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NPA 2016-11

Lennuamet · 11. november 2016
Viit
2-4/16/3655-1
Registreeritud
11. november 2016
Dokumendi liik
Kiri sissetulev
Adressaat
Euroopa Lennundusohutusamet
Saabumis/saatmisviis
e-post
Funktsioon
2 Õigusalane teenindamine
Sari
2-4 Kirjavahetus rahvusvaheliste lennundusnõuete küsimustes
Toimik
2-4/2016
Vastutaja
Mari Reinfeldt (Juhtkond, Juhtkond)
Lahendamise tähtaeg
9. jaanuar 2017

Failid

  • 📎(FYI)NLR-CR-2014-030.pdf2377 KB
  • 📎(FYI)RMT.0296 - AC Performance 2016, Survey summary.pdf292 KB
  • 📎(FYI)RMT.0296 - Annex final.pdf668 KB
  • 📎NPA 2016-11.pdf1532 KB

Sisu (failidest)

European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2016-11 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for commercial air transport operations RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) — 30.9.2016 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses a number of issues related to aeroplane performance requirements for commercial air transport (CAT) operations. In particular, the NPA addresses two safety recommendations (SRs), and it is linked with Actions 3.7.1, 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 of the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE). It also provides for alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State Letters 2016/12 and 2016/29. The NPA proposes standards for runway surface condition reporting, airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at time of arrival, an in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival as well as a reduced required landing distance for business aviation operations with performance class A aeroplanes and for performance class B aeroplane operations. The proposed changes are expected to increase the current level of safety in relation to aeroplane performance, to improve harmonisation with the corresponding Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules, to ensure alignment with (ICAO), and to allow for flexibility and proportionality for certain CAT operations. Applicability Process map Affected — Annex I (Definitions); Terms of Reference (ToR), Issue 1: 9.6.2015 regulations — Annex II (Part-ARO); Concept paper (CP): No and decisions: — Annex IV (Part-CAT); Rulemaking group (RMG): Yes to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) type: Full — ED Decision 2003/002/RM (CS-25); Technical consultation during NPA drafting: No — ED Decision 2012/015/R (Definitions); NPA consultation duration: 3 months — ED Decision 2014/017/R (Part-ORO); Review group (RG): Yes — ED Decision 2014/015/R (Part-CAT) Focused consultation: TBD Affected CAT aeroplane operators; flight crew; Opinion expected publication date: 2017/Q3 stakeholders: national aviation authorities (NAAs); Decision expected publication date: 2018/Q3 aircraft manufacturers Driver/origin: Safety/proportionality Reference: — EAPPRE; — SR UNKG-2008-076; — SR NORW-2011-011; — ICAO Annex 6, Part I TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 Table of contents Table of contents 1. Procedural information .................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. The rule development procedure ........................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents .................................................................................................. 3 1.3. How to comment on this NPA ................................................................................................................................. 3 1.4. The next steps in the procedure ............................................................................................................................. 3 2. Explanatory Note .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 2.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed ................................................................................................................. 5 2.2. Objectives ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 2.3. Summary of the RIA ................................................................................................................................................ 5 2.4. Overview of the proposed amendments ................................................................................................................ 8 2.4.1. Annex I (Definitions) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................. 8 2.4.2. Annex II (Part-ARO) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................... 9 2.4.3. Annex III (Part-ORO) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................. 9 2.4.4. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to the Air OPS Regulation .............................................................................................. 9 2.4.5. CS-25 ............................................................................................................................................................. 17 3. Proposed amendments................................................................................................................................................... 19 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) .................................................................................................................. 19 3.1.1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 19 3.1.2. Part-ARO ....................................................................................................................................................... 21 3.1.3. Part-CAT ........................................................................................................................................................ 21 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) ............................................................................................................................. 31 3.2.1. CS-25 Book 1 ................................................................................................................................................. 31 3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2 ................................................................................................................................................. 32 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) ................................................................................................................... 49 3.3.1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 49 3.3.2. Part-ORO....................................................................................................................................................... 50 3.3.3. Part-CAT ........................................................................................................................................................ 51 4. RIA ................................................................................................................................................................................... 68 4.1. Issues to be addressed .......................................................................................................................................... 68 4.1.1. Safety risk assessment .................................................................................................................................. 72 4.1.2. Who is affected? ........................................................................................................................................... 76 4.1.3. How could the issue/problem evolve? ......................................................................................................... 77 4.2. Objectives .............................................................................................................................................................. 77 4.3. Policy options ........................................................................................................................................................ 77 4.4. Methodology and data (only for a full RIA) ........................................................................................................... 79 4.4.1. Applied methodology ................................................................................................................................... 79 4.4.2. Data collection .............................................................................................................................................. 79 4.5. Analysis of impacts ................................................................................................................................................ 81 4.5.1. Safety impact ................................................................................................................................................ 81 4.5.2. Environmental impact .................................................................................................................................. 88 4.5.3. Social impact ................................................................................................................................................. 89 4.5.4. Economic impact .......................................................................................................................................... 90 4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues................................................................................................. 91 4.5.6. Impact on ‘better regulation’ and harmonisation ........................................................................................ 92 4.6. Comparison and conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 93 4.6.1. Comparison of options ................................................................................................................................. 93 4.6.2. Monitoring and ex post evaluation .............................................................................................................. 93 5. References ...................................................................................................................................................................... 94 5.1. Affected regulations .............................................................................................................................................. 94 5.2. Affected CS, AMC and GM..................................................................................................................................... 94 5.3. Reference documents ........................................................................................................................................... 94 6. Appendices ..................................................................................................................................................................... 96 TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 1. Procedural information 1. Procedural information 1.1. The rule development procedure The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (the EASA Basic Regulation) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme under RMT.0296 (former task number: OPS.008(A)). The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of RMG RMT.0296 (OPS.008(A)). It is hereby submitted to all interested parties3 for consultation. The process map on the title page contains the major milestones of this rulemaking activity to date and provides an outlook of the timescales of the next steps. 1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents Chapter 1 of this NPA contains the procedural information related to this task. Chapter 2 (Explanatory Note) explains the core technical content. Chapter 3 contains the proposed text for the new requirements, CS and AMC/GM. Chapter 4 contains the RIA showing which options were considered and what impacts were identified, thereby providing the detailed justification for this NPA. 1.3. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/4. The deadline for the submission of comments is 9 January 2017. 1.4. The next steps in the procedure Following the closing of the NPA public consultation period, EASA will review all the comments received. For this purpose, an RG will be established and one or more group meetings will be held if required. Depending on the number and nature of the comments received, a focused consultation in the form of a workshop with selected stakeholders may be also organised. The outcome of the NPA public consultation and eventual focused consultation will be reflected in the respective comment-response document (CRD). EASA will publish the CRD with the Opinion. 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material. 3 In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure. 4 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 1. Procedural information The Opinion contains proposed changes to European Union (EU) regulations (implementing rules (IRs)) and is submitted to the European Commission to be used as a technical basis in order to prepare a legislative proposal. The Decision(s) containing certification specifications (CS), acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) will be published by EASA when the related IRs are adopted by the European Commission. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note 2. Explanatory Note 2.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed The main issues this NPA addresses are the following: — standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting; — airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at time of arrival; — in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival; — crosswind limitations; — reduced required landing distance for business aviation operations with performance class A aeroplanes and for performance class B aeroplane operations; and — miscellaneous amendments to improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency. The reasons for addressing these issues are essentially the implementation of amendments to ICAO Annex 6, Part I, and to ICAO Annex 8, certain SRs addressed to EASA, harmonisation with the FAA, proportionality, technical improvements and clarifications of the rules on aeroplane performance. For a more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by this proposal, please refer to the RIA Section 4.1. — Issues to be addressed. 2.2. Objectives The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Chapter 2 of this NPA. The general objective of this proposal is to maintain a uniform and high level of safety with cost- efficient rules. The specific objectives of this proposal are to: — reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor; — provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations; and — contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations. 2.3. Summary of the RIA For two of the issues addressed by this NPA, namely: — miscellaneous amendments to improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency; and — crosswind limitations, a RIA is not considered necessary. The other two issues, namely: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note — implementation of ICAO amendments (which includes standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting, airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at time of arrival, and in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival); and — reduced required landing distance for performance class A and B aeroplane operations, which have different starting points and drivers, have been considered under two separate RIAs. Implementation of ICAO amendments Along with the baseline option (Option 0 — No changes), another option was considered: — implement the ICAO amendments. The impacts of the two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 below. Option 1 has been selected as the most appropriate one for the following reasons: — it is expected to provide the highest safety benefit; — it allows full alignment of the EU rules with the adopted ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs); and — it achieves a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules. Reduced required landing distance for performance class A and B aeroplane operations Along with the baseline option (Option 0 ‘No changes’), another option was considered: — introduce the possibility of using a landing factor of 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) for performance class A and B aeroplanes under defined conditions and with the approval of the competent authority (CA). The impacts of the two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 below. Option 1 has been selected as the most appropriate one because while it maintains the same level of safety as with the current rules, it is expected to achieve the following additional benefits: — to have a medium positive social impact; — to have a medium positive economic impact; — to render EU rules more proportionate; and — to achieve a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules. SRs addressed by this NPA EASA committed to consider the following SRs in this RMT: EAPPRE, Ref. 3.7.1 Establish and implement one consistent method of contaminated runway surface condition assessment and reporting by the aerodrome operator for use by aircraft operators. Ensure the relation of this report to aircraft performance as published by aircraft manufacturers. EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the changes of: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note — CAT.OP.MPA.311 on runway surface condition assessment; and — CS 25.1591 and CS 25.1592 on performance data published by the manufacturers. It should be noted that the requirements applicable to aerodrome operators to implement one consistent method for runway surface condition assessment and reporting will be developed through a future rulemaking task in the ‘Aerodromes (ADR)’ context. EAPPRE Ref. 3.7.2 Establish and implement one consistent method of calculation of crosswind limits for use by aircraft manufacturers and aircraft operators. EASA reply The development of a standardised methodology for the calculation of crosswind limits is at the level of flight testing and cannot be addressed in the context of operational rules for aeroplane performance. The SR is, therefore, considered to be beyond the scope of this NPA. Furthermore, it was recognised that the issue is currently being addressed by the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG), where EASA is represented and which is considered to be the most appropriate body to deliberate on the issue. EAPPRE Ref. 3.7.3 It is recommended that aircraft operators always conduct an in-flight assessment of the landing performance prior to landing. Note: Apply an appropriate margin to the results. EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the proposed new requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 for in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival. SR UNKG-2008-076 The European Aviation Safety Agency should require operators to ensure that flight crews are provided with guidance material on aircraft performance when operating on a runway that is notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’, or has sections thereof notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’. EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the proposed amendments of: — Annex I (Definitions) to Regulation (EU) No 965/20125 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Air OPS Regulation’) on the runway surface condition and contaminant descriptors; 5 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note — CAT.OP.MPA.311 on runway surface condition assessment; — CAT.OP.MPA.303 on in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival; and — CS 25.1591, CS 25.1592 SR NORW-2011-011 The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) recommends that FAA, EASA and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Norway evaluate the airlines’ crosswind limits in relation to friction values and consider whether they should be subject to separate approval by the authorities. EASA reply The SR has been accepted and the following assessment has been done: — Operational crosswind limits are either based on manufacturer’s approved data or on manufacturer’s advisory data provided in other documents; thus, an additional approval by the CA is not considered necessary. — Guidance to operators is necessary on how to use the information available from manufacturers to establish operational crosswind limits in the operations manual (OM) and to relate such limits to the runway surface conditions. The SR has been then addressed by the proposed amendments of: GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL. 2.4. Overview of the proposed amendments 2.4.1. Annex I (Definitions) to the Air OPS Regulation The definitions of dry, wet and contaminated runway are amended in accordance with the definitions introduced in ICAO Annex 6 and Annex 14. Procedural information that was previously contained in the definitions of dry and contaminated runway is moved to the related GM. For ‘contaminated runways’, it is further specified that being the runway condition reported by runway thirds, a ‘significant portion of the runway’ in this context refers to one third of the runway and not to the entire length. The definition of ‘damp runway’ is deleted as this condition is now included in the definition of ‘wet runway’. The following new definitions are added to support the proposed runway surface condition assessment and reporting system: — ‘runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’; — ‘runway condition report (RCR)’; — ‘runway condition code (RWYCC)’; and TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note — ‘runway surface condition(s)’. The definitions of the runway surface descriptors are added as well. Furthermore, a definition of ‘slippery wet runway’ is added in accordance with ICAO Annex 14. 2.4.2. Annex II (Part-ARO) to the Air OPS Regulation Appendix II Note 20 to the OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS form (EASA FORM 139, Issue 1) is amended to include under the listed items the approval for reduced required landing distance operations to be consistent with the proposed new rules CAT.POL.A.255 and CAT.POL.A.355 regulating such operations. 2.4.3. Annex III (Part-ORO) to the Air OPS Regulation GM2 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder The list of changes requiring prior approval is amended to include reduced required landing distance operations to be consistent with the proposed new rules CAT.POL.A.255 and CAT.POL.A.355 regulating such operations. GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general Guidance is proposed to operators on how to establish crosswind limits in the OM to clarify that the primary source should be the manufacturer’s information and that then, further restrictions may be applied based on the consideration of operational experience and operating-environment factors, including runway surface condition. 2.4.4. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to the Air OPS Regulation CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions A requirement for a specific in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival is proposed in accordance with ICAO Annex 6. For clarity reasons, the following amendments are also proposed: — The rule previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters is split in two different requirements. The new requirement CAT.OP.MPA.301 for helicopters has no content changes compared to the current rule. — The details of the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival are contained in a new dedicated rule because the current CAT.OP.MPA.300 serves also other purposes than checking the landing distances, such as checking the weather minima. In this regard, it should be noted that said rule is being revised under the ongoing RMT.0379 — All-weather operations (AWO) (check of the operating minima and other consistency changes). However, the proposal of RMT.0379 is not presented in this NPA, since the related NPA has not been published yet. Further coordination in this respect will be ensured in the future. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — The helicopter-related AMC is separated from the aeroplane-related AMC for clarity reasons without any content changes. — The aeroplane-related AMC is amended to specify that the commander should make during the approach preparation a decision on the worst runway condition that may be accepted for safe landing, should the meteorological conditions lead to a degradation of the runway condition. CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes A new requirement is proposed for an in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 and the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC) recommendations. A different approach is taken for various categories of aeroplanes as follows: — performance class A aeroplanes: the TALPA ARC recommendations require the application of a 15% factor to the landing distance determined in accordance with performance data for the landing distance at the time of arrival. — performance class B aeroplanes: in consideration of the fact that in many cases, data from the manufacturer may not be available for this category of aeroplanes as no relevant airworthiness standards may exist, the proposed new rule allows, as a minimum, to ensure that the landing distance calculated at the time of landing, based on the actual conditions, is at least in accordance with the criteria applicable at dispatch; and — performance class C aeroplanes: in consideration of the fact that in many cases, data from the manufacturer may not be available for this category of aeroplanes as no relevant airworthiness standards may exist, the proposed new rule allows, as a minimum, to ensure that the landing distance calculated at the time of landing, based on the actual conditions, is at least in accordance with the criteria applicable at dispatch. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a);(b)(1);(c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes A new AMC is proposed, based on the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32, for the use of corrective factors for the in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival when no manufacturer’s data are provided in the AFM for performance class A aeroplanes. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes Guidance is proposed mainly to explain the following: — when during the approach, the in-flight check of the landing distance should be performed; — what information should be considered; — the autobrake usage; and TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note — when the assessment may be limited only to confirmation of the dispatch calculation. CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting A new requirement is proposed in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 for the commander to report the braking action experienced during landing if it is not as good as expected from previous reports. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting A new AMC is proposed to implement the requirement on runway braking action reporting based on amendments of ICAO documents. The background is the following: The core of the ICAO amendments is the RCAM. Its structure adheres to the previous ICAO runway codes used in the SNOWTAM format and includes seven runway condition levels associated with codes from 0 (for less than poor braking action) to 6 (for dry), where each runway condition code (except 0) is matched with a corresponding aeroplane deceleration performance level. A version of the RCAM derived from the TALPA ARC proposals is available in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’. Different criteria of runway condition reporting can be used as entry points for the determination of the applicable aeroplane performance level. These reporting criteria are: — primary observations of contaminant type and depth, as well as of temperature; — pilot advisory report of braking action; and — runway friction measurements (Mu (μ)). The last two types of report should be used only for downgrading a braking action category of a runway, which is basically identified via contaminant type and depth. Runway condition codes are to be reported for each third of the runway when more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface is contaminated. If a friction measurement or reports from pilots of preceding aeroplanes (air reports (AIREPs)) indicate that the friction levels have dropped below those expected for the type of contaminant on the runway, the aerodrome should consider this information in reporting the relevant condition code in line with the observed friction or braking action. The TALPA ARC recommended that friction values should no longer be transmitted to pilots, but restricted to use by the aerodrome in consolidating the runway condition assessment, mainly to downgrade a runway condition assessment from descriptive characteristics. Furthermore, an ICAO SARP recommends not to consider friction readings in winter conditions, except on hard contaminants (i.e. compacted snow and ice). It should be noted that the RCAM provides a recommendation for the performance classification of runways that are reported as ‘slippery wet’ due to rubber contamination or otherwise degraded runway friction. The concept of reporting runways as ‘slippery wet’, when the measured friction drops below the maintenance threshold, was previously recommended for enforcement by the States in ICAO Annex 14, but no associated aeroplane performance was so far available to allow flight crew to take this information into account in their performance assessment at the time of arrival. CAT.POL.A.105 General Paragraph (d) on damp runways is deleted for consistency with the changes introduced in the definitions, and the following (e) is renumbered as (d) accordingly. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note CAT.POL.A.200 General A new paragraph is proposed for performance data necessary for the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General An amendment to the AMC on wet and contaminated runway data is proposed to reflect the new ICAO methodology of reporting runway surface condition based on the RWYCC and RCAM. GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 General A new GM is proposed to specify the applicable standards for the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival. CAT.POL.A.215 En-route — one-engine-inoperative (OEI) Further to taking into account proposal 6 of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) NPA-OPS 47, rule references are corrected and some text clarifications introduced. Moreover, a new paragraph is added as the current rule was assuming the availability of en route OEI net flight path data for performance class A aeroplanes. However, this is not always the case. Most notably, airworthiness standards applicable to commuter category aeroplanes (CS-23 or equivalent) do not require this information to be provided in the AFM. To address this disparity, it is necessary to specify the appropriate margin that should be applied to the OEI gross en-route flight path data for performance class A aeroplanes. Accordingly, the OEI net flight path margins specified in CS-25 for two-, three- and four-engined aeroplanes are added. CAT.POL.A.220 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative Further to the proposal of the JAA NPA-OPS 47, the following changes are introduced: — the use of ‘long range cruising speed’ is replaced with ‘cruising power’, thus harmonising with the corresponding Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121 requirement. This change would allow more flexibility to operators who would be able to substantiate the use of a speed other than the long-range cruising speed to comply with the rule; and — text clarifications are introduced and rule references added; it should be noted that the reference to CAT.POL.A.235 is restricted to wet runways only compared to the JAA proposal. CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways The rule is amended to include the existence of reduced required landing distance operations as per proposed new CAT.POL.A.255. Furthermore, paragraph (f) on alternates is proposed to be deleted for the following reasons: — the original intent of this requirement was to cater for a rare and unique set of circumstances, which is better addressed by an exemption or a derogation than a general rule; and — this paragraph is partly superseded regarding the in-flight check part by the proposed new CAT.OP.MPA.303. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note It is, however, considered that alleviation for alternates is necessary for operations on contaminated runways; in this regard, a proposal is made. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways Rule references are corrected. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways The possibility of a landing factor of 80 % is mentioned in consistence with the change proposed in CAT.POL.A.255. CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways A new paragraph is added to allow flexibility on the use of alternates when dispatching on contaminated runways. CAT.POL.A.250 Approval of short landing operations Further to the new type of operations introduced into CAT.POL.A.255, in CAT.POL.A.250, it is specified that short landing operations cannot be conducted in combination with reduced required landing distance operations. CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations A new requirement is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance class A aeroplanes. These operations are only allowed for non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations of aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19, and require a prior approval by the CA. The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, which in turn reduces the required landing distance. The intent of this proposed new requirement is to achieve proportionality of the rules for business aviation operations and harmonisation with the corresponding US requirement, under a set of conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of this NPA, attain a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230. The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas: — operational conditions; — flight crew; — aerodrome conditions, and — aeroplane characteristics and performance. Particularly as regards the assessment of aerodrome conditions, it should be noted that when the runway is forecast to be wet, a further check of the landing distance is required for the following reason: the landing distance calculated in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways at dispatch needs to be increased by 1.15 for the case of a wet runway (as per CAT.POL.A.235). This distance is obtained as follows: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note Wet LD = 1.15 × 1.25 × ALD where: — ‘Wet LD’ is the required landing distance for wet runways; — ‘1.15’ is the factor of the wet check required by CAT.POL.A.235; — ‘1.25’ is the factor resulting from the use of 80 % of the LDA; and — ‘ALD’ is the actual landing distance for the type resulting from AFM data in accordance with CS 25.125 or equivalent (FAR 25.125). However, a comparison with the landing distance required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 was performed for a number of performance class A aeroplane types showing that the distance based on CAT.OP.MPA.303 may be higher or lower than Wet LD figures depending on the aeroplane type, number of operative reversers and other assumptions made during the certification of the aeroplane. Figure 1 — Wet margin for large jet aeroplanes Current regulatory Wet margin (%) for Good/Wet time of arrival distance 40 Data based on Sea Level, 30 std. day, no slope, no wind 20 10 1.15*1.25*FAR 25.125 dry Margin compared to Unfactored % 0 TOA Good/Wet -10 -20 -30 Part-25-certified aeroplanes — mixture of commercial and business jets -40 These differences for certain aeroplane types may lead to the situation where the Wet LD for reduced required landing distance operations is systematically shorter of the one calculated in-flight due to the use of the 80 % landing factor. To avoid this situation, a requirement is proposed to compare at the time of dispatch the Wet LD with the distance calculated in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303, and use the longer of the two. Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 to check again the landing distance in-flight against the latest information available at the time of arrival remains valid. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is provided to clarify that charter operations are not eligible for reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is proposed on how to determine for these operations a level of safety equivalent to that attained by the current rules. It is highlighted that all the conditions established have to be adhered to as it is the combination that achieves the intended level of safety. Criteria for the risk assessment are also listed. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC is proposed on qualification, training, and checking of the flight crew. Details of the various phases as well as equivalence criteria to account for previous experience are also provided. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Flight data monitoring is recommended as a possible method to monitor these operations. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is provided to explain the intent of an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP). GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is provided on adverse weather conditions that have to be considered for these operations, especially in relation to wind. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance on equipment and minimum equipment list (MEL) usage is provided. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC on how to account additional aerodrome conditions is proposed. CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways The rule is amended to include the existence of reduced required landing distance operations as proposed in CAT.POL.A.355. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways Rule references are corrected. GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways The possibility of a landing factor of 80 % is mentioned in consistence with the change proposed in CAT.POL.A.355. CAT.POL.A.350 Approval of short landing operations Further to the new type of operations introduced into CAT.POL.A.355, in CAT.POL.A.350, it is specified that short landing operations cannot be conducted in combination with reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations A new requirement is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance class B aeroplanes. These operations are allowed for specific runways at aerodromes where a public interest and operational necessity have been determined by the state of the aerodrome, and require a prior approval by the CA. The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA which in turn reduces the required landing distance. The intent of the rule is to achieve proportionality of the rules for small CAT operators under a set of conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of this NPA, are considered to attain a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230. The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas: — operational conditions, — flight crew, — aerodrome conditions, and — aeroplane characteristics and performance. Compared to the corresponding rule for performance class A aeroplanes, requirements on training are simplified; however, further limitations are proposed on the control of the touchdown area, and operations are restricted to visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is proposed on how to determine for these operations a level of safety equivalent to that attained by the current rules. It is highlighted that all the conditions established have to be adhered to as it is the combination that achieves the intended level of safety. Criteria for the risk assessment are also listed. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC on how to control the touchdown area is proposed. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC is proposed on experience, training, and recency of the flight crew. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance is proposed: — to explain the intent of an aerodrome landing analysis program (ALAP); and — on adverse weather conditions that have to be considered for these operations, especially in relation to wind. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance on equipment and MEL usage is proposed. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations Guidance on the use of deceleration devices is proposed. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC on maintenance instructions and operational procedures to enhance the efficiency of deceleration devices is proposed. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations An AMC on how to account additional aerodrome conditions is proposed. CAT.POL.A.415 En-route — OEI The changes introduced into CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47 are also introduced here for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes. CAT.POL.A.420 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative The changes introduced in CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47 are also introduced here for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes. 2.4.5. CS-25 CS 25.1591 The applicability of this provision is restricted to take-off performance information only as a new standard is introduced for landing performance information. AMC 25.1591 Information and explanatory material is amended in accordance with the TALPA ARC recommendations and FAA AC 25-31, taking into account ICAO standards for runway condition codes and contaminant descriptors. Definitions and terminology used throughout the entire text are amended accordingly. Information related to landing is deleted and moved, appropriately amended, to new AMC 25.1592. In addition to the main changes, further improvements or clarifications are the following: — Paragraph 7.1 ‘Contaminant Drag — Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow’ is updated to provide for the option of using 100 % of drag accountability during acceleration, as an alternative to demonstration of conservatism considering 50 % for the entire accelerate and stop distance (ASD); — Paragraph 7.3.4 is added to provide limitations on upgrades for specially prepared winter runway surfaces in accordance with ICAO; and — In paragraph 8.3, references to other CS-25 provisions are added, as well as a clarification on crosswind. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 2. Explanatory Note CS 25.1592 A new standard is introduced for landing performance information, including performance data for the time of arrival, in accordance with ICAO Annex 8. AMC 25.1592 Information and explanatory material is amended in accordance with the TALPA ARC recommendations and FAA AC 25-32, taking into account ICAO standards for runway condition codes and contaminant descriptors. ICAO definitions and terminology are introduced accordingly throughout the entire text. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 3. Proposed amendments The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strike through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) 3.1.1. Definitions 1. Definitions is amended as follows: Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply: (…) (25) ‘contaminated runway’ means a runway of which a significant portion of the runway surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the substances listed under the runway surface condition descriptors.more than 25 % of the runway surface area within the required length and width being used is covered by the following: (a) surface water more than 3 mm (0,125 in) deep, or by slush, or loose snow, equivalent to more than 3 mm (0,125 in) of water; (b) snow which has been compressed into a solid mass which resists further compression and will hold together or break into lumps if picked up (compacted snow); or (c) ice, including wet ice; (…) (32) ‘damp runway’ means a runway where the surface is not dry, but when the moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance; (…) (42) ‘dry runway’ means a runway which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes those paved runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and maintained to retain ‘effectively dry’ braking action even when moisture is present;whose surface is free of visible moisture and not contaminated within the area intended to be used. (…) (103a) ‘Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’ means a matrix allowing the assessment of the runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed runway surface condition(s) and pilot report of braking action. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition report. Note: the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane performance calculation by the flight crew. (103c)‘Runway condition report (RCR)’ means a comprehensive standardised report relating to runway surface conditions and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance. (103d) ‘Runway surface condition(s)’ means a description of the condition(s) of the runway surface used in the runway condition report which establishes the basis for the determination of the runway condition code for aeroplane performance purposes. Note 1: the runway surface conditions used in the runway condition report establish the performance requirements among the aerodrome operator, aeroplane manufacturer and aeroplane operator. Note 2: aircraft de-icing chemicals and other contaminants are also reported but are not included in the list of runway surface condition descriptors because their effect on runway surface friction characteristics and the runway condition code cannot be evaluated in a standardised manner. (103e) ‘Runway surface condition descriptors’ means one of the following elements on the surface of the runway (note: the descriptions under (a) to (h) below are used solely in the context of the runway condition report and are not intended to supersede or replace any existing World Meteorological Organization (WMO) definitions): (a) ‘Compacted snow’: snow that has been compacted into a solid mass such that aeroplane tires, at operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without significant further compaction or rutting of the surface. (b) ‘Dry snow’: snow from which a snowball cannot readily be made. (c) ‘Frost’: ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is below freezing; frost differs from ice in that the frost crystals grow independently and, therefore, have a more granular texture. Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point of water (0 °C). Note 2: under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, and it is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. (d) ‘Ice’: water that has frozen or compacted snow that has transitioned into ice, in cold and dry conditions. (e) ‘Slush’: snow that is so water-saturated that water will drain from it when a handful is picked up or will splatter if stepped on forcefully. (f) ‘Standing water’: water of depth greater than 3 mm. Note: running water of depth greater than 3 mm is reported as ‘standing water’ by convention. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (g) ‘Wet ice’: ice with water on top of it or ice that is melting. Note: freezing precipitation can lead to runway conditions associated with wet ice from an aeroplane performance point of view. Wet ice can cause the surface to become very slippery. It is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. (h) ‘Wet snow’: snow that contains enough water to be able to make a well-compacted, solid snowball, but water will not squeeze out. (…) (107a) ‘Slippery wet runway’ means a wet runway where the surface friction characteristics of a significant portion of the runway have been determined to be degraded (…) (128) ‘Wet runway’ means a runway of which the surface is covered with water, or equivalent, less than specified by the ‘contaminated runway’ definition or when there is sufficient moisture on the runway surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing waterwhose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm deep within the intended area of use. 3.1.2. Part-ARO 1. Appendix II is amended as follows: APPENDIX II (…) 20. Other approvals or data can be entered here, using one line (or one multi-line block) per authorisation (e.g. short landing operations, steep approach operations, reduced required landing distance operations, helicopter operations to/from a public interest site, helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area, helicopter operations without a safe forced landing capability, operations with increased bank angles, maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval, aircraft used for non-commercial operations). EASA FORM 139 Issue 2(…) 3.1.3. Part-CAT 1. CAT.OP.MPA.300 is amended as follows: CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes Before commencing anDuring the approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that, according to the information available to him/her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway or FATO intended to be used should not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual. A landing distance assessment shall be done in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 2. New CAT.OP.MPA.301 is added: CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that according to the information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway or final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used should not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM). 3. New CAT.OP.MPA.303 is added: CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes (a) For performance class A aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless the landing distance available (LDA) is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment. (b) For performance class B aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless: (1) the LDA is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment; or (2) if approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment are not available, the LDA at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway is checked to be at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330 or CAT.POL.A.335, as applicable. (c) For performance class C aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless: (1) the LDA is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment; or (2) if approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment are not available, the LDA at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway is checked to be at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430 or CAT.POL.A.435, as applicable. 4. New CAT.OP.MPA.311 is added: CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported, the knowledge of which the commander considers to be safety relevant, he or she shall notify the air traffic services (ATS) as soon as practicable. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 5. CAT.POL.A.105 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.105 General (…) (d) For performance purposes, a damp runway, other than a grass runway, may be considered to be dry. (e) The operator shall take account of charting accuracy when assessing the take-off requirements of the applicable chapters. 6. CAT.POL.A.200 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.200 General (a) The approved performance data in the AFM shall be supplemented as necessary with other data if the approved performance data in the AFM is insufficient in respect of items such as: (1) accounting for reasonably expected adverse operating conditions such as take-off and landing on contaminated runways; and (2) consideration of engine failure in all flight phases. (b) For wet and contaminated runways, performance data determined in accordance with applicable standards on certification of large aeroplanes or equivalent shall be used. (c) For the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival, data determined in accordance with applicable standards on certification of large aeroplanes, or equivalent, shall be used. (d) The use of other data referred to in (a) and equivalent requirements referred to in (b) and (c) above shall be specified in the operations manual. 7. CAT.POL.A.215 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.215 En-route — one-engine-inoperative (OEI) (…) (c) The net flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue flight from the cruising altitude to an aerodrome where a landing can be made in accordance with CAT.POL.A.22530 or CAT.POL.A.2305, as appropriate. The net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track in accordance with the following: (1) the engine is assumed to fail at the most critical point along the route; (2) account is taken of the effects of winds on the flight path; (3) fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reservesas per CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used; and (4) the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure shall meet the following criteria: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (i) the performance requirements at the expected landing mass are met; and (ii) weather reports and/or forecasts and fieldrunway condition reports indicate that a safe landing can be accomplished at the estimated time of landing.; and (5) if the AFM does not contain en-route net flight path data, the gross OEI en-route flight path shall be diminished by a climb gradient of 1.1 % for two-engined aeroplanes, 1.4 % for three-engined aeroplanes, and 1.6 % for four-engined aeroplanes. (d) The operator shall increase the width margins of (b) and (c) to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does not meet at least required navigation performance 5 (RNP 5). 8. CAT.POL.A.220 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.220 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative (a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate,at the all- engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements of CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.235(a) as applicable at the expected landing mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (f). (b) The two-engines-inoperative en-route net flight path data shall allow the aeroplane to continue the flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, from the point where two engines are assumed to fail simultaneously to an aerodrome at which it is possible to land and come to a complete stop when using the prescribed procedure for a landing with two engines inoperative. The net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track. At altitudes and in meteorological conditions requiring ice protection systems to be operable, the effect of their use on the net flight path data shall be taken into account. If the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNP5, the operator shall increase the width margin given above to 18.5 km (10 NM). (c) The two engines shall be assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate,at the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from anthe aerodrome specified in (a) aboveat which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met. (d) The net flight path shall have a positive gradient at 1 500 ft above the aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made after the failure of two engines. (e) Fuel jettisoning shall be permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the required fuel reserves of (f) below, if a safe procedure is used. (f) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at least 1 500 ft directly over the landing area and thereafter to fly level for 15 minutes at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 9. CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways (a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall allow a full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold: (1) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes, within 60 % of the landing distance available (LDA); and (2) for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes, within 70 % of the LDA. and; (3) notwithstanding (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, for aeroplanes having a maximum certified take- off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non-scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations, within 80 % of the LDA when CAT.POL.A.255 is complied with. (b) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in accordance with (a), based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and shall comply with CAT.POL.A.245. (c) For short landing operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in accordance with (a) and shall comply with CAT.POL.A.250. (d) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take the following into account: (1) the altitude at the aerodrome; (2) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind component; and (3) the runway slope in the direction of landing if greater than ± 2 %. (e) For dispatching the aeroplane it shall be assumed that: (1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and (2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned, considering the probable wind speed and direction, the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. (f) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(1) for a destination aerodrome having a single runway where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with (a) to (e). Before commencing an approach to land at the destination aerodrome, the commander shall check that a landing can be made in full compliance with (a) to (d) and CAT.POL.A.225. (gf) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall be only dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that allows full compliance with (a) to (ed). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 10. CAT.POL.A.235 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230. (b) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be contaminated, the LDA shall be at least the landing distance determined in accordance with (a), or at least 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data or equivalent, whichever is greater. The operator shall specify in the operations manual if equivalent landing distance data are to be applied. (c) A landing distance on a wet runway shorter than that required by (a), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on wet runways. (d) A landing distance on a specially prepared contaminatedwinter runway shorter than that required by (b), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways. (e) For (b), (c) and (d), the criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly, except that CAT.POL.A.230(a) shall not be applied to (b) above. (f) For (b) and (d) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e). 11. CAT.POL.A.250 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.250 Approval of short landing operations (…) (b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that the following conditions are met: (1) the distance used for the calculation of the permitted landing mass may consist of the usable length of the declared safe area plus the declared LDA; (…) (11) the slope of the declared safe area does not exceed 5 % upward nor 2 % downward in the direction of landing; and (12) reduced required landing distance operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255 are prohibited; and TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (123) additional conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations. 12. New CAT.POL.A.255 is added: CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations (a) For aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non- scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations, landing operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) require prior approval by the competent authority. (b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that: (1) a risk assessment has been conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, is achieved; or (2) the following conditions are met: (i) special-approach procedures, such as steep approaches, planned screen heights higher than 60 ft or lower than 35 ft, low-visibility operations, planned operations outside stabilised approach criteria, are prohibited; (ii) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 are prohibited; (iii) an adequate training, checking and monitoring process for the flight crew is established; (iv) an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure that the following conditions are met: (A) no tailwind is forecasted at the expected time of arrival; (B) if the runway is forecasted to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) or be at least 115 % of the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(3), whichever is longer; (C) no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; and (D) no forecasted adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; (v) all the equipment affecting landing performance is operative before commencing the flight; (vi) the flight crew is composed of at least two qualified and trained pilots having recency in reduced required landing distance operations; TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (vii) the commander shall make the final decision to conduct reduced required landing distance operations and may decide not to do so when they consider this to be in the interest of safety; and (viii) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids, missed-approach and balked-landing considerations. 13. CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways (a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall allow a full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 70 % of the landing distance available (LDA). taking into account: (b) Notwithstanding (a) above, the landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome may allow a full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 80 % of the LDA when CAT.POL.A.355 is complied with. (c) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take the following into account: (1) the altitude at the aerodrome; (2) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind component; (3) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface; and (4) the runway slope in the direction of landing. (db) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in accordance with (a) based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and comply with CAT.POL.A.345. (ec) For short landing operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in accordance with (a) and comply with CAT.POL.A.350. (fd) For dispatching the aeroplane in accordance with (a) to (c), it shall be assumed that: (1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and (2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned considering the probable wind speed and direction, the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. (ge) If the operator is unable to comply with (d)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall only be dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that permits full compliance with (a) to (d). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 14. CAT.POL.A.350 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.350 Approval of short landing operations (…) (b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that the following conditions are met: (…) (10) reduced required landing distance operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.355 are prohibited; and (101) additional conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations. 15. New CAT.POL.A.355 is added: CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations (a) Operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway require prior approval by the competent authority. Such approval shall be obtained for each runway on which operations with reduced required landing distance are conducted. (b) To obtain the approval, a risk assessment shall be conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) is achieved, and at least the following conditions shall be met: (1) the state of the aerodrome has determined a public interest and operational necessity for the operation, either due to the remoteness of the aerodrome or to physical limitations relating to the extension of the runway; (2) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 and particular approaches approved under CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) are prohibited; (3) a specific control procedure of the touchdown area is defined in the operations manual (OM) and implemented; this procedure shall include adequate go-around and balked- landing instructions when touchdown in the defined area cannot be achieved; (4) an adequate aerodrome training and checking programme for the flight crew is established; (5) the flight crew is qualified and have recency in the concerned aerodrome in accordance with the standards defined in the OM; (6) an aerodrome landing analysis program (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure that the following conditions are met: (i) no tailwind is forecasted at the expected time of arrival; (ii) no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (iii) if the runway is forecasted to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(b) or be at least 115 % of the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.330(b), whichever is longer; and (iv) no forecasted adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; (7) operational procedures and instructions are established to ensure that: (i) all the equipment affecting landing performance and landing distance is operative before commencing the flight; (ii) the deceleration devices are correctly used by the flight crew; and (iii) landing on contaminated runways is prohibited; (8) specific maintenance instructions and operational procedures are established for the aeroplane’s deceleration devices to enhance the reliability of these systems; (9) the final approach and landing are conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only; and (10) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority. 16. CAT.POL.A.415 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.415 En-route — OEI (…) (e) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reserves as per CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used. 17. CAT.POL.A.420 is amended as follows: CAT.POL.A.420 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative (a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriateat the all- engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements of CAT.POL.A.430, applicable at the expected landing mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (e). (b) The two-engines-inoperative flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue the flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, clearing all obstacles within 9,3 km (5 NM) either side of the intended track by a vertical interval of at least 2 000 ft, to an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met. (c) The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriateat the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments from anthe aerodrome specified in (a) aboveat which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met. (d) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at an altitude of a least 450 m (1 500 ft) directly over the landing area and thereafter to fly level for 15 minutes at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate. (e) The available rate of climb of the aeroplane shall be taken to be 150 ft per minute less than that specified. (f) The width margins of (b) shall be increased to 18,5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNP5. (g) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the required fuel reserves as per (d) above, if a safe procedure is used. 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) 3.2.1. CS-25 Book 1 Certification Specifications Large Aeroplanes SUBPART G — OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND INFORMATION (…) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 1. CS 25.1591 is amended as follows: CS 25.1591 Take-off Performance Information for Operations with Contaminated Runway Surface Conditions (See AMC 25.1591) (a) Supplementary take-off performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on runways contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or ice may be furnishedprovided at the discretion of the applicant. If supplied, this information must include the expected performance of the aeroplane during take-off and landing on hard-surfaced runways covered by these contaminants. If information on any one or more of the above contaminated surfaces is not supplied, the AFM must contain a statement prohibiting take-offoperation(s) on the contaminated surface(s) for which information is not supplied. Additional information covering operation on contaminated surfaces other than the above may be provided at the discretion of the applicant. (b) Performance information furnishedprovided by the applicant must be contained in the AFM. The information may be used to assist operators in producing operational data and instructions for use by their flight crews when operating with contaminated runway surface conditions. The information may be established by calculation or by testing. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (c) The AFM must clearly indicate the conditions and the extent of applicability for each contaminant used in establishing the contaminated runway performance information. It must also state that actual conditions that are different from those used for establishing the contaminated runway performance information may lead to different performance. 2. New CS 25.1592 is added: CS-25.1592 Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment (See AMC 25.1592) (a) Landing performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on dry and wet runways and supplementary landing performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on runways contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or ice must be provided by the applicant. (b) Performance information provided by the applicant must be contained in the aircraft flight manual (AFM). The information may be used to assist operators in producing operational data and instructions for use by their flight crews for performance assessment. The information may be established by calculation or by testing. (c) The landing distance to be used for landing performance assessment consists of the horizontal distance from the point at which the main gear of the aeroplane is 50 ft above the landing surface to the point where the aeroplane comes to a complete stop. It considers runway surface conditions/braking action, winds, temperatures, average runway slope, pressure altitude, icing condition, planned final-approach speed, aeroplane mass and configuration, and deceleration devices used. 3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2 Acceptable Means of Compliance Large Aeroplanes AMC — SUBPART G 1. AMC 25.1591 is amended as follows: AMC 25.1591 The derivation and methodology of performance information for use when taking-off and landing with contaminated runway surface conditions. 1.0 Purpose This AMC provides information, guidelines, recommendations and acceptable means of compliance for use by applicants in the production of performance information for aeroplanes when operated ontaking off from runways that are contaminated by standing water, slush, snow, ice or other contaminants. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 2.0 Technical Limitations of Data (…) It has been recently determined that the assumption to use wet runway surface field length performance data for operations on runway surfaces contaminated with dry snow (depths below 10 mm) and wet snow (depths below 5 mm) may be inappropriate. Flight test evidence together with estimations have indicated some measure of relatively low gear displacement drag and a measurable reduction in surface friction in comparison to the assumptions associated with wet runway field performance data. As a consequence it has been agreed that additional work is required to further develop the associated methodology. As an interim measure it has been concluded that it is reasonable to consider these surfaces by recommending that they be addressed by using the data for the lowest depth of the contaminant provided.It is recognised that the observation and reporting of the type and depth of contaminants (water, slush, dry snow and wet snow) is limited in terms of the accuracy and timeliness with which it can be made and relayed to the flight crew. Furthermore, shallow depths of contaminants do not generally reduce wheel braking friction below that of a wet runway, except in unfavourable circumstances for which lower than expected runway condition codes (RWYCCs) are reported (see AMC 25.1592). In line with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) standards, a depth of more than 3 mm for contaminant accountability in take-off performance assessments is considered as a reasonable lower threshold. Below this depth, the runway is considered to be wet, for which AMC 25.1591 does not apply. (…) (…) 4.0 Definitions These definitions may be different to those used by other sources but are considered appropriate for producing acceptable performance data, suitable for use in aeroplane operations.The following definitions are a subset of the runway surface condition descriptors for which a representative take-off performance model may be derived using the methods contained in this AMC. 4.1 Standing Water Water of a depth greater than 3mm. A surface condition where there is a layer of water of 3mm or less is considered wet for which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable. Note: a surface condition where there is a layer of water of 3 mm or less is considered wet, for which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable. 4.2 Slush Partly melted snow or ice with a high water content, from which water can readily flow, with an assumed specific gravity of 0.85. Slush is normally a transient condition found only at temperatures close to 0°C.Snow that is so water-saturated that water will drain from it when a handful is picked up or will splatter if stepped on forcefully. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 4.3 Wet Snow Snow that will stick together when compressed, but will not readily allow water to flow from it when squeezed, with an assumed specific gravity of 0.5.Snow that contains enough water to be able to make a well-compacted, solid snowball, without squeezing out water. 4.4 Dry Snow Fresh snow that can be blown, or, if compacted by hand, will fall apart upon release (also commonly referred to as loose snow), with an assumed specific gravity of 0.2. The assumption with respect to specific gravity is not applicable to snow which has been subjected to the natural ageing process. Snow from which a snowball cannot readily be made. 4.5 Compacted Snow Snow which has been compressed into a solid mass such that the aeroplane wheels, at representative operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without causing significant rutting.Snow that has been compacted into a solid mass such that aeroplane tires, at operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without significant further compaction or rutting of the surface. 4.6 Ice Water whichthat has frozen or compacted snow that has transitioned into iceon the runway surface, including the condition where compacted snow transitions to a polished ice surface, in cold and dry conditions. Note: this definition excludes wet ice that has a film of water on top of it or contains melting ice, which provides minimal braking friction and uncertain lateral control. 4.7 Slippery Wet A wet runway where the surface friction characteristics of a significant portion of the runway have been determined to be degraded. 4.78 Specially Prepared Winter Runway A runway, with a dry frozen surface of compacted snow and/or ice which has been treated with sand or grit or has been mechanically or chemically treated to improve runway friction. The runway friction is measuredmonitored and reported on a regular basis in accordance with national procedures. 4.89 Specific Gravity The density of the contaminant divided by the density of water. 5.0 Contaminant Properties to be Considered 5.1 Range of Contaminants (…) TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Contaminant Range of Specific Is Drag Is Braking Analysis Type Depths to be Gravity Increased? Friction Paragraphs Considered - Assumed for Reduced Relevant mm Calculation below Dry Runway Value? Standing More than 3- 1.0 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4 Water, up to 15 Flooded (see Note 1) runway Slush More than 3- 0.85 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4 up to 15 (see Note 1) Wet Snow BelowMore No Yes 7.3, 7.4 (see Note 2) than 3 up to 5 (see Note 1) Wet Snow More than 5- 0.5 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4 (see Note 3) up to 30 Dry Snow BelowMore No Yes 7.3, 7.4 (see Note 2) than 3 up to 10 (see Note 1) Dry Snow More than 0.2 Yes Yes 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 10- up to 130 Compacted 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4 Snow (see Note 4) Ice 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4 (see Note 4) Slippery Wet 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4 Specially 0 No Yes 7.3.4, 7.4 Prepared (see Note 4) Winter Runway (see Note 5) Table 1 Note 1: Runways with water depths or slush or snow depths ofless than 3 mm or less are considered wet, for which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable. Note 2: Contaminant drag may be ignored. Note 3: For conservatism the same landing gear displacement and impingement drag methodology is used for wet snow as for slush. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Note 4: Where depths are given as zero it is assumed that the aeroplane is rolling on the surface of the contaminant. Note 5: No default model is proposed for specially prepared winter runways in this AMC. Such surfaces are specific and treatment may be of variable effectiveness. The procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of operator. (…) 6.0 Derivation of Performance Information 6.1 General Conditions Take-off and landing performance information for contaminated runways should be determined in accordance with the assumptions given in paragraph 7.0. (…) (…) 6.3 Landing on a Contaminated Runway 6.3.1 Airborne distance Assumptions regarding the airborne distance for landing on a contaminated runway are addressed in paragraph 7.4.2. 6.3.2 Ground Distance Except as modified by the effects of contaminant as derived below, performance assumptions for ground distance determination remain unchanged from those used for a dry runway. These assumptions include: - Touchdown time delays. - Stopping means other than wheel brakes (but see paragraph 7.4.3). 7.0 Effects of Contaminant 7.1 Contaminant Drag -— Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow General advice and acceptable calculation methods are given for estimating the drag force due to fluid contaminants on runways: Total drag Drag due to Drag due to airframe due to fluid = fluid displacement + impingement of fluid contaminant by tyres spray from tyres The essence of these simple calculation methods is the provision of appropriate values of drag coefficients below, at, and above tyre aquaplaning speed, VP (see paragraph 7.1.1): — Paragraphs 7.1.2.a and 7.1.2.b give tyre displacement drag coefficient values for speeds below VP. — Paragraph 7.1.3.b.2 gives tyre equivalent displacement drag coefficient values to represent the skin friction component of impingement drag for speeds below VP. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments — Paragraph 7.1.4 gives the variation with speed, at and above VP, of drag coefficients representing both fluid displacement and impingement. The applicant may account for contaminant drag for computation of the deceleration segment of the accelerate-stop distance. However, if the actual contaminant depth is less than the reported value, then, using the reported value to determine contaminant drag will result in a higher drag level than the one that actually exists, leading to a conservative take-off distance and take-off run, but a potentially optimistic accelerate-stop distance. It is assumed that these effects will offset each other; however, the applicant may consider: — either using 100 % of the reported contaminant depth when determining the acceleration portion, and 50 % when considering the deceleration portion; or — using 50 % of the reported contaminant depth when determining both the acceleration and the stop portion of the accelerate-stop distance. This will result in a conservative computation of the resultant take-off distance without being unduly penalising. The applicant should check to ensure that using drag for half of the contaminant depth for the accelerate-stop computation is conservative for the applicant’s aeroplane configuration. 7.1.1 Aquaplaning Speed An aeroplane will aquaplane at high speed on a surface contaminated by standing water, slush or wet snow. For the purposes of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on contaminant drag, the aquaplaning speed, VP, is given by - 𝑉𝑃 = 9√𝑃 where VP is the ground speed in knots and P is the tyre pressure in lb/in2. For the purpose of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on wheel-to-ground friction, the aquaplaning speed VP given above should be factored with a coefficient of 0.85. Predictions (Reference 5) indicate that the effect of running a wheel over a low density liquid contaminant containing air, such as slush, is to compress it such that it essentially acts as high density contaminant. This means that there is essentially no increase in aquaplaning speed to be expected with such a lower density contaminant. For this reason, the aquaplaning speed given here is not a function of the density of the contaminant. (See References 1, 5 and 10) (…) 7.3 Braking Friction (All Contaminants) On most contaminant surfaces the braking action of the aeroplane will be impaired. Performance data showing these effects can be based on either the minimum conservative ‘default’ values, given in Table 2 or test evidence and assumed values (see paragraph 7.3.2). In addition the applicant may optionally provide performance data as a function of aeroplane braking coefficient or wheel braking coefficient. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 7.3.1 Default Values To enable aeroplane performance to be calculated conservatively in the absence of any direct test evidence, default friction values as defined in Table 2 may be used. These friction values represent the maximum effective braking coefficient of an fully modulating anti-skid controlled braked wheel/tyre. For quasi-modulating systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.625. For on-off systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.375. For the classification of anti-skid systems, please refer to AMC 25.109(c)(2). Aeroplanes without anti-skid systems will need to be addressed separately on a case-by- case basis. Contaminant Default Wheel Braking Coefficient µ Standing Water and Slush where V is ground speed in knots Note: For V greater than 85 % of the aquaplaning speed, use µ = 0.05 constant Wet Snow below 0.167 5mmabove 3 mm depth Wet Snow 0.17 Dry Snow below 0.167 10mmabove 3 mm depth Dry Snow 0.17 Compacted Snow 0.20 below outside air temperature (OAT) -15 °C Ice (Cold & Dry) 0.075 Slippery Wet 0.16 Note: Braking Force = load on braked wheel x Default Friction Value µ Table 2 Note: For a specially prepared winter runway surface no default friction value can be given due to the diversity of conditions that will apply. (See reference 10) (…) 7.3.3 Use of Ground Friction Measurement Devices Ideally it would be preferable to relate aeroplane braking performance to a friction index measured by a ground friction device that would be reported as part of a Surface TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Condition Report. However, tThere is not, at present, a correlation between aircraft stopping capability andmmon friction index for all ground friction measuring devices. Hence it is not practicable at the present time to determine aeroplane performance on the basis of an internationally accepted friction index measured by ground friction devices. Notwithstanding this lack of correlationa common index, the applicant may optionally choose to present take-off and landing performance data as a function of an aeroplane braking coefficient or wheel braking coefficient constant with ground speed for runways contaminated with wet snow, dry snow, compacted snow or ice. The responsibility for relating this data to a friction index measured by a ground friction device will fall on the operator and the operatingcompetent authority of the state of operator. 7.3.4 Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface At the option of the applicant, take-off performance data may be provided for specially prepared winter runway surfaces. This may include icy surfaces that have been treated with sand or gravel in such a way that a significant improvement of friction may be demonstrated. It is suggested that a reasonable margin should be applied to the observed braking action in performance computations for such surfaces, and that effective friction not greater than 0.16 (for fully modulating anti-skid systems) should be assumed. The continued effectiveness of such a treatment must be frequently monitored. Appropriate procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of aerodrome. (…) 7.4.2 Landing Air Distance For contaminated surfaces, the airborne distance should be calculated by assuming that 7 seconds elapse between passing through the 50 ft screen height and touching down on the runway. In the absence of flight test data to substantiate a lower value, the touchdown speed should be assumed to be 93% of the threshold speed. 7.4.23 Reverse Thrust Performance information may include credit for reverse thrust where available and controllable, as described in AMC 25.109. 8.0 Presentation of Supplementary Performance Information (…) 8.3 Take-off and Landing Data This should be presented either as separate data appropriate to a defined runway contaminant or as incremental data based on the AFM normal dry or wet runway information. Information relating to the use of speeds higher than VREF on landing, that is speeds up to the maximum recommended approach speed additive to VREF, and the associated distances should also be included.The take-off distance (TOD) should be determined in accordance with CS 25.113(b) and the take-off run (TOR) in accordance with CS 25.113(c)(2). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments The landing distance must be presented either directly or with the factors required by the operating manuals, with clear explanation where appropriate. The applicant should provide crosswind guidance for operations on contaminated runways. Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, for example greater than 3, 6, 9, 12, 15mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant depths within the range of contaminant depths provided. The AFM should provide: — the performance data for operations on contaminated runways; — definitions of runway surface conditions; and — the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data. The AFM should state that operations are prohibited on runways with contaminant depths greater than those for which data is provided. Instructions for use of the data should be provided in the appropriate documentation. Where the AFM presents data using VSTOP and VGO, it must be stated in the AFM that use of this concept is acceptable only where operation under this standard is permitted. 9 References Reference sources containing worked methods for the processes outlined in 7.1 to 7.3.3 are identified below: 1. ESDU Data Item 83042, December 1983, with Amendment A, May 1998. ‘Estimation of Spray Patterns Generated from the Side of Aircraft Tyres Running in Water or Slush’. 2. ESDU Data Item 98001, May 1998. ‘Estimation of Airframe Skin -Friction Drag due to Impingement of Tyre Spray’. 3. ESDU Data Item 90035, November 1990, with Amendment A, October 1992. ‘Frictional and Retarding Forces on Aircraft Tyres. Part V: Estimation of Fluid Drag Forces’. 4. ESDU Memorandum No.97, July 1998. ‘The Order of Magnitude of Drag due to Forward Spray from Aircraft Tyres’. 5. ESDU Memorandum No. 96, February 1998. ‘Operations on Surfaces Covered with Slush’. 6. ESDU Memorandum No. 95, March 1997, ‘Impact Forces Resulting From Wheel Generated Spray: Re-Assessment Of Existing Data’. 7. NASA Report TP-2718 ‘Measurement of Flow Rate and Trajectory of Aircraft Tire - Generated Water Spray’. 8. Van Es, G.W.H., ‘Method for Predicting the Rolling Resistance of Aircraft Tires in Dry Snow’. AIAA Journal of Aircraft, Volume 36, No.5, September -October 1999. 9. Van Es, G.W.H., ‘Rolling Resistance of Aircraft Tires in Dry Snow’, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Technical Report TR-98165, Amsterdam, 1998. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 10. ESDU Data Item 72008, May 1972. ‘Frictional and retarding forces on aircraft tyres’. Part III: planning. 11. FAA AC 25-31, ‘Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways’, 22 December 2016. 12. ICAO Doc 10064, ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’ (to be published). 2. New AMC 25.1592 is added as follows: AMC 25.1592 The Derivation and Methodology of Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment at Dispatch and at Time of Arrival 1.0 Purpose This AMC provides information, guidelines, recommendations and acceptable means of compliance for use by applicants in the production of landing performance information. This information is for use by operators: — before flight when planning to land on runways that are contaminated by standing water, slush, snow, ice or other contaminants; and — at the time of arrival, whatever the runway surface condition is. 2.0 Applicability of Data Appropriate landing performance data assists operators in performing dispatch or time-of-arrival landing performance assessments. Because of differences in the variables to be taken into account and of the various ways that those data are to be used, the landing performance data for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments may be different than the landing performance data developed in accordance with CS 25.125 and provided in the aeroplane flight manual (AFM) in accordance with CS 25.1587(b). The methods contained in this AMC 25.1592 include those for derivation of landing distance on dry and wet runways intended to be used at the time of arrival only. The preflight landing performance assessment, when planning to land on a dry or wet runway surface, uses the landing distance developed in compliance with CS 25.125. The data derived in accordance with the method(s) contained in this AMC is appropriate for the preflight landing performance assessment when planning to land on a contaminated runway surface only. 3.0 Standard Assumptions The data for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should represent expected landing performance of a trained flight crew of average skill following normal flight procedures and training. It should take into account runway surface conditions/runway condition codes, winds, temperatures, average runway slope, pressure altitude, icing condition, final-approach speed, aeroplane weight and configuration, and deceleration devices used. Like the landing distances defined in CS 25.125, the landing distances to be used for time-of- arrival landing performance assessments should consist of the horizontal distance from the point TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments at which the main gear of the aeroplane is 50 ft above the landing surface to the position where the aeroplane is brought to a stop. See Figure 1 below. 4.0 Definitions In addition to those defined in AMC 25.1591 above, the following runway conditions should be considered: 4.1 Frost Ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is below freezing. Frost differs from ice in that frost crystals grow independently and, therefore, have a more granular texture. Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point of water (0 °C). Note 2:— under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, which is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. 4.2 Runway Condition Code (RWYCC) A number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition report. See Section 6.2 of this AMC for the classification of runway conditions. Note: the purpose of RWYCC is to permit an operational aeroplane performance calculation by the flight crew. Procedures for the determination of the runway condition code are described in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’. 5.0 Assumptions for Landing Distances Landing performance data should be provided in terms of RWYCCs within the approved operational envelope for landing. Data should be provided for codes 6 through 1. At the option of the applicant, additional data for fluid contaminants (dry snow, wet snow, slush and standing water) may be provided for the range of depths given in Table 2 of Section 7.0 of this AMC. Landing performance data is not presented for code 0 (zero) because this is not a performance category but rather a condition in which flight operations should cease on the runway until the aerodrome has taken an action to improve the braking action. Landing distance data should cover all normal operations with all engines operating within the normal landing operating envelope. The effect of each of the parameters affecting landing distance should be provided, by taking into account the following: — approved landing configurations, including Category III landing guidance, where approved; — approved deceleration devices (e.g. wheel brakes, speed brakes/spoilers, and thrust reversers); — pressure altitudes within the approved landing operating envelope; — weights up to the maximum take-off weight (MTOW); TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments — expected airspeeds at the runway threshold, including speeds up to the maximum recommended final-approach speed, considering possible speed additives for winds and icing conditions; — temperatures within the approved landing operating envelope; — winds within the approved landing operating envelope:  not more than 50 % of the nominal wind components along the landing path opposite to the direction of landing; and  not less than 150 % of the nominal wind components along the landing path in the direction of landing; — runway slopes within the approved landing operating envelope; and — icing conditions, if required to provide the landing distances required under CS 25.125 in icing conditions. 6.0 Derivation of Landing Distance The landing distance consists of three segments: — an airborne segment, — a transition segment, and — a final stopping configuration (full braking) segment, as shown in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 — Landing distance segments The landing distance for a time-of-arrival landing performance assessment may be determined analytically from the landing performance model developed to show compliance with CS 25.125. For the purposes of determining the landing distance for time-of-arrival assessments, the model should be modified as described in the following sections. Changes in the aeroplane’s configuration, speed, power, and thrust used to determine the landing distance for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should be made using procedures established for operation in service. These procedures should: — be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill; — use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments — include allowance for any time delays that may reasonably be expected in service (see Section 6.2. below). The procedures and assumptions used to develop the operational landing distances should be documented in the AFM. 6.1 Air Distance As shown in Figure 1 above, the air distance is the distance from a height of 50 ft above the landing surface to the point of main gear touchdown. This definition of the air distance is unchanged compared to that used for compliance with CS 25.125. However, the air distance determined under CS 25.125 may not be appropriate for use when making time-of-arrival landing performance assessments. The air distances determined under CS 25.125 may be shorter than the distance that the average pilot is likely to achieve in normal operations. The air distance used for any individual landing at any specific runway is a function of the following parameters: — runway approach guidance; — runway slope; — use of any aeroplane features or equipment (e.g. heads-up guidance, autoflight systems, etc.); — pilot technique; and — the inherent flare characteristics of the specific aeroplane. Unless the air distance used for compliance with CS 25.125 is representative of an average pilot flying in normal operations (see flight test demonstration below), the air distance used for time- of-arrival landing performance assessments should be determined analytically as the distance traversed over a time period of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the landing threshold, also referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP). This represents a flare time of 7 sec and a touchdown speed (VTD) of 96 % of the VAPP. The VAPP should be consistent with the procedures recommended by the applicant, including any speed additives, such as those that may be used for winds or icing. The effect of higher speeds, to account for variations that occur in operations or are caused by the operating procedures of individual operators, should also be provided. If the air distance is determined directly from flight test data instead of using the analytical method provided above, the flight test data should meet the following criteria: — procedures should be used that are consistent with the applicant’s recommended procedures for operations in service; these procedures should address the recommended final-approach airspeed, flare initiation height, thrust/power reduction height and technique, and target pitch attitudes; — at a height of 50 ft above the runway surface, the aeroplane should be at an airspeed not slower than the recommended final-approach airspeed; and — the touchdown rate of descent should be in the range of 1–4 ft per sec. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments If the air distance is based on a time of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the runway threshold, this air distance is considered valid for downhill runway slopes up to 2 % in magnitude (no credit should be taken for an uphill runway slope). 6.2 Transition Distance As shown in Figure 1 above, the transition distance is the distance travelled from the point of main gear touchdown to the point where all deceleration devices used for determining the landing distance are operating. If the air distance is based on a time of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the runway threshold, the speed at the start of the transition segment should be 96 % of the final approach speed. The transition distance should be based on the recommended procedures for use of the approved means of deceleration, both in terms of sequencing and of any cues for initiation. Reasonably expected time delays should also be taken into account. For procedures that call for initiation of deceleration devices beginning at nose gear touchdown, the minimum time for each pilot action taken to deploy or activate a deceleration means should be the demonstrated time, but not less than one second. For procedures that call for initiation of deceleration devices beginning prior to nose gear touchdown, the minimum time for each pilot action taken to deploy or activate a deceleration means should be the demonstrated time plus one second. For deceleration means that are automatically deployed or activated (e.g. auto speed brakes or autobrakes), the demonstrated time may be used with no added delay time. The distance of the transition segment, and the speed at the start of the final stopping configuration segment should include the expected evolution of the braking force achieved over the transition distance. The evolution of the braking force should take into account any differences that may occur for different RWYCCs, such as the aeroplane transition to the full braking configuration (see Table 1 below for the wheel braking coefficient of the full braking configuration of each runway surface condition and pilot-reported braking action). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments RWYCC Runway surface condition description Wheel braking coefficient 6 — Dry 90 % of certified value used to comply with CS 25.1251 5 — Frost Per method defined in CS 25.109(c) — Wet (includes damp and water equal to or less than 3 mm deep) Depth of 3 mm or less of: — Slush — Dry snow — Wet snow 4 –15 °C and colder outside air 0.202 temperature (OAT) — Compacted snow 3 — Wet (‘Slippery Wet’ runway) 0.162 — Dry snow or wet snow (any depth) over compacted snow More than 3 mm depth of: — Dry snow — Wet snow Warmer than – 15 °C OAT — Compacted snow 2 More than 3 mm depth of: (1) For speeds below 85 % of the — Water hydroplaning speed3, 50 % of the — Slush wheel braking coefficient determined in accordance with CS 25.109(c), but not greater than 0.162 (2) For speeds at 85 % of the hydroplaning speed3 and above, 0.052 1 — Ice 0.082 0 — Wet ice Not applicable (no operations in — Water on top of compacted snow RWYCC = 0 conditions) — Dry snow or wet snow over ice Table 1 — Correlation between wheel braking coefficient and RWYCC 1 100 % of the wheel braking coefficient used to comply with CS 25.125 may be used if the testing from which that braking coefficient was derived was conducted on portions of runways containing operationally representative amounts of rubber contamination and paint stripes. 2 These wheel braking coefficients assume a fully modulating anti-skid system. For quasi-modulating systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.625. For on-off systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.375. For the classification of anti-skid systems, please refer to AMC 25.109(c)(2). Aeroplanes without anti-skid systems will need to be addressed separately on a case-by-case basis. 3 The hydroplaning speed, VP, may be estimated by the equation VP = 9√𝑃, where VP is the ground 2 speed in kt and P is the tire pressure in lb/in . TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 6.3 Final Stopping Configuration Distance (Full Braking Distance) As shown in Figure 1 above, the final stopping configuration (full braking) segment begins at the end of the transition segment, which is the point where all deceleration devices used in determining the landing distance are operating. It ends at the nose gear position when the aeroplane comes to a stop. The calculation of the final stopping configuration distance should be based on the braking coefficient associated with the runway surface condition or pilot-reported braking action, including the effect of hydroplaning, if applicable. Credit may be taken for the use of thrust reversers, where available and controllable. See following Section 7 for information about taking into account contaminant drag from loose contaminants. 7.0 Contaminant Drag — Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow Loose contaminants result in additional contaminant drag due to the combination of the displacement of the contaminant by the aeroplane tires and impingement of the contaminant spray on the airframe. This contaminant drag provides an additional force helping to decelerate the aeroplane, which reduces the distance needed to stop the aeroplane. Because contaminant drag increases with contaminant depth, the deeper the contaminant is, the shorter the stopping distance will be. However, the actual contaminant depth is likely to be less than the reported depth for the following reasons: — contaminant depths are reported in runway surface condition reports using specific depth increments; — the procedure for reporting contaminant depths is to report the highest depth of the contaminant along the reported portion of the runway surface; contaminant depths, however, are unlikely to be uniform over the runway surface (or reported portion of the runway surface), so it is likely that there will be areas of lesser contaminant depth; and — in a stable weather environment (that is, no replenishment of the contaminant on the runway), the contaminant depth is likely to decrease as successive aeroplanes traverse through this environment and displace the contaminant. If the actual contaminant depth is less than the reported value, using the reported value to determine the contaminant drag will result in a higher drag level than the one that actually exists, leading to an optimistic stopping distance prediction. Therefore, it is recommended not to include the effect of contaminant drag in the calculation of landing distances for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments. If the effect of contaminant drag is included, it should be limited to no more than the drag resulting from 50 % of the reported depth. If the effect of contaminant depth is included in the landing distance data, then data should be provided for the reportable contaminant depths up to the maximum contaminant depth for each contaminant for which landing operations are permitted. In considering the maximum depth of runway contaminants, it may be necessary to take account of the maximum depth for which the engine air intakes have been shown to be free of ingesting hazardous quantities of water in accordance with CS 25.1091(d)(2). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments If the effect of contaminant depth is included in the landing distance data, then data should be provided for the specific gravities shown in Table 2 below. Loose contaminant Maximum depth Specific gravity Standing Water 15 mm 1.0 Slush 15 mm 0.85 Dry Snow 130 mm 0.2 Wet Snow 30 mm 0.5 Table 2 — Maximum depth and specific gravity of loose contaminants For the method of determining the contaminant drag, refer to AMC 25.1591. 8.0 Presentation of Supplementary Performance Information 8.1 General Performance information for contaminated runways, derived in accordance with Sections 5.0–7.0 of this AMC, should be accompanied by appropriate statements such as the following: — operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow, ice or other contaminants implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and, therefore, to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during landing since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based; where possible, every effort should be made to ensure that the runway surface is cleared of any significant contamination; — the performance information assumes any runway contaminant to be of uniform depth and density; and — the provision of performance information for contaminated runways should not be taken as implying that ground handling characteristics on these surfaces will be as good as those that may be achieved on dry or wet runways, in particular following engine failure, in crosswinds or when using reverse thrust. 8.2 Procedures In addition to performance information appropriate to operating on a contaminated runway, the AFM should also include recommended procedures associated with this performance information. Differences in other procedures for operation of the aeroplane on a contaminated surface should also be presented, e.g. reference to crosswinds. 8.3 Landing Data This should be presented either as separate data appropriate to a defined runway contaminant or as incremental data based on the normal dry or wet runway information in the AFM. Information relating to the use of speeds higher than the VREF on landing, that is, the VREF with an increment up to the maximum recommended approach speed, as well as the associated distances, should also be included. The landing distance should be TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments presented either directly or with the factors required by the operating manuals (OMs), with a clear explanation, where appropriate. Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, e.g. greater than 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant depths within the range of the contaminant depths provided. The AFM should provide: — the performance data for operations on contaminated runways; — definitions of runway surface conditions; and — the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data. The AFM should state that operations are prohibited on runways with contaminant depths greater than those for which data is provided. Instructions for use of the data should be provided in the appropriate documentation. 9.0 References 1. FAA AC 25-32, ‘Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments’, 22 December 2015. 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) 3.3.1. Definitions 1. New GM13 Annex I Definitions is added as follows: GM13 Annex I Definitions CONTAMINATED RUNWAY As the runway condition is reported in runway thirds, a significant portion of the runway surface area is more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface area within the required length and width being used. 2. New GM14 Annex I Definitions is added as follows: GM14 Annex I Definitions DRY RUNWAY The ‘area intended to be used’ means the area of the runway that is part of the take-off run available (TORA) or landing distance available (LDA) declared in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) or by notice to airmen (NOTAM). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 3.3.2. Part-ORO Subpart GEN — General requirements SECTION I — GENERAL 1. GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) is amended as follows: GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from the competent authority as specified in the applicable Implementing Rules: (…) (n) performance: (1) increased bank angles at take-off (for performance class A aeroplanes); (2) short landing operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); (3) steep approach operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); and (4) reduced required landing distance operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); (…) SUBPART MLR — MANUALS, LOGS AND RECORDS 2. New GM1 ORO.MLR.100 is added as follows: GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL (OM) When publishing operational crosswind limitations in Part B of the OM in accordance with AMC3 ORO.MLR.100, operators should consider: (a) the following manufacturer’s information: (1) values published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the aircraft flight manual (AFM); (2) maximum demonstrated crosswind values, when more limiting values are not published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the AFM; (3) gust values; and (4) additional guidance or recommendations; (b) operational experience; and (c) operating-environment factors such as: (5) runway width; (6) runway surface condition; and (7) prevailing weather conditions. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 3.3.3. Part-CAT Subpart B — Operating procedures Section 1 — Motor-powered aircraft 1. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE The in-flight determination of the landing distance should be based on the latest available meteorological orand runway statecondition report, preferably not more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time. When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway condition, the commander should determine during the approach preparation the most unfavourable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing. 2. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE The in-flight determination of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) suitability landing distance should be based on the latest available meteorological or runway condition report, preferably no more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time. 3. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL (a) Performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival should be developed in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent, and included in the operations manual (OM). (b) When the aircraft manufacturer does not provide the relevant data for performance class A aeroplanes, performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival may be determined by applying the following methods: (1) Correction factors may be applied to the certified landing distances on dry runway published in the AFM for turbojet-powered aeroplanes and turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes. (2) For this purpose, the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 below may be used: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Table 1 — LDFs Runway condition 6 5 4 3 2 1 code (RWYCC) Braking Good to Medium to Dry Good Medium Poor action medium poor Runway Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 description Turbojet without 1.67 2.6 2.8 3.2 4.0 5.1 reverse Turbojet with 1.67 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4 reverse Turboprop (see 1.67 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.9 Note 2) Note 1: runway descriptions may be found in the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) for each RWYCC or braking action. Note 2: these LDFs apply only to modern turboprops with efficient disking drag. For older turboprops without adequate disking drag, use the Turbojet, No Reverse LDFs. Note 3: the LDFs can apply to any type of anti-skid system, i.e. fully-modulating, quasi- modulating or on-off system. (3) To find the landing distance required (LDR) multiply the AFM (dry, unfactored) landing distance by the applicable LDFs from Table 1 above for the runway conditions existing at the time of arrival. If the AFM landing distances are presented as factored landing distances, then that data needs to be adjusted to remove the applicable dispatch factors applied to that data. (4) The LDFs given in Table 1 above include a 15 % safety margin and an air distance representative of normal operational practices. They account for variations of temperature up to international standard atmosphere (ISA) + 20 °C, runway slopes between –2 % and +2 %, and an average approach speed increment of 5 up to 20 kt. They may not be conservative for all configurations in case of unfavourable combinations of these parameters. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 4. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 is added as follows: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes TIMELINESS The assessment is initially performed when landing weather and runway condition reports are obtained, usually around top of descent. The assessment includes consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics can be tolerated so that a quick decision is made just prior to landing if the preceding aircraft provides a pilot advisory report of braking action (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action. RUNWAY CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS When available for the portion of the runway that will be used for landing, the following elements are considered: (a) runway condition code (RWYCC); (b) expected runway conditions (contaminant type and depth); and (c) pilot advisory report of braking action (AIREP). AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS The following considerations may impact operational landing distance calculations: (a) runway slope; (b) aerodrome elevation; (c) wind; (d) temperature; (e) aeroplane mass and configuration; (f) approach speed at threshold; (g) eventual adjustments to the landing distance, such as autoland; and (h) planned use of aeroplane ground deceleration devices. AUTOBRAKE USAGE While autobrakes are a part of the aeroplane’s landing configuration, the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival is not intended to force a selection of a higher than reasonable autobrake level. For operations when the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a porous friction course (PFC), if the manual braking distance provides a 15 % safety margin, then the braking technique may include a combination of autobrakes and manual braking even if the selected autobrake landing data does not provide a 15 % safety margin. ASSESSMENT BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA When the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a PFC, the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival may be done by confirming that the runway meets the criteria used for dispatch. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments The required landing distance for dry runways determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the time-of-arrival landing distance calculation on a dry runway, which includes specific allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation. When using wet runway dispatch applying the 15 % increase on the dry landing distance in accordance with CAT.POL.A.235(a) to determine the required landing distance for a wet grooved surface or with a PFC, there is adequate margin to cover eventualities considered in the time-of-arrival landing distance calculation. DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING The Operations Manual (OM) and training material should include the assumptions about and the limitations on the use of the data provided for performing a landing distance assessment at the time- of-arrival. 5. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting GENERAL Pilot reports of runways surface conditions and braking action are considered by the aerodrome when assessing the RWYCC reported in the runway condition report (RCR). A single reference within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) documentation to the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures is published in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. Pilot reports of runway braking action should be done in the format of special air report (AIREP). Instructions for in-flight reporting of runway braking action may be found in ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’. RCAM The presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the proposed standards would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment. It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to assess the RWYCC. Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to perform the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT). TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT Runway surface Surface condition Depth Notes RWYCC condition descriptor Including wet or contaminated Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6 each runway third Damp (any visible 5 Wet dampness) Wet 3 mm or less 5 Slippery wet 3 At or below OAT – 15 °C 4 Compacted snow Any Above OAT – 15 °C 3 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 100 mm Any On top of ice 02 Frost1 Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3 mm or less 5 More than Slush 3 mm up to 2 Contaminated 15 mm 3 mm or less 5 More than Standing water 3 mm up to 2 15 mm Any On top of ice 02 Wet ice Any 02 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 30 mm Any On top of ice 02 Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery. Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited. A primary assessment may have to be downgraded based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. The following table shows the correlation between AIREP terminology and RWYCC. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Table 2 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC AIREP Description RWYCC N/A 6 Braking deceleration is normal for the GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5 directional control is normal. Braking deceleration OR directional control GOOD TO MEDIUM 4 is between good and medium. Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3 directional control is noticeably reduced. Braking deceleration OR directional control MEDIUM TO POOR 2 is between medium and poor. Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort POOR 1 applied OR directional control is significantly reduced. Braking deceleration is minimal to non- LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort 0 applied OR directional control is uncertain. Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must be supported by all other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability/landing performance. Subpart C — Aircraft performance and operating limitations Section 1 — Aeroplanes Chapter 2 — Performance class A 6. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA If the performance data have been determined on the basis of a measured runway friction coefficient, the operator should use a procedure correlating the measured runway friction coefficient and the effective braking coefficient of friction of the aeroplane type over the required speed range for the existing runway conditions.Determination of take-off performance for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. Determination of landing performance should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. 7. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 General APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL Applicable standards for the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival are provided under AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1). 8. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways FACTORING OF AUTOMATIC LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA In those cases where the landing requires the use of an automatic landing system, and the distance published in the AFM includes safety margins equivalent to those contained in CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1), CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) and CAT.POL.A.235, the landing mass of the aeroplane should be the lesser of: (a) the landing mass determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1), CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) or CAT.POL.A.235, as appropriate; or (b) the landing mass determined for the automatic landing distance for the appropriate surface condition, as given in the AFM or equivalent document. Increments due to system features such as beam location or elevations, or procedures such as use of overspeed, should also be included. 9. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways LANDING MASS CAT.POL.A.230 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the destination and alternate aerodromes: (a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 60 %, 70 %, or 780 % (as applicable) of the landing distance available (LDA) on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded. (b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind, or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on this lesser mass. (c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 10. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations NON-SCHEDULED ON-DEMAND COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT) OPERATIONS Non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations do not include holiday charters, i.e. charter flights that are part of a holiday travel package. 11. New GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows: GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, may be achieved when conducting reduced required landing distance operations if mitigating measures are established and implemented. Such measures should address flight crew, aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and operations. It is, however, essential that all conditions established are adhered to as it is the combination of said conditions that achieves the intended level of safety. The operator should in fact also consider the interrelation of the various mitigating measures. The mitigating measures may be determined by the operator by using a risk assessment or by fulfilling all the conditions established under CAT.POL.A.255(b). An operator willing to establish a set of conditions different from those under CAT.POL.A.255(b) should demonstrate to the competent authority the equivalent level of safety through a risk assessment. The competent authority may require further mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the operator. 12. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations RISK ASSESSMENT The risk assessment required by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) should include at least the following elements: (a) flight crew qualification in terms of training, checking and recency; (b) flight crew composition; (c) runway surface conditions; (d) dispatch criteria; (e) weather conditions and limitations; (f) aerodrome characteristics; (g) aeroplane characteristics and limitations; (h) aeroplane equipment and systems affecting landing performance; (i) aeroplane performance data; and (j) operating procedures and operating minima. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 13. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations GENERAL (a) The operator should ensure that flight crew training programmes for reduced required landing distance operations include ground training, flight simulation training device (FSTD), and/or flight training. (b) Flight crew with no reduced required landing distance operations experience should have completed the full training programme of (a) above. (c) Flight crew with previous increased reduced required landing distance operations experience of a similar type of operation with another EU operator, may undertake the following: (1) an abbreviated ground training course if operating an aircraft of a type or class different from that of the aircraft on which the previous reduced required landing distance operations experience was gained; (2) an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course if operating the same type or class and variant of the same aircraft type or class on which the previous reduced required landing distance operations experience was gained; this course should include at least the provisions of the conversion training contained in this AMC; the operator may reduce the number of approaches/landings required by the conversion training if the type/class or the variant of the aircraft type or class has the same or similar operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics as the previously operated aircraft type or class. (d) Flight crew with reduced required landing distance operations experience with the operator may undertake an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course according to the following conditions: (1) when changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the content of the conversion training; (2) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has the same or similar operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics, as the previously operated aircraft type or class, a difference course or familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course’s purposes; and (3) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has significantly different operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics, the abbreviated course should include the content of the conversion training. GROUND TRAINING (a) The initial ground training course for reduced required landing distance operations should include at least the following: (1) operational procedures and limitations, including flight preparation and planning; TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (2) characteristics of the runway visual aids and runway markings; (3) aircraft performance related to reduced required landing distance operations, including: (i) aircraft-specific decelerating devices and equipment; (ii) items that increase the aircraft landing distance, e.g. excess speed at touchdown, threshold crossing height, delayed brake application, delayed spoiler/speed brake or thrust reverser application; and (iii) runway surface conditions; (4) in-flight assessment of landing performance, including maximum landing masses and runway conditions; (5) stabilised approach criteria; (6) correct vertical flight path after the DA/MDA; (7) correct flare, touchdown and braking techniques; (8) touchdown within the appropriate touchdown zone; (9) recognition of failure of aircraft equipment affecting aircraft performance, and action to be taken in that event; (10) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the activation of deceleration devices; (11) go-around/balked-landing criteria and decision-making; (12) selection of precision approaches versus non-precision approaches if both are available; and (13) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain reduced required landing distance operations, including aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) procedures. FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING (a) FSTD and/or flight training should at least be required for the commander and any other pilot flying for landing when performing reduced required landing distance operations. (b) FSTD and/or flight training for reduced required landing distance operations should include checks of equipment functionality, both on the ground and in-flight. (c) Initial reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of two approaches and landings to include at least the following exercises which may be combined: (1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass; (2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach; (3) a landing on a wet runway; (4) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and (5) a go-around/balked landing. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (d) Special emphasis should be given to the following items: (1) in-flight assessment of landing performance; (2) stabilised approach, recognition of an unstable approach and, consequentially, a go- around; (3) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the activation of deceleration devices; (4) timely and correct activation of deceleration devices; (5) correct flare technique; and (6) landing within the appropriate touchdown zone. CONVERSION TRAINING Flight crew members should complete the following reduced required landing distance operations training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which reduced required landing distance operations will be conducted. (a) Ground training, taking into account the flight crew member’s increased landing factor operations experience. (b) FSTD training and/or flight training. RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING (a) The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the normal recurrent training and operator’s proficiency checks, the pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with reduced required landing distance operations are adequate. (b) The items of the ground training should cover a 3-year period. (c) An annual reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of two approaches and landings so that it includes at least the following exercises which may be combined: (1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass; (2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach; (3) a landing on a wet runway; (4) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and (5) a go-around/balked landing. FLIGHT CREW QUALIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE (a) Flight crew qualification and experience are specific to the operator and type of aircraft operated. (b) The operator should ensure that each flight crew member successfully completes the specified FSTD and/or flight training before conducting reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments (c) The operator should ensure that no inexperienced flight crew members, as defined in AMC1.ORO.FC.200(a), perform an approach and landing with reduced required landing distance operations. 14. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations MONITORING (a) Reduced required landing distance operations should be continuously monitored by the operator to detect any undesirable trends before they become hazardous. (b) A flight data monitoring (FDM) programme, as required by ORO.AOC.130, is an acceptable method to monitor operational risks related to reduced required landing distance operations. (c) Although ORO.AOC.130 requires FDM only for aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of more than 27 000 kg, FDM is recommended for all operators conducting reduced required landing distance operations. 15. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP) The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any further increase of the landing distance. Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance: (a) unfavourable or variable winds; and (b) runway surface condition. 16. New GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) is added as follows: GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADVERSE WEATHER Adverse weather conditions include thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes, moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant, therefore, reduced required landing distance operations with tailwind are prohibited by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv)(A). Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in a considerable tailwind component. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 17. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid, autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing distance operations. 18. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations RECENCY Flight crew conducting reduced landing distance operations should have a recency in said operations of at least two landings, either in actual operations or in an FSTD, performed within the validity period of the operator proficiency check (OPC). 19. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS (a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that: (1) the aerodrome information is obtained from an approved source; (2) any change reducing landing distances that has been declared by the aerodrome operator has been taken into account; and (3) no steep approaches, screen heights lower than 35 ft or higher than 60 ft, operations outside the stabilised approach criteria, or low-visibility operations are required at the aerodrome where reduced required landing distance operations are conducted. (b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account. (c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment beyond the runway strip, and the effectiveness of any mitigation measures that may be in place to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments Chapter 3 — Performance class B 20. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS (a) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturers, the variable affecting the landing performance and the associated factor that should be applied to the AFM data are shown in the table below. It should be applied in addition to the operational factors as prescribed in CAT.POL.A.330 (a) and CAT.POL.A.330(b). Table 1: Landing distance correction factors Surface type Factor Grass (on firm soil up to 20 cm 1.15 long) (b) The soil should be considered firm when there are wheel impressions but no rutting. 21. GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways LANDING MASS CAT.POL.A.330 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the destination and alternate aerodromes. (a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 70 % or 80 %, as applicable, of the LDA on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded. (b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind, or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on this lesser mass. (c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival. 22. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) may be achieved when conducting reduced required landing distance operations if mitigating measures are established and implemented. Such measures should address flight crew, aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and operations. It is, however, essential that all conditions established are adhered to as it is the combination of said conditions that achieves the intended level of safety. The operator should in fact also consider the interrelation of the various mitigating measures. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 64 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments The competent authority may require further mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the operator. 23. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations CONTROL OF THE TOUCHDOWN AREA The control of the touchdown area may be ensured by using external references visible from the flight crew compartment. The end of the designated touchdown area should be clearly identified with a ground reference point beyond which a go-around is required. Adequate go-around and balked landing instructions should be established in the operations manual (OM). A written and/or pictorial description of the procedure should be provided for crew use. 24. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations TYPE EXPERIENCE The operator should specify in the operations manual (OM) the minimum pilot’s experience on the aircraft type or class required to conduct such operations. TRAINING PROGRAMME (a) Initial training (1) The aerodrome training programme shall include ground and flight training with a suitably qualified instructor. (2) Flight training should be carried out on the runway of the intended operations, and should include a suitable number of: (i) approaches and landings; and (ii) missed approach/balked landings. (3) When performing approaches and landings, particular emphasis should be placed on: (i) stabilised approach criteria; (ii) accuracy of flare and touchdown; (iii) positive identification of the ground reference point controlling the touchdown area; and (iv) correct use of deceleration devices. (4) These exercises should be conducted in accordance with the specific control procedure of the touchdown area established by the operator, and should enable the flight crew to identify the external visual references and the designated touchdown area. (b) Recurrent training The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the recurrent training and checking programme required by Subpart FC of Annex III (Part-ORO) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 65 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with this particular operation, for which the pilot is authorised by the operator, are verified. RECENCY The operator should define in the OM appropriate recent-experience requirements to ensure that the pilot’s ability to perform an approach to and landing on the intended runway is maintained. 25. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP) The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any further increase of the landing distance. Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance: (a) unfavourable or variable winds; and (b) runway surface condition. ADVERSE WEATHER Adverse weather conditions include thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes, moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant, therefore, reduced required landing distance operations with tailwind are prohibited by CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6)(i). Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in a considerable tailwind component. 26. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid, autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 66 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 3. Proposed amendments 27. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations CORRECT USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES Flight crew should use full reverse when landing irrespectively of any noise-related restriction on its use unless this affects the controllability of the aircraft. The use of all stopping devices, including reverse thrust, should commence immediately after touchdown without any delay. 28. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS Additional maintenance instructions, such as more frequent checks, for the aircraft’s deceleration devices, especially for the reverse system, should be established by the operator in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, and be included in the operator’s maintenance programme in accordance with Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES The operator should establish procedures for the flight crew to check before take-off the correct deployment of the deceleration devices, such as the reverse system. 29. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS (a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that: (1) the aerodrome information is obtained from an approved source; and (2) any change reducing landing distances declared by the aerodrome operator has been taken into account. (b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account. (c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment beyond the runway strip, and the effectiveness of any mitigation measures that may be in place to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 67 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA 4. RIA 4.1. Issues to be addressed General review of aeroplane performance requirements A first attempt to review the operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations with the purpose of harmonisation between US and EU rules was initiated by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)/Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Performance Harmonisation Working Group (PERFHWG). The recommendations of said working group were subsequently discussed by the JAA OPS Performance Sub-Committee (PERFSC) and included in an NPA (NPA-OPS 47). Such NPA became the input for EASA rulemaking task OPS.008 (former task number). The main effects of the proposed changes were considered to be an improvement of clarity, technical accuracy and flexibility for operators ,as well as harmonisation with the FAA rules. A general consistency review of the aeroplane performance requirements in Subpart C ‘AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND OPERATING LIMITATIONS’ of Part-CAT is also performed in this NPA. A further need for coordination and a consistency check has been identified in eventual changes proposed for aeroplane-performance-related rules by the following RMTs: — RMT.0379 ‘All-weather operations’ (AWO), and — RMT.0570 ‘Reduction of runway excursions’. ICAO amendments However, it soon became evident that the number of issues and safety concerns to be addressed in the field of aeroplane performance was larger. Later on in fact, it was recognised that airworthiness standards and operating rules may not cover adequately all conditions for take-off and landing performance, particularly in relation to runway surface condition when the runway is wet or contaminated. This issue touches multiple domains of the aviation regulatory framework such as Airworthiness (AW), Air Operations (Air OPS) and ADR. For this reason, the FAA tasked the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Advisory Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC) to perform an exhaustive review of operations on contaminated runways. TALPA ARC developed proposals along the three main directions of: — standards for runway condition reporting by aerodromes; — standards for aircraft manufacturers to produce data for operational landing performance computation at the time of arrival; and — operational rules for aircraft operators. Most of the TALPA ARC recommendations were endorsed by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE), which, in particular, contained the following SRs to EASA: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 68 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA — 3.7.1 — Establish and implement one consistent method of contaminated runway surface condition assessment and reporting by the aerodrome operator for use by aircraft operators. Ensure the relation of this report to aircraft performance as published by aircraft manufacturers. — 3.7.3 — It is recommended that aircraft operators always conduct an in-flight assessment of the landing performance prior to landing. Note: Apply an appropriate margin to these results. Under the Research Project EASA.2008/4, EASA also published in 2010 a study on runway friction characteristics measurement and aircraft braking (RuFAB), which endorses some of the TALPA ARC recommendations. Part of the TALPA ARC recommendations on certification aspects related to performance were also initially considered by EASA in RMT MDM.069 —‘Take-off and landing performance assessment’, which was then deleted from the EASA Rulemaking Programme to be included in the present RMT. The TALPA ARC recommendations were also the basis for the following two draft Advisory Circulars (ACs) published by the FAA in December 2015: — AC 25-32: Landing Performance Data for Time of Arrival Landing Performance Assessments. This AC provides guidance and standardised methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and aeroplane operators, can use when developing landing performance data for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments for transport category aeroplanes. This AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. — AC 25-31: Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways. This AC is equivalent to the above one but intended for developing take-off performance data. The TALPA ARC recommendations have been endorsed as well by ICAO through the work of the Friction Task Force (FTF). The result of this work were presented in ICAO State Letter 4/1.1.55-15/30, issued in 2015, including a number of standards and recommended practices amending the following annexes: — ICAO Annex 3 ‘Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation’; — ICAO Annex 6 ‘Operation of Aircraft’, Part I and Part II; — ICAO Annex 8 ‘Airworthiness of Aircraft’; — ICAO Annex 14 ‘Aerodromes’; and — ICAO Annex 15 ‘Aeronautical Information Services; as well as the following documents: — ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’; and — ICAO Doc 4444 ‘PANS — ATM’. Such proposals were then adopted by the Council of ICAO in 2016. This NPA addresses the following ICAO amendments: — assessment of performance at the time of landing (State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12, ICAO Annex 6, Part I — Amendment 40); TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 69 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA — reporting of degraded runway conditions by the flight crew (State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12, ICAO Annex 6, Part I — Amendment 40); and — provision of distances at the time of landing in the OM (ICAO Annex 8, Part IIIB — Amendment 105). The other amendments to ICAO Annexes will be addressed by a dedicated RMT in the context of ADR. However, the content of the amendment to ICAO Annex 14 (State Latter AN 4/1.2.26-16/19), as a well as that of Amendment 1 to the Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aerodromes in PANS- Aerodromes, as well as Amendment 7 to PANS-ATM will be referenced in the present NPA. In this context, the following SR to EASA: — UNKG-2008-076: The European Aviation Safety Agency should require operators to ensure that flight crews are provided with guidance material on aircraft performance when operating on a runway that is notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’, or has sections thereof notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’ is also addressed. Crosswind limitations Furthermore, EASA has received the following SR: — NORW-2011-011: The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) recommends that FAA, EASA and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Norway evaluate the airlines' crosswind limits in relation to friction values and consider whether they should be subject to separate approval by the authorities; and a similar SR in EAPPRE: — 3.7.2 — Establish and implement one consistent method of calculation of crosswind limits for use by aircraft manufacturers and aircraft operators. Guidance on crosswind limitations has been already produced by EASA in the Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No 2014-20 but, based on the above SRs, further assessment and regulatory developments are necessary. Reduced required landing distances for certain CAT operations In 2014, the European Business Aviation Association (EBAA) approached EASA to discuss the applicable landing factors for CAT operations in relation to the specificities of certain aircraft types, belonging to performance class A and used in business aviation, in order to determine whether more flexibility is achievable under given conditions. Such flexibility exists in the US in the context of ‘eligible on-demand operations’ regulated under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR).135 and 91K. For this purpose, EBAA has commissioned a study to an independent research body (National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR)) and has submitted it to EASA for consideration in the present RMT (Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft). The study identifies the risks related to landing operations with an increased landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, i.e. with a reduced required landing distance (RLD), as well as the mitigating measures to attain a level of safety equivalent to that of the current rules. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 70 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA A similar proposal, but for performance class B aeroplanes, was submitted to EASA in 2015 by the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) France. The drivers of this proposal are however different as in this case, the possibility to use an increased landing factor of 80 % of the LDA is restricted to specific aerodromes where a public interest exists. The safety justification of the proposal is based on a risk assessment that defines a number of mitigating measures tailored to the characteristics of the types in use in order to attain a level of safety equivalent to that of the current rules. Summary of the issues Based on the above, the following issues are addressed in this NPA: Issue Input sources General review of — JAA NPA-OPS 47 — Aeroplane Performance; aeroplane performance — technical improvements, clarifications and consistency check of requirements the rules on aeroplane performance; — coordination with RMT.0379 — AWO; — coordination with RMT.0570 — Reduction of runway excursions ICAO Amendment 1 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.1; Standards for runway — SR UNKG-2008-076; surface condition — ICAO SL 2015/30; assessment and reporting — ICAO SL 2016/12; — ICAO SL 2016/19; — Runway Friction Characteristics Measurement and Aircraft Braking (RuFAB) study ICAO Amendment 2 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.1; Airworthiness standards — ICAO SL 2015/30; for landing performance — ICAO SL 2016/29; computation at the time of — ICAO SL 2016/12; arrival — FAA AC 25-32; — FAA AC 25-31 ICAO Amendment 3 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.3; In-flight assessment of — ICAO SL 2015/30; landing performance at the — ICAO SL 2016/12 time of arrival Crosswind limitations — EAPPRE SR 3.7.2; — SR NORW-2011-011; — EASA SIB No 2014-20 Reduced required landing — Report No NLR-CR-2014-206; distance for performance — FAR 135.385(f); class A and B aeroplanes — DGAC France proposal TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 71 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA 4.1.1. Safety risk assessment General review of aeroplane performance requirements The JAA NPA-OPS 47 originally contained the following 10 proposals: Proposal JAR-OPS reference Subject Proposal 1 1.475 Deletion of the definition of ‘Damp Runway’. Proposal 2 1.480 Introduction of the definition of ‘Grooved or Porous Friction Course Wet Runway’ and changes to the definitions of runway surface contaminants. Proposal 3 1.485 Amendment of the reference to airworthiness standards for wet runways Proposal 4 1.490/1.495 Editorials. Guidance on ‘Grooved or Porous Friction Course Wet Runway’. Guidance for non-linear runway slope accountability Proposal 5 1.495 Clarifications on the maximum bank angles that can be used with and without approval Proposal 6 1.500 Text clarifications and new paragraph added to specify net flight path margins for two-, three- and four-engined aeroplanes Proposal 7 1.505 Text clarifications and technical-accuracy improvements Proposal 8 1.510 Clarifications on missed approach climb gradient requirements Proposal 9 1.515 Several changes on landing performance Proposal 10 1.570 Editorials Proposals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 were recognised to be superseded by the ICAO amendments addressed in this NPA and, therefore, were not considered further. Proposals 5 and 8 are not harmonised with the corresponding FAA rules. Furthermore, some of the issues touched by these proposals are under consideration in the FTWHG, which, having a wider representation of manufacturers in its composition, is considered to be a more appropriate forum to deliberate. Therefore, said proposals are not considered further in this NPA. The remaining Proposals 6, 7 and 10 are transposed into the corresponding requirements of Part-CAT. Further necessary consistency changes have been introduced, as a consequence of the changes proposed to address the other issues of this NPA. No further changes have been identified through RMT.0570 and RMT.0379, for each of which an NPA is yet to be published. Therefore, due to the nature of the above amendments, no safety impact has been identified for this issue and consequently, it will not be subject to this RIA. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 72 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Implementation of the ICAO amendments Runway surface conditions have contributed to many safety events, and investigations have revealed shortfalls in the accuracy and timeliness of assessment and reporting methods currently in use. An issue has been identified particularly in the lack of standardisation in the way runway surface conditions, and consequently braking action, are assessed and reported. Similarly, operating rules and performance data defined in accordance with the current airworthiness standards do not address adequately all conditions for take-off and landing performance in relation to the runway surface condition when the runway is wet or contaminated. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) Safety Report 2014 indicates that 87 % of runway excursions occurred in the landing phase, and poor weather conditions were present in 43 % of those cases. Said Report further recommends to operators to use a standardised runway surface condition reporting system harmonised with performance information provided by manufacturers, and to apply appropriate margins to the take-off and landing distances in relation to the runway surface condition. These issues are captured by EAPPRE SRs 3.7.1 and 3.7.3 as well as UNKG-2008-076. Furthermore, in a safety analysis conducted by EASA for this RMT over a period of 5 years (2011–2015), the accidents and serious incidents were reviewed in which at least one of the following conditions had been fulfilled: — aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition; — measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate; and — runway condition was a causal factor in an occurrence. In the analysis, 13 occurrences were identified, out of which 5 were classified as accidents and 9 as serious incidents. The majority occurred during landing. There is a balance between the number of runway overruns and that of side excursions that occurred during landing. The following figure shows the distribution of the occurrences by mass and propulsion type. 6 5 Number of aircraft 4 3 2 1 0 2 251 to 5 700 Kg 27 001 to 272 000 Kg 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Reciprocating Turbofan Turboprop Figure 1 — Distribution of occurrences by aircraft mass and propulsion type TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 73 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA In order to address these issues, further to an accident occurred to a 737-700, the FAA tasked in 2007 the TALPA ARC with an exhaustive review of safety issues of operations on contaminated runways. This working group was composed of a wide range of stakeholders such as aviation authorities, air operators, aerodrome operators, aeroplane manufacturers and various associations. In 2009, the TALPA ARC submitted to the FAA its proposals which were oriented along the following three main axes: — standards for runway condition reporting by aerodromes (in FAR 139); — definition of the operational landing performance computation (in FAR 25); and — operational rules for transport category aeroplanes (in FAR 121). In the period 2010–2011, field trials were conducted with volunteering aerodromes and operators to validate a crucial element of the proposals, the RCAM. The FAA has then taken the approach of implementing the proposals of the TALPA ARC in a series of ACs, as well as other guidance and policy documents that allow the various stakeholders to apply them on a voluntary basis. However, several aircraft manufacturers and States have already adopted significant elements of the TALPA ARC work in their operational documentation and reporting systems. The TALPA ARC proposals have been also endorsed by ICAO that, as mentioned above, through the work of the FTF, addressed the following three issues of interest for this NPA: (a) Standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting In ICAO Annex 6 (Section 4.4.2.1) pilots are required to issue the runway braking action special air report (AIREP) when the runway braking action encountered is not as good as reported. (b) Airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at the time of arrival In ICAO Annex 8 (Section 2.2.7.1(f)), manufacturers are required to provide in the AFM landing performance data for the time of landing. (c) In-flight assessment of landing performance at the time of arrival In ICAO Annex 6 (Section 4.4.11) pilots are required to assess landing performance at the time of arrival against the latest runway surface condition information available. These changes are considered in this NPA along with other relevant elements from other ICAO annexes and documents. Said assessment addresses SRs 3.7.1 and 3.7.3 of EAPPRE as well as UNKG-2008-076. Crosswind limitations The establishment, the understanding and the correct application of crosswind limitations, also in relation to runway surface conditions, have a significant safety relevance as crosswind has a major impact on directional stability. Crosswind is recognised as an important causal factor in runway excursions. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 74 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA The AIBN, in its Report SL 2011/10, performed a systematic analysis of 30 reports of accidents and incidents related to operations on contaminated and slippery runways over a 10-year period, and in 19 of those accidents/incidents, a correlation with the presence of crosswind was found. The safety relevance of crosswind limitations was also recognised in EAPPRE (SR 3.7.2). This assessment addresses EAPPRE SR 3.7.2 and SR NORW-2011-011. A study on crosswind (Research Project EASA.2011/08 ‘NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection’) was commissioned by EASA and carried out by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands (NLR). This study showed that a crosswind or tailwind component was a causal factor in a significant number of occurrences investigated since 1990 and involving CS-25-certified aeroplanes operated in CAT. These occurrences typically resulted in wingtip strikes, tail strikes, hard landings and runway excursions. The wind in these occurrences was frequently accompanied by gusty conditions. The analysis of existing practices revealed several issues: — demonstrated values of crosswind limits of different aircraft types cannot be compared with each other as different ways of wind determination during the flight tests may be used; — for most commercial aircraft designed since 1950, no hard crosswind limits were established during certification flight testing; — for the vast majority of commercial aircraft designed since 1950, gust is not mentioned in the demonstrated crosswind; — there is currently no common industry standard on how to derive advisory crosswind values for non-dry runway conditions; — most but not all operators surveyed for this study used hard crosswind limits; — not all operators consider gusts when evaluating crosswind limits; and — there is no generally accepted way of decomposing reported wind gusts into crosswind and tailwind components. Based on the above conclusions, EASA issued SIB No 2014-20 to raise awareness on the risks associated with operations in strong and/or gusty crosswind conditions and to provide guidance to manufacturers, operators and training organisations. The current EU rules on Air OPS, namely Part-CAT, are requiring operators to publish wind limitations in their OM, but no specific guidance is provided on how this limitations should be developed for crosswind, nor it is defined how to establish a correlation between crosswind and runway surface conditions. Having regard to EAPPRE SR 3.7.2, the RG considered the possibility to develop a standardised methodology for the calculation of crosswind limits; however, it was recognised that a similar action is already under consideration by the FTHWG. Furthermore, one of the conclusions of Research Project EASA.2011/08 ‘NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection’ indicated that the need for harmonisation among manufacturers of the methodology for determining crosswind limits is at the level of flight testing. The RG concluded that regulatory material for the development of such methodology is beyond the scope of this RMT and that this issue is more appropriately addressed by the FTHWG. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 75 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Similarly, having regard to SR NORW-2011-011, the RG considered the possibility to require an approval of the operator’s crosswind limits by the CA. This possibility was, however, also discarded as the definition of operational crosswind limits is either based on manufacturer’s approved data in the AFM or manufacturer’s advisory data provided in other documents. Thus, an additional approval by the CA is not considered necessary. It was then decided to provide only guidance to operators on how to use the information available from manufacturers to establish crosswind limits in the OM and to relate such limits to the runway surface conditions. Due to the nature of this proposed amendment, no negative safety impact or other adverse impacts have been identified and, consequently, it is not part of the RIA. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes The possibility to introduce flexibility into the methodology used to determine the landing distance is advocated by certain stakeholders. The current EU rules, namely CAT.POL.A.230, require to determine the landing mass of the aeroplane in a way that allows the aeroplane to come to a full stop within 60 % of the LDA for turbojet-powered aeroplanes and within 70 % of the LDA for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes, respectively. The application of this factor to the landing distance is intended to provide an adequate safety margin against landing overruns. The business aviation community requested EASA to allow the use of an 80 % landing factor for business aviation operations conducted with performance class A aeroplanes. The application of this factor to the LDA results in a reduction of the required landing distance. The proposal is based on a rule in force in the US regulatory framework under FAR.135 and 91K (eligible on-demand operations) and is substantiated by a study which defines a number of risk-mitigating conditions in order to attain a level of safety equivalent to that of the current rule. The adoption of this regulatory proposal would allow more flexibility for the above-mentioned business operators, facilitate the access to certain regional aerodromes and, according to EBAA, eliminate a competitive disadvantage for European operators. DGAC France has submitted to EASA a similar proposal to allow the use of the 80 % landing factor for the operation of performance class B aeroplanes. In this case, however, the reasons are different as these operations would be limited to specific aerodromes where the state of the aerodrome has determined a public interest (e.g. remote or isolated areas with reduced or no availability of other transport modes, aerodromes with short runways that cannot be extended, aeromedical services, etc.), and an operational necessity exist. This proposal is also based on a set of mitigating measures. The driver for the consideration of the issue in this NPA is, therefore, not safety but rather flexibility and proportionality of the rules; however, it should be noted that a safety risk is introduced if an 80 % landing factor is allowed without establishing appropriate mitigating measures to attain a level of safety equivalent to that originally attained through CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POL.A.330. 4.1.2. Who is affected? The issues identified in and addressed by this NPA affect CAT aeroplane operators and flight crews as they have to directly comply with the aeroplane performance requirements. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 76 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA CAs are also affected as the authorities responsible for the oversight and approvals related to aeroplane performance. Aeroplane manufacturers are also affected as they have to provide the necessary performance data to operators. 4.1.3. How could the issue/problem evolve? In case the issues considered in this NPA are not addressed, and if the regulatory framework is not changed, it is expected that the identified safety risks related to operations on wet and contaminated runways and in crosswind conditions would remain the same or possibly develop further. The harmonisation level between EU and US rules would remain the same or most likely develop further in relation to the implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations as well as of reduced required landing distance on-demand operations. Moreover, the EU rules would remain non-aligned with the corresponding ICAO SARPs. Finally, the lack of flexibility for business aviation operators when operating with a reduced required landing distance could create a competitive disadvantage for European operators. 4.2. Objectives The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Chapter 2 of this NPA. The general objective of this proposal is to maintain a uniform and high level of safety with cost- efficient rules. The specific objectives of this proposal are to: — reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor; — provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations; and — contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations. 4.3. Policy options Two of the issues listed under Section 4.1.1 above, namely ‘General review of aeroplane performance requirements’ and ‘Crosswind limitations’, do not require a RIA. The other two issues, having different starting points and drivers, will be subject to separate RIAs. Implementation of ICAO amendments When considering the implementation of the ICAO amendments, the RG assessed the option to introduce a new unified dispatch criterion for the landing distance by using already at dispatch the performance data for the in-flight assessment. This was an attempt to avoid using two different sets of performance data for landing performance, one at dispatch and one in-flight, the use of those two TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 77 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA different sets being in accordance with the new requirement of in-flight assessment of landing performance. However, this option was discarded for the following reasons: — the review of dispatch criteria was outside the scope of the TALPA ARC and ICAO amendments; — it would lead to disharmonisation with the FAA; and — landing distances calculated using the criteria at dispatch are used in the certification process of aeroplanes, therefore, the impact of this Option could not be estimated for most of the existing types. Table 1 — Selected policy options for ICAO amendments Option No Short title Description 0 No change Baseline option (no change in rules; risks remain as outlined in the issue analysis). 1 Implement ICAO Introduce: amendments — a requirement for pilot reports on the runway braking action; — a requirement for an in-flight check of landing performance at the time of arrival; — airworthiness standards for the production of landing performance data at the time of arrival. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes For this issue, the following options have been identified: Table 2 — Selected policy options for the reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Option No Short title Description 0 No change Baseline option (no change in rules; risks remain as outlined in the issue analysis). 1 Reduced Introduce the possibility of using a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA required landing for performance class A and B aeroplanes under defined conditions distance and with the approval of the CA. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 78 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA 4.4. Methodology and data (only for a full RIA) 4.4.1. Applied methodology The methodology applied to this RIA is the multi-criteria analysis (MCA), which allows comparing all options by scoring them against a set of criteria. The MCA covers a wide range of techniques that aim at combining a variety of positive and negative impacts into a single framework to allow an easier comparison of scenarios. Essentially, it applies cost- benefit thinking to cases where there is a need to present impacts that are a mixture of qualitative, quantitative, and monetary data, and where there are varying degrees of certainty. The MCA key steps generally include: — establishing the criteria to be used for comparing the options (these criteria must be measurable, at least in qualitative terms); — scoring how well each option meets the criteria; the scoring needs to be relative to the baseline scenario; — ranking the options by combining their respective weights and scores; and — performing a sensitivity analysis of the scoring to test the robustness of the ranking. The criteria used to compare the options were derived from the Basic Regulation, and the guidelines for the RIA were developed by the European Commission. The principal objective of EASA is to ‘establish and maintain a high uniform level of safety’ in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Basic Regulation. As additional objectives, the Basic Regulation identifies environmental, economic, proportionality, and harmonisation aspects, which are reflected below. For the scoring of the impacts, a scale of –5 to +5 is used to indicate the negative and positive impacts of each option (i.e. from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’ negative/positive impacts). The intermediate levels of benefits are termed ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’, providing a total of 5 levels in each direction (5 in the positive and 5 in the negative one), with a ‘no impact’ score also being possible. 4.4.2. Data collection In order to estimate the impact of the selected policy options for each issue considered in the RIA, the following data are needed: — fleet information; — information on stakeholders’ awareness of the ICAO amendments and their voluntary alignment therewith when manufacturers’ data is available; and — aerodrome information in relation to the use of increased landing factors. Fleet information is based on current fleet figures from the Ascend Flightglobal Consultancy. The data set includes most turbine-powered aircraft except a few piston-to-turbine conversions and kit-built aircraft6. 6 Cessna 206 Soloy, Cessna 207 Soloy, Cessna 210 Centurion, Cessna 421 Turbo Conversion, Comp Air Aviation 10, Comp Air Aviation 12, Comp Air Aviation 9, Epic Aircraft LT/Dynasty, Gulfstream Aerospace Goose, Gulfstream Aerospace S-2T Turbo Tracker, Hawker TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 79 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA The following fleet figures were extracted on 1 February 2016. They include all aircraft in service or temporarily stored in the fleet of EASA Member State (MS) operators used generally in CAT, or in business/corporate/executive aviation. Table 3 — MTOW and seat capacity of the CAT fleet of European operators Categories ≤ 5 700 kg 5 700–45 360 kg > 45 360 kg Total 19 or less 1 326 1 853 26 3 205 More than 19 11 1 031 3 657 4 699 Freight / Cargo 15 203 233 451 Total 1 352 3 087 3 916 8 355 Table 4 — MTOW and seat capacity of the business aviation fleet of European operators Seats ≤ 5 700 kg 5 700–45 360 kg > 45 360 kg Total 19 or less 1 167 1 683 25 2 875 More than 19 16 47 63 Total 1 167 1 699 72 2 938 A survey on the awareness and voluntary implementation of the ICAO amendments was conducted by EASA among stakeholders between mid-December 2015 and mid-February 2016. 73 stakeholders from 22 countries responded, amongst which: national aviation authorities (NAAs), air navigation service (ANS) providers, aerodrome operators, business aviation aircraft operators, General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) manufacturers and European Cockpit Association (ECA) pilots. The survey is provided as an Appendix to this NPA (see Chapter 6 below). Aerodrome information has been derived from Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft. The study is provided as an Appendix to this NPA (see Chapter 6 below). Traffic data for business aviation has been derived from Eurocontrol’s ‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in 2012’, STATFOR Briefing 167. Furthermore, EASA conducted a safety analysis over a period of 5 years (2011–2015) to review the accidents and serious incidents in which at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled: — aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition; — measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate; and — runway condition was a causal factor in an occurrence. The analysis is provided as an Appendix to this NPA (see Chapter 6 below). Beechcraft 18, Hawker Beechcraft Bonanza (turbine), Lancair Evolution, Lancair Propjet, Maule Aircraft 7, Pacific Aerospace Cresco, Pacific Aerospace FU-24, and Partenavia P68. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 80 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Other specific data, as necessary for the purposes of this NPA, were provided to the RG by Airbus, Embraer and IATA. Where necessary, the use of such data and their source are detailed in the following Sections. 4.5. Analysis of impacts 4.5.1. Safety impact Implementation of ICAO amendments The safety issues identified in relation to: — runway surface conditions assessment and reporting; — manufacturers’ performance data not addressing adequately take-off and landing performance on contaminated runways; and — the need to reassess landing performance at the time of arrival when the conditions considered at dispatch have changed, may be addressed effectively only in combination. In fact, a pilot report of braking action is effective only if based on a global and consistent methodology for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. Such information may be then used to reassess the landing performance calculation at the time of arrival when the actual conditions at the time of arrival differ from those at dispatch. However, the in-flight assessment has to be based on performance data consistent with the information on the runway surface condition. For this reason, the ICAO amendments imply the introduction of the following changes: — a requirement for pilot reports on the runway braking action; — a requirement for an in-flight check of landing performance at the time of arrival; and — airworthiness standards for the production of landing performance data at the time of arrival. The FAA, ICAO and the EAPPRE have concurred on the validity of these changes. In addition to the occurrences and the consequent SRs already considered in this NPA, the safety analysis conducted by EASA over the last 5 years identified the following events, where one or more of the above issues was a causal or contributing factor: TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 81 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA In the period 2011–2015, there were 29.9 million flights in Europe, which gives the following rates: — 1 accident per 10 million flights; and — 2.3 serious incidents per 10 million flights. In the base scenario of EUROCONTROL’s latest 7-year forecast (updated in February 2016), an average traffic growth of 2.2 % per annum is predicted for Europe between 2015 and 2022. However, it should be noted that this forecast is conservative, and that in the long term, the traffic growth is expected to be higher. The numbers of flights as well as the rates of accidents and serious incidents that may be expected if no regulatory changes are introduced are the following: The proposed changes are expected to prevent or mitigate the consequences of these potential accidents or serious incidents. Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact is Option 0 0 expected through this Option. This Option is expected to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the Option 1 4 potential accidents or serious incidents indicated in the table above. The safety impact is, therefore, considered high positive. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes The driver for the proposed changes in the use of a reduced required landing distance for performance class A and B aeroplanes under given conditions is flexibility and proportionality of the rules. In order to avoid that a safety risk is introduced, appropriate mitigating measures are necessary to attain a level of safety equivalent to that originally attained through CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POL.A.330. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 82 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Performance class A aeroplanes Under FAR.135 and 91K, the use of a landing factor of 80 % is allowed under certain conditions. Such factor in turn permits to reduce the required landing distance and to operate either on shorter runways or with higher payloads. Operators using this higher landing factor must meet certain requirements as per FAA 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4, including a two-pilot crew, specific additional flight crew experience, crew pairing requirements, the use of a destination airport analysis program (DAAP), and the prior approval of the CA. EU rules require either a factor of 60 % for turbojets or of 70 % for turboprops. In order to consider the use of an 80 % factor, a quantitative safety assessment is necessary. Such assessment was made in the study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft, which was conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory Air Transport Safety Institute (NLR-ATSI). The level of safety in this context is defined as the probability of a landing overrun and it is calculated by means of an engineering model based on a Montecarlo simulation, which considers aircraft characteristics, landing performance data and operational factors (floating, crew reaction times, threshold speed deviations, headwind/tailwind, runway surface condition, aircraft mass). The safety assessment is conducted for performance class A business-operated aircraft with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of 45 000 kg and a maximum seating capability of 19 passengers, reflecting the largest business aircraft currently operated and grouped in 4 categories: — 13–19-passenger jet aircraft; — 9–12-passenger jet aircraft; — 6–8-passenger jet aircraft; and — 14-passenger turboprop aircraft. For each group, an existing aircraft model was selected. The model showed that until the threshold of the 80 % factor, mitigating measures allow achieving an equivalent level of safety. Above that threshold, mitigating measures are not effective any longer. The following mitigating measures were identified: — avoidance of unstable approaches; — avoidance of long landings (floating); — use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse on each landing (if installed); — no landings on a runway that is forecasted to be contaminated; — no landings on a runway where tailwind is forecasted; and — no MEL dispatch allowed with inoperative systems having an effect on landing performance. The RG, based on these results, discussed extensively the issue and first limited the applicability of these operations to CAT operations where: — the aircraft has an MCTOM of 45 360 kg and an MOPSC of 19, and TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 83 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA — a prior approval is granted by the CA. Then the conditions for obtaining the approval were defined by means of a risk assessment based on 4 main criteria related to: — operational conditions:  special approach procedures, low-visibility operations or other operations requiring prior approval by the CA are prohibited in order to avoid the cumulation of different risks; — flight crew:  the crew is composed of two pilots having recency in those operations;  requirements for qualification, training, checking and monitoring of the flight crew are in place; and  the commander has the final authority to decide whether or not such operations shall be conducted: — aerodrome:  an ALAP is established to ensure that no tailwind, runway contamination conditions or other adverse weather conditions exist at the destination; and  a check of landing performance against wet runway landing criteria is made when the runway is wet; and — aircraft:  all equipment affecting landing performance is operative. Alternatively the operator may conduct a risk assessment covering all aspects identified by the 4 criteria above. Finally, the CA may impose additional conditions if specific concerns exist. Overall, the RG considered that through the proposed conditions, the mitigating measures identified by the study are implemented, and further safety barriers are created that permit to achieve a level of safety equivalent to that originally intended by CAT.POL.A.230. Performance class B aeroplanes The proposal for performance class B aeroplanes requires an assessment similar to that of performance class A aeroplanes; however, the following additional element was also considered: — the applicability of the proposed change is strongly limited by the fact that the required approval is for specific runways of specific aerodromes and is possible only in those aerodromes where a public interest has been declared, which significantly reduces the exposure of these operations to safety risks. Subsequently, a risk assessment was conducted to identify the appropriate mitigating measures for performance class B aeroplanes (see the following figure): TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 84 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Threats Aircraft Accurate flare Prevention controls Top Escalation Consequences maintained within and event factor stable approach touchdown: Go around criteria (SOPs): specific /balked propeller control monitoring of landing of the final the touchdown instructions VMC Flight crew land approach speed area significantly outside the touchdown criteria (zone or speed) No operations No tailwind on contaminated ! 10% Flight crew land within the forecasted runway Training touchdown Crew and criteria but LDR qualifications: checking: calculations are Experience Runway Landing Initial incorrect or no Recency excursion: factor Recurrent longer valid Enhanced No MEL items inability to Runway maintenance affecting Operational make a stop overrun: programme for landing checks of within the injuries/ aircraft’s performance braking expected fatalities Unanticipated stopping devices devices landing technical failure distance of the aircraft’s requirement stopping devices on landing Operational procedures mandating Propeller immediate and reverse Incorrect or no maximal use of highly deployment of braking devices effective the aircraft’s stopping devices by the flight crew TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 85 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA which is summarised as follows: Threat Preventive measures Risk Flight crew A specific monitoring of the touchdown area aims to improve Runway land the accuracy of the flare and touchdown performed by the excursion: significantly flight crew. inability to make outside the a stop within the This monitoring may be based on the use of external touchdown expected landing references that already exist (e.g. taxiway) or that must be criteria (zone distance created (e.g. specific painting on the runway), beyond which a or speed). requirement. go-around is mandatory. If an efficient control of the touchdown area is implemented, it may be considered that there is no more inaccuracy in the air distance, and the safety margin of 30 % may only be applied to the ground roll part. Adequate go-around or balked landing instructions should be established in the OM. Benefits of performance class B aeroplanes: at the lowest flight idle, propellers generate a significant drag that allows a better control of the final approach speed than turbofans on jet aircraft. Visual meteorological conditions that help perform a touchdown within the designated area. Crew qualifications, specific training and checking as well as aerodrome recency enhance the flight crew proficiency in performing an accurate landing in compliance with the specific operational procedures implemented by the operator. The initial and recurrent training shall include flight training. The specific aerodrome training and recency conditions help the flight crew to familiarise themselves with the airfield and acquire the necessary visual references to control the touchdown area. Flight crew No tailwind is forecasted around the estimated time of arrival. land within This constraint reduces the severity of the consequences that the may be induced by the variations between the forecasted and touchdown the actual wind. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 86 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA criteria but Landing on contaminated runway is prohibited. LDR calculations are incorrect or no longer valid. Unanticipated Additional maintenance instructions, such as more frequent technical checks of the aircraft’s deceleration devices, especially of the failure of the reverse system, should be established by the operator, in aircraft’s liaison with the manufacturer, in order to enhance the deceleration reliability of these systems. devices on landing The operator shall establish operational procedures to ensure that all equipment affecting landing performance is operative before commencing the flight. Incorrect or The operator shall establish operational procedures to ensure no the immediate and maximal use of deceleration devices by the deployment flight crew. of the aircraft’s Benefits of class B performance aircraft: propeller reverse is deceleration highly effective and can be used at much lower speeds than devices by reverse thrust on jet aircraft. the flight crew Crew qualifications, specific training and checking as well as aerodrome recency ensure appropriate use of deceleration devices by the flight crew in accordance with the operational procedures established by the operator. The initial and recurrent training shall include flight training. Based on the above assessment, the RG recognised that most of the risks are adequately addressed by the conditions defined for performance class A aeroplanes and, in addition to those, decided to introduce requirements for: — the control of the touchdown area; and — operations in VMC only. Overall, the RG considered that through the proposed conditions, the mitigating measures identified for performance class B aeroplanes are implemented in order to achieve a level of safety equivalent to that originally intended by CAT.POL.A.330. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 87 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Summary Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore; no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this option. Due to the limitations on the applicability of the changes proposed by this Option in combination with the mitigating measures required Option 1 0 for performance class A and B aeroplanes, respectively, no impact on safety is expected through this Option. 4.5.2. Environmental impact Implementation of ICAO amendments Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore; no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. This Option may have an environmental impact due to increased fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in those cases where the in-flight landing distance check gives a landing distance longer than that calculated at dispatch and does not allow a landing. In such cases, in fact, a diversion would be necessary. Airbus, having already voluntarily implemented the TALPA ARC recommendations, has conducted a large-scale check representative of 8 aircraft types on 8 000 runways. It was found that for wet runways, only 8 runways would be so limited to have operational consequences. In no cases, all runways of the same aerodrome were limited. Option 1 –1 A more limited study on contaminated runways (namely on one aircraft type and on runways contaminated with compacted snow and standing water) has identified that 15 aerodromes were limited. On average, the landing distances calculated in-flight were systematically longer than the one at dispatch only on contaminated runways. Another survey conducted by Embraer among its operators found that a limited number of diversions occur when TALPA ARC recommendations are applied. Overall, this Option is expected to have a very low negative environmental impact. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 88 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. The study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 indicates that the adoption of the changes proposed by this Option would lead to an increase of 15 % of the usable runways. Data form Eurocontrol (‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in Option 1 –1 2012’) indicates a yearly traffic growth forecast between 3 % and 4 % until 2018. However, business aviation contributes only by 1.1 % to CO2 emission in aviation. On this basis, this Option is expected to have a very low negative environmental impact. 4.5.3. Social impact Implementation of ICAO amendments Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. Option 1 0 No social impact is expected through this Option. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. This Option will lead to an increase of traffic in regional aerodromes Option 1 3 and will facilitate access to locations where a public interest exists. The social impact is expected to be medium positive. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 89 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA 4.5.4. Economic impact Implementation of ICAO amendments Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. A cost is expected for aircraft manufacturers for the production of performance data required by this Option. Several large aeroplane manufacturers, among which Airbus, Boeing and Embraer, have already produced performance data in accordance with the TALPA ARC recommendations. Such data is provided to operators either as a standard or as an option. For the manufacturers of smaller aeroplanes, a cost is also expected; however, for all performance class B and C aeroplanes, the changes proposed by this Option do not mandate the use of dedicated manufacturer data for the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival when such data is not available. A cost for operators for the implementation of this Option is also expected. Data provided to the RG by Airbus, IATA and Embraer shows, respectively, that: — 97 % of Airbus European operators have implemented the TALPA ARC methodology for the in-flight assessment of the Option 1 –1 landing distance at the time of arrival; — 11 Embraer operators out of 74 surveyed perform in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival based on the TALPA ARC methodology; and — out of 80 IATA operators contacted, 17 provided a reply, 14 of which European; overall, 16 perform in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival. Therefore, considering that voluntary implementation of the changes proposed by this Option has started, the cost for operators is considered small. As regards the cost for aerodromes becoming unusable due to the increased landing distance calculated at the time of arrival, which may lead to a diversion, the analysis done for the environmental impact shows that a very low economic impact is also expected. Overall, this option is expected to have a very low negative economic impact. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 90 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. The study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 indicates that the adoption of the changes proposed by this Option for performance class A aeroplanes would lead to an increase of 15 % of the usable runways. Data from Eurocontrol (‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in 2012’) indicates for business aviation a yearly traffic growth forecast between 3 % and 4 % until 2018. An economic benefit due to the increase of traffic is expected both for operators and aerodromes. Option 1 3 Conversely, some costs have been identified for operators, mainly for the qualification and training of the flight crew. However, this regulatory proposal offers the flexibility to conduct the training either in an FSTD or in-flight during normal operations. Overall, such costs are assumed to be largely outweighed by the enhanced operational flexibility and the increase of traffic. A small positive economic impact is expected also for performance class B aeroplane operations. On this basis, this option is expected to have a medium positive economic impact. 4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues Implementation of ICAO amendments Impact Rationale No impact on general aviation and proportionality is expected Option 0 0 through this Option as the current situation would remain unchanged. The criteria for the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival have been tailored to the different categories of aeroplanes. In most cases, the assessment is reduced to confirming Option 1 0 the criteria used at dispatch and, therefore, the implementation effort will be limited. The negative impact of this Option is therefore considered insignificant. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 91 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Impact Rationale No impact on general aviation and proportionality is expected Option 0 0 through this Option as the current situation would remain unchanged. A medium positive impact is expected through this Option as it would Option 1 3 introduce more flexibility and proportionality for small operators. 4.5.6. Impact on ‘better regulation’ and harmonisation Implementation of ICAO amendments Impact Rationale This Option will leave the current situation unchanged, thus making Option 0 –5 EU rules non-aligned with ICAO SARPs once the changes adopted by ICAO will enter into force. The impact is considered highly negative. This Option fully aligns EU rules with the described ICAO amendments and, therefore, is considered to have a very positive high impact. The harmonisation with the FAA is also achieved on the Option 1 5 content of the proposed changes; however, regarding the implementation, the FAA has opted for a voluntary system rather than mandating the ICAO standards. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Impact Rationale The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact Option 0 0 is expected through this Option. This Option introduces into the EU regulatory framework a similar concept to that of the ‘eligible on-demand operations’ existing in the US under FAR 135 and 91K although it defines more precise and Option 1 3 stringent conditions to obtain the approval for such operations. The impact on harmonisation with the FAA is considered medium positive. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 92 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 4. RIA 4.6. Comparison and conclusion 4.6.1. Comparison of options The following table summarises the impacts of the options considered in this NPA. Reduced required landing distance Implementation of ICAO amendments operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes Option 0 Option 1 Option 0 Option 1 Safety impact 0 4 0 0 Environmental 0 –1 0 –1 impact Social impact 0 0 0 3 Economic 0 –1 0 3 impact GA and proportionality 0 0 0 3 issues Impact on ‘better –5 5 0 3 regulation’ and harmonisation Total –5 7 0 11 Based on this assessment, it is considered that the following options provide the best global positive impact: Implementation of ICAO amendments: Option 1. Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes: Option 1. 4.6.2. Monitoring and ex post evaluation The need for monitoring and ex post evaluation of the implementation of the new requirements will be determined based on the results of the NPA public consultation. TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 93 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 5. References 5. References 5.1. Affected regulations — Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1) 5.2. Affected CS, AMC and GM — Decision No. 2003/2/RM of the Executive Director of the Agency of 17 October 2003 on certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and acceptable means of compliance, for large aeroplanes (‘CS-25’) — Decision N° 2012/015/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24th October 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council ‘Guidance Material to Annex I — Definitions’ — Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2’ — Decision 2014/015/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2’ 5.3. Reference documents — JAA NPA-OPS 47 — Aeroplane Performance — SR UNKG-2008-076 — Aircraft Accident Report 1/2009, Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), UK Department for Transport, 9 January 2009 — SR NORW-2011-011 — Report SL 2011/10, Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions, Vol II — Main Report, Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN), May 2011 — European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE), Released Edition 1.0, January 2013 — IATA Safety Report 2014, 51st Edition, April 2015 — Research Project EASA.2011/08 NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection (Report no. NLR-CR- 2012-143) — Eurocontrol — ‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in 2012’ — STATFOR Briefing 167 — Research Project EASA.2008/4 — Runway Friction Characteristics Measurement And Aircraft Braking (RuFAB), final report, March 2010 TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 94 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 5. References — EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No 2014-20 — Aeroplane Operations in Crosswind Conditions, 23 June 2014 — Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121 — Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 135 — FAA AC No. 25-32 — Landing Performance Data for Time of Arrival Landing Performance Assessments — FAA AC No. 25-31— Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways — ICAO Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Operation of Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes, 9th Edition, July 2010 — ICAO Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Airworthiness of Aircraft, 11th Edition, July 2010. — ICAO Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations, 6th Edition, July 2013 — ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.1.55-15/30 of 29 May 2015 — ICAO State Letter AN 3/5.10-16/29 of 6 April 2015 — ICAO State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12 of 8 April 2016 — ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.2.26-16/19 of 5 April 2016 — ICAO Doc 9981 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Aerodromes — ICAO Doc 4444 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Air Traffic Management (ATM) TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 95 of 96 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11 6. Appendices 6. Appendices Below documents are available for information only at the following address: https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2016-11 — Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft, conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory Air Transport Safety Institute (NLR-ATSI) — EASA EU Survey on RMT.0296 (February 2016) — Runway Excursions (RE) analysis 2011–2015 — Annex A: Safety data collection for RMT.0296 ‘Review of aeroplane performance requirements for commercial air transport operations’ TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 96 of 96 An agency of the European Union NLR-CR-2014-030 Safety assessment of landing performance factors of business type of aircraft G.W.H. van Es J.N.M. van Eekeren Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, P.O. Box 90502,1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands T: +31 88 511 35 00, F: +31 88 511 32 10, E: [email protected], I: www.nlr-atsi.nl NLR-CR-2014-030 Executive summary SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF LANDING PERFORMANCE FACTORS OF BUSINESS TYPE OF AIRCRAFT Problem area safety assessment that Report no. EASA Landing distance investigates what risk reducing NLR-CR-2014-030 limitations oblige operators to measures would be required to calculate the landing mass at the achieve an equivalent level of Author(s) destination airport in such a way safety with landing factors G.W.H. van Es J.N.M. van Eekeren a full stop is achieved at 60% of higher than those stated by the Landing Distance Available EASA. Report classification for a turbo-jet aircraft and 70% UNCLASSIFIED of the Landing Distance Results and conclusions Available for a turbo-propeller A safety assessment is done for Date aircraft. This regulation four different business aircraft May 2014 originally applied to commercial types that are representative to air carriers only. However, it can the aircraft used by European Knowledge area(s) now also apply to business business aircraft operators. Vliegveiligheid (safety & security) aircraft operators. This limits the Different mitigating measures Vliegoperaties destinations that can be selected are identified and their impact during dispatch. on the landing performance is Descriptor(s) determined. The impact of the Overrun safety Description of work identified mitigating measures is Business aircraft EBAA, in co-operation with quantified using a landing Landing performance GAMA and ERAC, intends to distance simulation model. This Landing factors present a Safety Case that shows that an equivalent level of analysis the possibility of higher safety with landing dispatch runway landing factors similar to factors higher than those stated the US. As a key input to this by EASA is achievable. safety case the EBAA requires a UNCLASSIFIED NLR-CR-2014-030 NLR Air Transport Safety Institute Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, UNCLASSIFIED P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands Telephone +31 88 511 35 00, Fax +31 88 511 32 10, Web site: http://www.nlr-atsi.nl NLR-CR-2014-030 SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF LANDING PERFORMANCE FACTORS OF BUSINESS TYPE OF AIRCRAFT G.W.H. van Es 1 J.N.M. van Eekeren 1 SAFE-RUNWAY GmbH No part of this report may be reproduced and/or disclosed, in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the owner. Customer EBAA - European Business Aviation Association Contract number ----- Owner EBAA - European Business Aviation Association Division Air Transport Distribution Limited Classification of title Unclassified May 2014 Approved by: Author Reviewer Managing department G.W.H. van Es H. Post A. Rutten Date: Date: Date: SUMMARY EASA Landing distance limitations as prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways – of Annex IV [Part-CAT] of the Cover Regulation on Air operations [Reg. (EC) 965/2012] oblige operators to calculate the landing mass at the destination airport in such a way a full stop is achieved at 60% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-jet aircraft and 70% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-propeller aircraft. This regulation originally applied to commercial air carriers only. However, it can now also apply to business aircraft operators. This limits the destinations that can be selected during dispatch. In the US, the FAA approved a change of the landing factor form 60% into 80% for business operators under certain conditions. Contrary to the FAA the EASA regulations do not (yet) provide a possibility for a relaxation of the landing factor. Since present EASA regulations are the most limiting, the EBAA claims that a situation “fair market distortion and unfair competition” occurs to business aircraft operators. Therefore EBAA, in co-operation with GAMA and ERAC, intends to present a Safety Case that analysis the possibility of higher runway landing factors similar to the US. As a key input to this safety case the EBAA requires a safety assessment that investigates what risk reducing measures would be required to achieve an equivalent level of safety with landing factors higher than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230. The present report presents the results of this safety assessment. The assessment is done for four different business aircraft types that are representative to the aircraft used by European business aircraft operators. Different mitigating measures are identified and their impact on the landing performance is determined. The impact of the identified mitigating measures is quantified using a landing distance simulation model. This shows that an equivalent level of safety with landing dispatch factors higher than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230 is achievable. The actual increase of the landing dispatch factors varies between the different aircraft types analysed. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 v CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Project objectives and scope 2 2 PROJECT APPROACH AND PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 4 2.1 Overall safety assessment approach 4 2.1.1 Landing overrun probability model 4 2.1.2 Application of the landing overrun model 7 2.1.3 Landing distance model 10 2.1.4 Important assumptions in landing distance simulations 13 3 RESULTS 16 3.1.1 Identification of mitigating measures 16 3.1.2 Background on mitigating measures 16 3.1.3 Implementation of the mitigating measures 18 3.1.4 Impact of mitigating measures on landing overrun probability 22 3.2 Impact of landing factor on runways/airports in Europe 26 4 CONCLUSIONS 28 5 REFERENCES 29 APPENDIX A EXAMPLES LANDING PERFORMANCE MODEL VERIFICATION 30 vi NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND Commercial air carriers cannot take off for a destination airport unless the Airplane Flight Manual indicates that the jet aircraft is capable of a full stop landing at that airport within 60% of the effective length of the runway. The original 60% rule reflects the inability to accurately predict aircraft landing performance for aircraft that existed during the 1940s and provided a safety margin against landing overruns. During this period, performance variations existed among aircraft of the same model produced by the same manufacturer, and these differences were often significant. Also the ability to accurately forecast weather conditions at the planned airport destination was not available. Although the typical problems of the 1940s that justified the use of the 60% rule were resolved in the years after, the rule is still in use today. This is mainly because the certified landing distances do not always represent the landing performance that can be achieved during day-to-day operations. The dispatch factor now accounts for the deviate from the conditions during certification flight test (e.g. longer flares, longer transition times from touchdown to braking, lower deceleration values, and higher approach speeds). The landing dispatch factor itself was never formally changed despite many changes in operations and certification of commercial aircraft. Also other improvements like better weather forecasts, better pilot training, and improvements in aircraft systems like brakes, and anti-skid systems have also not been considered. Today the landing dispatch factor developed in the 1940s is still applied for jet aircraft operations (for turbo propeller aircraft a factor of 70% is used). In 2000, the Fractional Ownership Aviation Rulemaking Committee proposed to the US Federal Aviation Authorities FAA that for certain business jet operations the 60% rule should be changed into 85%. The FAA finally agreed with a change of the landing factor into 80% however only under certain conditions. Operators using this higher landing factor must meet certain requirements identified in FAA 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4 including two-pilot crew and specific additional flight crew experience and crew pairing requirements. Also the operator must have a Destination Airport Analysis Program (DAAP) to keep an acceptable level of safety for landing. The landing factor of 80% was to the knowledge of the present authors not determined by a formal quantitative safety assessment. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 1 EASA has also regulations on landing factors that an operator needs to apply during dispatch which are similar to the FAA regulations. EASA Landing distance limitations as prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways – of Annex IV [Part-CAT] of the Cover Regulation on Air operations [Reg. (EC) 965/2012] oblige operators to calculate the landing mass at the destination airport in such a way a full stop is achieved at 60% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-jet aircraft and 70% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-propeller aircraft. Contrary to the FAA the EASA regulations do not (yet) provide a possibility for a relaxation of the landing factor. Since present EASA regulations are the most limiting, the EBAA claims that a situation “fair market distortion and unfair competition” occurs to business aircraft operators. Therefore EBAA, in co- operation with GAMA and ERAC, intends to present a Safety Case that analysis the possibility of higher runway landing factors similar to the US. This is done in advance of the proposed rulemaking tasks RMT.0296 (OPS.008 a) & RMT.0297 (OPS.008 b) producing Opinion and Decision for Aeroplane CAT performance taking into account the European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursion [EAPRE, (2013)]. As a key input to this safety case the EBAA requires a safety assessment that investigates what risk reducing measures would be required to achieve an equivalent level of safety with landing factors higher than those stated in CAT.POL.A.230. The present report presents this safety assessment. 1.2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE The objectives of the presented study are to: • To determine if a level of safety equivalent to that implied by the runway factors in CAT.POL.A.230 can be achieved using higher runway factors and additional risk reducing measures; • To conduct sensitivity tests to investigate how robust the conclusions of the risk assessment are and to determine what range of runway factors could be considered acceptably safe; • To provide documented evidence that can support the arguments to be developed within the EBAA Safety Case; • To determine, for certain types of business aircraft, how many runways/airports in Europe such a change in allowed landing distance would correspond to. 2 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 The safety assessment is conducted for performance class A, business operated aircraft with a takeoff mass of no more than 45,000 kg and a maximum seat capability of 19 seats or less (reflecting the largest business aircraft currently operated). Under EASA regulations performance Class A aircraft include multi- engine turboprop aircraft with more than 9 seats or a maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kilograms, and all multi-engine turbojet powered aircraft. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 3 2 PROJECT APPROACH AND PROPOSED METHODOLOGY The proposed methodology for the safety assessment of runway landing factors of business type aircraft is discussed in this section. 2.1 OVERALL SAFETY ASSESSMENT APPROACH The main objectives of the present study is to determine if a level of safety equivalent to that implied by the runway factors in CAT.POL.A.230 can be achieved using higher runway factors and additional risk reducing measures. In aviation, the level of safety is often defined in terms of the probability of an aircraft accident or incident occurring. In some cases the term risk is also used which refers to the combination of probability of an occurrence and the associated consequences. In this last case an equivalent level of safety can be achieved by reducing the probability of an occurrence and/or by reducing the consequences of the occurrence. In the present study the safety level is defined as the probability of a landing overrun. The consequences of a landing overrun are mainly influenced by the surface on which the aircraft runs on after leaving the runway and/or obstacles surrounding the runway end. The landing factors will primarily influence the landing overrun probability. In the present assessment consequences of landing overruns are therefore not taken into account. The selected approach here is to calculate the landing overrun probability for a given runway length, landing factor and aircraft type under a wide variety of operational conditions (e.g. runway conditions, tailwind, etc.). The reference case which determines the level of safety to be achieved is defined here as the landing overrun probability with a 60% landing factor. Overrun probabilities for higher landing factors are then determined and compared to the reference case. Mitigating measures that could reduce the landing overrun probability are defined and the impact on the landing overrun probability is quantified. 2.1.1 LANDING OVERRUN PROBABILITY MODEL In order to determine the safety level associated with a certain value of the landing dispatch factor, the landing overrun probability should be quantified. 4 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 Landings overruns are normally always caused by a combination of different factors. Typical important causal factors are: excess speed, long landings, late application of brakes, slippery runways, and strong tailwind [Van Es (2013), Van Es (2010)]. These types of causal factors have a direct influence on the landing stopping performance. Basically the energy during landing is too high (e.g. due to an unstable approach or tailwind) and/or the energy not reduced quickly enough during the landing resulting in an inability to stop the aircraft on the runway (e.g. due to slippery runways, late application of stopping devices etc.). There are several ways to quantify the landing overrun probability. First of all statistical data on landing overruns obtained from worldwide or European operations could be used. This approach can give a good indication of the average probability. However a major drawback is that it is difficult to accurately account for airport and aircraft specific factors like runway length and landing performance characteristics with this pure statistical approach. Furthermore there are several interdependencies between factors that can’t be easily quantified using statistical data only. In normal landing operations there is always randomness in the value of parameters such as pilot reaction times, speed deviations, aircraft weight variations etc. These factors play an important role that is difficult to assess using only statistical data. Therefore an alternative approach using simulations to quantify the landing overrun probabilities is used for the present study. NLR-ATSI has developed engineering aircraft performance models according to industry standards which accurately describe the landing performance of an aircraft. The landing performance models account for variations in environmental factors such as wind and runway contamination. Other factors like runway slope are also taken into account by the model. A schematic overview of the landing distance model is shown in Figure 1. The landing distance is calculated in distinct segments comprised of the air distance, the transition distance and the braking distance. A number of factors in landing performance are not constant and can vary. To analyse the effects of these random and varying factors, a simulations are conducted using the Monte Carlo method. This allows simulating millions of landings under a wide variation of conditions in a reasonable amount of time 1. For a given runway length it is then possible to calculate the probability that an aircraft cannot be stopped on the runway during a landing. In the Monte Carlo method, a landing distance model is used which includes (most of) the variables 1 The principal feature of a Monte Carlo simulation is that a large number of input random variables represented by probability distributions are utilised. The parameter values of the functions are randomly selected using a random number generator. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 5 that could affect the landing distance. Independent random values of each significant operational variable are selected from estimates of the statistical distribution of the variable, and the resulting landing distance is determined. The estimates of the statistical distribution of the variables (such as deviation from target approach speed, significant floating during flare, time from touchdown to braking etc.) are based as much as possible on available operational landing data for business aircraft obtained from flight data monitoring programmes. A number of such data for business jet operations are available to NLR-ATSI. These data have been extended with additional data of EBAA members that have a Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programme. The Monte Carlo approach used here has also been successfully used to analyse landing dispatch factors in relation to EASA NPA 14/2004 [Transport Canada (2005)]. The method used here has been used successfully to change proposed regulation on landing performance in the past. 6 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 Figure 1: Schematic overview of the landing performance simulation model. 2.1.2 APPLICATION OF THE LANDING OVERRUN MODEL The simulation model described in section 2.1.1 is applied to a limited number of business type of aircraft considered to be representative for their category. The assessment is done for EASA performance class A, business operated aircraft as defined in the project scope. Performance Class A aircraft include multi-engine turboprop aircraft with more than 9 seats or a maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kilograms, and all multi-engine turbojet powered aircraft. The present assessment is limited to 3 business jet aircraft and 1 business twin turboprop aircraft. Based on ownership and usage data of business aircraft operators in NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 7 EASA countries (see e.g. Figure 2) the following four aircraft categories are used for the safety assessment: • 13-19 passenger jet aircraft (like the Gulfstream G550/G650, Dassault Falcon 2000, Dassault Falcon 900, CL-600) ; • 9-12 passenger jet aircraft: (like the Citation Excel, Hawker Horizon, Learjet 45) ; • 6-8 passenger jet aircraft: (like Cessna CJ3, Cessna mustang, BEECHJET, BAE-125, Premier, MU-300); • 14 passenger turbo prop: (like the Beech king Air series); Figure 2: Activity data of business operated aircraft in Europe (source Eurocontrol STATFOR, 2012). For each category a model of a representative aircraft is selected and used for the simulations. For the selected aircraft types Monte Carlo simulations on landing distance are performed. The main result of these simulations is a range of actual landing distances that are compared to the available runway length (LDA). From that a landing overrun probability can be calculated. As a first step an assessment is 8 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 done for a 60% landing factor for jets and 70% factor for turboprops assuming the normal dispatch requirements. For those individual cases where the aircraft cannot comply with the dispatch landing distance requirement the result is disregarded from the simulation. The landing overrun probability associated with the landing factor of 60 or 70% is assumed to be a value for the level safety that needs to be achieved. In the next step the assessment is done for higher landing factors. This increase of the landing factor will automatically be associated with an increase in landing overrun probability compared to the lower values as the runway margins become less (shorter runways become available to land on). To account for the increase in landing overrun probability mitigating measures are identified and the impact of the measure on the operation is determined. For each mitigating measure and combinations of measures the assessment is done for a range of landing factors. This is repeated until an overrun probability is found that is equal to the reference value for a landing factor of 60/70%. Note that the reference case does not include any of the mitigating measures identified. Figure 3 illustrates the overall safety assessment process. Figure 3: Illustration of steps taken in safety assessment. The landing factors discussed so far are for dry runways. However changing these dry runway factors could also affect the safety when landing on none-dry runways. In the landing distance simulations wet and contaminated runways are also considered through a reduction in deceleration during the ground roll. Regulations require during dispatch an additional landing distance factor of 1.15 to be used on top of the dry runway factor when the runway is forecasted to be NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 9 2 wet or contaminated . Changes to this additional non-dry runway landing factor are not considered in the present study. All dispatch calculations conducted in the present assessment assume a factor of 1.15 for wet/contaminated runways on top of a dry runway landing factor. 2.1.3 LANDING DISTANCE MODEL Aircraft performance models are used here developed according to industry standards and practices. These models accurately describe the landing stopping performance of an aircraft. The landing performance models account for the aircraft characteristics, variations in environmental factors such as wind, runway contamination and other factors like runway slope are also taken into account by the model. A schematic overview of the landing distance model is shown in Figure 1. The landing distance is calculated in distinct segments comprised of the air distance, the transition distance and the braking distance. For each segment engineering models are used. The first segment is calculated using the method developed by ESDU [Mitchel (1991)]. This gives a detailed engineering model for estimating airborne distance for fixed-wing aircraft. The method is based on energy considerations. It is based on analyses of measured performance for a wide range of aircraft types including business jets and business propeller-powered aircraft. It accounts for factors like different styles of landing flares (e.g. floating), influence of speed losses, approach speed variation, wind and runway slope. The second segment in the landing distance is calculated using the touchdown speed (as determined in the first segment calculations), wind speed, and transition time. Finally the third segment is calculated using the e.g. the speed after transition ending, wind speed, time of use of thrust reversers, runway slope, and runway condition [see e.g. Boeing (2009), ESDU (2006)]. Models are developed for 4 classes of business aircraft as described in section 2.1.2. For each class data for an existing aircraft was used and a landing distance model was developed using the characteristics of this aircraft (e.g. wing area, maximum lift coefficients, wing aspect ratio, declarations capabilities, influence of thrust reverser etc.). The results obtained with the landing distance performance models are compared to the published landing performance data of the actual aircraft. Appendix A shows some comparisons of the landing distance 2 If the computed landing distance on a contaminated runway (calculated according to EASA CS 25.1591 or other advisory data provided by the manufacturer) plus a 15% safety margin is less than the factored wet runway landing distance, the factored wet runway landing distance prevails. This is taken into account in the landing simulations. 10 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 as calculated by the NLR engineering model and published performance data. Typically the average difference between the landing distance model and the published manufacturer data is less than 1.5% which is more than acceptable for the present study. Note that in the present assessment the 19 and 12 passenger jets and the 14 passenger turbo prop aircraft are equipped with thrust/propeller reversers, whereas the 8 passenger jet has no thrust reverser installed. This reflects the typical standards of aircraft in these categories. The distributions of the variable parameters affecting the landing distance used in the Monte Carlo Statistical Analysis are obtained from operational flight data of a number of business aircraft operators and other data sources available to NLR [FDM (2013)]. Frequency distributions are determined for parameters like head-tailwind during landing, flare characteristics, pilot reaction times, reverse thrust usage, glide slope deviations, runway conditions, speed deviations, runway slope, temperature etc. During each run in the landing simulation a runway length (LDA) is randomly selected. The distribution of this runway length is based on the frequency of airports used in Europe for the 4 different business aircraft categories considered in this study. These data were obtained from the Eurocontrol Statistics and Forecast Service, STATFOR 3. A large number of runs is required to establish a reliable estimate of model uncertainties. The total number of runs used here is based on a standard error of less than 1% of the mean statistic defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the calculated landing distance and the square root of the number of trials in the simulation. According to this measure the minimum required number of runs is in the order of 350 million. Most of the simulations were conducted with more than 350 million. A number of metrics can be considered to validate the Monte Carlo simulation model results. The ultimate metric is the landing overrun probability. However a direct comparison of the model predicted and historical landing overrun probabilities is not straightforward. Historical data on landing overruns need to be assessed over some time to obtain statically accurate rates (say 10-20 years). During such a period many changes could have occurred in the operational characteristics and technical developments which cannot always correctly be assessed within the model. Also the historical data are mainly recorded for accidents and serious incidents whereas the model results are for all types of overruns irrespectively of the consequences. The historical data therefore could 3 The Central Route Charges Office of EUROCONTROL is a key data source to STATFOR. It includes all IFR flights and only those VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights which are chargeable. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 11 result in lower overrun rates than calculated. Furthermore the Monte Carlo landing model is run for certain aircraft type whereas the historical data normally covers a wide range of different aircraft types. Nevertheless the probabilities calculated by the model have been compared to some historical data. It was found that these are in the same order of magnitude as historical rates or 4 somewhat higher . A second way of validation of the Monte Carlo model is done by looking how strongly model parameters influence the landing distance (and hence the landing overrun probability) and compare these with causal factors in landing overruns as an equivalent. Figure 4 shows how strongly different parameters in the model correlate with the calculated landing distance by the simulation model. The closer the correlation coefficient is to ±1 the stronger the correlation between the parameter and the landing distance is. A positive value of the coefficient relates to an increase in landing distance. For instance a non- dry runway will significantly affect the landing distance (increase) whereas a 5 headwind (as opposite to a tailwind) significantly reduces the landing distance. This is reflected by the model as shown in Figure 4. Rank correlation coefficient -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Wet/contamainetd runway condition Wind Floating Overspeed at screen Glidepath at screen Reverse thrust used Runway slope Height at screen Time delay braking/reverse thrust Figure 4: Correlation of model parameters with landing distance in Monte Carlo simulation. When compared to the major causal factors in landing overruns with business aircraft (see Figure 5), the model parameters show a very similar pattern in terms importance. This is also an indication that the model produces validate results. 4 It can be expected that the model would be slightly more conservative (identifying more landing overruns). 5 As more landings are made wind a headwind rather than a tailwind, the correlation coefficient shown is negative. The results show a strong influence of wind. 12 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 Wet/contaminted rwy Floating Fast approach/TD Tailwind Late/incorrect use of stopping devices High on approach 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% Figure 5: Causal factors in landing overruns with business aircraft as percent of overruns with known causes ([Van Es (2013)]. 2.1.4 IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS IN LANDING DISTANCE SIMULATIONS It is assumed in all calculations that any installed equipment that would influence the landing distance is serviceable. It is therefore assumed that no MEL dispatch occurs with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers (if installed), anti-skid 6 systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if installed), and flaps . Malfunctions of these systems can have a significantly greater impact on the actual landing distance and hence on the landing overrun probability than changes in the landing dispatch factors. Table 1 gives an overview of typical increases in landing distance for a number of system malfunctions for executive type of aircraft as found in flight manuals. Finally it should be noted that the failure rates of aircraft systems are not affected by the landing dispatch factor itself. 6 This means that during dispatch with higher landing factors these systems should be available. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 13 Table 1: Typical values for landing distance increase for different system malfunctions. Malfunction Typical increase in landing distance (dry runway) No ground spoilers 150-170% No anti-skid 160-200% No brakes 200-300% No flaps 130-150% There are different types of runway contaminates all with their specific impact on stopping performance. For the present study the braking characteristics associated with a flooded runway are used without any kind of contamination drag to account for the effect of contaminated runways on landing stopping performance. This gives a good average representation of impact of the different types of contaminated runways. 7 All Monte Carlo simulations are conducted with a so-called fixed seed value . This means that the results from simulation will not change each time it is run. As the present study looks at the impact of different mitigating measures it is important that the changes in the simulation results are not caused by the different seed values used to generate random numbers. It is assumed for all calculations that the conditions at the destination airport 8 have not changed while flying the mission . This means that the weather and runway conditions known during dispatch are assumed to be same when landing at the destination airport. During each run in the simulation a runway length is randomly selected. The distribution of the runway length is based on the frequency of airports used in Europe for the 4 different business aircraft categories. These data are obtained from Eurocontrol. Both a minimum and maximum runway length is used in the 7 Starting off with a seed value generates a particular sequence in the simulation. A different seed value will result in another sequence and hence other results if insufficient simulations are conducted. 8 In reality the conditions forecasted for the destination airport can change. The accuracy of a forecast (e.g. wind and runway condition) depends on a number of factors such as the quality of the local met office, regional influences, and the overall time for which the forecast is valid. By assuming unchanged conditions at the destination airport some error is introduced. However, it is believed that this error will be small as the actual conditions could be worse or better than forecasted. Also it is imperative that crews will perform an inflight weather check to assess if a safe landing can be performed. 14 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 simulation reflecting the actual limits in runway length at the European airports used by the involved business aircraft category. All simulations are done for airports with normal approach angles (2.5-3.5 degrees). Some airports require steep approaches. Some business aircraft have been certified to conduct such steep approaches. Steep approach procedures at airports could require lowering the threshold crossing height to e.g. 35 feet, allowing for an early touchdown. It is accepted that these types of operation allow less margin for error and that steep approaches require special training and procedures. Special procedures, such as steep approaches are outside the scope of this analysis. It is sometimes suggested that operations on very short runways will increase pilot’s alert levels. Psychological effects on pilot reaction times during operations on e.g. short runways; adverse weather operations; mountainous terrain etc. are also outside the scope of this analysis. Finally all special operating conditions such as MMEL; low visibility; special approach procedures (e.g. leading to go outside the stabilized approach criteria), etc. are not considered in the analysis. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 15 3 RESULTS 3.1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF MITIGATING MEASURES Mitigating measures are identified that could bring the level of safety for operations with the higher landing factors to the same level as for 60% or 70% landing factors. These mitigating measures were defined using available information from the literature e.g. European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions, items covered in a Destination Airport Analysis Program used by some US business aircraft operators, runway excursion safety studies, and assessments done by operational experts. The actual influence of some of 9) the mitigating measures on related landing parameters (e.g. tendency to floating, deviation from target speed at threshold etc.) had to be estimated through engineering judgement and/or known results from best practices from commercial airlines. After a careful analysis of the available information and expert knowledge the following mitigating measures are considered in the present analysis: • Avoidance of continuation of unstable approaches; • Avoidance of long landings (floating); • Use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse on each landing (if installed); • No landings on a runway that is forecasted to be contaminated or with a 10 braking action of less than GOOD ; • No landings on a runway forecasted to have a tailwind; • No MEL dispatch is allowed with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and flaps. 3.1.2 BACKGROUND ON MITIGATING MEASURES This chapter identifies reasoning behind the various factors leading to an increased overrun risk for business type aircraft operators which are used for defining mitigating measures. The next section, 3.1.3 addresses the mitigation measures that operators could implement. 9) NLR-ATSI has access to a large collection of operational landing flight data from commercial airlines from which this can be estimated. 10 Currently a new classification is being explored for runway friction classification (TALPA ARC Runway Condition Assessment Matrix). This will have a different classification for runways using numbers instead of braking action. 16 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 Stabilised approaches Flight data from business operators show that compared to commercial operators a larger percentage of unstabilised approaches are continued [FDM 11 (2013), Van Es (2013)] . Flight data from business operators show that there are significantly more overspeed events at the threshold during unstable approaches than during stable approaches and that the threshold crossing height distribution is similar for both unstable and stable approaches. The flight data also show that for business aircraft the speed deviations at the threshold are much higher than with landings of commercial airlines. It should be possible for business operators to obtain similar speed deviations at the threshold as the commercial airlines with the appropriate measures. For this flight crews of business operators should conduct a stabilised approach according to published criteria by the operator so as to cross the threshold at 50 feet and calculated speed in the intended landing configuration. Any approach which is not stabilised should result in executing the published missed approach procedure and no attempt should be made to continue the landing. Long landings/floating Flight data from business operators show that compared to commercial operators long landings occur more often within the business aircraft operations [FDM (2013), Van Es (2013)]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. It should be possible for business operators to reduce the amount of landings with significant floating to the same level as commercial operators. Flight crews should therefore aim to touchdown within the first 1000-1200 feet, avoiding floating as a mitigating measure. Figure 6: Comparison long landing rate [Van Es, (2013)]. 11 Commercial operations have an unstabilised approach rate in the order of 1-8% and business operations have a rate in the order of 4-14%. Only 1-2 % of unstabilised approaches resulted in a go-around. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 17 Maximum reverse thrust Late or incorrect use of reverse thrust is a contributing factor in landing overruns. Reverse thrust is especially effective on slippery runways. EAPRE recommendation 3.4.24 explicitly recommends the use of immediate full reverse on wet contaminated runways irrespective of any noise related restrictions. No tailwind landings Data show (refer to figure 3 and 4 of paragraph 2.1.3) that the Landing overrun risk is considerably increased in tailwind conditions. Variations of the forecasted wind with the actual wind cannot be avoided. However the probability of large deviations can be reduced by limiting the planned mean forecasted wind and by a forecast with high accuracy. Weather reports should therefore always come from a formally approved source and no forecasted tailwind should exist. No landings on contaminated runways Data show (refer to figure 3 and 4 of paragraph 2.1.3) landing overrun risk is considerably increased on contaminated runway operations. Although at the moment the interpretation of contaminated runway is changing; this analysis refers to the EASA definition. Reducing the landing overrun risk could therefore also be achieved by not considering operations on runways forecasted to be contaminated during dispatch. It is also important that the weather forecasts and possible runway reports are of high accuracy. Weather and runway reports should therefore always come from a formally approved source. Dispatch items It is assumed for all calculations that any installed equipment that would influence the landing distance is serviceable. This means that no MEL dispatch is allowed with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and flaps when using a higher landing factor than 60% for jets or 70% for turbo props. 3.1.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MITIGATING MEASURES In this section details are provided how operators can achieve a successful implementation of the different mitigating measures. Operational restrictions The operational restrictions to destinations such a contaminated runways, no tailwind, or no MEL dispatch with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers (if 18 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 installed), anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if installed), and flaps, can be covered in a dispatch checklist. The only extra provision here would be to assure that the data for the wind and runway reports are from an approved and reliable source. These limitations could reasonably simple be implemented at dispatch. It will prove more challenging to implement stabilized approaches, go-arounds, correct 50’ height crossing speed, avoiding floating, fast or long landings, timely use of brakes and reverse etc. as mitigating measures. All these items are dependent on human, crew performance. Only stating in an operational manual that e.g. “a correct approach and landing must be applied when using a higher landing factor” would be correct but at the same time be insufficient. Thus getting grip and improving crew performance is needed. A traditional method trying to quantify crew’s performance is to refer to flight hours. Apparently it is assumed that more flight hours will provide a certain guarantee that approaches are flown stable and landings are conducted normal. The FAA requires that when operators would like to plan with higher landing factors (EOD) 12, their pilots are trained in accordance with an approved Destination Airport Analysis Program (DAAP). The crew shall consist of minimal 2 qualified pilots; the PIC should have an ATPL, type rating and minimal1500 hours. The SEC should have a CPL IR with minimal 500 hours and either one must have minimal 75 hours on type for operations under the DAAP. Basically tries this traditional method based on flying hours to assure that operations with a higher landing factor would be flown accurate enough. However it might be expected that e.g. 1000 hours/ year on long haul flights only will be of far less significance than 50 landings/year on short runways. Thus regular exposure to short or critical runway operations could be regarded as a mitigating factor. Especially during operations with higher landing factors the combination of exposure, training and monitoring could prove to be of higher value than a flight hours alone criteria in assuring that the crew as mitigating element is acceptable. The EAPRE provides evolved recommendations on improving crew 13 performance. . Adopting these EAPRE recommendations would enable accepting crew performance as mitigating measure with reference to stabilized approaches, avoiding floating, long or fast landings, immediate use of braking devices. Experience by the large commercial aircraft operators learned that a combination 12 The Eligible On Demand operator must meet certain requirements identified in FAA 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4 13 (EAPRE 3.4.3; 3.4.15; ) NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 19 of regular exposure, continuous training (theoretical and practical), checking and monitoring proved to be a successful method to achieve the desired crew performance. Stabilised approach Especially during operations with an increased landing factor the crews mind set should be that the approach would result in a go-around except when all 14 parameters of the stabilized approach are met . This mind set can only be achieved if promoted by the operator and trained as such. Experience by large commercial operators and business aircraft operators show that a non-punitive FDM program not only enhances crew’s awareness, but also provide operators a good method of improving specific training and or operations. Another element of avoiding un-stabilised approaches is technology. Presently special on-board warning equipment is available warning the pilot when an unstabilised approach is flown. Such stabilised approach monitor systems offer a supplement to the flight crew awareness of unstabilised approaches. Such systems automatically issue advisories if the pre-defined stabilised approach criteria for e.g. flaps, speed, and approach profile are not met. Long landings / floating For operations with the increased landing factor are correct landings at the correct speed and touchdown point more important since the margin for error is proportionally reduced with the increased landing factor. A stabilised approach helps achieving this, but is no a guarantee. During these types of operation a firm and correct touchdown is preferable over a smooth, soft, and long landing. Operators should provide adequate training, passengers should be briefed and the crew should be aware of the aiming point and ultimate touchdown point 15. A non-punitive FDM program will help reducing the long landing / floating factor. Currently special on-board warning equipment is available for some aircraft that helps to warn the pilot when a long landing occurs. If the aircraft has not touched down before a pre-defined threshold, the system will activate an aural (caution) message upon the crew can react (e.g. balked landing). Immediate use of all braking devices Data show that too late using full reverse thrust (if installed) or too late wheel braking are a causal factor in landing overruns (see e.g. Figure 5). Especially low speed overruns occur often after late application of wheel brakes and finding out 14 EAPRE 3.4.16; 3.4.18; 3.4.19 15 EAPRE 3.4.21; 3.4.22; 20 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 too late that the deceleration is not what is expected to be. Immediate use of all available stopping devices is not only necessary on wet runways but is also 16 required when operating under the increase Landing Factor. This element should be adequately trained and monitored as well. Flight Data monitoring EAPRE 3.4.2 recommends that operators should include and monitor aircraft parameters related to potential runway excursions in their FDM program. Flight Data Monitoring is the pro-active use of digital flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety and is mandatory for aircraft with a maximum certificated take-off mass (MCTOM) in excess of 27 000 kg. FDM is now being used by aircraft operators throughout the world to inform and facilitate corrective actions in a range of operational areas. It offers the ability to track and evaluate operational safety trends, identify risk precursors, and take the appropriate remedial action. These actions include, but are not limited to, specific training, improved operations and addressing identified potential safety risks. Typical parameters would be related to the stabilized approach, touchdown point, touchdown speed and the moment of using the various braking devices. Data from various operators (airline and business) show that approach and landing deviations have been reduced considerably after implementing a non- 17 punitive FDM program . The European Authorities coordination Group on Flight Data Monitoring provides material on implementing FDM programs and standardised FDM based indicators. The main goals of a FDM program should be to recognise trends in unstabilised approaches, long landings, fast landings and / or late application of braking devices. It could also serve in a non-punitive environment as a specific crew awareness method. It is recognised that FDM is in general not obliged for business type operators and also not all business type operators would be in a position to set-up an own FDM. Nevertheless is it expected that a voluntarily FDM would enhance the possibility of regarding crews as a solid mitigating factor during increased landing factor operations. 16 EAPRE 3.4.24; 3.4.25; 17 The European Aviation Safety Plan addresses specifically the role of FDM in the risk of runway excursions. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 21 Other factors Visual clues Especially during the final approach phase could visual clues influence the 18 perception of pilots. Factors that are mentioned to increase the possibility of the overrun risk are wide, short runways, downslope, low intensity lighting and haze. These items should be addressed in crew training but should not be a regarded as limiting factors for planning with higher landing factors. Threshold crossing height It is generally accepted that each deviation of + 50 ft threshold crossing height, typically increases the landing distance by 300 meter. Crossing the threshold too low, increases the risk of an undershoot and decreases the margin for error. Planned deviations from the threshold crossing height are not considered in this analysis. Conclusion on realism of mitigating measures. It is reasonable to expect that the mentioned operational limits (contaminated runways, no tailwind, or no MEL dispatch with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers (if installed), anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if installed), and flaps) can be adhered to during dispatch. Crew related items require a more comprehensive approach. First of all is adequate training essential, second a reasonable amount of exposure and finally an (voluntarily) implemented FDM program would be beneficial. 3.1.4 IMPACT OF MITIGATING MEASURES ON LANDING OVERRUN PROBABILITY In this section the influence of the identified mitigating measures on the overrun probability for higher landing factors is presented and discussed. First Figure 7 shows the influence of different landing dispatch factors on the overrun probability relative to the reference case of each of the four aircraft types 19 considered without any mitigating measures . As shown increasing the landing factor without any mitigating measures will increase the landing overrun probability. The influence of the landing factor on the overrun probability differs for the different aircraft types. The lowest influence in noticeable for the 14 passenger turbo prop aircraft and the highest for the 12 passenger jet. During each run in the landing simulation a runway length (LDA) is randomly selected. 18 Airbus getting to grips ALAR. 19 Shown is the ratio between the overrun probability for a given landing factor and the probability for the reference case. 22 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 The distribution of this runway length is based on the frequency of airports used in Europe for the 4 different business aircraft categories. The frequency distributions of the LDA vary for the four aircraft which to some extend explains the differences between the aircraft shown in Figure 7. The rather low change of probability with increasing landing factor for the 14 passenger turbo prop can be explained by the fact that this type of aircraft is not frequently used at airports with short runways according to the Eurocontrol operational data. Therefore increasing the landing factor (which provides the opportunity to land at shorter runways) has not a strong influence. 20 18 19 passenger jet 12 passenger jet Relative increase in overrun probability 16 8 passenger jet 14 14 passenger turbo prop 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 70% 80% 90% Landing factor Figure 7: Influence of landing factor on the relative overrun probability (relative to the 60% or 70% factor for jets and turbo props respectively). Next the influence of mitigating measures on the overrun probability (as discussed in the previous section) on the landing overrun probability is discussed. The analysis was conducted with those measures and combinations of measures that were considered to be the most promising ones which also could be introduced without great difficulties or effort. For all cases it is assumed that systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and flaps are operative at the landing. For combinations of mitigating measures the landing factor was determined which would provide an equivalent level of safety to the reference case with a 60% or 70% landing factor (for jets and turbo props respectively). The overall process is illustrated in Figure 8. The simulation is NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 23 rerun with small increments of the landing dispatch factor until an equivalent level of safety is found. Figure 8: Illustration of the process for determining an equivalent level of safety for a given (set of) mitigating measure(s). It should be noted again that the reference cases do not include any of the mitigating measures. The results of the safety analysis are shown in Table 2. The combination of mitigating measures shown in this table were chosen as such that they provided the most effective influence in reducing the overrun probability compared to the reference case. The analysis started with the restriction of landings on contaminated runways as initial analysis indicated that this provided the most significant reduction of landing overrun probability of all mitigating measures identified. The results show that the restriction of landings on 20 contaminated runways provides an additional 8-12% landing factor for the business jets. The turbo prop aircraft only gained 1% in landing factor with this 21 measure . Restricting tailwind landings together with no landings on contaminated runways provides an additional 11-14% landing factor for the business jets. The effect of these combined measures for the turbo prop aircraft is small again as only 2% is gained in the landing factor. The addition of the 20 This is equivalent to a reported braking action less than GOOD. 21 As propeller reverse is highly effective and can be used down to much lower speeds than reverse thrust on jet aircraft the influence of restricting contaminated runway landings does not have a significant effect on the landing overrun probability of the 14 passenger turbo prop aircraft analysed here. 24 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 100% use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse (if installed) on each landing to the previous measures provides an absolute increase in the landing factor of 12- 22 18% for the business jets and 8% for the turbo prop aircraft . Reverser thrust is most effective in reducing stopping distance on contaminated runways. As contaminated runways are already excluded as a mitigating measure the impact of a 100% use of reverser thrust is now mainly for wet runway landings which is normally much less than for contaminated runways. Finally use of all mitigating measures considered provides an absolute increase in the landing factor of 18- 22% for the business jets and 11% for the turbo prop aircraft on top of the reference landing factor of 60% and 70% respectively. Table 2: Landing factors with an equivalent safety level for different mitigating measures. 13-19 passenger 9-12 passenger 6-8 passenger 14 passenger Mitigating measure(s)* jet jet jet turbo prop No landings on contaminated runways 69% 72% 68% 71% No tailwind landings, no landings on 71% 74% 71% 72% contaminated runways No tailwind landings, no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse 72% 78% N/A** 78% thrust No tailwind landings, no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse 78% 82% 74% 81% thrust, reduced unstable approaches, limited floating * It is assumed that systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and flaps are operative. **Aircraft type does not have thrust reversers installed. It can be concluded that when the identified mitigating measures (no tailwind landings, no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse thrust, reduced unstable approaches, limited floating) are all applied, an equivalent level of safety compared to the landing factor of 60% /70% is achieved at a landing factor of 78% (13-19 passenger jet); 82% (9-12 passenger jet); 74% (6-8 passenger jet) and 81% (14 passenger turbo prop). With the exemption of the 8-passenger jet the figures are close to the FAA 14 CFR part 135.4 of 80%. 22 Analysis of flight data of business aircraft operators indicated that reverse thrust is normally used during 90-99% of all landings. An average of 95% utilisation is assumed in the reference case. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 25 3.2 IMPACT OF LANDING FACTOR ON RUNWAYS/AIRPORTS IN EUROPE For a number of business aircraft it is determined how many additional runways (in Europe) a change in the landing factor would provide at dispatch. For this the NLR-ATSI airport database is used which contains detailed information on Landing distance Available LDA of all runways in Europe. Only those European airports are considered that according to Eurocontrol STATFOR data were used at least once a day on average by business aircraft in 2013. Landing distances for the different aircraft types considered are obtained from the official flight manuals of these aircraft. The assessment is conducted for still air conditions and a maximum landing mass. Only the most commonly used aircraft for 23 business operations in Europe are considered. The results are shown in Table 3. The percentages in this table show the increase in the number of runways available during dispatch relative to a landing factor of 60% for jets and 70% for turbo props. For jets a landing factor of 70% the number of available runways increases between 5 and 20% with an average of 9%. For a landing factor of 80% this ranges from 10-31% with an average of 15%. For the turbo props little is to gain with an increasing landing factor as the airports used by these aircraft have runways that are much longer than required during dispatch for these aircraft. 23 The most commonly used twin turboprop aircraft in an executive role are the Beech King Air 200 and the King Air 90 accounting for more than 75% of all aircraft activity in Europe (source: STATFOR Eurocontrol). 26 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 Table 3: Impact of higher landing factors on the increase in available runways for dispatch in Europe. Aircraft type 70% landing distance factor 80% landing distance factor F900EX 17.1% 25.3% F2000EX 11.9% 20.6% 7X 8.6% 14.3% G550 6.0% 10.3% LR60 19.7% 30.6% MU-300 6.3% 10.8% Beechjet 400 8.1% 15.1% HS-125-800 5.4% 10.7% Mustang 6.0% 11.2% CJ1 6.8% 11.2% XLS 9.2% 14.5% CJ2 7.1% 13.5% CJ3 6.1% 10.6% King Air 200 N/A 2.3% King Air 90 N/A 0.0% NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 27 4 CONCLUSIONS The present report presents the results of a safety assessment that investigates what risk reducing measures would be required to achieve an equivalent level of safety with landing dispatch factors higher than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230. The assessment is done for four different business aircraft types that are representative to the aircraft used by European business aircraft operators. Different mitigating measures are identified and their impact on the landing performance is determined using e.g. operational flight data. The impact of the identified mitigating measures is quantified using a landing distance simulation model. This shows that an equivalent level of safety with landing dispatch factors higher than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230 can be achieved. It is concluded that when the mitigating measures no tailwind landings, no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse thrust, reduced unstable approaches, and limited floating are all applied, an equivalent level of safety compared to the landing factor of 60% /70% is achieved at a landing factor of 78% (13-19 passenger jet); 82% (9-12 passenger jet); 74% (6-8 passenger jet) and 81% (14 passenger turbo prop). With the exemption of the 8-passenger business jet the figures are close to the FAA 14 CFR part 135.4 of 80%. It is shown that higher landing factors will increase the number of runways (and hence airports) available during dispatch. This applies to all business jet aircraft analysed. However, turbo prop business aircraft show hardly any increase of available runways with increasing dispatch factor. 28 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 5 REFERENCES FDM (2013) Unpublished Flight Data from business and commercial operators, NLR Van Es , GWH Why do business aircraft go off the runway more often than (2013) commercial aircraft? 58th annual Business Aviation Safety Seminar, Montreal, Canada Mitchel, D. Estimation of airborne performance in landing, ESDU 91032 (1991) Boeing (2009) Jet Transport Performance Methods, Boeing D6-1420 ESDU (2006) Calculation of ground performance in take-off and landing, ESDU 85029 Van Es, G.W.H A Study of Runway Excursions from a European Perspective, (2010) NLR CR-2010-259 Transport EASA NPA 14/2004 landing distance on contaminated Canada (2005) runways, discussion paper no. 35, Transport Canada aircraft certification flight test division EAPRE European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions. Edition 1.0, 2013. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 29 Appendix A EXAMPLES LANDING PERFORMANCE MODEL VERIFICATION 3500 NLR-ATSI Engineering model Published performance data 3000 Unfactored landing distance (ft.) 2500 2000 1500 -Vref -Maximum flaps -Threshold at 50 ft. 1000 -Sea Level 500 0 25000 35000 45000 55000 65000 75000 85000 95000 Landing mass (lbs.) 19 passenger jet business, dry runway no reverse thrust. 9000 NLR-ATSI Engineering model 8000 Published performance data 7000 Unfactored landing distance (ft.) 6000 5000 4000 -Vref -Max flaps 3000 -Threshold at 50 ft. -Sea Level 2000 1000 0 25000 35000 45000 55000 65000 75000 85000 95000 Landing mass (lbs.) 19 passenger business jet, dry runway, no braking, reverse thrust. 30 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 4000 NLR-ATSI Engineering model Published performance data 3500 Unfactored landing distance (ft.) 3000 2500 2000 -Vref 1500 -Max flaps -Threshold at 50 ft. -Sea Level 1000 500 0 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 Landing mass (lbs.) 12 passenger business jet, dry runway, no reverse thrust. 3500 NLR-ATSI Engineering model Published performance data 3000 Unfactored landing distance (ft.) 2500 2000 1500 -Vref -Max flaps -Threshold at 50 ft. 1000 -Sea Level 500 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Landing mass (lbs.) 8 passenger business jet, dry runway, no reverse thrust. NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 31 1600 NLR-ATSI Engineering model Published performance data 1400 Unfactored landing distance (ft.) 1200 1000 800 -Vref 600 -Max Flaps -Threshold at 50 ft. -Sea Level 400 200 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Landing mass (lbs.) 14 passenger turbo prop, no propeller reverse. 32 NLR-CR-2014-030 May 2014 European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Survey Summary Aeroplane performance Version 0 - 29 February 2016 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) through the Rulemaking task 0296 “Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations” is considering the implementation of the ICAO State Letter 30 proposing amendments to Annex 6 Part 1 and several other annexes. These proposed amendments introduce new elements for the in-flight assessment of landing distance and for runway surface condition reporting further to the work done by the Take-off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) and the ICAO Friction Task Force (FTF). A stepping stone for the process is to gain an understanding of the current situation, especially in the EASA Member States. For that reason an EU Survey was developed. Disclaimer The number of answers to this survey cannot ensure that the results are representative of the sector. Therefore the interpretation of the results has to be cautious. The Agency strongly recommends that you contact us ([email protected]) for any questions on the usage of the survey. The following summary of the survey has been done in order to give a short feedback to the respondents for each question they have answered. Further analysis are being performed by the Agency to assess how to use it in its rulemaking activities. Survey map Audience: Addressees: RAG/FCL&OPS TAG/ADR TAG/ATM-ANS TAG and SSCC Members Survey period: 22 December 2015 to 18 February 2016 Tool: EUSurvey website TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/Internet. Page 1 of 16 An agency o the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Table of contents 1. Background ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 2. General information on the survey ............................................................................. 3 3. Overview of the answers ........................................................................................... 4 3.1. By country ....................................................................................................... 4 3.2. By type of organisation ...................................................................................... 4 4. Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC or ICAO State Letter 30? ............. 5 4.2. Organisations other than authorities that are not aware of the proposed changes: .... 6 4.3. Aditional comments ........................................................................................... 6 4.4. Authorities that are aware of the proposed changes were also asked 4 additional questions: ................................................................................................................. 7 4.5. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the current rules EU (965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of landing performance at dispatch and in-flight?8 4.6. Additional comments ......................................................................................... 8 5. Air navigation service providers and aerodrome operators section .................................. 9 6. Business aviation aircraft operators section ............................................................... 11 7. ECA/pilots section .................................................................................................. 15 8. Appendices ........................................................................................................... 16 8.1. Appendix 2 – Template for survey sent in December 2015 ................................... 16 TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/Internet. Page 2 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 1. General information on the survey A survey was conducted to assess the scale of the problem from airline operators’ point of view (see Appendix 2 for survey template). EASA Advisory Bodies have been contacted to fill in or forward a questionnaire for airline operators between mid-December 2015 and mid-February 2016. 73 stakeholders from 22 countries answered, amongst which: authoties, air navigation service providers, aerodrome operators, business aviation aircraft operators, GAMA manufacturers and ECA/pilots. European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 3 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 2. Overview of the answers 2.1. By country 73 relevant participating organisations from 22 countries: Germany 7 11 13 Czech Republic 10 France 7 Sweden 1 3 1 Portugal 1111 Manufacturers Belgium 11 2 Slovak Republic 3 Air navigation service Switzerland 111 providers; United Kingdom 11 Norway 2 Aerodrome operators; Netherlands 11 Denmark 2 National aviation authorities; Finland 1 Spain 1 N/A ECA/pilots. Hong Kong 1 Albanian CAA 1 Business aviation aircraft Hungary 1 operators; MONTENEGRO 1 Croatia 1 Italy 1 Iceland 1 Source: EU Survey RMT.0296 2.2. By type of organisation Number of respondents per organisational type: Business aviation aircraft operators; 42 ECA/pilots. 13 National aviation authorities; 10 Aerodrome operators; 8 Air navigation service providers; 2 Manufacturers 1 Source: EU Survey RMT.0296 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 4 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 3. Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC or ICAO State Letter 30? Note: this question was asked to all participants in the survey but it was divided in two sets (1a for authorities and 1b for everyone else). Total number of respondents:74 1a & 1b: Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC or ICAO State Letter 30? 42 40 35 15 30 25 20 15 10 8 26 10 0 1 2 5 3 10 1 5 0 0 1 1 GAMA National aviation Air navigation Aerodrome Business aviation manufacturers authorities; service operators; aircraft providers; operators; Yes No Grand Total Source: question 1a and 1b Note: the below graph is a representation of the above one but filtered only for business aviation aircraft operators and shown by country. Total number of respondents:41 Operators (41): Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC/ICAO State Letter 30? Germany 6 7 France 3 4 Denmark 2 Belgium 1 1 Czech Republic 1 9 Yes Switzerland 1 3 No Slovak Republic Croatia 1 Portugal 1 Spain 1 Sweden 1 Source: question 1b European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 5 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 3.2. Organisations other than authorities that are not aware of the proposed changes: Germany 7 3 France 3 Denmark 2 Business aviation aircraft operators; Aerodrome operators; Belgium 1 Switzerland 1 Czech Republic 1 Source: question 1b 3.3. Aditional comments Additional comments on Q1: request for regulatory harmonisation 3% (blank) 97% European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 6 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 3.4. Authorities that are aware of the proposed changes were also asked 4 additional questions: Note: Total number of participating in the survey authorities:10 Authorities which marked "Yes" on Q1a: 1.4 Changes to your current practices? 6 3 1 1.3 Are you aware of difficulties in the implementation 6 4 0 of TALPA ARC recommendations? 1.2 Are runway condition reporting and in-flight landing distance assessment part of the Operations Manual 8 1 1 approval/assessment? 1.1 Do you already consider runway condition reporting and in-flight landing distance assessment when issuing 7 2 1 AOCs and during the oversight of CAT operators? 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Yes No No answer Source: question 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 7 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 3.5. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the current rules EU (965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of landing performance at dispatch and in-flight? Note: this questions was asked only to authorites. Total number: 10 2. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the current rules EU (965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of landing performance at dispatch and in-flight? Yes, 6 No, 2 No answer, 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Source: question 2 3.6. Additional comments Q2 Additional comments request for clarity and consistency of performance requirements 8% (blank) 92% European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 8 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 4. Air navigation service providers and aerodrome operators section Note: the below graph represents answers from both stakeholder types 3. What is your estimated number of Pilot Reports on braking action after 2011 as compared to before 2011? Aerodrome operators; More;, 2 Equal;, 5 No asnwer, 1 Air navigation service Equal;, 2 providers; Source: question 3 Note: the below graph represents answers from a question asked only to aerodrome operators Aerodromes (8): 4. Do you use Pilot Reports to manage airport operations in adverse weather conditions? correlated with Q3 (Estimated number on braking actions after 2011 compared to 2011) Yes More;, 2 Equal;, 3 No asnwer, 1 No Equal;, 2 Source: question 4 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 9 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Note: the below graph represents answers from a questiona asked only to aerodrome operators Aerodromes (8): 4.a. How do you use Pilot Reports to manage airport operations in adverse weather conditions? Decision-making tool, 2 Aditional info, 4 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 10 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 5. Business aviation aircraft operators section Operators(41): 5. Do you have a SMS that addresses take-off and landing performance? No, 7 Yes, 35 Source: question 5 Operators (41): 6. Do you have a FDM programme related to approach? No asnwer, 3 No, 17 Yes, 22 Source: question 6 Operators(41): Do you have SMS that addresses take-off and landing correlated with FDM related to approach? No asnwer, 3 Yes, 20 Yes, 2 No, 12 No, 5 No Yes Source: question 5 and 6 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 11 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Operators (41):7. Do you have a FDM programme related to landing performance? No, 19 Yes, 23 Source: question 7 Operators (41): 8. To which extent are in-flight landing distance assessments performed before landing? Always; 25 Only when needed; 10 Seldom. 5 No asnwer 1 Often; 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Source: question 8 Operators(41):9. If in-flight landing distance assessments are performed before landing, which criteria do you use? Mixed criteria 9 Runway state 8 Pre-defined tables 8 Other (braking action/no… 6 Weather 4 FMS 3 No criteria 2 EFB 1 Source: question 9 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 12 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Operators(41):10. Do your crews submit PIREPS on contaminated or slippery runways? No, 10 Yes, 32 Source: question 10 Operators(41):11. Is training provided to establish what a slippery runway is? No, 5 No asnwer, 2 Yes, 35 Source: question 11 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 13 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Source: question 10 and 11 Operators (41):12. Do you operate in airports with special landing or approach procedures or other restrictions in your network? Less than 25%; 33 None; 3 No asnwer 3 More than 50% 2 25%-50%; 1 Source: question 12 Operators (41):13. What is the estimated percentage of aerodromes in your network which are performance limited in take-off or landing by the available runway length? Less than 25%; 29 25%-50%; 8 None; 5 Source: question 13 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 14 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 6. ECA/pilots section ECA/pilots (13): 16. To which extent do you perform in-flight landing distance assessments before landing? United Kingdom 1 Finland 1 Switzerland 1 Hong Kong 1 Germany 1 Always; Italy 1 Only when needed; Portugal 1 Seldom. Iceland 1 Netherlands 1 Sweden 3 Belgium 1 Source: question 16 Source: question 17 and 18 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 15 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations 7. Appendices 7.1. Appendix 2 – Template for survey sent in December 2015 RMT0296AicraftPerf ormance2016_21_12_2015_EN.pdf European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 16 of 16 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency Date: 9 March 2016 Runway Excursions (RE) analysis 2011 - 2015 SM1. Safety Intelligence and Performance SM1.1 Safety Analysis Section Annex A: Safety data collection for RMT.0296 - Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations Table of Contents ANNEX A: SAFETY DATA COLLECTION FOR RMT.0296 - REVIEW OF AEROPLANE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CAT OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................................ 2 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................................... 2 OCCURRENCES DESCRIPTION TABLES..................................................................................................................... 6 PERFORMANCE CALCULATION ...........................................................................................................................................6 RUNWAY CONDITION AS A CASUAL FACTOR OF AN OCCURRENCE ..............................................................................................8 REPORTING OF RUNWAY CONDITION ................................................................................................................................15 Introduction The general objective of the RMT.0296 is to provide a uniform, cost-efficient rules and safety standards on aeroplane performance requirements for Commercial Air Transport operations. The specific objective is to reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor. Secondly, the resulting amendments should provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations. Thirdly, one of the aims of RMT.0296 is to contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations. During the development of the draft rules and the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), the Rule Making Group reviews the Take-off and Landing Performance Assessment Advisory and Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC) recommendations and their endorsement in the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE). The latter document, while recognising runway excursions as a recurring cause of accidents and serious incidents and identifying the main casual factors, contain recommendations to EASA, which are going to be addressed by the RMT.0296. Objectives Taking into account the principles mentioned above, as a part of the Analysis of Runway Excursions (RE) 2011-2015 and basing on the same set of occurrences, a sub-study has been performed in order to indicate all accidents and serious incidents in which at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled: — Aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition, — Measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate, — Runway condition was a casual factor of an occurrence. The results of this study will contribute to the safety data collection for the RIA. Scope The set of study is composed of 13 occurrences, each of them involving one aircraft. All accidents and serious incidents occurred in the period of 5 years between 01/01/2011 and 31/12/2015. Figure 1 summarises the distribution of occurrences along this period and its split between accident and serious incident (ICAO Annex 13 definitions). Due to the ongoing investigation of accidents and serious incidents, the true figure is possible to be slightly higher as complete investigations are not yet available for all events happened in 2015. 4 Number of RE occurrences 3 2 1 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Accident Serious incident Figure 1. Distribution by year and class of the occurrence There are 11 different States of Registry represented in the study set: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Morocco, Norway, Romania, Sweden and United Kingdom (see Figure 2). States of the operator are the same as the states of registry for all aircraft except one, which was registered in Norway and operated by a Swedish operator. 3 Number of aircraft 2 1 0 State of Operator State of Registry Figure 2. Distribution by state of operator and state of registry As shown in Figure 3, the vast majority of occurrences happened during landing, with 5 of them classified as accidents and 9 as serious incidents. 9 8 Nmber of RE occurrences 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Accident Serious incident Serious incident Landing Take-off Figure 3. Distribution by phase of flight and occurrence class From the Figure 4 it is clear that runway overruns were less frequent, however they caused higher level of damages and/or injuries than runway side excursions. 9 8 Number of RE occurrences 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Accident Serious incident Accident Serious incident runway overrun side excursion Figure 4. Distribution by type of runway excursion and occurrence class Figure 5 depicts the number of occurrences with a distinction between types of runway excursion, as well as between those that happened on landing and those that happened during take-off. The number of runway overruns and side excursions occurred during landing is balanced. In the study set there was no instance of a runway overrun during take-off. 6 5 Number of RE occurrences 4 3 2 1 0 Landing Landing Take-off runway overrun side excursion Figure 5. Distribution by type of runway excursion and phase of flight Figure 6 presents the distribution by propulsion type depending on the aircraft mass group. Among the aircraft lighter than 5 700 kg all were equipped with reciprocating engines, while the heavier aircraft have turbofan or turboprop engines. 6 5 Number of aircraft 4 3 2 1 0 2 251 to 5 700 Kg 27 001 to 272 000 Kg 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Reciprocating Turbofan Turboprop Figure 6. Distribution by aircraft mass and propulsion type There are 9 manufactures and 11 different models of aircraft represented in the study set (see Figure 7). 3 Number of RE occurrences 2 1 0 A320 A321 BN2A A319 737 DHC8 EMB505 - Phenom 340 ATR72 JETSTREAM3100 F27 AIRBUS ATR BAE BOEING BRITTEN DE EMBRAER FOKKER SAAB NORMAN HAVILLAND Figure 7. Distribution by manufacturer and model of the aircraft Due to specific criteria of selection (described in section ‘Objectives’above) and a small size of sample of occurrences, none of the graphs presented above should be considered statistically representative for all runway excursion accidents and serious incidents occurred in the EASA MS or involving EASA MS operators. Occurrences description tables Performance calculation Occurrence 1 of 5 Performance calculation State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry BAE - JETSTREAM3100 - 31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane 3200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance data. The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident. main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent operator’s concept for stabilised approach information related no use of friction coefficients, landing performed without access to any to performance calculation relevant performance data for landing on contaminated RWYs Occurrence 2 of 5 Performance calculation State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 25/08/2013 Czech Republic Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800 Propulsion Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase Type of RE type runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing overrun On 25. 8. 2013 during the landing, the aircraft ran outside the paved surface of the runway. The plane stopped 156 m in the foreground of the runway 27. The passengers and crew disembarked the plane with no injury. The aircraft did not suffer significant damages. RWY wet, wrong setting of flaps, wrong selection of braking mode, main factor opposite direction of the runway was more favourable, incompliance with SOPs information related wrong calculation, required distance exceeded the LDA to performance calculation Occurrence 3 of 5 Performance calculation State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft was evacuated. The aircraft was approaching in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated further with rain and variable winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a considerable distance past the touch down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with the airport perimeter fence and came to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the extended runway center line. Two passengers received broken legs during the evacuation. adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing main factor long information related inadequate in depth analysis of meteorological conditions to performance calculation Occurrence 4 of 5 Performance calculation State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 29/03/2013 France Aeroplane AIRBUS - A321 - 100 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun The crew made a Category 1 (CAT I) ILS approach to runway 36R. The meteorological conditions were such that low visibility procedures (LVP) were in place. On passing the stabilisation height at 1,000 ft, the speed of the aeroplane was 57 kt above the approach speed. At 140 ft, an inappropriate increase in thrust by the autothrust maintained the aeroplane at high speed. The flare was long and the aeroplane touched the runway at 1,600 metres past the 36R threshold. The aeroplane overran the runway and came to rest approximately 300 metres after the opposite threshold. unstabilised approach (incomplete preparation for the approach – crew not aware of tailwind and wet runway), tailwind, ATC procedures not followed, partial application of SOPs, impaired task sharing and main factor degraded CRM, progressive deterioration in situational awareness, landing fast and deep, A/THR anomaly (maintaining the aircraft at a high energy level during landing) information related wet runway, aircraft maximum landing weight and tailwind on ground to performance calculation not included in the calculation Occurrence 5 of 5 Performance calculation State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry EMBRAER (EMB505 - 06/08/2012 Switzerland Aeroplane Phenom 300) Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun After the initial call to the aerodrome control centre tower, the crew quickly decided, after an enquiry from the air traffic controller, on a direct approach on the runway 10 instrument landing system (ILS). Shortly thereafter, the landing gear and flaps were extended. The flaps jammed at approximately 10 degrees and the FLAP FAIL warning message was displayed. The crew carried out a go-around shortly before landing. The landing gear subsequently remained extended. The flaps remained jammed for the remainder of the flight. The crew decided immediately on a second ILS approach with jammed flaps, which according to the manufacturer's information required an increased approach speed. During the approach, the crew had difficulty in reducing the airspeed to this increased approach speed. At 13:40 UTC, the aircraft subsequently touched down on the wet runway at an indicated air speed of 136 kt, approximately 290 m after the runway threshold, and could not be brought to a standstill on the remaining length of runway. The aircraft then rolled over the end of runway 10, broke through the aerodrome perimeter fence and overrun the road running perpendicular to the runway centreline, on which a public transport bus was travelling. The aircraft rolled very close behind the bus and came to a standstill in a maize field, approximately 30 m from the end of the runway. The passenger and the two pilots were not injured in the accident. The aircraft was badly damaged. There was crop damage and damage to the aerodrome perimeter fence. landing long and fast, unstabilised approach, flaps jammed, late main factor initiation of braking, lack of cooperation between pilots information related aircraft configuration, approach speed, runway condition and runway to performance calculation length were not addressed Runway condition as a casual factor of an occurrence Occurrence 1 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 25/05/2015 Oslo Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing overrun Runway renovation had been in progress the last months with displaced threshold and a LDA of 1928 meters. XXRASH over the field. Another B737 who landed in front reported extremely slippery concrete on the rwy. B737 landed with flaps 30, autobrake 3 and touchdown 3-400 meters down the rwy. Reverse power selected early but with less retardation than expected. Maximum manual braking and maximum reverse applied. Runway excursion 50-100 meters into the 300 meters safety area. Minor damage to left cowling. A couple of rwy end lights damaged. Crew were mentally prepared for landing in headwind, but actually it was approximately 7 kt tailwind. Landing calculations after the incident shows that with autobrake 3 until complete stop, landing distance should be 1 960 meters and with manual braking 1 524 meters. main factor tailwind information related possible aggravating factor, extremely slippery RWY (reported by the to runway condition crew of previous A/C) Occurrence 2 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry DE HAVILLAND - DHC8 - 29/12/2014 Denmark Aeroplane 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion Upon landing on runway 23 and shortly after having selected reverse on both engines, the flight crew experienced that the aircraft unexpectedly started to veer to the left. The pilot flying attempted to correct this by deactivating reverse on both engines and by use of the wheel brakes and the nose wheel steering, but the aircraft continued veering towards the left side of the runway. The aircraft ran off the left side of the runway and came to a complete stop in the safety zone. A momentary failure of the right hand power lever micro switch causing a momentary activation of the right hand propeller beta backup protection in combination with a divergence between reported and effective braking action coefficients on runway 23 had a negative effect on the flight crew’s ability to maintain directional control, which resulted in the aircraft running off the side of the runway. Neither passengers nor crew members suffered any injuries. continuous snowfall, momentary activation of right propeller beta main factor protection, actual braking action coefficients different than reported information related possible aggravating factor to runway condition Occurrence 3 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane BAE - JETSTREAM3100 - 3200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance data. The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident. main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent operator’s concept for stabilised approach information related RWY contaminated with snow to runway condition Occurrence 4 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry BRITTEN NORMAN - 12/01/2014 United Kingdom Aeroplane BN2A - III2 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 2 251 to 5 700 Kg Reciprocating Serious incident Landing excursion Runway excursion in crosswind caused damage to runway edge lights. During a landing in heavy rain and with a strong crosswind the aircraft was blown from the asphalt runway surface onto the grass edge of the runway, damaging three runway lights. The aircraft was undamaged. The aircraft was making an approach into destination Airport. The pilot stated that, during the latter stages of the approach, there was a strong, gusting southerly crosswind and that the rain suddenly intensified. The pilot also stated that, during the landing roll, a very strong gust of wind was felt from the left such that the right main landing gear lost grip in a large area of standing water. The aircraft veered to the right, off the asphalt surface and onto the grass area at the side of the runway. The pilot was able to steer it back onto the asphalt section of the runway. The aircraft was undamaged but ATC subsequently discovered that the right main wheels had run over and damaged three runway edge lights. The aircraft encountered heavy rain shortly before touchdown and a strong crosswind gust shortly after touchdown. The strong gust and loss of the main landing gear grip in standing water caused the aircraft to veer to the right, off the asphalt surface and onto the grass area to the side of the runway. As a result of this incident, the operator reviewed its operation into the destination airport and reduced the crosswind limit for its Trislander aircraft to 20 kt while the runway declared width is reduced. main factor emergency descent, crosswind, human factor (crew fatigue) information related loss of MLG grip in standing water on RWY to runway condition Occurrence 5 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 10/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane FOKKER - F27 - 50 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion The weather forecast for destination Airport that had been issued at 18.30 hrs stated the wind direction to be 280 degrees and the wind strength 25 knots with wind gusts of 45 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The corresponding forecast that was issued at 00.30 hrs, i.e. about 45 minutes after take-off, stated the wind direction to be 280 degrees and the wind strength 30 knots with wind gusts of 42 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The forecasted wind direction meant that the wind was largely across the runway, i.e. direct crosswind. The operator's flight manual stated a limitation, regarding the crosswind component on landing, of 30 knots for a dry runway and 25 knots for a wet runway. According to the manufacturer's flight manual, the corresponding limitation is 33 knots for good braking action. According to the crew, the approach and touchdown were performed without problems. Shortly after touchdown, the engines were reversed. When the speed reduced, the aircraft began to yaw to the left. The commander explained that he used the nose wheel steering to compensate the yawing tendency but that the nose wheel “probably went across”. Furthermore, he was unsure whether the brakes had been used. The yaw continued towards the left, and the aircraft left the runway and stopped with the nose wheel and left main gear in the grass, with the right main gear on the asphalted runway shoulder. In connection with the excursion, the nose gear and left main gear each ploughed a furrow in the ground on the grass area with a depth corresponding to just under half the diameter of the wheels. operator’s crosswind limitations of the aircraft exceeded, wet runway, main factor one alternate only information related wet RWY, but braking action good to runway condition Occurrence 6 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 18/12/2013 United Kingdom Aeroplane AIRBUS - A319 - 100 Propulsion Type of Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing excursion Lateral runway excursion. The Aircraft slewed sideways on landing at approximately 70 knots. The LH gear exited the runway. Mud covered the LH landing gear and the Engine 1 cowlings and L/H fuselage. Initial inspections show no damage. strong crosswind (close to or possibly above maximum aircraft main factor limitation), insufficient de-crab at landing, no use of differential braking on a wet/flooded RWY information related possible aggravating factor, RWY between wet and flooded condition to runway condition Occurrence 7 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 25/08/2013 Czech Republic Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing overrun On 25. 8. 2013 during the landing, the aircraft ran outside the paved surface of the runway. The plane stopped 156 m in the foreground of the runway 27. The passengers and crew disembarked the plane with no injury. The aircraft did not suffer significant damages. RWY wet, wrong setting of flaps, wrong selection of braking mode, main factor opposite direction of the runway was more favourable, incompliance with SOPs information related wet RWY as a possible aggravating factor to runway condition Occurrence 8 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft was evacuated. The aircraft was approaching to the destination airport in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated further with rain and variable winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a considerable distance past the touch down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with the airport perimeter fence and came to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the extended runway center line. Two passengers received broken legs during the evacuation. adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing main factor long information related wet, but braking action good to runway condition Occurrence 9 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 29/03/2013 France Aeroplane AIRBUS - A321 - 100 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun The crew made a Category 1 (CAT I) ILS approach to runway 36R. The meteorological conditions were such that low visibility procedures (LVP) were in place. On passing the stabilisation height at 1,000 ft, the speed of the aeroplane was 57 kt above the approach speed. At 140 ft, an inappropriate increase in thrust by the autothrust maintained the aeroplane at high speed. The flare was long and the aeroplane touched the runway at 1,600 metres past the 36R threshold. The aeroplane overran the runway and came to rest approximately 300 metres after the opposite threshold. unstabilised approach (incomplete preparation for the approach – crew not aware of tailwind and wet runway), tailwind, ATC procedures not followed, partial application of SOPs, impaired task sharing and main factor degraded CRM, progressive deterioration in situational awareness, landing fast and deep, A/THR anomaly (maintaining the aircraft at a high energy level during landing) information related wet RWY to runway condition Occurrence 10 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 11/08/2012 Romania Aeroplane ATR - ATR72 - 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Accident Landing excursion During landing roll, at about 100m from touch down, the A/C exit the runway to the left and continue to run for about 300m on unpaved surface (grass and earth), with all three landing gears, and after that returned to the runway. main factor aquaplaning information related possible aggravating factor, wet runway with puddles to runway condition Occurrence 11 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry EMBRAER (EMB505 - 06/08/2012 Switzerland Aeroplane Phenom 300) Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun After the initial call to the aerodrome control centre tower, the crew quickly decided, after an enquiry from the air traffic controller, on a direct approach on the runway 10 instrument landing system (ILS). Shortly thereafter, the landing gear and flaps were extended. The flaps jammed at approximately 10 degrees and the FLAP FAIL warning message was displayed. The crew carried out a go-around shortly before landing. The landing gear subsequently remained extended. The flaps remained jammed for the remainder of the flight. The crew decided immediately on a second ILS approach with jammed flaps, which according to the manufacturer's information required an increased approach speed. During the approach, the crew had difficulty in reducing the airspeed to this increased approach speed. At 13:40 UTC, the aircraft subsequently touched down on the wet runway at an indicated air speed of 136 kt, approximately 290 m after the runway threshold, and could not be brought to a standstill on the remaining length of runway. The aircraft then rolled over the end of runway 10, broke through the aerodrome perimeter fence and overrun the road running perpendicular to the runway centreline, on which a public transport bus was travelling. The aircraft rolled very close behind the bus and came to a standstill in a maize field, approximately 30 m from the end of the runway. The passenger and the two pilots were not injured in the accident. The aircraft was badly damaged. There was crop damage and damage to the aerodrome perimeter fence. landing long and fast, unstabilised approach, flaps jammed, late main factor initiation of braking, lack of cooperation between pilots information related wet RWY, friction coefficient not measured to runway condition Occurrence 12 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 24/11/2011 Sweden Aeroplane SAAB 340 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Take-off excursion Runway veer off during takeoff, flat snow covered grass, minor damage nose wheel, taxi light, propeller tip. The take-off was performed in darkness and winter conditions. In connection with the take off a snow shower came in over the field which meant that visibility deteriorated and the wind speed increased. During take-off the aircraft gradually approached the left edge of the runway. After about 800 m the aircraft ran out of the left edge of the runway with the left main wheel and the nose wheel, continued parallel to the runway for about 350 meters and then came back up onto the runway again. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft veered once more to the left, left the runway completely and stopped a few metres from the runway edge parallel to the direction of take-off. All persons on board were uninjured and left the aircraft through the main entrance and its staircase. The incident was probably caused by a perceptual illusion for the pilots on account of large flakes of blowing snow, which led to the aircraft’s drift not being noticed in time. The illuminated landing lights have served to reinforce the illusion. main factor perceptual illusion (snowfall with large flakes) information related possible, RWY contaminated with snow to runway condition Occurrence 13 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry BRITTEN NORMAN - 08/06/2011 Germany Aeroplane BN2A Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 2 251 to 5 700 Kg Reciprocating Accident Landing overrun Overshoot during landing - Main gear collapsed. A/C substantially damaged After landing on the wet runway 33 the aircraft departed the end of the runway, crossed a walk-way and came to a stop in a dune. main factor aquaplaning information related to the possible aggravating factor, contaminated runway (standing water) runway condition Reporting of runway condition Occurrence 1 of 5 Reporting of runway condition State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry DE HAVILLAND - DHC8 - 29/12/2014 Denmark Aeroplane 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion Upon landing on runway 23 and shortly after having selected reverse on both engines, the flight crew experienced that the aircraft unexpectedly started to veer to the left. The pilot flying attempted to correct this by deactivating reverse on both engines and by use of the wheel brakes and the nose wheel steering, but the aircraft continued veering towards the left side of the runway. The aircraft ran off the left side of the runway and came to a complete stop in the safety zone. A momentary failure of the right hand power lever micro switch causing a momentary activation of the right hand propeller beta backup protection in combination with a divergence between reported and effective braking action coefficients on runway 23 had a negative effect on the flight crew’s ability to maintain directional control, which resulted in the aircraft running off the side of the runway. Neither passengers nor crew members suffered any injuries. continuous snowfall, momentary activation of right propeller beta main factor protection, actual braking action coefficients different than reported information related to the incorrect aerodrome measurement procedures and reporting of RWY reporting of runway condition condition Occurrence 2 of 5 Reporting of runway condition State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry BAE - JETSTREAM3100 - 31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane 3200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance data. The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident. main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent operator’s concept for stabilised approach information related to the reported, but not understood by the crew reporting of runway condition Occurrence 3 of 5 Reporting of runway condition State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 10/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane FOKKER - F27 - 50 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing excursion The weather forecast for destination Airport that had been issued at 18.30 hrs stated the wind direction to be 280 degrees and the wind strength 25 knots with wind gusts of 45 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The corresponding forecast that was issued at 00.30 hrs, i.e. about 45 minutes after take-off, stated the wind direction to be 280 degrees and the wind strength 30 knots with wind gusts of 42 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The forecasted wind direction meant that the wind was largely across the runway, i.e. direct crosswind. The operator's flight manual stated a limitation, regarding the crosswind component on landing, of 30 knots for a dry runway and 25 knots for a wet runway. According to the manufacturer's flight manual, the corresponding limitation is 33 knots for good braking action. According to the crew, the approach and touchdown were performed without problems. Shortly after touchdown, the engines were reversed. When the speed reduced, the aircraft began to yaw to the left. The commander explained that he used the nose wheel steering to compensate the yawing tendency but that the nose wheel “probably went across”. Furthermore, he was unsure whether the brakes had been used. The yaw continued towards the left, and the aircraft left the runway and stopped with the nose wheel and left main gear in the grass, with the right main gear on the asphalted runway shoulder. In connection with the excursion, the nose gear and left main gear each ploughed a furrow in the ground on the grass area with a depth corresponding to just under half the diameter of the wheels. operator’s crosswind limitations of the aircraft exceeded, wet runway, main factor one alternate only information related to the ATIS not understood by the crew (disruption by other communication), reporting of runway condition the crew had no awareness of the prevailing condition that the runway was wet Occurrence 4 of 5 Reporting of runway condition State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE runway 27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing overrun Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft was evacuated. The aircraft was approaching destination airport in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated further with rain and variable winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a considerable distance past the touch down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with the airport perimeter fence and came to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the extended runway center line. Two passengers received broken legs during the evacuation. adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing main factor long information related to the misleading ATIS information 'NOSIG', TAF communicated but it didn't reporting of runway condition reach the crew Occurrence 5 of 5 Reporting of runway condition State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of Local date Manufacturer/model occurrence category registration registry 24/11/2011 Sweden Aeroplane SAAB 340 Propulsion Type of Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase type RE side 5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Take-off excursion Runway veer off during takeoff, flat snow covered grass, minor damage nose wheel, taxi light, propeller tip. The take-off was performed in darkness and winter conditions. In connection with the take off a snow shower came in over the field which meant that visibility deteriorated and the wind speed increased. During take-off the aircraft gradually approached the left edge of the runway. After about 800 m the aircraft ran out of the left edge of the runway with the left main wheel and the nose wheel, continued parallel to the runway for about 350 meters and then came back up onto the runway again. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft veered once more to the left, left the runway completely and stopped a few metres from the runway edge parallel to the direction of take-off. All persons on board were uninjured and left the aircraft through the main entrance and its staircase. The incident was probably caused by a perceptual illusion for the pilots on account of large flakes of blowing snow, which led to the aircraft’s drift not being noticed in time. The illuminated landing lights have served to reinforce the illusion. main factor perceptual illusion (snowfall with large flakes) information related to the reported runway condition were not reflecting the actual condition reporting of runway condition
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