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Politseikoostöö seadustik

Rahandusministeerium · 17. jaanuar 2022
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1.1-11/9175-2
Registreeritud
17. jaanuar 2022
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Sissetulev kiri
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Siseministeerium
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Funktsioon
1.1 ÜLDJUHTIMINE JA ÕIGUSALANE TEENINDAMINE
Sari
1.1-11 Ettepanekud ja arvamused ministeeriumile kooskõlastamiseks saadetud õigusaktide eelnõude kohta
Toimik
1.1-11/2021
Vastutaja
Andres Kuningas (Rahandusministeerium, Kantsleri vastutusvaldkond, Euroopa Liidu ja rahvusvahelise koostöö osakond)

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Eelnõude infosüsteemis (EIS) on antud täitmiseks ülesanne. Eelnõu toimik: 9.4.1/21-1323 - COM(2021) 782 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA Eelnõu kohta seisukoha esitamine Vabariigi Valitsuse istungile vastavalt Riigikantselei 20.12.2021 resolutsioonile. Osapooled: Siseministeerium Tähtaeg: 24.01.2022 23:59 Link eelnõu toimiku vaatele: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a70e2376-23c5-4d41-a929-daea73dc9230 Link menetlusetapile: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/a70e2376-23c5-4d41-a929-daea73dc9230?activity=1 Eelnõude infosüsteem (EIS) https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon Viide: Siseministeerium / / ; Riigikantselei / / 2-5/21-02866 Resolutsiooni teema: Politseikoostöö seadustik Adressaat: Siseministeerium Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukoha ja otsuse eelnõu järgnevate algatuste kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli: - Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, COM(2021) 782 - Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation, COM(2021) 780 EISi toimiku nr: 21-1323 Tähtaeg: 24.01.2022 Adressaat: Justiitsministeerium, Rahandusministeerium Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Siseministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu). Tähtaeg: 14.01.2022 Lisainfo: Eelnõu on kavas arutada valitsuse 03.02.2022 istungil ja Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (26.01.2022) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 24.01.2022. Kinnitaja: Merli Vahar, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja Kinnitamise kuupäev: 20.12.2021 Resolutsiooni koostaja: Ann Saks [email protected], 693 5201 Politseikoostöö seadustik: - Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE Nimetus COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of ANDMED Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA ALGATUSE KOHTA - Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation Eelnõu nr COM(2021)782 Esitamise kuupäev: 08.12.2021 Menetluskord EL-is: Direktiivi puhul COM(2021)780 kaasotsustus RKKTS § 1521 lg 1 1. p1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist RKKTS § 1521 lg 1 SEISUKOHA 2. - algatuse/ vastuvõtmisega või teatises toodud meetmete rakendamisega kaasneb oluline majanduslik , sotsiaalne või muu mõju p2 VALITSUSSE TOOMISE ALUS 3. RKKTS § 1521 lg 2 - Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjoni või väliskomisjoni nõue 4. VVS § 201 lg 1 - algatuse/teatise reguleerimisala nõuab VV pädevusse kuuluva otsuse vastuvõtmist (määruse vastuvõtmine, muutmine, tühistamine) 5. VVS § 201 lg 2 - seisukoha võtmist algatuse/teatise osas peab oluliseks peaminister või minister (on poliitiliselt oluline või tundlik (Eestis või EL-is)) 03.02.2022 VV, VALITSUSELE Kuupäev 26.01 KOKi, EL menetluse ESITAMINE kaasvastutajate ajakava sisend 14.01 SISERIIKLIK Vastutav Kaasatud JUM, RaM Sotsiaalpartnerid, MENETLUS min SiM ministeeriumid (tollikoostöö) huvigrupid EELNÕU ÜLEVAADE KOKKUVÕTE EELÕU SISUST JA 8. detsembril 2021 a. avaldas komisjon politseikoodeksi nime all kolm ettepanekut: politsei EESMÄRKIDEST infovahetuse direktiiv; operatiivse politseikoostöö nõukogu soovitus ja nn Prüm II määrus (viimase kohta kujundatakse seisukohad eraldi). Politsei infovahetuse direktiiv ühtlustab liikmesriikide operatiivteabe infovahetuse kanaleid ja päringutele vastamise aega: Infovahetuse direktiiviga muudetakse Rootsi raamotsust, mis on tänaseni reguleerinud operatiivteabe vahetust. Direktiivi kohaselt peavad liikmesriikide infovahetuse kontaktpunktid (SPOC) muutuma 24/7 nö one stop shop’iks. Paika pannakse ühtsed reeglid nende ülesannetele ja ajaraam, mille jooksul tuleb teise liikmesriigi päringule vastata. Samuti peavad liikmesriigid direktiivi kohaselt kindlustama, et infovahetus toimub ainult selleks ette nähtud kanali kaudu (Europoli infokanal SIENA) ning et vahetatav info jõuab ka Europolini, kes saab seda kasutada oma analüüsitoodete koostamisel. Varasemalt on liikmesriikidel olnud suurem võimalus valida ise infovahetuseks sobivaimad kanalid ning päringutele vastamise aeg. Operatiivse politseikoostöö nõukogu soovitus loob selgema reeglistiku politseiametnike tegutsemiseks teise riigi territooriumil: Politsei operatiivtöö on poliitiliselt tundlik valdkond, mida puudutav seadusandlus nõuab ELTL artikkel 87 kohaselt vastuvõtmiseks ühehäälsust. Komisjon otsustas menetluslike probleemide vältimiseks juriidiliselt mittesiduva soovituse kasuks. Ennekõike loob ettepanek ühise selgema reeglistiku nendeks olukordadeks, kui politseiametnikud tegutsevad teise riigi territooriumil. See puudutab varjatud jälgimist, jälitustegevust, ühispatrulle ja -operatsioone. Samuti luuakse soovituse kohaselt EL koordinatsiooniplatvorm piiriüleste operatsioonide toetamiseks. Ettepanek puudutab ka töövahendite ühtlustamist (pardaarvutid, sõnumirakendused omavaheliseks suhtluseks) ning ühist politseikultuuri, mis on plaanis saavutada näiteks läbi õppuste ja koolituste. Muus osas üldine soovitus teeb erandi migrantide smugeldamise ja inimkaubanduse vallas tehtavale koostööle ja kutsub üles kasutama ühisoperatsioone smugeldajate ning illegaalsete sisserändajate tuvastamiseks. VÕIMALIKUD SOTS-MAJ. MÕJUD Positiivne mõju sisejulgeolekule Schengeni alal. VÕIMALIKUD ÕIGUSLIKUD Vajab analüüsi. MUUDATUSED MÕJU EELARVELE Vajab analüüsi. KOMMENTAARID 1/2 Alustatud: 15.12.2021 Muudetud: 20.12.2021 SEISUKOHAD EESTI SEISUKOHT ELPOL 2022-23 prioriteet: Loodav ELi politseikoostöö seadustik peab lihtsustama piiriülest politseikoostööd, tõhustades muu hulgas ühiste uurimisrühmade potentsiaali ning arvestades seniste kahe- ja mitmepoolsete koostöökokkulepete parimaid kogemusi. Soovime lisaks ELi tasandil täpsustada politseivabatahtlike kaasamise võimalusi. Piiriülese politseikoostöö tõhustamiseks on vaja edasi arendada pädevate asutuste infovahetust. Politseikoostöö soovitusega seoses on meile oluline, et soovitus käsitleb järgmisi küsimusi: 1) hot pursuit võimaldamine merel ja teistel veekogudel; 2) jälitustoimingute puhul teatud tingimustel isiku lihtsustatud kinnipidamine ja väljaandmine; 3) politseiametnike õigus piiriüleselt reageerida, kandes muuhulgas teenistusvormi ja –relva (näiteks maastikuotsingul); 4) droonide kasutamisega seonduvate küsimuste selgitamine. TEISTE RIIKIDE SEISUKOHAD KOMMENTAARID 2/2 Alustatud: 15.12.2021 Muudetud: 20.12.2021 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8.12.2021 COM(2021) 782 final 2021/0411 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA {SEC(2021) 420 final} - {SWD(2021) 374 final} - {SWD(2021) 377 final} EN EN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL • General context As set out in the EU Security Union Strategy1, the new Counter-terrorism agenda for the EU2 and the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-20253, transnational threats call for a coordinated, more targeted and adapted response. While national authorities operating on the ground are on the frontline in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, action at Union level and global partnerships are paramount to ensure effective cooperation as well as information and knowledge exchange among national authorities, supported by a common criminal law framework and effective financial means. Furthermore, organised crime and terrorism are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. These threats spread across borders and manifest themselves in organised crime and terrorist groups that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. In an area without internal border controls ('the Schengen area'4), police officers in one Member State should have equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues in another Member State (subject to the same conditions). They should cooperate effectively and by default across the Union. Exchange of information on criminal matters is thus a key enabler to safeguarding security in the Schengen area. Together with the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area, a set of rules for information exchange and police cooperation were agreed upon in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). In addition, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was established, creating a common EU security and border database containing information on wanted and missing persons and objects in the forms of alerts. According to the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (EU SOCTA), more than 70% of organised crime groups are present in more than three Member States5. The 2021 EU SOCTA and the EMCDDA European Drug report6 outline a number of areas where serious and organised crime appears to be on the rise. At the same time, as set out in the December 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda7, the EU remains on high terrorist alert. The Schengen area is the largest free travel area in the world. It allows more than 420 million people to move freely and goods and services to flow unhindered. By removing border controls between Member States, the Schengen area has become part of our European way of life. It is a symbol of Europe's interconnectedness and of the ties between European citizens 8. The Schengen area also contributes to the efficient functioning of the Single Market, and thus to the growth of the Union's economy9. 1 COM(2020) 605 final. 2 COM(2020) 795 final. 3 COM(2021) 170 final. 4 The Schengen area is composed of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 5 Europol (2021), European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA). 6 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European drug report 2021. 7 COM(2020) 795 final. 8 Eurobarometer 474: The Schengen Area. 9 COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. EN 1 EN However, the growing mobility of people within the EU also creates additional challenges in preventing and fighting criminal threats, and in ensuring public safety. Almost 2 million people commuted across borders, including 1.3 million cross-border workers10. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic having reduced intra-EU mobility, flows of people will likely continue to be important in the future. In recent years, the Schengen area has been repeatedly put to the test by a series of crises and challenges which have led several Member States to reintroduce internal border controls. One reason Member States have given for such a decision has been the uncontrolled secondary movements11 of irregular migrants, which these Member States consider to pose a serious threat to public policy or internal security, justifying the need to reintroduce border controls. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/39912 ('Schengen Borders Code'), the temporary reintroduction of border controls may be used only for a limited period of time, in exceptional circumstances (such as the migratory crisis observed in 2015/2016), as a last resort measure. In particular, there is room for improvement as regards the use of police checks and cooperation, including of course with regard to information exchange and communication. These measures, in particular if combined, have the potential to yield the same results in controlling secondary movements as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive when it comes to the free movement of persons, goods and services. The rapidly evolving criminal landscape and the mobility of people suggest that cross-border cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the EU and the Schengen area is crucial to tackle criminal offences, and allow citizens and third country nationals legally staying on the territory to safely use their free movement. However, important challenges remain for law enforcement authorities' ability to exchange information with their counterparts in other Member States in an effective and efficient manner. This capability still varies greatly among the Member States highlighting a degree of fragmentation detrimental to the effectiveness and efficiency of information exchange. As a result, criminals and groups of criminals continue to take advantage of these inefficiencies to operate across borders, and secondary movements of irregular migrants will continue to pose a problem. • Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The overall objective of this proposal is to legislate on organisational and procedural aspects of information exchange between law enforcement authorities in the EU with a view to contributing to the effective and efficient exchange of such information, hence protecting a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area. The proposal is (notably) without prejudice to the rules regulating the information exchange on alerts in the SIS via the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) Bureaux. This proposal for a Directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States forms part of a coherent package also comprising a proposal for a Council Recommendation reinforcing operational cross-border police cooperation, a proposal for a Regulation revising the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm II") as well as a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code as set out in the Commission Communication of June 2021 "A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area"13. Together, these proposals seek to establish a Police Cooperation Code with the 10 European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions. 11 Other most frequent reasons notified by the Member States included the migratory crisis of 2015/2016, persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic. 12 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code). 13 COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. EN 2 EN objective of streamlining, enhancing, developing, modernising and facilitating law enforcement cooperation between relevant national agencies, thus supporting Member States in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism. Taking full account of the opinion expressed by the co-legislator, this proposal is based on the findings presented in the accompanying Impact Assessment. These findings also cover information, analyses and recommendations stemming from the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation carried out in the past six years, the Communiction from the Commission on the way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data protection rules14, the extensive consultations with relevant stakeholders in the past two years, and the important body of Council guidance papers developed for the last 15 years. Based on this combined analysis, three main objectives were identified. The present proposal seeks to achieve them by addressing three underlying problems. (1) Lack of clear and robust common rules on information exchange The first objective of this proposal is to ensure, under precise, consistent and common rules, the equivalent access for any Member State's law enforcement authorities to information available in other Member States for the purpose of preventing and detecting criminal offences, conducting criminal investigations or criminal operations, while complying with fundamental rights, including data protection requirements. Member States' Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) are involved in daily cross-border information exchanges related to operations against criminal offences. Yet, rules at national level impede the effective and efficient flow of information. The general rules for the exchange of law enforcement information which has cross-border relevance among Member States' law enforcement authorities are laid down in Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA simplifying the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'Swedish Framework Decision' or 'SFD'15), adopted in 2006 before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Swedish Framework Decision partially superseded the police cooperation Chapter of the 1990 Convention Implementation the Schengen Agreement16. The Swedish Framework Decision lays down the principles according to which information should be shared (principles of availability and equivalent access), the timeframe within which a request for information should be replied to, the forms that should be used to lodge and reply to such requests, as well as the data protection safeguards to be ensured when handling these information. In practice, however, the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision is unclear, thereby hampering the full implementation of the principles of availability/equivalent access of relevant information in a cross-border context17. As a consequence, rules at national level continue to impede the flow of information despite the efforts made to complement the Swedish Framework Decision requirements by means of Council non-binding guidance18. 14 COM(2020) 262 final, 24.6.2020. 15 OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89–100. 16 OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19–62. 17 These outstanding issues have notably been highlighted in the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation. These country report evaluations underline the existence of diverging practices depending on the other State party. They also cover relevant Council guidance papers and the police cooperation chapter of the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and their related bi/multilateral agreements. 18 For example: Council doc. 5825/20 of 2/12/2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange. EN 3 EN Consequently, the current uncertainties would remain and continue to negatively affect the effective and efficient sharing of information, thereby leaving the impacts in the evolution of the EU security landscape and in the increased cross-border mobility essentially unaddressed. For this reason, establishing a legal framework by means of a Directive for these purposes will allow a better monitoring and enforcement of rules at EU and national levels, while ensuring a convergence of national practices, thereby improving the effectiveness and efficiency of information flows between Member States. (2) Lack of common structures and efficient management tools for exchanging information The second objective of this proposal for a Directive is to approximate common minimum standards with a view to ensuring an efficient and effective functioning of the Single Points of Contact. These common minimum requirements cover the composition, structures, responsibilities, staffing and technical capabilities. Member States are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security19. They are in principle free to organise their law enforcement authorities and services as they see fit. When it comes to law enforcement cooperation structures, all Member States have set up or are in the process of setting up a Single Point of Contact20 competent for channelling as much information exchange as possible. Based on national law or internal rules, law enforcement authorities may also exchange information directly between themselves. Although different manuals and national factsheets have been produced in order to facilitate a harmonised approach to the way national Single Points of Contact are organised, there are still significant differences across Member States as regards their structures, functions, means and capabilities. As a result, Member States do not always have the necessary structures in place to exchange information effectively and efficiently with other Member States. National Single Points of Contact do not always play their coordination role and can lack resources to face the increasing number of requests. Notably, they are not always equipped with the necessary information management tools (for example, a case management system with a common dashboard and automatic data upload and cross-check). Additionally, the Single Points of Contact do not always have direct and user-friendly access to all relevant EU and international databases and platforms. Moreover, some Single Points of Contact have limited access to relevant national databases, which further delays the overall information exchange process. Furthermore, the Single Points of Contact can lack resources to timely and effectively address the increasing number of requests received. Indeed, this rising trend has not always been accompanied by a proportionate increase of human and IT resources. A modern information management architecture, already in use in some 'advanced' Single Points of Contact, can alleviate tensions on limited human resources through the integration of information held by competent authorities in their respective databases, thereby also monitoring and tracking the deadline for answers to information requests21. Databases 19 Article 72 TFEU. 20 The Single Point of Contact is the national information hub centralising the reception, processing and the sending of the information to other countries. It gathers under the same management structure all main international and EU law enforcement communication channels (INTERPOL, Europol and SIRENE). 21 See the Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. EN 4 EN available at Single Points of Contact are not always used to their full potential either because of rudimentary search tools, preventing the adoption of transliteration22 techniques and "fuzzy logic"23 search functions. The lack of transliteration and fuzzy logic search options within information systems prevents officials from getting exhaustive results (hits) through a unique query. As a result, officials have to carry out a new search for each personal detail they are investigating, resulting in an increased workload, which slows down the search process (for example, inversion of first and last name, different spelling used for the same individual notably stemming from different languages, alphabets and diacritic accents). At present, deadlines are almost always exceeded when a judicial authorisation is required. The functional availability of a judicial authority, as it is already the case in more effective and efficient Single Points of Contact, will contribute to alleviate undue delays. Indeed, cases requiring a judicial authorisation can be handled more swiftly than what is currently the case, meaning that deadlines can be more readily met also in these cases. (3) Lack of common practice in the use of existing communication channel(s) to exchange information within the EU The third objective of this proposal for a Directive is to remedy the proliferation of communication channels used for law enforcement information exchange between Member States while reinforcing Europol’s role as the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate. Besides a number of system-specific cases regulated by EU law (i.e. requests for supplementary information related to SIS alerts must be made via SIRENE Bureaux24, and information exchange with Europol usually via ENUs25), Member States have not agreed on a single channel of information exchange between their law enforcement authorities for cases with an EU dimension, leading to duplication of requests, undue delays and occasional information loss. As a result, Member States use different channels to different extents to request, send and receive information, often without any clear, pre-defined rationale26, which hampers effective and efficient exchange of information. This also deprives national authorities from Europol's support even though Member States call on the Agency to be an EU criminal information hub able to deliver qualitative information-led products. Single Points of Contact do not always ensure the monitoring of existing channels 24/7 resulting in possible negative impacts on cross-border cases requiring urgent information sharing. At the same time, Europol's Secure Information Exchange Network Application (hereinafter 'SIENA') is being underused in spite of its tailored features and strong data security infrastructure. Even when Member States do use SIENA, they do not always involve 22 Transliteration is the process of representing words/names from one language using the alphabet or writing system of another language (multilingual name recognition). E.g. the letter "o" can be 'ò', 'ó', 'ô, 'õ', 'ö', 'ø' depending on the language/alphabet used. 23 A fuzzy database is a database which is able to deal with uncertain or incomplete information using fuzzy logic. i.e. the ability to find matches even when a person' name is misspelled. 24 The exchange of supplementary information related to SIS alerts must be done via a single network of national offices called SIRENE Bureaux. 25 Europol National Unit. Information exchange with Europol must be done via ENUs using SIENA. 26 A number of national SPOCs use internal guidelines recommending or requiring the specific use of a communication channel for specific purpose, thereby ensuring consistency and avoiding duplication of requests. However, other SPOCs rely on officers' habits and preferences, such leeway resulting in inefficiencies in a cross-border investigation context. EN 5 EN (by copying in) Europol, even though the information exchanged falls within its mandate. This can create significant information gaps at EU level. • Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area The present proposal is consistent with existing and upcoming policy provisions in the domain of law enforcement cooperation. Law enforcement cooperation is an area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States. In recent years, progress was made to improve the exchange of information cooperation between Member States and to close down the space in which terrorists and serious criminals operate. The legislative framework on counterterrorism and information exchange was strengthened in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Europe. Following the migration crisis of 2015, the general architecture of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) information systems and databases was overhauled with a focus on interoperability27 and dynamic convergence between security, borders and migration management. Moreover, greater cooperation between law enforcement bodies was promoted at EU level through the publication of (non-binding) Council recommendations and guidelines seeking to facilitate the convergence of national practices. As the two legs of law enforcement cooperation essentially relate to (i) information exchange (which is the focus of the present proposal), and (ii) operational cross-border cooperation, the present proposal will form part of a coherent package with the accompanying proposal for a Council Recommendation on aspects of cross-border operational police cooperation. This package is complemented with the parallel proposal for a Regulation revising the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm II"). The "Prüm II" proposal will aim at strengthening the technical architecture of the Prüm exchange, broadening its scope of data categories and streamlining and accelarating its post-hit data exchange. The reinforced "Prüm II" proposal would provide specific rules and possibilities for the automated exchange of specific – and particularly important – data categories (for example, fingerprints, DNA, facial images) within the overall framework and general rules for general information exchange that this Directive will provide. As an important measure to enhance security within the EU, the present proposal will also contribute to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area as set out in the Schengen Strategy. This proposal is also in full coherence with the 2020 proposal revising the Europol mandate28 with a view to strenghening the agency's mandate on processing large and complex datasets as well as with the European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters29. The proposal complements the legal framework30 on the 27 Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between the EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA [2019] OJ L 135/27; Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between the EU information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 [2019] OJ L 135/85. 28 COM/2020/796 final. 29 COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD). 30 OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing Regulation No 1987/2006; Regulation 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in EN 6 EN exchange of information on alerts in the SIS through the SIRENE Bureaux. This proposal is without prejudice to all those other acts of Union law, as well as other ones such as Directive 2019/1153 of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA for the purpose of facilitating access to and the use of financial information and bank account information by competent authorities for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences31. • Consistency with other Union policies The present proposal aims to contribute positively to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area, allowing more people to move freely, and goods and services to flow unhindered, which in turn contributes to the efficient functioning of the Single Market, and thus to the growth of the Union's economy. The present proposal is therefore fully consistent with other Union policies in the field of employment, transport, and ultimately economic growth in intra-EU border regions, but also across the entire EU. 2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY • Legal basis The legal basis for EU action in the field of intra-EU law enforcement cooperation is Title V, Chapter 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Pursuant to Article 87 TFEU: "the Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences". More specifically, Article 87(2)(a) TFEU relates to measures concerning the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information relevant for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. The present legal proposal is to be adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure. • Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence) EU action is needed to properly address the problems identified in the first section of this explanatory memorandum. The objective of improving information flows between relevant law enforcement authorities and with Europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone. Owing to the cross-border nature of crime and terrorism, the Member States are obliged to rely on one another. Hence, the establishment of common rules for the exchange of information can be better achieved at the Union level. Despite the existence of a number of national and regional measures in place, Member States alone would not be able to ensure the full implementation of the principles of availability and of equivalent access to information. If acting alone and on the basis of national schemes, Member States would not overcome current differences among Single Points of Contact, which hinder the efficient and effective exchange of relevant information across borders. They would not ensure an appropriate and uniform level of knowledge of, and capacity in, the use of relevant databases and communication channels. The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions taken at national level, address the divergence of national practices, prevent duplications, overlaps and uncertainties and eventually facilitate an efficient counter-action to cross-border criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended. 31 OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122–137. EN 7 EN crime and terrorism. EU action, in response to the identified problems, is expected to bring added value for the entire EU, and therefore to its citizens, as it will render more resilient and robust the Schengen area, with a ripple effect on Schengen Associated Countries32. Common EU level rules, standards and requirements facilitating information exchange on cross-border crime between law enforcement authorities will generate significant economies of scale while ensuring high-level data security and data protection standards. Law enforcement cooperation at EU level does not replace national policies on internal security. It does not substitute the work of national law enforcement authorities. Instead, EU level action supports and reinforces national security policies and the work of national law enforcement authorities against cross-border crime and terrorism. • Proportionality The present proposal aims to consolidate the EU legal framework in a single legal instrument on information exchange through the 'lisbonisation' of the Swedish Framework Decision. It also contains provisions stemming from a set of Council non-binding guidelines adopted over the past 15 years. Considering the call of the co-legislator and the willingness expressed by Member States in the consultation phase, this proposal for a Directive addresses the identified problems without going beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring effective and efficient information flows between Member States. • Choice of the instrument Building on previous relevant Council Conclusions33, the present Commission proposal for a Directive aims to achieve effective and efficient information flows between law enforcement authorities of the Member States, by means of a substantial approximation of Member States' legislation concerning information exchange and communication. Its provisions ensure the respect of the conferral of powers as well as the differences in the legal systems and traditions of the Member States, as acknowledged by the Treaties. In light of the above, the proposed legal proposal takes the form of a Directive. 3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS • Stakeholder consultations The consultation involved relevant stakeholders from a wide range of subject matters, national police, customs, judicial and data protection authorities, civil society organisations, academia, and from members of the public on their expectations and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU34. The Commission used different means of engagement such as targeted questionnaires, experts' interviews, focus groups, case-studies, and organised thematic workshops with Member States and Schengen Associated Countries' representatives. The subject matters and the policy options presented in the Impact Assessment accompanying the present proposal were also discussed within the relevant Council's Working Parties (for example, Law Enforcement Working Party/Police, Law Enforcement Working Party/Customs, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security). 32 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 33 Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20. 34 An exhaustive presentation of the stakeholder consultations is found in the Impact Assessment accompanying the present proposal. EN 8 EN In addition, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines35, the Commission launched a Public Consultation. The results of the consultation activities (20 answers) have been duly taken into account in the preparation of the present proposal36. • Collection and use of expertise Numerous consultation activities – such as scoping interviews, questionnaires and online surveys, semi-structured interviews, case-studies and focus groups – were also conducted by the contractor during the preparation of a 'Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation'. • Impact assessment In line with the Better Regulation guidelines, an Impact Assessment was carried out for the preparation of the present legislative proposal. Based on its findings, the Commission identified three main problems which corresponds to three main specific objectives of the present proposal (as mentioned above). Correspondingly, three policy options with different degrees of intervention were considered for potentially achieving each of the specific objectives37. Specific objective 1: Facilitate equivalent access for law enforcement authorities to information held in another Member State, while complying with fundamental rights, including data protection requirements. Through: (1) ensuring alignment of the provisions currently contained in the 2006 SFD with the 2016 Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive; (2) developing a set of new flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training and Commission guidance on specific aspects law enforcement information exchange, as appropriate; (3) improving the clarity of the SFD provisions. This is done through a clarification on the SFD scope and a simplification of its use. Commission guidance on the national datasets available in each Member States for possible exchange may also be developed to further improve implementation, as appropriate; (4) facilitating compliance with deadlines requirements by which information is to be made available to another Member State, including when a judicial authorisation is required. Specific objective 2: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point of Contact, including when a judicial authorisation is required to provide information upon request of another Member State. Through: (1) developing a new set of flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training, financial support and Commission guidance of relevance, as appropriate; (2) establishing minimum common requirements on the composition of the Single Points of Contact (including when a judicial authorisation is required), their functions, staffing, capabilities. 35 SWD (2017) 350, 7.7.2017. 36 EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 37 See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. EN 9 EN Specific objective 3: Remedy the proliferation of communication channels used for law enforcement information exchange between Member States, while reinforcing Europol’s role as the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate. Through: (1) developing new set of flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training, financial support and Commission guidance on information sharing, as appropriate; (2) requiring Member States to use SIENA for all bi- and multilateral information exchanges under the proposed Directive after a necessary transition period ensuring the full roll-out of SIENA. These measures will streamline, clarify, develop and modernise cross-border law enforcement cooperation, while better safeguarding fundamental rights in particular as regards the protection of personal data (as explained below). It will also step up Europol support to Member States in countering evolving threats. The preferred policy option will ensure a strong convergence of national practices regarding the effective and efficient functionning of Single Point of Contact, through common minimum standards. The most positive impacts of the preferred policy option are expected to stem from establishing the Single Point of Contact as a "one-stop shop" for law enforcement cooperation in all Member States. The establishment of Europol SIENA as the default channel of communication will add to the streamlining of law enforcement information exchange, while ensuring the convergence of information at Europol, and the security of such information (and personal data). The preferred policy option also contains flanking measures such as relevant trainings and financial support, key enablers to achieving the specific objectives presented above. The preferred option reflects the best cumulative impacts as regards to relevance, added value, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality. It draws lessons from the past and, at the same time, is sufficiently ambitious. The preferred option takes duly account of the views expressed by the Member States while responding to the legitimate expectations of the EU citizens and businesses. In doing so, the preferred option contributes to the effective and efficient functioning of the Schengen area. • Fundamental rights The Impact Assessment accompanying the present proposal analysed the effects that each policy options, including the measures envisaged by this proposal for a Directive, potentially have on fundamental rights of citizens. By definition, any policy options addressing information sharing between law enforcement authorities, have an impact on the right to protection of personal data, as provided for by Article 8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: Charter) and Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The policy options also have a potential impact on other fundamental rights, such as those protected by Articles 2 (Right to life), 3 (Right to the integrity of the person), 6 (Right to liberty and security), 17 (Right to property) and 45 (Freedom of movement and of residence) of the Charter. The Impact Assessment considered that the chosen policy options are proportionate since they are limited to what is strictly necessary to meet the objective of safeguarding the internal security in the Schengen area while protecting the free movement of persons38. 38 See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. EN 10 EN Furthermore, the alignment of the relevant rules on exchanges of information for law enforcement purposes with the subsequently adopted and applicable rules on processing personal data for law enforcement purposes (pursuant to the 2016 Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive; hereinafter: LED39) are expected to positively impact safeguarding citizens' fundamental rights. The use of SIENA as the communication channel will also enhance the security of the personal data processing systems and their overall protection against possible abuses. As the LED provides and ensures the required level of personal data protection in the Union, there is no need to go beyond it. Instead, the alignment will ensure full consistency with the EU personal data protection rules, including those contained in the LED. In this manner, effect is given to the Commission’s commitment contained in a 2020 Communication to "make a legislative proposal, which as a minimum will entail an amendment of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA to ensure the necessary data protection alignment, in the last quarter of 2021"40. 4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS While highly depending from the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters, an estimation of possible costs has been provided by Europol and reported in the Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. The necessary IT upgrades in both Single Points of Contact and Police and Customs Cooperation Centres41 were estimated to amount to a maximum one-off total of EUR 11,5 million. These are deemed to be divided as follows: – 1,5 million to set-up Case Management Systems (CMS) in 10 MS (not yet equipped); – 1 million to integrate SIENA in the CMS of the Single Points of Contacts of 20 MS (not yet equipped); – 2,25 million to establish connection of Police and Customs Cooperation Centres with SIENA in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (14 out of 59 are already connected); – 6,75 million to set-up CMSs in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (45x EUR 150.000). These costs (one-off investment) are deemed acceptable and proportionate to the identified problem and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the specific objectives set out by this proposal for a Directive. It should be noted that Member States are in any case pursuing a modernisation of their IT systems (also in the context of the interoperability of EU information systems). This provides a good opportunity for cost effective implementation of the changes envisaged by the provision of this proposal. These estimations do not cover training needs since, especially for IT upgrades, the training costs are highly depending from the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters. In any event, the costs at national level should be covered by Member States' programmes under the Internal Security Fund42. The Internal Security Fund includes the specific objective to "improve and facilitate the exchange of information" and to "improve and intensify cross- border cooperation"43. When preparing their national programmes, Member States are thus 39 Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 40 COM(2020)262, Way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data protection rules. 41 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres are regional information hubs set up in border regions of two or more Member States. They are composed by personnel of law enforcement authorities from these Member States. So far, 59 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres have been set up across Europe. 42 Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 43 See Articles 3(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. EN 11 EN invited to include activities relevant for the implementation of the envisaged Directive, with explicit reference to Single Points of Contact and Police and Customs Cooperation Centres, and the connection to SIENA. As some Member States are more advanced than others in their level of cooperation, the cost of implementing the proposed Directive will vary between Member States. Apart from the costs potentially covered by Member States’ programmes under the Internal Security Fund, there will be no other costs borne at EU level. 5. OTHER ELEMENTS • Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements The evaluation of impacts of the proposed measures depends on the information to be received from the Member States. For this reason, the present proposal contains provisions on collection of data indicators. The responsibility for the collection of the relevant monitoring data should be in the remit of national authorities, ideally the Single Points of Contact. Subsequently, the monitoring of these activity indicators will be used to inform on the application of the proposed measures. In this connection, the present proposal requires the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with this proposed Directive. The relevant article also requires the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing the added value of the Directive, 5 years after the entry into force, and consider a possible review of the Directive upon relevance. Aside from this legal proposal, the Commission, acting by virtue of its administrative autonomy, will set up an informal expert group composed of experts from each Member State, to advise and support the Commission in the monitoring and application of the Directive, including in the preparation of Commission guidance papers. This expert group could be built upon the existing informal Head of the Single Points of Contact' network. Last but not least, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation will continue to be carried out, in line with the current Council Regulation44, and eventually in line with its possible amendment45. These evaluation reports have so far covered the implementation of the Swedish Framework Decision. Future evaluations will encompass the application of the envisaged new Directive. • Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal This legislative proposal for a Directive is structured in six chapters: (1) General provisions for information exchange between Member States' law enforcement authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating criminal offences (Art. 1 to Art. 3) The first block of provisions builds on the structure and substance of the Swedish Framework Decision in force since 2006. In addition, it brings its scope and contents in line with the provisions concerning police cooperation (Title V, Chapter 4) as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in force since 2009. 44 OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27–37. 45 Commission proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing Regulation (EU) 1053/2013, 2 June 2021. EN 12 EN Article 1 defines the scope of application of the horizontal rules for exchanging information for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. The provisions of this Directive apply unless otherwise regulated by other, specific acts of EU law. Article 2 defines a number of key terms, such as the authorities subject to the horizontal rules on information exchange, the criminal offences concerned and the type of information available to law enforcement authorities. Article 3 outlines three principles that must be respected when exchanging information between the Member States under the Directive: the principle of equivalent access establishing that substantially the same conditions must exist for information exchanges within a Member State and between Member States; the principle of availability stating that if information is available concerning a criminal offence in a Member State, this must, as a general rule, be made available to other Member States as well; and the principle of confidentiality guaranteeing that Member States respect each other’s confidentiality requirements when treating such information by ensuring a similar level of protection. (2) Exchange of information through the Single Point of Contact (Art. 4 to Art. 6) Article 4 sets out a number of requirements regarding requests for information sent to the Single Point of Contact. This notably concerns criteria justifying the request and qualifying urgency. The request is to be submitted by the Single Point of Contact of other Member States or, where a Member State decides so, by other law enforcement authorities. The language used for the request must be chosen among a list of languages that each Member States is obliged to establish and that is to be published in the Official Journal of the EU. Article 5 establishes the obligation for the Single Point of Contact receiving the requests for information referred to in Article 4 to process and respond to the requests within precise time limits, which may be derogated from only in certain narrowly specified circumstances, namely, when a judicial authorisation is required. Such provision of information will have to be done in the same language used for the request. Article 6 lays down an exhaustive list of grounds that the Single Point of Contact may invoke, where objectively justified, to refuse the disclosure of the requested information, of which the relevant authority of the requesting Member State must be promptly informed. The possibility for the Single Point of Contact to seek clarifications as to the content of the requests is foreseen, which will suspend the applicable time limits, yet only if the clarifications are objectively necessary to avoid the request being refused. In respect of other clarifications that may be deemed necessary, there will be no such suspension. (3) Other exchanges of information (Art. 7 to Art. 8) Article 7 establishes the obligation for Member States to share information with another (other) Member State(s) spontaneously, i.e. on the relevant authority’s own initiative without a request for information having been submitted, when that information is likely to assist in achieving one of the purposes specified in the Directive. Article 8 ensures that the relevant Single Points of Contact are kept informed of any exchange of information upon request, other than requests submitted to the Single Point of Contact, i.e. either information exchanges upon request handled directly between law enforcement authorities of different Member States or upon requests for information submitted by a Single Point of Contact to a law enforcement authority of another Member State. This includes relevant information exchanges by Police and Customs Cooperation Centres and any other equivalent bodies, in as far as they qualify as law enforcement authorities under the proposed Directive. EN 13 EN (4) Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapter II and III (Art. 9 to Art. 13) Article 9 addresses situations where, under the national law of the Member State to which relevant information is available, a judicial authorisation is required for the provision of that information, either upon request or spontaneously and either by the Single Point of Contact or by a law enforcement authority. This provision gives effect to and further specifies the principle of equivalent access, meaning that substantially the same conditions must apply when the requested information is subject to judicial authorisation, regardless of the fact that the information is to be provided to an authority of another Member State rather than to an authority of the same Member State. This article also establishes that the authority concerned must immediately take all necessary steps, both practically and legally, in accordance with their national law, to obtain such judicial authorisation as soon as possible. Article 10 sets out certain requirements aimed at ensuring adequate protection of personal data, resulting in particular from the alignment with the rules of the LED. Article 11 regulates the language to be used by Single Points of Contact and law enforcement authorities in the situations specified in this Directive, both as regards the actual provision of information and any other communications related thereto. No such language requirements apply to the direct information exchanges and other communications referred to in Article 8. Member States are to establish a list of languages acceptable to them, which should also include English. Such lists must be published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the EU. Article 12 introduces the obligation for the Single Point Contact as well as all other law enforcement authorities to systematically keep informed Europol (meaning 'put in copy'), insofar as the exchanges concern crimes falling under the scope of Europol’s mandate as specified in its basic act. This obligation ensures that Europol can fulfil its role of information hub in the EU in relation to information relevant for law enforcement purposes. Article 13 requires all relevant authorities to use – and, to that aim, be directly connected to – the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), managed by Europol, for all exchanges of information and related communications covered by the Directive. These rules on the mandatory use of SIENA do not apply where specific acts of Union law contain different requirements on the communication channel to be used, for instance for information exchanges governed by the SIS Regulation46, given that exchanges under such specific acts are excluded from the scope of this Directive. (5) Minimum requirements on establishing a Single Point of Contact as a central entity to coordinate information exchange between Member States (Art. 14 to Art. 16) The fifth block of provisions sets out and builds on the obligation for each Member State to establish or designate a Single Point of Contact as the central entity coordinating information exchanges between its law enforcement authorities and those of other Member States within 46 OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing Regulation No 1987/2006; Regulation 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended. EN 14 EN the scope of the Directive. It lays out a number of minimum requirements that any Single Point of Contact must comply with. Article 14 sets out the tasks and capabilities of the Single Point of Contact. In order to carry out its functions, the Single Point of Contact is to have access to the necessary information and be kept systematically informed of all direct information exchanges between its national authorities and those of the other Member States. The actual establishment or designation of the Single Points of Contact must be notified, within a set time period, to the Commission, which must then publish such notifications in the Official Journal of the EU. Article 15 establishes minimum requirements regarding the composition of the Single Point of Contact, leaving a degree of flexibility to each Member State to determine its precise organisation and composition as deemed most appropriate depending on its national circumstances, provided the requirements of the Directive are met. Article 16 defines minimum requirements for the Case Management System of the Single Points of Contact. (6) Final provisions The final provisions ensure that the implementation of the proposed Directive is properly monitored. Firstly, by the Member States, through the obligation to collect and provide a minimum set of statistical data on a yearly basis (Article 17). Secondly, by the Commission, through the obligation to report to the European Parliament and the Council, having regard inter alia to the data provided by Member States, thus allowing, thirdly, those two institutions to monitor the Directive’s implementation as well (Article 18). Finally, Articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 deal with a number of necessary legal-technical issues, namely, the deletion or repeal of pre-existing rules which the rules of the proposed Directive replace, transposition into national law, as well as entry into force and addressees. As regards the existing rules contained in the CISA (Article 19), Article 39 thereof is replaced only insofar as it relates to information exchange for the purpose specified in the proposed Directive. Article 39 continues to be applicable to other forms of police cooperation covered by that article. In contrast, Article 46 of the CISA, which specifically relates to such information exchange, is fully superseded by the proposed Directive and is therefore deleted. EN 15 EN 2021/0411 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 87(2), point (a), thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, Whereas: (1) Transnational threats involving criminal activities call for a coordinated, targeted and adapted response. While national authorities operating on the ground are on the frontline in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, action at Union level is paramount to ensure efficient and effective cooperation, including as regards the exchange of information. Furthermore, organised crime and terrorism, in particular, are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. Those threats spread across borders and manifest themselves in organised crime and terrorist groups that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. (2) In an area without internal border controls, police officers in one Member State should have, within the framework of the applicable Union and national law, the possibility to obtain equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues in another Member State. In this regard, law enforcement authorities should cooperate effectively and by default across the Union. Therefore, an essential component of the measures that underpin public security in an interdependent area without internal border controls is police cooperation on the exchange of relevant information for law enforcement purposes. Exchange of information on crime and criminal activities, including terrorism, serves the overall objective of protecting the security of natural persons. (3) Exchange of information between Member States for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences is regulated by the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 198547, adopted on 19 June 1990, notably in its Articles 39 and 46. Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA48 partially replaced 47 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19). 48 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89). EN 16 EN those provisions and introduced new rules for the exchange of information and intelligence between Member States' law enforcement authorities. (4) Evaluations, including those carried under Council Regulation (EU) 1053/201349, indicated that Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is not sufficiently clear and does not ensure adequate and rapid exchange of relevant information between Member States. Evaluations also indicated that that Framework Decision is scarcely used in practice, in part due to the lack of clarity experienced in practice between the scope of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and of that Framework Decision. (5) Therefore, the existing legal framework consisting of the relevant provisions of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA should be updated and replaced, so as to facilitate and ensure, through the establishment of clear and harmonised rules, the adequate and rapid exchange of information between the competent law enforcement authorities of different Member States. (6) In particular, the discrepancies between the relevant provisions of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA should be addressed by covering information exchanges for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences, thereby fully superseding, insofar as such exchanges are concerned, Articles 39 and 46 of that Convention and hence providing the necessary legal certainty. In addition, the relevant rules should be simplified and clarified, so as to facilitate their effective application in practice. (7) It is necessary to lay down rules governing the cross-cutting aspects of such information exchange between Member States. The rules of this Directive should not affect the application of rules of Union law on specific systems or frameworks for such exchanges, such as under Regulations (EU) 2018/186050, (EU) 2018/186151, (EU) 2018/186252, and (EU) 2016/79453 of the European Parliament and of the 49 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27). 50 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1). 51 Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing Regulation No 1987/2006 (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 14). 52 Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 56). 53 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53). EN 17 EN Council, Directives (EU) 2016/68154 and 2019/115355 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA56 and 2008/616/JHA57. (8) This Directive does not govern the provision and use of information as evidence in judicial proceedings. In particular, it should not be understood as establishing a right to use the information provided under this Directive as evidence and, consequently, it leaves unaffected any requirement provided for in the applicable law to obtain the consent from the Member State providing the information for such use. This Directive leaves acts of Union law on evidence, such as Regulation (EU) …/…58 [on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters] and Directive (EU) …/…59 [laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings], unaffected. (9) All exchanges of information under this Directive should be subject to three general principles, namely those of availability, equivalent access and confidentiality. While those principles are without prejudice to the more specific provisions of this Directive, they should guide its interpretation and application where relevant. For example, the principle of availability should be understood as indicating that relevant information available to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of one Member State should also be available, to the largest extent possible, to those of other Member States. However, the principle should not affect the application, where justified, of specific provisions of this Directive restricting the availability of information, such as those on the grounds for refusal of requests for information and judicial authorisation. In addition, pursuant to the principle of equivalent access, the access of the Single Point of Contact and the law enforcement authorities of other Member States to relevant information should be substantially the same as, and thus be neither stricter nor less strict than, the access of those of one and the same Member State, subject to the Directive’s more specific provisions. (10) In order to achieve the objective to facilitate and ensure the adequate and rapid exchange of information between Member States, provision should be made for obtaining such information by addressing a request for information to the Single Point of Contact of the other Member State concerned, in accordance with certain clear, simplified and harmonised requirements. Concerning the content of such requests for information, it should in particular be specified, in an exhaustive and sufficiently detailed manner and without prejudice to the need for a case-by-case assessment, when 54 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132). 55 Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122). 56 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1). 57 Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12). A proposal for a Regulation on automated data exchange for police cooperation ("Prüm II"), intends to repeal parts of those Council Decisions. 58 Regulation proposal, COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD). 59 Directive proposal, COM/2018/226 final - 2018/0107 (COD). EN 18 EN they are to be considered as urgent and which explanations they are to contain as minimum. (11) Whilst the Single Points of Contact of each Member State should in any event have the possibility to submit requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State, in the interest of flexibility, Member States should be allowed to decide that, in addition, their law enforcement authorities may also submit such requests. In order for Single Points of Contact to be able to perform their coordinating functions under this Directive, it is however necessary that, where a Member State takes such a decision, its Single Point of Contact is made aware of all such outgoing requests, as well as of any communications relating thereto, by always being put in copy. (12) Time limits are necessary to ensure rapid processing of requests for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact. Such time limits should be clear and proportionate and take into account whether the request for information is urgent and whether a prior judicial authorisation is required. In order to ensure compliance with the applicable time limits whilst nonetheless allowing for a degree of flexibility where objectively justified, it is necessary to allow, on an exceptional basis, for deviations only where, and in as far as, the competent judicial authority of the requested Member State needs additional time to decide on granting the necessary judicial authorisation. Such a need could arise, for example, because of the broad scope or the complexity of the matters raised by the request for information. (13) In exceptional cases, it may be objectively justified for a Member State to refuse a request for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the system created by this Directive, those cases should be exhaustively specified and interpreted restrictively. When only parts of the information concerned by such a request for information relate to the reasons for refusing the request, the remaining information is to be provided within the time limits set by this Directive. Provision should be made for the possibility to ask for clarifications, which should suspend the applicable time limits. However, such possibility should only exist where the clarifications are objectively necessary and proportionate, in that the request for information would otherwise have to be refused for one of the reasons listed in this Directive. In the interest of effective cooperation, it should remain possible to request necessary clarifications also in other situations, without this however leading to suspension of the time limits. (14) In order to allow for the necessary flexibility in view of operational needs that may vary in practice, provision should be made for two other means of exchanging information, in addition to requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact. The first one is the spontaneous provision of information, that is, on the own initiative of either the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities without a prior request. The second one is the provision of information upon requests for information submitted either by Single Points of Contact or by law enforcement authorities not to the Single Point of Contact, but rather directly to the law enforcement authorities of another Member State. In respect of both means, only a limited number of minimum requirements should be set, in particular on keeping the Single Points of Contact informed and, as regards own-initiative provision of information, the situations in which information is to be provided and the language to be used. EN 19 EN (15) The requirement of a prior judicial authorisation for the provision of information can be an important safeguard. The Member States' legal systems are different in this respect and this Directive should not be understood as affecting such requirements established under national law, other than subjecting them to the condition that domestic exchanges and exchanges between Member States are treated in an equivalent manner, both on the substance and procedurally. Furthermore, in order to keep any delays and complications relating to the application of such a requirement to a minimum, the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities, as applicable, of the Member State of the competent judicial authority should take all practical and legal steps, where relevant in cooperation with the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authority of another Member State that requested the information, to obtain the judicial authorisation as soon as possible. (16) It is particularly important that the protection of personal data, in accordance with Union law, is ensured in connection to all exchanges of information under this Directive. To that aim, the rules of this Directive should be aligned with Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council 60. In particular, it should be specified that any personal data exchanged by Single Points of Contacts and law enforcement authorities is to remain limited to the categories of data listed in Section B point 2, of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council61. Furthermore, as far as possible, any such personal data should be distinguished according to their degree of accuracy and reliability, whereby facts should be distinguished from personal assessments, in order to ensure both the protection of individuals and the quality and reliability of the information exchanged. If it appears that the personal data are incorrect, they should be rectified or erased without delay. Such rectification or erasure, as well as any other processing of personal data in connection to the activities under this Directive, should be carried out in compliance with the applicable rules of Union law, in particular Directive (EU) 2016/680 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council62, which rules this Directive leaves unaffected. (17) In order to allow for adequate and rapid provision of information by Single Points of Contact, either upon request or on their own initiative, it is important that the relevant officials of the Member States concerned understand each other. Language barriers often hamper the cross-border exchange of information. For this reason, rules should be established on the use of languages in which requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact, the information to be provided by Single Points of Contact as well as any other communications relating thereto, such as on refusals and clarifications, are to be provided. Those rules should strike a balance between, on the 60 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 89). 61 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53). 62 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1). EN 20 EN one hand, respecting the linguistic diversity within the Union and keeping costs of translation as limited as possible and, on the other hand, operational needs associated with adequate and rapid exchanges of information across borders. Therefore, Member States should establish a list containing one or more official languages of the Union of their choice, but containing also one language that is broadly understood and used in practice, namely, English. (18) The further development of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) as the Union’s criminal information hub is a priority. That is why, when information or any related communications are exchanged, irrespective of whether that is done pursuant to a request for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact or law enforcement authority, or on their own-imitative, a copy should be sent to Europol, however only insofar as it concerns offences falling within the scope of the objectives of Europol. In practice, this can be done through the ticking by default of the corresponding SIENA box. (19) The proliferation of communication channels used for the transmission of law enforcement information between Member States and of communications relating thereto should be remedied, as it hinders the adequate and rapid exchange of such information. Therefore, the use of the secure information exchange network application called SIENA, managed by Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794, should be made mandatory for all such transmissions and communications under this Directive, including the sending of requests for information submitted to Single Points of Contact and directly to law enforcement authorities, the provision of information upon such requests and on their own initiative, communications on refusals and clarifications, as well as copies to Single Points of Contact and Europol. To that aim, all Single Points of Contact, as well as all law enforcement authorities that may be involved in such exchanges, should be directly connected to SIENA. In this regard, a transition period should be provided for, however, in order to allow for the full roll-out of SIENA. (20) In order to simplify, facilitate and better manage information flows, Member States should each establish or designate one Single Point of Contact competent for coordinating information exchanges under this Directive. The Single Points of Contact should, in particular, contribute to mitigating the fragmentation of the law enforcement authorities' landscape, specifically in relation to information flows, in response to the growing need to jointly tackle cross-border crime, such as drug trafficking and terrorism. For the Single Points of Contact to be able to effectively fulfil their coordinating functions in respect of the cross-border exchange of information for law enforcement purposes under this Directive, they should be assigned a number of specific, minimum tasks and also have certain minimum capabilities. (21) Those capabilities of the Single Points of Contact should include having access to all information available within its own Member State, including by having user-friendly access to all relevant Union and international databases and platforms, in accordance with the modalities specified in the applicable Union and national law. In order to be able to meet the requirements of this Directive, especially those on the time limits, the Single Points of Contact should be provided with adequate resources, including adequate translation capabilities, and function around the clock. In that regard, having a front desk that is able to screen, process and channel incoming requests for information may increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Those capabilities should also include having at their disposition, at all times, judicial authorities competent to grant necessary judicial authorisations. In practice, this can be done, for example, by EN 21 EN ensuring the physical presence or the functional availability of such judicial authorities, either within the premises of the Single Point of Contact or directly available on call. (22) In order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under this Directive, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of representatives of national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this Directive. While it is for each Member State to decide on the precise organisation and composition needed to meet that requirement, such representatives may include police, customs and other law enforcement authorities competent for preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences, as well as possible contact points for the regional and bilateral offices, such as liaison officers and attachés seconded or posted in other Member States and relevant Union law enforcement agencies, such as Europol. However, in the interest of effective coordination, at minimum, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of representatives of the Europol national unit, the SIRENE Bureau, the passenger information unit and the Interpol National Central Bureau, as established under the relevant legislation and notwithstanding this Directive not being applicable to information exchanges specifically regulated by such Union legislation. (23) The deployment and operation of an electronic single Case Management System having certain minimum functions and capabilities by the Single Points of Contact is necessary to allow them to carry out their tasks under this Directive in an effective and efficient manner, in particular as regards information management. (24) To enable the necessary monitoring and evaluation of the application of this Directive, Member States should be required to collect and annually provide to the Commission certain data. This requirement is necessary, in particular, to remedy the lack of comparable data quantifying relevant information exchanges and also facilitates the reporting obligation of the Commission. (25) The cross-border nature of crime and terrorism requires Member States to rely on one another to tackle such criminal offences. Adequate and rapid information flows between relevant law enforcement authorities and to Europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone. Due to the scale and effects of the action, this can be better achieved at Union level through the establishment of common rules on the exchange of information. Thus, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. (26) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Directive builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark should, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Directive whether it will implement it in its national law. EN 22 EN (27) This Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland takes part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC63; Ireland is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is bound by it. (28) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis64 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC65. (29) As regards Switzerland, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis66 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC67 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA68. (30) As regards Liechtenstein, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis69 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU70 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU71, 63 Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002). 64 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 65 Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999). 66 OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. 67 Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 68 Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 69 OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. 70 Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011). 71 Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the EN 23 EN HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Chapter I General provisions Article 1 Subject matter and scope 1. This Directive establishes rules for the exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States where necessary for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. In particular, this Directive establishes rules on: (a) requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact established or designated by the Member States, in particular on the content of such requests, mandatory time limits for providing the requested information, reasons for refusals of such requests and the channel of communication to be used in connection to such requests; (b) the own-initiative provision of relevant information to Single Points of Contact or to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, in particular the situations and the manner in which such information is to be provided; (c) the channel of communication to be used for all exchanges of information and the information to be provided to the Single Points of Contact in relation to exchanges of information directly between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States; (d) the establishment, tasks, composition and capabilities of the Single Point of Contact, including on the deployment of a single electronic Case Management System for the fulfilment of its tasks. 2. This Directive shall not apply to exchanges of information between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences that are specifically regulated by other acts of Union law. 3. This Directive does not impose any obligation on Member States to: (a) obtain information by means of coercive measures, taken in accordance with national law, for the purpose of providing it to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States; (b) store information for the purpose referred to in point (a); (c) provide information to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States to be used as evidence in judicial proceedings Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis relating in particular to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011). EN 24 EN 4. This Directive does not establish any right to use the information provided in accordance with this Directive as evidence in judicial proceedings. Article 2 Definitions For the purpose of this Directive: (1) 'law enforcement authority' means any authority of the Member States competent under national law for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences; (2) 'criminal offences' means any of the following: (a) offences referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA72; (b) offences referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794; (c) tax crimes relating to direct and indirect taxes, as laid down in national law; (3) 'information' means any content concerning one or more natural persons, facts or circumstances relevant to law enforcement authorities in connection to the exercise of their tasks under national law of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences; (4) 'available' information means information that is either held by the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State, or information that those Single Points of Contact or those law enforcement authorities can obtain from other public authorities or from private parties established in that Member State without coercive measures; (5) ‘SIENA’ means the secure information exchange network application, managed by Europol, aimed at facilitating the exchange of information between Member States and Europol; (6) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in Article 4, point (1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Article 3 Principles of information exchange Member States shall, in connection to all exchanges of information under this Directive, ensure that: (a) any relevant information available to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of Member States is provided to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of other Member States (‘principle of availability’); (b) the conditions for requesting information from the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, and those for providing information to the Single Points of Contact and the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, are equivalent to those applicable for 72 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). EN 25 EN requesting and providing similar information from and to their own law enforcement authorities (‘principle of equivalent access’); (c) information provided to the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of another Member State that is marked as confidential is protected by those law enforcement authorities in accordance with the requirements set out in the national law of that Member State offering a similar level of confidentiality (‘principle of confidentiality’). Chapter II Exchanges of information through Single Points of Contact Article 4 Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact 1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact and, where they have so decided, their law enforcement authorities submit requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member States in accordance with the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 to 5. Where a Member State has decided that, in addition to its Single Point of Contact, its law enforcement authorities may also submit requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member States, it shall ensure that those authorities send, at the same time as submitting such requests, a copy of those requests, and of any other communication relating thereto, to the Single Point of Contact of that Member State. 2. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State shall be submitted only where there are objective reasons to believe that: (a) the requested information is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose referred to in Article 1(1); (b) the requested information is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State. 3. Any request for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State shall specify whether or not it is urgent. Those requests for information shall be considered urgent if, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances of the case at hand, there are objective reasons to believe that the requested information is one or more of the following: (a) essential for the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to the public security of a Member State; (b) necessary in order to protect a person’s vital interests which are at imminent risk; (c) necessary to adopt a decision that may involve the maintenance of restrictive measures amounting to a deprivation of liberty; (d) at imminent risk of losing relevance if not provided urgently. EN 26 EN 4. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State shall contain all necessary explanations to allow for their adequate and rapid processing in accordance with this Directive, including at least the following: (a) a specification of the requested information that is as detailed as reasonably possible under the given circumstances; (b) a description of the purpose for which the information is requested; (c) the objective reasons according to which it is believed that the requested information is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State; (d) an explanation of the connection between the purpose and the person or persons to whom the information relates, where applicable; (e) the reasons for which the request is considered urgent, where applicable. 5. Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State shall be submitted in one of the languages included in the list established by the requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11. Article 5 Provision of information pursuant to requests to the Single Point of Contact 1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article and to Article 6(3), Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact provides the information requested in accordance with Article 4 as soon as possible and in any event within the following time limits, as applicable: (a) eight hours, for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State without having to obtain a judicial authorisation; (b) three calendar days, for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State subject to a requirement to obtain a judicial authorisation; (c) seven calendar days, for all requests that are not urgent. The time periods laid down in the first subparagraph shall commence at the moment of the reception of the request for information. 2. Where under its national law in accordance with Article 9 the requested information is available only after having obtained a judicial authorisation, the requested Member State may deviate from the time limits referred to paragraph 1 insofar as necessary for obtaining such authorisation. In such cases, Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact does both of the following: (i) immediately inform the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State of the expected delay, specifying the length of the expected delay and the reasons therefore; (ii) subsequently keep it updated and provide the requested information as soon as possible after obtaining the judicial authorisation. EN 27 EN 3. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact provides the information requested in accordance with Article 4 to the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, in the language in which that request for information was submitted in accordance with Article 4(5). Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact provides the requested information to the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, it also sends, at the same time, a copy of the information to the Single Point of Contact of that Member State. Article 6 Refusals of requests for information 1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact only refuses to provide the information requested in accordance with Article 4 insofar as any of the following reasons applies: (a) the requested information is not available to the Single Point of Contact and the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State; (b) the request for information does not meet the requirements set out in Article 4; (c) the judicial authorisation required under the national law of the requested Member State in accordance with Article 9 was refused; (d) the requested information constitutes personal data other than that falling within the categories of personal data referred to in Article 10, point (i); (e) there are objective reasons to believe that the provision of the requested information would: (i) be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the requested Member State; (ii) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation of a criminal offence; or; (iii) unduly harm the vital interests of a natural or legal person. Any refusal shall only affect the part of the requested information to which the reasons set out in the first subparagraph relate and shall, where applicable, leave the obligation to provide the other parts of the information in accordance with this Directive unaffected. 2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact informs the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State of the refusal, specifying the reasons for the refusal, within the time limits provided for in Article 5(1). 3. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact immediately requests additional clarifications needed to process a request for information that otherwise would have to be refused from the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State. The time limits referred to in Article 5(1) shall be suspended from the moment that the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State receives the request for clarifications, until the moment EN 28 EN that the Single Point of Contact of the requested Member State receives the clarifications. 4. The refusals, reasons for the refusals, requests for clarifications and clarifications referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as any other communications relating to the requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State, shall be transmitted in the language in which that request was submitted in accordance with Article 4(5). Chapter III Other exchanges of information Article 7 Own-initiative provision of information 1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities provide, on their own initiative, any information available to them to the Single Points of Contact or to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, where there are objective reasons to believe that such information could be relevant to that Member State for the purpose referred to in Article 1(1). However, no such obligation shall exist insofar as the reasons referred to in points (c), (d) or (e) of Article 6(1) apply in respect of such information. 2. Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities provide information on their own-initiative in accordance with paragraph 1, they do so in one of the languages included in the list established by the requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11. Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities provide such information to the law enforcement authority of another Member State, they also send, at the same time, a copy of that information to the Single Point of Contact of that other Member State. Article 8 Exchanges of information upon requests submitted directly to law enforcement authorities Member States shall ensure that, where Single Points of Contact or law enforcement authorities submit requests for information directly to the law enforcement authorities of another Member State, their Single Points of Contact or their law enforcement authorities send, at the same time as they send such requests, provide information pursuant to such requests or send any other communications relating thereto, a copy thereof to the Single Point of Contact of that other Member State and, where the sender is a law enforcement authority, also to the Single Point of Contact of its own Member State. Chapter IV Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapters II and III Article 9 Judicial authorisation EN 29 EN 1. Member States shall not require any judicial authorisation for the provision of information to the Single Points of Contact or law enforcement authority of another Member State under Chapters II and III, where no such requirement applies in respect of similar provision of information to their own Single Point of Contact or their own law enforcement authorities. 2. Member States shall ensure that, where their national law requires a judicial authorisation for the provision of information to the Single Points of Contact or the law enforcement authority of another Member State in accordance with paragraph 1, their Single Points of Contact or their law enforcement authorities immediately take all necessary steps, in accordance with their national law, to obtain such judicial authorisation as soon as possible. 3. The requests for judicial authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be assessed and decided upon in accordance with the national law of the Member State of the competent judicial authority. Article 10 Additional rules for information constituting personal data Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities provide information under Chapters II and III that constitutes personal data: (i) the categories of personal data provided remain limited to those listed in Section B, point 2, of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794; (ii) their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities also provide, at the same time and insofar as possible, the necessary elements enabling the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authority of the other Member State to assess the degree of accuracy, completeness and reliability of the personal data, as well as the extent to which the personal data are up to date. Article 11 List of languages 1. Member States shall establish and keep up to date a list with one or more of the official languages of the Union in which their Single Point of Contact is able to provide information upon a request for information or on its own initiative. That list shall include English. 2. Member States shall provide those lists, as well as any updates thereof, to the Commission. The Commission shall publish those lists, as well as any updates thereof, in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 12 Provision of information to Europol Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities send requests for information, provide information pursuant to such requests, provide information on their own initiative or send other communications relating thereto under Chapters II and III, they also send, at the same time, a copy thereof to Europol, insofar as the information to which the communication relates concerns offences falling within the scope of the objectives of Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794. EN 30 EN Article 13 Use of SIENA 1. Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement authorities send requests for information, provide information pursuant to such requests, provide information on their own initiative or send other communications relating thereto under Chapters II and III or under Article 12, they do so through SIENA. 2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact, as well as all their law enforcement authorities that may be involved in the exchange of information under this Directive, are directly connected to SIENA. Chapter V Single Point of Contact for information exchange between Member States Article 14 Establishment, tasks and capabilities 1. Each Member State shall establish or designate one national Single Point of Contact, which shall be the central entity responsible for coordinating exchanges of information under this Directive. 2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact is empowered to carry out at least all of the following tasks: (a) receive and evaluate requests for information; (b) channel requests for information to the appropriate national law enforcement authority or authorities and, where necessary, coordinate among them the processing of such requests and the provision of information upon such requests; (c) analyse and structure information with a view to providing it to the Single Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States; (d) provide, upon request or upon its own initiative, information to the Single Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States in accordance with Articles 5 and 7; (e) refuse to provide information in accordance with Article 6 and, where necessary, request clarifications in accordance with Article 6(3); (f) send requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member States in accordance with Article 4 and, where necessary, provide clarifications in accordance with Article 6(3). 3. Member States shall ensure that: (a) their Single Point of Contact has access to all information available to their law enforcement authorities, insofar as necessary to carry out its tasks under this Directive; (b) their Single Point of Contact carries out its tasks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; EN 31 EN (c) their Single Point of Contact is provided with the staff, resources and capabilities, including for translation, necessary to carry out its tasks in an adequate and rapid manner in accordance with this Directive and in particular the time limits set out in Article 5(1); (d) the judicial authorities competent to grant the judicial authorisations required under national law in accordance with Article 9 are available to the Single Point of Contact 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 4. Within one month of the establishment or designation of their Single Point of Contact, Member States shall notify the Commission thereof. They shall update that information where necessary. The Commission shall publish those notifications, as well as any updates thereof, in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 15 Composition 1. Member States shall determine the organisation and the composition of its Single Point of Contact in such a manner that it can carry out its tasks under this Directive in an efficient and effective manner. 2. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact is composed of representatives of national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this Directive, including at least the following insofar as the Member State concerned is bound by the relevant legislation to establish or designate such units or bureaux: (a) the Europol national unit established by Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794; (b) the SIRENE Bureau established by Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council73; (c) the passenger information unit established under Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/681; (d) the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) established by Article 32 of Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL. Article 16 Case Management System 1. Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact deploys and operates an electronic single Case Management System as the repository that allows the Single Point of Contact to carry out its tasks under this Directive. The Case Management System shall have at least all of the following functions and capabilities: 73 Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 312 7.12.2018, p. 56). EN 32 EN (a) recording incoming and outgoing requests for information referred to in Articles 5 and 8, as well as any other communications with Single Points of Contact and, where applicable, law enforcement authorities of other Member States relating to such requests, including the information about refusals and the requests for and provision of clarifications referred to in Article 6(2) and (3) respectively; (b) recording communications between the Single Point of Contact and national law enforcement authorities, pursuant to Article 15(2), point (b); (c) recording provisions of information to the Single Point of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States in accordance with Articles 5, 7 and 8; (d) cross-checking incoming requests for information referred to in Articles 5 and 8, against information available to the Single Point of Contact, including information provided in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 5(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 7(2) and other relevant information recorded in the Case Management System; (e) ensuring adequate and rapid follow-up to incoming requests for information referred to in Article 4, in particular with a view to respecting the time limits for the provision of the requested information set out in Article 5; (f) be interoperable with SIENA, ensuring in particular that incoming communications through SIENA can be directly recorded in, and that outgoing communications through SIENA can be directly sent from, the Case Management System; (g) generating statistics in respect of exchanges of information under this Directive for evaluation and monitoring purposes, in particular for the purpose of Article 17; (h) logging of access and of other processing activities in relation to the information contained in the Case Management System, for accountability and cybersecurity purposes. 2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all cybersecurity risks relating to the Case Management System, in particular as regards its architecture, governance and control, are managed and addressed in a prudent and effective manner and that adequate safeguards against unauthorised access and abuse are provided for. 3. Member States shall ensure that any personal data processed by their Single Point of Contact are contained in the Case Management System only for as long as is necessary and proportionate for the purposes for which the personal data are processed and are subsequently irrevocably deleted. Chapter VI Final provisions Article 17 Statistics EN 33 EN 1. Member States shall provide the Commission with statistics on the exchanges of information with other Member States under this Directive, by 1 March of each year. 2. The statistics shall cover, as a minimum: (a) the number of requests for information submitted by their Single Point of Contact and by their law enforcement authorities; (b) the number of requests for information received and replied to by the Single Point of Contact and by their law enforcement authorities, broken down by urgent and non-urgent, and broken down by the other Member States receiving the information; (c) the number of requests for information refused pursuant to Article 6, broken down per requesting Member States and per grounds of refusal; (d) the number of cases where the time limits referred to in Article 5(1) were deviated from due to having to obtain a judicial authorisation in accordance with Article 5(2), broken down by the Member States having submitted the requests for information concerned. Article 18 Reporting 1. The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 3 years], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the implementation of this Directive. 2. The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 5 years], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing the effectivity and effectiveness of this Directive. The Commission shall take into account the information provided by Member States and any other relevant information related to the transposition and implementation of this Directive. On the basis of this evaluation, the Commission shall decide on appropriate follow-up actions, including, if necessary, a legislative proposal. Article 19 Amendments to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement From [the date referred to in Article 21(1), the first subparagraph], the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement is amended as follows: (i) Article 39 is replaced by this Directive insofar as that article relates to the exchange of information for the purpose referred to in Article 1(1) of this Directive; (ii) Article 46 is deleted. Article 20 Repeal Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is repealed from [the date referred to in Article 21(1), the first subparagraph]. References to that Framework Decision shall be construed as references to the corresponding provisions of this Directive. EN 34 EN Article 21 Transposition 1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [date of entry into force + 2 years]. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions. They shall apply those provisions from that date. However, they shall apply Article 13 from [date of entry into force + 4 years]. When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. Article 22 Entry into force This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 23 Addressees This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties. Done at Brussels, For the European Parliament For the Council The President The President EN 35 EN EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8.12.2021 SWD(2021) 375 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on operational police cooperation {COM(2021) 780 final} EN EN SYNOPSIS REPORT This report provides a summary of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken while preparing the Commission proposal for a Council Recommendation on operational police cooperation. 1. CONSULTATION STRATEGY The aim of the consultation was to receive relevant input from stakeholders to enable an evidence-based preparation of future Commission initiatives on improving law enforcement cooperation between Member States. Stakeholders were consulted between July 2019 and July 2021. This consisted of expert workshops in 2019 followed by expert and policy discussions in relevant Council working parties, which led to Council Conclusions on issues covered by this proposal. The Commission also gained extensive knowledge of the issues at hand from the ongoing Schengen evaluations on police evaluation that have been carried out in all Schengen States since 2019 and are still ongoing. In addition, it conducted targeted stakeholder consultations by way of an external study and two workshops it hosted with Member States and Schengen Associated Countries’ representatives. The Commission identified relevant stakeholders and consulted them throughout the development of this proposal. It sought views from a range of subject matter experts, national authorities, civil society organisations and from members of the public on their expectations and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU. 2. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES (SUMMARY) 2.1. Feedback on the inception impact assessment As part of the inception impact assessment on an ‘EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime’, the Commmission organised a call for feedback, seeking views from interested stakeholders, from 28 September to 16 November 2020. The consultation, which sought feedback from public authorities, businesses, civil society organisations and the public, was open from 4 May 2020 to 9 July 2020. Respondents were able to provide online comments and submit position papers to provide more background on their views. The Commission received four contributions1, which were integrated as part of the study’s findings. 2.2. Consultations during the study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation 2.3.1. Feedback on the public consultation The public consultation was carried out from 19 April to 14 June 2021. The Commission received 20 contributions, which it integrated as part of the study’s findings. 2.3.2. Targeted consultation – questionnaires The Commission also held an online survey in the form of questionnaires made accessible to targeted stakeholders via the EUSurvey tool as part of the study. This consultation aimed to receive feedback, comments and observations on the challenges identified in the legal proposal. The questionnaires were tailored to different stakeholders. The Commission received 239 contributions, which served as the basis for the study’s findings. 1 EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 1 2.3.3. Consultation of Member State experts by way of meetings In the course of the consultation undertaken as part of the study, the contractor organised two workshops on 24 March and 25 May 2021. Representatives of the Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission were invited. The first workshop aimed to exchange views with and between Member States and Schengen Associated Countries on their current challenges when engaging in cross-border law enforcement cooperation and on possible options addressing them and their respective impacts. The Commission also made use of the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP)2 meetings of 22 February and 16 March 2021 to brief Member States on its preparatory work and relevant technical deliberations, in the context of strengthening law enforcement cooperation, and to explore Member States’ views on the problems and potential solutions. The same was done at the Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP)3 on 23 March 2021. On 26 May 2021, the contractor carrying out the study presented the findings from the questionnaire sent to national Single Points of Contact to gather additional information. 2.3.4. Semi-structured interviews The consultation conducted as part of the study included targeted bilateral and multilateral semi-structured interviews with stakeholders on the basis of formalised and open-ended questions allowing for open and in-depth discussions. These interviews were conducted from March to June 2020 via teleconferencing. They included in particular relevant EU agencies, services and Commission Directorates-General, national experts and academics. 3. STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION A large number of stakeholders were consulted either directly by the Commission, during the study or during the discussions in the relevant Council working parties that addressed the issues covered by the present proposal. The stakeholders included:  EU institutions, agencies and bodies (e.g. Europol, Frontex, eu-LISA, Eurojust, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the General Secretariat of the Council);  law enforcement and judicial authorities in the Member States and Schengen Associated Countries (e.g. police, customs);  data protection authorities;  non-governmental organisations, academia, civil society organisations. Feedback on the inception impact assessment included responses from members of the public and non-governmental organisations with an interest in this field. 4. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS During the consultation process, the Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of consultation. They included: 2 This is a Council preparatory body that handles work relating to legislative activities as well as cross- border policing and related operational issues. 3 This is a Council preparatory body that handles work relating to operational cooperation among national customs administrations. LEWP and CCWP are now referred to as LEWP-Police and LEWP- Customs in the Council. 2 • open consultation on the inception impact assessment, which sought views from all interested parties; • targeted stakeholder workshops that focused on subject matter experts, including practitioners at national level. Taking into account the technicalities and specific requirements and characteristics of the subject, the Commission focused on targeted consultations, addressing a broad range of stakeholders at national and EU level. The Commission took into account the findings of the ‘Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation’. This was commissioned by DG HOME and developed by a consortium of contractors based on desk research and the following stakeholder consultation methods: scoping interviews, questionnaire and online survey (open public consultation), semi- structured interviews, case studies and two online workshops. The Commission also took into account the findings of the Schengen evaluations on police cooperation carried out by the Commission and Member State experts, which included adetailed questionnaire, planned and unplanned on-site visits and interviews. The Commission participated in the following evaluations in the field of police cooperation: 2015 – Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Liechtenstein; 2016 – Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Croatia, Malta, France; 2017 – Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain; 2018 – Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Switzerland; 2019 – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; 2020 – Germany, Austria, Lichtenstein; 2021 – Belgium, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, Italy, Malta. In addition, the Commission took into account the expert discussions that took place in the Council for the preparation of Council Conclusions on the subject. These included replies to written questionnaires together with expert and policy discussions in the relevant Council working parties. The aforementioned range of viewpoints ensured that the Commission proposal addressed the needs and took account of the concerns of a wide range of stakeholders. Moreover, it allowed the Commission to gather necessary data, facts and views on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value of the proposal. Taking into consideration the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions and inability to interact in person with relevant stakeholders, the consultation activities focused on alternatives such as online surveys, semi-structured phone interviews as well as meetings via video conference. 5. RESULTS 5.1. CONSULTATION ON THE INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT This public consultation on the inception impact assessment received four answers. Two were from members of the public, one from a private company and one from a European police trade union association. All the responses have been published in full online. The European Confederation of Police (EuroCOP) indicated the need to improve police cooperation, which is particularly relevant for border territories. They should be allowed to develop direct cooperation between corresponding police forces under Article 40 of the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). EuroCOP supported streamlining and developing the different EU legal texts and non-binding guidelines on police 3 cooperation into one consolidated legal text and turning some of the most advanced types of police cooperation included in recent bilateral cooperation agreements between Member States into EU law. This includes the creation of a comprehensive list of investigative tools for effectively fighting serious and organised crime. 5.2. STUDY TO SUPPORT THE PREPARATION OF AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON EU POLICY INITIATIVES FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION The study highlighted specific areas where there is scope for improvement on cross-border cooperation. This includes the use of joint patrols at border regions. While recognised as good practice and despite the existence of specific EU measures aimed at regulating their use, there is evidence that they are underused. Besides joint patrols, mutual assistance during large-scale events has also proved to be limited. Three main drivers contribute towards an insufficient deployment of joint operations: a) the legal driver, namely the limited and at times asymmetric conferral of executive powers of law enforcement officials operating in the respective host countries, as well as limited awareness of these powers on the ground; b) the technical driver, namely that officials on the ground have limited remote access to relevant law enforcement databases; c) structural drivers, namely that specialised national analytical departments rarely cooperate with similar departments in other countries to design actionable joint cross-border threat assessments/risk analysis and the limited integration of police and customs information and analysis. With respect to hot pursuits, the study identified inconsistencies that hamper the efficient use of this tool during cross-border operations. Even though the use of CISA as the legal basis ensures a certain degree of consistency, bilateral agreements often add a number of more specific and operational rules for the implementation of the tool in the different regional contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated differently depending on the regional agreement under which it is applied. Issues mainly relate to differences in the right granted by the national law to foreign officials to arrest/apprehend a suspect. Differences in territorial and time restrictions represent another barrier to the use of cross-border hot pursuits, with countries applying different restrictions to foreign officials when implementing these tools. On surveillance, besides differences in the surveillance methods adopted at national level, there are also differences in the maximum time allowed by different Member States or Schengen associated countries to carry out surveillance activities. This leads to cases (in countries where this period is comparatively shorter) in which the timeframe might not be sufficient to get evidence about a criminal activity or organisation. The study also identified the limited availability of training for law enforcement staff involved in cross-border cooperation. Training is not conducted on a regular basis and does not always take into account the latest developments. There is also a limited awareness and knowledge of relevant databases and about the executive powers conferred by different Member States. Language barriers also hamper effective cross-border operational police cooperation. 5.3. WORKSHOPS ON THE FUTURE OF EU LAW ENFORCEMENT. Given the sensitivities relating to police cooperation between Member States, the Commission launched a series of consultations with external stakeholders as early as 2019 as part of the ‘future of EU law enforcement’ initiative. It gathered experts from the Member States and relevant Justice and Home Affairs agencies in a series of workshops to discuss the current challenges and outlook on different topics relating to police cooperation and information exchange. Participants included all 27 Member States, Schengen Associated 4 Countries, relevant EU agencies such as Europol, Frontex, eu-LISA, Eurojust and FRA, and the General Secretariat of the Council. In July 2019, the Commission organised a first expert workshop that covered topics on best practices and challenges of the Police Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs), joint police stations, and cross-border investigations. The workshop also discussed the need to review the current legal framework on cross-border operational police cooperation. The majority of Member States supported the consolidation and modernisation of the EU legal framework on police cooperation. There was agreement that the different EU texts and bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements on police cooperation leave officers confused as to what they can or cannot do, which often significantly limits their actions. A number of Member States called for the need to reinvent the PCCC model and strengthen it. The presentation on the permanent joint Franco-Swiss operational brigade carrying out cross- border investigations in France and Switzerland garnered interest from other Member States. The first workshop concluded with a broad consensus among Member States on the need to develop a national risk analysis structure in each Member State. This would better target operations involving police, customs and border guards. National risk analysis should fully cover the cross-border dimension and be translated at tactical and operational levels. Importantly, PCCCs could contribute to the development of a more precise local/regional crime threat picture. Participants agreed with the need to develop permanent structures for joint cross-border investigation at local/regional level, possibly by setting up mixed investigator teams inspired by the Franco-Swiss and German-Czech permanent police stations. In addition, there was broad agreement on the need to:  simplify and consolidate the EU legal framework on police cooperation so as to facilitate and broaden the use of cross-border operational tools, in particular cross- border hot pursuits and surveillance operation;  clarify the powers of police officers when acting on a foreign territory (same power to arrest, detain, use his firearms, liability);  facilitate action in a neighbouring country. In October 2019, the Commission organised a second expert workshop that covered topics on police cooperation training. It aimed to identify good practices and concrete measures to boost the added value of EU support to law enforcement training in a cross-border context. The workshop discussed the role of CEPOL and Member States in providing training and the opportunity to create an ‘Erasmus of Police’ large-scale exchange programme in order to foster a true culture of European policing. The presentation on the integrated joint training of police cadets between the French gendarmerie and Spanish Guardia Civil garnered interest from other Member States. In December 2019, the Commission organised a third expert workshop that covered topics on information management (access to, exchange of and analysis of information for law enforcement purposes), notably the role of national Single Points of Contact. The workshop also addressed the impact of new technologies and innovation on law enforcement, in particular the development of the Europol Innovation Lab. In January 2020, the Commission organised a fourth and final expert workshop on the future of EU law enforcement. It focused on improving EU information systems in the area of 5 law enforcement. The topics discussed related to IT systems such as Prüm, API or ETIAS, which are out of the scope of this Recommendation. 5.4. SCHENGEN EVALUATIONS ON POLICE COOPERATION The Schengen acquis includes rules and compensatory measures to counterbalance the absence of internal border controls. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism monitors the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the countries that apply it in part or in full4. It also assesses:  the capacity of those countries where internal border controls have not yet been lifted to implement the Schengen acquis in full5;  the implementation of measures in the areas of external borders, return, visa policy, police cooperation, the Schengen Information System, data protection, and the absence of internal border controls. The Commission carries out evaluations over a five-year cycle following multiannual and annual programmes, together with experts from Member States and EU agencies participating as observers. Each country is evaluated at least once every 5 years. These evaluations provide extremely important evidence of obstacles that hamper police cooperation and good practices deployed in some Member States. The following paragraph summarises the main findings of these evaluations. CISA introduced provisions to increase cooperation and information exchange between the police forces of Member States as a compensatory measure to the abolition of internal border controls. These cover:  cooperation to prevent and detect crime;  operational cooperation, e.g. the possibility to extend surveillance or to pursue criminals across internal borders;  the sharing of information to prevent and repress crime or threats to public order and safety.6 The Schengen evaluations carried out by the Commission in relation to police cooperation 7 between 2015-2021 led to the conclusion that Member States are generally compliant with the Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation. However, a number of recurring deficiencies prevent Member States from reaching the full potential of some of the existing police cooperation and information exchange tools. The improvements most needed include: 4 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen. 5 This applies to Cyprus and Croatia. As specified in recital 28 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation, the evaluation of Bulgaria and Romania has already been completed pursuant to Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession. No evaluation would be carried out under Article 1(b) of the SCH-EVAL Regulation. 6 Articles 39-41 and Article 46 of the CISA. 7 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Functioning of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism pursuant to Article 22 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 First Multiannual Evaluation Programme (2015-2019), SWD/2020/327 final. 6  developing and sharing strategic crime threat assessments and risk analyses to allow a better joint response to cross-border crime ;  revising the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by the Member States to extend and facilitate the possibilities for operational cross-border cooperation (in particular cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits);  the need for sufficient collection and analysis of statistics and radio communication interoperability. Cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit CISA provides the legal bases for cross-border surveillance (Article 40 CISA) and hot pursuit (Articles 41 to 43 CISA). The evaluations confirmed that the regulatory structure of Article 41 CISA, namely the different options to choose from by way of unilateral declaration, leads to a scattered regulatory framework for hot pursuits. Moreover, the notion of ‘caught in the act’ as a prerequisite for cross-border hot pursuits can lead to uncertainties and different interpretations if suspected criminals are not directly caught in the act, but detected during controls away from the scene of crime, i.e. in the immediate border area. The evaluations also revealed that even though the use of CISA as the legal basis for conducting hot pursuits or surveillance ensures a certain degree of consistency, bilateral agreements often add a number of more specific and operational rules for the implementation of these tools in the different regional contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated differently depending on the regional agreement under which it is applied. Issues identified mainly relate to differences in the right granted by the national law to foreign officials to arrest/apprehend a suspect. Some agreements grant foreign officials only the right to arrest/apprehend a suspect, while others do not. Territorial and time restrictions represent another barrier to the use of cross-border hot pursuits, with countries applying different restrictions to foreign officials when implementing these tools. The evaluations identified in particular that the majority of Schengen States impose a too narrow geographical limit or time limit for hot pursuits. The majority of Schengen States were also found to apply other rules that discourage hot pursuits in practice, for instance by prohibiting the right to stop, interrogate or detain a person and to use firearms for legitimate self-defence or the defence of others. Besides differences in bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements, issues were also identified in relation to the relevance of EU provisions on cross-border hot pursuits. Since the definition included in Article 41 CISA only covers land borders, countries having sea or river borders cannot use cross-border hot pursuits unless covered in bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements. The evaluations revealed other difficulties that arise when pursuing officers use different classes of service weapons than the officers in the country where the pursuit takes place. The evaluation teams found that a police force that is prevented from performing identity checks or from using its service weapons to stop, question and apprehend a suspect or protect themselves is likely to simply avoid engaging in a hot pursuit. On cross-border surveillance operations, the evaluations revealed that some Schengen States impose heavy procedural conditions and/or impose additional restrictions on officers from other Schengen States, for instance prohibiting them from carrying service weapons. Apart from differences in the surveillance methods adopted at national level, there are also differences in the maximum time allowed among Schengen States to carry out surveillance 7 activities. This leads to cases in which the timeframe is not sufficient to collect evidence on a criminal activity or organisation. Similarly, the different rules applied nationally to the use of audio and technical surveillance, including voice bugging and GPS tracking, and the fact that it is allowed in some but not all countries, hamper their use during cross-border operations. Furthermore, the differences in the types of institutions responsible for overseeing the cross- border implementation of investigative tools or the absence of a central authority in charge of coordination create additional obstacles to cooperation needed to conduct cross-border operations. Joint police patrols and other joint operations The evaluations found that joint patrols are not used to their full potential. They are often a random and routine exercise led only by quantitative indicators (for instance the requirement to perform two joint patrols per week), depending on bilateral agreements and/or practice, and are not deployed based on prior joint threat analysis. As a result, their benefit is questioned. In addition, deployed police officers do not usually have police powers in the hosting Member State and struggle to access relevant databases and use communication tools effectively. As for hot pursuits, the limitations affecting the right to stop, question and apprehend suspects and the use of service weapons in legitimate self-defence or the defence of others are hindering factors. Moreover, there is a lack of centralised statistics on joint operations carried out, which prevents further assessment on their use. Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) Schengen States have set up permanent structures to ensure cross-border police cooperation in intra-EU border areas, in particular PCCCs. There are currently 59 PCCCs across the Schengen Area, mostly located at Schengen internal borders in order to address the security needs in border regions. Police, customs and border officers of two, three or even four Schengen States work together in PCCCs and exchange data and information by accessing their own national databases and communication systems. The evaluations noted that only some PCCCs support cross-border operations, such as joint patrols and hot pursuits. PCCCs can also engage in a ‘chain request’, whereby an information request is passed from one PCCC to the next until it reaches its final recipient. This practice slows down the exchange of information and can create information gaps. Training The evaluations found that initial national training on cross-border police cooperation is provided to newly recruited police officers in the Schengen Area. However, joint training between the relevant national authorities and neighbouring countries on the use of police cooperation tools has been assessed as insufficient as it can cause discrepancies and different interpretations of the rules that can be applied in the field. Furthermore, life-long and specialised training is usually less common than initial training. Online training also remains underused by officers said to be ‘absorbed by their daily tasks’. As a result, both a poor level of awareness on the availability of such training materials and on the use of various international police cooperation instruments was noted. This, depending on the country evaluated, is extended to CEPOL training. There is often a lack of incentives for staff to 8 commit to specialised training. In addition, certification processes are often not in place. This finding applies to the majority of the Schengen States evaluated. Radio telecommunication tools and mobile access to databases Cross-border radio communications between Schengen States are hindered by the lack of interoperability between radio equipment. As a result, the majority of Schengen States evaluated resort to non-secure radio communication tools or mobile phones in order to contact their respective dispatch unit for background checks when operating abroad. This carries a risk of communication failures (frequent in mountainous areas), misunderstandings (e.g. in the case of transliteration issues) or undue delays with alerts for discrete checks. Moreover, as part of hot pursuits for instance, the evaluations noted that national radio communication systems are interoperable only to a limited extent. In practice, this can lead to situations in which officials from one Member State cross the border to another Member State as part of a hot pursuit, but lose the radio connection to their operations centre. This can lead to a higher likelihood of suspects evading police forces. The evaluation also identified the absence of mobile access to databases, which entails similar risks to the lack of interoperability of communications. 5.5. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS Under the German Presidency, the Council adopted conclusions on internal security and European police partnership on 14 December 2020. The Conclusions – which were the object of discussions between Member States in the Council’s Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP-Police) and the Council’s Standing Committee on Internal Security – reiterate a number of political priorities to be achieved between 2020 and 2025. These include establishing an upgraded acquis on cross-border police cooperation including, for example, adequate powers for cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit. The Conclusions emphasise the need to take all necessary steps to further strengthen operational cross-border cooperation by effectively implementing existing instruments and, where appropriate, by strengthening, consolidating and simplifying the legal foundations in order to keep the EU safe. The Conclusions observed growing discrepancies between CISA and the Prüm decisions on the one hand, and the dynamically evolving practice based on bilateral, trilateral and multilateral treaties and the practical requirements of contemporary law enforcement work on the other. This results in uncertainty over the applicability and scope of existing forms of cooperation in certain cases. As a result, they stressed the need to evaluate the legal requirements of cross-border cooperation instruments that enable activities such as cross- border surveillance and cross-border hot pursuits against the necessities of contemporary law enforcement work. They underlined the role of joint police patrols, units and offices, joint operation points, joint action days and joint investigations. These (i) strengthen the maintenance of public order, crime prevention and the fight against crime particularly in border regions; (ii) increase the subjective sense of security of citizens; and (iii) allow for cooperation between law enforcement authorities from different Member States to enable regular joint services, thereby creating the basis for mutual trust. In particular, the Conclusions called on the Member States to take all necessary steps to further strengthen operational cross-border law enforcement cooperation by (…) consolidating, simplifying and extending the legal foundations, including joint patrols, units, offices and operation points, and to further increase the use of these instruments and their effectiveness and cost efficiency. They also called on Member States to extend in certain clearly defined circumstances the allocation of mutually agreed and balanced executive 9 powers to foreign officers operating outside the territory of their home country so they can fulfil their duties. On cross-border surveillance, the Conclusions called on Member States to clarify and consider simplifying the legal requirements for conducting such surveillance, while upholding the principle of national sovereignty, the existing standards for the protection of fundamental rights, existing legal systems in Member States and the decisive role of the host country to assess the standardisation of the measures that may be approved and the technical means that may be deployed, e.g. drones and localisation devices. They also called for improved authorisation procedures, including by:  redefining the distinction between urgent and non-urgent surveillance;  extending the required timeframe for obtaining authorisation for urgent surveillance as appropriate;  considering, where necessary and proportionate under strict conditions and without affecting the existing instruments, including mutual legal assistance agreements where applicable, allowing surveillance to be launched in the territory of another country before it continues in the home country of the officers involved. On hot pursuits, the Conclusions called on Member States to clarify, while upholding the principle of national sovereignty, the existing standards for the protection of fundamental rights, existing legal systems in the Member States and the decisive role of the host country, the legal conditions for hot pursuits to adapt the legal requirements to the needs of the practitioners. This could be achieved by broadening both the scope for hot pursuits and the competences of officers operating across borders. This includes improving the sharing of localisation data, enabling hot pursuits whenever a person attempts to evade law enforcement procedures and allowing for hot pursuits to be carried out by land, air, sea and waterways. The Conclusions also called on Member States to (i) increase efforts to foster recourse to cross-border cooperation, in particular for mass gatherings, disasters and serious accidents with joint operational planning and exercises; (ii) swiftly improve the means for the regular or ad hoc exchange of information and direct communication, including common structures such as intranet platforms, operation control systems or radio communication networks; and (iii) continue developing a common European culture for law enforcement authorities and, depending on the operational and pedagogical adherence observed, (gradually) set up a national mechanism for the recognition of knowledge acquired in other Member States or even a common standard leading to European certification. Moreover, the Conclusions called on the Commission to consider consolidating the EU legal framework in order to further strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation. This includes (i) guaranteeing data protection and fundamental rights; (ii) addressing current operational needs; (iii) reviewing in particular the provisions in CISA Title III, Chapter 1 on Police Cooperation, (…) Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA, 2008/616/JHA (Prüm decision) (…) especially on hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance, which should be fully functional across Europe; (iv) respecting the possibility for Member States to work out the details of such cooperation and provide for even closer cooperation bilaterally. The Conclusions also called on the Commission to step up its support for improved regional forms (structures) of cooperation such as the PCCCs, joint police stations and joint training sessions, while ensuring their efficient cooperation with Single Points of Contact. 6. HOW THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT The results of all these consultation activities have been duly taken into account in the preparation of this proposal. It recommends actions to address the problems identified during 10 the consultation and based on the feedback received. It aims to remove existing legal, technical and operational obstacles to operational cooperation between Member States and to implement across the EU a number of best practices stemming from the more modern bilateral agreements between Member States. The proposal puts forward a number of recommendations that directly follow up on the Council Conclusions. In this context, the proposal:  clarifies and aligns the rules of engagement in cross-border law enforcement operations to be able to monitor and arrest criminals and terrorists under surveillance or involving hot pursuit, joint patrols and other joint operations across national territories as necessary;  allows remote access to their own databases in neighbouring Member States and the use of secure communications that can continue to function across borders;  expands the role of existing PCCCs to become joint police stations capable of not only exchanging information, but also of planning, supporting and coordinating joint patrols and operations based on shared risk analysis;  uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, based on prior analysis, to counter migrant smuggling as well as to prevent and detect illegal stays and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration;  uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, based on prior analysis, to counter human trafficking and to identify and protect victims;  creates a coordination platform, together with the Commission and Europol, to support and target joint operations and patrols across the EU in order to maintain and strengthen public order and safety, prevent criminal offences or help address specific crime waves in key locations or during specific times (e.g. tourist regions, key criminal hubs, holiday season), during mass gatherings (e.g. large sport events, international summits), or in case of disasters and serious accidents;  expands joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and the lifelong training of officers involved in operational cross-border cooperation, and reflects on the creation of a large-scale pan-European joint training programme on operational cross-border cooperation to create a true EU culture of policing. 11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8.12.2021 COM(2021) 780 final 2021/0415 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation {SWD(2021) 375 final} EN EN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL • Reasons for and objectives of the proposal1 Article 3(2) of the Treaty of the European Union (‘TEU’) provides that the EU must offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured, together with appropriate measures for external border controls, asylum, immigration and preventing and combating of crime. The area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers can be ensured, inter alia, through robust police and judicial cooperation across Member States. 2 Police officers in one Member State, therefore, should cooperate effectively and systematically across the EU. However, police cooperation between Member States still varies greatly. Without a sufficient level of cooperation between the police forces in the Member States, criminals will continue to operate across Member States unabated, taking advantage of the different national jurisdictions, and unauthorised movements of irregular migrants will continue to pose a challenge. The recent tragic events in the Channel highlighted once more the need for a strong police cooperation, which is reflected in the decision by France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany on 28 November 2021 to reinforce operational police cooperation to counter migrant smuggling. Cross-border crime and the security threats connected with it have, by definition, an international context. As set out in the EU Security Union strategy3, the EU faces evolving and increasingly complex security threats. These threats spread across borders, and manifest themselves in criminals and organised crime groups that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As highlighted in the 2021-2025 EU strategy to tackle organised crime4, organised crime is a significant threat to Europeans, businesses, and national institutions, as well as to the economy as a whole. By operating across different jurisdictions, criminal groups avoid detection and exploit the differences in national laws. Along with the accompanying proposal on a Directive on information exchange, this proposal seeks to establish a Police Cooperation Code with the objective of streamlining, enhancing, developing, modernising and facilitating law enforcement cooperation between relevant national agencies, thus supporting Member States in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism. According to the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (EU SOCTA), the organised crime landscape is characterised by a networked environment where cooperation between criminals is fluid, systematic and driven by profit. Almost 70% of criminal networks are active in more than three Member States. Around 65% of the criminal networks active in the EU are composed of members of multiple nationalities. Over 80% of 1 For this Recommendation, ‘police cooperation’ means cooperation involving all the Member States' competent law enforcement authorities, including police, gendarmes, border guards, customs and other specialised law enforcement services to prevent, detect and investigate criminal offences. Unless specified otherwise, ‘cross-border’ covers (i) cross-border actions between two or more neighbouring Member States (e.g. during a hot pursuit) and (ii) trans-national actions between non-neighbouring Member States (e.g. the deployment of police officers in another Member State during touristic season or a mass-event) or neighbouring Member States in a non-border area. 2 COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021. 3 COM(2020) 605 final, 24.7.2020. 4 COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021. EN 1 EN the reported criminal networks are involved in major types of cross-border crimes, covering trade in drugs, property crime, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling.5 The 2021 EU SOCTA and EMCDDA European Drug report6 identifies areas where serious and organised crime appears to be on the rise. Key locations such as border regions, airports, motorways, or ferry connections in the EU attract criminals, including because of their geographic position. In border regions, criminals take advantage of the natural delineations of individual law enforcement jurisdictions, which create options to evade law enforcement and provide proximity to multiple markets.7 The mobility of criminals within the EU creates challenges in preventing and fighting criminal threats8, and in ensuring public safety. At the same time, as set out in the December 2020 Counter-terrorism agenda9, the EU remains on high terrorist alert. Criminals and terrorists use information and communications technology to communicate among themselves and to prepare and conduct their criminal activities.10 The area without controls at internal borders (‘the Schengen area’11) is the largest free travel area in the world. It allows more than 420 million people to move freely and goods and services to flow unhindered. Intra-EU border areas cover approximately 40% of the EU's territory and they were home in 2017 to 30% of the population, some 150 million people. In 2017, almost 2 million people commuted across borders, including 1.3 million cross-border workers12. In 2018, EU residents made 1.1 billion trips, either for professional or personal reasons – an increase of 11% since 2014. The COVID-19 pandemic has reduced intra-EU mobility because of quarantine measures, travel restrictions, limitations to public life and lockdowns13. However, flows of people will likely continue to be significant in the future, especially as life returns to normal. The Schengen area is a symbol of the EU’s interconnectedness and of the ties between Europeans.14 It also contributes to the efficient functioning of the single market, and therefore to the growth of the EU’s economy.15 5 Europol (2021), European Union serious and organised crime threat assessment, a corrupting influence: the infiltration and undermining of Europe's economy and society by organised crime, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 6 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2021), European Drug Report 2021: Trends and Developments, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 7 Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021. 8 International mobility is a defining characteristic of criminal networks. For instance, organised property crime carried out in the EU is perpetrated primarily by MOCGS (Mobile Organised Crime Groups) and mobility remains their main characteristic to avoid detection and minimise the risk of apprehension. Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021. 9 COM(2020) 795 final, 9.12.2020. 10 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying Regulation of The European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, as regards Europol’s cooperation with private parties, the processing of personal data by Europol in support of criminal investigations, and Europol’s role on research and innovation. (SWD(2020) 543 final, 9.12.2020). 11 The Schengen Area consists of 26 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 12 European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions. link. 13 Pandemic profiteering. How_criminals_exploit_the_COVID-19_crisis, Europol, March 2020. 14 Special Eurobarometer 474: The Schengen Area, https://data.europa.eu/euodp/nl/data/dataset/S2218_89_3_474_ENG 15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area,’ COM/2021/277 final. EN 2 EN In recent years, the Schengen area has been repeatedly put to the test by a series of crises and challenges. Several Member States have reintroduced internal border controls, notably because of the unauthorised movements16 of irregular migrants, which they consider to pose a serious threat to public policy or internal security. Unauthorised movements within the Schengen area, which are not related to a major migratory crisis or structural deficiencies in the management of the external borders17, should be addressed by means other than internal border controls, which can be used only as a last resort measure, to address the concrete threats to internal security or public policy. These persisting internal border controls have revealed that there is room for improvement as regards the use of police checks and cooperation, procedures allowing for simplified readmission between the Member States and the application of bilateral agreements and arrangements in that context, in line with Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC.18 It is noted that, in line with recital 8 of the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/43219, an effective Union return policy requires efficient and proportionate measures for the apprehension and identification of irregular migrants. These measures, if combined, have the potential to yield the same results in controlling unauthorised movements as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive when it comes to the free movement of persons, goods and services. Police cooperation tools as a development of the Schengen acquis The recommendations on operational police cooperation as set out in this Recommendation contribute to the development of the Schengen rules. First, one of the pillars of the EU legal framework underpinning police cooperation was designed 30 years ago through the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA)20, well before the above-mentioned crises and challenges that have transformed the realities of the Schengen area. The CISA sets out a number of obligations for contracting parties on police cooperation, to counteract any security deficit caused by the abolition of checks at the internal borders. Notably, the CISA sets a number of baseline rules on the conduct of cross-border hot pursuits and cross-border surveillance operations. Second, joint patrols and other operations are directly linked to the development of the Schengen acquis, including Article 39(1) of the CISA on assistance between authorities, which enables the policies covered by Schengen. Joint patrols and joint operations are addressed by cross-border cooperation agreements between Member States. The Prüm Decisions21 of 2008 set out a number of baseline rules on how to conduct joint patrols and 16 Other most frequent reasons notified by the Member States included the migratory crisis of 2015/2016, persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic. 17 Under Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1), the temporary reintroduction of border controls can only be put in place for a limited period, in exceptional circumstances (such as the migratory crisis of 2015/2016), and as a last resort measure. 18 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98). 19 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432 of 7 March 2017 on making returns more effective when implementing the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 20 Official Journal L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062. 21 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA (Prüm Council Decision). Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA addresses joint operations, and Article 18 addresses assistance in connection with mass gatherings, disasters and serious accidents. EN 3 EN other joint operations across EU internal borders, as well as cross-border assistance in case of disaster and serious accidents. While the centre of gravity of the Prüm Decisions was the automated exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data, and the sections on joint patrols and operations were consequently not labelled as a development of Schengen, it is likely that they would constitute a development of the Schengen acquis, had they been adopted separately, given their cross-border nature. Third, operational police cooperation between Member States is also taking place under national law, taking account of non-binding Council documents, including good practice (‘Schengen Catalogue’22) and guidelines (‘Single Points of Contact’ (SPOC)) Guidelines, Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC) Guidelines, Manuals on law enforcement information exchange and cross-border operations). SPOCs23 and PCCCs24 have been created as a direct consequence of the need to exchange relevant information following the removal of internal borders. Schengen associated countries25 have also set up PCCCs and have established national SPOCs. Fourth, Member States have systematically complemented and extended this Schengen ‘baseline’ legal framework with bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements between themselves. The Commission has identified at least 60 of them across the EU, all different from one another. Schengen associated countries have also concluded such operational cooperation agreements with Member States. Issues identified First, the current EU legal framework provides a number of options that Member States can choose from when cooperating with other Member States (e.g. the CISA allows Member States either to set or not to set kilometre distance limitations when hot pursuits take place on their territory26). This creates uncertainty and lack of clarity as to which rules police officers have to follow when intervening in another Member State. Moreover, some of the choices made in this regard lead to obstacles, which would not have existed if other choices were made as permitted by the EU legal framework. Second, the bi- and multilateral police cooperation agreements between Member States, while allowing regional specificities when cooperating with neighbouring Member States, are very time-consuming for Member States to negotiate, sign and ratify. The proliferation of these bilateral agreements has created a complex web of several different arrangements, containing different applicable rules, which have led to fragmentation and obstacles to cooperation. For 22 Schengen Catalogue. Recommendations and best practices. Police cooperation, 15785/3/10 REV 3, Brussels 15.11.2011. 23 The Single Point of Contact (SPOC) means the national central body responsible for international police cooperation referred to in Article 39(3) of the CISA. Pursuant to the Commission proposal for a Directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, put forward together with the present proposal for a Council Recommendation, Member States would become legally bound to designate a SPOC, which is to be attributed certain minimum tasks relating to information exchange. Once Member States have done so, the reference to the SPOC in this Recommendation should be understood as referring to the SPOC as designated under that Directive. 24 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres bring together, in a single physical location, different law enforcement authorities of the participating Member States and are closely linked to the national central authority dealing with international cooperation – Single Point of Contact (SPOC). 25 Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein are associate members of the Schengen Area. 26 Article 41(3) of the CISA provides that: ‘Hot pursuit shall be carried out in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 and in one of the following ways as defined by the declaration provided for in paragraph 9: (a) in an area or during a period as from the crossing of the border, to be established in the declaration; (b) without limit in space or time’. EN 4 EN instance, in smaller or landlocked countries, law enforcement officers working across borders have to carry out operational actions following, in some cases, up to seven different sets of rules.27 As a result, some operations such as hot pursuits of suspects over internal borders are not allowed or take place in an uncoordinated sub-optimal way, which criminals use to their advantage. Operational cooperation making use of new technologies such as drones is also insufficiently covered by the current rules. Third, the Schengen evaluations28 in police cooperation conducted over the past six years confirmed that some of the bi- or multilateral agreements between Member States are outdated or underused. Others go much further than the rules on cross-border cooperation, allowing the establishment of what could be considered good practice to more effectively fight cross-border crimes (e.g. joint police stations with cross-border criminal investigative powers, or joint trainings) but these are not systematically replicated across the EU. Fourth, because of the incompatibility of secured communication equipment used between different Member States, the communication equipment of some police officers engaged for instance in hot pursuits, stops functioning when they cross the border. This makes it impossible to liaise with their own authorities, or the authorities of the Member State in which they enter. Furthermore, officers deployed in joint patrols or operations in other Member States are often not provided with mobile equipment that allows them to access remotely and securely their own national, EU and international databases. Fifth, joint patrols and other joint operations often take place in intra-EU border areas and in other areas within the EU on an ad hoc basis. They often lack coordination and take place without prior risk analysis that would allow for their better targeted deployment. No forum for Member States to exchange such risk analysis or inform other Member States of their needs and priority areas exists. For example, in order to better target joint patrols or other joint operations taking place across the EU during large events (e.g. large sports events, international summits), at specific times (e.g. holiday seasons), or in the face of specific crimes waves (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, match-fixing, trafficking in counterfeit goods, credit card fraud, pickpocketing and other property crimes). Sixth, criminal networks active in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitate the unauthorised movements of irregular migrants and exploit the vulnerable situation of victims, treating people as commodities. Organised migrant smuggling is a key criminal activity and facilitated unauthorised movements are a major concern for the EU’s security. Trafficking in human beings constitutes another core activity of serious and organised crime, set to remain a threat for the foreseeable future.29 Nearly half of the victims of trafficking within the EU are EU nationals, and most traffickers are EU citizens.30 Such crimes have a high cross-border nature and their detection and investigation requires targeted police action on the ground in intra-EU border areas. Notably, coordinated joint patrols and 27 For instance neighbouring country 1 allowing cross-border hot pursuits but only within 5 km after the border and with no possibility to stop or apprehend the suspect, neighbouring country 2 allowing hot pursuits within 10 km of the border but without the right to carry different (possibly heavier) classes of service weapons; neighbouring country 3 allowing hot pursuits for only 1 hour, etc. Faced with the complexity of such a wide range of different restrictions, even though hot pursuits are in principle permitted, some Member States instruct their police officers to always abandon a hot pursuit when the suspect crosses the border to any of these Member States. Criminals know this and use this to escape almost systematically the police. 28 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis (…). 29 Europol (2021), EU SOCTA 2021. 30 Data Collection on Trafficking in Human beings in the EU (2020); COM(2020) 661 final, 20.10.2020 EN 5 EN other joint operations, based on risk analysis, where officers from Member States operating together (e.g. in a patrol car) should focus where appropriate on detecting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Seventh, officials involved in cross-border law enforcement cooperation in the EU are not always properly trained to have the necessary knowledge and operational skills to fulfil the tasks at hand in the most effective and efficient manner. The 2021 study carried out for the Commission identified a limited availability of training for law enforcement staff involved in cross-border cooperation. Training is not conducted on a regular basis and does not always take into account the latest developments. There is also a limited awareness and knowledge of relevant databases and about the executive powers conferred by different Member States. Language barriers also hamper effective cross-border operational police cooperation. The way forward As set out in the Commission’s Communication of June 2021 ‘A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area31,’ this Recommendation aims to contribute to the creation of common standards to allow police officers to cooperate effectively with their colleagues in other Member States. Respecting existing EU legislation, and building on good practice in bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements between Member States, police officers should carry out targeted joint operations, including joint patrols32, in particular in intra-EU border areas. As terrorists and other criminals operate across Member States, police authorities should be able to better monitor them, and when engaging in hot pursuits across national territories, be able to detain them as necessary, or conduct surveillance operations in respect of them. Furthermore, joint operations can help in addressing effectively the issue of unauthorised movements of irregular migrants. Respecting the role of Member States in internal security and the need for flexibility to cooperate regionally, this Recommendation sets out actions in operational police cooperation that aim to: – Clarify and align the rules of engagement in cross-border law enforcement operations to monitor and arrest criminals and terrorists in surveillance, hot pursuit, joint patrols and other joint operations across national territories. – Enable remote access by police officers to their own databases when operating in other Member States, and the use of secure communications that can continue to function in a cross-border context. – Broaden the role of existing Police Customs Cooperation Centres to become joint police stations capable of not only exchanging information, but of planning, supporting and coordinating joint patrols and other joint operations based on shared risk analysis. – Use targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, based on prior analysis, to counter migrant smuggling as well as to prevent and detect illegally staying migrants and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration. 31 COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. 32 According to Article 17 of the Prüm Council Decision, “In order to step up police cooperation, the competent authorities designated by the Member States may, in maintaining public order and security and preventing criminal offences, introduce joint patrols and other joint operations in which designated officers or other officials (officers) from other Member States participate in operations within a Member State's territory.” EN 6 EN – Use targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, based on prior analysis, to counter trafficking in human beings and to identify and protect victims. – Create a coordination platform, together with the Commission and Europol33, to support and target joint operations and patrols across the EU to maintain and improve public order and safety, prevent criminal offences or help address specific crime waves in key locations or during specific times (e.g. tourist areas, key criminal hubs, holiday season), during mass gatherings (e.g. large sport events, international summits), or in case of disasters and serious accidents. – Broaden joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and lifelong training of officers involved in operational cross-border cooperation, and reflecting on the creation of a large-scale pan-European joint training programme on operational cross-border cooperation to create a true EU culture of policing. As set out in the proposed Recommendation, Member States should change their national rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States, where appropriate, in order to implement the measures contained therein. • Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area This Recommendation is consistent with existing and upcoming policy provisions in law enforcement cooperation. As highlighted under the ‘reasons for and objectives of the proposal’ section, existing Commission strategic documents underpin the Commission’s efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement cooperation in the EU. These include the Security Union strategy34, the Counter-terrorism agenda for the EU35, the EU 2021-2025 strategy to tackle organised crime36, the EU 2021-2025 strategy on combating trafficking in human beings37, the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse38, the EU 2021- 2025 drugs strategy39, and the new Schengen strategy.40 The Council takes a comparable stance, notably most recently in the Council Conclusions of November 2020 on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, which ask the Commission “to consider consolidating the EU legal framework to further strengthen cross- border law enforcement cooperation41. ” This Recommendation will also contribute to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area as set out in the Schengen strategy, which reiterates “the need for common standards to allow police officers to cooperate effectively with their colleagues in neighbouring countries.” It 33 The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, as established by the Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA. OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53–114. 34 COM(2020) 605 final, 24.7.2020. 35 COM(2020) 795 final, 9.12.2020. 36 COM(2021) 170 final, 14.4.2021. 37 COM(2021) 171 final, 14.4.2021. 38 COM(2020) 607 final, 24.7.2020. 39 Council Conclusions on EU 2021-2025 drugs strategy, 14178/20, 18 December 2020. 40 COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. 41 Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20, 24 November 2020. EN 7 EN will help to ensure a high level of security within the territory of Member States and therefore support a Schengen area without controls at internal borders. It will also complement the proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code. As the two legs of law enforcement cooperation essentially relate to (i) operational cross- border cooperation (which is the focus of this proposal), and (ii) information exchange, this Recommendation will form part of a coherent package together with the proposal for a Directive on information exchange and communication between law enforcement authorities of Member States, and the proposal to revise the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation (‘Prüm II Regulation’). • Consistency with other Union policies This Recommendation aims to contribute positively to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area, allowing more than 420 million people to move freely, and goods and services to flow unhindered. This will in turn contribute to the efficient functioning of the single market, and therefore to the growth of the EU’s economy. This Recommendation is therefore fully consistent with other EU policies in employment, transport, and ultimately economic growth in intra-EU border areas, but also across the whole of the EU. 2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY • Legal basis The legal basis for EU action in law enforcement cooperation is Title V, Chapter 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’). Under Article 87 of the TFEU, “the Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences.” More specifically, Article 87(3) of the TFEU relates to measures concerning operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities. Such measures are provided for in this Recommendation. It also contains measures covered by Article 89 of the TFEU relating to conditions and limitations under which Member States' law enforcement authorities may operate on the territory of another Member State. To the extent that the Recommendation also contains measures potentially covered by Article 87(2) of the TFEU (e.g. on information exchange and training), those measures are in this case ancillary to the measures based on Article 87(3) and 89 of the TFEU. This Recommendation is therefore based on Articles 87(3) and 89 of the TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 292 of the TFEU, which states “The Council shall adopt recommendations […] on a proposal from the Commission in all cases where the Treaties provide that it shall adopt acts on a proposal from the Commission. It shall act unanimously in those areas in which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act.” • Choice of the instrument Stepping-up operational police cooperation in the EU requires strong political engagement by all relevant actors, notably in the Member States. Cross-border operational police cooperation typically involves the physical intervention of uniformed and armed police forces from one Member State in the territory of other Member States. The intervention is to conduct preventive and repressive missions that may lead to the EN 8 EN provisional arrest and detention of individuals until the arrival of the authorities of the other Member State. These types of operations touch upon the core of Member States’ sovereignty, and can lead to constitutional issues, rendering any new EU legislation in this area a very sensitive issue. This is the reason why unanimity tends to be required in the Council when voting on EU legislation in operational cooperation. The Commission considers that a proposal for EU legislation with binding force to harmonise this type of operational police cooperation is premature at this stage. Nonetheless, it can be noted that, although not legally binding, under the TFEU, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU, Recommendations are legal acts and, as such, cannot be regarded as having no legal effect and are to be taken into account at national level where appropriate. Building on previous relevant Council Conclusions42 and good practice that some Member States have already implemented, the Commission decided to propose a Council Recommendation, which puts forward a number of recommended actions that aim to improve the way in which Member States cooperate operationally. The Commission plans to monitor the implementation of this Recommendation and assess the need for an EU legislation with binding force on cross-border operational police cooperation in the future. • Subsidiarity EU action is needed to properly address the problems identified in the first section of this explanatory memorandum. Without action at EU level, Member States alone will continue to face uncertainties and obstacles stemming from different rules on the rights of officials when operating in other Member States. Also, to solve long-standing technical interconnectivity issues that contribute to reducing the appeal of joint operations, an approach at EU level is needed. Given the transnational nature of serious and organised crime, it is essential to ensure swift cooperation between police and judicial authorities in relation to the operational measures at issue in a cross-border context. The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions taken at the national level, address the divergence of practices, prevent duplications and uncertainties and eventually ensure an efficient counter-action to cross-border crime. EU action in response to the identified problems is expected to bring added value for the EU and therefore to its citizens. • Proportionality This proposal recommends that Member States take a number of measures to address obstacles and strengthen existing relevant cross-border cooperation mechanisms and tools. It does not contain recommendations that go against what existing EU legislation provides for. Instead, Member States should take the recommended measures in compliance with that EU legislation. In addition, Member States are not expected to alter, and indeed to continue to apply, conditions and safeguards contained in national law relating to the operational activities covered, insofar as they are compliant with EU legislation and not specifically addressed in this Recommendation. Given the sensitivity of measures on operational cross-border police cooperation, and the willingness expressed by Member States to engage in a further dialogue on what measures 42 Council conclusions on certain aspects of European preventive policing, 10062/19, 6 June 2019; Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20, 24 November 2020. EN 9 EN should be put in place to strengthen operational police cooperation, a proposal for a Council Recommendation is the most appropriate and proportionate choice. The reason being is that it does not go beyond what is necessary, at this stage, to achieve the objectives of improving operational police cooperation across the EU. 3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS • Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation No fitness check of existing legislation in operational cooperation was conducted for this proposal. This is because the EU baseline legislation is very limited, and systematically complemented by bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements between Member States. • Stakeholder consultations The period of time during which the stakeholders' consultation took place was between July 2019 and July 2021. The consultation involved targeting stakeholders from a wide range of subject matter experts, national authorities, civil society organisations, and from members of the public on their expectations and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU. The Commission used different means of engagement such as targeted questionnaires, conducted experts’ interviews and organised several thematic workshops with Member States and Schengen associated countries' representatives. The subject matters of this Recommendation were also discussed in the Council’s Working Parties (e.g. Law Enforcement Working Party – Police and Customs subgroups, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security). The Commission also launched a public consultation, hosted on the Commission’s website in all EU official languages for eight weeks, from 19 April 2021 to 14 June 2021. Numerous consultation activities were also conducted by the contractor during the preparation of an external ‘Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation.’ The aim of the consultation was to receive relevant input from stakeholders to enable an evidence-based approach to preparing the proposed measures to improve law enforcement cooperation between Member States. The results of all these consultation activities have been duly taken into account in preparing this Recommendation.43 The consultation activities used the main elements of the methodology used in an impact assessment, starting with the problem definition and exploring the most suitable options. • Impact assessment The proposed recommendations will, if adopted in their current form and effectively acted upon, improve cross-border operational police cooperation and will have a significant positive impact on preventing and detecting crimes in the Member States. However, given the unanimity principle covering the relevant operational police cooperation measures, and sovereignty concerns expressed by some Member States in the consultation 43 SWD(2021) 375, Stakeholder consultation, synopsis report. EN 10 EN phase, as noted above, the Commission considers that a proposal for EU legislation with binding force to govern such cooperation is premature at this stage. Instead, this Recommendation calls upon Member States to strengthen existing aspects of cross-border operational police cooperation, building on good practice which have already been implemented and tested by Member States, including in a bilateral and a multilateral contexts. This proposal for a Council Recommendation on cross-border operational police cooperation is therefore not supported by an impact assessment. 4. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS By improving Member States competent authorities' ability to cooperate across intra-EU borders, within the limits set by relevant EU and national legislation, this Recommendation will contribute to better protecting citizen’s lives and their security. Any interference with fundamental rights resulting from the Recommendation is justified and does not go beyond what is necessary and proportionate. On personal data protection, the impact is considered to be neutral. This Recommendation is likely to result in a quantitative increase in the exchange of personal data between Member States, in line with the expected increase in cross-border operational police cooperation. This additional exchange of personal data will however be subject to the same robust rules and procedures already in place to process such data, in line with EU law, in particular the Law Enforcement Directive44. As regards other fundamental rights, such as minimum procedural rights of suspects and accused persons under the EU Directives on procedural rights45 (the right to information when apprehending a suspect, the right to interpretation and the right of access to a lawyer), the impact is neutral. This Recommendation, which would lead to an increase of the existing cross-border police operations, does not undermine or change the applicable rules on procedural rights. Likewise, rules and standards as defined in other areas of EU law remain applicable, in line with the obligation by Member States to respect fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 5. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS The budgetary implications of this Recommendation depend notably on the Council’s response to this proposal for a Recommendation and the extent to which Member States subsequently give effect to these recommendations. 44 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 45 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings, Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, Directive (EU) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings. EN 11 EN As some Member States are more advanced than others in their level of cooperation, the cost of implementing the proposed recommendations will vary between Member States. The cost will reflect a gradual and incremental increase in the existing operational cooperation between Member States, as the effect of implementing the recommended measures takes place over time. Given the nature of the measures that are to be put in place, the costs at national level could, to a considerable extent and subject to the applicable conditions, be covered by Member States’ programmes under the Internal Security Fund.46 The Internal Security Fund includes specific objectives to “improve and facilitate the exchange of information”, to “improve and intensify cross-border cooperation” and to “support the strengthening of Member States’ capabilities in relation to preventing and combating crime, terrorism and radicalisation, as well as managing security-related incidents, risks and crises.47” Apart from the costs potentially covered by Member States’ programmes under the Internal Security Fund, there will be no other costs borne at EU level. 6. OTHER ELEMENTS • Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements The Commission calls on the Council to adopt the proposed Recommendation by June 2022 at the latest. In the view of the Commission there should be a standing discussion point on cross-border operational police cooperation in the relevant working party of the Council, so as to allow for that working party to serve as a permanent forum for Member States’ discussions on the issues addressed in, and in particular the follow-up given to, this Recommendation. The Commission should report one year after the adoption of this Recommendation on the progress made by Member States in implementing it. The report should assess if there is a need for EU legislation with binding force on the forms of cross-border operational police cooperation covered. • Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal Section 1 defines the key terms in the Recommendation. Section 2 makes recommendations aimed at addressing obstacles to the intervention of police officers in other Member States, in the context of cross-border hot pursuits, cross- border surveillances, and joint patrols and other joint operations. The recommendations aim to increase the current list of crimes48 for which cross-border hot pursuits and surveillances can be used, and to remove the geographical and temporal limitations that some Member States have established, which create barriers for such operations. They aim at aligning the rules on the conferral of executive power between Member States in order to increase the clarity and certainty of what police officers can do when engaging in cross-border hot pursuits, surveillances and joint operations. The recommendations on cross-border hot pursuits relate not only to the crossing of land borders, but also of water (sea, river, lake) and air borders. They also relate to the use by the 46 Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 47 See Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 48 Article 40(7) and Article 41(4) of CISA sets out the list of crimes for which cross border surveillances and hot pursuits, respectively, can be started. These lists can also be found in the various bi- and multilateral agreements between Member States. EN 12 EN police officers involved of their service weapon not only in legitimate self-defence, but also in the defence of others. On these points, the recommendations go beyond what is provided for in Article 41(5)(b) and (e) of the CISA. However, Article 41(10) of the CISA allows for the adoption of additional provisions when implementing Article 41. This includes in this case the conditions under which the hot pursuit may be conducted. Section 3 makes recommendations aimed at promoting cross-border police cooperation as a tool to counter migrant smuggling and support the prevention and detection of irregular migration. Member States should use targeted joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, based on analysis49, to counter migrant smuggling and prevent and detect illegally staying migrants and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration. Member States should also ensure coordination at national level between the competent authorities involved in the joint operations and those competent to further handle third country nationals apprehended for an illegal stay. They should do so, in particular, using the mechanisms referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC.50 Section 4 makes recommendations aimed at enhancing cross-border police cooperation to counter trafficking in human beings and identifying and protecting victims. Member States should use joint operations to counter trafficking in human beings and to identify, provide safety and support to victims. Potential victims of trafficking in human beings can be detected and identified in the context of joint operations. They should be immediately referred to assistance, support and protection services, including in cooperation with civil society organisations where appropriate. Early identification of victims is also crucial in enabling police authorities to better investigate and punish traffickers. In this context, training law enforcement authorities in detecting cases of trafficking in human beings is vital. Section 5 makes recommendations aimed at transforming existing Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) in intra-EU border areas into Joint Police and Customs Stations (JPCS). In addition to their current tasks of regional cross-border information exchange, Joint Police and Customs Stations should develop the capacity to establish, support, coordinate and conduct permanent forms of operational cooperation in cross-border areas, such as joint patrols and other joint operations. They should produce joint analysis of cross-border crimes that are specific to their border area, and share them through the national Single Point of Contact (SPOC) with all Member States and competent EU agencies, such as Europol. Such targeted joint operations would be governed by the rules on the exercise of police powers in the intra-EU border areas, notably those set out in Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is to ensure that they do not have an effect equivalent to border controls. Member States should also develop the capacity to jointly support investigations into cross- border crimes occurring in their region, in conformity with applicable legislation and based on relevant legal authorisations as required and issued under such legislation. Section 6 makes recommendations aimed at better planning, coordinating and supporting joint operations across the EU. Member States and the Commission should create a 49 Pursuant to Article 4(1)(f) of the Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794, Europol prepares threat assessments, strategic and operational analyses and situation reports. Europol’s flagship report is the EU Serious and Organised Threat Assessment (SOCTA), which presents inter alia key locations of crime in the EU. Similarly, pursuant to Article 29(1) of the Frontex Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 Frontex provides risk analysis. Recital (11) of the Frontex Regulation clarifies that, in the context of European integrated border management, risk analysis covers the Schengen area. 50 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98–107. EN 13 EN coordination platform where Member States can exchange information on their needs and priorities. The aim is to better target joint operations especially during large events (e.g. large sports events, international summits), at specific times (e.g. holiday seasons), and to help address specific crimes waves (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, match-fixing, trafficking in counterfeit goods, credit card fraud, pickpocketing and other property crimes), perpetrated notably by serious and organised crime groups, making use where appropriate of existing EU financing and the outcomes of EU security research and innovation projects. Member States should instruct their national SPOC to coordinate such joint operations, including joint patrols, from and to other Member States. They should also develop joint threat assessments and risk analyses, and annual needs assessments by exchanging information on upcoming large-scale events, threats to public order, safety, internal security and mobility patterns of citizens, notably during tourist seasons. This approach should help prepare and set up more targeted joint patrols and other joint operations, including coordinated police checks in intra- EU border areas. Over time, it should enable the targeting of key crime locations in the EU as described in the EU SOCTA 2021. Section 7 makes recommendations aimed at ensuring effective availability of information and communication during cross-border operations. Member States should equip their police officers with tools that allow them to access remotely and securely their own databases in line with national law, as well as EU international and international databases via the European Search Portal. The aim is to allow them to carry out their police functions during cross-border operations, for example by carrying out identity checks. Member States should also equip their police officers engaged in cross-border operations with secure communication means (e.g. instant messenger tool) that operate across borders allowing to interconnect and communicate directly in real time with the officers of the hosting Member State. Member States should make use of the technical solutions to be provided by Europol’s innovation lab, to ensure the interconnectivity of secure communication means across borders. Section 8 makes recommendations aimed at moving towards a common EU culture of policing by significantly increasing joint trainings on operational police cooperation. Member States should set up joint training and exchange programmes for their police cadets to build long-term knowledge and confidence between police forces in the EU. The joint training should follow the successful example of the Franco-Spanish joint Gendarmerie Nationale/Guardia Civil training programme. They should develop joint ongoing development courses and exchange programmes for frontline police officers and crime investigators to improve their skills and knowledge on cross-border operational cooperation. In particular, on relevant legislation, rules of engagement, tools, mechanisms, professional standards and ethics, procedures and best practice. These could range, with CEPOL’s51 support, from online training modules to officer exchanges and should simulate real situations. Language courses for officers from intra-EU border areas should be significantly stepped-up. Member States should also align the programme of their national police academies to include accredited European cross-border operational police cooperation courses. They should reflect on the possibility to create large-scale and long-term joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and Member States’ officers in operational police cooperation. 51 The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training as established by Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2005/681/JHA. OJ L 319, 4.12.2015, p. 1–20. EN 14 EN Section 9 contains final recommendations. Member States are invited to make use of the forum offered by the relevant working party of the Council, referred to above, to discuss issues related to cross-border operational police cooperation as covered by this Recommendation, and in particular issues relating to the implementation of this Recommendation. In addition, Member States are invited to initiate within six months of the adoption of this Recommendation, a process to change their national rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States in order to implement the measures of this Recommendation. One year after the adoption of the Recommendation, the Commission should publish a report assessing the Member States’ implementation of this Recommendation. EN 15 EN 2021/0415 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 87(3) and Article 89, in conjunction with Article 292,thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament52, Whereas: (1) Cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits are indispensable operational police cooperation instruments without which criminals can escape the police by crossing the border, taking advantage of the change of jurisdiction and absence of continuity of police action. The existing limitations that some Member States have put in place should be addressed, as they create obstacles for such operations to take place into their territory. It is also necessary to adjust certain rules of engagement in cross-border police operations to monitor and arrest criminals in surveillance, hot pursuits, and joint operations. (2) Setting up permanent joint patrols and other joint operations’ capabilities in intra-EU border areas is necessary to match the criminal activities and the challenges that the permanent and growing mobility of people, goods and services inside the Union entails for police forces. Existing structures such as the Police and Customs Cooperation Centers should expand their current role to become capable of planning, supporting, coordinating and conducting joint patrols and other joint operations based on shared risk analysis and needs assessment, in accordance with the applicable legal requirements, in order to prevent, detect, and support investigations into cross-border crimes conducted in intra-EU border areas. (3) Criminal networks active in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings take advantage of the absence of internal borders in the area without controls at internal borders (“the Schengen area”) to facilitate the unauthorised movements of irregular migrants and exploit the vulnerable situation of victims for profit. An effective Union return policy requires efficient and proportionate measures for the apprehension and identification of irregular migrants. In that regard, coordination, in particular by using the mechanisms referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council53, should be encouraged, so as to contribute to preventing and responding to unauthorised movements of irregular migrants and help 52 OJ C […], […], p. […]. 53 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98). EN 16 EN address the threats to public policy or internal security, while limiting the impact on the movement of bona fide travellers. In the absence of internal border controls, targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in intra-EU border areas are a valuable tool to counter migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, to prevent and detect illegal staying and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration, and to facilitate the effective practical implementation of bilateral readmission agreements, while respecting Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432.54 Combatting trafficking in human beings effectively requires police cooperation in both national and transnational contexts, in order to identify and support victims, as well as to improve prosecution and conviction of traffickers. (4) The limited availability of police forces that Member States can deploy abroad and the lack of coordinated deployment based on prior joint analysis can render police deployments in other Member States ineffective. A Union coordination platform where Member States can exchange on their needs and priorities for joint patrols and other joint operations with a pan-European dimension could create the necessary structure to conduct such operations in an efficient and effective manner, so as to maintain and enhance public order and safety, to prevent criminal offences, including by serious and organised crime groups, and to help address specific crime waves in key locations, at specific times and in specific situations. (5) Communication and access to available information are critical for successful cross- border operational cooperation. Front line officers acting in another Member State should have real-time access through mobile solutions, such as handheld devices or in- car mounted police computers, to information held in Union information systems, through the European Search Portal (ESP), and to their relevant national databases, in line with applicable access rights and the applicable Union and national legislation. They should also be equipped with reliable and secure, real-time interconnectable mobile communication means, such as instant messenger tools, that function across borders in order to communicate directly with their authorities and those of the host Member State. Member States should make use of the technical solutions to be provided by Europol’s innovation lab, to ensure the interconnectivity of secure communication means across borders that should as a minimum enable the secure use of real-time mobile communication means, as well as the geolocation of their police vehicles, for example through GPS tracking or drones, during a cross-border police operation. (6) Effective cross-border operational police cooperation requires moving towards a common Union culture of policing. Setting up joint initial trainings and exchange programmes between police cadets on matters relating to such cooperation and continuous development courses on those matters for front line officers and crime investigators are instrumental in building skills, knowledge and confidence. It is important that Member States adjust and align the curricula of their national police academies, in all levels of training to include accredited cross-border operational police cooperation courses, and career paths for cadets and officers who graduate from these trainings. Member States should also make best use of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) by providing their training needs and support the agency’s activities, aligning their training portfolio to the priorities related 54 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432 of 7 March 2017 on making returns more effective when implementing the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. OJ L 66, 11.3.2017, p. 15–21. EN 17 EN to cross-border cooperation set in the EU Strategic Training Needs Assessments (EU- STNA). They should reflect on the possibility to create large scale and long term pan- European joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and officers in the field of cross-border operational police cooperation. (7) Given the importance of coordination and cooperation in relation to the issues addressed in this Recommendation, and in particular its implementation, there will be a standing discussion point on cross-border operational police cooperation in the relevant working party of the Council. That working party should serve as a permanent forum for Member States to discuss such issues, including the alignment of their rules and agreements, other measures to address obstacles to the effectiveness and efficiency of cross-border police cooperation operations, reporting on the progress made, as well as issues relating to the necessary guidance and good practices. (8) Effect should be given to this Recommendation within a reasonable timeframe. Within six months of its adoption, Member States should initiate a process to change their national rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States, as relevant, in order to give effect to the recommended measures and subsequently complete that process as soon as reasonably possible. (9) The progress made in giving effect to this Recommendation should be reviewed after a certain time period. Therefore, one year after its adoption, the Commission should evaluate such progress, with a view, inter alia to deciding whether binding acts of Union law with binding force are needed in this area. (10) Taking into account that this Recommendation does not have binding force, the Member States should give effect to the measures recommended therein in accordance with the applicable acts of Union law, especially those which have binding force. In particular, the Member States should give effect to the recommended measures in accordance with the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA)55, especially by choosing the recommended options where the CISA provides for several options and by extending the scope and adopting additional provisions in implementation of and in accordance with the relevant articles of the CISA. (11) This Recommendation should not be understood as seeking to affect the rules providing for limitations, safeguards and conditions not specifically addressed in this Recommendation, that apply to the relevant cross-border operational police cooperation activities pursuant to acts of Union law with binding force, including the CISA, and to national law in accordance with Union law. For example, the carrying and use of service weapons, the use of road traffic privileges, the use of technical means for conducting cross-border surveillances and the performance of identity checks and interception of persons trying to avoid such checks, referred to in this Recommendation, may be subject to such rules. (12) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Recommendation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Recommendation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark should, in accordance with Article 4 of 55 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19). EN 18 EN that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Recommendation whether it will implement it in its national law. (13) This Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland takes part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC56; Ireland is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Recommendation and is bound by it, except for those sections. (14) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s' association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis57 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC.58 (15) As regards Switzerland, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis59 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC60 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA.61 (16) As regards Liechtenstein, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis62 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU63 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU.64 56 Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002). 57 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 58 Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999). 59 OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. 60 Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 61 Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 62 OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. 63 Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss EN 19 EN (17) As regards Bulgaria and Romania, this Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession and should be read in conjunction with Council Decisions 2010/365/EU65 and (EU) 2018/934.66 (18) As regards Croatia, this Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession and should be read in conjunction with Council Decision (EU) 2017/733.67 (19) As regards Cyprus, this Recommendation, with the exception of its sections 2.1 and 2.2, constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession. HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION: 1. DEFINITIONS For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply: (a) ‘cross-border hot-pursuit’ means a police operation whereby officers of a competent law enforcement authority of a Member State pursue in that Member State one or more persons caught in the act of committing or participating in a criminal offence and, in the course of that pursuit, cross a border with another Member State and continue the pursuit on the territory of that other Member State; (b) ‘cross-border surveillance’ means a police operation whereby officers of a competent law enforcement authority of a Member State keep under surveillance, as part of a criminal investigation in that Member State, one or more persons who are suspected to have committed or participated in a criminal offence or who can lead to the identification or tracing of such suspects, and continue the surveillance in the territory of another Member Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011). 64 Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis relating in particular to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011). 65 Council Decision 2010/365/EU of 29 June 2010 on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L 166, 1.7.2010, p. 17). 66 Council Decision (EU) 2018/934 of 25 June 2018 on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L 165, 2.7.2018, p. 37). 67 Council Decision (EU) 2017/733 of 25 April 2017 on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Croatia (OJ L 108, 26.4.2017, p. 31). EN 20 EN State, after the person or persons under surveillance crossed the border with that other Member State; (c) ‘joint operations’ means police operations, including joint patrols and other joint operations in the field of public order, public security and crime prevention, jointly carried out either in intra-EU border areas or in other areas within the Union by officers of the competent law enforcement authorities of two or more Member States, whereby officers from one Member State act on the territory of another Member State; (d) ‘Single Point of Contact’ means the national central body responsible for international police cooperation, referred to in Article 39(3) of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement; (e) ‘Police and Customs Cooperation Centre’ means a joint law enforcement structure aimed at exchanging information and providing support to other law enforcement activities in intra-EU border areas, which a Member State has set up based on bi- or multilateral agreement with one or more neighbouring Member States, and which is located in the immediate vicinity of the borders between the Member States concerned; (f) ‘intra-EU borders area’ means the geographic area in the immediate vicinity of internal borders between Member States. 2. ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WHEN POLICE OFFICERS OPERATE IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE 2.1. Cross-border hot pursuit: (a) Member States should: i. ensure that the types of crimes eligible for cross-border hot pursuits into their territory cover the criminal offenses listed in the Annex to this Recommendation; ii. allow for the conduct of cross-border hot pursuits into their territory across land, sea, river, lake and air borders; iii. allow cross-border hot pursuit to continue into their territory without any geographical or temporal limitation, until the arrival of their competent law enforcement authority; iv. collect statistics on the cross-border hot pursuits that their competent law enforcement authorities conducted and report those statistics annually to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. (b) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement authority of another Member State conducting cross-border hot pursuits into their territory to do the following: i. carry their service weapon and ammunition; ii. use their service weapon in legitimate self-defence and, where necessary, in the defence of others; iii. stop, arrest or provisionally detain a suspect, including through means of coercion and physical force, pending the arrival of EN 21 EN officers of the competent authorities of the Member State in whose territory the hot pursuit took place; iv. use the road traffic privileges applicable in the Member States where the hot pursuit takes place; v. use their GPS systems to have those officers’ vehicles tracked by the competent law enforcement authority of that other Member State. 2.2. Cross-border surveillance (a) Member States should: i. ensure that the types of crimes eligible for cross-border surveillance into their territory cover the criminal offences listed in the Annex to this Recommendation; ii. allow the conduct of cross-border surveillance into their territory in relation to persons suspected of having committed or participated in one or more of those criminal offences, but also to persons that can lead to the identification or the tracing of such suspects; iii. allow the conduct of cross-border surveillance into their territory across land, sea, river, lake and air borders; iv. allow and facilitate the pooling of material, including through short or long-term loans based on jointly agreed procedures, to conduct cross-border surveillances more efficiently; v. designate their Single Point of Contact as their central authority responsible for coordinating inbound and outbound cross-border surveillances, including by enabling it to process and provide requests for authorisation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; vi. collect statistics on the cross-border surveillances that their competent law enforcement authorities conducted, and report those statistics annually to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. (b) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement authority of another Member State conducting cross-border surveillances into their territory to do the following: i. carry their service weapon and ammunition; ii. use their service weapon in legitimate self-defence and, where necessary, in the defence of others; iii. use technical means necessary to conduct the cross-border surveillances, including GPS trackers, drones, audio and video equipment. 2.3. Joint operations (a) Member States should allow officers from the competent law enforcement authority of another Member State involved in joint operations conducted in their territory to do the following: EN 22 EN i. perform identity checks, and intercept any person who tries to avoid an identity check; ii. to wear their uniform and carry their service weapon and ammunition; iii. use their service weapons in legitimate self-defence and, where necessary, in the defence of others; iv. operate their radio facilities in intra-EU border areas. (b) Member States should: i. provide language trainings and trainings for officers from the competent law enforcement authorities likely to be involved in joint operations on operational procedures, administrative and criminal law, and criminal procedures of other Member States used in intra-EU border areas, including on countering trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling and preventing and detecting illegal staying and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration, or other serious and organised crime activities of cross-border nature; ii. collect statistics on cross-border joint patrols and operations that their competent law enforcement authorities conducted in the territory of other Member States and report those statistics annually to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 3. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION TO COUNTER MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND CROSS-BORDER CRIME LINKED TO IRREGULAR MIGRATION (a) Member States should use joint operations in intra-EU border areas to: i. counter migrant smuggling; ii. prevent and detect illegally staying migrants and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration. (b) Member states should ensure coordination at national level between the competent authorities involved in joint operations and those involved in the further handling of third country nationals apprehended for an illegal stay, in particular by using mechanisms as referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC. 4. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION TO COUNTER TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS AND TO IDENTIFY AND PROTECT VICTIMS (a) Member states should use cross-border joint operations in intra-EU border areas to: i. counter the trafficking in human beings; ii. identify and provide safety and support to victims of trafficking in human beings. EN 23 EN 5. JOINT POLICE AND CUSTOMS STATIONS (a) Member States should expand the current tasks of their existing Police and Customs Cooperation Centres by: i. carrying out, supporting, and coordinating joint operations in intra- EU border areas; ii. producing joint analysis of cross-border crimes specific to their intra-EU border area and sharing such analysis through the national Single Point of Contact with all other Member States and competent Union Agencies and bodies, such as Europol and where appropriate, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); iii. supporting investigations into cross-border crimes occurring in their intra-EU border areas. (b) Member States should, in view of those expanded tasks of their existing Police and Customs Cooperation Centres, rename them as Joint Police and Customs Stations. 6. A COORDINATION PLATFORM FOR JOINT OPERATIONS (a) Member States, together with the Commission and Europol, should: i. jointly set up a single coordination platform where Member States can exchange their needs and priority areas for joint operations: – in locations that are of particular importance to prevent and counter crime such as key criminal hubs or touristic areas visited by tourists from other Member States; – during mass gatherings and major events likely to attract visitors from other Member States such as large sport events or international summits; – in case of disasters and serious accidents, in coordination with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), and in particular the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) ;68 – in case of other serious and organised crime activities of cross border nature. ii. jointly establish, based on information provided by competent Union agencies and Member States, and with the input from their Joint Police and Customs Stations, a single regular report analysing the risks and needs for joint operations, which Member States can use to target their joint operations. (b) Member States should: 68 During crises and emergencies (mostly linked to disasters or large accidents), any affected Member State or third country may call for civil protection or humanitarian assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) then coordinates, facilitates and co-finances Member States’ response to the request for assistance (Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) | European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (europa.eu)). EN 24 EN i. provide the coordination platform with information on all serious threats to public order and safety of which they are aware, upcoming mass gatherings and large-scale events that are likely to attract significant numbers of visitors from other Member States and the mobility patterns of their citizens, notably during touristic seasons; ii. designate the Single Point of Contact as a national contact point for the coordination of such joint operations. 7. ENSURING EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION (a) Member States should ensure that the officers from their competent law enforcement authority involved in the cross-border operational police cooperation covered by this Recommendation and acting in the territory of another Member State: i. have remote and secure access to their own national databases and to Union and international databases through the European Search Portal, as permitted under their national law, allowing them to carry out their police functions in the territory of another Member State as part of those operations, such as carrying out identity checks; ii. can use secure real-time communication means that are capable of operating in the territory of another Member State, allowing them to communicate directly with the competent law enforcement authority of their Member States and with the officers of competent law enforcement authorities of the other Member State or Member States concerned. (b) Member States should make use of the technical solutions to be provided by Europol’s innovation lab, to ensure secure real-time direct communication across borders. 8. JOINT TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RELATING TO CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION (a) Member States should: i. set up, together with their neighbouring Member States, joint initial trainings and exchange programmes for their police cadets on cross-border operational police cooperation; ii. adjust and align the curricula of their national police academies, in all levels of training, to include accredited European cross-border operational police cooperation courses; iii. design and implement career paths for cadets and officers who completed joint initial training, exchange programmes or specific cross-border operational police cooperation courses; iv. set up joint continuous professional development courses and initiatives for front line police officers and crime investigators to develop skills and knowledge on cross-border operational police cooperation, in particular on relevant legislation, rules of EN 25 EN engagement, tools, techniques, mechanisms, procedures and best practices; v. step-up language courses for their police officers to enable them to participate effectively in cross-border operational police cooperation; vi. align their training portfolio to the priorities related to cross-border operational police cooperation set in the EU Strategic Training Needs Assessments (EU-STNA); vii. inform CEPOL of their needs for training relating to cross-border operational police cooperation and support relevant CEPOL activities; viii. reflect on the possibility of creating large-scale and long-term pan- European joint training and exchange programmes for police cadets and officers in the field of cross-border operational police cooperation. 9. FINAL PROVISIONS (a) Member States should discuss and take forward the issues covered by this Recommendation, and in particular issues relating to its implementation. (b) Member States should make full use of the financial support made available through the Internal Security Fund – Police to improve and intensify cross- border operational cooperation. (c) Within six months of the date of adoption of this Recommendation, Member States should take the necessary measures, including by changing their national rules and bi- and multilateral agreements with other Member States where relevant and in accordance with Union law, to give effect to this Recommendation. (d) One year after the date of adoption of this Recommendation, the Commission should assess the effect given to this Recommendation by the Member States and publish a report thereon. Done at Brussels, For the Council The President EN 26 EN EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8.12.2021 COM(2021) 780 final ANNEX ANNEX to the Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on operational police cooperation {SWD(2021) 375 final} EN EN ANNEX Offences referred to in Recommendations 2.1 and 2.2 are the following serious offences: – Participation in a criminal organisation, – Terrorism, – Trafficking in human beings, – Sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, – Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, – Illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives, – Corruption, including bribery, – Fraud, including that affecting the Union’s financial interests within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law, – Laundering of the proceeds of crime, – Counterfeiting currency, including of the euro, – Computer-related crime, – Environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and varieties, – Facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence, – Murder and grievous bodily injury, – Illicit trade in human organs and tissue, – Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking, – Racism and xenophobia, – Organised or armed robbery, – Illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art, – Swindling, – Racketeering and extortion, – Counterfeiting and piracy of products, – Forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein, – Forgery of means of payment, – Illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters, – Illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials, – Trafficking in stolen vehicles, – Rape, EN 1 EN – Arson, – Crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, – Unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, spacecraft, – Sabotage. EN 2 EN Saatja: SiM info <[email protected]> Saadetud: 17.01.2022 10:30 Adressaat: RAM Info <[email protected]> Teema: Delta: Teile on saadetud Arvamuse andmiseks Sissetulev kiri "Riigikantselei resolutsioon: Politseikoostöö seadustik" tähtajaga 31.01.2022 Tere Rahandusministeerium! Siseministeeriumi dokumendihaldussüsteemi kaudu on edastatud Teile/Teie asutusele uus tööülesanne Töövoo liik:Arvamuse andmiseksPealkiri:Riigikantselei resolutsioon: Politseikoostöö seadustikTöövoo resolutsioon:Operatiivse politseikoostöö nõukogu soovitus loob selgema reeglistiku politseiametnike tegutsemiseks teise riigi territooriumil Ennekõike loob ettepanek ühise selgema reeglistiku nendeks olukordadeks, kui politseiametnikud tegutsevad teise riigi territooriumil. See puudutab varjatud jälgimist, jälitustegevust, ühispatrulle ja -operatsioone. Samuti luuakse soovituse kohaselt EL koordinatsiooniplatvorm piiriüleste operatsioonide toetamiseks. Ettepanek puudutab ka töövahendite ühtlustamist (pardaarvutid, sõnumirakendused omavaheliseks suhtluseks) nnig ühist politseikultuuri, mis on plaanis saavutada näiteks läbi õppuste jaokk lituste. Muus osas üninie soovitus teeb poliitilise erandi migrantide smugeldamise ja inimkaubanduse vallas tehtavale koostööle ja kutsub üles kasutama ühisoperatsioone smugeldajate ning illegaalsete sisserändajate tuvastamiseks.TÜ resolutsioon:Palume lisaks direktiiviga seonduvatele dokumentidele tutvuda 3 täiendava dokumendiga, mis puudutavad politseikoostööd ja on samuti suurema politseikoostöö seadustiku osaks. Kui soovite arvamust avaldada, on see teretulnud ja kui ei, palun võtke lihtsalt teadmiseks. Eesti seisukohtade valmimisel (milles on ka nende dokumentide sisu täpsemalt avatud) esitatakse need teile tutvumiseks ja soovi korral saate ka siis arvamust avaldada. Esitame ined kolm dokumenti uuesti, sest tehnilise rikke tõttu ei jõudnud need kõikiin ddressaatideni.TÜ tähgdnt:31.01.2022TÜ algataja:Liisa AbelDokumendi liik: Sissetulev kiriViit:5-1/49-1Reg kpv:20.12.2021
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