Kiri

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT INTERREG PROJECT Priority 3 – Sustainable transport Specific objective 3.3 ‘ Maritime safety ’ Examples of actions: Harmonising interpretation and implementation of safety codes, standards and regulations; Implementing advanced technologies for maritime safety and security, e.g. implementing e‐Navigation, automatic identification systems; Deploying dynamic risk assessment systems for vessels entering the Baltic Sea; Developing comprehensive security risk assessment for the entire Baltic Sea; Piloting solutions for risk prevention and response measures e.g. i mplementing joint exercises; Developing self‐regulative maritime safety, especially among smaller shipping companies in w hich private actors voluntarily improve the safety of their operations (linked to e.g. corporate social responsibility or ecolabelling ); Improving education and training systems for seafarers in order to increase their competence and motivation and the attractiveness of this profession; Enhancing integrated maritime surveillance. Main target groups: Public authorities/institutions responsible for planning, maritime administration, environmental protection, prevention and response measures at sea and on land in case of major emergencies Enterprises (in particular shipping, logistic and infrastructure providers / operators) Rescue services Academic and research institutions NGOs, in particular related to environmental protection Funding Public funding sources The Programme funds come from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and Norwegian national funding. Project partners co-finance activities with their own resources. Total funds available at the Programme start: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): 263.8 million EUR European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): 8.8 million EUR (subject to signing of the Financing agreement) Norwegian national funding: 6.0 million EUR Co-financing rates For priorities 1-3 (capacity for innovation, efficient management of natural resources and sustainable transport) the programme co-funds: up to 75% of costs generated by partners from Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Finland up to 85% for partners from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland up to 50% for partners from Norway (from Norwegian national funding) up to 75% for countries outside the Union part of the Programme area As the Financing Agreements between Russia and the EU, as well as Belarus and the EU, are not signed, partners from Russia and Belarus cannot receive funds at this stage. However, applicants are encouraged to include associated partners from Belarus and Russia with funding from other sources. Please wait... If this message is not eventually replaced by the proper contents of the document, your PDF viewer may not be able to display this type of document. You can upgrade to the latest version of Adobe Reader for Windows®, Mac, or Linux® by visiting http://www.adobe.com/go/reader_download. For more assistance with Adobe Reader visit http://www.adobe.com/go/acrreader. Windows is either a registered trademark or a trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Mac is a trademark of Apple Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. INTERREG Baltic Sea Programe 2014-2020 Priority 3 Sustainable transport , 3.3. Maritime safety CONCEPTION New instruments for the safety of the Baltic Sea WP 1 COOPERATION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY ENTITIES FOR THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION WATER REGIONS CLOSING / EXCLUDING / LIMITING Issue Military usage of the sea water areas in time of trainings / usage as training grounds cause temporary closing / excluding of some water areas for shipping and fishing. The time of the area exclusion from the usage is much more longer that the real time of usage in time of trainings / usage as training grounds. Threat / risk Operations mentioned above cause situation of exclusion of water area or shipping lanes for the time longer that it is necessary, and as a result the situation forces the necessity of the course changing to the bypass routes, what generates additional costs, increases risk of collision, impact on areas dangerous in terms of navigation (risk of grounding) . In case of changing the course on the line in the coastal zone the risk of the environmental threats increases, and in the event of collision release of toxic agents (fuel) creates threat also for the coastal zone. Fishery w ater areas closing , generates economical losses for the fishery, especially for small fishing units below 300 RT. Moreover, failure to comply with the applicable prohibitions on violating the temporary closed zones for shipping and fishing causes the danger for the units staying there, as well as increases the control and inspection activities of the Navy and Border Guard units. THREATS INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM S . Issue The form of information about closed areas is the main issue. Navigational danger signals / water areas closing are transmitted by the NAVTEX (navigational text messages) from the Harbor Master’s Office with VHF radio, VTS system , FAX or warnings posted on information posts in fishing ports and harbors . The way of providing information causes incomplete distribution of informat ion to users of sea water / polygons, with particular emphasis on small and less equipped units. Threat / risk This way of providing information does not always reach all users or reaches with significant delay, especially small units, which do not have the obligation to have the VHF radio. Announcements posted on the information posts, despite the obligation to read them, are not an effective way to provide information . Lack of information or too late notification about the water area closing can cause entry the units into the zones in which training takes place, which is a threat both for big units, fish cutters and Military units taking part in training. OFFSHORE WIND FARMS Issue Decision about building wind maricultures on the sea is the reason of the necessity of changing the shipping routes, which may contribute to their approximation to the territorial sea zone of coastal states, and in the event of a unit accident may have significant meaning for the safety of fauna and flora. Distance of shipping lanes, in turn, may have an impact on reducing the attractiveness of coastal ports. Threat / risk In connection with the closing of water areas to polygons / trainings , the problem of changing the shipping routes is deepening and, as a result, the risks associated with increased movement of vessels sailing on the other Baltic Sea routes intensify and this increases the risk of collisions on already congested Baltic routes. Solution to the problem / Tasks to be performed A nalysis of existing systems and ways of informing about the zones being closed: identification of the sea polygon ordering system to be used by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (together with the armies of other states) conducting training on the areas temporarily closed for shipping and fishing; defining the actions of entities responsible for maintaining security on waters temporarily closed to shipping and fishing (operations of the Duty Operational Service ); indication / isolation of currently existing traffic identification and supervision systems in civil and military (national and allied) and civil-military structures; analysis of current system solutions in the field of providing information on areas temporarily closed for shipping and fishing; Legal analysis of the defined problem in terms of examining whether the existing development conditions respect coastal, seagoing and access to ports. Risk assessment for fisheries and shipping Identification of results of untimely receipt of information about closed water areas and actions taken as a result of their occurrence; Evaluation of economic loss for fishery and shipping. Recommendations / effects Developing recommendations for an agreement between civil and military subjects with a uniform real-time information exchange system for maintaining the safety, intensity and quality of shipping in the Baltic Sea in an effort to preserve the unique character of the sea, to close zones covered by military trainings and other nautical messages; Development of a special application or adaptation of available applications (SMS, R WS – Regional Warning System , Newsletter), as a single, publicly available information system about closing zones for the duration of the training s in advance; Training for fishermen and ship owners by the institutions as the Maritime Office , and Hydrographic Office of the Polish Army ; Proposing cyclical revision meetings for the future: the Ministry of National Defense with the Maritime Office, fishermen, ship owners; Legal recommendations for bilateral or multilateral agreements between countries; Development of information management system about the training ground, including IMO recommendations . WP 2 AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT Issue In recent years, a very dynamic development of unmanned platforms operating in the marine environment in the air space, sea surface and in the water depth is noticeable. Military activities (military applications) and those in the area of security as well as conducting advanced research of the marine environment are an important engine of development. The main problem is the lack of uniform and universally recognized legal grounds for the use and recording of such measures, whic h creates the risk of many threats . Lack of uniform and universally legal for the use and registration of autonomous vehicles in the marine environment; The risk of many threats both at sea and in ports. Threat / risk collision of vehicles with other floating, flying units, platforms / installations at sea; difficulty in enforcing criminal / material responsibility towards the user / operator of an autonomous vehicle in the case of an event (collision); illegally collecting data / photographing objects - espionage ( eg economic); the use of vehicles by criminal and terrorist organizations for the transfer of contraband, explosives; use of unmanned systems against critical infrastructure (seaports, offshore facilities, underwater installations) and maritime communication routes (with particular reference to the choke points). Solution to the problem / Tasks to be performed analysis of legal solutions regarding the use of unmanned platforms in the marine environment with respect to applicable international, state and local regulations; analysis of threats caused by autonomous vehicles in the marine environment and ports ; evaluation of methods / ways of registering / recording / marking unmanned systems; SWA T analysis of individual autonomous systems; defining potential application areas of unmanned systems operating in the marine environment (in airspace, on the surface of the sea and in sea depth and on the bottom), taking into account the specificity of the Baltic Sea; analysis of the scope of cooperation of manned systems (classic floating units, aircraft, ground objects) with autonomous systems; analysis of the possibilities of using unmanned systems to improve the safety of marine critical infrastructure facilities (also in relation to manned systems vs. unmanned systems). Recommendations / effects Recommending zones with an absolute ban on the use of the above-mentioned vehicles (platform zones, ports, approach tracks, etc.); Implementation of rules for the identification / registration of unmanned sea vehicles and systems supporting their identification and informing other water users about the operation of equipment within its boundaries ( eg Code of Practice for UUVs); Program development and implementation as well as organization of train ing for autonomous system users; Conception and prototype protection system against of autonomous vehicles in the administrative area of ports. WP 3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE FLOATING UNITS (BELOW 300 RT) Issue The problem is the lack of unambiguous identification of small vessels (unconventional recreational yachts, ie not subject to the SOLAS Convention), which often do not respond to the service request (despite having a VHF), and at the same time may pose a threat both in the context of port security and critical infrastructure (the possibility of secretive approach and take subversive action), as well as the safety of navigation and saving life at sea. This state of affairs makes it impossible for the services to uniquely identify the unit in a situation when it does not respond to calls by the radio. Threats / risk difficulties in rescue operations ; hazards associated with collision on shipping lanes; problem with the identification of the owner of the unit ; problem with determining the position of the unit ; problem with enforcing liability for damage to the environment. Solution to the problem / Tasks to be performed analysis of the legal situation of small vessels; analysis of the current state of identification of vessels operating Baltic Sea basins, with particular emphasis on coastal areas; characteristics of threats resulting from the lack of registra tion of unit traffic below 300 R T ; identification of procedures related to the response of services responsible for maintaining security in the Baltic Sea shipping lines (with particular reference to coastal areas) in the event of a threat. Recommendations / effects Development of equal, recommended standards of conduct for the countries of the Baltic Sea basin; development of proposals for system solutions (technical and organizational) aimed at efficient identification of small units (proposing a device for remote identification of yachts and their monitoring); preparation of an additional GSM / internet application that enables the services to read data about the unit; proposing solutions in the field of infrastructure enabling the use of the Internet in the entire territorial waters of the countries of the Baltic Sea; working out legal recommendations for actions leading to systemic changes. WP 4 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OF MOVEMENT OF GOODS OF THE MARINE Issue The issues of modern information systems in the marine environment, especially regarding the transport of goods, includes the plane of integration of already existing sources of data acquisition, their proper processing as well as information management. The lack of an efficient management system in the era of intensification of maritime transport leads to the following risks: lack of information about the cargo being carried, lack of information on the origin of the load (sender / recipient, place of shipment), lack of information on time of sending. No possibility to identify particularly dangerous cargoes. Threats / risk the use of containers for the transfer of hazardous materials; smuggling contraband to the Baltic Sea State by criminal and terrorist organizations; avoidance of customs duties ; extending the service time of the unit due to the procedures for checking the transported goods. Solution to the problem / Tasks to be performed identification of sources of information on freight and passenger traffic on the Baltic transport routes (with special regard to administration); analysis of management capabilities of information coming from many different sources; characterization of the problem of data transmission (of considerable size) in the on-line relationship; identification of information protection issues against unauthorized access. Recommendations / effects development of a proposal for the architecture of the information management system for increasing the safety of maritime transport on the Baltic communication routes on the basis of the existing ones; proposing recommendations for legal regulations or at least "good practices" for the Baltic Sea area in order to improve the intensified sea transport and ensure a higher level of security; trainings… Dsse From: Ingvar Pärnamäe [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, February 19, 2018 3:15 PM To: Rene Arikas <[email protected]> Subject: Fwd: European reseach project Tere Rene, Ega sulle mingi selline asi huvi ei või pakkuda? Vastamistähtajaga vist suht kiire. Terv. Ingvar Ingvar Pärnamäe CEO / Juhatuse esimees Estonian Defence Industry Association / Eesti Kaitsetööstuse Liit Cluster Manager / Klastrijuht Defence & Security Industry Innovation Cluster / Kaitse- ja julgeolekutööstuse innovatsiooni klaster Lõõtsa 6, Tallinn 11415, Estonia mob: +372 53 423 016 e-mail: [email protected] web: www.defence.ee Begin forwarded message: From: "Fabisiak Jacek" <[email protected]> Subject: European reseach project Date: 15 February 2018 at 16:15:32 EET To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> Dear Mr. Ingvar Pärnamäe, We acquired your address from Mr Ugis Romanovs. We are looking for the project partners in the Interreg BSR programme. You will find all the details in the attached documents. Generally the project concentrates on maritime transport and security at the Baltic Sea. Please do not think that the concept is final, these are rather our suggestions, which can be developed. Unfortunately we need the final answer until the end of next week. If you decide that it is not interested for you and you know some other national/privet especially maritime authorities could you please help us to contact them. Thank you for your attention and hope to hear from you soon, Katarzyna Wardin PhD, Polish Naval Academy, Gdynia Z poważaniem, kmdr por. dr inż. Jacek Fabisiak Dyrektor Instytutu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Akademia Marynarki Wojennej ul. inż. J. Śmidowicza 69 81-103 Gdynia tel. +48 261 262954, fax. +48 261 262802