooperate across intra-EU
borders, within the limits set by relevant EU and national legislation, this Recommendation
will contribute to better protecting citizen’s lives and their security. Any interference with
fundamental rights resulting from the Recommendation is justified and does not go beyond
what is necessary and proportionate.
On personal data protection, the impact is considered to be neutral. This Recommendation is
likely to result in a quantitative increase in the exchange of personal data between Member
States, in line with the expected increase in cross-border operational police cooperation. This
additional exchange of personal data will however be subject to the same robust rules and
procedures already in place to process such data, in line with EU law, in particular the Law
Enforcement Directive44.
As regards other fundamental rights, such as minimum procedural rights of suspects and
accused persons under the EU Directives on procedural rights45 (the right to information when
apprehending a suspect, the right to interpretation and the right of access to a lawyer), the
impact is neutral. This Recommendation, which would lead to an increase of the existing
cross-border police operations, does not undermine or change the applicable rules on
procedural rights. Likewise, rules and standards as defined in other areas of EU law remain
applicable, in line with the obligation by Member States to respect fundamental rights as
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
5. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The budgetary implications of this Recommendation depend notably on the Council’s
response to this proposal for a Recommendation and the extent to which Member States
subsequently give effect to these recommendations.
44
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
45
Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, Directive
2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects
and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant
proceedings, Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, Directive (EU) 2016/800 on
procedural safeguards for children who are suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings.
EN 11 EN
As some Member States are more advanced than others in their level of cooperation, the cost
of implementing the proposed recommendations will vary between Member States. The cost
will reflect a gradual and incremental increase in the existing operational cooperation between
Member States, as the effect of implementing the recommended measures takes place over
time.
Given the nature of the measures that are to be put in place, the costs at national level could,
to a considerable extent and subject to the applicable conditions, be covered by Member
States’ programmes under the Internal Security Fund.46 The Internal Security Fund includes
specific objectives to “improve and facilitate the exchange of information”, to “improve and
intensify cross-border cooperation” and to “support the strengthening of Member States’
capabilities in relation to preventing and combating crime, terrorism and radicalisation, as
well as managing security-related incidents, risks and crises.47” Apart from the costs
potentially covered by Member States’ programmes under the Internal Security Fund, there
will be no other costs borne at EU level.
6. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
The Commission calls on the Council to adopt the proposed Recommendation by June 2022
at the latest.
In the view of the Commission there should be a standing discussion point on cross-border
operational police cooperation in the relevant working party of the Council, so as to allow for
that working party to serve as a permanent forum for Member States’ discussions on the
issues addressed in, and in particular the follow-up given to, this Recommendation.
The Commission should report one year after the adoption of this Recommendation on the
progress made by Member States in implementing it. The report should assess if there is a
need for EU legislation with binding force on the forms of cross-border operational police
cooperation covered.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Section 1 defines the key terms in the Recommendation.
Section 2 makes recommendations aimed at addressing obstacles to the intervention of
police officers in other Member States, in the context of cross-border hot pursuits, cross-
border surveillances, and joint patrols and other joint operations. The recommendations aim to
increase the current list of crimes48 for which cross-border hot pursuits and surveillances can
be used, and to remove the geographical and temporal limitations that some Member States
have established, which create barriers for such operations. They aim at aligning the rules on
the conferral of executive power between Member States in order to increase the clarity and
certainty of what police officers can do when engaging in cross-border hot pursuits,
surveillances and joint operations.
The recommendations on cross-border hot pursuits relate not only to the crossing of land
borders, but also of water (sea, river, lake) and air borders. They also relate to the use by the
46
Regulation (EU) 2021/1149.
47
See Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149.
48
Article 40(7) and Article 41(4) of CISA sets out the list of crimes for which cross border surveillances
and hot pursuits, respectively, can be started. These lists can also be found in the various bi- and
multilateral agreements between Member States.
EN 12 EN
police officers involved of their service weapon not only in legitimate self-defence, but also in
the defence of others. On these points, the recommendations go beyond what is provided for
in Article 41(5)(b) and (e) of the CISA. However, Article 41(10) of the CISA allows for the
adoption of additional provisions when implementing Article 41. This includes in this case the
conditions under which the hot pursuit may be conducted.
Section 3 makes recommendations aimed at promoting cross-border police cooperation as
a tool to counter migrant smuggling and support the prevention and detection of
irregular migration. Member States should use targeted joint operations in specific intra-EU
border areas, based on analysis49, to counter migrant smuggling and prevent and detect
illegally staying migrants and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration. Member States
should also ensure coordination at national level between the competent authorities involved
in the joint operations and those competent to further handle third country nationals
apprehended for an illegal stay. They should do so, in particular, using the mechanisms
referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC.50
Section 4 makes recommendations aimed at enhancing cross-border police cooperation to
counter trafficking in human beings and identifying and protecting victims. Member
States should use joint operations to counter trafficking in human beings and to identify,
provide safety and support to victims. Potential victims of trafficking in human beings can be
detected and identified in the context of joint operations. They should be immediately referred
to assistance, support and protection services, including in cooperation with civil society
organisations where appropriate. Early identification of victims is also crucial in enabling
police authorities to better investigate and punish traffickers. In this context, training law
enforcement authorities in detecting cases of trafficking in human beings is vital.
Section 5 makes recommendations aimed at transforming existing Police and Customs
Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) in intra-EU border areas into Joint Police and Customs
Stations (JPCS). In addition to their current tasks of regional cross-border information
exchange, Joint Police and Customs Stations should develop the capacity to establish,
support, coordinate and conduct permanent forms of operational cooperation in cross-border
areas, such as joint patrols and other joint operations. They should produce joint analysis of
cross-border crimes that are specific to their border area, and share them through the national
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) with all Member States and competent EU agencies, such as
Europol. Such targeted joint operations would be governed by the rules on the exercise of
police powers in the intra-EU border areas, notably those set out in Article 23 of the Schengen
Borders Code. This is to ensure that they do not have an effect equivalent to border controls.
Member States should also develop the capacity to jointly support investigations into cross-
border crimes occurring in their region, in conformity with applicable legislation and based on
relevant legal authorisations as required and issued under such legislation.
Section 6 makes recommendations aimed at better planning, coordinating and supporting
joint operations across the EU. Member States and the Commission should create a
49
Pursuant to Article 4(1)(f) of the Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794, Europol prepares threat
assessments, strategic and operational analyses and situation reports. Europol’s flagship report is the EU
Serious and Organised Threat Assessment (SOCTA), which presents inter alia key locations of crime in
the EU. Similarly, pursuant to Article 29(1) of the Frontex Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 Frontex
provides risk analysis. Recital (11) of the Frontex Regulation clarifies that, in the context of European
integrated border management, risk analysis covers the Schengen area.
50
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals. OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98–107.
EN 13 EN
coordination platform where Member States can exchange information on their needs and
priorities. The aim is to better target joint operations especially during large events (e.g. large
sports events, international summits), at specific times (e.g. holiday seasons), and to help
address specific crimes waves (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, match-fixing, trafficking in
counterfeit goods, credit card fraud, pickpocketing and other property crimes), perpetrated
notably by serious and organised crime groups, making use where appropriate of existing EU
financing and the outcomes of EU security research and innovation projects. Member States
should instruct their national SPOC to coordinate such joint operations, including joint
patrols, from and to other Member States. They should also develop joint threat assessments
and risk analyses, and annual needs assessments by exchanging information on upcoming
large-scale events, threats to public order, safety, internal security and mobility patterns of
citizens, notably during tourist seasons. This approach should help prepare and set up more
targeted joint patrols and other joint operations, including coordinated police checks in intra-
EU border areas. Over time, it should enable the targeting of key crime locations in the EU as
described in the EU SOCTA 2021.
Section 7 makes recommendations aimed at ensuring effective availability of information
and communication during cross-border operations. Member States should equip their
police officers with tools that allow them to access remotely and securely their own databases
in line with national law, as well as EU international and international databases via the
European Search Portal. The aim is to allow them to carry out their police functions during
cross-border operations, for example by carrying out identity checks. Member States should
also equip their police officers engaged in cross-border operations with secure communication
means (e.g. instant messenger tool) that operate across borders allowing to interconnect and
communicate directly in real time with the officers of the hosting Member State. Member
States should make use of the technical solutions to be provided by Europol’s innovation lab,
to ensure the interconnectivity of secure communication means across borders.
Section 8 makes recommendations aimed at moving towards a common EU culture of
policing by significantly increasing joint trainings on operational police cooperation.
Member States should set up joint training and exchange programmes for their police cadets
to build long-term knowledge and confidence between police forces in the EU. The joint
training should follow the successful example of the Franco-Spanish joint Gendarmerie
Nationale/Guardia Civil training programme. They should develop joint ongoing development
courses and exchange programmes for frontline police officers and crime investigators to
improve their skills and knowledge on cross-border operational cooperation. In particular, on
relevant legislation, rules of engagement, tools, mechanisms, professional standards and
ethics, procedures and best practice. These could range, with CEPOL’s51 support, from online
training modules to officer exchanges and should simulate real situations. Language courses
for officers from intra-EU border areas should be significantly stepped-up. Member States
should also align the programme of their national police academies to include accredited
European cross-border operational police cooperation courses. They should reflect on the
possibility to create large-scale and long-term joint training and exchange programmes for
police cadets and Member States’ officers in operational police cooperation.
51
The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training as established by Regulation (EU)
2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council
Decision 2005/681/JHA. OJ L 319, 4.12.2015, p. 1–20.
EN 14 EN
Section 9 contains final recommendations. Member States are invited to make use of the
forum offered by the relevant working party of the Council, referred to above, to discuss
issues related to cross-border operational police cooperation as covered by this
Recommendation, and in particular issues relating to the implementation of this
Recommendation.
In addition, Member States are invited to initiate within six months of the adoption of this
Recommendation, a process to change their national rules and bi- and multilateral
agreements with other Member States in order to implement the measures of this
Recommendation. One year after the adoption of the Recommendation, the Commission
should publish a report assessing the Member States’ implementation of this
Recommendation.
EN 15 EN
2021/0415 (CNS)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on operational police cooperation
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 87(3) and Article 89, in conjunction with Article 292,thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament52,
Whereas:
(1) Cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits are indispensable operational police
cooperation instruments without which criminals can escape the police by crossing the
border, taking advantage of the change of jurisdiction and absence of continuity of
police action. The existing limitations that some Member States have put in place
should be addressed, as they create obstacles for such operations to take place into
their territory. It is also necessary to adjust certain rules of engagement in cross-border
police operations to monitor and arrest criminals in surveillance, hot pursuits, and joint
operations.
(2) Setting up permanent joint patrols and other joint operations’ capabilities in intra-EU
border areas is necessary to match the criminal activities and the challenges that the
permanent and growing mobility of people, goods and services inside the Union
entails for police forces. Existing structures such as the Police and Customs
Cooperation Centers should expand their current role to become capable of planning,
supporting, coordinating and conducting joint patrols and other joint operations based
on shared risk analysis and needs assessment, in accordance with the applicable legal
requirements, in order to prevent, detect, and support investigations into cross-border
crimes conducted in intra-EU border areas.
(3) Criminal networks active in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings take
advantage of the absence of internal borders in the area without controls at internal
borders (“the Schengen area”) to facilitate the unauthorised movements of irregular
migrants and exploit the vulnerable situation of victims for profit. An effective Union
return policy requires efficient and proportionate measures for the apprehension and
identification of irregular migrants. In that regard, coordination, in particular by using
the mechanisms referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council53, should be encouraged, so as to contribute to
preventing and responding to unauthorised movements of irregular migrants and help
52
OJ C […], […], p. […].
53
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98).
EN 16 EN
address the threats to public policy or internal security, while limiting the impact on
the movement of bona fide travellers. In the absence of internal border controls,
targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in intra-EU border areas are a valuable
tool to counter migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, to prevent and
detect illegal staying and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration, and to
facilitate the effective practical implementation of bilateral readmission agreements,
while respecting Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432.54 Combatting
trafficking in human beings effectively requires police cooperation in both national
and transnational contexts, in order to identify and support victims, as well as to
improve prosecution and conviction of traffickers.
(4) The limited availability of police forces that Member States can deploy abroad and the
lack of coordinated deployment based on prior joint analysis can render police
deployments in other Member States ineffective. A Union coordination platform
where Member States can exchange on their needs and priorities for joint patrols and
other joint operations with a pan-European dimension could create the necessary
structure to conduct such operations in an efficient and effective manner, so as to
maintain and enhance public order and safety, to prevent criminal offences, including
by serious and organised crime groups, and to help address specific crime waves in
key locations, at specific times and in specific situations.
(5) Communication and access to available information are critical for successful cross-
border operational cooperation. Front line officers acting in another Member State
should have real-time access through mobile solutions, such as handheld devices or in-
car mounted police computers, to information held in Union information systems,
through the European Search Portal (ESP), and to their relevant national databases, in
line with applicable access rights and the applicable Union and national legislation.
They should also be equipped with reliable and secure, real-time interconnectable
mobile communication means, such as instant messenger tools, that function across
borders in order to communicate directly with their authorities and those of the host
Member State. Member States should make use of the technical solutions to be
provided by Europol’s innovation lab, to ensure the interconnectivity of secure
communication means across borders that should as a minimum enable the secure use
of real-time mobile communication means, as well as the geolocation of their police
vehicles, for example through GPS tracking or drones, during a cross-border police
operation.
(6) Effective cross-border operational police cooperation requires moving towards a
common Union culture of policing. Setting up joint initial trainings and exchange
programmes between police cadets on matters relating to such cooperation and
continuous development courses on those matters for front line officers and crime
investigators are instrumental in building skills, knowledge and confidence. It is
important that Member States adjust and align the curricula of their national police
academies, in all levels of training to include accredited cross-border operational
police cooperation courses, and career paths for cadets and officers who graduate from
these trainings. Member States should also make best use of the European Union
Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) by providing their training needs and
support the agency’s activities, aligning their training portfolio to the priorities related
54
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432 of 7 March 2017 on making returns more effective when
implementing the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. OJ L 66,
11.3.2017, p. 15–21.
EN 17 EN
to cross-border cooperation set in the EU Strategic Training Needs Assessments (EU-
STNA). They should reflect on the possibility to create large scale and long term pan-
European joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and officers in the
field of cross-border operational police cooperation.
(7) Given the importance of coordination and cooperation in relation to the issues
addressed in this Recommendation, and in particular its implementation, there will be
a standing discussion point on cross-border operational police cooperation in the
relevant working party of the Council. That working party should serve as a permanent
forum for Member States to discuss such issues, including the alignment of their rules
and agreements, other measures to address obstacles to the effectiveness and
efficiency of cross-border police cooperation operations, reporting on the progress
made, as well as issues relating to the necessary guidance and good practices.
(8) Effect should be given to this Recommendation within a reasonable timeframe. Within
six months of its adoption, Member States should initiate a process to change their
national rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States, as
relevant, in order to give effect to the recommended measures and subsequently
complete that process as soon as reasonably possible.
(9) The progress made in giving effect to this Recommendation should be reviewed after a
certain time period. Therefore, one year after its adoption, the Commission should
evaluate such progress, with a view, inter alia to deciding whether binding acts of
Union law with binding force are needed in this area.
(10) Taking into account that this Recommendation does not have binding force, the
Member States should give effect to the measures recommended therein in accordance
with the applicable acts of Union law, especially those which have binding force. In
particular, the Member States should give effect to the recommended measures in
accordance with the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA)55,
especially by choosing the recommended options where the CISA provides for several
options and by extending the scope and adopting additional provisions in
implementation of and in accordance with the relevant articles of the CISA.
(11) This Recommendation should not be understood as seeking to affect the rules
providing for limitations, safeguards and conditions not specifically addressed in this
Recommendation, that apply to the relevant cross-border operational police
cooperation activities pursuant to acts of Union law with binding force, including the
CISA, and to national law in accordance with Union law. For example, the carrying
and use of service weapons, the use of road traffic privileges, the use of technical
means for conducting cross-border surveillances and the performance of identity
checks and interception of persons trying to avoid such checks, referred to in this
Recommendation, may be subject to such rules.
(12) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark,
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Recommendation
and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Recommendation
builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark should, in accordance with Article 4 of
55
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19).
EN 18 EN
that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on
this Recommendation whether it will implement it in its national law.
(13) This Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes a
development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland takes part, in
accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC56; Ireland is therefore taking part in
the adoption of this Recommendation and is bound by it, except for those sections.
(14) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Recommendation constitutes a development of
the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded
by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom
of Norway concerning the latter’s' association with the implementation, application
and development of the Schengen acquis57 which fall within the area referred to in
Article 1, points A and H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC.58
(15) As regards Switzerland, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the
European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of
the Schengen acquis59 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and
H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council
Decision 2008/146/EC60 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA.61
(16) As regards Liechtenstein, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the
European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the
Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to
the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis62 which fall within the area
referred to in Article 1, points A and H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC read in
conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU63 and with Article 3 of
Council Decision 2011/349/EU.64
56
Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of
the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002).
57
OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36.
58
Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the
Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999).
59
OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52.
60
Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008).
61
Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union
of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008).
62
OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21.
63
Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union,
of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and
the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
EN 19 EN
(17) As regards Bulgaria and Romania, this Recommendation, with the exception of its
sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the
Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession and
should be read in conjunction with Council Decisions 2010/365/EU65 and (EU)
2018/934.66
(18) As regards Croatia, this Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and
2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis
within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession and should be read in
conjunction with Council Decision (EU) 2017/733.67
(19) As regards Cyprus, this Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and
2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis
within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession.
HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:
1. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:
(a) ‘cross-border hot-pursuit’ means a police operation whereby officers of a
competent law enforcement authority of a Member State pursue in that
Member State one or more persons caught in the act of committing or
participating in a criminal offence and, in the course of that pursuit, cross a
border with another Member State and continue the pursuit on the territory of
that other Member State;
(b) ‘cross-border surveillance’ means a police operation whereby officers of a
competent law enforcement authority of a Member State keep under
surveillance, as part of a criminal investigation in that Member State, one or
more persons who are suspected to have committed or participated in a
criminal offence or who can lead to the identification or tracing of such
suspects, and continue the surveillance in the territory of another Member
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L
160, 18.6.2011).
64
Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of
the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the
Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community
and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis relating in particular to judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011).
65
Council Decision 2010/365/EU of 29 June 2010 on the application of the provisions of the Schengen
acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L
166, 1.7.2010, p. 17).
66
Council Decision (EU) 2018/934 of 25 June 2018 on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions
of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and
Romania (OJ L 165, 2.7.2018, p. 37).
67
Council Decision (EU) 2017/733 of 25 April 2017 on the application of the provisions of the Schengen
acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Croatia (OJ L 108, 26.4.2017, p.
31).
EN 20 EN
State, after the person or persons under surveillance crossed the border with
that other Member State;
(c) ‘joint operations’ means police operations, including joint patrols and other
joint operations in the field of public order, public security and crime
prevention, jointly carried out either in intra-EU border areas or in other areas
within the Union by officers of the competent law enforcement authorities of
two or more Member States, whereby officers from one Member State act on
the territory of another Member State;
(d) ‘Single Point of Contact’ means the national central body responsible for
international police cooperation, referred to in Article 39(3) of the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement;
(e) ‘Police and Customs Cooperation Centre’ means a joint law enforcement
structure aimed at exchanging information and providing support to other law
enforcement activities in intra-EU border areas, which a Member State has set
up based on bi- or multilateral agreement with one or more neighbouring
Member States, and which is located in the immediate vicinity of the borders
between the Member States concerned;
(f) ‘intra-EU borders area’ means the geographic area in the immediate vicinity of
internal borders between Member States.
2. ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WHEN POLICE OFFICERS
OPERATE IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE
2.1. Cross-border hot pursuit:
(a) Member States should:
i. ensure that the types of crimes eligible for cross-border hot pursuits
into their territory cover the criminal offenses listed in the Annex to
this Recommendation;
ii. allow for the conduct of cross-border hot pursuits into their
territory across land, sea, river, lake and air borders;
iii. allow cross-border hot pursuit to continue into their territory
without any geographical or temporal limitation, until the arrival of
their competent law enforcement authority;
iv. collect statistics on the cross-border hot pursuits that their
competent law enforcement authorities conducted and report those
statistics annually to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission.
(b) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement
authority of another Member State conducting cross-border hot pursuits into
their territory to do the following:
i. carry their service weapon and ammunition;
ii. use their service weapon in legitimate self-defence and, where
necessary, in the defence of others;
iii. stop, arrest or provisionally detain a suspect, including through
means of coercion and physical force, pending the arrival of
EN 21 EN
officers of the competent authorities of the Member State in whose
territory the hot pursuit took place;
iv. use the road traffic privileges applicable in the Member States
where the hot pursuit takes place;
v. use their GPS systems to have those officers’ vehicles tracked by
the competent law enforcement authority of that other Member
State.
2.2. Cross-border surveillance
(a) Member States should:
i. ensure that the types of crimes eligible for cross-border
surveillance into their territory cover the criminal offences listed in
the Annex to this Recommendation;
ii. allow the conduct of cross-border surveillance into their territory in
relation to persons suspected of having committed or participated
in one or more of those criminal offences, but also to persons that
can lead to the identification or the tracing of such suspects;
iii. allow the conduct of cross-border surveillance into their territory
across land, sea, river, lake and air borders;
iv. allow and facilitate the pooling of material, including through short
or long-term loans based on jointly agreed procedures, to conduct
cross-border surveillances more efficiently;
v. designate their Single Point of Contact as their central authority
responsible for coordinating inbound and outbound cross-border
surveillances, including by enabling it to process and provide
requests for authorisation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
vi. collect statistics on the cross-border surveillances that their
competent law enforcement authorities conducted, and report those
statistics annually to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission.
(b) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement
authority of another Member State conducting cross-border surveillances into
their territory to do the following:
i. carry their service weapon and ammunition;
ii. use their service weapon in legitimate self-defence and, where
necessary, in the defence of others;
iii. use technical means necessary to conduct the cross-border
surveillances, including GPS trackers, drones, audio and video
equipment.
2.3. Joint operations
(a) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement
authority of another Member State involved in joint operations conducted in
their territory to do the following:
EN 22 EN
i. perform identity checks, and intercept any person who tries to
avoid an identity check;
ii. to wear their uniform and carry their service weapon and
ammunition;
iii. use their service weapons in legitimate self-defence and, where
necessary, in the defence of others;
iv. operate their radio facilities in intra-EU border areas.
(b) Member States should:
i. provide language trainings and trainings for officers from the
competent law enforcement authorities likely to be involved in
joint operations on operational procedures, administrative and
criminal law, and criminal procedures of other Member States used
in intra-EU border areas, including on countering trafficking in
human beings, migrant smuggling and preventing and detecting
illegal staying and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration,
or other serious and organised crime activities of cross-border
nature;
ii. collect statistics on cross-border joint patrols and operations that
their competent law enforcement authorities conducted in the
territory of other Member States and report those statistics annually
to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
3. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION TO COUNTER MIGRANT
SMUGGLING AND CROSS-BORDER CRIME LINKED TO IRREGULAR MIGRATION
(a) Member States should use joint operations in intra-EU border areas to:
i. counter migrant smuggling;
ii. prevent and detect illegally staying migrants and cross-border
crime linked to irregular migration.
(b) Member states should ensure coordination at national level between the
competent authorities involved in joint operations and those involved in the
further handling of third country nationals apprehended for an illegal stay, in
particular by using mechanisms as referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive
2008/115/EC.
4. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION TO COUNTER TRAFFICKING
IN HUMAN BEINGS AND TO IDENTIFY AND PROTECT VICTIMS
(a) Member states should use cross-border joint operations in intra-EU border
areas to:
i. counter the trafficking in human beings;
ii. identify and provide safety and support to victims of trafficking in
human beings.
EN 23 EN
5. JOINT POLICE AND CUSTOMS STATIONS
(a) Member States should expand the current tasks of their existing Police and
Customs Cooperation Centres by:
i. carrying out, supporting, and coordinating joint operations in intra-
EU border areas;
ii. producing joint analysis of cross-border crimes specific to their
intra-EU border area and sharing such analysis through the national
Single Point of Contact with all other Member States and
competent Union Agencies and bodies, such as Europol and where
appropriate, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);
iii. supporting investigations into cross-border crimes occurring in
their intra-EU border areas.
(b) Member States should, in view of those expanded tasks of their existing Police
and Customs Cooperation Centres, rename them as Joint Police and Customs
Stations.
6. A COORDINATION PLATFORM FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
(a) Member States, together with the Commission and Europol, should:
i. jointly set up a single coordination platform where Member States
can exchange their needs and priority areas for joint operations:
– in locations that are of particular importance to prevent and
counter crime such as key criminal hubs or touristic areas visited
by tourists from other Member States;
– during mass gatherings and major events likely to attract visitors
from other Member States such as large sport events or
international summits;
– in case of disasters and serious accidents, in coordination with
the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), and in
particular the Emergency Response Coordination Centre
(ERCC) ;68
– in case of other serious and organised crime activities of cross
border nature.
ii. jointly establish, based on information provided by competent
Union agencies and Member States, and with the input from their
Joint Police and Customs Stations, a single regular report analysing
the risks and needs for joint operations, which Member States can
use to target their joint operations.
(b) Member States should:
68
During crises and emergencies (mostly linked to disasters or large accidents), any affected Member
State or third country may call for civil protection or humanitarian assistance through the Union Civil
Protection Mechanism. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) then coordinates,
facilitates and co-finances Member States’ response to the request for assistance (Emergency Response
Coordination Centre (ERCC) | European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
(europa.eu)).
EN 24 EN
i. provide the coordination platform with information on all serious
threats to public order and safety of which they are aware,
upcoming mass gatherings and large-scale events that are likely to
attract significant numbers of visitors from other Member States
and the mobility patterns of their citizens, notably during touristic
seasons;
ii. designate the Single Point of Contact as a national contact point for
the coordination of such joint operations.
7. ENSURING EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
(a) Member States should ensure that the officers from their competent law
enforcement authority involved in the cross-border operational police
cooperation covered by this Recommendation and acting in the territory of
another Member State:
i. have remote and secure access to their own national databases and
to Union and international databases through the European Search
Portal, as permitted under their national law, allowing them to carry
out their police functions in the territory of another Member State
as part of those operations, such as carrying out identity checks;
ii. can use secure real-time communication means that are capable of
operating in the territory of another Member State, allowing them
to communicate directly with the competent law enforcement
authority of their Member States and with the officers of competent
law enforcement authorities of the other Member State or Member
States concerned.
(b) Member States should make use of the technical solutions to be provided by
Europol’s innovation lab, to ensure secure real-time direct communication
across borders.
8. JOINT TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RELATING TO CROSS-BORDER
OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION
(a) Member States should:
i. set up, together with their neighbouring Member States, joint initial
trainings and exchange programmes for their police cadets on
cross-border operational police cooperation;
ii. adjust and align the curricula of their national police academies, in
all levels of training, to include accredited European cross-border
operational police cooperation courses;
iii. design and implement career paths for cadets and officers who
completed joint initial training, exchange programmes or specific
cross-border operational police cooperation courses;
iv. set up joint continuous professional development courses and
initiatives for front line police officers and crime investigators to
develop skills and knowledge on cross-border operational police
cooperation, in particular on relevant legislation, rules of
EN 25 EN
engagement, tools, techniques, mechanisms, procedures and best
practices;
v. step-up language courses for their police officers to enable them to
participate effectively in cross-border operational police
cooperation;
vi. align their training portfolio to the priorities related to cross-border
operational police cooperation set in the EU Strategic Training
Needs Assessments (EU-STNA);
vii. inform CEPOL of their needs for training relating to cross-border
operational police cooperation and support relevant CEPOL
activities;
viii. reflect on the possibility of creating large-scale and long-term pan-
European joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets
and officers in the field of cross-border operational police
cooperation.
9. FINAL PROVISIONS
(a) Member States should discuss and take forward the issues covered by this
Recommendation, and in particular issues relating to its implementation.
(b) Member States should make full use of the financial support made available
through the Internal Security Fund – Police to improve and intensify cross-
border operational cooperation.
(c) Within six months of the date of adoption of this Recommendation, Member
States should take the necessary measures, including by changing their national
rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States where
relevant and in accordance with Union law, to give effect to this
Recommendation.
(d) One year after the date of adoption of this Recommendation, the Commission
should assess the effect given to this Recommendation by the Member States
and publish a report thereon.
Done at Brussels,
For the Council
The President
EN 26 EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.12.2021
COM(2021) 780 final
ANNEX
ANNEX
to the
Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on operational police cooperation
{SWD(2021) 375 final}
EN EN
ANNEX
Offences referred to in Recommendations 2.1 and 2.2 are
the following serious offences:
– Participation in a criminal organisation,
– Terrorism,
– Trafficking in human beings,
– Sexual exploitation of children and child pornography,
– Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
– Illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives,
– Corruption, including bribery,
– Fraud, including that affecting the Union’s financial interests within the meaning of
Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July
2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal
law,
– Laundering of the proceeds of crime,
– Counterfeiting currency, including of the euro,
– Computer-related crime,
– Environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and
in endangered plant species and varieties,
– Facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence,
– Murder and grievous bodily injury,
– Illicit trade in human organs and tissue,
– Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking,
– Racism and xenophobia,
– Organised or armed robbery,
– Illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art,
– Swindling,
– Racketeering and extortion,
– Counterfeiting and piracy of products,
– Forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein,
– Forgery of means of payment,
– Illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters,
– Illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials,
– Trafficking in stolen vehicles,
– Rape,
EN 1 EN
– Arson,
– Crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
– Unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, spacecraft,
– Sabotage.
EN 2 EN
Saatja: SiM info <
[email protected]>
Saadetud: 17.01.2022 10:30
Adressaat: RAM Info <
[email protected]>
Teema: Delta: Teile on saadetud Arvamuse andmiseks Sissetulev kiri
"Riigikantselei resolutsioon: Politseikoostöö seadustik" tähtajaga
31.01.2022
Tere Rahandusministeerium!
Siseministeeriumi dokumendihaldussüsteemi kaudu on edastatud Teile/Teie
asutusele uus tööülesanne
Töövoo liik:Arvamuse andmiseksPealkiri:Riigikantselei resolutsioon:
Politseikoostöö seadustikTöövoo resolutsioon:Operatiivse politseikoostöö
nõukogu soovitus loob selgema reeglistiku politseiametnike tegutsemiseks
teise riigi territooriumil Ennekõike loob ettepanek ühise selgema
reeglistiku nendeks olukordadeks, kui politseiametnikud tegutsevad teise
riigi territooriumil. See puudutab varjatud jälgimist, jälitustegevust,
ühispatrulle ja -operatsioone. Samuti luuakse soovituse kohaselt EL
koordinatsiooniplatvorm piiriüleste operatsioonide toetamiseks. Ettepanek
puudutab ka töövahendite ühtlustamist (pardaarvutid, sõnumirakendused
omavaheliseks suhtluseks) nnig ühist politseikultuuri, mis on plaanis
saavutada näiteks läbi õppuste jaokk lituste. Muus osas üninie soovitus
teeb poliitilise erandi migrantide smugeldamise ja inimkaubanduse vallas
tehtavale koostööle ja kutsub üles kasutama ühisoperatsioone smugeldajate
ning illegaalsete sisserändajate tuvastamiseks.TÜ resolutsioon:Palume
lisaks direktiiviga seonduvatele dokumentidele tutvuda 3 täiendava
dokumendiga, mis puudutavad politseikoostööd ja on samuti suurema
politseikoostöö seadustiku osaks. Kui soovite arvamust avaldada, on see
teretulnud ja kui ei, palun võtke lihtsalt teadmiseks. Eesti seisukohtade
valmimisel (milles on ka nende dokumentide sisu täpsemalt avatud)
esitatakse need teile tutvumiseks ja soovi korral saate ka siis arvamust
avaldada. Esitame ined kolm dokumenti uuesti, sest tehnilise rikke tõttu
ei jõudnud need kõikiin ddressaatideni.TÜ tähgdnt:31.01.2022TÜ
algataja:Liisa AbelDokumendi liik: Sissetulev kiriViit:5-1/49-1Reg
kpv:20.12.2021