Dear Madam/Sir,
Please find attached hereto a preliminary draft for an EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) [task
2016.313] regarding
Manual Flight Training and Operations.
for consultation until 17 February 2017.
We would be grateful to you if you could send any comment(s) to
[email protected] by making
reference to [task 2016.313], no later than the above-mentioned deadline.
We would appreciate to receive a consolidated response from each organisation.
Safety Information Section Email:
[email protected]
EASA Website
(Attachment is in Acrobat PDF format)
Postal: Postfach 10 12 53, 50452 Cologne, Germany
An agency of the European Union
This message is intended for the use of the addressee only and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you are not the
intended recipient, you are notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please notify us immediately by returning this e-mail. Sender accepts no liability for damage of any kind resulting from
the risks inherent in the electronic transmission of messages. This communication does not constitute any formal commitment on behalf of the
European Aviation Safety Agency.
EASA SIB No.: 2017-XX
Safety Information Bulletin
Operations
SIB No.: 2017-XX
Issued: dd month 2017
Subject: Manual Flight Training and Operations
Ref. Publications:
• EASA SIB 2010-33R1 on Automation Policy - Mode Awareness and Energy State
Management
• EASA SIB 2013-02 on Stall and Stick Pusher Training
• EASA SIB 2015-17R1 on Unreliable Airspeed Indication at High Altitude/Manual Handling
at High Altitude
• Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 as amended
• FAA Safety Alert for Operators: FAA SAFO 13002 on Manual Flight Operations.
This SIB replaces:
• EASA SIB 2013-05 on Manual Flight Training and Operations dated 23 April 2013
Applicability:
Commercial air transport (CAT) operators, National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) and flight crews.
Description:
Modern aeroplanes are commonly operated using auto-flight systems (e.g. autopilot or auto-
throttle/auto-thrust). Generally, automation has contributed substantially to the overall
improvement of flight safety by increasing the timeliness and precision of routine procedures, and
reducing the opportunity for errors and the associated risks to the safety of the flight. It also
generally decreases workload, allowing flight crews to dedicate more attention to monitoring
activities and maintaining situational awareness.
Nevertheless, continuous use of automated systems does not contribute to maintaining pilot
manual flying skills. According to recent studies and publications, and the results of the EASA Cockpit
Automation Survey, continuous use of auto-flight systems could lead to potential degradation of
the pilot’s ability to cope with the manual handling of the aircraft. A pilot is normally required to
revert to manual flight operation for take-off and landing and when manual flight is the most
appropriate option which provides an equivalent level of safety, or in case of automation failure or
disconnection, or when an aircraft is dispatched with an inoperative auto-flight system.
Today, operators’ automation policies, which include provisions for manual flying, vary significantly
across Europe, spanning from mandating the use of full automation at all times, except take-off and
landing (when not required by operations), to encouraging disconnecting the automation whenever
possible, below a certain altitude/flight level.
This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.
TE.CAP.00117-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Page 1 of 4
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
An agency of the European Union
EASA SIB No.: 2017-XX
In April 2013, the Agency issued an SIB on “Manual Flight Training and Operations” to remind NAAs
and operators of the importance of manual flying during recurrent simulator training and also, when
appropriate, during flight operations. The intent was to achieve an appropriate balance between
the use of automation and the need to maintain pilot manual flying skills. A similar recommendation
was issued through FAA SAFO 13002.
This SIB emphasizes the fact that the balance between the benefits and drawbacks associated with
the practice of pilot manual handling skills in CAT operations must favour safety at all times. It
further clarifies how safety management principles should apply to mitigate the dangers that may
result from potential misperception of risk and risk-taking behaviour in pursuit of improving
handling skills without careful consideration.
Recommendation(s):
Operators are recommended to consider incorporating emphasis on manual flight operations, as a
means of maintaining basic flying skills, into training (initial, conversion and recurrent) and, when
feasible, line operations.
The underlying principle is that the safest environment for refreshing manual handling skills is in an
appropriately qualified Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD). Operators and flight crews are asked
to join efforts to ensure that the above principle is incorporated into operational and training
policies.
Operational principles should be developed by operators and included in their automation policy.
Operators should ensure that such policies adequately provide training opportunities during initial1,
conversion, refresher, upgrade and recurrent training for pilots to retain and enhance their manual
handling skills.
Similarly, flight crews should apply sound judgement and airmanship when electing to practise
manual handling during routine operations.
The following risk factors should be carefully considered and risk mitigation strategies implemented,
so that at least the conditions under which manual flying is not recommended in line operations are
clearly stated:
Manual flying, for retention of manual handling skills,
Condition NOT RECOMMENDED in line operations
Workload conditions: When manual handling increases workload conditions to
the detriment of safe flight;
Altitude/Flight Level When not appropriate to terrain, airspace classification;
(non-RVSM):
Weather conditions: In poor Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)
conditions affecting any part of the projected flight path;
In Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) under
convective activity;
1 Initial training, in this context, refers to the operator conversion training course before commencing unsupervised line flying as
required by ORO.FC.120. It is not in the scope of this SIB to address the initial training provided by Part-ORA training organisations
approved under Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011.
This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.
TE.CAP.00117-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Page 2 of 4
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
An agency of the European Union
EASA SIB No.: 2017-XX
Manual flying, for retention of manual handling skills,
Condition NOT RECOMMENDED in line operations
Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Under complex ATC/ATM procedures;
Air Traffic Management When aircraft energy is inappropriate to the projected
(ATM) procedures: flight path under visual approach2 granted by ATC;
Pilot and crew experience, Below minimum experience as determined in accordance
for aeroplanes: with the Operator’s Operations Manual*
* Unless under the supervision of a flight crew member
specifically nominated and trained for the task in
accordance with the operator’s procedures;
Pilot and crew experience, Below minimum experience as determined in accordance
for helicopters: with the Operator’s Operations Manual*
* Unless under the supervision of a flight crew member
specifically nominated and trained for the task in
accordance with the operator’s procedures, following
completion of a command course or a type rating.
Note: The table above is not meant to be prescriptive or to provide a complete list of all risk factors.
The conditions and procedures for manual flying should be clearly described in the operator’s
manual and submitted to the competent authority for verification of compliance as required by
ARO.GEN.300.
Furthermore, the principles of safety management and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) should be
applied consistently to allow operators to closely monitor safety trends. Data related to the number,
magnitude and pattern of deviations from consolidated average flight precision should be gathered
and analysed so as to effectively balance the benefits and the risks of manual flying and adjust
policies accordingly. Operators implementing an Alternative Training and Qualification Programme
(ATQP) should tailor their training programme based on such data.
It has to be noted that manual handling practice during line operations does not imply or require
reversion to Raw Data (i.e. Flight Director [F/D], Auto-Pilot [A/P] & Auto-Throttle [A/THR] or Auto
Thrust [A/T] OFF). It is also possible to practise manual handling skills during line operations by
reducing the level of automation (e.g. A/P and A/T OFF) while retaining the inherent safety features
of the F/D System. Crews should ensure the proper F/D modes are selected for the desired
manoeuvre. If the F/D commands are not to be followed, the F/D should be turned off. Exercising
manual flight with an inappropriate level of automation or in inappropriate circumstances during
line operations may be the precursor to unintended reduction of safety margins (e.g. leading to
unstable approaches). If data monitoring reveals an erosion of safety margins during manual
handling, the operator should respond via its Safety Management System (SMS). Manual flight in
line operations is not recommended when data monitoring reveals erosion of safety margins.
It is reminded that the most suitable environment for Raw Data manual handling practice and
training is in an appropriately qualified FSTD, operated by a duly qualified instructor or in a
2 As referred to under definition 125 of ANNEX I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 as amended.
This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.
TE.CAP.00117-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Page 3 of 4
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
An agency of the European Union
EASA SIB No.: 2017-XX
controlled training environment. This ensures that pilots are capable of flying the aircraft safely
without the support of automation (i.e. F/D, A/P & A/THR or A/T OFF). Operators are encouraged
to consider incorporating pure Raw Data basic instrument flight manoeuvres in their simulator
training programmes.
Competent authorities and operators should work together to ensure that the content of this SIB is
incorporated into operational policies, provided to pilots during theoretical training, and reinforced
during practical training.
Contact(s):
For further information contact the Safety Information Section, E-mail:
[email protected].
This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.
TE.CAP.00117-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Page 4 of 4
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
An agency of the European Union