Kaitsevägi · 7. november 2025
Sisu (failidest)
STANDARDIZATION ACCORD DE
AGREEMENT NORMALISATION
STANAG 4440
NATO GUIDELINES DIRECTIVES OTAN
FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY POUR LE STOCKAGE
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES DES MUNITIONS ET EXPLOSIFS
MILITAIRES
EDITION/ÉDITION 4
4 November/novembre 2025
NORTH ATLANTIC ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ
TREATY ORGANIZATION DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD
Published by Publié par
the NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE le BUREAU OTAN DE NORMALISATION
(NSO) (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
4 November/novembre 2025 NSO(CASG)1294(2025)SGC/4440
LETTER OF PROMULGATION LETTRE DE PROMULGATION
STATEMENT DÉCLARATION
The enclosed NATO standardization L’accord de normalisation OTAN (STANAG)
agreement (STANAG), which has been ratified ci-joint, qui a été ratifié par les pays membres
by member nations, as reflected in the dans les conditions figurant dans la Base de
NATO Standardization Documents Database données des documents de
(NSDD), is promulgated herewith. normalisation OTAN (NSDD), est promulgué
par la présente.
ENACTMENT ENTRÉE EN VIGUEUR
This STANAG is effective upon receipt for use Ce STANAG entre en vigueur dès réception
by the participating nations and NATO bodies. aux fins d’application par les pays et les
organismes OTAN participants.
ACTIONS BY NATIONS MESURES À PRENDRE PAR LES PAYS
Nations are invited to examine their ratification Les pays sont invités à examiner l'état
of the STANAG and, if they have not already d’avancement de la ratification du STANAG et à
done so, advise the NSO of their intention informer, s’ils ne l’ont pas encore fait, le NSO de
regarding its ratification and implementation. leur intention concernant sa ratification et sa
mise en application.
Once implemented, Allies shall provide Dès que le STANAG est mis en application, les
implementation details through the electronic Alliés doivent fournir les informations y
reporting tool. afférentes via l’outil de notification électronique.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFICATION DE SÉCURITÉ
This STANAG is a NATO non-classified Ce STANAG est un document OTAN
document to be handled in accordance non classifié qui doit être traité conformément
with C-M(2002)60. au C-M(2002)60.
RESTRICTION TO REPRODUCTION RESTRICTION DE REPRODUCTION
This NATO standardization document is issued Ce document de normalisation OTAN est
by NATO. In case of reproduction, NATO is to produit par l'OTAN. Il peut être reproduit
be acknowledged. NATO does not charge any moyennant mention de la paternité de l'OTAN.
fee for its standardization documents at any L'OTAN n'exige aucune participation financière,
stage, which are not intended to be sold. They à aucun stade, pour ses documents de
can be retrieved from the NATO normalisation, lesquels ne sont pas destinés à
Standardization Documents Database la vente. Ceux-ci sont disponibles dans la base
(https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your de données des documents de normalisation
national standardization authorities. OTAN (https://nso.nato.int/nso/) ou auprès de
l'organisme national de normalisation.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INFORMATIONS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES
The covered allied standard AASTP-1 has L'AASTP-1, norme interalliée couverte par
been significantly amended. Part IV Chapter 6 le STANAG 4440, a été considérablement
Naval and Military Ports has been completely modifiée. La Partie IV, Chapitre 6, consacrée
replaced and now uses the same aboveground aux ports navals et militaires, a été entièrement
quantity distances as Part I. The "warship remplacée et utilise désormais les mêmes
exemption" has been replaced with a safety distances de sécurité hors-sol que celles
management system to formally assess, indiquées dans la Partie I. L'« exemption pour
communicate, and accept explosives risk. navire de guerre » a été remplacée par un
système de gestion de la sécurité permettant
d'apprécier, de communiquer et d'accepter
formellement les risques liés aux explosifs.
Part I was updated to address storage sub- La Partie I a été mise à jour pour traiter des
division (SsD) 1.2.3 Parenthetical Hazardous distances entre parenthèses de projection des
Fragment Distances (HFD) and there are éclats potentiellement dangereux (HFD) de la
mathematical and typographical corrections. sous-division de stockage (SsD) 1.2.3, et des
corrections mathématiques et typographiques
ont été apportées.
Part II has improved guidance concerning La Partie II renferme des directives améliorées
3- and 7-bar ECM blast design curves and concernant les courbes nominales de la force
Chapter 5 Storage Facilites' Design de souffle pour les magasins recouverts de terre
Environment Consideration has been reduced (courbes de 3 et 7 bars), et le Chapitre 5,
in scope. consacré à la prise en compte de
l'environnement de conception des installations
de stockage, a été réduit dans sa portée
Thierry P ETTE ierry POULETTE
Major Genéral, FRA (A) 1éral de division, FRA (A)
Director, NATO Standardization,US' _Dire cteur du Bureau OTAN
de normalisation
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STANAG 4440 Edition/Édition 3
NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE DIRECTIVES OTAN POUR LE STOCKAGE
OF MILITARY AMMUNITION DES MUNITIONS ET EXPLOSIFS MILITAIRES
AND EXPLOSIVES
AIM BUT
The aim of this NATO standardization Le présent accord de normalisation OTAN
agreement (STANAG) is to respond to the (STANAG) a pour but de répondre aux exigences
following interoperability requirements. d’interopérabilité suivantes.
INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS EXIGENCES D’INTEROPÉRABILITÉ
To ensure that munitions used by NATO forces Veiller à ce que les munitions utilisées par les
are safe. Safe munitions ensure high user forces de l’OTAN soient sûres : des munitions
confidence, enhancing military operations and sûres inspirent à l’utilisateur un degré de
especially interoperability between national confiance élevé, ce qui facilite les opérations
forces participating in NATO multinational militaires et renforce notamment l’interopérabilité
operations. This includes the following life cycle des forces nationales participant à des opérations
aspects: design, manufacture, suitability for multinationales de l’OTAN. Sont concernés les
service, packaging, storage, transportation, and aspects suivants du cycle de vie : conception,
disposal. fabrication, aptitude au service, conditionnement,
stockage, transport et élimination.
AGREEMENT ACCORD
Participating nations agree to implement the Les pays participants conviennent de mettre en
following standard. application la norme suivante.
STANDARD NORME
AASTP-1, Edition D AASTP-1, Édition D
OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS AUTRES DOCUMENTS CONNEXES
• STANAG 4123 - DETERMINATION OF • STANAG 4123 – DÉTERMINATION DU
THE CLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY CLASSEMENT DES MUNITIONS ET
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES – AASTP-03 EXPLOSIFS MILITAIRES – AASTP-03
• STANAG 4442 – EXPLOSIVES • STANAG 4442 – ANALYSE DU RISQUE
SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS – GUIDELINES FOR POUR LA SÉCURITÉ DES EXPLOSIFS –
RISK-BASED DECISIONS – AASTP-04, VOL. I LIGNES DIRECTRICES POUR LA PRISE DE
DÉCISIONS FONDÉES SUR LE RISQUE –
AASTP-04, VOL. I
• STANAG 4802 - EXPLOSIVES SAFETY • STANAG 4802 - ANALYSE DU RISQUE
RISK ANALYSIS – TECHNICAL POUR LA SÉCURITÉ DES EXPLOSIFS –
BACKGROUND - AASTP-04, VOL. II CONTEXTE TECHNIQUE - AASTP-04, VOL. II
• STANAG 4657 - NATO GUIDELINES • STANAG 4657 – DIRECTIVES OTAN POUR
FOR THE STORAGE, MAINTENANCE AND LE STOCKAGE, LA MAINTENANCE ET LE
TRANSPORT OF AMMUNITION ON TRANSPORT DES MUNITIONS AU COURS DE
DEPLOYED MISSIONS OR OPERATIONS – MISSIONS OU D'OPÉRATIONS DE FORCES
AASTP-05 DÉPLOYÉES – AASTP-05
• STANAG 2617 - ALLIED LOGISTICS • STANAG 2617 – PUBLICATION
PUBLICATIONS FOR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY INTERALLIÉE SUR LA LOGISTIQUE RELATIVE
AND MUNITIONS RISK MANAGEMENT À LA SÉCURITÉ DES EXPLOSIFS ET LA
(ESMRM) IN NATO PLANNING, TRAINING GESTION DES RISQUES LIÉS AUX
AND OPERATIONS – ALP-16 MUNITIONS (ESMRM) DANS LE CADRE DE LA
PLANIFICATION, DE L’ENTRAÎNEMENT ET
DES OPÉRATIONS DE L’OTAN – ALP-16
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• STANAG 4441 - ALLIED MULTI- • STANAG 4441 – DIRECTIVE
MODAL TRANSPORTATION OF INTERALLIÉE POUR LE TRANSPORT
DANGEROUS GOODS DIRECTIVE – MULTIMODAL DES MARCHANDISES
AMovP-06 DANGEREUSES – AMovP-06
SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS ANNULÉS ET REMPLACÉS
This STANAG supersedes the following Le présent STANAG annule et remplace le
document: document suivant :
STANAG 4440, Edition 3, dated 8 March 2023 STANAG 4440, Édition 3, du 8 mars 2023
NATIONAL RATIFICATION RESPONSE RÉPONSES NATIONALES AUX DEMANDES
DE RATIFICATION
National responses are recorded in Les réponses nationales sont consignées dans
the NATO Standardization Documents la Base de données des documents de
Database (NSDD). normalisation OTAN (NSDD).
Allies shall provide ratification details through Les Alliés doivent rendre compte de leurs
the electronic reporting tool (e-Reporting). ratifications via l’outil de notification électronique
(e-Reporting).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT MISE EN APPLICATION DE L’ACCORD
This STANAG is implemented when: Le présent STANAG est mis en application dès
que :
a. national regulations apply the guidelines a. les réglementations nationales intègrent les
contained herein for the safe storage of directives contenues dans la norme qu’il
military ammunition and explosives; couvre ;
b. training programmes have been updated to b. les programmes de formation ont été mis à
disseminate and apply the guidelines; and jour afin de permettre la diffusion et la mise
en application de ces directives ;
c. trained personnel are applying the guidelines c. un personnel formé met en application ces
in the safe storage of military ammunition and directives.
explosives.
Allies and NATO bodies shall provide Les Alliés et les organismes OTAN doivent
implementation details through the electronic rendre compte de leur mise en application via
reporting tool (e-Reporting). l’outil de notification électronique (e-Reporting).
Partner nations are invited to provide their Les pays partenaires sont invités à rendre
implementation details through the electronic compte de leur mise en application via l’outil de
reporting tool (e-Reporting). notification électronique (e-Reporting).
NATO EFFECTIVE DATE (NED) DATE D’ENTRÉE EN VIGUEUR OTAN (NED)
Not applicable. Sans objet.
REVIEW RÉEXAMEN
This STANAG is to be reviewed in accordance Le présent STANAG doit être réexaminé
with AAP-03. The result of the review is to be conformément à l’AAP-03. Le résultat de ce
recorded within the NSDD. réexamen doit être consigné dans la NSDD.
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TASKING AUTHORITY AUTORITÉ DE TUTELLE
This STANAG is supervised under the authority Le présent STANAG est sous la responsabilité
of: du :
CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (CNAD)/
CNAD AMMUNITION SAFETY GROUP (AC/326)
CONFÉRENCE DES DIRECTEURS NATIONAUX DES ARMEMENTS (CDNA)/
GROUPE DE LA CDNA SUR LA SÉCURITÉ DES MUNITIONS (AC/326)
Sub-Group C on In-Service and Operational Safety Management/
Sous-groupe C sur la gestion de la sécurité en service et en opérations
(SG/C)
FEEDBACK INFORMATIONS EN RETOUR
Any comments concerning this STANAG shall be Tous les commentaires concernant le
directed to: présent STANAG doivent être adressés au :
NATO Standardization Office Bureau OTAN de normalisation
(NSO) (NSO)
Boulevard Léopold III
1110 BRUXELLES – Belgique
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STANDARDS RELATED DOCUMENT
AASTP-1.1
MANUAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SITE PLAN BASED
ON AASTP-1
Edition A, Version 1
MARCH 2023
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
AASTP-1.1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 3
1.1 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SITE PLANS .......................................................... 3
1.2 QUANTITY DISTANCES .............................................................................. 3
1.3 RISK-BASED APPROACH .......................................................................... 5
1.4 NATIONAL DIFFERENCES ......................................................................... 5
1.5 AIM ............................................................................................................... 5
1.6 RESOURCES............................................................................................... 5
1.7 APPLICABILITY ........................................................................................... 6
1.8 LAYOUT ....................................................................................................... 6
GENERAL ESSP GUIDANCE ........................................................... 7
2.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 7
2.2 WHEN NOT ALL CRITERIA CAN BE MET .................................................. 7
2.3 COORDINATION – KEY PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT ............................. 9
2.4 OVERVIEW OF THE PHASES OF AN ESSP .............................................. 9
ESSP PHASE 1 - DATA COLLECTION .......................................... 10
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 10
3.2 DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED ............... 10
3.2.1 Site maps; topographic maps, if applicable ......................................... 10
3.2.1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 10
3.2.1.2 Type of map and scale ........................................................................ 10
3.2.1.3 Level of detail ...................................................................................... 11
3.2.1.4 Define the evaluation zone per PES ................................................... 12
3.2.2 PES ..................................................................................................... 14
3.2.2.1 Identification of the PES ...................................................................... 14
3.2.2.2 Type designation of the PESs in the example ..................................... 15
3.2.2.3 ECM as a PES .................................................................................... 16
3.2.2.4 Light Walled Magazines as a PES ...................................................... 16
3.2.2.5 Explosives Workshops as a PES ........................................................ 17
3.2.3 ES ....................................................................................................... 17
3.2.3.1 Identification of the ESs ...................................................................... 17
3.2.3.2 ES inside the installation boundary ..................................................... 17
3.2.3.2.1 Data collection for all ES ..................................................................... 18
3.2.3.2.2 Data collection for ES containing AE (exposed PES) .......................... 18
3.2.3.2.3 Identification of the ESs inside the installation in the example ............ 19
3.2.3.2.4 ES outside the installation boundary ................................................... 21
3.2.3.3 ES outside the installation boundary in our example ........................... 22
3.2.3.3.1 Vulnerable Buildings (VB) ................................................................... 22
3.2.3.3.2 Inhabited Buildings (IB) ....................................................................... 23
3.2.3.3.3 Public Traffic Routes (PTR)................................................................. 24
3.2.3.3.4 Other ESs outside the installation ....................................................... 24
3.2.4 Creation of the distance table.............................................................. 24
I Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
3.2.5 PESs and ESs not listed in QD tables ................................................. 28
3.2.5.1 PESs not listed in the QD tables ......................................................... 28
3.2.5.2 ESs not listed in the QD tables............................................................ 28
3.2.6 Barricades ........................................................................................... 28
3.2.6.1 Barricades for the prevention of prompt propagation .......................... 28
3.2.6.2 Barricades for the protection of people ............................................... 30
3.2.7 Other relevant information ................................................................... 32
3.2.7.1 Protective construction details............................................................. 32
3.2.7.2 Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordance (HERO) ................. 33
3.2.7.3 Risks other than QD-related ................................................................ 33
3.3 DATA WORKSHEETS ............................................................................... 33
ESSP PHASE 2 – DEVELOPMENT ................................................ 36
4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 36
4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF UNIQUE PES-ES RELATIONSHIP ......................... 36
4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIRED NATO QD CRITERIA FOR EACH
UNIQUE PES-ES RELATIONSHIP ............................................................ 39
4.4 ASSESSING REQUIRED VERSUS AVAILABLE DISTANCES ................. 41
4.5 RECORDING ASSESSMENT RESULTS .................................................. 41
4.6 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF THE PES, THE RELEVANT ESS, AND
THE SAFETY ZONES ................................................................................ 44
4.7 CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS LISTING .............................................. 44
4.8 ANALYZE CALCULATION RESULTS ....................................................... 45
4.9 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY QD ARCS............................................................. 45
4.10 ESSP DOCUMENTATION ......................................................................... 49
ESSP PHASE 3 - REVIEW AND APPROVAL ................................. 51
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 51
5.2 REVIEW PROCESS................................................................................... 51
5.3 APPROVAL PROCESS ............................................................................. 51
5.4 CONTENT OF THE SUBMISSION ............................................................ 51
ESSP PHASE 4 - OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT.................... 52
6.1 NATIONAL OWNERSHIP – REGULATORY OVERSIGHT ........................ 52
6.2 OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT AT ALL LEVELS ................................ 52
USING THE QD TABLES ................................................................ 53
7.1 OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TABLES ....................................................... 53
7.2 METHODOLOGY TO USE THE QD TABLES............................................ 56
7.2.1 Step 1 – Select the correct PES-ES interaction .................................. 56
7.2.2 Step 2 – Use the HD/SsD table to determine the applicable calculations
............................................................................................................ 56
7.2.2.1 Determine the relevant explosion effects ............................................ 56
7.2.2.2 Look up the applicable formula ........................................................... 57
7.2.3 Step 3 – Use the HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or
MCE .................................................................................................... 58
7.2.3.1 Result for Blast in the example............................................................ 58
II Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
7.2.3.2 Result for Debris and Fragments in the example ................................ 59
7.2.3.3 Result for Progressive Event for SsD 1.2.1 in the example ................. 60
7.2.3.4 Step 4 – Use the associated formula for minimum distance or maximum
quantity ............................................................................................... 60
7.2.3.4.1 Result of Step 4 in the example .......................................................... 60
HOW TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY ECM (AS A PES)
RELATIONSHIPS TO ES ................................................................ 62
8.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 62
8.2 DIFFERENT SIDES OF AN ECM............................................................... 62
8.2.1 ECM Front ........................................................................................... 63
8.2.2 ECM rear ............................................................................................. 66
8.2.3 ECM side............................................................................................. 67
8.2.4 Lines cutting an ES ............................................................................. 68
RECORDING QD ASSESSMENT DATA ........................................ 70
9.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 70
9.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FORM ................................................................. 70
9.3 SOURCE OF THE DATA TO RECORD ON THE FORM ........................... 71
RISK-BASED APPROACH .......................................................... 73
ESSP TOOLS .............................................................................. 74
11.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 74
11.2 TOOLS FOR QD ........................................................................................ 74
11.3 TOOLS FOR CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK ............................. 74
11.3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 74
11.3.2 MQDCAT Overview ............................................................................. 74
11.3.3 MQDCAT Description .......................................................................... 77
REFERENCES............................................................................. 80
QD Assessment Calculation Form ..................................................... A-1
III Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
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IV Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AASTP Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication
AC Allied Committee
AE Ammunition and Explosives
AGM Aboveground Magazine
AGS Aboveground Structure
BD Blast Distance
CASG CNAD Ammunition Safety Group
CG Compatibility Group
CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors
DESR Defense Explosives Safety Regulations (US)
DFD Debris and Fragment Distance
DLV Debris Launch Velocity
DoD Department of Defense
ECM Earth Covered Magazine
ESMRM Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management
ES Exposed Site
ESO Explosives Safety Officer
ESSP Explosives Safety Site Plan
ESTC Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (UK)
EWD Explosives Workshop Distance
GR Group Risk
HAS Hardened Aircraft Shelter
HD Hazard Division
HE High Explosive
IB Inhabited Building
IBD Inhabited Building Distance
ILD Intraline Distance (US)
IR Individual Risk
IM Insensitive Munitions
IMD Inter-Magazine Distance
MCE Maximum Credible Event
NEQ, Q Net Explosive Quantity
NEW Net Explosive Weight
NEWQD NEW for Quantity Distance (US equivalent to NEQ)
PD Progressive event Distance
PES Potential Explosion Site
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
PTRD Public Traffic Route Distance
QD Quantity Distance
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis
SDW Substantial Dividing Wall
SG Sensitivity Group
SGC Subgroup C
1 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
SRD Standards Related Document
SsD Storage sub Division
TD Thermal event Distance
2 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SITE PLANS
NATO standards provide minimum explosives safety requirements for military
installations where Ammunition and Explosives (AE) are stored and handled. AASTP-
1 [1] [2] is applicable for storage in the home country and AASTP-5 [3] for storage on
deployed missions when the Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) does not exceed 4,000 kg
per Potential Explosion Site (PES). Many NATO nations have national policies that
directly refer to NATO standards, or have included adjusted contents from the
standards into their policies.
Explosives Safety Site Plans (ESSP) are developed to ensure that the
abovementioned explosives safety requirements are met. An ESSP is necessary to
demonstrate that separation distances, also called Quantity Distances (QDs), are
adhered to before new construction starts and prior to deployment of AE in any given
area. An ESSP does not prevent explosive accidents – it is intended to mitigate the
consequences and provide an acceptable level of protection to exposed people and
property.
Explosives safety site planning is the process of conducting and documenting a
comprehensive assessment of new and/or existing facilities and missions involving AE
and their surroundings. An ESSP verifies that required QD between PESs and
Exposed Sites (ES) are met to reduce the consequences of an accidental explosion to
a tolerable level, impacting personnel, buildings, transportation, utilities, and other
infrastructure essential to mission accomplishment.
An ESSP also considers aspects such as survivability, mission criticality, operational
considerations, and economic, security, environmental, and legal criteria to meet the
mission goals and objectives. ESSPs are prepared and presented to the appropriate
national authority for approval and form the basis for explosives licences. The
explosives allowance specified in a license should be based on the results of an
approved ESSP.
1.2 QUANTITY DISTANCES
Explosives safety site planning involves determining QDs between PES and ES and
the resulting maximum allowable NEQ of AE for each Hazard Division (HD).
AASTP-1 [1] [2] specifies QD between PES and ES containing AE to prevent prompt
propagation, as well as towards ES involving personnel and third parties (e.g.,
inhabited buildings) to meet defined levels of protection. Figure 1 gives an illustration
of a number of QD.
3 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Exterior QDs
Interior QDs
Exposed Sites (ES)
Example: Inter Magazine Distance (IMD)
Earth Covered
Magazine (ECM)
Examples:
Heavy Structure
Potential Explosion Site
(PES) Light Structure
PES factors: Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)
Intraline Distance (ILD)
• Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ, Q)
• Hazard Division (Storage Non-Explosives Workshop Distance
Subdivision): (HD1.1, HD1.2
(SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.2, SsD1.2.3),
HD1.3 (SsD1.3.1, SsD1.3.2),
HD1.4, HD1.5, HD1.6) Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)
• Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
• Compatibility Group (CG) (A-N, S)
• Sensitivity Group (SG) (SG1-SG5) Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)
Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD)
Explosives Area
POL
Overhead power grid
Figure 1 - Illustration of AASTP-1 QD [4]. Not to scale.
QD are primarily consequence-based, which means that the occurrence of an
accidental explosion is assumed. The probability of an event is thus not considered in
a QD assessment. AASTP-5 [3] specifies Field Distances (FD) equivalent to QD for
storage structures on deployed missions.
A variety of explosion effects (blast, debris and fragments, progressive event reactions,
and thermal effects) have to be considered in a QD assessment. The relevant effects
depend on the PES, ES, HD, and NEQ but also on the presence of barricades and
natural terrain slopes. The most dominant (restrictive) effect determines the overall
QD.
With Edition C Version 1 of AASTP-1 [2], the procedure to determine QD has changed.
The assessment has become more transparent and has a better empirical basis. Still,
it may also be more complex and time-consuming when conducted manually. To assist
the user, the current Standards Related Document (SRD) has been developed, as well
as a calculation tool.
4 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
1.3 RISK-BASED APPROACH
The starting point is to meet QD criteria that prevent prompt propagation, i.e., the
Intermagazine Distances (IMD). However, it may not be possible to meet all QD
requirements due to a lack of space or mission requirements. When QD cannot be
met, a risk assessment should be conducted. This topic will only be discussed briefly
in this SRD. More information on the risk based approach can be found in Chapter 10
and AASTP-4 [5].
1.4 NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Many NATO nations adopt the process mentioned above - to first determine QD, and
if these cannot be met, to conduct a risk assessment [6] [7].
It is important to realize that although there are many commonalities between NATO
nations’ explosives safety criteria, national policies may differ in the way QD is
assessed and the way risk analysis is conducted. This SRD will not address national
differences but instead focuses on developing an ESSP based on NATO standards
and best practices.
1.5 AIM
This SRD provides practical guidance and examples for developing an ESSP for
military installations based on the requirements outlined in AASTP-1 Edition C
Version 1 [1] Part I.
This SRD was specifically developed to help practitioners with the increased
complexity of the AASTP-1 Part 1 QD tables in Edition C Version 1 [2]. Where there
is a contradiction between the AASTP-1 and this SRD, the AASTP-1 takes
precedence.
1.6 RESOURCES
This SRD is based on course material from the “AASTP-1 and AASTP-5 lecture
series” developed by the Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC). Its
steering committee has approved releasing parts of that course material to the
AC/326 community.
This SRD points to an application (NEQ Capacity Calculator) developed by ESSINT
for the AC/326 community to support the application of QD. Furthermore, this SRD
points to the MSIAC Quantity Distance Tool (MQDCAT), which was developed for
MSIAC members to calculate consequences to support a risk analysis in cases where
QD cannot be met. The links to these tools can be found in Chapter 11.
5 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
1.7 APPLICABILITY
This SRD has been developed for those involved in explosives safety site planning,
such as Explosives Safety Officers (ESOs). It assumes basic prior knowledge about
AE, including hazard classification and the application of QD and risk analysis.
This SRD applies to military installations where AE are stored and handled. In the
remainder of this document, we will use the term “installation” as equivalent to “facility”
or “base”.
1.8 LAYOUT
This SRD describes the development of an ESSP in a typical chronological order,
which is the basis for the following chapters in this document.
General ESSP guidance is given in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 through 6 describe the four
phases in developing an ESSP: data collection; development; review and approval;
and oversight and management. Chapter 7 will discuss application of the AASTP-1
Edition C Version 1 QD tables, whereas Chapter 8 will identify the relations between
Earth Covered Magazines (ECMs) and ESs. The recording of QD assessment data is
discussed in Chapter 9. A brief discussion about the risk-based approach is presented
in Chapter 10. Finally, tools for QD and risk assessment are presented in Chapter 11.
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GENERAL ESSP GUIDANCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
ESSPs are to be developed for military installations where AE are stored and handled,
including AE storage depots, holding areas, pads, re-supply points, transfer points,
loading docks, burn pans, and handling areas designed, constructed, and used for
recurring AE operations. ESSPs can vary from relatively simple to highly complex,
depending on the scale of the installation.
An ESSP should be in place for existing AE installations. Changes to the ESSP are
necessary for:
• Structural modification of existing PES (e.g., related to substantial
dividing walls (SDW) or roof type)
• Construction of new PES within AE installations
• Changes to quantity and type of AE (e.g., NEQ or HD)
• Changes to the type of mission or operations (e.g., increased threat
level and risk)
• Changes to the use of ES, which may require the application of more
stringent explosives safety criteria
• Construction of new ES within the QD arcs of AE installations
ESSPs should be developed for peacetime day-to-day operations, training,
contingency operations, deployed environment, and wartime. Some installations (e.g.,
airbases) need to be tier-sited, which means they need to have different site plan
options for different operational situations.
Installations that are only used to store and handle HD 1.4 AE do not require ESSPs.
Also, AE Amnesty collection points will not require ESSP. However, a risk assessment
and a license are still required.
2.2 WHEN NOT ALL CRITERIA CAN BE MET
An explosives safety management program aims to manage and mitigate explosives-
safety-related risk (including consequences). To meet QD criteria, obvious measures
are reducing NEQ, increasing distances, or structural enhancements to PES and ES.
Nevertheless, it may not be possible to meet all requirements.
Relaxation or non-application of AASTP-1 QD or other explosives safety criteria can
increase the risk to the stockpile, facilities, personnel, and the public and should be
avoided.
Of all QD, the inter-magazine distance (IMD) should never be waivered or
compromised. Not meeting IMD implies prompt propagation. When PESs cannot be
separated by IMD, as an alternative, they can be grouped as one PES with the
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aggregated NEQ. Figure 2 shows an example of two PESs that are so close that IMD
criteria cannot be met, resulting in “no capacity” for both PESs. Merging these two
PESs and considering them as one single PES can bypass IMD issues to create
capacity. If two or more HDs and SsDs are involved, then the AASTP-1 mixing rules
apply. The disadvantage of this approach is the larger required QD towards other PES
and ES.
Figure 2- Example of two PESs with IMD not meeting criteria that can be
grouped
Relaxation of Exterior QD should be permitted only with the written consent of the
appropriate authorities. QD reflects a tolerable but non-zero level of consequence (and
risk), and any relaxation further increases the risk to the ESs.
AASTP-1 often provides equivalent protection levels for different PES-ES pairs. In
some cases, one or more explosion effects are neutralized through increased
distances or protective construction that permits the reduction of required QD. For
example: for HD 1.1, an exposed barricaded Light Walled Magazine requires a smaller
separation distance than an exposed unbarricaded Light Walled Magazine. In the first
case, the low-angle high-velocity fragment and debris throw effects are defeated by
the barricade. In the second case, the separation distance needs to be increased to
defeat the relevant explosion effects. In both cases, an equivalent protection level can
be achieved.
Correctly identifying and quantifying explosives hazards as well as selecting effective
mitigation strategies is a challenge. Mischaracterizing hazards can lead to improperly
proposed solutions.
Some AASTP-1 criteria violations may have quick solutions that can be implemented
immediately. In contrast, others can only be implemented when resources become
available and are hence categorized as “short term”, “long-term”, or maybe even
“never”. However, regardless of the category, it is very likely that intermediate solutions
can already be found that reduce risks from violations or concerns until the final
solution can be implemented.
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Some violations will require a risk-based approach followed by a risk decision from the
appropriate authority to continue operations or documenting a “risk acceptance” for a
particular area of concern (see Chapter 10 and AASTP-4 [5]).
Recommendations about acceptable solutions to eliminate the discrepancies can be
provided in the ESSP Final Package. This final package provides opinions and
thoughts (e.g., advantages and disadvantages) of applying a risk-based approach
versus another approach to solving potential QD problems. Whether the risk
assessment is considered part of the ESSP is dependent on the nation.
2.3 COORDINATION – KEY PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT
Personnel from various backgrounds and organizations should be involved in the
development of the ESSP. The following is a non-exhaustive list:
• Explosives Safety
• Installation Master Planning
• Operating Units
• Installation Engineering
• Public Works
• Logistics
• Environmental and Health
• Explosives Operations
• Ammunition Surveillance
• Range Control (if the installation is range related)
• Fire Department
• Security
2.4 OVERVIEW OF THE PHASES OF AN ESSP
The following phases in the development of an ESSP can be identified:
• Phase 1: Data collection
• Phase 2: Development
• Phase 3: Review and approval
• Phase 4: Oversight and Management
These phases will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
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ESSP PHASE 1 - DATA COLLECTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the first phase of ESSP development, detailed data on all the PES and the ES within
the installation boundaries are collected. It is equally important to collect detailed
information relating to ESs outside the installation boundaries, as NATO explosives
safety criteria also apply to them. The ESs outside the boundaries, out to a predefined
evaluation distance from each PES, will need to be assessed.
The more information provided, the better. The more data, the more accurate the ESSP
product.
3.2 DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED
3.2.1 Site maps; topographic maps, if applicable
3.2.1.1 Introduction
The importance of current, accurate maps cannot be overstated. A critical element of
a good ESSP is to have good maps that show the location of each PES and its
relationship to surrounding ESs such as the installation boundaries1, hospitals,
schools, places of worship, sports stadiums, passenger terminals, built-up areas,
utilities, roads, railroads, waterways, ponds, lakes, recreation areas, fire stations,
laboratories, storage magazines, outdoor storage, water tanks, fuel tanks, historical
sites, equipment, maintenance, production, and other operations.
3.2.1.2 Type of map and scale
Preferably a Geographic Information System (GIS) software packages should be used
to create georeferenced vector maps. GIS data can be used for map display and spatial
analysis (such as measuring distances between map features).
When using hardcopy maps, the map should be of an appropriate scale, and show
locations and distances accurately on a sheet of paper of convenient size to be most
useful.
1 Some nations treat the installation boundary itself as an ES
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3.2.1.3 Level of detail
The map should reproduce each object (structure or open air) that may be considered
a PES or ES. This level of detail is required for both inside and outside the installation.
Figure 3 shows an example of a map of an AE installation and its surroundings. This
installation will serve as an example throughout the remainder of this document.
Figure 3 - Map of the installation and its surroundings
A legend that explains the symbols used on the map should be provided to correctly
identify all the elements on the map (see Figure 4). The scale should be clearly
indicated.
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Figure 4 - Legend of the map
The evaluation zones of the PESs define the required size of the map. How to
determine the evaluation zones is explained in the next paragraph.
A layer definition document should be included. For example, layer number 1 is the
installation boundary, layer number 2 is the perimeter fences, etc.. In addition, if the
maps are georeferenced, the coordinate reference system (CRS) utilized should be
defined.
3.2.1.4 Define the evaluation zone per PES
For each PES, an initial evaluation zone will be determined based on the desired or
maximum allowed NEQ capacity. The evaluation zone is defined by a distance around
a PES, and is used to identify (see Figure 5) ESs within which QD criteria may apply
(see also § 4.2).
Recommended ranges of the evaluation zone are given in Table 1 for various ESs
exposed to the effects of a PES containing HD 1.1. The most restrictive criterion
determines the evaluation zone.
RECOMMENDED RANGE OF THE
MAXIMUM ALLOWED OR SITED NEQ CAPACITY PER PES
EVALUATION ZONE
(distances in meter)
1000 kg 5000 kg 1 000 kg 25000 kg 50000 kg 100000 kg 250000 kg 500000 kg
EXPOSURE TYPE
VULNERABLE BUILDING 450 800 1000 1300 1700 2100 2800 3600
INHABITED BUILDING & PTR HIGH DENSITY 450 600 650 750 850 1100 1400 1800
PTR MEDIUM DENSITY 300 400 450 500 550 700 1000 1200
PTR LOW DENSITY 250 300 350 400 450 600 700 900
EXPLOSIVES WORKSHOP 300 400 500 650 850 1100 1400 1800
Table 1 - Recommended range of the evaluation zone per ES type for various
HD 1.1 NEQ.
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The maximum NEQ being considered per PES determines the range of the required
zone outside the installation (also called evaluation zone). On some occasions, the
maximum allowable NEQ in a PES is based on structure type limitations (e.g., a
specific ECM type with a maximum allowable NEQ of 100 tons NEQ of HD 1.1). All
ESs beyond the evaluation zone based on this NEQ capacity limitation are left out of
consideration. On other occasions, the maximum allowable NEQ will be based on the
nearest ES of a specific type. For example, when the closest exposed, vulnerable
building distance in Table 1 is at 2100m, the maximum allowable NEQ can not exceed
100 000 kg. Therefore, the evaluation zone for vulnerable buildings does not need to
be larger than the closest ES of this type.
The determined evaluation distance will be applied 360 degrees around the considered
PES, from the exterior of the building or edge of the stack.
Figure 5 - Applying the evaluation zone (yellow coloured area on the map)
distance 360 degrees around the PES (ECM “A” in our example)
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3.2.2 PES
3.2.2.1 Identification of the PES
PES data includes:
• Facility number
• Facility name
• PES type with reference to approved design (if applicable). The QD
Tables in Part I offer specific criteria for four PES structure types (see
AASTP-1 § 1.1.1.2.7. and the QD Tables in Annex A2) :
• The current allowed NEQ for each HD and SsD.
• Intended use (e.g., storage of missiles)
• Presence of a barricade (including geometric information of the
barricade, the position of the barricade(s) (e.g., at each side of the PES
or only on one side))
• Identification of sector-related angles, if applicable (for directional
effects)
• Internal and external dimensions (length, width, and height) are
necessary to verify requirements for barricade geometry and to
calculate the PES internal volume, etc.)
All PESs need proper identification of their structure type. This is of paramount
importance for the application of QD criteria. The QD tables cover the following PES
structure types:
• Table 1 - ECM (rear, side, and front)
• Table 2 - Heavy Walled Magazine (with or without a protective roof)
• Table 3 - Medium Walled Magazine (with or without barricades)
• Table 4 - Light Walled Magazine and open stacks (with or without a
barricade)
To correctly classify PESs into these types, relevant information should be collected.
Construction plans provide essential details like wall thickness, construction materials
(e.g., masonry walls or concrete walls), roof thickness (can the roof be identified as a
“protective roof” or not?), type designation of the ECM (7 bar, 3 bar, or undefined). A
PES should not be classified based on assumptions only. Construction details should
support the selected PES type.
This information will help determine the appropriate basis for the AASTP-1 QD criteria
application. All information will be documented, and references should be made to
applicable sections of AASTP-1 to define PES structure type and appropriate criteria
to apply.
2 Airfields and Ports have specific PES and ES types which are detailed in the relevant chapters of
AASTP 1 Part IV
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A PES structure may not fit precisely in one particular category. For example, the wall
thickness matches the structure description of a Light Walled Magazine, but the roof is
a protective roof matching the medium Walled Magazine type description. In this case,
assessing the PES structure for both types is required and selecting the most restrictive
results from the QD calculations.
In general, separation distances are measured from the PES outside walls or outer
boundaries of a PES-designated facility/location (i.e., parking for AE uploaded
vehicles) to the nearest wall or boundary of the ES. Hence, the polygon for an ECM
should represent the external walls of the storage facility footprint and not any aspects
of its earth cover.
3.2.2.2 Type designation of the PESs in the example
In the example shown in Figure 3 and Figure 6, we observe two types of AE storage
magazines which, based on the available collected data, are identified in Figure 4 as:
• ECM of the undefined type with an internal volume >500m³
• Light Walled Magazines
Additionally, explosives workshops (EWSs) are indicated on the map. An EWS is also
to be considered as a PES because AE can be present. Based on the available data,
the PES structure type of the workshop is identified as a Light Walled Magazine.
Figure 6 Ammunition storage area
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3.2.2.3 ECM as a PES
For each ECM, three elements are visible on the map of Figure 6; the earth cover, the
wing walls, and the concrete box underneath the earth cover. For QD measurements,
only the structure contours of the concrete are relevant (see Figure 7).
Figure 7 - Measuring distances between two ECMs
As a PES, the type designation of the ECMs isn’t essential. But when the PESs act as
an ES, then the type designation is relevant information.
The pictograms in Figure 8 represent the ECM as a PES.
Figure 8 - Pictograms for ECMs acting as a PES
As can be seen, the pictograms are generic and do not distinguish between different
ECM-type designations (i.e., 7 bar, 3 bar and undefined type). Arrows are leaving from
the structure to indicate that the pictograms represent a PES and the direction of
concern of the explosion effects in case of an accidental explosion. The specific design
of an ECM dictates the directional effects. These are respectively rear, side and front.
To correctly identify how ECMs relate to ESs, see Chapter 8.
When an ECM PES has a front door barricade, this should be recorded. AASTP-1 Part
I does not have a dedicated pictogram for door barricaded ECM front, but contains
specific criteria if such a barricade exists.
3.2.2.4 Light Walled Magazines as a PES
The Light Walled Magazine PES type is represented by pictograms shown in Figure
9. A distinction is made between Light Walled Magazines PES with a barricade and
without a barricade. The method for determining if a PES is identified as barricaded
or unbarricaded will be explained further in this document.
Figure 9 - Pictograms for Light Walled Magazines as a PES
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3.2.2.5 Explosives Workshops as a PES
Explosives workshops (EWS) acting as a PES do not have a dedicated pictogram.
The structure type needs to be selected from the list given in AASTP-1 § 2.2.2.1.
This contrasts with an EWS acting as an ES, where specific pictograms are available
dependent on the structural characteristics of the exposed EWS. The EWS acting as
a PES is classified in a similar way to AE storage magazines.
In our example, we will consider the EWS as having a non-protective roof with walls
that meet the Light Walled Magazine descriptions. Consequently, the same
pictogram shown in Figure 9 should be used to represent the EWS as PES.
3.2.3 ES
3.2.3.1 Identification of the ESs
All ESs will be identified within the evaluation zone for each PES. ESs will be
categorized into their appropriate type, separation distances, and all other information
documented.
ES types for AASTP-1 Part I are specified in AASTP-1 Part I Chapter 3 and the QD
Tables of Annex A.
The following gives the nature and the level of detail that will need to be collected or
made available for the ESSP.
3.2.3.2 ES inside the installation boundary
On all installations, there will typically be many ES. Some will support the entire
installation; others will not. Some will support the explosives area only; others will not.
Some will be associated (related) to one or more PESs; others will not be associated
to a PES.
All ESs (explosives and non-explosives) within the Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)
arc generated by PESs should be identified and assessed as to the appropriate
AASTP-1 criteria that apply to them.
IBD provides protection to persons, therefore applying IBD to all non-PES ESs inside
the installation is recommended, but this is not always possible in practice. Examples
of such ESs are operations and support facilities, administrative areas, classrooms,
utilities, roads, railroads, waterways, ponds, lakes, recreation areas, fire stations,
laboratories, storage magazines, outdoor spaces, water tanks, fuel tanks, earthen
barricades, etc.
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To determine if reduced QD can be applied, details of the ESs are necessary:
associated or not to the explosives tasks, directly or indirectly associated, only a few
people exposed or many people exposed, structural protection or not. AASTP-1 § 1.3.7
provides guidance on the kind of injuries and damage expected at different QD and
proposes typical personnel (types and/or numbers) or facilities for which these
distances might be considered acceptable. It is important to note that this guidance is
for NEQ > 4,500 kg HD 1.1, considering blast only, (i.e., excluding debris and
fragments).
3.2.3.2.1 Data collection for all ES
For each identified ES, the following information should be provided (this includes ES
with AE (or exposed PES) and ES without AE):
• Purpose of the ES:
Provide a general narrative that is describing each activity conducted in
the facility.
• Construction details:
▪ Reference of approved design (if applicable)
▪ Drawings (if available) showing the building layout, construction,
and utilities. If the construction drawings for a facility cannot be
provided, then as much information as possible will be
documented in other formats, and pictures will be documented.
▪ A floor plan showing a top-down view. If available, provide a
vector-based graphic for each facility.
▪ A general narrative describing construction details.
▪ Basis of design details, structural analysis, and construction
drawings should be available for on-site review and discussion.
▪ Barricade details
• Occupancy:
Identify the number of individuals working in every facility/room, hours
of operation and their general work locations.
• Miscellaneous information:
Miscellaneous Information such as the presence of other hazardous
materials.
3.2.3.2.2 Data collection for ES containing AE (exposed PES)
For each identified ES that contains AE, the following information should be provided:
• Identify the design basis and the criteria applied, and the design
agency. Have construction drawings available for review and
discussion.
• Identify any protective construction feature that has been incorporated
into the facility’s design, such as substantial dividing walls, non-
propagating walls, frangible panels.
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• For each protective feature(s), explain what that protective feature
consists of, describe its basis of design. For example , management of
blast, fragments, and/or structural breakup and any NEQ allowance, the
design agency, the design specification applied, and any modifications
made to the original design basis.
• On the floor plan, identify where AE are stored, handled, and
processed, as well as the highest elevation of explosives in each
facility/room.
• In explosives processing buildings:
▪ Use arrows on the floor plan to denote the flow of explosives
through the facility.
▪ For explosives operations involving sequential steps, describe
those steps and use arrows to illustrate those sequential steps
between facilities.
3.2.3.2.3 Identification of the ESs inside the installation in the example
Figure 10 shows the non-AE ESs inside the installation (green colored on the map)
that all need to be identified.
Figure 10 - Non-PES ESs inside the installation
Figure 11 shows typical ESs inside an installation that require IBD separation.
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NON AE DINING
WORKSHOP
ADMIN
Figure 11 - ESs inside the installation that require IBD separation
Figure 12 shows a couple of ESs where reduced distances could be acceptable. This
is related to the temporary presence of people at these ES. Another reason is that the
ES needs to be closer to the PESs to properly fulfill their mission (e.g., security
personnel cannot be efficient when located at a large distance like IBD).
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OPEN AIR
RECREATION
PARKING
GUARDS
REST BUILDING
ASSOCIATED TO
PES
Figure 12 - Non-PES ESs inside the installation where reduced QD can apply
3.2.3.2.4 ES outside the installation boundary
Concerning ES located outside the installation perimeter (or installation boundary),
AASTP-1 QD Tables distinguish between the following ES types:
• Public traffic routes (PTR)
• Inhabited buildings and places of assembly (IB)
• Vulnerable buildings (VB)
• Power Lines and Communication Lines
• POL (including pipelines)
Additional details that could affect explosives limits such as:
• Traffic routes: details, density, distances, and used by whom and
frequency.
• Power lines: size, buried or overhead, distance, use, part of a grid.
• Utilities: fuel source (tank, lines), water (tank, lines), fiber optics, etc.
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Some nations identify the installation boundary as an element requiring IBD
protection. Identifying the installation boundary as IB ES is good practice, when
achievable, and keeps the final explosive safety zones inside the installation's
footprint. In most cases, the real estate outside the installation boundary isn’t
controlled by the competent national authorities dealing with explosives safety.
Explosives safety zones beyond the installation boundary imply that consent is
needed from other (civil) authorities to accept the risk imposed on those areas. When
the installation boundary is not considered an IBD requiring element, there is a risk
that public encroachment will cause issues in land not owned or managed by the
government, which will negatively impact the NEQ capacity of the installation.
All PTR within the evaluation zone should be identified and classified according to
their traffic density because each traffic density level has its criteria. Traffic density
considerations are detailed in AASTP-1.
ESs outside the installation perimeter (or installation boundary) typically include
administrative areas, schools, universities, hospitals, private homes and villages,
recreational areas and footpaths, utilities, railroads, highways, roads, and navigable
waterways, training areas.
If the maximum allowed (or desired) NEQ capacity for the PESs is known, then the
ESs within the evaluation zone should be identified. The recommended range of the
evaluation zone was presented before in Table 1. However, it is recommended to
identify the closest presence of each ES type even when this is located outside the
evaluation zone as proof that this ES type has been assessed.
When the maximum allowed (or desired) NEQ capacity is unknown, the closest ESs
of each type should be identified for each PES. The closest ESs are the most
restrictive and will determine the maximum allowed NEQ capacity.
3.2.3.3 ES outside the installation boundary in our example
3.2.3.3.1 Vulnerable Buildings (VB)
The dashed purple line in Figure 13 represents the installation boundary. In this
figure, the two VBs within the evaluation zone have been identified. There could be
more VBs at greater distances but these would not be relevant since only the closest
relationship will determine the allowed NEQ capacity.
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Figure 13 - Identification of the VBs
3.2.3.3.2 Inhabited Buildings (IB)
Figure 14 shows the identification of the ESs that require IBD separation (e.g., civil
houses). Again it is crucial that for each PES, the closest relationship is identified.
Figure 14 - Identification of the IBD requiring ESs outside the installation
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3.2.3.3.3 Public Traffic Routes (PTR)
Figure 15 shows the PTR outside the installation. In this example, only roads are
shown, but PTR includes railways, waterways (including rivers, canals, and lakes),
and even footpaths.
Figure 15 - PTR outside the installation (highlighted in yellow)
3.2.3.3.4 Other ESs outside the installation
Besides VBs, IBs, and PTRs, other ESs also require QD. Some examples are POL
installations, communication lines and antennas, powerlines, solar farms, and
windmills. The QD tables offer some criteria. Power supply and communication
systems are defined by specific qualifications and whom they support.
If no criteria are offered in the tables, a proper judgment should be made to select an
appropriate criterion to provide sufficient protection.
3.2.4 Creation of the distance table
Once all PESs and ESs have been identified and listed, a distance table should be
created that provides the shortest distance between all listed PESs and ESs.
Aspects of distance measurement for QD purposes are covered in various places in
AASTP-1: § 1.3.2.2.1, § 1.3.2.2.2.
QDs are measured from the nearest point of the PES to the nearest point of the ES.
Distances are measured along a straight line without regard to barricades or earth
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cover (for ECM). When no structure is involved (explosives open stacks), QDs are
measured from and to the nearest points of the stacks (see Figure 16).
Figure 16 - Measuring QDs when PES is an open stack
When the NEQ in a PES is separated into stacks so that the possibility of mass
reaction is limited to the quantity in a single stack, then distances are measured from
the outside of the wall adjacent to the controlling explosives stack to the nearest
outside wall of another structure. If the separation to prevent a mass reaction is
provided by a substantial dividing wall(s), then the distances are measured from
these walls instead of from the outside walls of the building.
In most cases, the shortest distance between PES and ES is the most relevant for
calculation purposes. However, in the case of structures with a directional effect
(e.g., ECM and Hardened Aircraft Shetler (HAS)), the distance for calculations
depends on where the PES and ES are located (in the front, rear, or side sector).
Figure 17 illustrates that the closest relationship isn’t always the relevant relationship.
In this figure, you can see an ECM PES with two IB ESs; one IB in the front sector of
the ECM and one in the side sector. Although the IB in the side sector is closer to the
PES, the separation for a frontal ES is greater. For PESs with directional effects, the
closest relationship for each sector (rear, side, and front) should be identified. Hence,
creating a distance table that differentiates between front, side, and rear ESs is
recommended.
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Figure 17 - ECM with front and side exposed IB
To assess whether ESs are front, side, or rear exposed to the PES, lines need to be
drawn on the map that define these sectors for all ECMs and HASs, as shown in
Figure 18 (see Paragraph 8.2). The map gets cluttered very fast with all these lines. It
is highly recommended to use drawing software (by preference GIS software) to
bring up or hide specially dedicated layers with these lines for assessment purposes.
An example of a distance table is shown in Table 2.
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Figure 18 - Front, rear, and side made visible by drawing lines on the map
DISTANCE TABLE (SHORTEST DISTANCES in meter)
IMD (IQD) EQD
ECM 3 BAR TYPE MEDIUM WALLED MAGAZINES OPEN STORAGE
ID HD PTR INHABITED VULNERABLE
1 2 3 4 5 OFFICE
BUILDING BUILDING
A B C D LOW
BAR UNBAR UNBAR BAR UNBAR UNBAR BAR UNBAR
REAR ALL 609 556 872
1.1/1.3 47 112 170 50 430 401 856
SIDE
A 1.2/1.6 47 112 170 245 199 145 101 50 308 401 856
1.1/1.3 245 199 145 101 329 308 401
FRONT
1.2/1.6 329 338 480
REAR ALL 616 548 873
1.1/1.3 47 52 110 150 109 453 453 910
SIDE
B 1.2/1.6 47 52 110 265 224 182 150 109 336 334 453 910
ECM 3 BAR TYPE
1.1/1.3 265 224 182 155 336 334 453
FRONT
1.2/1.6 430 453
REAR ALL 615 545 879
1.1/1.3 112 52 46 209 174 481 513 970
SIDE
C 1.2/1.6 112 52 46 299 264 233 209 174 354 372 489 970
1.1/1.3 299 264 233 354 372 445
FRONT
1.2/1.6 463 445
REAR ALL 627 553 896
1.1/1.3 170 110 46 263 232 616 579 1032
SIDE
D 1.2/1.6 170 110 46 332 303 280 263 232 373 404 436 1032
1.1/1.3 332 303 280 267 373 404 436
FRONT
1.2/1.6 470 436
BARRICADED 33 89 145 243 74 52 176 939
1
UNBARRICADED 110 285
MEDIUM
For distances between "MEDIUM
WALLED
2 UNBARRICADED 33 40 96 195 129 93 231 906
WALLED MAGAZINES" and "ECM"
BARRICADED 89 40 30 130 185 137 270 852
3 look in the "ECM" rows vs. "MEDIUM
UNBARRICADED 379 369
WALLED MAGAZINES" colums. Similar
4 UNBARRICADED 145 96 30 75 241 193 282 824
for the open Storage Pad "5"
OPEN BARRICADED 243 195 130 75 336 295 341 800
5
STORAGE UNBARRICADED 885 495
Table 2 - Example of a distance table
27 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
3.2.5 PESs and ESs not listed in QD tables
3.2.5.1 PESs not listed in the QD tables
It is possible that a PES structure cannot be classified according to the PES type
description detailed in AASTP-1 (see paragraph 3.2.2.1). Standard Related
Document AASTP-1.3 [8] on Nationally Approved Structures for Explosives Areas
provides additional, useful information on NATO Nations’ nationally approved
structures about AE storage. Its primary objective is to document the nationally
approved structures and identify the protection they provide to their contents from
explosion effects.
3.2.5.2 ESs not listed in the QD tables
ESs not associated with AE operating requirements or the security of AE should be
sited at or beyond the IBD (see AASTP-1 Paragraph 1.3.7.1.). It may not always be
possible in practice, or it is not desired to provide this distance. Some ESs need to be
sited at less than the IBD (e.g., a security building for controlling the access of an AE
installation). In other cases, the nature of the structure requires greater protection
than that afforded by IBD (e.g., an ES such as an associated administrative building
that could be classified as a vulnerable building would require VB QD separation). Or
the ES has structural protection that allows siting at a shorter distance (e.g., an
administrative building provided with a protective roof and barricaded from a PES).
AASTP-1 Part I Chapter 3 Section VII provides examples of specific ESs for which
QD less than IBD might be acceptable. That section aims to provide guidance on the
kind of injuries and damage that can be expected at different levels of protection and
to propose typical personnel or facilities for which these levels of protection might be
considered acceptable.
3.2.6 Barricades
Barricades may serve several purposes. Two important ones are:
• The prevention of prompt propagation (reduction of IMD)
• The protection of people (reduction of other QD, e.g. IBD/DFD).
Dependent on the purpose, specific barricade design criteria apply. Prevention of
prompt propagation is covered in AASTP-1 [2] - § 2.2.3. The criteria for reduction of
IBD/DFD are described in Standard Related Document AASTP-1.2 [9] - § 4.4.3 and §
4.4.5. A summary of the barricade design criteria is given below.
3.2.6.1 Barricades for the prevention of prompt propagation
Barricades are a critical element in protective construction that can influence applicable
IMD criteria and the resulting capacity for PES and ES. Design criteria can be
summarized as follows:
28 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
• The barricade height should extend at least 0.3 m above the line of sight
between the top of the stacks (the PES or ES type are in this respect not
relevant).
• The barricade should be at least 2.4 m wide at the line of sight and at least 1.0
m wide on the crest of the barricade.
• The barricade should extend at least 1 m in the length direction on both sides
of the stacks,
These criteria are illustrated in Figure 19 and Figure 20.
Figure 19 - Barricade height requirements for IMD
Figure 20 - Barricade length requirements for IMD
These requirements also apply when the ES is an explosives workshop.
29 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
PES-ES pairs may only be considered as a “barricaded configuration” when the
barricade meets all geometrical requirements. It is impossible to assess this from a
map's top-down view alone, and hence a site survey is necessary.
In the example shown in Figure 21, it can be observed that for PES Light Walled
Magazine n°01, the exposed magazine n°04 can be considered as barricaded. On the
other hand n°05 is not barricaded because the length requirement isn’t met.
In order to benefit from reduced QD, only one barricade between PES and ES is
required. It does not matter if the barricade is on the PES side or the ES side as long
as the barricade meets the requirements. In the example in Figure 21, the barricade
close to magazine n°04 is interacting between the PES n°01 and the exposed
explosives workshop (colored orange on the map). Provided that the height and width
requirements are met, the relationship between PES n°01 and the explosives
workshop is barricaded.
Figure 21 - Line-of-sight assessment for barricades
3.2.6.2 Barricades for the protection of people
Additional requirements apply when a barricade is intended to also protect ESs
involving people at larger distances (such as on public traffic routes and inhabited
buildings). In this case a barricade needs to have at least the height of the PES walls.
This height needs to be reached within not more than 1.5 times the PES wall height.
In practice this will often imply that these barricades need to have a vertical face. The
criteria for Medium and Heavy Walled Magazines are illustrated in Figure 22.
30 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Figure 22 - Barricade requirements for Medium and Heavy Walled Magazines
Table 3, where for an unbarricaded Medium Walled Magazine, DFD3 or DFD4 has to
be used, whereas for a barricaded configuration the shorter DFD5 may be used.
Further details are given in the AASTP-1.2 SRD about the development of DFD [9].
Table 3 – Excerpt from QD table, illustrating the different DFD criteria for
barricaded and unbarricaded Medium Walled Magazines
In case of Light Walled Magazines there is an additional requirement that the top of
the barricade should be at a minimum height created by a 25 degree angle measured
from the top of the stack closest to the PES wall where the munitions will be stored
(see Figure 23).
31 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Figure 23 - Barricade requirements for Light Walled Magazines
If the stack is stored in the open, only the 25 degree angle requirement from the top of
the stack height applies (see Figure 24).
Figure 24 - Barricade requirements for open storage
3.2.7 Other relevant information
3.2.7.1 Protective construction details
Protective construction elements (e.g., protective roof, barricades) may only be
considered for selecting the related reduced QD criteria when these elements fully
meet requirements.
32 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
3.2.7.2 Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordance (HERO)
Sources of radio frequency (RF) transmissions (i.e., fixed communication sites,
radars, mobile, portable handheld devices, etc.) should be identified. A safety
distance should be maintained between these sources and electrically initiated
ordnance in order to prevent safety (premature firing) and reliability (EID dudding or
altered functional characteristics) effects.
The use of radiofrequency (RF) transmitters (i.e., fixed communication sites, radar,
mobile, portable handheld devices, etc.) within an Ammunition Area should be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and permission to operate such equipment should
be provided by the National Technical Authority and/or ESO. If the use of such
devices is permitted, the National Technical Authority will provide a safety distance
(or a means for calculating a safety distance) in order to protect electrically initiated
AE. STANAG 1380/AECP-2 [10] provides a calculation methodology for determining
safety distances and managing the effects of EMR on munitions and weapon
systems containing electrically initiated devices (EIDs).
3.2.7.3 Risks other than QD-related
Risks that do not violate QD criteria should also be identified. For example, glass
hazards, lack of adequate lightning protection with a warning system and personnel
evacuation, storage of HD 1.4 within an inter-magazine distance (IMD) from PESs,
roads inside the installation.
3.3 DATA WORKSHEETS
Data worksheets are used to assist in collecting much of the facility and operation-
related information needed for the conduct of the ESSP. The data worksheets are
intended to capture essential information. An example of a data worksheet can be
found in the following table.
33 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
FIELD TITLE FIELD DESCRIPTION
Facility Number Assigned Building number
Facility Name Description of the facility specifying the utilization of the facility
Facility Description Description of the facility use and operations conducted
User of the Facility Primary user of this facility
Sited NEQ HD 1.1 1.1 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.2.1 1.2.1 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.2.2 1.2.2 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.2.3 1.2.3 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.3.1 1.3.1 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.3.2 1.3.2 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.4 1.4 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Sited NEQ HD 1.6 1.6 NEQ sited for peacetime.
Remote operation Identify if this operation or some aspect of operations are remotely controlled. Identify
the control room location.
Sequential operation Identify if this operation is part of a sequential operation. Identify the sequential facility
prior and facility following
No of People Number of people that normally occupy the facility. Suffix M or C indicates if people are
military or civilian. For example, 3 M 2 C.
Size Size of facility in whatever dimensions are appropriate. For example, 400 liters for a
fuel tank or 800 m³ for a warehouse.
Facility Notes Can be used for anything not covered by other fields
Number of Bays Number of bays if the facility is subdivided by substantial dividing walls
Side Wall Thickness Side dividing wall thickness in cm if facility is subdivided in bays
Rear Wall Thickness Rear dividing wall thickness in cm if facility is subdivided in bays
Protective Construction Description and basis of design for any protective contruction (e.g., frangible wall,
substantial or non-propagating wall)
Construction Drawing Drawing number(s), if any, used for construction
Reference
Protective Construction Drawing number(s), if any, used for protective construction features
Drawing Reference
ECM Drawing Reference If this facility is an explosives storage magazine, identify construction drawings
ECM Structural Rating Is the ECM a 7 Bar, 3 Bar or Undefined magazine. Provide supporting information
Construction material E.g., brick wall 22cm, reinforced concrete 30cm, insulated pre-fabricated steel panels
Floor Material E.g., brick wall 22cm, reinforced concrete 30cm, insulated pre-fabricated steel panels
Doors Number of doors, construction material, surface in m²
Length exterior Length of facility in cm - exterior
Width exterior Width of facility in cm - exterior
Height exterior Height of facility in cm - exterior
Length interior Length of facility in cm - interior
Width interior Width of facility in cm - interior
Height interior Height of facility in cm - interior
Elevation Elevation above sea level of ground floor of facility in meter.
34 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
FIELD TITLE FIELD DESCRIPTION
Net Floor Area Total square meter.
Stories Number of stories or floors in this facility.
Water Is there a water connection to this facility?
Sewer Is there a sewer connection to this facility?
Electric Is there electricity to this facility?
Gas Is there a gas connection to this facility?
Steam Is there a steam pipe connection to this facility.
Heat Is this facility heated or type of heat code.
Floor Material Construction material for floor.
Foundation Mat Construction material for foundation.
Wall Material Construction material for walls.
Roof Material Construction material for roof.
Presence of LPS Is a Lightning Protection System (LPS) installed on the facility?
Explosives Stack Height Give the highest height from ground level of explosives in each bay
Barricades Presence of barricades
Barricade construction Used construction material for the barricade (e.g., earth, brick, concrete or a
material combination of materials)
Barricade distance from Give the distance of the barricade from each wall that is barricaded - identify the wall
wall direction (e.g., north, west)
Barricade length Barricade length in meter
Barricade heigth Barricade height in meter
Barricade width Barricade width in meter
Barricade slope Barricade slope in degrees
Glass Presence of glass and indication of precise locvation of the glass, glass quality and glass
surface in m²
Facility Coordinate point 1 coordinate of facility corner front right when standing faced to main entrance door
Facility Coordinate point 2 coordinate of facility corner front left when standing faced to main entrance door
Facility Coordinate point 3 coordinate of facility corner back right when standing faced to main entrance door
Facility Coordinate point 4 coordinate of facility corner back left when standing faced to main entrance door
Table 4 Example of a data collection worksheet
35 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
ESSP PHASE 2 – DEVELOPMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the development of an ESSP, each PES is analyzed individually. For each PES, all
other PESs and ESs are to be considered as ESs. The guidelines presented below are
to be repeated for each PES.
4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF UNIQUE PES-ES RELATIONSHIP
An essential first step is identifying the correct relationships between the PES under
consideration, and all ESs found inside the earlier defined evaluation zone. The more
facilities involved (both explosives and non-explosives), the more complicated this
assessment will be.
The obtained PES-ES relationships should be recorded in an assessment document.
A methodology and a form to record this information is provided in Chapter 9.
The distances between the identified PES-ES pairs can be looked up from the
previously created distance table (Table 2).
It is possible to find ESs of the same type within the evaluation zone, as shown in
Figure 25. Identical ESs at a further distance from the PES will not be the limiting
factors for that unique relationship. In our example, as a minimum, School 1 and House
3 will be the ESs that need to be recorded in the ESSP assessment document because
they are the closest relationship of their type. It is not necessary to list all the ESs.
Doing so is good practice, but at the cost of a more complex assessment document.
36 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Figure 25 - ESs of the same type within the evaluation zone
As can be seen in Figure 25, some ESs can fall outside the evaluation zone. This
makes these ESs non-relevant because they will not limit the maximum allowed or
desired NEQ capacity for the considered PES. These ESs do not need to be recorded
for the assessment.
An example assessment of a Light Walled Magazine PES (number 01), is shown in
Figure 26.
37 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Figure 26 - Defining all PES-ES pairs
All unique PES-ES pairs need to be recorded. This methodology provides the required
information to calculate capacities accurately and is recommended when this work has
to be done manually. For each unique PES-ES pair, the closest relationship will
determine the obtained capacity. As can be seen in Figure 27, as an ES, ECM “B”
relates to PES “01” in the same way as ECM “A”. But ECM “A” is the closest
relationship and will be the limiting relationship for this type of PES-ES pair. It is
sufficient to record only ECM “A” for this PES-ES pair. In a real scenario, there can be
many similar PES-ES pairs of a specific type (like ECM “A” and “B”).
38 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
72m PES
ES
DISTANCE BETWEEN
PES AND ES [m]
72m
ECM "A"
Figure 27 - The closest side exposed ECM is the relevant relationship for this
PES-ES pair type
4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIRED NATO QD CRITERIA FOR EACH UNIQUE
PES-ES RELATIONSHIP
Once the PES-ES relationships have been identified, the next step in the ESSP
process is to define the applicable QD criterion for each identified relationship. AASTP-
1 QD Tables provide a dedicated page for each PES-ES pair. An example is shown in
Figure 28.
The methodology for using the QD tables is explained in Chapter 7.
39 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
Figure 28 - Example of QD Table: IB exposed from a PES from the ECM type
The applicable criteria for all relevant explosion effects need to be recorded on the
ESSP assessment document for all identified PES-ES relationships.
Very often, multiple criteria are offered for the same explosion effect. This is shown in
Figure 28, e.g., for the blast effect. It is good practice to document the different possible
options in the ESSP assessment document. An accompanying statement should
explain why a specific criterion was chosen and ultimately applied in the assessment.
In some instances, different criteria may need to be applied in the siting of PESs, e.g.,
in deployed environments where the host nation requires its own (possibly more
stringent) siting criteria. These criteria may differ from AASTP-1 QD criteria. The ESSP
should indicate if and where such situations exist.
AASTP-1 does not provide in-depth technical information for all siting situations (e.g.,
remote-controlled operations). It does provide an allowance for the use of other criteria
when warranted by structural analysis. This allowance can be identified and recorded
in the ESSP as the basis for using other than NATO criteria if warranted.
Figure 29 shows the result of this step for our example.
40 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
PES ID: LIGHT WALLED
NEQ/MCE01
CAPACITY CALCULATION SHEET These calculations are based on AASTP-1 Ed C version 1 criteria (DRAFT version)
DISTANCE APPLICABLE TO HD:
PES PROG 1.2.1
PROTECTION LEVEL
DEBRIS & THERMAL THERMAL
BLAST MCE MCE PROG 1.2.2
FRAG 1.3.1 1.3.2
ES ≤ 50 kg > 50 kg
DISTANCE BETWEEN (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (e) (f)
PES AND ES [m] EXPLOSION EFFECT (a-f) (APPLICABLE CRITERION/EXPLOSION EFFECT)
LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER
1.1
72m 1.3
BD7 BD7 N/A N/A N/A TD1 No QD
ECM "A" 1.2
1.6
1.1
237m 1.3 BD14 BD14 N/A N/A N/A TD1 60m
ECM "C" 1.2
BD14 BD14
1.6
1.1
62m 1.3
BD9 BD9 N/A N/A N/A TD1 TD1≤60
LW "02" 1.2
BD4 BD4
1.6
1.1
195m 1.3
BD30 BD30 N/A N/A N/A TD1 TD1≤60
LW "05" 1.2
BD14 BD14
1.6
1.1
1.3
BD18 DFD20 P1D1 P1D1 P2D3 TD2 60m
307m
1.2
1.6
1.1
1.3
BD26 DFD18 P1D3 P1D3 P2D3 TD3 TD3
MEDIUM
539m
1.2
DENSITY 1.6
1.1
1.3
BD31 DFD6 P1D4 P1D4 P2D4 TD4 TD4
454m
1.2
1.6
1.1
1.3
BD36 DFD6 P1D4 P1D4 P2D4 TD4 TD4
1387m
1.2
1.6
Figure 29 - Recording the applicable criteria
4.4 ASSESSING REQUIRED VERSUS AVAILABLE DISTANCES
Capacities can be calculated based on an existing distance from an existing PES or
based on a required distance for a planned (not yet existing) PES. To calculate the
required minimum QD, the quantity of explosives in the magazine has to be known.
This quantity should be expressed in NEQ, MCE (where applicable), and HD/SsD.
Maps and drawings will demonstrate graphically that QD are in compliance with
appropriate tables in AASTP-1.
4.5 RECORDING ASSESSMENT RESULTS
One PES-ES relationship is typically the most restrictive and governs the maximum
NEQ capacity for a specific HD or SsD. For each PES, the most restrictive relationship
for each level of protection should be identified and documented. For each PES,
explosives limits will be documented for the building as a whole or by bay/room,
whichever is most appropriate.
41 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
When MCE, rather than NEQ, provides the basis for QD assessment, supporting
information should be recorded in the assessment.
The result of this step can be seen in Figure 30. This figure shows the result for ECM
“A” as a PES in our example. This calculation sheet needs to be created for all PESs.
Important to mention is that applicable footnotes also need to be recorded.
42 Edition A Version 1
PES ID: ECM "A" UNDEF >500m³ NEQ/MCE CAPACITY CALCULATION SHEET These calculations are based on AASTP-1 Ed C version 1 criteria (DRAFT version)
PES PROG 1.2.1 NEQ HD 1.2 NEQ HD 1.3 MCE
DEBRIS & THERMAL THERMAL NEQ (1.2.1,
BLAST MCE MCE PROG 1.2.2 1.2.1 1.2.1 NEQ 1.6
FRAG 1.3.1 1.3.2 HD 1.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.2.3, &
ES > 50 kg ≤ 50 kg MCE > 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg 1.6)
(a)/(b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a)*/(b)*
DISTANCE BETWEEN (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (e) (f)
PROTECTION LEVEL
* = calculation based on MCE in stead of NEQ
PES AND ES [m]
DISTANCE APPLICABLE TO HD:
EXPLOSION EFFECT (a-f) (APPLICABLE CRITERION/EXPLOSION EFFECT) CAPACITY [in kg]
74m 258m 1.1 25m (S) 60000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 60000
BD7 (SF) BD7 (SF) N/A N/A N/A No QD (SF)
ECM "B" ECM "D" 1.3 TD1 (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
74m 1.2 BD4 (S) BD4 (S) 10m (S) 500000 500000
1.6 BD7 (F) BD7 (F) TD1 (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
ECM "B"
183m 1.1 BD9 (S) BD9 (S) TD1 (S) 50000 500000 500000 500000 500000 0 500000 500000 250000
1.3 N/A N/A N/A 60m (SF)
ECM "C" BD14 (F) BD14 (F) 240m (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
183m 1.2 BD4 (S) BD4 (S) 50000 500000 500000 500000 500000
1.6
25m (SF)
ECM "C" BD14 (F) BD14 (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
146m 1.1 25m (R) 50000 500000 500000 500000 500000 250000 (S) 500000 250000 (S) 50000
1.3
BD9 (RS) BD9 (RS) N/A N/A N/A 60m (RS)
90m LW "02" TD1 (S) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
LW "04" 146m 1.2 500000 500000 500000
1.6
BD4 (RS) BD4 (RS) 25m (RS) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
LW "02"
72m 1.1 25m (R) 25000 500000 500000 500000 500000 100000 (S) 500000 500000 25000
43
1.3
BD9 (RS) BD9 (RS) N/A N/A N/A 60m (RS)
123m LW "01" TD1 (S) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
LW "05" 72m 1.2 500000 500000 500000
1.6 BD4 (RS) BD4 (RS) 25m (RS) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
LW "01"
1.1 35000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 35000
1.3
BD18 DFD8 P1D1 No QD No QD TD2 60m
(a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
280m
1.2
1.6 (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
1.1 DFD8 (S) No QD (S) 20m (S) 60000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 60000
591m 1.3
BD26 (SF) P1D3 (SF) TD3 (SF) TD3 (SF)
DFD10 (F) P1D3 (F) P2D3 (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
MEDIUM 1.2 BD23 (S) 60000 45000 (S)
591m 700m 1.6 (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
DENSITY BD26 (F)
1.1 DFD1 (S) 60m (S) 30m (S) 12000 250000 (S) 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 12000
518m 1.3
BD31 (SF) P1D4 (SF) TD4 (SF) TD4 (SF)
DFD2 (F) P1D4 (F) P2D4 (F) (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
1.2 BD28 (S) 12000 20000
518m 980m 1.6 (a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
BD31 (F)
1.1 25000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 25000
1303m 1.3
BD36 DFD1 P1D4 60m 30m TD4 TD4
(a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
Figure 30 - Completed capacity calculation sheet
1.2 45000 45000
1303m 1.6
BD34
LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER
(a) (b) (c) (c') (d) (f) (e) (f) (f) (a) (b)
RESULTS TOTAL CAPACITY 12000 250000 500000 500000 500000 0 500000 250000 20000
(in kg)
Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
AASTP-1.1
4.6 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF THE PES, THE RELEVANT ESS, AND
THE SAFETY ZONES
The PES assessment is completed with a graphical presentation. Besides the
calculation sheet, a map of the assessed PES with all ESs as documented on the
calculation sheet is created. The arrows which are drawn from the PES toward each
ES show all calculated PES-ES relationships. This map will demonstrate graphically
that the QD comply with the appropriate tables in AASTP-1 (see AASTP-1 Part I
Paragraph 1.3.4.5. 2.a.). As a minimum, the IBD safety zone should be depicted on
the map because IBD is the distance at which the hazard is considered tolerable, within
which construction is controlled or made subject to special authorization (see also
Paragraph 4.9).
According to this AASTP-1 requirement, the map should contain the following
information:
• The PES in relation to internal facilities and buildings and exterior ESs
(such as surrounding villages, highways, and cities)
• The location of PES in relation to other PESs (interior QD)
• Construction features that affect QDs (such as barricades)
Figure 31 - Graphical presentation of the PES
4.7 CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS LISTING
Identify any limitations or contingencies associated with the facility (e.g., facilities to be
evacuated during remote operations or when the NEQ exceeds a particular value,
44 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1
facilities, or rooms within a building that cannot be used concurrently, AE vulnerable to
spall that cannot be stored, etc.).
4.8 ANALYZE CALCULATION RESULTS
The ESSP study does not stop after performing all QD calculations. As soon as all
calculations have been made, the data is analyzed to view whether the capacities
obtained can be further optimized. For example, when an exposed PES is the limiting
factor (the PES under consideration has no or limited capacity due to too short a
distance to another PES). Potential solutions could include construction of a barricade
or using the exposed PES to store inert material or AE of HD 1.4.
It is good practice to review in detail the most limiting relationship to identify possible
measures to neutralize this limitation or limit the impact.
4.9 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY QD ARCS
AASTP-1 § 1.3.4.5 advises that “protective zones are established around explosives
locations, subject to national regulations, out to the distance at which the hazard is
considered tolerable, and within which construction is controlled or made subject to
special authorization”.
For existing PESs, QD arcs are drawn from the PES (also known as “forward arcs”).
For new PESs, QD arcs are drawn from ESs (also known as “reverse arcs”).
The distances used to draw the arcs from a PES are based on the obtained NEQ
capacity. The NEQ capacity for the various HD/SsD may follow directly from a licence
or storage requirement, but may also have been reduced due to limitations posed by
one or more ESs. It is typically one ES that limits the NEQ of a certain HD/SsD the
most. A common misunderstanding is that the IBD arc is always determined by the
nearest IB. This is not generally true as it may very well be that ESs other than IB are
posing more severe limitations. Which ES is the limiting factor may differ per HD/SsD.
This is illustrated by the two cases in Figure 32:
• The map on the left side of Figure 32 shows the IBD safety zone for Light Walled
Magazine N° 2 in our example. In this case the IBD arc is limited by the nearest
IB. This is the IB west of the PES, which can be seen touching the IBD arc.
• The map on the right side of Figure 32 shows the IBD safety zone for Light
Walled Magazine N° 5. In this case, the nearest IB has not been the limiting
factor. Instead an adjacent PES has caused a more severe restriction.
Consequently, the IBD safety zone has been determined by that restriction, and
not by the closest IB.
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Figure 32 - Examples of IBD safety zones
Drawing IBD safety zones based on the distance of the nearest IB ES when that is
not the limiting relationship results in claiming more land than necessary and it limits
the possibility of future construction of new IBD requiring elements in or around the
installation.
On the other hand, it could also result in a safety zone that is not fully covering the
needed area because of directional effects. When the PES under consideration has
associated directional effects, as for an ECM, the explosives safety arcs are more
complex. This is shown in the example for ECM “D” in Figure 33, where because of a
directional effect, the front area of the ECM requires larger distances than the side
sector.
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Figure 33 - Example of a footprint of an IBD safety zone for ECM “D”
HD 1.2 HD 1.3
CALCULATED
CAPACITIES
PES HD 1.1 SsD 1.2.1 HD 1.6
SsD 1.2.2 SsD 1.2.3 SsD 1.3.1 SsD 1.3.2
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE > 50kg
500 000 250 000 500 000 250 000
ECM A 12 000 500 000 0 500 000
MCE: ≤50 MCE: 12 000 MCE: 12 000 MCE: 12 000
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
BD25 (MCE) = 13m BD25 (MCE) = 321m BD25 (MCE) = 321m BD25 (MCE) = 321m
DISTANCES FOR IBD
REAR BD25 = 321m 30m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m
DFD1 (MCE) = 94m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m
DFD1 = 295m
SAFETYZONE
60m (NEQ) P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
BD28 (MCE) = 17m BD28 (MCE) = 413m BD28 (MCE) = 321m BD28 (MCE) = 321m
ECM A SIDE BD28 = 413m 30m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m
DFD1 (MCE) = 94m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m
DFD1 = 295m
60m (NEQ) P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
FRONT DFD2 (MCE) = 196m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m P2D4 = 269m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m
DFD2 = 432m
P1D4 (NEQ) = 532m P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
Table 5 gives another example for which capacity values from ECM PES “A” in our
example are converted into IBD, applying the relevant IBD criteria to draw the arcs that
will define the IBD safety zone. The required distance is determined for each direction
of the ECM PES (rear, side, and front) and for all HD/SsD capacities. The largest
distance is selected to draw the IBD arc of that area. It can be noted in this example
that for rear and side a distance of 508m is required. For front, the distance required is
532m. But because this requirement is based on HD 1.2 criteria, this distance will be
drawn only in the area defined by the 100° angles (see Figure 31 for a graphical view
of the resulting IBD safety zone).
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HD 1.2 HD 1.3
CALCULATED
CAPACITIES
PES HD 1.1 SsD 1.2.1 HD 1.6
SsD 1.2.2 SsD 1.2.3 SsD 1.3.1 SsD 1.3.2
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE > 50kg
500 000 250 000 500 000 250 000
ECM A 12 000 500 000 0 500 000
MCE: ≤50 MCE: 12 000 MCE: 12 000 MCE: 12 000
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
BD25 (MCE) = 13m BD25 (MCE) = 321m BD25 (MCE) = 321m BD25 (MCE) = 321m
DISTANCES FOR IBD
REAR BD25 = 321m 30m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m
DFD1 (MCE) = 94m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m
DFD1 = 295m
SAFETYZONE
60m (NEQ) P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
BD28 (MCE) = 17m BD28 (MCE) = 413m BD28 (MCE) = 321m BD28 (MCE) = 321m
ECM A SIDE BD28 = 413m 30m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m
DFD1 (MCE) = 94m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m DFD1 (MCE) = 295m
DFD1 = 295m
60m (NEQ) P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
BD31 (MCE) = 21m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m BD31 (MCE) = 509m
BD31 = 509m
FRONT DFD2 (MCE) = 196m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m P2D4 = 269m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m TD4 = 0m TD4 = 508m DFD2 (MCE) = 432m
DFD2 = 432m
P1D4 (NEQ) = 532m P1D4 (NEQ) = 506m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m TD4 (NEQ) = 508m
Table 5 - Converting capacities into required IBD for an ECM
Envelloping all PES arcs creates the earlier mentioned safety zones for the installation.
In Figure 34, the map on the left shows all individual IBD arcs for each PES in our
example. The map on the right shows the envelop of all the IBD arcs to create the IBD
explosives safety zone for the complete installation. No ES requiring IBD consideration
should be located within this zone.. As soon as a new building that requires IBD
separation is planned in this zone, it will affect the current capacity of one or more
PESs in the installation.
Figure 34 - Merging the safety arcs
As a minimum, the IBD safety zones should be drawn, but it is highly recommended to
draw all safety zones (i.e., EWD, PTR, VBD), like in Figure 35.
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Figure 35 - Explosives safety zones for ECM "A" in our example
Unlike the UN IATG (and some national guidelines), NATO AASTP-1 doesn’t impose
a color convention in conjunction with the different types of safety zones.
4.10 ESSP DOCUMENTATION
The final ESSP package will consist of all the information necessary to assess
compliance with NATO AASTP-1 explosives safety standards. Hardcopy and/or
electronic file versions should be provided.
It will consist of (non-inclusive list):
• A general location map showing the installation (with an indication of
the installation boundaries) with the surrounding area
• A general layout map of the installation (showing all buildings/functions
including utilities)
• Description of the facility and its mission (briefly discuss the explosives
operation and/or process for the facility/facilities)
• A map of the installation with the combined explosives safety zones
(merged per type)
• A map for each PES showing the relevant ESs with the safety zones,
based on the calculated NEQ capacities for each PES and each HD
and SsD
• A form for each PES with recorded QD assessment data for all relevant
PES-ESs pairs (required criterion, resulting NEQ/MCE capacity,
calculated explosives limits, etc.)
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• Personnel limits (when applicable)
• Relevant technical documentation like operation description drawing,
Electro-Magnetic Radiation (EMR) analysis, general construction
drawings, protective feature drawings, special equipment, glass, etc.
• Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) Evaluation
and Controls: the ESSP should indicate that HERO hazards have been
evaluated and addressed to AE at the PES and from any equipment ES
that emits electromagnetic radiation
• Additional information about ESs that could affect explosives limits such
as traffic route densities, type of powerlines, and POL.
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ESSP PHASE 3 - REVIEW AND APPROVAL
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The review and approval process assures that the proposed AE operation and facilities
meet the AASTP-1 explosives safety criteria. The review and approval process is
organized at a national level and is carried out by appropriate military and national
authorities.
5.2 REVIEW PROCESS
ESSPs affect the safety of facility staff, the local community, and expensive stocks of
AE. ESSPs underpin the facility infrastructure plan. Before approval, the relevant
authorities should review the submitted ESSP.
Installation safety managers should periodically (e.g., annually) review the installation’s
map with explosives safety zones to monitor encroachment within the safety arcs
shown in the ESSP and any other deviation of the applicable safety criteria. The review
should be documented, and each installation shall maintain a map showing the
locations of all PESs.
5.3 APPROVAL PROCESS
To ensure that minimum explosives safety criteria are met, ESSPs from tenants and
installation safety personnel are prepared and forwarded through the appropriate
safety approval chain of command.
For new construction, approval of the final ESSP should be obtained before
construction begins. It is recommended to submit a preliminary ESSP through the
command channels while the project is in the initial planning stages to obtain siting
approval before it is released for design.
5.4 CONTENT OF THE SUBMISSION
The contents required in each submission vary per nation. Details are provided in the
national explosives safety standards. In Paragraph 4.8, elements are listed that are
typically part of the ESSP.
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ESSP PHASE 4 - OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
6.1 NATIONAL OWNERSHIP – REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
In each nation, a specific authority has oversight of all safety aspects of AE. This
authority may also manage the national ammunition safety management program, of
which the ESSP is part, to ensure compliance with applicable standards and national
processes. Possibly this authority also has the approval responsibility. National
ownership implies that a nation takes full responsibility for developing, implementing,
and overseeing the ESSP process.
6.2 OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT AT ALL LEVELS
At all levels (e.g., ammunition safety officers, installation managers, etc.), oversight
should be provided during the storage, handling, transportation, and use of AE to
ensure compliance with the approved ESSP.
Personnel involved in the oversight and technical management of ESSPs should have
a detailed technical understanding of the applicable explosives safety standards, and
the knowledge and experience to identify hazards and manage risks.
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USING THE QD TABLES
7.1 OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TABLES
There are three kinds of tables in AASTP-1 Part I:
• Tables with PES-ES QD criteria (Tables 1 – 4)
• Tables with QD formulas (Tables 5 – 9)
• QD Look-up tables (Tables 10 – 12)
Firstly, there are four tables with PES-ES QD criteria:
• Table 1: Earth Covered Magazines
• Table 2: Heavy Walled Magazines
• Table 3: Medium Walled Magazines
• Table 4: Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
Figure 36 - The four PES-ES Matrix Tables
Furthermore, there are five (5) QD formula tables:
• Table 5 – Formulas for Blast
• Table 6 – Formulas for Debris and Fragments
• Table 7 – Formulas for Progressive Event for SsD 1.2.1
• Table 8 – Formulas for Progressive Event for SsD 1.2.2
• Table 9 – Formula for Thermal Event
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Figure 37 - Overview of the five calculation tables
And finally, there are three (3) QD look-up tables:
• Table 10 – BD (Blast Distance)
• Table 11 – DFD (Debris and Fragment throw distance)
• Table 12 – PROGRESSIVE and THERMAL event distances
These QD look-up tables are based on formulas for determining a distance (in meters)
for a given NEQ (in kg) and all the formulas for the reverse calculation to determine
the NEQ for a given distance.
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The distances that can be looked up in these tables are the results from the formula:
• rounded up to the next meter for distances
• rounded down to the smaller quantity in kg for NEQ
Figure 38 – Excerpts from the different look-up tables
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7.2 METHODOLOGY TO USE THE QD TABLES
7.2.1 Step 1 – Select the correct PES-ES interaction
Based on the PES-ES pair, the correct interaction in the PES-ES QD criteria table has
to be selected (see § 4.2)
In the example below, the PES-ES pair has been identified as an ECM Rear PES
versus an IB ES (Figure 39). This defines the applicable QD criteria for determining
the capacity for all HDs and SsDs.
Figure 39 - Example of an identified PES-ES pair and the applicable PES-ES QD
criteria
7.2.2 Step 2 – Use the HD/SsD table to determine the applicable calculations
7.2.2.1 Determine the relevant explosion effects
For each HD and SsD, the relevant explosion effects should be determined. The table
contains QD criteria for different explosion effects (blast, debris and fragments,
progressive event reactions, and thermal effects). Also, the table indicates which
explosion effects are relevant for the various HD and SsD and the relevant quantity of
explosives (NEQ or MCE) which should be used to perform the QD calculation.
In Figure 40, the relevant explosion effects and the QD formulas are determined for
SsD 1.2.1 as an example. This results in:
• Blast – calculation based on MCE
• Debris and Fragmentation throw – calculation based on MCE
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• Progressive event SsD 1.2.1 – calculation based on NEQ
Figure 40 - Identify the relevant explosion effects for all HDs and SsDs
7.2.2.2 Look up the applicable formula
Calculations should be performed for each explosion effect, and the greatest distance
or smallest quantity should be used as the limiting factor for each PES/ES interaction.
In our example (see Figure 41), the look-up results are:
• Blast: BD31 or BD25 (the latter criterion is only applicable if the PES is
a NATO standard type ECM with an internal volume exceeding 500m³
and when the NEQ is less than 45000 kg)
• Debris and Fragmentation throw: DFD1
• Progressive event SsD 1.2.1: 60m (for MCE <50kg) or P1D4 (for MCE
50kg<MCE≤500kg)
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Figure 41 – Look up the applicable formulas for all relevant explosion effects
7.2.3 Step 3 – Use the HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
Each effect should be calculated, and the greatest distance or smallest quantity should
be used as the limiting factor for each PES/ES interaction.
The allowable NEQ for each HD/SsD for each PES-ES relationship will be determined
based on the actual separation distance. Also, MCE for SsD 1.2.1, 1.2.3, and HD 1.6
will be determined. The nearest (governing) relationship for each level of protection
type will be used unless additional factors need to be considered (e.g., barricades,
protective construction, MCE). Suppose the given information (distance or quantity) is
beyond the maximum tabulated values (distance or quantity), required distance in the
table, or the maximum allowable NEQ. In that case, the maximum values given in the
tables will be used.
7.2.3.1 Result for Blast in the example
In the example (see Figure 42), the required QD is calculated for blast. For munitions
with MCE = 50 kg and based on the selected criterion of BD31, the required
minimum distance is 21 m.
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Figure 42 - Looking up the results for blast
7.2.3.2 Result for Debris and Fragments in the example
In the example (see Figure 43), the required QD is calculated for Debris and
Fragments. Based on the criterion of DFD1, the required QD for munitions with MCE
= 50 kg is 94 m.
Figure 43 - Looking up the results for debris and fragment throw
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7.2.3.3 Result for Progressive Event for SsD 1.2.1 in the example
In the example (see Figure 44), the required QD is calculated for the Progressive
Event of SsD 1.2.1. For munitions with MCE = 50 kg, the criterion requires a fixed
minimum distance of 60 m. No look-up table is required here.
Figure 44 - Looking up the results for the progressive event of SsD 1.2.1
7.2.3.4 Step 4 – Use the associated formula for minimum distance or
maximum quantity
Once all relevant explosion effects are calculated, the largest obtained distance will
be the minimum appropriate QD.
When starting from an existing distance to determine the NEQ and MCE, the smallest
obtained value is selected (for NEQ and MCE individually) that will be used to define
the NEQ and MCE capacity.
7.2.3.4.1 Result of Step 4 in the example
After all relevant explosion effects have been calculated, the larger QD is selected as
the QD that should be observed between the PES and ES.
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Figure 45 - Result of the assessment in the example
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HOW TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY ECM (AS A PES)
RELATIONSHIPS TO ES
8.1 INTRODUCTION
ECMs are structures covered by earth on three sides, while the front consists of a
headwall and door. As a result, for the ECM as a PES, directional effects are relevant.
For the ECM as a ES, different criteria are provided depending on how the ECM is
oriented. Therefore, it is of prime importance that the relationship with the ECM is
correctly identified to apply the correct criteria.
8.2 DIFFERENT SIDES OF AN ECM
For ECMs, three different orientations are identified: Front, Rear, and Side. Lines are
drawn starting from the corners of the concrete box of the ECM to separate these three
orientations. These lines are drawn at predefined angles (see Figure 46) and create
the areas that need to be screened when assessing ESs related to that orientation of
the ECM. The lines need to be drawn out to a distance that is at least equal to the
evaluation zone distance. All observed ESs found in the area between the two lines
are related to that orientation of the ECM.
For HD 1.1 and 1.3 when the ECM is For HD 1.2 and HD 1.6 (only when the
acting as a PES. For all HD when the ECM is acting as a PES)
ECM is acting as an ES
Figure 46 - Lines to draw to define Front, Rear, and Side of an ECM
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8.2.1 ECM Front
The front of an ECM is the weakest part of an ECM. The front of an ECM is defined
differently when the ECM acts as a PES compared to when it acts as an ES, hence
the two diagrams in Figure 46.
When the ECM acts as a PES, the front is defined by different angles when assessing
HDs 1.1 and 1.3 capacities on the one hand and HDs 1.2 and 1.6 capacities on the
other hand.
For the ECM as a PES for HDs 1.1 and 1.3, lines are drawn at a 150° angle from both
corners of the front wall to indicate the “front” of the ECM. Figure 47 shows ECM “A”
in our example where one can see the two lines drawn at a 150° angle from the front
wall.
Figure 47 – Front of ECM “A” for HD 1.1 and HD 1.3
In the front area of PES “A”, we see two exposed ECMs (ECM “C” and “D”). In other
words, for HD 1.1 and HD 1.3, PES ECM “A” is front related to these two exposed
ECMs. This assessment determines the applicable PES pictogram (see Figure 48).
Figure 48 - The applicable PES-pictogram resulting from the assessment
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To determine how the exposed ECMs relate to PES “A”, we should use the lines of the
ES to assess the interaction (see Figure 49). Only one set of angles (150°) is used for
an ECM acting as an ES, which is applicable for all HDs and SsDs. It can be observed
that PES “A” can be seen in the front area of exposed ECM “C”. In other words,
exposed ECM “C” is front related to PES ECM “A”.
Figure 49 - Lines are drawn from the corners of exposed ECM “C” to determine
the relationship with PES ECM “A”
With this assessment, the interaction between PES “A” and ES “C” has been
determined to be a “front-to-front” relationship (see Figure 50).
ES ECM “C” FRONT PES ECM “A” FRONT
Figure 50 - Interaction between PES "A" and ES "C"
For ES ECM “D”, the situation is different as can be seen in Figure 51. For ES ECM
“D”, the PES falls into the side area and not in the front.
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Figure 51 - Lines are drawn from the corners of exposed ECM “D” to determine
the relationship with PES ECM “A”
The resulting relationship is shown in Figure 52.
ES ECM “D” SIDE PES ECM “A” FRONT
Figure 52 - Interaction between PES "A" and ES "D"
ECM “A” front should now be assessed for HD 1.2 and 1.6 because the angles deviate
for these HDs when the ECM acts as a PES. Instead of 150°, only 100 ° applies. Figure
53 shows that no exposed ECMs can be observed in the small front area created by
the line drawn at 100° angles.
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Figure 53 - Lines at a 100° angle to assess the relationships for HD 1.2 and 1.6
8.2.2 ECM rear
The analysis is relatively straightforward for the rear because only one set of angles
applies to an ECM's rear (135°). In our example (Figure 54), there is no exposed ECM
in the rear sector. If this had been the case, again, the lines of the exposed ECMs
would have determined how they interact with the PES.
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Figure 54 - Assessment of the REAR area of PES ECM "A"
8.2.3 ECM side
The two sets of angles that define front of an ECM acting as a PES impact how the
side sector of an ECM is defined. In Figure 55 the left map shows how the side is
defined when assessing HDs 1.1 and 1.6, and the right map when looking at HDs 1.2
and 1.6.
Figure 55 - The side sector of an ECM
Based on the final assessment of the exposed ECMs “C” and “D”, the recorded
interactions from PES ECM “A” are as shown in Figure 56.
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Figure 56 - IMD relationships between PES "A" and exposed ECMs
8.2.4 Lines cutting an ES
When lines cut an ES, then the ES concerned should be analyzed for both possible
ES types. The most limiting relationship will then determine the result.
In our example (see Figure 57), we see that exposed magazine 5 is cut by the lines
that define the rear sector of the PES. In other words, magazine 5 will be both “rear”
and “side” exposed from PES ECM “A”. This will be documented as such on the
calculation sheet of the observed PES when it is a relevant relationship (in our current
example, the “side” exposed magazine 5 is not relevant because a closer identical
relationship exists (magazine 1) – see Figure 58).
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Figure 57 - Lines cut through an ES
PES ID: ECM "A" UNDEF >500m³
DISTANCE APPLICABLE TO HD:
PES
ES
DISTANCE BETWEEN
PES AND ES [m]
72m 1.1
123m LW "01" 1.3
LW "05" 72m 1.2
LW "01" 1.6
Figure 58 - IMD relationships between PES "A" and exposed UNBARRICADED
LIGHT WALLES MAGAZINES
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RECORDING QD ASSESSMENT DATA
9.1 INTRODUCTION
AASTP-1 § 1.3.2.5. f. recommends calculating the QDs for each HD/SsD and recording
the QDs in terms of each HD/SsD.
AASTP-1 does not provide a template form to record the information. This SRD offers
a template that can be used to record QD assessments as described in CHAPTER 4
- when the QD assessment is done manually. The form is not mandatory, and each
nation can develop its own form for recording QD assessment results.
A template of this form can be found under Annex A, including guidance for
downloading a high resolution digital copy.
9.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FORM
The form has three main sections (see Figure 59):
• Section 1:
▪ identification of the PES (number and type of the PES structure)
▪ matrix to record all identified PES-ES relationships with their
pictograms and separation distances to be used for the capacity
calculation
▪ two rows per PES-ES pair allow differentiating depending on
how PES interacts with ES and vice-versa (directional effects:
front, rear, and front relationships)
• Section 2:
▪ table to record the applicable criteria for all identified PES-ES
pairs from section 1 and all explosion effects
▪ two rows per PES-ES pair allow recording multiple criteria when
offered in the QD Tables
• Section 3:
▪ table to record the calculated capacities based on the
information from section 1 and 2 for NEQ and MCE (calculated
values from the equations or values from the look-up tables in
AASTP-1 Annex 1)
▪ two rows per PES-ES pair allow recording different capacity
results when multiple applicable criteria are offered in the QD
Tables
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SECTION 1 SECTION 2
SECTION 3
Figure 59 The three sections of the QD Capacity Calculation Form (overview
not intended to be legible)
9.3 SOURCE OF THE DATA TO RECORD ON THE FORM
All data to record on the form comes from the AASTP-1 QD Tables or concerns data
needed to retrieve information from the QD Tables.
Figure 60 shows the interaction between the AASTP-1 QD Tables and the Calculation
Form.
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Figure 60 Source of the data to record on the form
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RISK-BASED APPROACH
The initial goal is to meet QD criteria, thereby preventing prompt propagation (inter
magazine distance (IMD)) and operating within widely accepted levels of risk (inhabited
building distance (IBD)). However, it may not be possible to meet all QD requirements
due to a lack of space or mission requirements. When QD cannot be met, a risk
assessment should be conducted. In a risk analysis, the consequences of accidental
explosions are determined in greater detail, and the probability of event is additionally
taken into account. Various national risk analysis models and tools are described in
AASTP-4 [5].
Both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis approaches exist. In a quantitative risk
analysis (QRA), the individual and group risks are determined and compared with
national acceptance or tolerability criteria. Some qualitative risk analysis methods are
described, as part of the Explosives Safety Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM)
process in ALP-16 [11] and AASTP-5 [3]. In this case, the probability and
consequences are expressed in qualitative terms such as low, medium, and high. After
a risk analysis, risk is compared with criteria, and risk acceptance takes place by the
appropriate authority (national or NATO). Finally, attention has to be given to risk
communication and risk tracking.
Many NATO nations have adopted the process mentioned above to - first determine
QD, and if these cannot be met, to conduct a risk assessment. However, some nations
only apply QD or, as France, use a hybrid approach with QD based on risk criteria
instead of consequence criteria. Conversely, e.g., Switzerland does not apply QD but
only assesses risk.
It is important to realize that although there are many commonalities between NATO
nations’ explosives safety criteria, national policies may differ in the way QD and risk
analysis is conducted and assessed.
Also, there are differences between risk acceptance criteria and how existing and new
facilities are treated. Finally, there are differences in the types of ESSP. In the US,
there is a distinction between regular ESSP, risk-based ESSP, and ESSP that do not
require QD for limited quantities of SsD 1.2.2, HD 1.3, or HD 1.4 because of operational
necessity [6]. In the UK, the risk-based approach is not part of the ESSP itself [7].
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ESSP TOOLS
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Automation of some ESSP related tasks is recommended because it helps in reducing
errors, provides consistency in application, and increases reliability.
Automated site planning tools provide the following benefits:
• Much more rapid site planning capability
• Much more thorough evaluation capability of site planning options
• Improved quality of ESSPs will decrease the review and approval
process time
• Tools will allow a more accurate risk assessment, mitigation, and
acceptance as necessary via a waiver or exemption.
11.2 TOOLS FOR QD
The NEQ Capacity Calculation Sheet has been developed by ESSINT and can be
downloaded through the following link after approval.
Add link in published version
11.3 TOOLS FOR CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK
11.3.1 Introduction
Various national applications exist for consequence and risk analysis. These are
described in AASTP-4 [5]. In this manual, we will describe an internationally available
tool, the MSIAC Quantity Distance Tool (MQDCAT). MQDCAT v2.4 is available to all
MSIAC member nations and can be accessed through the MSIAC secure website:
https://portal.msiac.nato.int/cas/login/?next=/
11.3.2 MQDCAT Overview
The objective of the MQDCAT is to perform an experimentally validated consequence
analysis of the initiation of various types and quantities of munitions in various types of
magazines (PES) and with possible mitigation measures in place. MQDCAT is
consistent with the QD in AASTP-1 (Edition C Version 1) for all Hazard Divisions (HD)
and over the full range of Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ). MQDCAT gives insight into
the consequences that are to be expected when QD cannot be met and provides input
for both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis.
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MQDCAT V2.4 was issued in September 2020 together with a detailed specification
report [12]. The main addition to Version 2.4 was the possibility to determine the
consequences (number of fatalities and injuries) for three types of ESs (ES): people
in the open, in inhabited buildings, and in hardened structures. For this purpose,
various injury and lethality models were developed. These are consistent with QD in
the sense that they give appropriate consequences, e.g., at the debris and fragment
Inhabited Building Distances (IBD), the probability of fatality or injury is about 1%.
Figure 61 through Figure 63 give an impression of MQDCAT.
Figure 61 MQDCAT V2.4 input screen (Specification of PES)
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Figure 62 MQDCAT V2.4 output screen (distance versus NEQ for various
phenomena)
Figure 63 MQDCAT V2.4 input/output screen (specification of ES and
number of fatalities and injuries)
76 Edition A Version 1
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11.3.3 MQDCAT Description
MQDCAT has three input tabs in which the user can specify the characteristics of a
PES, the stored ammunition, and the ES. All input data has to be provided in SI units.
PES input
The PES can be specified by providing essential and optional input (Figure 61, left).
Essential input is:
• Type of PES. This is a drop-down menu with a list of PES types.
• PES direction towards ES. For ECM, a distinction is made between front, side,
and rear. Significant differences exist between blast and debris effects between
these directions. For Aboveground Brick and Reinforced Concrete structures, a
distinction is made between main (wall-normal) and diagonal (more than 25°
from main) directions. Significantly more debris is thrown in the main direction
compared to the diagonal direction.
• Presence of a barricade between PES and the ES. A choice can be made
between No Barricade, AASTP-1 barricade (meeting requirements that provide
protection against most low-angle debris and fragments based on AASTP-1),
and Screening Barricade (Barricade protecting against all low angle debris and
fragments). If a barricade protects not all ES, the analysis needs to be split up.
There is also optional input. Default values are used when this is not altered. Changing
the default values will only affect some of the output.
• Internal dimensions (width, length, and height) of the PES
• Wall thickness of the PES
• Earth cover thickness
Based on the PES input, a relevant pictogram is displayed.
Ammunition input
Ammunition can be specified by providing the following input (Figure 61, right):
• The first two input parameters, NEQ of a single round and Maximum NEQ for
calculations, define the range of NEQ for which various consequence
calculations will be performed. If the NEQ of a single round is unknown, it is
recommended to use the default of 1 kg. However, for ammunition of SsD 1.2.1,
1.2.3, and HD1.6, it is important to enter an appropriate value when a Maximum
Credible Event (MCE) is calculated based on a number of rounds.
• NEQ of interest. This is the NEQ for which the consequences at specific ES will
be calculated.
• Hazard Division (HD). This is a drop-down menu with HD, including the Storage
subdivisions (SsD).
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• The number of rounds in a package. This is only relevant in some cases for the
determination of an MCE.
• Determination of Maximum Credible Detonation Event (MCDE). This is a drop-
down menu with various options. Based on the choice for HD, the options are
limited.
• Cased ammunition? Select Yes or No.
ES input and output
Various ES can be specified by providing the following input (Figure 63):
• The Type of ES. This is a drop-down menu with a list of ES types.
o A person in the open is exposed to direct blast injury and fragment/debris
impact
o A person in an inhabited brick building is exposed to direct blast injury,
structural damage or collapse, window failure and partly to
fragment/debris impact
o A person in a hardened structure is protected from debris and fragments
and any structural damage. Direct blast injury due to blast ingress is still
possible
• Distance. This is the distance between PES and ES outer edges
• A number of people in the ES.
The ES table also shows the calculation results for the number of fatalities and injuries
related to each ES. The total number of people, fatalities, and injuries are determined
by summation. The ES results can be used to calculate individual risk (IR) and group
risk (GR) values. In MQDCAT v2.4, risk calculations have not been automated, but
there are plans to implement this in the future.
The Individual (fatality) risk can be obtained by defining an ES with one person and
multiplying the resulting number of fatalities by the annual probability of event (e.g.,
1E-5/year).
The group risk is the average number of fatalities per year. It can be calculated by
multiplying the total number of fatalities (based on ES population) with the probability
of event.
If relevant, the above risk calculations can be extended by multiplying with an exposure
fraction (fraction of time present).
Other output
Besides the ES-related output, there is also a graph (Figure 62) that shows distances
to various consequence levels. Blast damage levels A through D are further detailed
in Table 6 below and on the help page of MQDCAT. last output screen shows
predictions of PES loading density and Debris Launch Velocity (DLV).
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Table 6: Damage level specification
Damage level RB ratio Description
A 0.675 almost complete demolition
B 1.00 50-75% external brickwork destroyed or rendered
unsafe and requiring demolition
Cb 1.74 houses uninhabitable – partial or total collapse of roof,
partial demolition of one to two external walls, severe
damage to load-bearing partitions requiring
replacement
Ca 3.0 not exceeding minor structural damage, and partitions
and joining wrenched from fittings
D 6.0 remaining inhabitable after repair – some damage to
ceilings and tiling, more than 10% window panes
broken
79 Edition A Version 1
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REFERENCES
[1] “AASTP-1, NATO Guidelines for the Storage of Military Ammunition and
Explosives, Edition B Version 1,” NATO, Brussels, December 2015.
[2] “AASTP-1, NATO Guidelines for the Storage of Military Ammunition and
Explosives, Edition C Version 1,” NATO, Brussels, 2021 (to be published).
[3] “AASTP-5 NATO Guidelines for the Storage, Maintenance and Transport fo
Ammunition on Deployed Missions and Operations, Edition 1 Version 3,” NATO,
Brussels, June 2016.
[4] M. van der Voort, E. J. Deschambault and J. de Roos, “L-229, Experimental and
Theoretical Basis of NATO Standards for Safe Storage of Ammunition and
Explosives - Final Report,” MSIAC, Brussels, 2019.
[5] “AASTP-4, Explosives Safety Risk Analysis Part I: Guidelines for Risk Based
Decisions, Edition 1 Version 4,” NATO, September 2016.
[6] “DESR, Defence Explosives Safety Regulations,” DDESB, 2019.
[7] “DSA 03.OME Part 2 (JSP 482) - Defence Code of Practice (DCOP) and
Guidance Notes for In-Service and Operational Safety Management of OME,”
DOSR, 2000.
[8] “AASTP-1.3 SRD, Nationally Approved Structures for Explosives Areas,” NATO,
Brussels, 2021 (to be published).
[9] “AASTP-1.2 SRD, Development of NATO Debris and Fragment Distances
curves for AASTP-1,” NATO, Brussels, 2021 (to be published).
[10] “STANAG 1380/AECP-02 "NATO Naval Radio and Radar Radiation Hazards”.
[11] “ALP-16 Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) in NATO
Planning, Training, and OperationsSMRM, Edition A, Version 1,” NATO,
Brussels, April 2015.
[12] M. Van der Voort, L-252, Specification of the MSIAC Quantity Distance
Consequence Analysis Tool, Brussels: MSIAC, September 2020.
80 Edition A Version 1
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QD ASSESSMENT CALCULATION FORM
Figure 64 - ANNEX A QD ASSESSMENT CALCULATION FORM (also
available as a separate PDF file)
A-1 Edition A Version 1
AASTP-1.1(A)(1)
NATO STANDARD
AASTP-1
NATO GUIDELINES
FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
Edition D, Version 1
NOVEMBER 2025
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE AND TRANSPORT PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
4 November 2025
1. The enclosed Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication AASTP-1,
Edition D, Version 1, NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES, which has been approved by the nations in the
CNAD AMMUNITION SAFETY GROUP (CASG - AC/326), is promulgated herewith.
The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 4440.
2. AASTP-1, Edition D, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and
supersedes AASTP-1 Edition C, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance
with the local procedure for the destruction of documents.
3. This NATO standardization document is issued by NATO. In case of
reproduction, NATO is to be acknowledged. NATO does not charge any fee for its
standardization documents at any stage, which are not intended to be sold. They can
be retrieved from the NATO Standardization Documents Database
((https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities.
4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.
ation Office
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
AASTP-1
RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
i EDITION D VERSION 1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ii EDITION D VERSION 1
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
iii EDITION D VERSION 1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
iv EDITION D VERSION 1
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
[nation] [detail of reservation]
BGR 1. The requirements of the standard will be applied by the formations
participating in NATO operations outside the territory of the Republic
of Bulgaria.
2. On the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria the standard will be
applied for infrastructure in the process of construction as well as
ammunition and explosives storage sites.
DEU DEU reserves the right regarding “Grandfathering” for existing and
planned (advanced state) infrastructure, if unavoidable.
DNK 1) Denmark does not apply Sensitivity groups to ammunition.
2) Danish Type 2 magazines are registered as ECM despite their
only 45 cm earth cover.
3) Separation distances are not applied in naval and military ports.
FIN Finland will support the ratification and implementation of the
standard. Due to the critical differences with the national regulations
and legislation further studies are needed to plan the full
implementation of the standard. Currently, it has been identified that
full implementation of standard requires additional personnel,
infrastructural changes and possible changes to the national
legislation as well as training for the key personnel. Because of this,
the exact timetable for the full implementation of the standard
remains open.
GBR Further scoping is required in the UK from the current UK MOD
scheme to encompass AASTP-1 into regulation and training
regimes.
GRC Hellenic Navy: (1) Greece reserves the right to approve storage of
ammunition on the basis of the national assessment method
regarding distances among Ammunition Storage Buildings related to
the amount of ammunition stored in each Ammunition Storage
Building.
(2) Implementation will take place when new constructions of
ammunition storage facilities will commence.
NOR Norway reserves the right to do site approval based on AASTP-4
(Risk Assessment). The tables for internal distances will be still used.
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SVK The implementation will be effective for all PESs that meet the
requirements according to this standard. The implementation for the
other objects will be effective after the first reconstruction in order to
accomplish the terms following this standard.
For the full and effective implementation of this document, it is
necessary to establish the position of ESO into the Armed Forces of
the Slovak Republic and therefore to provide the proper training from
the NATO level to obtain the qualifications for the given position.
In addition, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic reserves the
right not to implement those parts of the standard dealing with the
naval and military ports (Part IV / Chapter 6).
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
vi EDITION D VERSION 1
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TABLES OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PREFACE.................................................................................................................. xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ......................................................... xx
Note
The four tables which follow provide a quick overview of the manual. Each Part
Heading is linked to a Table of Contents in the applicable Part. These individual
tables are fully linked to the Part content.
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PREFACE
1.1 GENERAL
1.1.1. Purpose and Scope of the Manual
1. The primary purpose of this manual is to establish conventional military
ammunition and explosives1 safety principles and guidelines for NATO Nations.
These standards, agreed to by NATO’s explosives safety technical experts, have
been developed for two main reasons. Firstly, to be used as a guide between host
countries and NATO forces for munitions storage areas (facilities, depots). Secondly,
these guidelines are intended to form the basis of national regulations as far as
possible.
2. Although the storage of ammunition is emphasized throughout this manual, it
should be noted that it includes other ammunition life-cycle aspects that are related
to storage, such as maintenance, surveillance, transportation and disposal.
3. This manual cannot address all situations nor provide the answers to all
issues which may arise. In circumstances where the answer is not provided the
problem should be submitted to the Secretary of the Conference of National
Armaments Directors (CNAD) Ammunition Safety Group (CASG), AC/326.
4. This manual is in four parts:
a. Part I, General Principles and Guidelines for all Explosives Storage and
Quantity Distance (QD) Tables for Above Ground Storage;
b. Part II, Explosives Storage Magazine Design and Operational
Guidelines for Explosives Facilities;
c. Part III, Underground Explosives Storage, and;
d. Part IV, Special Situations .
5. Since this manual provides guidelines rather than a set of mandatory
regulations the words "must", "should" "may/can" and "is/are" are used in the
following sense:
MUST Indicates a technical requirement which is vital for safety
and the avoidance of a catastrophe.
SHOULD Indicates a safety requirement which is important but
not essential.
MAY/CAN Indicates optional courses of action and possibilities.
IS/ARE Indicates a fact or a valid technique.
1
“Ammunition and explosives” is usually referred to as “munitions” in NATO terminology, but the terms
may appear interchangeably throughout this publication.
xii EDITION D VERSION 1
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1.1.2. Basis of the Manual
The manual is based upon, and supersedes NATO DOCUMENT AC/258-D/258
(1976), its numerous corrigenda and published revisions. It is one of a series of
publications that have been promulgated by the CASG as Allied Ammunition Storage
and Transportation Publications (AASTPs), as follows:
AASTP-2 – Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military
Ammunition and Explosives 2
AASTP-3 – Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Hazard Classification
of Military Ammunition and Explosives
AASTP-4 – Manual on Explosives Safety Risk Analysis
AASTP-5 – NATO Guidelines for the Storage, Maintenance and Transport of
Ammunition on Deployed Operations or Missions
1.1.3. Updating and Inquiries
The In-Service and Operational Safety Management Sub-group (SG C), as custodian
of this Manual, will keep this manual current. Proposals for change or inquiries
regarding AASTP-1 and its Parts should be submitted to the Secretary of the
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) Ammunition Safety Group
(CASG), AC/326 at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium, using the form
“AASTP-1 Change Proposal/Comment Form”.
1.1.4. Conditions of Release
AASTP-1 is an open document without security classification or specific releasability
instructions. This is in the interests of promoting ammunition and explosives safety
worldwide and harmonization of NATO requirements with other international
explosives safety standards.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANUAL
1. This manual is the result of successive revisions, over a period of 50 years, of
a document (AC/106-D/5 dated 1 September 1963) drafted by an AC/106 Restricted
Sub-Group consisting of representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. These experts, meeting as specialists and not as national
representatives, made a study of the systems used in France, the United Kingdom
and the United States which took into account national trials and an analysis of
archives relating to damage from accidental explosions or acts of war. This attempt
at consolidation involved each member waiving some of his own nation’s regulations.
This difficulty was overcome by accepting that each nation would be free when
authorizing implementation of the NATO system in its territory to refrain from applying
any regulation relating to particular items for which, in its view, no compromise was
possible. It was hoped, however, that in view of the very abundant information which
2 AC/326 Sub-Group 2 was transitioned to the Logistics Committee/Movement and Transportation
Panel in 2009 as part of committee reorganization. AASTP-2 was reissued as AMovP-6 (Allied
Movement Publication). Of note this publication has to do with all classes of Dangerous Goods, not
just ammunition and explosives
xiii EDITION D VERSION 1
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had been used to prepare the document new ideas would become acceptable in the
interests of NATO even if they were not always in accordance with host nation
practice up to that point.
2. The four specialists of the Restricted Sub-Group who drew up the original
document were reconstituted in 1964 as the AC/74 Restricted Sub-Group of Experts
on the Storage of Ammunition (STORAM) to supplement the document. This task
included revision of the original document and completion of annexes on hazard
classification tests, storage on military airfields, storage in ships and barges and
underground storage. AC/106-D5(Revised) was issued in 1965.
3. The Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of
Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258) was created in 1966 to continue this
work. A Storage Sub-Group, set up under its aegis with broader representation,
prepared a new revised version published under reference AC/258-D/70 dated
December 1969. This was a very full document, including both the basic principles
from the original document and recommendations dealing with special cases such as
storage on military airfields, on board ship, underground, in the vicinity of petroleum
products or near radio transmitters. The QD Tables were produced in a new format,
using metric units only, in order to simplify the presentation. Certain corrections and
rationalizations were introduced in the tables and in the criteria for Quantity Distances.
Smaller intervals than hitherto were introduced in the values of explosives quantity to
eliminate the need for frequent interpolation and the consequent risk of mistakes.
Values of QD were rounded off to give uniform precision of about 1%. This eliminated
cases of unduly large errors in the small distances in the original tables. Also, detailed
annexes were prepared describing tests to be applied to ammunition in order to
decide on its hazard classification. The provisions for underground storage were
completely re-written in the light of recent advances in this field of explosives
technology. However, certain underground explosives storage criteria still remained
to be formulated.
4. The AC/258 Group had always hoped that the various national storage
regulations would be harmonized on the basis of the principles in its own storage
document (AC/258-D/70). Therefore in 1970 the Conference of National Armaments
Directors (CNAD), on the recommendation of the Group, formally invited nations to
adopt the principles, in whole or in part, as the basis of their national regulations as a
matter of policy. Over the next few years member nations made declarations of intent
or firm commitments. In many cases the timing of the change was linked to another
innovation, the adoption of the International System of Classification of Explosives
formulated by the United Nations Group of Experts on Explosives which dealt with the
safety of both military and civil explosives during transport. The AC/258 Group
adopted the UN system of compatibility groups as an amendment to the storage
document in 1971. Evidently the ultimate degree of standardization could not be
achieved until the International System of Classification as a whole was incorporated,
in the storage document. This involved replacing the NATO hazard classes by the
divisions of the UN explosives class.
xiv EDITION D VERSION 1
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5. Meanwhile interest in the storage document was growing as several nations
outside NATO requested copies. The requests were usually granted by the
appropriate authority. Member nations asked for additional topics related to storage
to be included in the document or in supplements. Therefore an Editorial Sub-Group
of AC/258 was set up in 1971 to promote consistent style and format in all the texts
the Group adopted on these topics and to consider how best to publish the
information.
6. In 1974 the Group, noted that the corrigenda which had been published
(totally14) had modified considerably the original text of AC/258-D/70, decided to
publish a completely revised edition as a manual in three parts: Part 1 dealing with
general principles, Part II containing more detailed information on aboveground
storage and on the historical background of the manual, and Part III dealing with
special types of storage.
7. During the period of this major revision - where a further two corrigenda were
published to AC/258-D/70 – the Group participated in the design and assessment of
field tests, both on scaled models and at full scale, to improve its criteria for QD (in
particular the "ESKIMO" series of trials in the United States). These tests resulted in
more economical methods of storage in depots and more reliable assessment of the
inherent risks of such storage. Members of the Group also participated in several
international tests at a large scale to acquire better data on underground explosions.
The conclusions and recommendations from all this experimental work were
incorporated in the manual under the reference AC/258-D/258.
8. Almost the whole of Part I of the manual was published in 1976 followed by
certain chapters of Part II and Part III in 1977. In the period 1976 to 1982 new chapter
and sections were added and corrections were made to Parts I to III.
9. In 1981 during the work related to updating the chapter dealing with QD criteria
for airfield, the Group found that under certain circumstances it was not possible,
without seriously prejudicing operational effectiveness, to apply the normal principles
detailed in Part I of the manual. As a consequence therefore, it was decided to publish
a new part of the manual – Part IV- where advice on safety principles under
circumstances is given. At the same time it was decided that certain chapters (Field
Storage, Missiles Installations and Basic Load Ammunition Holding Areas), which
until then had been published in Parts II and III, rightly belonged to the contents of
Part IV. Consequently they were transferred to the new part of the Storage Manual.
10. From 1981 to 1985, 23 corrigenda to the manual were issued. In 1995, the
idea grew that a presentation more in accordance with NATO standards should be
adopted. This was achieved by restructuring the manual in the form of an Allied
Publication (AP) and producing Standardization Agreements (STANAG) with which
to implement the AP. The manual, Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation
xv EDITION D VERSION 1
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Publication Volume 1 (AASTP-1) August 1997, was ratified through STANAG 4440
Edition 1, 13 September 1996.
11. In late 2002 AC/258 was merged with AC/310 to form AC/326 and Sub-group
5, Logistics and Disposal was created in order to manage AASTPs -1 and -3. Work
continued on the development of AASTP-1 and two important Changes to Edition 1
were published in May 2003 and May 2006.
12. In the meantime significant technical support began to be provided to AC/326,
including Sub-group 5 by the creation of the NATO Insensitive Munitions Information
Centre (NIMIC), which became the Munitions Safety Information Analysis Centre
(MSIAC) in 2004.
13. During this period the Group realized – as NATO began conducting deployed
operations – that two elements of ammunition safety – risk management and safety
on operations – deserved special attention and created Sub-group 6, Ammunition
Operational Safety, and began the development of AASTPs -4 (Explosives Safety
Risk Analysis) and -5 (NATO Guidelines for Storage, Maintenance and Transport of
Ammunition on Deployed Missions or Operations). In concert with the development
of AASTP-5 it was determined that some portions of AASTP-1 Part IV which were
concerned exclusively with deployed operations should be moved to AASTP-5
(BLAHA and Field Storage).
14. In 2009 considerable focus was put on the creation of Change 3, which aimed
to: better coordinate the four Parts; eliminate duplication; move Part IV portions to
AASTP-5; update technical aspects; and, (most importantly) introduce a new format
for QD Tables in Part I. The details and substantiation for the changes is contained in
AC/326-(SG/5)D(2011)0001 (PFP) of 6 July 2011, Details and Rationale for AASTP-1
Edition 1 Change 3. The updated manual was published 3 May 2010.
15. Throughout 2011 and 2012 work continued for the next update of the
publication and a document was created to better manage the numerous intended
changes, AC/326(SG/5)N(2011)0003 (PFP) “Work Elements for the Preparation of
AASTP-1 Edition 1 Change 4”, dated 27 September 2011. This document was
subsequently updated with several revisions and then re-designated
AC/326(SG/C)N(2013)0002 (PFP) dated 17 June 2013 due to the reorganization of
the Sub-Groups as described in the next paragraph.
16. In 2012 the Sub-Groups of AC/326 were reorganized and Sub-Groups 5 and
6 were merged to become SG C, In-Service and Operational Safety Management.
SG C responsibilities include AASTPs -1, -4 and -5. This allows for better overview
and coordination of AASTPs -1 and -5 concerned with storage and storage-related
activities both for domestic and deployed operations as well as consideration of risk
management in these areas.
xvi EDITION D VERSION 1
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17. A further update of AASTP-1 was published in December 2015. Due to a
change in how NATO accounted for its documents, the update was Edition B Version
1. The covering STANAG 4440 was also rewritten and submitted for ratification for
the first time since 1996 (Edition 2, 11 December 2015). Notably the titles of both
AASTP-1 and STANAG 4440 were changed from “principles” to “guidelines” in
consideration of how the publication has developed and changed over the years.
18. Concurrent with the publication of Edition B, a new program of work was
begun, focused on Parts I, II and IV, and a document was created to manage the
numerous intended changes, AC/326(SG/C)N(2016)0001 (PFP) “Work Elements for
the Preparation of AASTP-1 Edition B Version 2, dated 27 July 2016. This document
was succeeded by AC/326(SG/C)N(2021)0001, dated 23 February 2022. A series of
Technical Working Groups, along with items carried over from the previous program
of work, established initial priorities. Part I efforts examined Debris and Small
Quantity Quantity Distance (SQQD) guidelines and Inter-magazine distances (IMD)
for HD 1.2. This work coalesced into a major rewrite of the QD tables. SQQD are
now integrated. The major change is the separate consideration of each of the
effects: blast, debris and fragmentation, progressive (SsD 1.2.1), progressive (SsD
1.2.2), thermal (SsD 1.3.1) and thermal (SsD 1.3.2). Debris and Fragment Distances
(DFD) were developed based on an extensive analysis of available debris and
fragment test data. Fixed minimum distances that had resulted from treating blast
and fragmentation hazards jointly have been removed. Rounding rules were
standardized: round up to the nearest metre and down to the nearest kg. Improved
guidance was provided for treating an earth covered magazine (ECM) as an exposed
site (ES). Consideration of Hazard Classification for Storage, specifically when
ammunition is out of its packaging, resulted in the transfer of AASTP-3 to AC/326
SG/B.
19. Part II changes included elimination of the 2-degree rule for inter-magazine
barricades, the addition of a note to Table 4-1 concerning pyrotechnics that contain
magnesium, and harmonization of withdrawal distances with those in AMoVP6.
Withdrawal distance will now be known as “hazard evacuation distance”. Two former
annexes were removed: ANNEX II-A containing accident information sheets for Class
1 road traffic in order to avoid duplication with AMovP 6, and ANNEX II-B as content
is now provided in SRD AASTP-1.3 Nationally Approved Structures (NAS) for
Explosives Areas. Late in the review process it was noted that SRD AASTP-1.1
contains information concerning barricades for the protection of personnel that is not
reflected in AASTP-1. A new point (2.2.3.1.2.c) was added to draw attention to this
information.
20. Part IV changes include the transfer of the former Chapter 4 Manoeuvre
Warfare to AASTP-5 and an extensive update to Chapter 5 Airfields Used Only By
Military Aircraft.
21. Although Part III was not included in the program of work, editorial corrections
were made to article 3.3.4.2.9.b. on pages III-3-39 and -40.
xvii EDITION D VERSION 1
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22. Three Standard Related Documents (SRD) have been created and are
accessible on the NATO Standardization Office site:
a. AASTP-1.1 Manual for the development of an explosives safety site
plan based on AASTP-1
b. AASTP-1.2 Development of NATO Debris and Fragment Distance
Curves for AASTP-1.
c. AASTP-1.3 Nationally Approved Structures (NAS) for Explosives Areas
23. Concurrent with the publication of Edition C, a new program of work was begun
and a document was created to manage the numerous intended changes,
AC/326(SG/C)N(2016)0001 (PFP) “Work Elements for the Preparation of AASTP-1
Edition C Version 2, dated 23 February 2023. This document was succeeded by
AC/326(SG/C)D(2023)0001, dated in 2024. A limited focus was selected: completion
of the Ports Criteria Working Group (revision of Part IV Chapter 6), the intent being to
publish a new version (later accepted as a new edition) as soon as possible. Two
new technical working groups were also initiated, both with a longer timeframe: the
Hazard Division 1.3 TWG and the Levels of Protection Working Group. Their work
does not feature in this edition of AASTP-1 but is tracked in the above documents.
24. The principal change from Edition C to Edition D is the complete replacement
of Part IV Chapter 6 Naval and Military Ports. The new chapter utilizes the same
aboveground quantity distance criteria as Part I. The other significant change is the
removal of the “warship exemption”, replacing it with a safety management system to
formally assess, communicate, and accept explosives risk. It also describes common
risk mitigations applied to military vessels as part of a national safety and risk
management system, such as ensuring that vessels are in a quiescent state.
25. Other changes resulted from change proposals:
a. Part I
i. Paragraph 1.3.1.6.9: Updates made to address storage sub-division
(SsD) 1.2.3 Parenthetical Hazardous Fragment Distances (HFD)
ii. Mathematic and typographical corrections (detail at 1.1.1.3)
b. Part II
i. Chapter 5 Storage Facilites’ Design Environment Consideration. This
chapter was reduced in scope
ii. Improved guidance concerning 3- and 7- bar ECM blast design
curves
c. Part IV
i. Chapter 5 Airfields, within table footnotes on pages IV-5-28 and IV-
5-31, "full protection" was changed to asset preservation" for
consistent terminology.
ii. Chapter 7 Destruction, website address for UFC-3-340-02 was
updated.
xviii EDITION D VERSION 1
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26. Barricades. As noted in paragraph 19 above, the revised barricade standard,
now including DFD Barricades, is not yet in AASTP-1, but should be included in
Edition D Version 2. Consult SRD AASTP-1.1 for the new barricade standards. Note,
the QD tables in Part I, and equivalents in Part 4, assume the appropriate barricade
type is in use, but the pictograms do not indicate the type. When employing the
barricaded DFD curves it is assumed that you are doing so in conjunction with the
DFD Barricade that satisfies all requirements of SRD AASTP-1.1.
1.3 APPLICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
1. As outlined above, the storage criteria that have been developed and presented
in this manual are based upon Hazard Classification of munitions and QD. These do
not provide absolute safety in terms of immunity from propagation, damage or
injury/death in the case of an undesired explosive event, but are judged to be minimum
acceptable levels of safety.
2. Increasingly, during the past several decades, the tenants of risk management
began to be applied to the life cycle of munitions. Indeed, some Nations now solely use
a risk management approach versus a QD one for storage. AC/326 had recognized
this and so AASTP-4 was created. AASTP-5 also provides a risk management process
for the examination of storage where neither AASTP-1 nor AASTP-5 storage guidelines
can be met. The aspects of probability of the occurrence of an undesired event,
together with the probable consequences should it occur, and considered in terms of
exposed personnel, materiel and infrastructure provides an assessment of the level of
risk that can be briefed to responsible commanders for their approval. Part IV provides
additional information about risk management.
3. In concert with the development of a risk approach in AASTPs-4 and -5, and
due to observations on NATO multi-national operations, an Allied Logistics Publication
(ALP-16) has been developed, “Explosives Safety Munitions Risk Management
(ESMRM) in Operational Planning, Training and Execution”. This is under the auspices
of the Logistics Committee AC/305 and other policy and doctrine documents were
adjusted to include explosive safety considerations – especially to the NATO
operational planning process. Those documents point to AASTP-1 and AASTP-5 for
NATO explosives safety criteria.
xix EDITION D VERSION 1
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
This list pertains to all four parts of this manual and has been placed here for ease of reference.
AASTP Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication
AC Allied Committee
AD Airfield Distance
AE Ammunition and Explosives
AECP Allied Environmental Conditions Publication
AGS Aboveground Structure
ALP Allied Logistics Publication
AMovP Allied Movement Publication
BD Blast Distance
CAPA Combat Aircraft Parking Area
CALA Combat Aircraft Loading Area
CNAD Conference of National Armament Directors
DFD Debris and Fragment Distance
ECM Earth Covered Magazine
EED Electro-Explosives Device
EID Electrically Initiated Devices
EM Electromagnetic
ENEQ Effective Net Explosive Quantity
ESMRM Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management
EWD Explosive Workshop Distance
ES Exposed Site
FARP Forward Ammunition and Refueling Point
FD Field Distance
HAS Hardened Aircraft Shelter
HD Hazard Division
HE High Explosive
HED Hazard Evacuation Distance
HERO Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
HFD Hazardous Fragment Distance
IBD Inhabited Building Distance
IM Insensitive Munitions
IMD Inter-Magazine Distance
ISS In-Service Surveillance
LPS Lightning Protection System
MCE Maximum Credible Event
MFD Maximum Fragment Distance
MPTN Modified Pseudo Trajectory Normal
NAS Nationally Approved Structures
NEM Net Explosive Mass
NEQ, Q Net Explosive Quantity
NEWQD Explosive Weight Quantity Distance
OB Open Burn
OD Open Detonation
PES Potential Explosion Site
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
xx EDITION D VERSION 1
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PTRD Public Traffic Route Distance
QD Quantity Distance
RADHAZ Radiation Hazard
RC Reinforced Concrete
RF Radio Frequency
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
SD Ship Distances
SG Sensitivity Group
SGC Sub-Group C
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SQQD Small Quantity Quantity Distances
SRAD Susceptibility RADHAZ Designator
SRD Standards Related Document
SsD Storage sub-Division
TD Thermal event Distance
TRAD Transmitter RADHAZ Designator
xxi EDITION D VERSION 1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
xxii EDITION D VERSION 1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
EDITION D VERSION 1
AASTP-1(D)(1)
AASTP-1
ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE
AND TRANSPORT PUBLICATION 1
(AASTP-1)
MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY GUIDELINES
FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
PART I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR ALL EXPLOSIVES STORAGE AND QUANTITY DISTANCE
TABLES FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS – PART I
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION........................................................................ I-1-1
CHAPTER 2 – CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND
EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE ............................................................................. I-2-1
SECTION I – HAZARD DIVISIONS ............................................................................ I-2-1
SECTION II – COMPATIBILITY GROUPS ................................................................... I-2-7
SECTION III - MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE ..................... I-2-13
SECTION IV – SENSITIVITY GROUPS .................................................................... I-2-15
SECTION V – TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GROUPS (TDG) .................................. I-2-15
CHAPTER 3 – ABOVEGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS ................................ I-3-1
SECTION I – PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTITY DISTANCES ........................................... I-3-1
SECTION II – DETERMINATION OF QUANTITY DISTANCES........................................ I-3-16
SECTION III – QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
......................................................................................................................... I-3-18
SECTION IV – QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN EXPOSED SITES....................... I-3-21
SECTION V – STORAGE BUILDINGS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY
DISTANCES ........................................................................................................ I-3-24
SECTION VI – BARRICADES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY DISTANCES
......................................................................................................................... I-3-27
SECTION VII – INJURY AND DAMAGE TO BE EXPECTED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
PROTECTION FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.1 AND GROUPING OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES
......................................................................................................................... I-3-31
CHAPTER 4 – SEPARATION OF POL FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS .............................................................................................. I-4-1
CHAPTER 5 – REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS ........................... I-5-1
CHAPTER 6 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION ....................................... I-6-1
ANNEX I-A – QUANTITY DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE .. I-A-1
SECTION I – GENERAL NOTE AND EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS ............................... I-A-1
SECTION II – QUANTITY DISTANCES TABLES (QD TABLES) .................................... I-A-4
TABLE 1 EARTH COVERED MAGAZINES ................................................................ I-A-5
TABLE 2 HEAVY WALLED MAGAZINES ................................................................ I-A-49
TABLE 3 MEDIUM WALLED MAGAZINES .............................................................. I-A-88
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TABLE 4 LIGHT WALLED MAGAZINES AND OPEN STACKS .................................. I-A-104
TABLE 5 LIST OF FORMULA - BLAST ................................................................. I-A-137
TABLE 6 LIST OF FORMULA - DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS ..................................... I-A-140
TABLE 7 LIST OF FORMULA - PROGRESSIVE 1.2.1 ............................................. I-A-144
TABLE 8 LIST OF FORMULA - PROGRESSIVE 1.2.2 ............................................. I-A-144
TABLE 9 LIST OF FORMULA - THERMAL ............................................................ I-A-145
TABLE 10 LOOK UP TABLE - BLAST ................................................................. I-A-146
TABLE 11 LOOK UP TABLE - DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS ...................................... I-A-153
TABLE 12 LOOK UP TABLE - PROGRESSIVE 1.2.1, 1.2.2 AND THERMAL .............. I-A-157
ANNEX I-B – FLOWCHART SHOWING HOW TO USE QD TABLES ............ I-B-1
ANNEX I-C – WORKED EXAMPLES .............................................................. I-C-1
I-1-iii Edition D Version 1
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1.1 Purpose and Scope of Part I
1. The objective of Part I is to establish Quantity Distance (QD) safety
principles for above ground storage to be used by Nations for the layout of
conventional munitions (ammunition and explosives) storage facilities. This
includes storage ranging from domestic depots to deployed operations’ main
storage facilities where required safety distances can be accommodated.
These guidelines are intended also to form the basis of national regulations as
far as possible. For deployed operations / missions these guidelines are to be
used to develop mutually agreeable standards between host countries and
NATO forces.
2. Part I is intended to serve as a guide for authorities responsible for the
safe storage of munitions who are engaged in the planning and construction of
ammunition storage depots or facilities of a capacity of not less than 1 kg of
Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) per storage site.
3. The content of Part I is intended to be information directly supporting
the QD Tables contained herein but is also closely linked to Part II, containing
such important information as building and barricade design, firefighting,
hazards of electro-magnetic radiation.
4. It is impracticable to prescribe distances which would be safe distances
in the true sense, i.e., which would guarantee absolute immunity from
propagation, damage to material/infrastructure, or injury/death of personnel.
The recommendations in this Part inherently include a risk-based approach
whereby there is consideration of the probability of an undesired or accidental
explosive event, together with consideration of the consequences i.e., the
resulting damage or injury/death. The separation distances (Quantity
Distances) between a potential explosion site and an exposed site
recommended in this Part therefore represent a compromise deemed tolerable
by the AC/326 Group of Experts between absolute safety and practical
considerations including costs and operational requirements.
5. Whether risk is tolerable depends upon many factors, some of which
are objective, such as the quantity of explosives involved, the nature of the
explosives, the packaging of dangerous items, their distribution within
premises or in the open air, distance, the nature of the terrain and its contours,
etc. Other factors are more subjective - to what extent are the expected
consequences of an explosive event or accident tolerable? For example, how
many deaths, how many serious injuries, how many buildings destroyed or
damaged, how much loss of stocks, and other costs are tolerable? It is
essential to have a good knowledge of the nature of the main hazard, namely
blast or projections or fire, as well as the foreseeable development of the
accident: instantaneous, progressive, sporadic etc.
6. Consideration of these factors will yield the concept of hazard divisions,
the net explosives quantity and the mutual influence of potential explosion site
and exposed site. QDs are proposed in each case in the form of tables. These
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QDs imply a degree of harm or damage which is difficult to quantify but which
most NATO nations regard as tolerable.
7. There may be occasions when rational economic or operational
considerations, usually of a temporary nature, warrant the acceptance of a
significantly greater risk to life and property. The granting of waivers or
relaxations in such cases is outside the scope of this Part. Nevertheless, it is
stressed that a detailed assessment of the risks involved must be made by a
competent agency before the appropriate authorities grant such dispensations.
Conversely, authorities which might find unacceptable the risks deemed
"tolerable" in this Manual can always reduce the risks by using suitable
protective devices and/or by increasing the recommended distances.
However, this will be possible only with a higher operating cost.
1.1.1.2 Change summary for AASTP-1 Part I Edition C Version 1
1. AASTP-1 Part I Edition C Version 1 was prepared by a Technical
Working Group (TWG) formed from NATO Committee AC326 Subgroup C
members in 2016 and developed until 2021. The aim was to introduce updated
text and QD tables for AASTP-1 with new table formats and QD calculations
based on work undertaken by the US and MSIAC. The new format aims to
integrate the proposed Small Quantity Distance (SQQD) tables and considers
the relevant explosive effects for each of the Hazard Divisions (HD). It draws
extensively on the technical conversations held in the TWGs, Custodian
Working Groups (CWGs) and various discussion papers produced by MSIAC
(e.g., report L-229 “Experimental and Theoretical Basis of NATO standards for
safe storage of ammunition and explosives – final report”, which was issued in
September 2019).
2. This edition must be considered together with the “Development of NATO
Debris and Fragment Distance Curves for AASTP-1 (Standard Related
Document AASTP-1.2)" by Mr. Robert Conway from EXWC in the US. This
report provides the experimental background and choices made by the TWG
to develop the Debris and Fragment Distance (DFD).
3. Formerly, QD calculations have considered different explosives effects at
the same time. For example, HD1.1 calculations have attempted to address
blast pressure and debris and fragment hazard with a combined calculation
and a fixed minimum distance.
4. The following effects should be considered for each HD:
a. Blast effects are associated with the largest possible explosion in
the PES. For HD1.1 this is an en masse explosion of the total NEQ
present, or the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) from SsD1.2.1,
SsD1.2.3 and HD1.6 items.
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b. Debris and fragmentation effects are hazardous projections from
the munition as primary fragments or debris projected from the
munition packaging or the building as it breaks up as a result of the
explosive event. As for blast effects (a.), the debris and
fragmentation effects are related to a mass explosion for HD1.1 or
the MCE for the other HD (SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.3 and HD1.6). As
decided at the TWG in spring 2017, hazardous debris and
fragments have an impact energy of 79 J or greater. Debris and
fragment QDs (hereafter called Debris and Fragment Distances
(DFD)), are calculated using the Modified Pseudo Trajectory
Normal (MPTN) technique and in the wall normal direction. It was
also decided to introduce a correction factor to account for
reductions in azimuthal direction.
c. The progressive event is a series of detonations or lower order
reactions of individual rounds progressing over time. The total
hazardous fragment count is a function of the total NEQ present 1. It
is sometimes called the ‘popcorn’ effect. Different calculations are
needed for SsD1.2.1 and SsD1.2.2.
d. The thermal event is the thermal hazard of a device separate from
any blast, debris, or fragment effects. Different calculations are
needed for SsD1.3.1, SsD1.3.2, SsD1.2.3 and HD1.6. For HD1.1,
SsD1.2.1 and SsD1.2.2 events this is many times less than both the
frag and blast effects and is consequently ignored for these hazard
divisions.
5. Table 1 shows all the possible effects that must be considered in
calculating the minimum QD for each HD. For each HD, each effect shown in
the HD/SsD table must be calculated and the largest QD (or smallest NEQ)
must be used to provide the correct level of protection. By separating each
explosive effect, it becomes easier to integrate the SQQD calculations that
were prepared in earlier TWGs.
6. Table 1 also indicates if the QD is based on the total NEQ (in kg)
present at the Potential Explosion Site (PES), in which case the table shows
NEQ or if the QD is based on the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) (in kg) of
any nature present in the PES, in which case the table shows MCE.
7. In Annex 1-A the QD Formulae are shown as a function of Q. Q can
either be the NEQ or MCE dependent on the application described above. The
correct MCE can be calculated in accordance with AASTP-1, Chapter 3, Para
1.3.1.6.
1 Lobbed munitions are assumed not to initiate on impact. Any lobbed munitions that have
survived the launch event are likely to be sufficiently intact that the safety and fuzing mechanism
will prevent initiation on impact as the device will not have received two separate arming stimuli
(e.g., setback and spin or removal of arming pin and impact of primer)
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HD1.1 SsD1.2.1 SsD1.2.2 SsD1.2.3 SsD1.3.1 SsD1.3.2 HD1.6
BLAST NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & NEQ MCE MCE MCE
FRAG
PROG’ NEQ
1.2.1
PROG’ NEQ
1.2.2
THERMAL NEQ
1.3.1
THERMAL NEQ NEQ NEQ
1.3.2
TABLE 1: RELEVANT EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS FOR EACH OF THE HDS AND
SSDs
This table is repeated for every PES/ES interaction in each of the QD tables in
ANNEX I-A.
• Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
• Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
• Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
• Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
8. From these tables, QD can be determined for the same PES and ES as
covered in previous editions of AASTP-1. The HDs and SsDs for which QD
can be determined have been extended to SsD 1.2.3 and HD1.6.
9. QD calculations are given for every interaction to calculate both Distance
from Quantity and the ‘backward’ calculation of Quantity from Distance. Look
up tables are provided with distances rounded up to the nearest meter and
masses rounded down to the nearest kg.
10. The new formulas are shown in the formula table with a link to legacy
QDs (Quantity Distances (QD) from AASTP-1 Edition B V1 Part I, Small
Quantity (SQ) QD from WP Rev1, Field Distances (FD) from AASTP-5 Ed
1V3, Airfield Distances (AD) from AASTP-1 EDB V1 Pt IV and Ship Distances
(SD) from AASTP-1 Edition B V1 Part IV)
11. All numbers in lists of formulas, QD tables and look up tables have been
displayed with a space as the thousand separator (except for 4 digit numbers)
and the point (.) as the decimal separator.
12. ‘No QD for very low-density usage’ has been added to all PTRD-ES, and
the definition of ‘very low-density usage’ as ‘<20 per day’ has been added to
the tables.
13. The door on the Icon of the PES ‘ECM side’ has been changed to a
dotted line to remove any chance of it being mistaken as specifically a 3 or 7
bar ECM.
14. Updated and improved pictographs for ES ‘vulnerable objects’, ‘Power
grid’, ‘Office, workshop, canteen’ and ‘POL incl. pipelines’ have been added.
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15. Text has been changed to implement the new tables however the
minimum number of changes to accommodate the new tables have been
made except for changes required due to normal amendment action. The
definition of Type 1,2 & 3 vulnerable buildings has been reintroduced.
16. A flow chart has been included to explain how the tables must be used
with three worked examples included to show how the process must be
completed. Additionally, improved drawings to show the angles that must be
used to select the correct PES/ES interaction have been included.
17. For consistency, the word ‘munition’ has been used throughout rather
than the synonymous word ‘ammunition’, and the word Igloo has been
replaced with Earth Covered Magazine (ECM).
1.1.1.3 Change summary for AASTP-1 Part I Edition D Version 1
1. AASTP-1 Part I Edition D Version 1 was prepared by the custodian of
AASTP-1 Part I, based on change proposals received from NATO Committee
AC326 Subgroup C members between 2021 and 2024. Most changes were
corrections of typographic errors and clarification of mathematical calculations
within Debris and Fragment Distance (DFD) tables, where the clarification
required a change from decimalised constants to fractional constants, enabling
more accurate quantity-distance calculations. Full details of changes carried
out are detailed in the IWP submitted by the custodian under the following
document reference: AC/326(SG/C)(UK)IWP(2024)0001(PfP).
2. Further clarification was made to Paragraph 1.3.1.6.9 surrounding the
scenario where a hazardous fragment distance (HFD) for storage sub-division
(SsD) 1.2.3 is known, where the HFD is shown as a parenthetical number (xx)
in hundreds of metres, following submission of an IWP from the US reference
AC/326(SG/C)-(US)IWP[0002]-[2024] (PfP).
I-1-5 Edition D Version 1
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CHAPTER 2 CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE
1.2.1 SECTION I – HAZARD DIVISIONS
1.2.1.1 General
1. To promote the safe storage and transport of dangerous goods, the UN
International System for Classification of Dangerous Goods2 is used. The
system consists of 9 classes (1-9) of which Class 1 comprises ammunition and
explosives. Class 1 is divided into six divisions, which indicate the primary type
of hazard to be expected in the event of an accident:
a. Division 1.1: Substances and articles which have a mass explosion
hazard.
b. Division 1.2: Substances and articles which have a projection hazard
but not a mass explosion hazard.
c. Division 1.3: Substances and articles which have a fire hazard and
either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but
not a mass explosion hazard.
d. Division 1.4: Substances and articles which have no significant
hazard.
e. Division 1.5: Very insensitive substances which have a mass
explosion hazard.
f. Division 1.6: Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass
explosion hazard.
2. For storage criteria purposes, this Manual further subdivides some
Divisions to better define the hazards associated with munitions which have
been hazard classified within those Divisions.
3. In addition, to simplify the expression of an item’s hazard classification,
this Manual uses the terms “Hazard Division (HD)” and Storage Subdivision
(SsD) to avoid repeatedly using the clumsy terminology “Subdivision X of
Division Y of Class Z.”
4. Ammunition and explosives must be classified in accordance with
STANAG 4123. Guidance and Safety Principles for the hazard classification of
military ammunition and explosives, and a list of National Competent
Authorities, for the classification of ammunition and explosives are given in
AASTP-3.
2 Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods—Model Regulations, United Nations
Publication, New York, New York 10017.
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1.2.1.2 Definitions of the Hazard Divisions (definitions taken from
AASTP-3 Edition 1)
1. Hazard Division 1.1 - Substances and articles which have a mass
explosion hazard.
a. The major hazards of this division are blast, high velocity
projections and other projections of relatively low velocity.
b. The explosion results in severe structural damage, the severity and
range being determined by the amount of high explosives involved.
There may be a risk from heavy debris propelled from the structure
in which the explosion occurs or from the crater.
2. Hazard Division 1.2 - Substances and articles which have a projection
hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
a. The explosion results in items burning and exploding 3
progressively, a few at a time. Furthermore fragments, firebrands
and unexploded items may be projected in considerable numbers;
some of these may explode on or some time after impact and cause
fires or explosions. Blast effects are limited to the immediate
vicinity.
b. For the purpose of determining QDs a distinction, depending on the
size and range of fragments, is made between those items which
give fragments of moderate range (classified as SsD 1.2.2) and
those which give fragments with a considerable range (classified as
SsD 1.2.1).
(1) SsD 1.2.1 ‐ Fragments and Lobbed ammunition from Rounds
greater than 0.136 kg individual applicable HE content 4. This,
the most hazardous part of HD 1.2 comprises those rounds
and ammunition (characteristic of 81 mm and 105 mm) which
contain a high explosive charge and may also contain a
propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The total applicable HE
content of these rounds, etc. will be greater than 0.136 kg. It is
impractical to specify QDs which allow for the maximum
possible flight ranges of propulsive items but the likely range
of packaged items, if involved in an accident during storage, is
typical of this part of HD 1.2. Munitions which explode during
an accident will rarely detonate in their design mode. In a fire
situation, explosive fillings may melt and expand, breaching
their casings and then explode via cook‐off or burning to
detonation reactions. These explosions may involve anything
3
Definitions given in Annex I of Allied Ordnance Publication (AOP) ‐39, Guidance on the
Assessment and Development of Insensitive Munitions (IM).
4 Applicable HE Content: The weight of the explosive material in any individual explosive train
of one payload component within a HD 1.2 munition system that, by design, will detonate with
the intention of producing metallic fragments from the payload's outer case. The largest
determined weight of a payload component's explosive train may be used to assign SsD 1.2.1
or SsD 1.2.2 to the munition.
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from 100% to very little of the fill dependent on the amount of
the filling that has escaped through the breach.
Based on 81 mm and 105 mm testing used in HD 1.2 Test
Programme (PFP(AC/326‐SG/5)N(2004)0001 14 June 2004),
the largest HD 1.1 equivalent event (called the maximum
credible event (MCE)) will be less than 50 kg. The
fragmentation produced by such reactions is totally different to
that generated in a design detonation. The case splits open
producing large (for a 105 mm shell, for example 2‐3 kg) but
comparatively few fragments with velocities of 100‐ 500 ms‐1.
These are likely to be projected further than the smaller
fragments from the full detonation of similar munitions in a HD
1.1 reaction. Quantities of unexploded munitions, sub‐
assemblies or sub‐ munitions also may be projected to
considerable ranges and will, due to thermal or mechanical
damage, be more hazardous than in their pristine state. Data
on individual round characteristics obtained from tests and
accidental explosions may be used to determine the validity of
including a specific round in this category or to reduce it to the
lesser category described in Paragraph 1.2.1.2.2.b (2) below.
(2) SsD 1.2.2 ‐ Fragments and Lobbed Ammunition from Rounds
less than or equal to 0.136 kg applicable HE content. This less
hazardous part of Hazard Division HD 1.2 comprises those
rounds and ammunition which contain a high explosive charge
and may also contain a propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The
total applicable HE content of these rounds, etc. will be less
than or equal to 0.136 kg. It will also typically comprise
ammunition which does not contain HE, such as rounds with
inert projectiles, pyrotechnics, WP rounds, illumination rounds,
and similar items. Rocket motors are an exception and should
be assessed as they may be more appropriately addressed by
assignment to SsD 1.2.1. Tests show that many items of this
type produce fragments and lobbed ammunition with a range
significantly less than that of items in 2. 1.2.1.2.2.b (2) above
but of course greater than that of ammunition and explosives
of Hazard Division 1.4.
(3) Subdivisions for Storage. It is important not to exaggerate the
significance of the value of 0.136 kg used in 1.2.1.2.2.b (1)
and 1.2.1.2.2.b (2) above. It was based on a break point in the
database supporting the QD relationships and tables and the
HE of the rounds tested, i.e., 0.136 kg equates to the quantity
of HE contained in the German 40 mm ammunition used in the
NATO HD 1.2 trials. This ammunition reacted differently to the
105 mm and 81 mm and as such formed the known upper limit
of SsD 1.2.2. If comprehensive data is available for a
particular item, then the item may be placed in that category of
HD 1.2 supported by the data and allocated the relevant QDs.
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It may also be necessary to take into account the vulnerability
of ammunition, explosives, and buildings at the ES under
consideration, see Part II, Chapter 5, Section I.
c. A special storage subdivision, SsD 1.2.3, with its own unique set of
QDs, is applicable to munitions that exhibit at most an explosion
reaction in sympathetic reaction testing as per STANAG 4396 and a
burning reaction in bullet impact, slow heating, and liquid fuel /
external fire testing as per STANAGs 4241, 4382 and 4240,
respectively.
d. To advise on Maximum Credible Event (MCE) calculation. MCE is
only applicable to SsD 1.2.1 and SsD 1.2.3 munitions. The MCE for
SsD 1.2.3 is the NEQ of one item or package, as determined
through testing. SsD 1.2.1 munitions that produce fragmentation
effects similar to 81 mm and 105 mm, as tested in the HD 1.2 Test
Program (PFP(AC/326‐ SG/5)N(2004)0001 14 June 2004), can be
considered to have a default MCE less than 50 kg. Where the
default 50 kg MCE is not being applied, then the MCE can be
determined in one of three ways:
(1) Established by testing or analogy (i.e., comparison to a like
munition packed in a like manner). This will be typical of all
new items being developed.
(2) When no specific test data is available, by multiplying the HE
content of an item times the number of items in three
unpalletized, outer shipping packages. This will typically be
used with older SsD 1.2.1 items, for which data is not
available. This method could give an extremely conservative
value that will likely exceed the 50 kg default value discussed
later in Chapter 3, thereby requiring very stringent QD
application.
(3) Assessing SsD 1.2.1 munitions on a case‐by‐case basis using
available data to arrive at a reasonable value. This will
typically be used with older SsD 1.2.1 items where the very
conservative MCE/QD as discussed in 1.2.1.2.2.d(2) above is
not acceptable.
3. Hazard Division 1.3 - Substances and articles which have a fire hazard
and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a
mass explosion hazard.
a. This division comprises substances and articles:
(1) which give rise to considerable radiant heat, or
(2) which burn one after another, producing minor blast or
projection effects or both.
b. This division includes some items, which burn with great violence
and intense heat emitting considerable thermal radiation (mass fire
hazard) and others, which burn sporadically. Items in this division
may explode but do not usually form dangerous fragments.
Firebrands and burning containers may be projected. For
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determining QDs and defining mixing and aggregations rules, a
distinction is made between the more hazardous propellant
explosives of HD 1.3 (classified as SsD 1.3.1) and the less
hazardous items and substances of HD 1.3 (classified as SsD
1.3.2).
4. Hazard Division 1.4 - Substances and articles which present no
significant hazard. This division comprises substances and articles which
present only a small hazard in the event of initiation. The effects are largely
confined to the package and no projection of fragments of appreciable size or
range are to be expected. An external fire shall not cause virtual instantaneous
explosion of almost the entire contents of the package.
NOTE: Substances and articles of this division are in Compatibility Group
S if they are so packaged or designed that any hazardous effects arising
from accidental functioning are confined within the package unless the
package has been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or projection
effects are limited to the extent that they do not significantly hinder fire-
fighting or other emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of
the package.
5. Hazard Division 1.5 - Very insensitive substances which have a mass
explosion hazard. This division comprises substances which have a mass
explosion hazard but are so insensitive that there is very little probability of
initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal conditions.
NOTE 1: The probability of transition from burning to detonation is
greater when large bulk quantities are transported or stored.
NOTE 2: For storage purposes, such substances are treated as Hazard
Division 1.1 since, if an explosion should occur, the hazard is the same
as for items formally assigned to Hazard Division 1.1 (i.e., blast).
6. Hazard Division 1.6 - Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a
mass explosion hazard. This division comprises articles which contain only
extremely insensitive substances, and which demonstrate a negligible
probability of accidental initiation or propagation.
NOTE: The risk from articles of Hazard Division 1.6 is limited to the
explosion of a single article.
1.2.1.3 Hazard Classification
Information necessary for hazard classification of ammunition and explosives
will be found in AASTP-3. Ammunition which does not contain any explosive or
other dangerous goods (for instance dummy bombs, cartridges, and projectiles)
is excluded from the system of hazard classification.
1.2.1.4 Depleted Uranium (DU) Ammunition
Ammunition containing DU in the form of a penetrator or projectile is assigned to
the Hazard Classification appropriate to the explosives content of the
ammunition only. The normal storage rules associated with the Hazard
Classification may need to be modified to take account of the slight radioactivity
and chemical toxicity of DU and therefore rules may be prescribed for DU
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ammunition as a separate class of ammunition, or for specific types of DU
ammunition (see Part I, Chapter 7).
1.2.1.5 Effect of Package on Classification
As the packaging may have a decisive effect on the classification, particular
care must be taken to ensure that the correct classification is determined for
each configuration in which ammunition and explosives are stored or
transported. Therefore, every significant change in the packaging (e.g.,
degradation) may well affect the classification awarded.
1.2.1.6 Classification of Unit Loads
Unit Loads or transport units which contain ammunition of mixed Compatibility
Groups C, D and E and mixed HD (e.g., HD 1.1D, HD 1.2D and HD 1.3C)
must be allocated an overall classification code for the unit load or transport
unit. The appropriate HD (e.g., 1.1 through 1.6) is determined by applying the
mixing rules as contained in paragraph 1.2.3.3.
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1.2.2 SECTION II – COMPATIBILITY GROUPS
1.2.2.1 General Principles
1. Ammunition and explosives are considered to be compatible if they may
be stored together without significantly increasing either the probability of an
accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an
accident.
2. Ammunition and explosives should not be stored together with other
goods which can hazard them. Examples are highly flammable materials,
acids, and corrosives.
3. The safety of ammunition and explosives in storage would be enhanced
if each kind was kept separate. However, a proper balance of the interests of
safety against other factors may require the mixing of several kinds of
ammunition and explosives.
4. The principles of mixing compatibility groups may differ in storage and
transport circumstances. Detailed information on mixing compatibility groups is
to be found in AASTP-3.
1.2.2.2 Determination of Compatibility Groups
1. Based on the definitions in paragraph 1.2.2.3. ammunition and
explosives are formally grouped into thirteen Compatibility Groups: A to H, J, K,
L, N and S.
2. Group I is omitted to avoid possible confusion between the letter "I" and
the Roman numeral "I". Group S is given a distinctive letter since it
corresponds to a unique possibility for mixing in storage and transport.
1.2.2.3 Definitions of the Compatibility Groups (definitions taken
from AASTP-3 Edition 1):
Group A Primary explosive substance.
Group B Article containing a primary explosive substance and not
containing two or more effective protective features.
Group C Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating
explosive substance or article containing such explosive
substance.
Group D Secondary detonating explosive substance or black
powder or article containing a secondary detonating
explosive substance, in each case without means of
initiation and without a propelling charge, or article
containing a primary explosive substance and containing
two or more effective protective features.
Group E Article containing a secondary detonating explosive
substance, without means of initiation, with a propelling
charge (other than one containing a flammable liquid or
gel or hypergolic liquids).
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Group F Article containing a secondary detonating explosive
substance with its own means of initiation, with a
propelling charge (other than one containing a flammable
liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids) or without a propelling
charge.
Group G Pyrotechnic substance, or article containing a
pyrotechnic substance, or article containing both an
explosive substance and an illuminating, incendiary, tear-
or smoke-producing substance (other than a water-
activated article or one containing white phosphorus,
phosphides, a pyrophoric substance, a flammable liquid
or gel, or hypergolic liquids).
Group H Article containing both an explosive substance and white
phosphorus.
Group J Article containing both an explosive substance and a
flammable liquid or gel.
Group K Article containing both an explosive substance and a
toxic chemical agent.
Group L Explosive substance or article containing an explosive
substance and presenting a special risk (e.g. due to
water activation or presence of hypergolic liquids,
phosphides or a pyrophoric substance) and needing
isolation of each type.
Group N Articles which contain only extremely insensitive
substances.
Group S Substances or articles so packed or designed that any
hazardous effects arising from accidental functioning are
confined within the package unless the package has
been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or
projection effects are limited to the extent that they do
not significantly hinder or prohibit fire-fighting or other
emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of
the package.
Notes on Compatibility Groups (for information Purposes only)
(a) Compatibility Group D applies only when secondary detonating
explosive (high explosive) or black powder is properly packed in a dust‐
tight container. Otherwise, special precautions are essential, and
Compatibility Group L would apply.
(b) Compatibility Group D or E may apply to ammunition, which is
fuzed or packed together with fuzes, if the fuzes are adequately
protected. See the definitions of "With/without its (own) Means of
Initiation" in AOP‐38.
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(c) Compatibility Group F does not necessarily apply to ammunition,
which is fuzed or packed together with fuzes, if the fuzes are adequately
protected. See the definitions of "With/without its (own) Means of
Initiation" in AOP‐38.
(d) Compatibility Group N applies only to HD 1.6. The potential
administrative advantage of Compatibility Group N ammunition will be
lost when mixed with other hazard divisions and/or compatibility groups.
1.2.2.4 Classification Code
1. Each munition item is marked or labelled with a classification code to
facilitate its identification. The munition classification code can be used to
simplify the labelling of ammunition, the entries in storage and transport
documents and the formulation of safety regulations. The classification code is
composed of the number of the munitions assigned HD (see paragraph
1.2.1.1) and its assigned compatibility group (see paragraph 1.2.2.3) ‐ for
example "1.1 B".
2. Number of Classification Codes. Table 2 identifies the classification
codes in use, and Table 3 shows how those classification codes are derived.
The blank intersections in Table 3 are the 43 combinations that do not exist,
because the definitions of the HD and the compatibility group are mutually
exclusive, or do not occur in practice because the resultant characteristics
would be highly improbable or useless for ammunition.
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Description of substance or article to be Compatibility Classification
classified Group Code
Primary explosive substance A 1.1A
Article containing a primary explosive B 1.1B
substance and not containing two or more 1.2B
effective protective features 1.4B
Propellant explosive substance or other C 1.1C
Deflagrating explosive substance or article 1.2C
containing such explosive substance 1.3C
1.4C
Secondary detonating explosive substance D 1.1D
or black powder or article containing a 1.2D
secondary detonating explosive substance, 1.4D
in each case without means of initiation 1.5D
and without a propelling charge, or article
containing a primary explosive substance
and containing two or more effective
protective features
Article containing a secondary detonating E 1.1E
explosive substance, without means of 1.2E
initiation, with a propelling charge (other 1.4E
than one containing a flammable liquid or
gel or hypergolic liquids)
Article containing a secondary detonating F 1.1F
explosive substance with its own means of 1.2F
initiation, with a propelling charge (other 1.3F
than one containing a flammable liquid or 1.4F
gel or hypergolic liquids) or without a
propelling charge
Pyrotechnic substance, or article G 1.1G
containing a pyrotechnic substance, or 1.2G
article containing both an explosive 1.3G
substance and an illuminating, incendiary, 1.4G
tear, or smoke producing substance (other
than a water activated article or one
containing white phosphorus,
phosphides, a pyrophoric
substance, or a flammable liquid or gel, or
hypergolic liquids)
Article containing both an explosive H 1.2H
substance and white phosphorus 1.3H
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Article containing both an explosive J 1.1J
substance and a flammable liquid or gel 1.2J
1.3J
Article containing both an explosive K 1.2K
substance and a toxic chemical agent 1.3K
Explosive substance or article containing L 1.1L
an explosive substance and presenting a 1.2L
special risk (e.g., due to water activation or 1.3L
presence of hypergolic liquids, phosphides,
or a pyrophoric substance) and needing
isolation of each type
Articles which contain only extremely N 1.6N
insensitive detonating substances, and
which demonstrate a negligible probability
of accidental initiation or propagation
Substances or articles so packed or S 1.4S
designed that any hazardous effects
arising from accidental functioning are
confined within the package unless the
package has been degraded by fire, in
which case all blast or projection effects
are limited to the extent that they do not
significantly hinder or prohibit fire-fighting
or other emergency response efforts in the
immediate vicinity of the package
TABLE 2: CLASSIFICATION CODES
A-
Hazard
A B C D E F G H J K L N S S
Division
Σ
1.1 1.1A 1.1B 1.1C 1.1D 1.1E 1.1F 1.1G 1.1J 1.1L 9
1.2 1.2B 1.2C 1.2D 1.2E 1.2F 1.2G 1.2H 1.2J 1.2K 1.2L 10
1.3 1.3C 1.3F 1.3G 1.3H 1.3J 1.3K 1.3L 7
1.4 1.4B 1.4C 1.4D 1.4E 1.4F 1.4G 1.4S 7
1.5 1.5D 1
1.6 1.6N 1
1.1-1.6 Σ 1 3 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 2 3 1 1 35
TABLE 3: COMBINATION OF HAZARD DIVISIONS AND COMPATIBILITY
GROUPS
3. Use of classification codes. Classification codes are very useful
because they are so concise and present no language problems. The 35
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codes shown in tables 2 and 3 summarize the significant characteristics, for
safe storage and transport, of the whole range of types of ammunition. These
advantages can be exploited as follows:
(a) Documents relating to storage and transport of ammunition can use
classification codes to convey the majority, and sometimes the
whole, of technical information needed to ensure safe handling,
permitted mixed storage or stowage, required segregation, a
suitable building or vehicle and appropriate fire‐fighting techniques.
(b) Safety regulations for storage and transport of ammunition can be
formulated more simply and concisely by framing them in terms of
classification codes. The codes currently in use have been selected
so as to harmonize with the requirements of the various nations and
individual modes of transport. Although the requirements may differ,
the regulations can all use the same codes to promote
standardization of concepts and terminology.
4. Serial Number and Authorized short Name. In addition to a
classification code, each munition item is assigned a “UN number” and a
“shipping name” in accordance with the UN international system for
classification of dangerous goods and based on their hazard classification and
their composition. The munitions assigned UN number and shipping name are
required to be written in capital letters on packaging and in transport
documentation.
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1.2.3 SECTION III - MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND
EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE
1.2.3.1. Mixed Storage
Ammunition and explosives of different hazard divisions may be stored together
if compatible. The required QDs and the permitted quantities for above ground
storage must be determined in accordance with Part I Chapter 3 of this Manual.
1.2.3.2. Storage Limitations
1. The rules which apply to the mixing of hazard divisions and compatibility
groups in above ground storage are detailed below. Special rules apply to
underground storage (see Part III). The basic rules are given in the form of two
tables as follows which have been taken from AASTP-3:
Table 4: Above ground Storage - Mixing and Aggregation Rules for
Hazard Divisions and Storage Sub-Divisions.
Table 5: Mixing of Compatibility Groups in Aboveground Storage.
2. Special circumstances are addressed at paragraph 1.2.3.3. and
ammunition and explosives of unknown condition at paragraph 1.2.3.4.
3. Mixed hazard divisions (HD) and Storage Sub-divisions should be
aggregated as shown in table 4:
HD/
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.4 1.5 1.6
SsD
1.1 1.1 1) 1) 1) 1.1 1.1 3) 1.1 1.1
1.2.1 1) 1.2.1 2) 2) 2), 6) 2), 6) 3) 1) 4)
1.2.2 1) 2) 1.2.2 2) 2), 6) 2), 6) 3) 1) 4)
1.2.3 1) 2) 2) 1.2.3 2) 2) 3) 1) 4)
1.3.1 1.1 2), 6) 2), 6) 2) 1.3.1 5) 3) 1.1 4)
1.3.2 1.1 2), 6) 2), 6) 2) 5) 1.3.2 3) 1.1 4)
1.4 3) 3) 3) 3) 3) 3) 1.4 3) 3)
1.5 1.1 1) 1) 1) 1.1 1.1 3) 1.1 1.1
1.6 1.1 4) 4) 4) 4) 4) 3) 1.1 1.6
TABLE 4: ABOVE GROUND STORAGE - MIXING AND AGGREGATION
RULES FOR HAZARD DIVISIONS AND STORAGE SUB-DIVISIONS
NOTES FOR USE OF TABLE 4:
1) Select the larger QD associated with the following:
a) Aggregate the NEQ for the HD 1.1 or HD 1.5 material and the HD 1.2
material and treat as HD 1.1.
b) Consider only the HD 1.2 NEQ and apply appropriate HD 1.2 criteria.
2) The NEQ of the mixture is the NEQ of the sub-division requiring the
largest QD. Do not aggregate the various SsD present but determine QD
for each individually.
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3) HD 1.4 may be stored with any other HD without aggregation of the NEQ.
4) Treat the HD 1.6 material as SsD 1.2.3 and apply Note 2.
5) Sum the NEQ and use the larger QD associated with the following:
a) Treat as SsD 1.3.1.
b) Treat as SsD 1.3.2.
6) There is a significant risk that, in certain circumstances, a mix of SsD 1.2.1
and 1.2.2 and HD 1.3 will behave as an aggregated quantity of HD 1.1.
1.2.3.3. Mixed Storage - Special Circumstances
1. There may be special circumstances where the above mixing rules may
be modified by the National Competent Authority, subject to adequate
technical justification based on tests where these are considered to be
appropriate.
2. Very small quantity HD 1.1 and large quantity HD 1.2. It should be
possible to arrange storage in such a manner that the mixture will behave as
HD 1.2.
3. Mixing of HD 1.1, HD 1.2, and HD 1.3. The QD to be applied in these
unusual circumstances is that which is the greatest when considering the
aggregate NEQ as HD 1.1, HD 1.2, or HD 1.3.
4. With the exception of substances in Compatibility Group A, which should
not be mixed with other compatibility groups, the mixing of substances and
articles is permitted as shown in Table 5.
Compatibility
A B C D E F G H J K L N S
Group
A X
B X 1) 1) 1) 1) 1) X
C 1) X X X 2) 3) 5) X
D 1) X X X 2) 3) 5) X
E 1) X X X 2) 3) 5) X
F 1) 2) 2) 2) X 2), 3) X
G 1) 3) 3) 3) 2), 3) X X
H X X
J X X
K X
4)
L
5) 5) 5) 7) 6)
N
S X X X X X X X X 6) X
TABLE 5: MIXING OF COMPATIBILITY GROUPS IN ABOVE GROUND
STORAGE. LEGEND: X = Mixing permitted.
NOTES FOR USE OF TABLE 5:
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1) Compatibility Group B fuzes may be stored with the articles to which
they will be assembled, but the NEQ must be aggregated and treated as
Compatibility Group F.
2) Storage in the same building is permitted if effectively segregated to
prevent propagation.
3) Mixing of articles of Compatibility Group G with articles of other
compatibility groups is at the discretion of the National Competent Authority.
4) Compatibility Group L articles must always be stored separately from all
articles of other compatibility groups as well as from all other articles of
different types of Compatibility Group L.
5) Articles of compatibility N should not in general be stored with articles of
other Compatibility Groups except S. However, if such articles are stored with
articles of Compatibility Groups C, D and E, the articles of Compatibility Group
N should be considered as having the characteristics of Compatibility Group D
and the compatibility groups mixing rules apply accordingly.
6) A mixed set of munitions HD 1.6N and HD 1.4S may be considered as
having the characteristics of Compatibility Group N.
7) It is allowed to mix HD l.6N ammunition. The Compatibility Group of the
mixed set remains N if the ammunition belongs to the same family or if it has
been demonstrated that, in case of a detonation of one munition, there is no
instant transmission to the munitions of another family (the families are then
called “compatible”). If it is not the case the whole set of ammunition should be
considered as having the characteristics of Compatibility group D and the
compatibility groups mixing rules apply accordingly.
1.2.3.4. Ammunition and Explosives of Unknown Condition (Mixed
storage)
1. Ammunition and explosives of unknown condition must not be stored with
any other ammunition and explosives; this includes A&E in substandard or
damaged packaging, captured enemy ammunition (CEA). Further information
is available in AASTP-5 para 2.4.
2. If any of the following circumstances exists, the mix must be aggregated
as HD 1.1 unless relevant trials or analyses indicate otherwise:
a. The presence of HD 1.2 shaped charges,
b. High energy propellants (e.g., as used in some tank gun
applications),
c. High loading density storage of HD 1.3 in conditions of relatively
heavy confinement,
d. HD 1.2 articles with an individual NEQ > 5 kg.
3. There may also be other circumstances, not yet defined, under which the
mix should be aggregated as HD 1.1.
4. Compatibility groups may be mixed in aboveground storage as shown in
table 5.
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1.2.4 SECTION IV – SENSITIVITY GROUPS
1.2.4.1. General Principles
1. In certain storage or operational situations, for example, where walls
are used to prevent, or at least substantially delay, transmission of explosion
between stacks of ammunition on opposite sides of the wall, initiation by either
fragment impact or direct shock can be disregarded. In such situations,
however, prompt acceptor detonation reactions may still occur because of
mechanisms such as kinetic trauma—the initiation of acceptor munitions due
to impacts with other acceptor munitions or with portions of the structure itself.
2. Sensitivity group is a classification category used to describe the
susceptibility of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 Articles and Explosives to sympathetic
reaction (SR).
1.2.4.2. Determination of Sensitivity Groups
Using the definitions in paragraph 1.2.4.3, ammunition and explosives are
grouped into five Sensitivity Groups SG1, SG2, SG3, SG4, and SG5.
1.2.4.3. Definitions of Sensitivity Groups (definitions taken from
AASTP-3 Edition 1):
SG1 Robust
SG2 Non-robust
SG3 Fragmenting
SG4 Cluster bombs/dispenser munitions
SG5 SD Sensitive
1.2.4.4 Guidance for Classifying an item in Sensitivity Groups
Guidance on the practical procedure for classifying an item in Sensitivity
Groups is given in AASTP-3.
1.2.5 SECTION V – TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS
GROUPS (TDG)
NATO requirements for the transport of ammunition and explosives can be
found in Allied Movement Publication (AMovP) ‐ 6, “Allied Multi‐Modal
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directive,” which sets out the NATO
policy, guidance, and criteria for the safe movement of ammunition and
explosives by all modes of transport.
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CHAPTER 3 ABOVE GROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS
1.3.1 SECTION I - PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTITY
DISTANCES
1.3.1.1 General
Potential Explosion Sites (PES) such as magazines, stacks, and vehicles
(trucks, trailers, and railcars) present an obvious risk to personnel and property.
Such sites are located at carefully calculated distances from each other and
from other magazines and installations to ensure the minimum practicable risk
to life and property (including munitions). These distances are called Quantity
Distances (QD) and are given in the tables in Annex I-A.
1.3.1.2 Basis of Quantity Distances
The QDs are based on an extensive series of trials and a careful analysis of all
available data on accidental explosions in different countries. However, QDs are
subject to uncertainty owing to the variability of explosions. As regards the
rounding of values of QDs, see Annex I-A, paragraph A.1.2. Criteria & formulae
for QDs are given in AC/326(SG/C)D(2013)0001(PFP). QD distances provided
in this document for HD 1.1 are based on TNT-equivalencies for the energetic
materials that are involved. Significant differences in the TNT equivalency must
be considered.
1.3.1.3 Kinds of Quantity Distances
1. There are two kinds of Interior QDs for each hazard division/SsD:
a. Inter-Magazine Distances (IMD) (see paragraphs 1.3.1.9. -
1.3.1.12)
b. Explosives Workshop Distances (EWD) (see paragraphs 1.3.1.13. -
1.3.1.14)
2. There are two kinds of Exterior QDs for each hazard division/SsD:
a. Public Traffic Route Distances (PTRD) (see paragraph 1.3.1.15)
b. Inhabited Building Distances (IBD) (see paragraph 1.3.1.16)
1.3.1.4 Quantity Distances for Hazard Divisions
1. Annex I-A, Tables 1 to 4 give QD Matrices for all Hazard Divisions and
Tables 5-9 give the formula for each explosives effect and Tables 10-12 are
look-up tables to give pre-calculated quantities or distances. BD calculations
relate to Blast Distances, DFD calculations relate to Debris and Fragment
Distances, P calculations relate to Progressive Event Distances and TD
calculations relate to Thermal Distances.
2. A flow chart is given in Annex I-B, showing how to use the QD Matrices
with the formula for each explosives effect and the look-up tables to give the
tolerably safe distance or quantity. The NEQ/MCE matrix shows which
explosives effect must be considered for each HD/SsD and whether the full
NEQ of the PES or the MCE of the item is to be used. Each effect must be
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calculated, and the greatest distance or smallest quantity must be used as the
limiting factor for each PES/ES interaction.
3. Where the tables give ‘No QD’ this is because either the PES or the ES
protects from the explosives effects at the PES and no QD is required. The
separation to other explosives storehouses, explosives workshops, public
traffic routes or inhabited buildings will be dependent on constructional details,
access for rescue and fire-fighting personnel or other administrative
arrangements. Where “No QD” is shown on the matrix, practical
considerations will dictate actual separation distances.
1.3.1.5 Quantity Distances for Hazard Division 1.1
The IMD should not be used for packages of primary explosives and other
very sensitive explosive substances like blasting gelatine which require
individual assessment when at an ES.
1.3.1.6 Quantity Distances for Hazard Division 1.2 and 1.6
1. The QDs have been based on the following four factors. The first factor
is the range of fragments and lobbed munitions which are projected from a
PES. The second factor is the total number of projections likely to hazard an
ES. If comprehensive data are available for a particular item, then the QDs for
Hazard Division 1.2, which are based on trials with individual rounds
considered to be representative, may be replaced by this more appropriate
data taking into account the vulnerability of the munitions, explosives, and
buildings at the ES under consideration (see Part II, Chapter 5, Section I.).
The third factor is the behavior of some types of SsD 1.2.1 munitions inside a
structure (See paragraph1.3.1.11.3). Structure types (both PES and ES) and
MCE at the PES significantly impact SsD 1.2.1 QDs. Additionally, for SsD
1.2.1, there is a fourth factor; whereby the items’ MCE must be considered.
2. Fragments and Lobbed munitions from Rounds greater than 0.136 kg
individual applicable HE content (SsD1.2.1) 5. This, the most hazardous part of
Hazard Division 1.2 comprises those rounds and munitions (characteristic of 81
mm and 105 mm) which contain a high explosive charge and may also contain a
propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The total applicable HE content of these
rounds, etc. will be greater than 0.136 kg. It is impractical to specify QDs which
allow for the maximum possible flight ranges of propulsive items. The more
realistic approach chosen, is to base QDs on the likely range of packaged items.
Munitions which explode during an accident will rarely detonate in their design
mode. In a fire situation explosive fillings may melt and expand, breaching their
casings and then explode via cook-off or burning to detonation reactions. These
explosions may involve anything from 100% to very little of the fill dependent on
the amount of the filling that has escaped through the breach. Based on 81 mm
and 105 mm testing used in HD 1.2 Test Programme (PFP(AC/326-
SG/5)N(2004)0001 14 June 2004), the largest HD 1.1 equivalent event (called
5 Applicable HE Content: The weight of the explosive material in any individual explosive train
of one payload component within a HD 1.2 munition system that, by design, will detonate with
the intention of producing metallic fragments from the payload's outer case. The largest
determined weight of a payload component's explosive train may be used to assign SsD 1.2.1
or SsD 1.2.2 to the munition.
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the Maximum Credible Event (MCE)) will be less than 50 kg. The fragmentation
produced by such reactions is totally different to that generated in a design
detonation. The case splits open producing large (for a 105 mm shell, for
example 2-3 kg) but comparatively few fragments with velocities of 100-500 ms-1.
These are likely to be projected further than the smaller fragments from the full
detonation of similar munitions in a HD 1.1 reaction. Quantities of unexploded
munitions, sub-assemblies or sub-munitions also may be projected to
considerable ranges and will, due to thermal or mechanical damage, be more
hazardous than in their pristine state. Data on individual round characteristics
obtained from tests and accidental explosions may be used to determine the
validity of including a specific round in this category or to reduce it to the lesser
category described in Paragraph 3. below.
3. Fragments and Lobbed Munitions from Rounds less than or equal to
0.136 kg applicable HE content (SsD1.2.2). This less hazardous part of Hazard
Division 1.2 comprises those rounds and munitions which contain a high
explosive charge and may also contain a propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The
total applicable HE content of these rounds, etc. will be less than or equal to
0.136 kg. It will also typically comprise munitions which do not contain HE, such
as rounds with inert projectiles, pyrotechnics, WP rounds, illumination rounds,
and similar items. Rocket motors are an exception and should be assessed as
they may be more appropriately addressed by assignment to SsD 1.2.1. Tests
show that many items of this type produce fragments and lob munitions with a
range significantly less than that of items in para 2. above but of course greater
than that of munitions and explosives of Hazard Division 1.4.
4. Subdivisions for Storage. It is important not to exaggerate the significance
of the value of 0.136 kg used in 2. and 3. above. It was based on a break point in
the database supporting the QD relationships and tables and the HE of the
rounds tested, i.e., 0.136 kg equates to the quantity of HE contained in the
German 40 mm munition used in the NATO HD 1.2 trials. This munition reacted
differently compared to the 105 mm and 81 mm and as such forms the known
upper limit of SsD 1.2.2. If comprehensive data is available for a particular item,
then the item may be placed in that category of HD 1.2 supported by the data
and allocated the relevant QDs. It may also be necessary to take into account
the vulnerability of munitions, explosives, and buildings at the ES under
consideration, see Part II, Chapter 5, Section I.
5. Number of Fragments and Lobbed Items at an Exposed Site. Following the
initiation of an event in storage there will be a delay before there are any violent
events and projections. This delay will be highly dependent on the nature,
dimensions and packaging of the items involved. For 40 mm HE rounds it can be
as short as two or three minutes and for 105 mm HE rounds 15-20 minutes.
Once munitions start to react the rate of reactions increases rapidly and then
decreases more slowly. Reactions may still occur hours after the event. The
ability of the storage structure at the PES to contain the fragments etc. will
determine both in time and density the effects at the exposed site. For medium
and lightly constructed PES where, at some stage, walls and/or roofs will be
destroyed, the modifying effect of the building on the fragmentation is not taken
into account. Evacuation from PTR and beyond may be possible. However, the
QDs given at Annex I-A assume no amelioration from firefighting or evacuation.
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They are based on the total fragmentation at the exposed site from the event at
the PES.
6. Arrangements for Firefighting. The levels of protection afforded by the Inter-
Magazine Distances in Annex I-A are based on the fragment density at the
Exposed Site for the total incident and the degree of protection afforded by the
structure at the Exposed Site. In the light of the indeterminacy of the
fragmentation effects both in time and quantity, firefighting will, in general, be
inadvisable. However, the installation of automatic fire-fighting arrangements
could be invaluable from the stock preservation and event containment points of
view. It is assumed that an incident involving Hazard Division 1.2 cannot be
promptly curtailed by manual firefighting. It is considered unlikely that any
significant attempts could be made to fight a fire involving Hazard Division 1.2
explosives as it is anticipated that such efforts would have to be made from such
a distance and from behind protective cover so as to make those efforts
ineffective. In addition, some storage areas are too remote from professional fire-
fighting services, and other lack suitable protective cover from behind which
firefighters could even attempt to attack a fire involving munitions of Hazard
Division 1.2. The levels of protection take into account the fact that the
Explosives Area is endangered by firebrands, projections and lobbed munitions
which would most likely propagate fire or explosion if the QDs were insufficient.
The available fire-fighting effort should be directed at preventing the spread of
fire and the subsequent propagation of explosions. Fuller recommendations are
given in Part II, Chapter 4 of the Manual.
7. To advise on Maximum Credible Event (MCE) calculation. The MCE is the
single largest HD1.1 equivalent event (as defined in para 1.3.1.6 2) that is
expected to occur from a given quantity and type of munitions. MCE is applicable
to SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.3 and HD1.6 munitions only.
8. The MCE for SsD 1.2.1 munitions that produce fragmentation effects
similar to 81 mm and 105 mm, as tested in the HD 1.2 Test Program
(PFP(AC/326-SG/5)N(2004)0001 14 June 2004), can be considered to have a
default MCE of 50 kg. Where the default 50 kg MCE is not being applied, then:
a. The MCE can be determined in one of three ways:
(1) Established by testing or analogy (i.e., comparison to a like
munition packed in a like manner). This will be typical of all
new items being developed.
(2) When no specific test data is available, by multiplying the HE
content of an item times the number of items in three
unpalletized, outer shipping packages. This will typically be
used with older SsD 1.2.1 items, for which data is not
available. It should be understood that this method could give
an extremely conservative value that will likely exceed the 50
kg default value discussed later, thereby requiring very
stringent QD application.
(3) Assessing SsD 1.2.1 munitions on a case-by-case basis using
available data to arrive at a reasonable value. This will
typically be used with older SsD 1.2.1 items where the very
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conservative MCE/QD as discussed in 1.3.1.6. 8.a (2) above
is not acceptable.
9. The MCE for SsD 1.2.3 is the NEQ of one item or package, as determined
through testing, whereas the MCE for HD 1.6 is the NEQ of a single item. When
the Hazardous Fragment Distance (HFD) for a specific SsD1.2.3 item is known,
it is shown as a parenthetical number (xx), with xx in hundreds of meter. E.g.
(01) SsD1.2.3 refers to an HFD of 100 m. For storage in the open, this HFD may
be used to overrule the more generic DFD6 and DFD7. Storage in light PES
must use the default DFD Curves, as the parenthetical HFD does not consider
the structural debris hazard arising from the list PES. Additionally, where DFD18
and DFD20 are the prescribed distance, 2/3 times the parenthetical HFD can be
used, and where DFD19 and DFD21 are prescribed, 0.5 times the parenthetical
HFD can be used for the Debris & Frag distance. If the PES for the SsD 1.2.3
item satisfies all DFD Barricade requirements, the lesser of the parenthetical
HFD and DFD7 can be used.
10. To advise situations where the 50 kg MCE is exceeded. Where the MCE
exceeds 50 kg, in any structure that can contribute to the debris.hazard,
structural debris, and fragmentation hazards need to be addressed. For open
stack, structural debris hazards do not apply. Where MCE largely exceeds 500
kg, specific attention should be given to repeated blast exposures of ES by
multiple similar events.
11. For any specific quantity or distance determination, as an alternative to the
SsD 1.2.3 QD criteria, when an increase in the allowable quantity or a reduction
in the required distance will result, SsD 1.2.3 items may be treated as follows:
a. If the single-round HE content is greater than 0.136 kg
(see1.3.1.6. 2.), consider the item as SsD 1.2.1.
b. If the single-round HE content is equal to or less than 0.136 kg
(see 1.3.1.6. 3.) consider the items as SsD 1.2.2.
12. When assessing the available storage capacity based on given PES and
distances, the MCE (either for SsD 1.2.1, SsD 1.2.3 or HD 1.6) cannot be larger
than the HD 1.1 NEQ. If for any reason the MCE exceeds the calculated HD 1.1
NEQ capacity, the MCE should be limited and set equal to the HD 1.1 NEQ
capacity.
13. Situations which require no QDs. Where either the PES or the ES is an
earth covered magazine (ECM) or a building which can either contain or mitigate
the effects generated in an accidental explosion of the HD 1.2 then, in general,
no QDs are necessary. The separation to other explosive storehouses, explosive
workshops, public traffic routes or inhabited buildings will be dependent on
constructional details, access for rescue and fire-fighting personnel or other
administrative arrangements. For public traffic routes and inhabited buildings,
consideration should be given to the use of fixed distances of 30 m for
ammunition of SsD 1.2.2 or 60 m for SsD 1.2.1. However, where there is an
aperture such as a door in the PES and the ES has either an unprotected and
undefined door pointing towards the PES or offers little or no protection to its
contents then the higher QDs shown in the tables should be applied.
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1.3.1.7 Quantity Distances for Hazard Division 1.3
1. General. Hazard Division 1.3 QDs requires separate consideration of
two types of explosives, namely propellants (classified as SsD 1.3.1 -
Compatibility Group C) and other items (classified as SsD 1.3.2 - Compatibility
Group G). Although many hazardous effects are common to both types, the
dominant hazards used, as the bases of certain QDs are different in the two
cases hence there are two tables.
2. Explosives producing a mass fire effect (SsD1.3.1). The explosives
producing a mass fire effect are likely to be propellants, which produce a
fireball with intense radiant heat, firebrands, and some fragments. The
firebrands may be massive fiery chunks of burning propellant. (The effect of
quite normal winds may augment a calculated flame radius by 50 %. A
building with marked asymmetry of construction such as an ECM or building
with protective roof and walls, but with one relatively weak wall or a door,
induces very directional effects from the flames and the projection of burning
packages.). These items or substances are called items or substances of SsD
1.3.1.
3. Munitions and Explosives not Producing a Mass Fire Effect (SsD1.3.2).
Items other than propellants produce a moderate fire with moderate
projections and firebrands. The projections include fragments, but these are
less hazardous than those which characterize Hazard Division 1.2. These
items or substances are called items or substances of SsD 1.3.2.
1.3.1.8 Distances for Hazard Division 1.4
Separation distances from munitions and explosives of Hazard Division 1.4 are
not a function of the NEQ. Distances prescribed by fire regulations apply.
1.3.1.9 Inter-Magazine Distances - General Considerations
1. These distances are the minimum permissible separation distances
between PES and storage sites containing munitions or explosives. These
distances are intended to provide specified degrees of protection to the
munitions and explosives at the ES. Besides explosives safety considerations, a
typical minimum distance of 10 m should be applied for practical reasons such
as firefighting, vehicle/handling equipment access requirements, ventilation
requirements and security. The degree of protection is highly dependent upon
factors such as sensitiveness of explosives, type of munitions, type of packaging,
and type and construction of building at the PES or ES or both. In general, the
provision of stronger buildings allows the use of smaller QDs for a given degree
of protection, or achieves a better standard of protection at a given distance,
especially in the case of a PES containing munitions and explosives of Hazard
Division 1.1 or 1.2.
2. The selection of the optimum combination of types of construction of the
buildings, QD and degree of protection involves a balance between the cost of
construction, the availability and cost of land, and the value of the stocks of
munitions and explosives which might be rendered unserviceable at ES in the
event of an accident at the PES. The hazard divisions and compatibility groups
of the munitions and explosives and the need for flexibility in the use of the sites
should be taken into account.
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3. The following paragraphs describe the levels of protection corresponding
to common combinations of buildings or stacks and QDs for each hazard division
as a guide for decisions on the optimum solution. These levels of protection are
incorporated in the Inter-Magazine Distances in Annex I-A, Tables 1 to 4. Some
entries in the tables show only one level of protection owing to a lack of
information at the present time. In a few cases it is not possible to predict the
level of protection as it depends on the type of structure at the ES and the
sensitiveness of its contents. An indication of the full range of possibilities is
given in Part II, Chapter 5.
1.3.1.10 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.1
1. Protection of Stocks. The observed damage to stocks at an Exposed
Site from an accidental explosion varies widely and, although detailed
prediction of such effects is outside the scope of this Manual, a measure of
guidance is given here. Since an ECM is designed to resist external blast,
primary fragments or secondary projections, the design ensures that the
stocks survive and would be expected to generally remain serviceable.
However, at the BD3-distances the ground shock may render unserviceable
sensitive electrical and electronic components of guided missiles, etc. For
open stacks and buildings, other than those covered with earth, a general
assessment is that for distances less than BD5-distances it is probable that,
even though propagation may not have taken place, the stocks are likely to be
unserviceable and covered by debris from the collapsed building. Stocks at
BD9-distances and greater are only likely to be serviceable if the building has
not suffered serious structural damage although some structural damage at
the BD9-distances, dependent on the type of building, can be expected.
2. Alternative Levels of Protection at an ES. As described above, the ECM
design affords extremely good protection to its contents. Weaker buildings and
open stacks would not be expected to give such good protection although
concrete structures are considered to be superior generally to brick from an
Exposed Site point of view. The level of protection also depends on the
vulnerability or robustness of the munitions stored at the Exposed Site and the
type of traversing used. Note: Refer to AASTP-3 for how to determine if a
munition can be considered robust as certain conditions must be met in order
for a munition to fall into this category. The following paragraphs describe the
three levels of protection which are incorporated in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4 and
which are intended to provide an adequate basis for the selection of a
particular QD. Some entries in the table show only one level of protection due
to a lack of data. The three levels of protection are:
a. There is virtually complete protection against practically instantaneous
propagation of explosion by ground shock, blast, flame, and high
velocity projections. There are unlikely to be fires or subsequent
explosions caused by these effects or by lobbed munitions. The
stocks are likely to be serviceable. However, ground shock may
cause indirect damage and even explosions among especially
vulnerable types of munition or in conditions of saturated soil. These
exceptional circumstances require individual assessment rather than
use of the QDs in Annex I-A.
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b. There is a high degree of protection against practically instantaneous
propagation of explosion by ground shock, blast, flame, and high
velocity projections. There are occasional fires or subsequent
explosions caused by these effects or by lobbed munitions. Most of
the stocks are likely to be serviceable although some are covered by
debris.
c. There is only a limited degree of protection against practically
instantaneous propagation of explosion by ground shock, flame, and
high velocity projections. There are likely to be fires or subsequent
explosions caused by these effects or by lobbed munitions. The
stocks are likely to be heavily damaged and rendered unserviceable;
they are sometimes completely buried by debris. This level of
protection is not recommended for new construction.
3. The levels of protection described above in Para 1.3.1.10.2. are not
applicable to small quantities of HD 1.1 (i.e., < 500 kg NEQ). PES-ES IMD
relationships in this range provide a “high level” of protection against prompt
propagation thus eliminating the need to aggregate separate stacks of small
quantities of HD1.1. This is accomplished through the consideration of PES
and/or ES construction, or the presence of an intervening barrier (e.g., a
barricade) between the two, on the basis that low-angle, high-velocity
fragments and/or debris (the primary cause of prompt propagation) are
defeated.
1.3.1.11 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.2
1. All IMDs prevent immediate propagation, meaning that separate locations
do not need to be aggregated. HD 1.2 IMDs are based on MCE, while delayed
progressive event reactions are left out of consideration and are shown as “Not
applicable” in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4. IMDs for HD 1.2 relate essentially to three
levels of munition and explosives (asset) protection at the ES. The protection
offered by the combination of PES and ES against the explosion effects from the
PES, e.g., low angle high velocity and lobbed munitions / fragments / debris and
blast is considered. Asset protection will vary by SsD because of an increase in
MCE. The following are the three levels of protection offered to munitions and
explosives at the ES:
a. Virtually complete protection.
b. High degree of protection.
c. Limited degree of protection.
2. The MCE of an item is calculated using the process in 1.3.1.6, 8, a with
regards to SsD 1.2.1 inside heavy structures (ECM or heavy brick/concrete of
appropriate thicknesses), the 50 kg default MCE, which has been conservatively
established, represents the breakpoint at which a heavy structure can no longer
sufficiently either contain or mitigate the effects to provide equivalent IMD.
3. IMD relationships that involve heavy structures/ECMs as a PES or ES,
and/or barricades are expected to either contain or sufficiently protect adjacent
stores of any munitions and explosives from the prompt effects of an SsD 1.2.1
event. For prompt propagation to occur, low-angle, high-velocity fragments must
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be unimpeded and heavy structures/ECMs, as PES or ES, and/or barricades will
provide sufficient protection towards impeding such fragments. Consequently, as
there is a significant delay with lobbed fragments or high angle debris arrival,
they are considered irrelevant with respect to IMD, and so protective roofs are
not a requirement to provide adequate IMD separation.
4. For SsD 1.2.2, any substantial PES or ES structure and/or intervening
barricade is expected to either contain or sufficiently protect adjacent munitions
or explosives stacks from the instantaneous effects of an SsD 1.2.2 event and
will prevent prompt propagation for IMD purposes.
1.3.1.12 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.3
1. The IMD for HD 1.3 relate essentially to two levels of protection of
munitions and explosives at an ES:
a. There is virtually complete protection against immediate or
subsequent fires among the contents of an ES by flame, radiant heat,
firebrands, projections, and lobbed munitions. There may be ignition
of combustible parts of the building, but this is unlikely to spread to
the contents even if it were not possible to provide prompt and
effective fire-fighting services.
b. There is a high degree of protection against immediate propagation of
fire to the contents of an ES by flame, radiant heat, firebrands,
projections, and lobbed munitions. There is a considerable risk that
one or more of these effects, especially lobbed munitions, is likely to
ignite the contents directly or as the result of ignition of combustible
parts of the building unless effective firefighting is able to prevent
such consequences.
1.3.1.13 Explosives Workshop Distances
1. General Considerations. These distances are the minimum permissible
distances between PESs and explosive workshops designed in accordance with
AASTP1 Part 2. The distances are intended to provide a reasonable degree of
immunity for personnel within the explosives workshops from the effects of a
nearby explosion, such as blast, flame, radiant heat and projections. Light
structures are likely to be severely damaged, if not completely destroyed. These
distances also provide a high degree of protection against immediate or
subsequent propagation of detonations.
2. Explosive Workshop Distance for HD 1.1
a. For HD 1.1 the standard Explosives Workshop Distance should be
the distances, as applicable, prescribed in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4. At
this distance the major effects to be considered are the peak side-
on overpressure, which is anticipated to be no greater than 20 kPa
(3 psi) and debris, which is extremely difficult to quantify, but would
be a very significant effect.
b. When siting and designing explosives workshops the following
effects should be borne in mind amongst others. A person in a
building designed to withstand the anticipated blast loading and
without windows would be merely startled by the noise of the
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explosion at an adjacent site whereas a person in a brick building
with windows might suffer eardrum damage or suffer indirect
injuries through his translation by blast and subsequent impact on
hard objects or through possible collapse of the building upon them.
3. Explosive Workshop Distance for HD 1.2
a. Since debris and/or fragmentation hazards are considered to be
dominant for HD 1.2 and the IBD is based on an appreciation of this
hazard then the Explosive Workshop Distance is generally
determined as 36% of the IBD.
b. However, where the PES is an ECM or a building which can either
contain or mitigate the effects generated in an accidental explosion of
the HD 1.2 then no QDs are necessary to adjacent explosive
workshops although the separation between them and the explosive
storehouses will be dependent on constructional details and access
for rescue and fire-fighting personnel.
c. Where the PES is an ECM or a building which can either contain or
mitigate the effects generated in an accidental explosion of the HD
1.2 but has a door or other aperture in the direction of the ES then the
Explosive Workshop Distance is determined as 36% of the IBD.
d. Where the explosive workshop is protected by a barricade and has a
protective roof it is considered that the occupants are afforded a high
degree of protection which decreases to limited if the building is either
not barricaded or does not have a protective roof. In the absence of
any protective features, such as a barricade or a protective roof, not
only is the level of protection limited but it is recommended that such
explosive workshops should only be sited at an increased separation.
1.3.1.14 Separation of Explosives Workshops from Storage Sites
1. The BD18-distances in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4, may not give protection to
personnel in explosives workshops having light roofs. If greater protection is
required against projections than that provided by BD18-distances for example
to protect personnel and valuable test equipment, then the explosive workshop
must be provided with a protective roof. If there is a possibility of a serious
fragment hazard, then consideration should be given to using a greater distance
between explosives workshops having light roofs and storage sites containing
munitions and explosives of HD 1.1 as is already required in certain
circumstances.
1.3.1.15 Public Traffic Route Distances (PTRD)
1. General Considerations
a. These distances are the permissible distances between a PES and
routes used by the public, which are generically referred to as (PTRs)
These routes include:
(1) Roads
(2) Railways
(3) Waterways, including rivers, canals, and lakes, and
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(4) Footpaths
b. It is important to appreciate that PTRs or common access areas
should not be treated independently of each other or of any other
constraints around an explosives site. They should be viewed within
the overall picture and the above guidelines used to indicate whether
a particular situation is likely to be worth consideration. Ideally a full
risk analysis should be conducted to ascertain how these additional
risks would fit into the overall risk picture. Only then can informed
decisions be made regarding the soundness of a particular license.
2. Traffic Density Considerations
a. Since the exposed sites presented by PTRs are so diverse three
alternatives are provided as follows:
(1) The use of full IBD protection for heavily used routes.
(2) The use of a reduced PTRD, generally 2/3 of the appropriate
IBD, for less heavily used routes, and
(3) The use of a lower distance for routes which are used
intermittently or infrequently by low numbers of people.
(4) For Very Low Density Roads No QD is given.
b. The dominant factors which determine the number and severity of
road casualties are the traffic speed and density, the width of traffic
lanes and their number, the presence of crash barriers, the surface
condition, and the radius of any curves. Factors of less importance
are the presence or absence of roadside trees and ditches and of
separated carriageways for opposing traffic. For other types of routes,
it is essentially the density and speed of the “traffic” which are the
critical factors.
c. Because of the variety of waterway borne traffic some cognisance
may need to be taken of special factors, e.g., passenger carrying
ferries which, although traversing the hazarded area much quicker
than other craft, may merit special consideration because of the
number of passengers carried.
1.3.1.16 Inhabited Building Distances
1. General. These distances are the minimum permissible distances
between PESs and inhabited buildings or assembly places. The distances are
intended to prevent serious structural damage by blast, flame, or projections to
ordinary types of inhabited buildings or caravans/mobile homes and
consequent death or serious injuries to their occupants.
2. Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.1
a. The distances for HD 1.1 are based on tolerable levels of damage
expected from a side-on overpressure of 5 kPa. They are intended
to ensure that the debris produced in an accidental explosion does
not exceed one hazardous fragment (energy > 79 J) per 56 m² at
the IBD. They are not sufficiently large to prevent breakage of glass
and other frangible panels, or cladding used in the three types of
buildings of vulnerable construction. This broken glass, cladding
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etc. can cause injury to occupants and those in the immediate
vicinity of the buildings. Such buildings of vulnerable construction
should be situated as follows:
(1) Curtain Wall Construction (Type-1) and Largely Glass
Construction (Type 2): are considered to be of similar
vulnerability. Type 1 buildings are four storeys or more and
with large (≥ 1.5 m2) frangible or glass curtain wall panels
(external non-load bearing panels on a separate sub-frame
which are supported off the structural frame or floors) and
where the frangible or glass curtain wall panels extend over
50% or more of any elevation. Type 2 buildings are of four
storeys or more with solid walls and large (≥ 1.5 m2) individual
glass panes or frangible panels extending over 50% or more
of any elevation. These frangible or glass panels are liable to
shatter producing fragments or be displaced under the effect
of lateral explosive blast loads greater than the designed wind
forces. The curtain walling and wall panels would be
considered a hazard to personnel both inside and outside the
building because of flying fragments or falling panels. These
two types of construction are typical of that found in high rise
buildings. These types of buildings should normally be situated
at distances not less than two times inhabited building
distances (i.e., > 44.4Q1/3) for blast (see paragraph 1.3.7.6.).
However, such buildings, but probably not schools or
hospitals, may be acceptable within the 44.4Q 1/3 distances,
particularly if the population outside the building (on whom the
displaced glass etc. would fall) is small or virtually nil. When
vulnerable buildings have been allowed within the
44.4Q1/3distances on these grounds, it will be necessary to
check at regular intervals that the original conditions (i.e., area
around building free of people) have not changed.
(2) Frangible Non-Load Bearing Panel Construction (Type 3): this
presents a difficult problem, and it is intended to cover the
multiplicity of new construction types which have been
introduced since the curtain wall concept was first thought of.
Type 3 buildings are those of 400 m2 plan area with
continuous or large (≥ 1.5 m2) individual glass panes or
frangible panels on the walls or roof and where those panes or
panels extend over more than 50% of any elevation. Type 3
building construction is typically found in covered market
buildings, shopping complexes and retail warehouses. Broken
glass, cladding etc. can cause injury to occupants and those in
the immediate vicinity of these buildings. When there is not
large population either inside or outside the buildings such as
may occur at some industrial or retail distribution facilities,
these buildings may be permitted within the 44.4Q1/3 distances
but at not less than the 22.2Q1/3 distances. Each such building
has to be treated on its merits, the hazard assessed and an
appropriate QD selected. Any large building which is not of
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traditional house construction should likely be sited for blast in
the 44.4Q1/3 region.
b. With respect to debris and fragments, the IBD is based on a large
amount of testing involving detonations of various magnitude in
various PES structure types. Based on debris and fragment pick-up
data the IBD has been determined according to the definition
above. This has led to Debris and Fragment Distances (DFD) for
the following PES and orientations:
DFD 1: ECM rear and side
DFD 2: ECM front, unbarricaded
DFD 3: Medium and Heavy walled magazines, internal volume
larger than 20 m3, unbarricaded
DFD 4: Medium and Heavy walled magazines, internal volume
smaller than 20 m3, NEQ less than 1170 kg, unbarricaded
DFD 5: Medium and Heavy walled magazines of any volume,
barricaded.
DFD 6: Light structures and open stacks, unbarricaded
DFD 7: Light structures and open stacks, barricaded.
A graph showing the DFD as a function of NEQ is given in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: DFD as a function of NEQ for various PES structure types
c. The DFD are replacing 400 m minimum separation distances used
in previous versions of AASTP-1. Dependent on NEQ or MCE, DFD
can both be smaller or larger than the 400 m distance.
d. ECMs with a barricaded front are not defined as a separate PES in
this manual. When desired, the user of this manual can give credit
to an ECM front barricade, by multiplying DFD 2 with the following
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reduction factor. The resulting distances are indicated in Figure 1-1
as DFD 2*:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 0.7 (1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≤ 5000 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
3 23
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) =∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 +
350000 35
(5000 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 < 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≤ 40000 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 1 (40000 < 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≤ 500000 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
e. The reduction factor specified in 1.3.1.16.2.d applies to all DFD
from a barricaded front of an ECM containing HD1.1. It also applies
to a front barricaded ECM containing HD 1.2, both for progressive
event distances (relevant for SsD 1.2.1 and SsD 1.2.2) as well as
for DFD in relation to MCE, where MCE < 50 kg (relevant for SsD
1.2.1 and SsD 1.2.3). Due to a higher degree of uncertainty for
small NEQ, the DFD to the front of an ECM with a barricade shall
not be less than 91m, which represents the minimum distance for
an unbarricaded ECM.
f. Due to the directional nature of debris throw from unbarricaded
medium and heavy walled magazines, as well as from the
unbarricaded front of ECM, the debris hazard away from the wall
normal-direction is significantly smaller than in the wall-normal
direction. When desired, the user of this manual can multiply related
DFD with a reduction factor of 0.75 for directions more than 25°
away from the wall normal, as measured from the corner/edge of
the PES. Due to a higher degree of uncertainty for small NEQ, this
off angle reduction shall not result in a DFD less than 61m for
medium and heavy walled magazines, or 91m for the unbarricaded
front of an ECM.
g. For barricaded medium and heavy walled magazines, and
barricaded front of ECM, the correction factor for off-normal
directions may not be directly applied. However, for situations that
are both barricaded and off-normal the minimum DFD (barricade vs.
off-normal) may be used.
3. Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.2. The distances for
HD 1.2 are based on a tolerable risk from blast, fragments, or structural debris.
Using the total NEQ or MCE, as specified in Tables 1 through 4. Further
information is given in paragraphs 1.3.1.6, etc, including information on the use
of MCE.
4. Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.3.
a. The distances for HD 1.3 are based on a thermal flux criterion of 1.5
cal per cm². It is anticipated that occupants of traditional types of
inhabited buildings would not suffer injury unless standing in front of
windows; such persons and other in the open are likely to
experience reddening of any exposed skin areas.
b. If venting from the PES is directed towards the ES at IBD, then a
fixed distance of 60 m should be employed.
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1.3.2 SECTION II - DETERMINATION OF QUANTITY
DISTANCES
1.3.2.1 Quantity Distance Tables
1. The QDs required for each building type are given in Annex I-A, Tables 1-
4.
2. For an intermediate quantity between those given in the tables, the next
greater distance in the tables should be used when determining a QD.
Conversely the next lesser quantity in the tables should be used when
determining an NEQ limit for a given intermediate distance, alternatively, the
distances corresponding to an intermediate NEQ may be either calculated from
the formulae or determined from the Tables 5-9
3. QDs for an NEQ greater than 500,000 kg are determined by extrapolation
using the appropriate formula in AC/326(SG/C)D(2013)0001(PFP), as far as the
explosives safety factors are concerned. Adequate consideration should be
given to the economic and logistic implications of such a large NEQ in a single
storage site.
4. The tables in Annex I-A provide QDs for ECMs up to 500,000 kg NEQ.
However, certain ECM designs may require a lower NEQ to be assigned to
them, as in the case of HD 1.1. The reason being blast loads produced by a
detonating ECM is a function of the NEQ it contains, whereas the blast
resistance (i.e., blast protection capability) of an ECM (as an ES), depends on
the structural strength inherent in its design. ECM-related IMDs are based on
the structural hardness of an ES ECM, given its ability to withstand blast loads
resulting from an accidental detonation of the NEQ in an adjacent PES. Any
limitations applicable to a particular ECM design (i.e., its structural strength
rating. maximum NEQ it can withstand, or specific IMDs) must be obtained from
the design authority.
1.3.2.2 Measuring of Quantity Distances
1. QDs are measured from the nearest point of the PES to the nearest point
of the ES. Distances are measured along a straight line without regard to
barricades or earth cover.
2. Where the NEQ in a storage site or explosives workshop is so separated
into stacks that the possibility of mass reaction (i.e., prompt propagation of
detonation, explosion, fire) is limited to the quantity in any one stack, distances
are measured from the outside of the wall adjacent to the controlling explosives
stack to the nearest outside wall of another structure. If the separation to
prevent mass reaction is provided by one or more substantial dividing walls,
then the distances are measured from these walls, if appropriate, instead of
from the outside walls of the building. Where not so separated the total NEQ
that may suffer mass explosion is used for QD computations.
1.3.2.3 Determination of Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ)
1. NEQ of a single munition. The NEQ of a single munition is the total
explosive contents (NEM) of the munition unless it has been determined (e.g. by
testing) that the explosive effects of the munition significantly differ from the
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explosive effects expected from that quantity (e.g. there is no contribution from a
rocket motor in an all‐up missile).
2. NEQ of a set of munitions:
a. The NEQ of a set of identical munitions (e.g., unit load) is obtained
by adding together the NEQ of each munition, unless it has been
determined (e.g., by testing) that the explosive effects of the set
significantly differ from the explosive effects expected from that
quantity.
b. The NEQ of a set of munitions of different classifications (e.g., a
storage unit) depends on the classification of ammunition. The
mixing rules for hazard divisions and compatibility groups are given
in Chapter 5. Determination of the NEQ is then obtained as
explained above.
3. The total NEQ of all munitions and explosives in a single PES is used for
the computation of QDs unless it has been determined by testing or analogy to
testing that the effective NEQ is significantly different from the actual NEQ.
4. Where two or more PES are not separated by the appropriate IMDs, they
are considered as a single site and the aggregated NEQs are used for
determining QDs. If two or more HDs and SsDs are involved, then the principles
in Part I, Chapter 2 Section 3 apply.
5. For HD1.2 munitions, the aggregated explosives content of all rounds or
munitions present is used in the computation of the NEQ for QD purposes.
6. The NEQ does not include such substances as white phosphorous,
chemical agents, smoke or incendiary compositions unless these substances
have been shown to contribute significantly to the explosion hazard. Any other
energetic materials such as liquid fuels should be aggregated as part of the
NEQ unless it has been determined by testing that they do not contribute to the
overall hazard.
1.3.2.4 Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
1. The MCE is the single largest HD1.1 equivalent event (as defined in para
1.3.1.6.2) that is expected to occur from a given quantity and type of munitions
calculated in accordance with para 1.3.1.6, 8, a.
2. MCE is only determined for SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.3 and HD1.6 items.
1.3.2.5 Determination of Quantity Distances or permitted NEQ or
MCE
1. Depending on the explosives effect, and HD/SsD being assessed, either
the NEQ or the MCE will be used to calculate the separation distances or
permitted quantity of explosives.
2. The location of magazines or stacks containing munitions or explosives
with respect to each other and to other ES is based on the total NEQ in the
individual magazines or stacks unless the NEQ is so subdivided that an incident
involving any one of the smaller concentrations cannot produce a practically
instantaneous reaction (i.e., detonation, explosion, fire) of the whole contents of
the magazine or stack.
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3. The QDs required from each of two or more nearby storage sites or
explosives workshops to contain munitions and explosives of one HD are
determined by considering each as a PES. The NEQ permitted in the storage
sites or explosives workshops is limited to the t maximum amount allowed by
the appropriate tables based on available distances separating the storage sites
or explosives workshops concerned.
4. The QDs required from each PES containing munitions and explosives of
different HDs and SsDs are determined as follows, the flow chart at Annex A-1
Section 3 may also prove helpful:
a. Consider each PES in turn.
b. Select the correct PES/ES interaction for each ES in turn.
c. Determine each HD/SsD that is required to be present. The largest
permitted MCE should be noted on the licence to prevent the MCE
limit being exceeded.
d. Use the NEQ/MCE matrix to identify the explosives effects of
interest.
e. Refer to the Formula Matrix and calculate the QD of each HD/SsD
by calculating each relevant explosive effect separately. The
NEQ/MCE matrix shows whether to use NEQ or MCE and the look-
up tables can be used to aid with the calculations. For each
HD/SsD the select the limiting explosive effect. This is the one that
gives the largest distance (when calculating distances) or the lowest
Quantity (when calculating distances).
f. Calculate the QDs for each HD/SsD. Record the QDs in terms of
each HD/SsD.
5. Alternatively calculate the permitted quantity of each HD/SsD based upon
the available distances. Tables 5-9 give formula to calculate quantity from
distance and distance from quantity.
1.3.2.6 Relaxation of Quantity Distances
1. Interior Quantity Distances
a. Relaxation of IMD increases the total loss of stocks in other
magazines or stacks or at least them being rendered unserviceable.
Furthermore, a much larger detonation may result than that used as
basis for Exterior QDs. Disastrous damage to property and injury to
the public may be the consequence.
b. Relaxation of EWD may be permitted when a specially constructed
building is available to protect against blast and debris or where the
number of persons in the workshop is small (The number or people
permitted is a national decision) .
2. Exterior Quantity Distances. Relaxation of Exterior QDs may increase the
hazard to life and property. Relaxation should therefore be permitted only with
the written consent of the appropriate authorities (see also subparagraph
1.1.1.1.4.).
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1.3.3 SECTION III - QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN
TYPES OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES
1.3.3.1 Barricaded Stacks of Munitions
1. Stacks (Modules) of Bombs etc. BD1-distances up to 120,000 kg as
shown in Annex I-A, Table 4 may be used between unboxed bombs of HD 1.1
under the following conditions:
a. The stacks are to be separated by effective earth barricades.
b. The bombs must be relatively strong so as to withstand intense air
shock without being crushed.
c. There should be the minimum of flammable dunnage etc., which
could catch alight and lead to subsequent mass explosion of a
stack.
d. When the BD1-distances associated with quantities less than
30,000kg are used then the stacking height must not exceed 1 m.
e. In the event of a detonation in one stack the distances will provide a
high degree of protection against simultaneous detonation of bombs
in adjacent stacks. Some of the bombs in the ES may be buried and
not immediately accessible, some may be slightly damaged. There
may be occasional fires and delayed low order detonations,
particularly if the bombs are stacked on concrete storage pads.
2. Other Unpackaged Munitions of HD 1.1 In principle, the foregoing
distances and conditions may be applicable to other kinds of unboxed munitions
of 1.1 and Compatibility Group D. An example is the 155 mm shell M107 which
has a robust steel casing (see AASTP-3 for what constitutes as robust) and a
relatively insensitive high explosive filling. Each case must be judged on its
merits, using ad hoc tests or analogy with existing test data as requisite.
3. Cluster Bomb Units. Tests have shown that certain packaged cluster bomb
units (CBU) may be stored safely in accordance with subparagraph a) above. In
this case, it is the robust containers rather than the heavy casings which prevent
sympathetic detonation between stacks. Each type of bomblet and container
must be carefully assessed to ensure a satisfactory combination for the
application of this modular storage.
4. Buffered Storage
a. Tests have shown that stacks of certain types of bombs can be
stored in the same facility in such a manner separated by using
buffer materials (munitions as well as inert materials), that even
though a high order detonation will propagate through one stack it
will not propagate to the second stack. Storage under these
conditions presents the risk of explosion of a single stack only,
rather than a mass risk involving all the stacks in one module, cell,
or magazine. Hence, the NEQ of the larger stack plus the NEQ of
the "buffer" material, if any, may be used to determine the QDs
requirement for each entire module or magazine so used.
b. The storage of bombs using the buffered storage concept and
basing storage on the NEQ of the largest stack plus the buffer
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material is authorized provided nationally approved storage
arrangements are used. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section I.
1.3.3.2 Unbarricaded Stacks of TNT or Amatol Filled Shell
Certain types of TNT or Amatol filled projectiles of HD1.1 may be stored in
stacks which comply with the principle that, although a high order detonation
would propagate throughout a stack, it would be unlikely to propagate from
stack to stack. Storage under these conditions presents the risk of explosion of
a single stack only, rather than a mass risk involving all the stacks in one
module or magazine. Hence the NEQ of the appropriate single stack may be
used to determine the QDs for each entire module or magazine so used. The
special types of projectiles and the conditions are given in Part II, Chapter 3,
Section I.
1.3.3.3 Unbarricaded Storage of Fixed Munitions with Robust Shell
Trials show that munitions comprising robust shell with an explosive content not
exceeding about 20 % of the total weight (excluding propelling charges, cartridge
cases and weight of packages) and with shell-walls sufficiently thick to prevent
perforation by fragments produced by munitions of HD 1.1 may be stored
without barricades and without the risk of practically instantaneous detonation
provided an increased QD is used.
1.3.3.4 Propulsive Rockets
Rockets stored in a propulsive state (i.e., unpackaged propulsive rockets and
missiles in the assembled condition, waiting to be placed upon a tactical
launcher or vehicle) present special problems in which the flight range of the
rocket is the main safety criterion rather than the explosive content.
Consequently, the rockets should be stored in special magazines or held by
devices to prevent their flight (see Part II, Chapter 3, Section II). The QDs for
the appropriate hazard division apply only when these conditions are met,
except for the special case of missiles on the launchers at a missile installation
(see Part IV, Chapter 3). QDs are not capable of considering the risk of
propulsive munitions and the national authority or manufacturer should ensure
measures exist to prevent munitions becoming propulsive.
1.3.3.5 Storage of Very Sensitive Explosives
It is possible for the blast at an ES to cause practically instantaneous
propagation of packaged primary explosive substances and certain other very
sensitive explosive substances like blasting gelatine even when barricaded at
the BD5-distances in Annex I-A, Table 1-4. Storage conditions for such
explosives are assessed individually taking account of the protection afforded by
packaging and the magazine at the ES.
1.3.3.6 Storage of Depleted Uranium (DU) Munitions
QDs will, in general, be those appropriate to the Hazard Classification of the
munitions stored. In some cases, a special radiological safety distance may be
required between a storehouse and the nearest point of public access if it is
estimated that the adverse radiological/toxic effects of an atmospheric
dispersion of DU could give rise to a possibility of injury to a member of the
public comparable to that caused by the explosive components of the munitions.
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In such a case the more restricted of the two distances, the radiological safety
distance, or the explosives QD, shall be the one applied.
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1.3.4 SECTION IV - QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR
CERTAIN EXPOSED SITES
1.3.4.1 Separation of Miscellaneous Occupied Buildings and
Facilities in an Explosives Area
Buildings containing empty packages or other inert materials should be
separated from a PES by a distance based on the risk to the munitions and
explosives from a fire in the empty packages or other inert materials (minimum
distance 25 m). Special consideration should be given to the separation of high
value packages from a PES.
1.3.4.2 Criteria for Siting of Holding, Marshalling and Interchange
Yards
1. Holding Yards. Each holding yard is considered to be a PES. QDs and/or
explosive limits are determined as for storage sites.
2. Marshalling Yards
a. Appropriate IMD must be applied to protect a marshalling yard from
external explosions.
b. It is not necessary to treat a marshalling yard as a PES provided
the vehicles are moved expeditiously (within 4 hours) from the yard.
If a yard is used at any time for purposes other than marshalling,
e.g., holding, it is considered to be a PES and appropriate QDs as
for storage site will be applied.
3. Interchange Yards. It is not necessary to treat an interchange yard as a
PES, provided no munitions or explosives handling is accomplished and the
vehicles are moved expeditiously from the yard, the exact length of time is a
national decision. However, if a yard is used at any time for a purpose other
than interchange, it is considered to be a PES and appropriate QDs will be
applied.
1.3.4.3 Separation of Pipelines etc. from an Explosives Area
1. Aboveground Facilities. For the separation of POL facilities see Chapter 4.
2. Underground Pipelines. For the separation of underground pipelines see
Chapter 4.
1.3.4.4 Separation of Electric Supply and Communications Systems
from an Explosives Area
1. There may be mutual hazards created by siting an explosives area near to
high voltage transmission lines, powerful transmitters, vital communications
lines etc. Each case must be assessed individually to take account of the
voltage and power involved, the importance of the transmission lines, the time
for the necessary repairs and the consequences of losing communications at a
time when assistance may be required following an explosion. The assessment
should be based on the following factors:
a. Hazard from the Munitions or Explosives. PTRD is a reasonable
separation to protect public service or military emergency
communication lines and overhead electrical power transmission
lines exceeding 15 kV or associated substations. Particularly
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important installations such as the lines of a super-grid network
should be given greater protection from fragments and debris by
affording them one or even one and a half times IBD. This
increased separation is also appropriate for microwave, ultra-high
frequency (UHF) reflectors which would be vulnerable to damage
by air shock or debris and fragments. Minor transmission and
communication lines such as those serving the buildings of the
explosives area, may be sited in accordance with subparagraph b
below.
b. Hazards to the Munitions or Explosives. The QDs determined on
the basis of 1) above should be reviewed in the light of a possible
hazard from electrical lines and transmitters to the munitions and
explosives themselves. If any overhead transmission line
approaches nearer to a magazine containing munitions or
explosives than one span between the poles or pylons,
consideration should be given to the consequences of mechanical
failure in the line. Arcing and large leakage currents may be set up
before the supply could be isolated. An overriding minimum
separation of 15 m is prudent. Generating stations and substations
should be at least 45 m from any magazine containing munitions or
explosives in view of the small but real risk of fire, explosions or
burning oil in such electrical equipment. Powerful transmitters of
electromagnetic energy may hazard electrically initiated munitions.
See Part II Chapter 7.
1.3.4.5 Explosives Storage Site/Depot Safety
1. Protective Zones Around a Depot or Storage Site. Subject to national
regulations it is advisable that any depot or PES be surrounded by zones, out to
the distance at which the hazard is considered tolerable, within which
construction is controlled or made subject to special authorization.
2. Procedures for Safety Site Plans.
a. Since all explosives areas require QD separations, a safety site
plan is necessary to demonstrate these separation distances are
provided before construction commences, or explosives are
deployed into any given area. Maps and drawings will demonstrate
graphically that separation distances are in compliance with
appropriate tables in this Manual. The damaging effects of potential
reactions (i.e., detonations, explosions, fires) may also be altered
by barricades and specialized construction features. Site plan
submissions will also demonstrate when these features exist and
provide details for review by safety authorities. The following kinds
of information constitute a safety site plan:
(1) A QD schedule providing the HD/SsD and NEQ assigned to
each PES.
(2) A map of the explosives area in relation to other internal
facilities and buildings, surrounding villages, highways, and
cities (exterior QD).
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(3) Drawings showing the location of PESs in relation to one
another (interior QD).
(4) Drawings showing details of construction features which affect
QDs.
b. The NATO force sponsoring the new facility should require the
preparation of a safety site plan and its submission through
appropriate military and national authorities for review and approval.
Normally, the military command planning to use the new facility will
provide the specific details to support preparation of the site plan
document. However, administrative details are the business of
individual member nations. The intent of this requirement is to
ensure that documentation is provided for competent review before
funds are committed.
1.3.4.6 Levels of Protection
A more detailed examination of the levels of protection afforded by the QDs
given in Annex I-A Tables 1-4 and of the structures and activities considered
acceptable at each protection level is given in Part I, Chapter 3, Section VII for
HD 1.1.
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1.3.5 SECTION V - STORAGE MAGAZINES: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QD
1.3.5.1 General
1. It is not considered practicable to construct surface magazines which
withstand direct attack by hostile activities but in order to reduce the hazards
and the QDs as far as practicable, certain precautions in building construction
should be observed.
2. The construction of magazines for use by only one HD/SsD only is
uneconomic. Magazines may be used for storage of different HD/SsDs because
storage requirements vary in the course of time.
3. Guidance on structural requirements is given in Part II, Chapter 3, Section
II.
1.3.5.2 Earth Covered Magazines (ECM)
1. A storage site comprising ECMs gives the simplest and safest set of IMDs
when it is a rectangular array with the axes of the ECMs parallel and the doors
all facing in one direction. This arrangement significantly reduces the real estate
footprint required for a storage area. A front-to-front configuration should be
avoided since this requires very large separation distance between the fronts of
ECMs. It may also be expedient to arrange the ECMs back-to-back in two rows,
but this configuration may be less flexible for further development of the storage
area.
2. ECMs which conform to the minimum design criteria in Part II, paragraph
2.3.2.2. qualify for reduced IMDs compared with other types of aboveground
magazines and open stacks. ECMs of a strength exceeding the minimum
prescription may warrant further reductions in IMDs. Conversely, the other
ECMs depicted in the Annex I-A PES-ES matrices require larger IMDs. It is for
the National Authority to balance the cost of various types of construction
against the cost and availability of real estate and to determine the optimum
balance in any particular situation.
1.3.5.3 Blast Resistance of Structures at Exposed Sites
1. It may be possible for a structure at an ES to fail under blast loading so
that its contents are initiated practically instantaneously. This may be the result
of major internal spalling from walls, implosion of the door(s) or catastrophic
failure of the entire structure. The QDs in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4 presume that a
structure acting as an ES is designed either to be strong enough to withstand
the blast or to be so light that secondary projections from the structure do not
initiate the contents. An ES containing munitions vulnerable to the effects of
heavy spalling (e.g., missile warheads filled with relatively sensitive high
explosives) requires special consideration, see Part II, Chapter 5.
1.3.5.4 Influence of Protective Construction on QD
1. A magazine with marked asymmetry of construction, such as an ECM or
another PES with protective roof and walls, but with one relatively weak wall,
induces very directional effects from the flames and the projection of burning
packages containing munitions and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3. However,
it is assumed for simplicity that the effects from Hazard Division 1.3 are
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symmetrical about a PES, although it is known that other structural
characteristics and the wind can be significant.
2. Roofs may be designed to have special functions, such as:
a. Containment of fragments and prevention of lobbing of munitions
(at a PES).
b. Shielding against blast, projections, and lobbed munitions (at an
ES).
c. The QDs for magazines which contain fragments etc. depend upon
the particular design specifications. The reduced QDs resulting from
shielding roofs are incorporated in the Tables in Annex I-A.
3. Walls may be designed to exclude firebrands, projections, and lobbed
munitions. The resultant reduced QDs are incorporated in the Tables in Annex I-
A. However, a reduction often depends also on the provision of shielding roofs
and barricades.
1.3.5.5 Construction to Contain Fragments and to Prevent Lobbing
1. The design of structures to contain projections or lobbed munitions of HD
1.1 is an extremely complicated procedure and, unless warranted due to other
special circumstances, is prohibitive in cost.
2. In practice, it is generally only feasible to design such a structure when the
NEQ is small or when the total NEQ of the magazine is divided into smaller
units through use of dividing walls which prevent the mass detonation of the
entire NEQ in the magazine in the event of a detonation of one of the units. The
design of a structure to contain projections and lobbed munitions represents a
more stringent requirement than that for dividing walls to prevent propagation.
1.3.5.6 Structures to Protect from Flame Projections and Lobbed
Munitions
1. Protection from Effects of Munitions of Hazard Division 1.1
a. Protection against High Velocity Low-Angle Projections from the
Detonation of Stacks of Munitions. Munition stacks in the open or in
magazines will produce high velocity low-angle projections as a
result of a detonation. These projections may penetrate storage
magazines and retain sufficient energy to initiate the contents
practically instantaneously. Certain of the QDs in Annex I-A (ECMs)
presume that the roof, headwall, and door(s) of ECMs at the ES will
arrest these high velocity fragments. The presence of a barricade
around the stack or magazine is always preferred because of the
increased protection given against the threat posed by high velocity
low-angle projections.
b. Protection against Lobbed Munitions. In the case of an accident,
munitions may be lobbed from any of the PES in Annex I-A,
Tables 1-4. Munitions are least likely to be lobbed from the side and
rear of ECMs and more likely to be lobbed from other PES. It is
impossible for the QD to cater for ongoing propagation from an
event through lobbed munitions. Lobbed munitions are assumed
not to initiate on impact. Any lobbed munitions that have survived
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the launch event are likely to be sufficiently intact that the safety
and fuzing mechanism will prevent initiation on impact as the device
will not have received two separate arming stimuli (e.g., setback
and spin or removal of arming pin and impact of primer). Despite
this, a certain level of risk still remains and the presence of a
barricade around a magazine is always preferred and gives
increased protection against high velocity projections, but not those
arising from items lobbed over the barricade.
2. Protection from Effects of Munitions of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3. Certain
types of construction provide a reasonable degree of protection against
firebrands, comparatively low velocity projections, and lobbed munitions (see
Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.3.). Examples are:
a. An earth covered magazine with a headwall and door(s) of 0.15 m
reinforced concrete or equivalent.
b. A heavy-walled magazine.
c. A barricaded explosives workshop with a protective roof.
In such cases the smaller Interior QDs in Annex I-A, Table 1 to 4 are used. If
the door or one weak wall etc. does not completely conform to the above
requirements, such smaller distances should only be authorized after a special
assessment of the relative orientation of the weak elements and the hazards
involved.
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1.3.6 SECTION VI – BARRICADES AND EARTH COVER:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QD
1.3.6.1 Functions of Barricades
1. An effective barricade arrests high velocity low-angle projections from a
detonation which otherwise could cause direct propagation of a detonation to an
adjacent stack of munitions or explosives.
2. A vertical faced barricade close to a PES also reduces the projection of
burning packages, munitions or explosives and structural debris.
3. A barricade may also provide limited protection against blast and flame
arising either from an external or from an internal explosion when the NEQ is
relatively small as it usually is in explosives workshops. Barricades are also
called traverses in certain nations.
1.3.6.2 Influence of Barricades upon Quantity Distances for HD 1.1
1. IMD. An effective barricade can reduce required IMDs between PESs.
Real estate requirements present a significant factor in the cost of a depot and
reducing needed real estate through the application of lesser IMDs can
contribute to significant real estate cost reductions. The reduced QDs are
given in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4
2. Explosives Workshop Distances. An effective barricade can reduce
required Explosives Workshop Distances. A barricade or heavy wall around an
explosives workshop considered as an ES may provide some protection for
personnel in the lee of the barricade. Further reduction can be obtained through
the addition of a protective roof on the explosive workshop acting as an ES.
3. Exterior Quantity Distances. An effective barricade reduces fragment and
debris based IBD over a range of NEQs for certain structure types. A barricade
has an insignificant impact on blast effects at these distances. Both effects are
reflected in the QD tables.
1.3.6.3 Influence of Door Barricade upon QDs for HD 1.1
When ECMs are sited side-to-side or rear-to-rear a door barricade is not
required as far as the use of IMDs are concerned. When ECMs are sited so the
front of an ES ECM faces the side or rear of the PES ECM, its door barricade
will intercept fragments and debris, but the major consideration is the blast
resistance of the headwall and door(s) at the ES ECM which is unaffected by
the door barricade. When ECMs are sited front-to-front, a door barricade will
only be effective against debris and fragments, not blast threats.
1.3.6.4 Influence of Door Barricades upon QDs for HD 1.2
A fire in an ECM containing munitions of HD 1.2 produces a serious hazard
through the doorway from fragments and ejected munitions. This hazard is
reduced by providing a separate barricade, with a vertical wall facing the door.
Such a barricade at an ES permits reduced distances shown in Annex I-A,
Tables 1-4
1.3.6.5 Influence of Door Barricades upon QDs for HD1.3
1. The deflagration of items and substances classified SsD 1.3.1 in an ECM
or in a heavy structure produces marked directional effects in the hazardous
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sector, which is taken to be the area bounded by lines drawn from the centre of
the door and inclined 30° on either side of a perpendicular to the door. This
hazard is reduced by a door barricade, at the PES, which has a vertical wall
facing the door and is preferably backed with earth. Such a barricade permits
the use of the reduced QDs in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4. This door barricade is not
necessary when the door of the magazine at the PES faces the rear or side of
an ECM at an ES, or faces an explosives workshop, which has both a barricade
and a protective roof.
2. The burning of items classified SsD 1.3.2 in an ECM or heavy structure
produces a hazard from fragments and projected items in the sector in front of
the door. This hazard is reduced by providing a separate barricade, with a
vertical wall facing the door. Such a barricade at both a PES and at an ES
permits reduced distances shown in Annex I-A, Tables 1-4.
1.3.6.6 Earth cover and the influence upon QD
1. In the case of a detonation, the type of earth cover between ECMs affects
the load on the acceptor ECM. The earth cover should be at least 0.6 m in
depth. A slope of two to one, meaning one unit of vertical rise for every two units
of horizontal run is recommended for the earth cover. The earth should comply
with Part II, Para 2.3.3.3. An ECM often provides virtually complete protection to
its contents from the effects of an incident at a PES containing munitions or
explosives of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3.
2. When ECMs, which meet the requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.6. 1.)
and have an internal volume exceeding 500 m³, are considered as PES, then
for NEQ of HD 1.1 munitions or explosives not exceeding 45,000 kg the
following QDs should be applied to side- and rear-configurations only:
a. IBDs. BD28-distances in Table 1 may be used from the sides of the
earth covered magazine (PES) and BD25-distances from the rear of
the same ECM. Definitions of front/rear/side configurations are
given in Annex I-A, Section I, Note A.1.5. Para 7. However, for all
other explosives effects the appropriate QD must be calculated and
considered.
b. PTRD. The PTRD may be reduced to 2/3 of the IBD (BD25 and
BD28 distances respectively) as calculated in subparagraph a).
These distances (BD20- and BD23-distances) are shown in Annex
I-A, Tables 1-4. However, for all other explosives effects the
appropriate QD must be calculated and considered.
3. When two or more ECMs share a common earth cover, the allowable NEQ
permitted in them is less than it would be if the magazines had separate earth
cover. This is due to the earth coupling between the two PESs, meaning the
earth will transmit the explosive shock loading with greater efficiency than air.
To accommodate various types of earth, the following QD is applied:
a. If the two earth covers intersect at a point 3/4 the height of the
structures or higher, Column BD5 distances apply.
b. If the two earth covers intersect at a point between 3/4 and 1/2 the
height of the structures, Column BD4 distances apply.
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c. If the two earth covers intersect at, or below, a point 1/2 the height
of the structures, there is no QD reduction and normal IMD apply.
These distances refer to ECMs as specified in Annex II B. In the case of
undefined ECMs in principle Column BD6 distance applies.
1.3.6.7 Natural Barricades
It is acceptable to take advantage of natural terrain where this provides
protection equivalent to that of artificial barricades. However, it is found that hills
are usually insufficiently steep or close to the munitions or explosives and
woods cannot usually be relied upon to provide the required protection.
1.3.6.8 Barricade Design Criteria
The details of what constitutes an effective barricade are given in Part II,
Chapter 3, Section III.
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1.3.7 SECTION VII - INJURY AND DAMAGE TO BE
EXPECTED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FOR HD
1.1 AND GROUPING OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES
1.3.7.1 Introduction
1. The purpose of applying HD 1.1 QDs between PES and ES is to ensure
that minimum risk is caused to personnel, structures, and facilities. In principle,
those functions and facilities not directly related to operating requirements or to
the security of munitions or explosives should be sited at or beyond the IBD.
2. In practice, it may not always be possible to provide this level of protection
and some activities and facilities will of necessity be sited at less than the IBDs.
In other cases, the nature of the facility or structure requires that greater
protection than that afforded by IBD should be provided.
3. Damage to buildings and injury to personnel can result from either blast
overpressure effects or from projections (munitions fragments and building
debris from the PES). The severity of the effects will be dependent on both the
type of structure at the PES and at the ES. The levels of damage considered in
this section are when the PES is an:
a. Open stack or light structure
b. ECM
4. The blast overpressure predictions in this section are relevant for NEQs in
excess of 4,500 kg. For smaller NEQs, the blast related damage and injury
levels may be conservative. This section does however not address projection
hazards which may be a dominant threat especially for smaller NEQ.
1.3.7.2 Purpose of the Section
1. The aim of this section is to provide guidance on the kind of injuries and
damage which can be expected at different levels of protection and to propose
typical personnel or facilities for which these levels of protection might be
considered acceptable.
1.3.7.3 Levels of Protection
1. Blast Effects - Open Stacks and Light Structures. It can be assumed that
the blast overpressure from a light structure is the same as that to be expected
from a bare charge. This assumption is especially true as the scaled distance
increases. The following levels of protection (scaled distances) are considered:
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Scaled Distance, m/kg1/3 Peak Incident Overpressure
Expected, bar (Side-on)
(Q in kg, distance in m)
55.5 Q1/3 0.015
44.4 Q1/3 to 33.3 1/3 0.02 to 0.03
22.2 Q1/3 0.05
14.8 Q1/3 0.09
9.6 Q1/3 0.16
8.0 Q1/3 0.21
7.2 Q1/3 0.24
3.6 Q1/3 0.70
2.4 Q1/3 1.80
2. Blast Effects - ECMs. ECMs will generally attenuate the blast overpressure
from an internal detonation, although in the near field enhanced overpressure
can be expected from its front. The degree of reduction in blast overpressure
from the sides and rear of the ECM decreases as the scaled distance and/or as
the NEQ increases. In general, the greatest reduction will be obtained from the
rear of the ECM. The following levels of protection (scaled distance) are
considered:
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Direction Scaled Distance, m/kg1/3 Peak Incident Overpressure
Expected, bar (Side-on)
(Q in kg, distance in m)
Side 18.0 Q1/3 0.05
Rear 14.0 Q1/3 0.05
Side 12.0 Q1/3 0.09
Rear 9.3 Q1/3 0.09
These overpressures do not apply when the NEQ is greater than 45,000 kg
and when the ECM’s volume is less than 500 m3.
3. Projection Hazards - All PESs. Contrary to blast, the projection hazard
from a PES cannot be related to a scaled distance. The Debris and Fragment
Distances (DFD) presented in Par 1.3.1.16 provide insight in the projection
hazard from various PES and the influence of barricades. In the remainder of
this section only blast related damage and injury will be discussed.
1.3.7.4 Reduction of the Hazard
1. Enhancement of buildings to prevent or reduce the hazard is feasible and
may not be prohibitively expensive. The hazard may be reduced by:
a. Suitably designed protective construction at the PES, is only
practicable when the NEQ is relatively small. For example,
reinforced concrete cubicles used in explosive process building
construction have a maximum practical limit of about 250 kg.
Standard NATO ECMs can suppress about 100 kg as a PES.
b. By designing the structures at the ES to withstand the
overpressures and the debris and fragment attack.
1.3.7.5 Protection Level 55.5 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light
Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects
a. The overpressure expected at this distance (55.5 Q1/3) will cause
little or no damage to un-strengthened structures.
b. Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast
effects. There may be a minor hazard from broken glass or cladding
falling from a considerable height, so as to strike people.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. At this distance and beyond there is
no restriction on personnel, activities, or facilities.
1.3.7.6 Protection Level 44.4 Q1/3 to 33.3 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and
Light Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects
a. Un-strengthened structures are likely to suffer only superficial
damage.
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b. Large panes of glass that face a PES can expect 50 % or more
breakages to occur.
c. Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast
effects. Injuries that do occur will be caused principally by flying
glass and flying/falling debris with injury severity a function of what
part of the body is hit by that glass/debris.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. Protection level 44.4 Q1/3 equates to
vulnerable constructions distance. Because even superficial damage may in
some instances be unacceptable, National Authorities may require siting at
these distances for facilities of especially vulnerable construction or public
importance. Examples are:
a. Large facilities of special construction of importance including:
(1) Large factories of vulnerable construction.
(2) Multi-storey office or apartment buildings of vulnerable
construction.
(3) Public buildings and edifices of major value.
(4) Large educational facilities of vulnerable construction.
(5) Large hospitals.
(6) Major traffic terminals (e.g., large railway stations, airports
etc.)
(7) Major public utilities (e.g., gas, water, electricity works).
b. Facilities of vulnerable construction used for mass meetings:
(1) Assembly halls and fairs.
(2) Exhibition areas.
(3) Sports stadiums.
c. Built-up areas which are both large and densely developed.
1.3.7.7 Protection Level 22.2 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light
Structures
1. The equivalent protection levels in respect of ECMs with greater internal
volume than 500 m³ and when containing a NEQ of HD less than 45,000 kg are:
a. From the side: 18.0 Q1/3
b. From the rear: 14.0 Q1/3
2. Expected Blast Effects
a. Un-strengthened buildings will suffer minor damage, particularly to
parts such as windows, door frames and chimneys. In general,
damage is unlikely to exceed approximately 5 % of the replacement
cost but some buildings may suffer serious damage.
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b. Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast
effects. Injuries that do occur will be caused principally by glass
breakage and flying/falling debris with injury severity a function of
what part of the body is hit by that glass/debris.
3. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. This protection level equates to IBD.
It is the minimum distance, in conjunction with the Debris and Fragment
Distances (DFD) mentioned in paragraph 1.3.7.3.4, at which inhabited buildings
not directly connected with the functions of a PES should be sited. This level of
protection is proposed as acceptable for the following kinds of facilities:
a. Unbarricaded stacks of munitions or explosives.
b. Structures and facilities in the administration area of a depot or
factory with a considerable number of occupants (20 or more),
examples are:
(1) Main office buildings.
(2) Non-explosives workshops.
(3) Mess halls and kitchens.
(4) Main canteens.
(5) Main shower and changing facilities.
c. Structures and facilities in the administrative area of a depot or a
factory which are important for the functioning of the installation,
examples are:
(1) Manned fire stations.
(2) Central heating plants.
(3) Main vehicle pools.
(4) Gasoline storage and dispensing facilities.
(5) Unprotected water supply and power installations.
d. Inhabited buildings (as defined by the National Authority), whether
single buildings, communities, or areas of scattered habitations.
e. Structures and facilities in which people assemble, except as
indicated in subparagraph 1.3.7.6. 2. above.
f. Facilities serving the safety and needs of the general public,
examples are:
(1) Gas, water, and electricity supply installations.
(2) Radar and communications stations.
g. Important lines of transport, examples are:
(1) Main railway lines.
(2) Motorways and major roads.
(3) Major navigable waterways.
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1.3.7.8 Protection Level 14.8 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light
Structures
1. The equivalent protection levels in respect of ECMs with greater internal
volume than 500 m3 and containing a NEQ of HD 1.1 less than 45,000 kg are:
a. From the side: 12.0 Q1/3
b. From the rear: 9.3 Q1/3
2. Expected Blast Effects
a. Un-strengthened buildings will suffer average damage costing in the
range of 10 % of the total replacement costs to repair.
b. Personnel in the open are not likely to be seriously injured by blast.
c. There is a fairly high probability that fatalities and injuries will be
caused by glass breakage and flying/falling debris with severity a
function of what part of the body is hit by that glass/debris.
3. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. This distance is termed the "Public
Traffic Route Distance" and is the minimum distance at which routes used by
the general public, for purposes unconnected with the explosives facility, should
be sited (except when the PES is a heavy-walled magazine and when the route
is a main route or when the traffic is dense). This level of protection is proposed
as acceptable for the following kinds of facility:
a. Structures and facilities where the activity is connected with the
explosives installation with a limited number of occupants (less than
20), and it is unreasonable to locate them elsewhere.
b. Facilities in which people assemble only temporarily and which can
be quickly cleared. Examples are:
(1) Public paths.
(2) Recreational areas where no structures are involved.
(3) Parking places.
(4) Small arms ranges.
c. Railways, public roads, and navigable waterways of minor to
medium importance. (For public roads the risk of secondary injury
can be reduced by ensuring that the roadsides are free from
obstacles which are likely to result in injuries to the occupants of
vehicles leaving the road as a result of the driver's reaction to the
explosion).
1.3.7.9 Protection Level 9.6 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects
a. Buildings which are un-strengthened can be expected to suffer
damage to main structural members. Repairs may cost more than
20 % of the replacement cost of the building. Strengthening of
buildings to prevent damage and secondary hazards is feasible and
not prohibitively expensive.
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b. Cars may suffer some damage to metal portions of the body and
roof by blast. Windows facing the blast may be broken, however,
the glass should not cause serious injuries to the occupants.
c. Aircraft will suffer some damage to appendages and sheet metal
skin. They should be operational with only minor repair (see also
Part IV, Chapter 5).
d. Cargo type ships will suffer minor damage from blast to deck
houses and exposed electronic gear (see also Part IV, Chapter 6).
e. Personnel may suffer temporary loss of hearing; permanent ear
damage is not to be expected. Other injuries from the direct effects
of blast overpressure are unlikely, although there are likely to be
injuries from secondary effects, i.e., translation of objects.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. This should normally be the minimum
distance at which unprotected duty personnel (troops, military and civilian
maintenance and security personnel and crews of ships) should be permitted
when their duties are not closely and specifically related to the PES. Examples
are:
a. Open air recreation facilities used only by military personnel and
where dependants and the public are not involved.
b. Training areas for unprotected military personnel.
c. All military aircraft when the PES is not for the immediate service of
the aircraft.
1.3.7.10 Protection Level 8.0 Q1/3 - Open stacks and Light Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects
a. Buildings which are un-strengthened can be expected to suffer
serious damage which is likely to cost above 30 % of the total
replacement cost to repair.
b. Serious injuries to personnel, which may result in death, are likely to
occur due to building collapse or loose translated objects.
c. There is some possibility of delayed communication of the
explosion as a result of fires or equipment failure at the ES, direct
propagation of the explosion is not likely.
d. Cargo ships would suffer damage to decks and superstructure. In
particular doors and bulkheads on the weather-deck are likely to be
buckled.
e. Aircraft are expected to sustain considerable structural damage.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable. This protection level equates to
"Explosives Workshop Distance", This level of protection is acceptable for the
following kinds of facility:
a. Explosives workshops in which the personnel present are kept to
the minimum essential for the task.
b. Packing and shipping (transit) buildings in the Explosives Area.
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c. Minor transmission and communication lines.
1.3.7.11 Protection Level 7.2 Q1/3
1. This distance is used by US Authorities to define explosives workshop
separation in the US and is comparable to Protection Level 8.0 Q1/3. However,
a great deal of information is available in the US for Protection Level 7.2 Q1/3
and is included in this section for completeness.
2. Expected Blast Effects
a. Damage to un-strengthened buildings will be of a serious nature.
Repair is likely to cost 50 % or more of the total replacement cost.
b. Personnel injuries of a serious nature or possible death are likely
from debris of the building at the ES and from translation of loose
objects.
c. There is a 1 % chance of eardrum damage to personnel.
d. Some possibility of delayed communication of explosion as a result
of fires or equipment failure at the ES. There is a high degree of
protection against direct propagation of an explosion.
e. Cargo ships would suffer some damage to decks and
superstructure by having doors and bulkheads buckled by
overpressure.
f. Aircraft can be expected to suffer considerable structural damage
from blast overpressure.
3. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable
a. Workers engaged in major construction in the vicinity of munitions
or explosives production areas, waterfront areas where munitions or
explosives is being handled or areas used for the loading of aircraft
with explosives.
b. Labour intensive operations closely related to the PES, including
inert supply functions serving two or more identical or similar PES.
c. Rest and buildings for light refreshment for use of workers in the
immediate vicinity. Such facilities will normally only be used when
work is stopped in the nearby explosives magazines and should be
limited to a maximum of 6 persons.
d. Area offices with a permanent occupancy of a small number of
persons directly supporting the work of the Explosives Area or
process buildings.
e. Guard buildings in which those security personnel directly
responsible for the security of the Explosives Area are housed
when not on patrol.
f. Unmanned buildings containing immediate reaction fire-fighting
appliances.
I-3-37 Edition D Version 1
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g. Operations and training functions that are exclusively manned or
attended by personnel of the unit operating the PES. This includes
day rooms, squadron operations offices and similar functions for
units such as individual missile firing batteries, aircraft squadrons,
or munitions or explosives supply companies. Manoeuvre area,
proving grounds tracks and similar facilities for armoured vehicles
together with the armoured vehicles themselves may provide
adequate protection to the crew from fragment and debris.
h. Areas used for the maintenance of military vehicles and equipment
(trucks, tanks) when the PES is basic load or ready storage limited
to 4,000 kg or less at each end when the maintenance work is
performed exclusively by and for military personnel of the unit for
which the basic load of munitions is stored.
i. Auxiliary power and utilities functions, inert storage and issue sites
and mechanical support at naval dock areas when not continuously
manned, when serving only the waterfront area, and when the PES
is a ship or a munitions or explosives handling location at the
waterfront. When loss of the facility would cause an immediate loss
of a vital function, IBD must be used.
j. Minimum distance between separate groups of explosives loaded
combat-configured aircraft or between aircraft and a PES such as a
preload site which serves to arm the aircraft. The use of intervening
barricades is required to further reduce communication and
fragment damage and eliminate the necessity for totalling the NEQ.
The loading of munitions or explosives aboard aircraft can be
accomplished within each group of aircraft without additional
protection.
k. Parking lots for privately owned automobiles belonging to the
personnel employed or stationed at the PES.
l. Separation of naval vessels from PES consisting of other naval
vessels to which QD standards apply. When the PES is a munitions
ship or involves munitions or explosives activities, the separation
will be determined by reference to special regulations established
for piers and wharves of munition or explosives ship loading
activities.
m. Container "stuffing" and "unstuffing" operations which are routine
support of the PES. When the PES is a magazine in a storage area,
containerizing operations may be considered as part of the
magazine and separate QD rules will not be applied.
1.3.7.12 Protection Level 3.6 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects
a. Un-strengthened buildings will suffer severe structural damage
approaching total demolition.
b. Severe injuries or death to occupants of the ES are to be expected
from direct blast effects, building collapse or translation.
I-3-38 Edition D Version 1
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c. Aircraft will be damaged by blast to the extent that they will be
beyond economical repair. If aircraft are loaded with explosives,
delayed explosions are likely to result from subsequent fires.
d. Explosions may occur in ES containing munitions or explosives as a
result of fire spread by lobbed debris or blast damage. A high
degree of protection against direct propagation of an explosion is to
be expected providing direct attack by low-angle high velocity
fragments is prevented.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable
a. Buildings housing successive steps of a single process in an
explosives factory.
b. Separation of buildings for security guards from explosives
locations, provided the risk of the personnel becoming militarily
ineffective in the event of an explosive accident can be accepted.
c. Separations among buildings and facilities of a tactical missile site
where greater distances cannot be provided due to technical
reasons.
d. Temporary holding areas for trucks or railcars containing explosives
to service production or maintenance facilities provided barricades
are interposed between the explosives locations.
e. Unmanned auxiliary power facilities, transformer stations, water
treatment and pollution abatement facilities and other utility
installations which serve the PES, and loss of which will not create
an immediate secondary hazard or prejudice vital operations.
1.3.7.13 Protection Level 2.4 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures
1. Expected Blast Effects. Un-strengthened buildings will almost certainly
suffer complete destruction.
2. Personnel and Facilities Acceptable
a. Personnel stationed in magazine areas for one or two men.
b. Crews performing storage and shipping functions in the magazines
may operate for short periods of time at adjacent magazines. In
large magazine areas controls should be exercised by management
to reduce the length of time that unrelated operations are exposed
to one another at distances less than 9.6 Q1/3.
I-3-39 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
CHAPTER 4 SEPARATION OF POL FACILITIES WITHIN
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
1.4.1.1 Separation of Small Quantities of POL
Small quantities (not exceeding 100 litres) of petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL) held as immediate reserves for operational purposes within a military
installation require in case of HD 1.1 and 1.3 10m QD and in case of HD 1.2 or
1.4 no specific QDs from magazines or stacks containing munitions or
explosives.
1.4.1.2 Separation of Unprotected Aboveground POL Tanks and
Drums
If required, unprotected aboveground POL steel tanks and drums are separated
from magazines or stacks containing munitions or explosives by IBD (Annex I-
A,). Where the POL-facilities are vital they should be sited at IBD, and a
minimum distance of 400 m must be observed from magazines or stacks
containing munitions or explosives of HD 1.1. Dependent on NEQ, lesser IBD
than 400 m may be applicable for small quantities of HD 1.1 < 500 kg NEQ.
However, for brick and reinforced concrete magazines with internal volume < 20
m3, IBD greater than 400 m may be required due to the additional debris hazard
presented by these types of structures.
1.4.1.3 Separation of Protected Aboveground POL Tanks and
Drums
1. If required, QDs less than those for unprotected tanks and drums (see
paragraph 1.4.1.2.) may be used where a surface storage tank or a drum
storage area is provided with structural protection against blast and fragment
hazards. For purposes of applying this paragraph, “protected” will be considered
to mean that the POL storage tank or drum as an ES is provided with structural
protection sufficient to ensure that the POL storage tank or drum and contents
will experience no more damage than if sited at IBD.
2. The criteria specified for the separation of POL from explosives areas are
intended primarily for use in determining separations at large permanent
munition depots. It may be desirable to weigh the cost of distance/protective
construction against strategic value of the POL supplies and the ease of
replacement in the event of an incident. Reduced distances may be approved if
the POL loss can be accepted, and if the POL-facilities are sited and provided
spill containment so as not to endanger the explosives. Such reduced distances
must be acceptable to both host and user nations.
1.4.1.4 Separation of Buried POL Tanks or Pipelines
Buried POL tanks or pipelines should be separated from magazines or stacks
containing munitions or explosives of HD 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 by a minimum or fixed
distance of 25 m as appropriate. The distances are given in Annex I-A, Tables
1-4.
I-4-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
CHAPTER 5 REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS
1.5.1.1 Information Required
1. In order that reports on damage resulting from munitions accidents be of
value to the "NATO Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation
and Storage of Military Munitions and Explosives (AC/326)" and useful in
verifying the safety principles, the information should include the following:
a. Type and quantity of munitions or explosives in the stack or
magazine where the accident occurred.
b. NEQ and name of filling and weight of filled items.
c. Method of packing of the munitions or explosives where the initial
accident occurred and material of packages.
d. Distances between the articles in the packages.
e. Method of storing the munitions or explosives where the initial
accident occurred.
f. Information as above for neighbouring storage places of munitions
and explosives stating whether such neighbouring stacks were set
off or otherwise affected.
g. The thickness of walls and roofs if munitions or explosives were
stored in magazines and whether there were windows through
which fragments or debris got into the magazines.
h. Distances between magazines, or stacks, if magazines were not
used.
i. The presumed influence of barricades upon the protection of
neighbouring buildings and stacks.
j. Fire-fighting measures (attempts to fight fire).
k. The time between the first and last propagation from stack to stack.
l. The general effect on inhabited buildings in the vicinity and their
inhabitants.
m. A map indicating the size and distribution of fragments and debris.
n. A summary of the causes and the effects.
1.5.1.2 Summary Report
A summary report is first required for translation and distribution by NATO. A full
report should be forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. This report would be
available on loan to NATO-countries in the language of the country of origin. A
copy of the report should be forwarded to the AC/326 and AC/326 SGC
chairpersons, as well as the Armaments Directorate Secretary, Defence
Investment Division, NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels.
I-5-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
CHAPTER 6 DEPLETED URANIUM MUNITIONS
1.6.1.1 Use of Depleted Uranium
There is an internal ban on the development and use of DU munitions, and most
nations no longer own such munitions. However, they still are in existence and
do present different risks so SGC has decided to keep this chapter in AASTP-1.
Munition containing Depleted Uranium (DU) was as an improved armour
piercing weapon, mainly for anti-tank warfare. A DU munition may consist of a
DU penetrator made of DU metal (or of a DU alloy) and a propellant charge
which may be integral with the penetrator or loaded into the gun separately. The
use of DU in armour piercing munitions exploits the high density of the metal,
which, when propelled at high velocity, results in the delivery of sufficient kinetic
energy to effect penetration. The penetration is accompanied by disintegration
of the projectile and a violent combustion of the fragments thus formed.
1.6.1.2 Radioactivity
1. DU is mildly radioactive at a level that is low enough to permit handling
and transportation with simple precautionary measures. DU has a chemical
toxicity at the same level as other heavy metals such as Lead, allowing handling
and transportation in authorized packaging without abnormal risk. The
mechanisms whereby radioactivity and toxicity might lead to harmful effects are
if:
a. Personnel are in close contact with DU over extended periods, or
b. If DU is involved in a fire or explosion in which Uranium Oxides from
the munitions could be dispersed and inhaled by personnel sited
downwind from the event.
2. Also refer to World Health Organisation (WHO) Guidance on Exposure
to Depleted Uranium: (WHO/SDE/OEH/01.12.2001):
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/en/Recommend_Med_Officers_final.pdf
1.6.1.3 Storage Facilities
Storage facilities for DU munitions are usually located in military controlled sites,
at distances from the nearest point of public access beyond which the
predictable explosive, inhalation and surface contamination effects would be
acceptable. Thus, any accidental contamination requiring remedial action
should be confined to areas under military control and therefore restriction of
access necessary during such action should not interfere significantly with
normal public life.
1.6.1.4 Principles of Segregation
The separate storage of the DU and explosive components of the munition, or,
at least, the separate storage of DU munition from other types must be regarded
as offering positive safety advantages and should be adopted whenever
practicable.
I-6-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
1.6.1.5 Firefighting
1. In addition to all other firefighting considerations, the combustion
properties of DU metal should be taken into account when dealing with a fire
involving DU munition. It is prudent to assume from the outset that DU is
burning, and that DU oxide smoke is being produced and to apply the
appropriate precautions, as follows:
a. Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining
oxidation reaction has commenced, the application of small
quantities of conventional extinguishants is likely to be ineffective and
may even add to the spread of the fire by dispersing the burning
uranium. For example, insufficient water to cool the fire would react
with hot uranium metal to form hydrogen gas. For a small fire
involving uranium and no explosives, the most effective extinguishant
is an inert powdered smothering agents, but when explosives are
present the closeness of approach necessary to deliver such an
extinguishant to the seat of the fire would be hazardous to the fire
fighters. In particular, propellants, the most likely energetic material to
be closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant heat,
firebrands and some ejected fragments. The firebrands may be only
small pieces of packaging materials, but it is possible that they could
be fiery fragments of burning propellant.
b. The most practicable method is to drench the fire with copious
quantities of water delivered from a safe distance with the aim of
rapidly cooling the combustibles. Normal precautions in dealing with
an explosives fire such as the fire crew sheltering behind protective
barriers should be observed. Self-contained breathing apparatus
should be worn and, where practicable, the fire should be tackled
from the windward side. Care should be taken to ensure that the fire
is completely extinguished and that the remaining ashes and debris
are cold and thoroughly saturated with water.
c. Disposition of water contaminated with DU particulates should be
based on the advice of the local National Authority.
I-6-2 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
ANNEX I-A
QD TABLES FOR ABOVEGROUND STORAGE
SECTION I – GENERAL NOTE AND EXPLANATION OF
SYMBOLS
1. Net Explosives Quantities in Kilograms (NEQ or Q in kg).
2. Quantity Distances in Metres (D in m).
3. It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since
they are complementary.
4. Abbreviations for formulas
a. BD# Blast Distance Formula
b. DFD# Debris and Fragment Distance Formula
c. P1D# Progressive Event SsD 1.2.1 Formula
d. P2D# Progressive Event SsD 1.2.2 Formula
e. TD# Thermal Event Formula
5. Rounding of QD. The values of QDs in the QD Tables 1 to 3 have been
rounded up to the nearest metre. If an NEQ is back calculated from a distance,
using the appropriate QD formula, the answer should be rounded down to the
nearest kg.
6. General Note on Pictographs. The pictographs are intended to simplify the
presentation of information in the QD Tables. The tables are intended to be
used in conjunction with the principles given in the text of this Leaflet. The
pictographs are purely diagrammatic; their shapes do not imply that actual
structures should have similar shapes and proportions. The orientation shown is
intended to indicate the direction of principal concern for blast, flame, radiant
heat, and projections as shown by arrows. In an actual situation every direction
must be considered in turn. At a PES there are relatively few significant
variations but at an ES it is necessary to distinguish among different types of
construction and among different functions of buildings.
7. Definitions of Front/Side/Rear Configurations for ECMs as a PES or ES.
The directional effects for HD 1.1 or HD 1.3 from ECMs are considered to occur:
a. Through the front in the area bounded by lines drawn at 150o to the
front face of the PES from its front corners.
b. Through the rear in the area bounded by lines drawn at 135o to the
rear face of the PES from its rear corners.
c. All area around a PES not included in a. or b. above are considered to
be to the side of the PES.
8. These sectors are also used for an ECM containing HD 1.2 when
I-A-1
Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
considered as an ES.
9. These sectors are also used for an ECM, in relation to the MCE for SsD
1.2.1, SsD 1.2.3 and HD 1.6, when considered as a PES.
10. In those cases where an ES lies on the line separating rear/side etc. of a
PES, the greater QD should be observed.
1500
FRONT
SIDE SIDE
REAR
1350
FIGURE A-1 DIRECTIONAL EFFECTS TO / FROM AN ECM
CONTAINING HD 1.1 AND HD 1.3, AND TO AN ECM
CONTAINING HD 1.2
I-A-2
Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
11. Directional effects from an ECM or a heavy magazine (as PES) containing
HD1.2. The directional effects for HD 1.2 from ECM or a heavy magazine are
considered to occur through the front in the area bounded by lines drawn at
100o to the front face of the PES from its front corners.
100°
FRONT
SIDE SIDE
REAR
135° 135°
FIGURE A-2 DIRECTIONAL EFFECTS FROM AN ECM OR
HEAVY-WALLED BUILDING CONTAINING HD 1.2
I-A-3
Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
SECTION II – QUANTITY DISTANCES TABLES (QD TABLES)
Table 1 Earth Covered Magazines ............................................................ 1-A-5
Table 2 Heavy Walled Magazines ........................................................... 1-A-38
Table 3 Medium Walled Magazines......................................................... 1-A-71
Table 4 Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks ............................... 1-A-104
Table 5 List of Formula – Blast .............................................................. 1-A-137
Table 6 List of Formula - Debris and Fragments ................................... 1-A-140
Table 7 List of Formula - Progressive 1.2.1 ........................................... 1-A-144
Table 8 List of Formula - Progressive 1.2.2 ........................................... 1-A-144
Table 9 List of Formula – Thermal ......................................................... 1-A-145
Table 10 Look up Table – Blast ............................................................. 1-A-146
Table 11 Look up Table - Debris and Fragments .................................. 1-A-152
Table 12 Look up Table - Progressive 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and Thermal ........... 1-A-156
I-A-4
Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD3 BD3 BD4 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
1 Standard NATO ECM, designed protection protection protection
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2, DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary NEQ MCE MCE MCE
with the door facing away from PES explosives explosives explosives
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m
Virtually Complete
No QD No QD Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m
High degree of
protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-5 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD3 BD3 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
protection protection protection
2 Standard NATO ECM, designed
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary NEQ MCE MCE MCE
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,
explosives explosives explosives
with the door facing perpendicularly
to the direction of PES
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m
Virtually Complete
No QD No QD Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m
High degree of
protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-6 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete BD11
protection
3 Standard NATO ECM, designed BD4 1.3.3.5 No primary
High degree of
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2, protection
Virtually complete explosives
with the door towards a PES 1.3.5.6 (1a) Effect of
protection
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary
or BD4 high velocity NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of projections
explosives
protection 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
1.3.3.5 No primary lobbed munition
explosives
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
No QD No QD TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-7 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD3 BD3 BD4 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
4 ECM designed for 3 bar in protection protection protection
accordance with Part 2, with the DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary NEQ MCE MCE MCE
door facing away from PES explosives explosives explosives
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m
Virtually Complete
No QD No QD Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m
High degree of
protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-8 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD3 BD3 BD5
BLAST Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection protection protection
5 ECM designed for 3 bar in 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
accordance with Part 2, with the DEBRIS & FRAG explosives explosives explosives NEQ MCE MCE MCE
door facing perpendicularly to the
direction of PES
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m
Virtually Complete
No QD No QD Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m
High degree of
protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-9 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
protection
6 ECM designed for 3 bar in BD7 BD7 1.3.5.6 (1a) Effect of
accordance with Part 2, with the Virtually complete Virtually complete
high velocity
door towards a PES DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
projections
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
No QD No QD TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-10 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
7 Earth covered magazine not protection protection BD14
complying with Part 2, but with a or BD4 or BD4 Limited degree of
headwall and door(s) resistant to High degree of High degree of protection
high velocity projections (see DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.5.6). The door faces a PES. 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary lobbed munition
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
No QD No QD TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-11 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
8 E Earth covered magazine not protection protection
or BD4 or BD4 BD14
complying with Part 2, but with a High degree of
door barricade, (see 1.3.6.4-1.3.6.6). High degree of High degree of
protection
The door faces a PES. DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection Protection
TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete NEQ
10m 10m Protection
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
No QD No QD 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-12 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
BD5 BD5 Virtually complete
protection
9 Earth covered magazine not Virtually complete Virtually complete
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
complying with Part 2, with or protection protection
lobbed munition
without a headwall and door(s) 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
resistant to fire and low velocity explosives explosives or BD4
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), but the
or BD4 or BD4 High degree of
door faces away from a PES. protection
DEBRIS & FRAG Virtually complete Virtually complete
1.3.3.5 No primary
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection protection
explosives
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
1.3.5.3 No items
explosives explosives
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
No QD No QD TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-13 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete
protection protection BD7
10 Earth covered magazine not or BD4 or BD4 Limited degree of
High degree of High degree of
complying with Part 2, with or protection
protection protection
without a headwall and door(s) DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
resistant to fire and low velocity explosives explosives lobbed munition
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), but the 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
door faces perpendicularly to the vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
direction of a PES.
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection Protection
TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete NEQ
10m 10m Protection
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-14 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection BD14
11 Earth covered magazine not or BD4 or BD4 Limited degree of
complying with Part 2, with or High degree of High degree of protection
without a headwall and door(s) DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
resistant to fire and low velocity 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary lobbed munition
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), with the explosives explosives
door facing a PES. 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) 60m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
No QD Protection Protection
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection 25m 25m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
I-A-15 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection
protection protection
12 Building of non-combustible or BD4 or BD4 or BD5
construction with walls of nominal High degree of High degree of High degree of
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
equivalent) and protective roof of 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
150 mm RC with suitable support. explosives explosives explosives
The door is barricaded if it faces a 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
PES. vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
No QD No QD TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD 10m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection protection
I-A-16 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
13 Building of non-combustible or BD4 or BD4 or BD5
construction with walls of nominal High degree of High degree of High degree of
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
equivalent), without a protective 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
roof. The door is barricaded if it explosives explosives
explosives
faces a PES. 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m)
25m Virtually Complete
Virtually Complete Protection
60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection
High degree of
protection
I-A-17 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
14 Building constructed with walls of High degree of High degree of High degree of
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protective roof of 150 mm concrete 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
with suitable support, barricaded. explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m)
25m Virtually Complete
Virtually Complete Protection
60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection
High degree of
protection
I-A-18 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
BD30
protection protection
High degree of
15 Building constructed with walls of or BD4 or BD4 protection
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and High degree of High degree of
protective roof of 150 mm concrete DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection or BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
with suitable support, unbarricaded 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary Limited degree of
explosives explosives protection
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m)
25m Virtually Complete
Virtually Complete Protection
60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection
High degree of
protection
I-A-19 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
16 Open air stack or light structure, High degree of High degree of High degree of
barricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
freight container loaded with 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
munition, barricaded. explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤60m)
25m Virtually Complete
Virtually Complete Protection
60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection
High degree of
protection
I-A-20 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
BD30
protection protection
High degree of
17 Open air stack or light structure, or BD4 or BD4 protection
High degree of High degree of
unbarricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection or BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
or freight container loaded with
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary Limited degree of
munition, unbarricaded.
explosives explosives protection
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
PROG’ 1.2.1
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 240m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m)
25m Virtually Complete
Virtually Complete Protection
60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection
High degree of
protection
I-A-21 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD18 BD18
High degree of High degree of High degree of
BLAST NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
18 Explosives Workshop with personnel personnel personnel
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13) No QD No QD No QD
DEBRIS & FRAG Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50 kg MCE ≤ 50 kg
No QD No QD
High Degree of High Degree of
protection for protection for P1D1
personnel personnel High Degree of
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50 kg MCE > 50 kg
NEQ
protection for
P1D1 P1D1 personnel
High Degree of High Degree of
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
No QD No QD P2D1
High degree of High degree of High degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25 m 25 m 25 m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-22 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD18 BD18
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
BLAST NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
19 Explosives Workshop without DFD8 DFD8 DFD10
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13) Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
No QD No QD
High Degree of High Degree of
protection for protection for P1D1
personnel personnel Limited Degree of
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
NEQ
protection for
P1D1 P1D1 personnel
Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
No QD No QD P2D1
High degree of High degree of Limited Degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-23 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD18 BD31
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
BLAST NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
20 Explosives Workshop with or
without protective roof, unbarricaded DFD8 DFD8 DFD10
(1.3.1.13) Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
No QD No QD P1D3
High Degree of High Degree of Limited Degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
NEQ
P1D1 P1D1 P1D4
Limited Degree of Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
No QD No QD P2D3
High degree of High degree of Limited degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-24 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD22 BD22
or or
BLAST
BD16 BD19 BD22 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
21 Low Density Usage
Roads – Less than 1000 vehicles 1.3.6.6.2Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
per day QD Reduced QD
Railways – Less than 1000
passengers per day
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD9 DFD9 DFD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Waterways – Less than 400 users MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
per day No QD No QD
Public Rights of Way or Recreational PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D2 NEQ
Facilities – Less than 200 users per
day P1D2 P1D2
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
PROG’ 1.2.2 No QD No QD P2D2 NEQ
No QD for Very Low Density Usage THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
Roads and Public Rights of Way
(<20 per day) THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-25 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD26 BD26
or or
BLAST
BD20 BD23 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
22 Medium Density Usage
Roads – 1000 or more but less than 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
5000 vehicles per day QD Reduced QD
Railways – 1000 or more but less
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD8 DFD8 DFD10 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
than 5000 passengers per day
Waterways – 400 or more but less MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
than 1800 users per day No QD No QD
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 NEQ
Facilities – 200 or more but less MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
than 900 users per day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions) P1D3 P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 20m 20m P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-26 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD31 BD31
or or
BLAST
BD25 BD28 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
23 High Density Usage
Roads – 5000 or more vehicles per 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
day QD Reduced QD
Railways – 5000 or more
passengers per day
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Waterways – 1800 or more users MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
per day 60m 60m
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ
Facilities – 900 or more users per MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions) P1D4 P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m 30m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-27 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD31 BD31
or or
24 Inhabited Building BLAST
BD25 BD28 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Places of Assembly
1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
QD Reduced QD
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
MCE ≤ 50kg
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg P1D4
60m 60m 1.3.1.16.
PROG’ 1.2.1 IBD for HD 1.2 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D4 P1D4 MCE > 50kg
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m 30m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-28 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD36 BD36
or or
25 Vulnerable Constructions
BLAST
BD33 BD34 BD35 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
(1.3.1.15 for full definition) 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
QD Reduced QD
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
60m 60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D4 P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m 30m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-29 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD26 BD26
or or
BLAST
BD20 BD23 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
26a Office, Non-explosives
workshop, 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
Canteen with less than 20 persons QD Reduced QD
who are directly associated with the
explosives task in a support role DEBRIS & FRAG DFD8 DFD8 DFD10 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
(1.3.7.8) MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
40m 40m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D3 P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 20m 20m P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-30 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD31 BD31
or or
BLAST
BD25 BD28 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
26b Office, Non-explosives
workshop, 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
Office, Non-explosives workshop, QD Reduced QD
Canteen with 20 or more persons
who are directly associated with the DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
explosives task in a support role MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
(1.3.7.7) 60m 60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D4 P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m 30m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-31 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD31 BD31
or or
BLAST
BD25 BD28 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27a Overhead Power Grid
Supergrid Network and associated 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2
substations QD Reduced QD
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
60m 60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D4 P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m 30m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-32 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD26 BD26
or or
BLAST
BD20 BD23 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27b Overhead Power Grid
Normal Network and associated 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced 1.3.6.6.2 Reduced
substations QD QD
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD8 DFD8 DFD10 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
30m 30m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D3 P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 15m 15m P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-33 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD18 BD18 BD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG No QD No QD No QD NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27c Overhead Power Grid MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
Minor Network and associated
substations
No QD No QD
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D1 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D1 P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.2 No QD No QD P2D1 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-34 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD6 BD6 BD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG 25m 25m 25m NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28a POL Facilities incl Pipelines PROG’ 1.2.1 25m 25m 25m NEQ
Protected or Underground
PROG’ 1.2.2 25m 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 25m 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-35 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 DFD1 DFD2 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28b POL Facilities incl Pipelines MCE ≤ 50 kg MCE ≤ 50 kg
Unprotected, aboveground vital 60m 60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50 kg MCE > 50 kg
P1D4 P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30 m 30 m P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-36 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 1 – Earth Covered Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for
full formula.
Earth covered Earth covered magazine. Earth covered magazine. 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
magazine. Directional Directional effects through Directional effects 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
effects through the door the door and headwall are through the door and 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E and headwall are away perpendicular to the headwall are towards an 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
from an Exposed Site. direction of an ES. Exposed Site HD / SsD
S (a) (b) (c)
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD8 DFD8 DFD10 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28c POL Facilities incl Pipelines MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
Unprotected, aboveground, non-vital 30m 30m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
P1D3 P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 15m 15m P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-37 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD5 BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
1 Standard NATO ECM, designed
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
with the door facing away from PES
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-38 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD5 BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
2 Standard NATO ECM, designed
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,
with the door facing perpendicularly Not Not
to the direction of PES
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-39 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD30 BD30 BD30 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
3 Standard NATO ECM, designed protection protection protection
for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2, 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
with the door towards a PES lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
DEBRIS & FRAG or BD11 or BD11 or BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-40 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD5 BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
4 ECM designed for 3 bar in High degree of High degree of High degree of
accordance with Part 2, with the
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
door facing away from PES
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-41 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD7 BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
5 ECM designed for 3 bar in DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
accordance with Part 2, with the
Not Not
door facing perpendicularly to the
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
direction of PES
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-42 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD30 BD30 BD30 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete
6 ECM designed for 3 bar in protection protection protection
accordance with Part 2, with the 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
door towards a PES lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
DEBRIS & FRAG or BD14 or BD14 or BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-43 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD14 BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
7 Earth covered magazine not protection protection protection
complying with Part 2, but with a DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
headwall and door(s) resistant to lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
high velocity projections (see
Not Not
1.3.5.6). The door faces a PES.
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD 25m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-44 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD14 BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
8 E Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, but with a
door barricade, (see 1.3.6.4-1.3.6.6). Not Not
The door faces a PES. PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
25m TD1 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete High degree of High degree of NEQ
Protection protection protection
25m TD1(25m≤D≤60m) 25m
Virtually Complete No QD (D>60m) Virtually Complete
Protection Virtual Complete Protection
THERMAL 1.3.2 NEQ NEQ NEQ
10m Protection
25m, High degree of
10m
High degree of High degree of
protection
protection protection
I-A-45 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD7 BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
9 Earth covered magazine not
complying with Part 2, with or
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
without a headwall and door(s)
resistant to fire and low velocity Not Not
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), but the PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
door faces away from a PES. (see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-46 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD7 BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection protection
10 Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, with or lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
without a headwall and door(s) Not Not
resistant to fire and low velocity
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), but the (see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
door faces perpendicularly to the 1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
direction of a PES. Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection TD1 Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of NEQ
10m protection 10m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
No QD No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-47 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD14 BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection protection
11 Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, with or lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
without a headwall and door(s) Not Not
resistant to fire and low velocity PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
projections, (see 1.3.5.6), with the (see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
door facing a PES. 1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete High degree of High degree of NEQ
Protection protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection TD1 (≤ 60m) Protection
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m protection 25m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
I-A-48 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
12 Building of non-combustible 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
construction with walls of nominal lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or
equivalent) and protective roof of or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
150 mm RC with suitable support. Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
The door is barricaded if it faces a DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
PES. 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m
Virtually Complete
No QD Protection No QD
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection 10m Protection
High degree of
protection
No QD 10m No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection Protection
I-A-49 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
13 Building of non-combustible 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
construction with walls of nominal lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
equivalent), without a protective Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
roof. The door is barricaded if it
faces a PES.
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete High degree of High degree of NEQ
Protection protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete High degree High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection of protection of protection
I-A-50 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
14 Building constructed with walls of
or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protective roof of 150 mm concrete DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
with suitable support, barricaded. 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete High degree of NEQ
Protection Protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually complete High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection protection of protection
I-A-51 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD14 BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
or BD30 or BD30 or BD30
15 Building constructed with walls of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
protective roof of 150 mm concrete
Not Not
with suitable support, unbarricaded
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete High degree of NEQ
Protection Protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually complete Virtually complete (≤ 60 m) NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection High degree
of protection
I-A-52 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD9 BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of High degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition lobbed munition
16 Open air stack or light structure, or BD4 or BD4 or BD4
barricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
freight container loaded with DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
munition, barricaded. 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete High degree of High degree of NEQ
Protection protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 TD1 (≤ 60 TD1 (≤ 60
THERMAL 1.3.2 m)Virtually Complete m)High degree m)High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection of protection of protection
I-A-53 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD14 BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
DEBRIS & FRAG or or or NEQ MCE MCE MCE
17 Open air stack or light structure,
unbarricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar
BD30 BD30 BD30
or freight container loaded with 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
munition, unbarricaded. lobbed munition of lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
Not Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) applicable (see applicable (see NEQ
1.3.1.11) 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete High degree of High degree of NEQ
Protection protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 TD1 (≤ 60 TD1 (≤ 60
THERMAL 1.3.2 m)Virtually complete m)High degree m)High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection of protection of protection
I-A-54 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BD18 BD18 BD18
BLAST High degree of High degree of High degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
18 Explosives Workshop with personnel personnel personnel
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13)
No QD No QD No QD
DEBRIS & FRAG Virtually complete Virtually complete Virtually complete NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
No QD No QD
High Degree of High Degree of
protection for protection for
personnel personnel P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.1 High Degree of NEQ
MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg protection for
personnel
P1D1 P1D1
High Degree of High Degree of
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
No QD No QD P2D1
PROG’ 1.2.2 High degree of High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-55 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BD18 BD18 BD18
BLAST Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
19 Explosives Workshop without For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13) volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
DEBRIS & FRAG volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg
No QD
High Degree of
protection for P1D1 P1D1
personnel Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg
NEQ
protection for protection for
P1D1 personnel personnel
Limited Degree of
protection for
personnel
No QD P2D1 P2D1
High degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-56 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BD31 BD31 BD31
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
BLAST NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for protection for
20 Explosives Workshop with or personnel personnel personnel
without protective roof, unbarricaded For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
(1.3.1.13) volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
DEBRIS & FRAG volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
Limited degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg MCE ≤ 50kg
No QD P1D3 P1D3
High Degree of Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
NEQ
P1D1 P1D4 P1D4
Limited Degree of Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
No QD P2D3 P2D3
High degree of Limited degree of Limited degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 NEQ
protection for protection for protection for
personnel personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-57 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD22 BD22 BD22 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume volume volume
21 Low Density Usage >20m³ >20m³ >20m³
Roads – Less than 1000 vehicles
per day
DFD13 DFD13 DFD13
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Railways – Less than 1000
passengers per day volume volume volume
Waterways – Less than 400 users ≤20m³ ≤20m³ ≤20m³
per day DFD15 DFD15 DFD15
Public Rights of Way or Recreational MCE ≤ 50kg
Facilities – Less than 200 users per
day No QD
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions) PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D2 P1D2 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
No QD for Very Low Density Usage P1D2
Roads and Public Rights of Way
(<20 per day) PROG’ 1.2.2 No QD P2D2 P2D2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-58 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD26 BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
22 Medium Density Usage
Roads – 1000 or more but less than DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
5000 vehicles per day
Railways – 1000 or more but less volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
than 5000 passengers per day DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
Waterways – 400 or more but less MCE ≤ 50kg
than 1800 users per day
No QD
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – 200 or more but less
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
than 900 users per day P1D3
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
PROG’ 1.2.2 20m P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-59 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume volume volume
23 High Density Usage >20m³ >20m³ >20m³
Roads – 5000 or more vehicles per
day DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Railways – 5000 or more
passengers per day volume volume volume
Waterways – 1800 or more users ≤20m³ ≤20m³ ≤20m³
per day DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
Public Rights of Way or Recreational MCE ≤ 50kg
Facilities – 900 or more users per
60m
day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-60 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
24 Inhabited Building volume volume volume
Places of Assembly >20m³ >20m³ >20m³
DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume volume volume
≤20m³ ≤20m³ ≤20m³
DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
MCE ≤ 50kg
60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-61 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD36 BD36 BD36 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
25 Vulnerable Constructions volume volume volume
(1.3.1.15 for full definition) >20m³ >20m³ >20m³
DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume volume volume
≤20m³ ≤20m³ ≤20m³
DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
MCE ≤ 50kg
60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-62 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD26 BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
26a Office, Non-explosives
workshop, DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
Canteen with less than 20 persons DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
who are directly associated with the volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
explosives task in a support role.
(1.3.7.8)
DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
MCE ≤ 50kg
40m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 20m P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-63 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
26b Office, Non-explosives
workshop, DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
Office, Non-explosives workshop, DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Canteen with 20 or more persons volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
who are directly associated with the
explosives task in a support role.
DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
(1.3.7.7) MCE ≤ 50kg
60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-64 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³
27a Overhead Power Grid volume >20m³ volume >20m³
Supergrid Network and associated DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
substations DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal
For PES internal
For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
≤20m³
DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
MCE ≤ 50kg
60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-65 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD26 BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
27b Overhead Power Grid
Normal Network and associated DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
substations
volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
MCE ≤ 50kg
30m
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 15m P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-66 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD18 BD18 BD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG No QD No QD No QD NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27c Overhead Power Grid MCE ≤ 50kg
Minor Network and associated
substations No QD
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D1 P1D1 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.2 No QD P2D1 P2D1 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD2 TD2 TD2 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-67 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD6 BD6 BD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG 25m 25m 25m NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28a POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Protected or Underground
PROG’ 1.2.1 25m 25m 25m NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 25m 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 25m 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-68 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume >20m³ volume >20m³ volume >20m³
28b POL Facilities incl Pipelines DFD3 DFD3 DFD3
Unprotected, aboveground vital DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³ volume ≤20m³
DFD4 DFD4 DFD4
MCE ≤ 50kg
60m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
P1D4
PROG’ 1.2.2 30m P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-69 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 2 – Heavy Walled Magazines
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full
formula.
As (d) but with door As (d) but without a 1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
Non-combustible or other large protective roof. 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
construction with walls aperture faces an (f) 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
E of nominal 450 mm ES. 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
S RC (680 mm brick or (e)
equivalent) protective HD/SsD
roof of 150 mm RC
with suitable support. 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(d)
BLAST BD31 BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
volume volume volume
28c POL Facilities incl Pipelines >20m³ >20m³ >20m³
Unprotected, aboveground, non-vital DFD12 DFD12 DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG For PES internal For PES internal For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume volume volume
≤20m³ ≤20m³ ≤20m³
DFD14 DFD14 DFD14
MCE ≤ 50kg
30m
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
MCE > 50kg
P1D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 15m P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-70 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1 Standard NATO ECM, designed for Virtually complete Virtually complete
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with protection protection
the door facing away from PES DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-71 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
2 Standard NATO ECM, designed for DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection protection
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with
the door facing perpendicularly to the Not
direction of PES
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-72 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD11 BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
3 Standard NATO ECM, designed for protection protection
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
the door towards a PES lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-73 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
4 ECM designed for 3 bar in High degree of High degree of
accordance with Part 2, with the door protection protection
facing away from PES DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-74 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
5 ECM designed for 3 bar in DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
accordance with Part 2, with the door
Not
facing perpendicularly to the direction
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
of PES
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-75 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD11 BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
6 ECM designed for 3 bar in protection protection
accordance with Part 2, with the door DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
towards a PES lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-76 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
7 Earth covered magazine not protection
complying with Part 2, but with a 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
headwall and door(s) resistant to high lobbed munition BD14
velocity projections (see 1.3.5.6). The
door faces a PES.
or BD4 High degree of
Limited protection only protection
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
explosives of lobbed munition
1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-77 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
8 Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, but with a door
barricade, (see 1.3.6.4-1.3.6.6). The Not
door faces a PES. PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection Protection NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m 25m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
I-A-78 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
9 Earth covered magazine not
complying with Part 2, with or without
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
lobbed munition of lobbed munition
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire
and low velocity projections, (see Not
1.3.5.6), but the door faces away from PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
a PES. (see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-79 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection
10 Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, with or without lobbed munition of lobbed munition
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire Not
and low velocity projections, (see
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
1.3.5.6), but the door faces (see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
perpendicularly to the direction of a (see 1.3.1.11)
PES. Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-80 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of
protection
11 Earth covered magazine not 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
complying with Part 2, with or without lobbed munition BD14
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire or BD4 Limited degree of
and low velocity projections, (see Limited protection only protection
1.3.5.6), with the door facing a PES. DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect NEQ MCE MCE MCE
explosives of lobbed munition
1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-81 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
12 Building of non-combustible 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
construction with walls of nominal lobbed munition lobbed munition
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or or BD4 or BD4
equivalent) and protective roof of Limited degree of Limited degree of
150 mm RC with suitable support. The protection protection
door is barricaded if it faces a PES. DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 NEQ
10m 10m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-82 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
13 Building of non-combustible
lobbed munition lobbed munition
construction with walls of nominal 450
mm RC (680 mm brick or equivalent), or BD4 or BD4
without a protective roof. The door is Limited degree of Limited degree of
barricaded if it faces a PES. protection protection
DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-83 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
or BD4 or BD4
14 Building constructed with walls of Limited degree of Limited degree of
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and protection protection
DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protective roof of 150 mm concrete 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
with suitable support, barricaded. explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-84 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
protection BD14
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of Limited degree of
lobbed munition protection
or BD4 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
15 Building constructed with walls of Limited degree of of lobbed munition
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and DEBRIS & FRAG protection
1.3.3.5 No primary
or NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protective roof of 150 mm concrete
with suitable support, unbarricaded explosives BD30
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
vulnerable to spall lobbed munition
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-85 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
or BD4 or BD4
Limited degree of Limited degree of
16 Open air stack or light structure,
protection protection
barricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
freight container loaded with munition,
explosives explosives
barricaded.
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
lobbed munition of lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
of protection of protection
I-A-86 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of BD14
lobbed munition Limited degree of
or BD4 protection
Limited degree of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect
protection of lobbed munition
17 Open air stack or light structure, DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
unbarricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or 1.3.3.5 No primary Or BD30
freight container loaded with munition, explosives 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
unbarricaded. 1.3.5.3 No items lobbed munition
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
Not
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
Not
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable
(see 1.3.1.11) Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
of protection of protection
I-A-87 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BD18 BD18
BLAST High degree of High degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
18 Explosives Workshop with personnel personnel
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13)
No QD No QD
DEBRIS & FRAG Virtually complete NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Virtually complete
protection for
protection for personnel
personnel
P1D1 P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.1 High Degree of NEQ
High Degree of
Protection for
Protection for Personnel
Personnel
No QD No QD
PROG’ 1.2.2 High degree of NEQ
High degree of
protection for
protection for personnel
personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-88 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BD18 BD18
Limited degree of
BLAST Limited degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for
protection for personnel
personnel
19 Explosives Workshop without For PES internal
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13) volume >20m³
DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume ≤20m³
DFD14
MCE ≤ 50kg
MCE ≤ 50kg P1D1
P1D1 High Degree of
High Degree of Protection for
Protection for Personnel Personnel
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
NEQ
P1D1 P1D1
Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
Protection for Personnel Protection for
Personnel
No QD No QD
High degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 High degree of NEQ
protection for
protection for personnel
personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
60m 60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-89 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BD18 BD31
BLAST High degree o f NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of
protection for
protection for personnel
20 Explosives Workshop with or personnel
without protective roof, unbarricaded For PES internal
(1.3.1.13) volume >20m³
DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD14
MCE ≤ 50kg
MCE ≤ 50kg P1D1
P1D1 High Degree of
High Degree of Protection for
Protection for Personnel Personnel
PROG’ 1.2.1 MCE > 50kg MCE > 50kg
NEQ
P1D1 P1D3
Limited Degree of Limited Degree of
Protection for Personnel Protection for
Personnel
No QD No QD
High degree of
PROG’ 1.2.2 High degree of NEQ
protection for
protection for personnel
personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
60m 60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-90 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD22 BD22 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
21 Low Density Usage For PES internal
Roads – Less than 1000 vehicles per volume
day >20m³
Railways – Less than 1000 DFD13
passengers per day DEBRIS & FRAG DFD17 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Waterways – Less than 400 users per volume
day ≤20m³
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – Less than 200 users per
DFD15
day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D2 P1D2 NEQ
No QD for Very Low Density Usage PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D2 P2D2 NEQ
Roads and Public Rights of Way
(<20 per day) THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-91 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
22 Medium Density Usage >20m³
Roads – 1000 or more but less than
5000 vehicles per day DFD12
Railways – 1000 or more but less than
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
5000 passengers per day volume
Waterways – 400 or more but less ≤20m³
than 1800 users per day DFD14
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – 200 or more but less than PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
900 users per day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions) PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-92 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
23 High Density Usage >20m³
Roads – 5000 or more vehicles per
day DFD3
Railways – 5000 or more passengers
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
per day volume
Waterways – 1800 or more users per ≤20m³
day DFD4
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – 900 or more users per day PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-93 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
24 Inhabited Building volume
Places of Assembly >20m³
DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD4
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-94 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD36 BD36 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
25 Vulnerable Constructions volume
(1.3.1.15 for full definition) >20m³
DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD4
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-95 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
26a Office, Non-explosives workshop,
>20m³
Canteen with less than 20 persons
who are directly associated with the DFD12
explosives task in a support role. DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
(1.3.7.8) volume
≤20m³
DFD14
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-96 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
26b Office, Non-explosives workshop,
>20m³
Office, Non-explosives workshop,
Canteen with 20 or more persons who DFD3
are directly associated with the DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
explosives task in a support role. volume
(1.3.7.7) ≤20m³
DFD4
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-97 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
27a Overhead Power Grid >20m³
Supergrid Network and associated
substations DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD4
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-98 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
27b Overhead Power Grid >20m³
Normal Network and associated
substations DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD14
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-99 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD18 BD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG No QD No QD NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27c Overhead Power Grid
Minor Network and associated PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D1 P1D1 NEQ
substations
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D1 P2D1 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD2 TD2 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-100 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD6 BD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG 25m 25m NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28a POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Protected or Underground
PROG’ 1.2.1 25m 25m NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-101 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
>20m³
28b POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Unprotected, aboveground vital DFD3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD5 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD4
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-102 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 3 – Medium Walled Magazines
EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
PES Building constructed Building constructed 2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
with walls of 215 mm 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
with walls of 215 mm
brick (or equivalent) 4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity
brick (or equivalent) and
protective roof of and protective roof HD/SsD
E 150 mm concrete with of 150 mm concrete
with suitable
S suitable support,
barricaded support,
(g) unbarricaded.
1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
(h)
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
For PES internal
volume
>20m³
28c POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Unprotected, aboveground, non-vital DFD12
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD16 For PES internal
NEQ MCE MCE MCE
volume
≤20m³
DFD14
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-103 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1 Standard NATO ECM, designed for Virtually complete Virtually complete
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
the door facing away from PES
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-104 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
2 Standard NATO ECM, designed for High degree of High degree of
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
the door facing perpendicularly to the
direction of PES PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-105 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD11 BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
3 Standard NATO ECM, designed for protection protection
7 bar in accordance with Part 2, with DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
the door towards a PES lobbed munition lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-106 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD5 BD5 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
4 ECM designed for 3 bar in High degree of High degree of
accordance with Part 2, with the door DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
facing away from PES
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-107 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
5 ECM designed for 3 bar in DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
accordance with Part 2, with the door
facing perpendicularly to the direction PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
of PES (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-108 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD11 BD11 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
6 ECM designed for 3 bar in protection protection
accordance with Part 2, with the door DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
towards a PES lobbed munition lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-109 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
7 Earth covered magazine not protection
complying with Part 2, but with a 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
headwall and door(s) resistant to high lobbed munition
velocity projections (see 1.3.5.6). The BD14
door faces a PES.
or BD4 High degree of
Limited protection protection
DEBRIS & FRAG only 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary lobbed munition
explosives
1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
10m 25m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-110 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD14 BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
8 E Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, but with a door
barricade, (see 1.3.6.4-1.3.6.6). The
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
door faces a PES. (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
THERMAL 1.3.2 Protection Protection NEQ NEQ NEQ
25m 25m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
I-A-111 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
9 Earth covered magazine not
complying with Part 2, with or without
DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
lobbed munition lobbed munition
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire
and low velocity projections, (see PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
1.3.5.6), but the door faces away from (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
a PES.
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-112 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD7 BD7 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of Limited degree of
protection protection
10 Earth covered magazine not DEBRIS & FRAG 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
complying with Part 2, with or without lobbed munition lobbed munition
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire
and low velocity projections, (see PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
1.3.5.6), but the door faces
perpendicularly to the direction of a PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
PES. (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
No QD No QD
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-113 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD14 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Limited degree of
protection
11 Earth covered magazine not 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
complying with Part 2, with or without BD14
a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire or BD4 Limited degree of
and low velocity projections, (see Limited protection protection
1.3.5.6), with the door facing a PES.
DEBRIS & FRAG only 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary lobbed munition
explosives
1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-114 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
12 Building of non-combustible 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
construction with walls of nominal lobbed munition lobbed munition
450 mm RC (680 mm brick or
equivalent) and protective roof of or BD4 or BD4
150 mm RC with suitable support. The Limited degree of Limited degree of
door is barricaded if it faces a PES. DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
25m 25m
Virtually Complete Virtually Complete
Protection Protection
THERMAL 1.3.1 NEQ
10m 10m
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
10m 10m
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-115 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
13 Building of non-combustible 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
construction with walls of nominal 450 lobbed munition lobbed munition
mm RC (680 mm brick or equivalent), or BD4 or BD4
without a protective roof. The door is Limited degree of Limited degree of
barricaded if it faces a PES.
DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-116 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
or BD4 or BD4
14 Building constructed with walls of Limited degree of Limited degree of
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and DEBRIS & FRAG protection protection NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protective roof of 150 mm concrete 1.3.3.5 No primary 1.3.3.5 No primary
with suitable support, barricaded. explosives explosives
1.3.5.3 No items 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall vulnerable to spall
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60 m) TD1 (≤ 60 m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-117 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD9 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
protection BD14
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of Limited degree of
lobbed munition protection
or BD4 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
Limited degree of lobbed munition
15 Building constructed with walls of DEBRIS & FRAG protection or NEQ MCE MCE MCE
1.3.3.5 No primary
215 mm brick (or equivalent) and
explosives BD30
protective roof of 150 mm concrete 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
with suitable support, unbarricaded 1.3.5.3 No items
vulnerable to spall lobbed munition
1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of
lobbed munition
PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ
Protection Protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 Virtually Complete Virtually Complete NEQ NEQ NEQ
Protection Protection
I-A-118 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD4 BD4 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of High degree of
protection protection
See left side. See left side.
1), 2) and 3) 1), 2) and 3)
16 Open air stack or light structure,
barricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or
or BD9 or BD9
freight container loaded with munition, High degree of High degree of
protection protection
barricaded. DEBRIS & FRAG NEQ MCE MCE MCE
See left side 3) See left side 3)
1) 1.3.3.5 No primary or BD1 Or BD1
explosives High degree of High degree of
2) 1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable protection See left protection See left
to spall side. side 3) and 4)
3) 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of lobbed 3) and 4)
munition
4) 1.3.3.1 Open bomb bay PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
storage (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
(see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
TD1 TD1
THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
of protection of protection
I-A-119 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD4 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
High degree of
protection
See left side 1), 2)
and 3) BD14
Limited degree of
or BD9 protection
High degree of See left side.
17 Open air stack or light structure, protection See left
DEBRIS & FRAG 3) and 5) NEQ MCE MCE MCE
side 3)
unbarricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or
or BD30
freight container loaded with munition, or BD1 See left side 3)
unbarricaded. High degree of
protection
1) 1.3.3.5 No primary See left side 3) and
explosives 4)
2) 1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable
to spall PROG’ 1.2.1 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
3) 1.3.5.6 (1b) Effect of lobbed (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
munition
PROG’ 1.2.2 Not Applicable Not Applicable NEQ
4) 1.3.3.1 Open bomb bay (see 1.3.1.11) (see 1.3.1.11)
storage
5) 1.3.3.3. Unbarricaded TD1 TD1
storage robust munitions THERMAL 1.3.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection protection
TD1 (≤ 60m) TD1 (≤ 60m)
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection of protection
I-A-120 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD18
BLAST High degree of High degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
18 Explosives Workshop with personnel personnel
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13)
No QD No QD
DEBRIS & FRAG Virtually complete Virtually complete NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
P1D1 P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.1 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
P2D1 P2D1
PROG’ 1.2.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-121 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD18
BLAST Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
19 Explosives Workshop without
protective roof, barricaded (1.3.1.13) DFD20 DFD18
DEBRIS & FRAG Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
P1D1 P1D1
PROG’ 1.2.1 Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
P2D1 P2D1
PROG’ 1.2.2 Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
60m 60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-122 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BD18 BD31
BLAST Limited degree of High degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
20 Explosives Workshop with or personnel personnel
without protective roof, unbarricaded
(1.3.1.13)
DFD20 DFD18
DEBRIS & FRAG Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ MCE MCE MCE
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
MCE ≤ 50kg
P1D3
Limited Degree of
Protection for
P1D1 Personnel
PROG’ 1.2.1 Limited Degree of NEQ
Protection for MCE > 50kg
Personnel
P1D4
Limited Degree of
Protection for
Personnel
P2D3 P2D3
PROG’ 1.2.2 Limited degree of Limited degree of NEQ
protection for protection for
personnel personnel
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
60m 60m
THERMAL 1.3.2 High degree of High degree of NEQ NEQ NEQ
protection protection
I-A-123 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD22 BD22 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD21 DFD19 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
21 Low Density Usage
Roads – Less than 1000 vehicles per PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D2 P1D2 NEQ
day
Railways – Less than 1000
passengers per day
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D2 P2D2 NEQ
Waterways – Less than 400 users per
day
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – Less than 200 users per
day
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
THERMAL 1.3.2 60m 60m NEQ NEQ NEQ
No QD for Very Low Density Usage
Roads and Public Rights of Way
(<20 per day)
I-A-124 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD20 DFD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
22 Medium Density Usage
Roads – 1000 or more but less than PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
5000 vehicles per day
Railways – 1000 or more but less than
5000 passengers per day
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
Waterways – 400 or more but less
than 1800 users per day
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – 200 or more but less than
900 users per day THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
I-A-125 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
23 High Density Usage
Roads – 5000 or more vehicles per PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
day
Railways – 5000 or more passengers
per day
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
Waterways – 1800 or more users per
day
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
Public Rights of Way or Recreational
Facilities – 900 or more users per day THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
(See 1.3.1.15 for full definitions)
I-A-126 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
24 Inhabited Building DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
Places of Assembly
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-127 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD36 BD36 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
25 Vulnerable Constructions
(1.3.1.15 for full definition)
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-128 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD20 DFD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
26a Office, Non-explosives workshop,
Canteen with less than 20 persons
who are directly associated with the
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
explosives task in a support role
(1.3.7.8) PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-129 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
26b Office, Non-explosives workshop,
Office, Non-explosives workshop,
Canteen with 20 or more persons who
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
are directly associated with the
explosives task in a support role PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
(1.3.7.7)
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-130 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27a Overhead Power Grid
Supergrid Network and associated PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
substations
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-131 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD26 BD26 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD20 DFD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27b Overhead Power Grid
Normal Network and associated PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
substations
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-132 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD18 BD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG No QD No QD NEQ MCE MCE MCE
27c Overhead Power Grid
Minor Network and associated PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D1 P1D1 NEQ
substations
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D1 P2D1 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD2 TD2 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD2 TD2 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-133 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD6 BD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG 25m 25m NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28a POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Protected or Underground
PROG’ 1.2.1 25m 25m NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 25m 25m NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 25m 25m NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-134 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD7 DFD6 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28b POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Unprotected, aboveground vital
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D4 P1D4 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D4 P2D4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 TD4 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 TD4 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-135 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Table 4 – Light Walled Magazines and Open Stacks
PES EFFECT See introduction for full instructions and calculation tables for full formula.
1. Select correct PES/ES interaction.
2. Use HD/SsD table to determine applicable calculations
Open-air stack or light Open-air stack or light 3. Use HD/SsD table to determine quantity, either NEQ or MCE
structure, barricaded. structure,
4. Use associated formula for min Distance or max Quantity.
E Truck, trailer, rail-car unbarricaded.
Truck, trailer, rail-car
S or freight container
loaded with munitions, or freight container
barricaded. loaded with munitions, HD/SsD
(i) unbarricaded.
(j) 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.6
BLAST BD31 BD31 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD20 DFD18 NEQ MCE MCE MCE
28c POL Facilities incl Pipelines
Unprotected, aboveground, non-vital
PROG’ 1.2.1 P1D3 P1D3 NEQ
PROG’ 1.2.2 P2D3 P2D3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD3 TD3 NEQ
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD3 TD3 NEQ NEQ NEQ
I-A-136 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5 - LIST OF FORMULAS – BLAST
FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF Comment/ Legacy QD CONDITION
BD# = … [m] CONDITION Q = … [kg]
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.35*Q^(1/3) ≤D< (D/0.35)^3
30,000 kg 11 m
BD1 D1, D2
30,000 kg 11 m
≤Q≤ 0.44*Q^(1/3) ≤D≤ (D/0.44)^3
120 000 kg 22 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.4*Q^(1/3) ≤D< (D/0.4)^3
1,500 kg 5m
BD2 FD1
1,500 kg 5m
≤Q≤ 0.6*Q^(1/3) ≤D≤ (D/0.6)^3
500,000 kg 48 m
1 kg 1m
BD3 D3, SQ1, AD1 ≤Q≤ 0.5*Q^(1/3) ≤D≤ (D/0.5)^3
500,000 kg 40 m
1 kg 1m
BD4 D4, SQ2, AD2 ≤Q≤ 0.8*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/0.8)^3
500,000 kg 64 m
1 kg 2m
BD5 D5, SQ3, AD3 ≤Q≤ 1.1*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/1.1)^3
500,000 kg 88 m
1 kg 2m
BD6 0.5*D7 ≤Q≤ 1.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/1.2)^3
500,000 kg 96 m
1 kg 2m
BD7 D6, SQ4, AD4 ≤Q≤ 1.8*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/1.8)^3
500,000 kg 143 m
1 kg 2m
BD8 AD5 ≤Q≤ 2.0*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/2)^3
500,000 kg 159 m
1 kg 3m
BD9 D7, SQ5, FD2, AD6 ≤Q≤ 2.4*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/2.4)^3
500,000 kg 191 m
1 kg 4m
BD10 AD7, SD1 ≤Q≤ 3.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/3.2)^3
500,000 kg 254 m
1 kg 4m
BD11 D8, AD8 ≤Q≤ 3.6*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/3.6)^3
500,000 kg 286 m
1 kg 4m
BD12 FD4 ≤Q≤ 4.0*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/4)^3
500,000 kg 318 m
1 kg 5m
BD13 AD9 ≤Q≤ 4.4*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/4.4)^3
500,000 kg 350 m
1 kg 5m
BD14 D9, SQ6, FD3, AD9(new), SD2 ≤Q≤ 4.8*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/4.8)^3
500,000 kg 381 m
1 kg 6m
BD15 FD5 ≤Q≤ 6*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/6)^3
500,000 kg 477 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.47*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.47)^1.5
2,500 kg 87 m
2,500 kg 87 m
BD16 0.5*D14 ≤Q< 1.73*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/1.73)^2
4,500 kg 117 m
4,500 kg 117 m
≤Q≤ 7*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/7)^3
45,000 kg 249 m
1 kg 8m
BD17 AD10 ≤Q≤ 7.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/7.2)^3
500,000 kg 572 m
1 kg 8m
BD18 D10, SQ7, FD6, AD11, SD3 ≤Q≤ 8*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/8)^3
500,000 kg 635 m
I-A-137 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF Comment/ Legacy QD CONDITION
BD# = … [m] CONDITION Q = … [kg]
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.61*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.61)^1.5
2,500 kg 113 m
2,500 kg 113 m
BD19 0.5*D15 ≤Q< 2.23*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/2.23)^2
4,500 kg 150 m
4,500 kg 150 m
≤Q≤ 9*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/9)^3
45,000 kg 321 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.63*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.63)^1.5
2,500 kg 117 m
2,500 kg 117 m
BD20 D16 ≤Q< 2.30*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/2.30)^2
4,500 kg 155 m
4,500 kg 155 m
≤Q≤ 9.3*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/9.3)^3
45,000 kg 331 m
1 kg 10 m
BD21 AD12 ≤Q≤ 9.6*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/9.6)^3
500,000 kg 762 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.75*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.75)^1.5
2,500 kg 139 m
2,500 kg 139 m
BD22 0.5*D13, SQ8 ≤Q< 2.75*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/2.75)^2
4,500 kg 185 m
4,500 kg 185 m
≤Q≤ 11.1*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/11.1)^3
500,000 kg 882 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.81*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.81)^1.5
2,500 kg 150 m
2,500 kg 150 m
BD23 D17, AD13 ≤Q< 2.97*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/2.97)^2
4,500 kg 200 m
4,500 kg 200 m
≤Q≤ 12*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/12)^3
45,000 kg 427 m
1 kg 13 m
BD24 FD7(part) ≤Q≤ 13*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/13)^3
500,000 kg 1032 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 0.95*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/0.95)^1.5
2,500 kg 175 m
2,500 kg 175 m
BD25 D14, AD16 ≤Q< 3.47*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/3.47)^2
4,500 kg 233 m
4,500 kg 233 m
≤Q≤ 14*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/14)^3
45,000 kg 498 m
1 kg 1m
≤Q< 1*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/1)^1.5
2500 kg 185 m
2500 kg 185 m
BD26 D11 ≤Q< 3.6*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/3.6)^2
4500 kg 242 m
4500 kg 242 m
≤Q≤ 14.8*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/14.8)^3
500,000 kg 1175 m
1 kg 16 m
BD27 AD14, SD4 ≤Q≤ 16*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/16)^3
500,000 kg 1270 m
1 kg 2m
≤Q< 1.22*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/1.22)^1.5
2,500 kg 225 m
2,500 kg 225 m
BD28 D15, AD17 ≤Q< 4.46*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/4.46)^2
4,500 kg 300 m
4,500 kg 300 m
≤Q≤ 18*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/18)^3
45,000 kg 641 m
I-A-138 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF Comment/ Legacy QD CONDITION
BD# = … [m] CONDITION Q = … [kg]
1 kg 20 m
BD29 AD18 ≤Q≤ 20*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/20)^3
500,000 kg 1588 m
D12, 1 kg 23 m
BD30 SQ9(unused), FD10(part), ≤Q≤ 22.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/22.2)^3
AD15 500,000 kg 1763 m
1 kg 2m
≤Q< 1.5*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/1.5)^1.5
2500 kg 277 m
2500 kg 277 m
BD31 D13 ≤Q< 5.5*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/5.5)^2
4500 kg 369 m
4500 kg 369 m
≤Q≤ 22.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/22.2)^3
500,000 kg 1763 m
1 kg 25 m
BD32 AD19 ≤Q≤ 25*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/25)^3
500,000 kg 1985 m
1 kg 2m
≤Q< 1.89*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/1.89)^1.5
2,500 kg 349 m
2,500 kg 349 m
BD33 2*D14 ≤Q< 6.94*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/6.94)^2
4,500 kg 466 m
4,500 kg 466 m
≤Q≤ 28*Q^1/3 ≤D< (D/28)^3
45,000 kg 996 m
1 kg 3m
≤Q< 2.43*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/2.43)^1.5
2,500 kg 448 m
2,500 kg 448 m
BD34 2*D15 ≤Q< 8.92*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/8.92)^2
4,500 kg 599 m
4,500 kg 599 m
≤Q≤ 36*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/36)^3
45,000 kg 1281 m
1 kg 45 m
BD35 2*D12, SQ10 ≤Q≤ 44.4*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/44.4)^3
500 ,000 kg 3525 m
1 kg 3m
≤Q< 3*Q^2/3 ≤D< (D/3)^1.5
2,500 kg 553 m
2,500 kg 553 m
BD36 2*D13 ≤Q< 11*Q^1/2 ≤D< (D/11)^2
4,500 kg 738 m
4,500 kg 738 m
≤Q≤ 44.4*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/44.4)^3
500,000 kg 3525 m
Note: Certain discontinuities are possible where the different formulas intersect. Although
these are normally trivial, they need to be treated carefully and in general the furthest
distance or smallest quantity of possible formulas is used.
I-A-139 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 6 - LIST OF FORMULAS – DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS
Reverse
Comment/ Condition FORMULA REVERSE - FORMULA
REF condition
Legacy QD [kg] DFD# = … [m] Q DFD# = … [kg]
[m]
41
1≤Q≤
41*Q^0.21 ≤D≤ (D/41)^(1/0.21)
31,000
360
31,000 360
ECM, <Q≤ 0.21*Q^0.72 <D≤ (D/0.21)^(1/0.72)
DFD1 side/rear 100,400 839
100,400 <
87.261*LN(Q)-166.56 839 < D ≤ EXP((D+166.56)/87.261)
Q≤
979
500,000
94
1≤Q≤
91+2.687*Q ≤D≤ (D-91)/2.687
23
152
23 152 EXP(-
64.995+7.249*(LN(Q))+
<Q≤ <D≤ 7.249/13.386+SQRT((7.249/13.386)^2-
6.693*(LN(Q))^2
350 338 (64.995-D)/6.693))
350 338
ECM, <Q≤ 0.0081*Q+334.3 <D≤ (D-334.3)/0.0081
DFD2 Front 73,571 931
73,571 931
<Q≤ 22.2*Q^(1/3) <D≤ (D/22.2)^3
100,400 1,032
100,400 < 1,032 < D
107.386*LN(Q)-204.97 EXP((D+204.97)/107.386)
Q≤ ≤ 1,205
500,000
above
ground 1≤Q≤
61 D = 61 1 ≤ Q ≤ 14
storage, 14
un-
DFD3 barricaded,
internal 61 < D <
14 < Q ≤ 87.261*LN(Q)-166.56 EXP((D+166.56)/87.261)
volume 979
500,000
>20m³
EXP(-
1≤Q< 64.995+7.249*(LN(Q))+ 65 ≤ D <
7.249/13.386+SQRT((7.249/13.386)^2-
5 6.693*(LN(Q))^2 94
above (64.995-D)/6.693))
ground 5 EXP(-
97.493+10.874*(LN(Q))+ 150 < D <
storage, ≤Q≤ 10.874/20.08+SQRT((10.874/20.08)^2-
10.04*(LN(Q))^2 450
un- 223 (97.493-D)/10.04))
DFD4 barricaded, 223
internal <Q≤ 450 D = 450 223<Q≤1,170
volume 1,170
<20m³
450 < D ≤
1,170 < Q 87.261*LN(Q)-166.56 EXP((D+166.56)/87.261)
979
≤ 500,000
1≤Q< D=
61 1 ≤ Q < 15
15 61
15
61 < D ≤
≤Q≤ 68*LN(Q)-121 EXP((D+121)/68)
525
above 13,150
ground 13,150
DFD5 storage, <Q≤ 22.2*Q^(1/3)
525 < D ≤
(D/22.2)^3
758
barricaded 39,800
39,800 < 758 < D ≤
87.261*LN(Q)-166.56 EXP((D+166.56)/87.261)
Q≤ 979
500,000
open/
light
1 ≤Q ≤ 121 ≤ D ≤
DFD6 structure,
500,000
121*Q^0.164
1041
(D/121)^(1/0.164)
un-
barricaded
1≤Q< 1≤Q<
open/ 61 D=61
10 10
light
DFD7 structure,
10
61 < D ≤
≤Q< 61+0.1*(Q-9) (D-60.1)/0.1
barricaded 100
400
I-A-140 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Reverse
Comment/ Condition FORMULA REVERSE - FORMULA
REF condition
Legacy QD [kg] DFD# = … [m] Q DFD# = … [kg]
[m]
400 100
≤Q≤ 100+5.5*(Q-400)^0.5 <D< ((D-100)/5.5)^2+400
3,375 400
3,375
<Q≤ 400 D = 400 3,375 < Q ≤ 5,000
5,000
5,000
400 < D ≤
<Q≤ 0.058*Q+110 (D-110)/0.058
518
7,020
518 < D ≤
7,020 < Q 121*Q^0.164 (D/121)^(1/0.164)
1041
≤ 500,000
28 ≤
1≤Q≤
27.47*Q^0.21 D≤ (D/27.47)^(1/0.21)
31,000
242
31,000 242
2/3 * <Q≤ 0.141*Q^0.72 <D≤ (D/0.141)^(1/0.72)
DFD8 DFD1 100,400 563
100,400 < 563
58.465*LN(Q)-111.595 EXP((D+111.595)/58.465)
Q≤ < D ≤ 656
500,000
1≤Q≤ 21
20.5*Q^0.21 (D/20.5)^(1/0.21)
31,000 ≤ D ≤ 180
31,000
180 < D ≤
<Q≤ 0.105*Q^0.72 (D/0.105)^(1/0.72)
0.5 * 420
DFD9 DFD1
100,400
100,400 < 420 < D ≤
43.631*LN(Q)-83.28 EXP((D+83.28)/43.631)
Q≤ 490
500,000
1≤Q≤ 63 ≤ D ≤
60.97+1.8*Q (D-60.97)/1.8
23 102
23
43.547+4.857*(LN(Q))+ 102 < D ≤ EXP(-4.857/8.968+SQRT
<Q≤
4.484*(LN(Q))^2 226 ((4.857/8.968)^2-(43.547-D)/4.484))
350
350 226
<Q≤ 0.005427*Q+223.981 <D≤ (D-223.981)/0.005427
2/3 *
DFD10 DFD2
73,571 624
73,571 624
<Q≤ 14.874*Q^(1/3) <D≤ (D/14.874)^3
100,400 692
692
100,400 <
71.949*LN(Q)-137.33 <D≤ EXP((D+137.33)/71.949)
Q≤
807
500,000
1≤Q≤ 47 ≤ D ≤
45.5+1.344*Q (D-45.5)/1.344
23 77
23 EXP(-3.625/6.694+SQRT
32.498+3.625*(LN(Q))+ 77 < D ≤
<Q≤ ((3.625/6.694)^2-
3.347*(LN(Q))^2 169
350 (32.498-D)/3.347))
350 169
<Q≤ 0.00405*Q+167.15 <D≤ (D-167.15)/0.00405
0.5 *
DFD11 DFD2
73,571 466
73,571 466
<Q≤ 11.1*Q^(1/3) <D≤ (D/11.1)^3
100,400 516
516
100,400 <
53.693*LN(Q)-102.485 <D≤ EXP((D+102.485)/53.693)
Q≤
603
500,000
1≤Q≤ D= 1≤Q≤
41
14 41 14
2/3 *
DFD12 DFD3 41 < D ≤
14 < Q ≤ 58.465*LN(Q)-111.595 EXP((D+111.595)/58.465)
656
500,000
1≤Q≤ D= 1≤Q≤
31
14 31 14
0.5 *
DFD13 DFD3 31 < D ≤
14 < Q ≤ 43.631*LN(Q)-83.28 EXP((D+83.28)/43.631)
490
500,000
I-A-141 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Reverse
Comment/ Condition FORMULA REVERSE - FORMULA
REF condition
Legacy QD [kg] DFD# = … [m] Q DFD# = … [kg]
[m]
EXP(-
1≤Q< 43.547+4.857*(LN(Q))+ 44 ≤ D <
4.857/8.968+SQRT((4.857/8.968)^2-
5 4.484*(LN(Q))^2 63
(43.547-D)/4.484))
5 EXP(-
65.32+7.286*(LN(Q))+ 100 < D <
≤Q≤ 7.286/13.454+SQRT((7.286/13.454)^2-
6.727*(LN(Q))^2 302
2/3 * 223 (65.32-D)/6.727))
DFD14 DFD4 223
<Q≤ 302 D = 302 223 < Q ≤ 1,170
1,170
302 < D ≤
1,170 < Q 58.465*LN(Q)-111.595 EXP((D+111.595)/58.465)
656
≤ 500,000
EXP(-
1≤Q< 32.498+3.625*(LN(Q))+ 33 ≤ D <
3.625/6.694+SQRT((3.625/6.694)^2-
5 3.347*(LN(Q))^2 47
(32.498-D)/3.347))
5 EXP(-
48.747+5.437*(LN(Q))+ 75 < D <
≤Q≤ 5.437/10.04+SQRT((5.437/10.04)^2-
0.5 * 5.02*(LN(Q))^2 225
DFD15 DFD4
223 (48.747-D)/5.02))
223
<Q≤ 225 225 223 < Q ≤ 1,170
1,170
1,170 < Q 225 < D ≤
43.631*LN(Q)-83.28 EXP((D+83.28)/43.631)
≤ 500,000 490
1≤Q< D= 1≤Q<
41
15 41 15
15
41 < D ≤
≤Q≤ 45.56*LN(Q)-81.07 EXP((D+81.07)/45.56)
352
13,150
2/3 * 13,150
DFD16 DFD5 <Q≤ 14.874*Q^(1/3)
352 < D ≤
(D/14.874)^3
508
39,800
39,800 < 508 < D ≤
58.465*LN(Q)-111.595 EXP((D+111.595)/58.465)
Q≤ 656
500,000
1≤Q< D= 1≤Q<
31
15 31 15
15
31 < D ≤
≤Q≤ 34*LN(Q)-60.5 EXP((D+60.5)/34)
262
13,150
0.5 * 13,150
DFD17 DFD5 <Q≤ 11.1*Q^(1/3)
262
(D/11.1)^3
< D ≤ 376
39,800
376
39,800 <
43.631*LN(Q)-83.28 <D≤ EXP((D+83.28)/43.631)
Q≤
490
500,000
2/3 * 1≤Q≤ 82
DFD18 DFD6 500,000
81.07*Q^0.164
≤ D ≤ 698
(D/81.07)^(1/0.164)
0.5 * 1≤Q≤ 61
DFD19 DFD6 500,000
60.5*Q^0.164
≤ D ≤ 521
(D/60.5)^(1/0.164)
1≤Q< 1≤Q≤
41 D = 41m
10 10
10
41 < D <
≤Q< 40.267+0.067*Q (D-40.267)/0.067
68
400
400 68
2/3*(100+5.5*(Q-
≤Q≤ ≤D< ((D-67)/3.685)^2+400
400)^0.5)
3,375 268
2/3 *
DFD20 DFD7
3,375
<Q≤ 268 D=268 3,375 < Q ≤ 5,000
5,000
5,000
269 < D ≤
<Q≤ 2/3*(0.058*Q+110) (D-73.7)/0.03886
347
7,020
347 < D ≤
7,020 < Q 81.07*Q^0.164 (D/81.07)^(1/0.164)
698
≤ 500,000
1≤Q<
0.5 * 1≤Q<
DFD21 DFD7 10
31 D = 31 10
I-A-142 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Reverse
Comment/ Condition FORMULA REVERSE - FORMULA
REF condition
Legacy QD [kg] DFD# = … [m] Q DFD# = … [kg]
[m]
10
31 < D <
≤Q< 30.05+0.05*Q (D-30.05)/0.05
51
400
400 51
0.5*(100+5.5*(Q-
≤Q≤ ≤D< ((D-50)/2.75)^2+400
400)^0.5)
3,375 200
3,375
<Q≤ 200 D = 200 3,375 < Q ≤ 5,000
5,000
5,000
200 < D ≤
<Q≤ 0.029*Q+55 (D-55)/0.029
259
7,020
259
7,020 < Q 60.5*Q^0.164 <D≤ (D/60.5)^(1/0.164)
≤ 500,000 521
I-A-143 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 7 - LIST OF FORMULAS – PROGRESSIVE 1.2.1
Comment
CONDITION FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF / Legacy
[kg] P1D# = … [m] CONDITION [m] Q = … [kg]
QD
1 D = 20
≤Q< 20 1 ≤ Q < 29
29
P1D1 D4
29 20 EXP(70.345/2.606-
0.36*(-1.303*(LN(Q))^2+ ≤D<
≤Q≤ SQRT((70.345/2.606)^2-(-167.648-
70.345*LN(Q) -167.648) 192
500 000 (D/0.36))/-1.303))
1 D = 60
≤Q< 60 1 ≤ Q < 85
85
P1D2 0.5*D2
85 60 EXP(70.345/2.606-
0.5*(-1.303*(LN(Q))^2+ ≤D<
≤Q≤ SQRT((70.345/2.606)^2-(-167.648-
70.345*LN(Q) -167.648) 266
500 000 (D/0.5))/-1.303))
1 D = 60
≤Q≤ 60 1 ≤ Q ≤ 50
50
P1D3 D6
50 60 EXP(70.345/2.606-
2/3*(-1.303*(LN(Q))^2+
<Q≤ ≤D< SQRT((70.345/2.606)^2-(-167.648-
70.345*LN(Q) -167.648)
500 000 356 (D/0.67))/-1.303))
1 D = 60
≤Q≤ 60 1 ≤ Q ≤ 31
31
P1D4 D2
31 60 EXP(70.345/2.606-
(-1.303*(LN(Q))^2+
<Q≤ ≤D< SQRT((70.345/2.606)^2-(-167.648-D)/-
70.345*LN(Q) -167.648)
500 000 532 1.303))
TABLE 8 - LIST OF FORMULAS – PROGRESSIVE 1.2.2
Comment
CONDITION FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF / Legacy
[kg] P2D# = … [m] CONDITION [m] Q = … [kg]
QD
1
≤Q< 20 D = 20 1 ≤ Q < 125
125
P2D1 D3
125 20
0.36*(1.577*(LN(Q))^2 EXP(2.364/3.154+SQRT((2.364/3.154)^
≤Q≤ ≤D≤
-2.364*LN(Q)+28.127) 2-(28.127-(D/0.36))/1.577))
500 000 97
1
≤Q< 30 D = 30 1 ≤ Q < 200
200
P2D2 0.5*D1
200 30
0.5*(1.577*(LN(Q))^2- EXP(2.364/3.154+SQRT((2.364/3.154)^
≤Q≤ ≤D≤
2.364*LN(Q)+28.127) 2-(28.127-(D/0.5))/1.577))
500 000 135
1
≤Q< 30 D = 30 1 ≤ Q < 59
59
P2D3 D5
59 30
2/3*(1.577*(LN(Q))^2- EXP(2.364/3.154+SQRT((2.364/3.154)^
≤Q≤ ≤D≤
2.364*LN(Q)+28.127) 2-(28.127-(D/(2/3)))/1.577))
500 000 181
1
≤Q< 30 D = 30 1≤Q<7
7
P2D4 D1
7 30
1.577*(LN(Q))^2- EXP(2.364/3.154+SQRT((2.364/3.154)^
≤Q≤ ≤D≤
2.364*LN(Q)+28.127 2-(28.127-D)/1.577))
500 000 269
I-A-144 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 9 - LIST OF FORMULAS – THERMAL
Comment/ CONDITION FORMULA REVERSE REVERSE - FORMULA
REF
Legacy QD [kg] TD# = … [m] CONDITION [m] Q = … [kg]
1 1
≤Q< 25 ≤D< 0
12 000 25
TD1 D1
12 000 25
≤Q≤ 0.22*Q^1/2 ≤D≤ (D/0.22)^2
500 000 156
1 1
≤Q< 60 ≤D< 0
6000 60
TD2 D2
6000 60
≤Q≤ 3.2*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/3.2)^3
500 000 254
1 1
≤Q< 60 ≤D< 0
2500 60
TD3 D3
2500 60
≤Q≤ 4.3*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/4.3)^3
500 000 342
1 1
≤Q< 60 ≤D< 0
800 60
TD4 D4
800 60
≤Q≤ 6.4*Q^1/3 ≤D≤ (D/6.4)^3
500 000 508
I-A-145 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 - LOOK UP TABLE - BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD1 BD2 BD3 BD4 BD5 BD6 BD7 BD8 BD9 BD10 BD11 BD12 BD13 BD14 BD15
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 6
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 6 6 7 8
3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 6 7 7 9
4 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 6 6 7 7 8 10
5 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 11
6 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 11
7 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 7 7 8 9 10 12
8 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 7 8 8 9 10 12
9 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 10 10 13
10 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13
20 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 14 17
30 2 2 2 3 4 4 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 15 19
40 2 2 2 3 4 5 7 7 9 11 13 14 16 17 21
50 2 2 2 3 5 5 7 8 9 12 14 15 17 18 23
60 2 2 2 4 5 5 8 8 10 13 15 16 18 19 24
70 2 2 3 4 5 5 8 9 10 14 15 17 19 20 25
80 2 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 11 14 16 18 19 21 26
90 2 2 3 4 5 6 9 9 11 15 17 18 20 22 27
100 2 2 3 4 6 6 9 10 12 15 17 19 21 23 28
125 2 2 3 4 6 6 9 10 12 16 18 20 22 24 30
150 2 3 3 5 6 7 10 11 13 18 20 22 24 26 32
175 2 3 3 5 7 7 11 12 14 18 21 23 25 27 34
200 3 3 3 5 7 8 11 12 15 19 22 24 26 29 36
225 3 3 4 5 7 8 11 13 15 20 22 25 27 30 37
250 3 3 4 6 7 8 12 13 16 21 23 26 28 31 38
275 3 3 4 6 8 8 12 14 16 21 24 27 29 32 40
300 3 3 4 6 8 9 13 14 17 22 25 27 30 33 41
325 3 3 4 6 8 9 13 14 17 23 25 28 31 34 42
350 3 3 4 6 8 9 13 15 17 23 26 29 32 34 43
375 3 3 4 6 8 9 13 15 18 24 26 29 32 35 44
400 3 3 4 6 9 9 14 15 18 24 27 30 33 36 45
425 3 4 4 7 9 10 14 16 19 25 28 31 34 37 46
450 3 4 4 7 9 10 14 16 19 25 28 31 34 37 46
475 3 4 4 7 9 10 15 16 19 25 29 32 35 38 47
500 3 4 4 7 9 10 15 16 20 26 29 32 35 39 48
600 3 4 5 7 10 11 16 17 21 27 31 34 38 41 51
700 4 4 5 8 10 11 16 18 22 29 32 36 40 43 54
800 4 4 5 8 11 12 17 19 23 30 34 38 41 45 56
900 4 4 5 8 11 12 18 20 24 31 35 39 43 47 58
1,000 4 4 5 8 11 12 18 20 24 32 36 40 44 48 60
1,200 4 5 6 9 12 13 20 22 26 35 39 43 47 52 64
1,400 4 5 6 9 13 14 21 23 27 36 41 45 50 54 68
1,600 5 8 6 10 13 15 22 24 29 38 43 47 52 57 71
1,800 5 8 7 10 14 15 22 25 30 39 44 49 54 59 73
2,000 5 8 7 11 14 16 23 26 31 41 46 51 56 61 76
2,500 5 9 7 11 15 17 25 28 33 44 49 55 60 66 82
I-A-146 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 - LOOK UP TABLE - BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD1 BD2 BD3 BD4 BD5 BD6 BD7 BD8 BD9 BD10 BD11 BD12 BD13 BD14 BD15
3,000 6 9 8 12 16 18 26 29 35 47 52 58 64 70 87
3,500 6 10 8 13 17 19 28 31 37 49 55 61 67 73 92
4,000 6 10 9 14 19 20 30 34 40 53 60 67 73 80 100
5,000 6 11 9 14 19 21 31 35 42 55 62 69 76 83 103
6,000 7 11 10 15 20 22 33 37 44 59 66 73 80 88 110
7,000 7 12 10 16 22 23 35 39 46 62 69 77 85 92 115
8,000 7 12 10 16 22 24 36 40 48 64 72 80 88 96 120
9,000 8 13 11 17 23 25 38 42 50 67 75 84 92 100 125
10,000 8 13 11 18 24 26 39 44 52 69 78 87 95 104 130
12,000 9 14 12 19 26 28 42 46 55 74 83 92 101 110 138
14,000 9 15 13 20 27 29 44 49 58 78 87 97 107 116 145
16,000 9 16 13 21 28 31 46 51 61 81 91 101 111 121 152
18,000 10 16 14 21 29 32 48 53 63 84 95 105 116 126 158
20,000 10 17 14 22 30 33 49 55 66 87 98 109 120 131 163
25,000 11 18 15 24 33 36 53 59 71 94 106 117 129 141 176
30,000 11 19 16 25 35 38 56 63 75 100 112 125 137 150 187
35,000 15 20 17 27 36 40 59 66 79 105 118 131 144 158 197
40,000 16 21 18 28 38 42 62 69 83 110 124 137 151 165 206
45,000 16 22 18 29 40 43 65 72 86 114 129 143 157 171 214
50,000 17 23 19 30 41 45 67 74 89 118 133 148 163 177 222
60,000 18 24 20 32 44 47 71 79 94 126 141 157 173 188 235
70,000 19 25 21 33 46 50 75 83 99 132 149 165 182 198 248
80,000 19 26 22 35 48 52 78 87 104 138 156 173 190 207 259
90,000 20 27 23 36 50 54 81 90 108 144 162 180 198 216 269
100,000 21 28 24 38 52 56 84 93 112 149 168 186 205 223 279
120,000 22 30 25 40 55 60 89 99 119 158 178 198 218 237 296
140,000 - 32 26 42 58 63 94 104 125 167 187 208 229 250 312
160,000 - 33 28 44 60 66 98 109 131 174 196 218 239 261 326
180,000 - 34 29 46 63 68 102 113 136 181 204 226 249 272 339
200,000 - 36 30 47 65 71 106 117 141 188 211 234 258 281 351
250,000 - 38 32 51 70 76 114 126 152 202 227 252 278 303 378
500,000 - 48 40 64 88 96 143 159 191 254 286 318 350 381 477
I-A-147 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 – LOOK UP TABLE – BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD16 BD17 BD18 BD19 BD20 BD21 BD22 BD23 BD24 BD25 BD26 BD27 BD28 BD29 BD30
1 1 8 8 1 1 10 1 1 13 1 1 16 2 20 23
2 1 10 11 1 2 13 2 2 17 2 2 21 2 26 28
3 1 11 12 2 2 14 2 2 19 2 3 24 3 29 33
4 2 12 13 2 2 16 2 3 21 3 3 26 4 32 36
5 2 13 14 2 2 17 3 3 23 3 3 28 4 35 38
6 2 14 15 3 3 18 3 3 24 4 4 30 5 37 41
7 2 14 16 3 3 19 3 3 25 4 4 31 5 39 43
8 2 15 16 3 3 20 3 4 26 4 4 32 5 40 45
9 3 15 17 3 3 20 4 4 28 5 5 34 6 42 47
10 3 16 18 3 3 21 4 4 29 5 5 35 6 44 48
20 4 20 22 5 5 27 6 6 36 7 8 44 9 55 61
30 5 23 25 6 7 30 8 8 41 10 10 50 12 63 69
40 6 25 28 8 8 33 9 10 45 12 12 55 15 69 76
50 7 27 30 9 9 36 11 11 48 13 14 59 17 74 82
60 8 29 32 10 10 38 12 13 51 15 16 63 19 79 87
70 8 30 33 11 11 40 13 14 54 17 17 66 21 83 92
80 9 32 35 12 12 42 14 16 57 18 19 69 23 87 96
90 10 33 36 13 13 44 16 17 59 20 21 72 25 90 100
100 11 34 38 14 14 45 17 18 61 21 22 75 27 93 104
125 12 36 40 16 16 48 19 21 65 24 25 80 31 100 111
150 14 39 43 18 18 52 22 23 70 27 29 86 35 107 118
175 15 41 45 20 20 54 24 26 73 30 32 90 39 112 125
200 17 43 47 21 22 57 26 28 77 33 35 94 42 117 130
225 18 44 49 23 24 59 28 30 80 36 37 98 46 122 136
250 19 46 51 25 26 61 30 33 82 38 40 101 49 126 140
275 20 47 53 26 27 63 32 35 85 41 43 105 52 131 145
300 22 49 54 28 29 65 34 37 88 43 45 108 55 134 149
325 23 50 56 29 30 67 36 39 90 45 48 111 58 138 153
350 24 51 57 31 32 68 38 41 92 48 50 113 61 141 157
375 25 52 58 32 33 70 40 43 94 50 53 116 64 145 161
400 26 54 59 34 35 71 41 44 96 52 55 118 67 148 164
425 27 55 61 35 36 73 43 46 98 54 57 121 69 151 167
450 28 56 62 36 37 74 45 48 100 56 59 123 72 154 171
475 29 57 63 38 39 75 46 50 102 58 61 125 75 157 174
500 30 58 64 39 40 77 48 52 104 60 63 127 77 159 177
600 34 61 68 44 45 81 54 58 110 68 72 135 87 169 188
700 38 64 72 49 50 86 60 64 116 75 79 143 97 178 198
800 41 67 75 53 55 90 65 70 121 82 87 149 106 186 207
900 44 70 78 57 59 93 70 76 126 89 94 155 114 194 215
1,000 47 72 80 61 63 96 75 81 130 95 100 160 122 200 222
1,200 54 77 86 69 72 103 85 92 139 108 113 171 138 213 236
I-A-148 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 – LOOK UP TABLE – BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD16 BD17 BD18 BD19 BD20 BD21 BD22 BD23 BD24 BD25 BD26 BD27 BD28 BD29 BD30
1,400 59 81 90 77 79 108 94 102 146 119 126 179 153 224 249
1,600 65 85 94 84 87 113 103 111 153 130 137 188 167 234 260
1,800 70 88 98 91 94 117 111 120 159 141 148 195 181 244 271
2,000 75 91 101 97 101 121 120 129 164 151 159 202 194 252 280
2,500 87 98 109 113 117 131 139 150 177 175 185 218 225 272 302
3,000 95 104 116 123 126 139 151 163 188 191 198 231 245 289 321
3,500 103 110 122 132 137 146 163 176 198 206 213 243 264 304 338
4,000 117 119 133 150 155 159 185 200 215 233 242 265 300 331 367
5,000 120 124 137 154 160 165 190 206 223 240 254 274 308 342 380
6,000 128 131 146 164 169 175 202 219 237 255 269 291 328 364 404
7,000 134 138 154 173 178 184 213 230 249 268 284 307 345 383 425
8,000 140 144 160 180 186 192 222 240 260 280 296 320 360 400 444
9,000 146 150 167 188 194 200 231 250 271 292 308 333 375 417 462
10,000 151 156 173 194 201 207 240 259 281 302 319 345 388 431 479
12,000 161 165 184 207 213 220 255 275 298 321 339 367 413 458 509
14,000 169 174 193 217 225 232 268 290 314 338 357 386 434 483 536
16,000 177 182 202 227 235 242 280 303 328 353 373 404 454 504 560
18,000 184 189 210 236 244 252 291 315 341 367 388 420 472 525 582
20,000 191 196 218 245 253 261 302 326 353 381 402 435 489 543 603
25,000 205 211 234 264 272 281 325 351 381 410 433 468 527 585 650
30,000 218 224 249 280 289 299 345 373 404 436 460 498 560 622 690
35,000 229 236 262 295 305 315 364 393 426 458 485 524 589 655 727
40,000 240 247 274 308 319 329 380 411 445 479 507 548 616 684 760
45,000 249 257 285 321 331 342 395 427 463 498 527 570 641 712 790
50,000 - 266 295 - - 354 409 - 479 - 546 590 - 737 818
60,000 - 282 314 - - 376 435 - 509 - 580 627 - 783 870
70,000 - 297 330 - - 396 458 - 536 - 610 660 - 825 915
80,000 - 311 345 - - 414 479 - 561 - 638 690 - 862 957
90,000 - 323 359 - - 431 498 - 583 - 664 718 - 897 995
100,000 - 335 372 - - 446 516 - 604 - 687 743 - 929 1031
120,000 - 356 395 - - 474 548 - 642 - 730 790 - 987 1095
140,000 - 374 416 - - 499 577 - 676 - 769 831 - 1039 1153
160,000 - 391 435 - - 522 603 - 706 - 804 869 - 1086 1206
180,000 - 407 452 - - 543 627 - 735 - 836 904 - 1130 1254
200,000 - 422 468 - - 562 650 - 761 - 866 936 - 1170 1299
250,000 - 454 504 - - 605 700 - 819 - 933 1008 - 1260 1399
500,000 - 572 635 - - 762 882 - 1032 - 1175 1270 - 1588 1763
I-A-149 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 – LOOK UP TABLE – BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD31 BD32 BD33 BD34 BD35 BD36
1 2 25 2 3 45 3
2 3 32 4 4 56 5
3 4 37 4 6 65 7
4 4 40 5 7 71 8
5 5 43 6 8 76 9
6 5 46 7 9 81 10
7 6 48 7 9 85 11
8 6 50 8 10 89 12
9 7 53 9 11 93 13
10 7 54 9 12 96 14
20 12 68 14 18 121 23
30 15 78 19 24 138 29
40 18 86 23 29 152 36
50 21 93 26 33 164 41
60 23 98 29 38 174 46
70 26 104 33 42 183 51
80 28 108 36 46 192 56
90 31 113 38 49 199 61
100 33 117 41 53 207 65
125 38 125 48 61 222 75
150 43 133 54 69 236 85
175 47 140 60 77 249 94
200 52 147 65 84 260 103
225 56 153 70 90 271 111
250 60 158 76 97 280 120
275 64 163 80 103 289 127
300 68 168 85 109 298 135
325 71 172 90 115 306 142
350 75 177 94 121 313 149
375 79 181 99 127 321 157
400 82 185 103 132 328 163
425 85 188 107 138 334 170
450 89 192 111 143 341 177
475 92 196 116 148 347 183
500 95 199 120 154 353 189
600 107 211 135 173 375 214
700 119 222 150 192 395 237
800 130 233 163 210 413 259
900 140 242 177 227 429 280
1,000 150 250 189 243 444 300
1,200 170 266 214 275 472 339
1,400 188 280 237 305 497 376
1,600 206 293 259 333 520 411
I-A-150 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 10 – LOOK UP TABLE – BLAST
MASS BLAST DISTANCE (m)
kg BD31 BD32 BD33 BD34 BD35 BD36
1,800 222 305 280 360 541 444
2,000 239 315 301 386 560 477
2,500 277 340 349 448 603 553
3,000 302 361 381 489 641 603
3,500 326 380 411 528 675 651
4,000 369 413 466 599 734 738
5,000 380 428 479 616 760 760
6,000 404 455 509 655 807 807
7,000 425 479 536 689 850 850
8,000 444 500 560 720 888 888
9,000 462 521 583 749 924 924
10,000 479 539 604 776 957 957
12,000 509 573 642 825 1017 1017
14,000 536 603 675 868 1071 1071
16,000 560 630 706 908 1119 1119
18,000 582 656 734 944 1164 1164
20,000 603 679 761 978 1206 1206
25,000 650 732 819 1053 1299 1299
30,000 690 777 871 1119 1380 1380
35,000 727 818 916 1178 1453 1453
40,000 760 855 958 1232 1519 1519
45,000 790 890 996 1281 1580 1580
50,000 818 922 - - 1636 1636
60,000 870 979 - - 1739 1739
70,000 915 1031 - - 1830 1830
80,000 957 1078 - - 1914 1914
90,000 995 1121 - - 1990 1990
100,000 1031 1161 - - 2061 2061
120,000 1095 1234 - - 2190 2190
140,000 1153 1299 - - 2306 2306
160,000 1206 1358 - - 2411 2411
180,000 1254 1412 - - 2507 2507
200,000 1299 1463 - - 2597 2597
250,000 1399 1575 - - 2798 2798
500,000 1763 1985 - - 3525 3525
I-A-151 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 11 - LOOK UP TABLE – DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS
MASS DEBRIS AND FRAGMENT DISTANCE (m)
kg DFD1 DFD2 DFD3 DFD4 DFD5 DFD6 DFD7 DFD8 DFD9 DFD10 DFD11 DFD12 DFD13 DFD14
1 41 94 61 65 61 121 61 28 21 63 47 41 31 44
2 48 97 61 74 61 136 61 32 24 65 49 41 31 50
3 52 100 61 82 61 145 61 35 26 67 50 41 31 55
4 55 102 61 88 61 152 61 37 28 69 51 41 31 59
5 58 105 61 94 61 158 61 39 29 70 53 41 31 63
6 60 108 61 150 61 163 61 41 30 72 54 41 31 100
7 62 110 61 157 61 167 61 42 31 74 55 41 31 105
8 64 113 61 164 61 171 61 43 32 76 57 41 31 110
9 66 116 61 170 61 174 61 44 33 78 58 41 31 114
10 67 118 61 176 61 177 61 45 34 79 59 41 31 118
20 77 145 95 221 83 198 63 52 39 97 73 64 48 148
30 84 168 131 251 111 212 64 57 42 112 84 88 66 168
40 89 183 156 275 130 222 65 60 45 123 92 105 78 184
50 94 196 175 294 146 230 66 63 47 132 98 118 88 197
60 97 207 191 311 158 237 67 65 49 139 104 128 96 208
70 101 217 205 325 168 243 68 68 51 146 109 137 103 218
80 103 226 216 338 177 249 69 69 52 151 113 145 108 227
90 106 234 227 350 185 254 70 71 53 157 117 152 114 235
100 108 241 236 361 193 258 71 73 54 162 121 158 118 242
125 114 257 255 385 208 268 73 76 57 172 129 171 128 258
150 118 270 271 405 220 276 76 79 59 181 135 182 136 271
175 122 281 285 422 231 283 78 82 61 189 141 191 143 283
200 125 292 296 437 240 289 81 84 63 196 146 199 148 293
225 128 301 307 450 248 295 83 86 64 202 151 206 154 302
250 131 310 316 450 255 300 86 88 66 208 155 212 158 302
275 134 317 324 450 261 304 88 90 67 213 159 217 162 302
300 136 325 332 450 267 309 91 92 68 218 163 222 166 302
325 139 331 339 450 273 313 93 93 70 222 166 227 170 302
350 141 338 345 450 278 317 96 94 71 226 169 231 173 302
375 143 338 351 450 283 320 98 96 72 227 169 235 176 302
400 145 338 357 450 287 324 101 97 73 227 169 239 179 302
425 147 338 362 450 291 327 128 98 74 227 169 243 181 302
450 148 338 367 450 295 330 139 100 74 227 169 246 184 302
475 150 339 372 450 299 333 148 101 75 227 170 249 186 302
500 152 339 376 450 302 336 155 102 76 227 170 252 188 302
600 158 340 392 450 314 346 178 106 79 228 170 263 196 302
700 163 340 406 450 325 355 196 109 82 228 170 272 203 302
800 167 341 417 450 334 363 210 112 84 229 171 280 209 302
900 172 342 428 450 342 370 223 115 86 229 171 287 214 302
1,000 175 343 437 450 349 376 235 118 88 230 172 293 219 302
1,200 182 345 453 453 362 388 256 122 91 231 173 303 227 303
1,400 188 346 466 466 372 397 274 126 94 232 173 312 233 312
1,600 194 348 478 478 381 406 291 130 97 233 174 320 239 320
1,800 198 349 488 488 389 414 306 133 99 234 175 327 244 327
2,000 203 351 497 497 396 421 320 136 102 235 176 333 249 333
2,500 213 355 517 517 412 437 353 143 107 238 178 346 259 346
I-A-152 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 11 - LOOK UP TABLE – DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS
MASS DEBRIS AND FRAGMENT DISTANCE (m)
kg DFD1 DFD2 DFD3 DFD4 DFD5 DFD6 DFD7 DFD8 DFD9 DFD10 DFD11 DFD12 DFD13 DFD14
3,000 221 359 533 533 424 450 381 148 111 241 180 357 267 357
3,500 228 363 546 546 434 462 400 153 114 243 182 366 273 366
4,000 235 367 558 558 443 472 400 157 118 246 184 374 279 374
5,000 246 375 577 577 459 490 400 165 123 252 188 387 289 387
6,000 255 383 593 593 471 504 458 171 128 257 192 398 297 398
7,000 264 391 607 607 482 517 516 177 132 262 196 407 304 407
8,000 271 400 618 618 491 529 529 182 136 268 200 414 309 414
9,000 278 408 628 628 499 539 539 186 139 273 204 421 314 421
10,000 284 416 638 638 506 549 549 191 142 279 208 427 319 427
12,000 295 432 654 654 518 565 565 198 148 290 216 438 327 438
14,000 305 448 667 667 536 580 580 204 153 300 224 447 334 447
16,000 314 464 679 679 560 592 592 210 157 311 232 455 340 455
18,000 321 481 689 689 582 604 604 216 161 322 241 462 345 462
20,000 329 497 698 698 603 614 614 220 165 333 249 468 349 468
25,000 344 537 718 718 650 637 637 231 172 360 269 481 359 481
30,000 358 578 734 734 690 657 657 240 179 387 289 492 367 492
35,000 393 618 747 747 727 673 673 264 197 414 309 501 374 501
40,000 433 659 759 759 759 688 688 290 217 442 330 508 380 508
50,000 508 740 778 778 778 714 714 341 254 496 370 521 389 521
60,000 579 821 794 794 794 736 736 388 290 550 411 532 397 532
70,000 647 902 807 807 807 755 755 434 324 604 451 541 404 541
80,000 712 957 819 819 819 771 771 478 356 641 479 549 410 549
90,000 775 995 829 829 829 786 786 520 388 667 498 556 415 556
100,000 837 1031 839 839 839 800 800 561 419 691 516 562 420 562
120,000 854 1051 854 854 854 824 824 573 427 705 526 573 427 573
140,000 868 1068 868 868 868 845 845 582 434 716 534 582 434 582
160,000 880 1082 880 880 880 864 864 589 440 725 541 589 440 589
180,000 890 1095 890 890 890 881 881 596 445 734 548 596 445 596
200,000 899 1106 899 899 899 896 896 603 450 741 553 603 450 603
250,000 919 1130 919 919 919 930 930 616 460 757 565 616 460 616
500,000 979 1205 979 979 979 1041 1041 656 490 807 603 656 490 656
I-A-153 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 11 - LOOK UP TABLE – DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS
MASS DEBRIS AND FRAGMENT DISTANCE (m)
kg DFD15 DFD16 DFD17 DFD18 DFD19 DFD20 DFD21
1 33 41 31 82 61 41 31
2 37 41 31 91 68 41 31
3 41 41 31 98 73 41 31
4 44 41 31 102 76 41 31
5 47 41 31 106 79 41 31
6 75 41 31 109 82 41 31
7 79 41 31 112 84 41 31
8 82 41 31 115 86 41 31
9 85 41 31 117 87 41 31
10 88 41 31 119 89 41 31
20 111 56 42 133 99 42 32
30 126 74 56 142 106 43 32
40 138 87 65 149 111 43 33
50 147 98 73 154 115 44 33
60 156 106 79 159 119 45 34
70 163 113 84 163 122 45 34
80 169 119 89 167 125 46 35
90 175 124 93 170 127 47 35
100 181 129 97 173 129 47 36
125 193 139 104 179 134 49 37
150 203 148 110 185 138 51 38
175 211 155 116 190 142 52 39
200 219 161 120 194 145 54 41
225 225 166 124 198 148 56 42
250 225 171 128 201 150 58 43
275 225 175 131 204 152 59 44
300 225 179 134 207 155 61 46
325 225 183 137 210 157 63 47
350 225 186 139 212 159 64 48
375 225 189 142 215 160 66 49
400 225 192 144 217 162 68 51
425 225 195 146 219 164 86 64
450 225 198 148 221 165 94 70
475 225 200 150 223 167 99 74
500 225 203 151 225 168 104 78
600 225 211 157 232 173 120 89
700 225 218 163 238 178 131 98
800 225 224 167 243 182 141 105
900 225 229 171 248 185 150 112
1,000 225 234 175 252 188 158 118
1,200 227 242 181 260 194 172 128
1,400 233 249 186 266 199 184 137
1,600 239 256 191 272 203 195 146
1,800 244 261 195 278 207 205 153
2,000 249 266 198 282 211 215 160
2,500 259 276 206 293 219 236 177
I-A-154 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 11 - LOOK UP TABLE – DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS
MASS DEBRIS AND FRAGMENT DISTANCE (m)
kg DFD15 DFD16 DFD17 DFD18 DFD19 DFD20 DFD21
3,000 267 284 212 302 225 255 191
3,500 273 291 217 310 231 268 200
4,000 279 297 222 316 236 268 200
5,000 289 307 230 328 245 268 200
6,000 297 316 236 338 252 307 229
7,000 304 323 241 347 259 346 258
8,000 309 329 246 354 265 354 265
9,000 314 334 250 361 270 361 270
10,000 319 339 253 368 275 368 275
12,000 327 347 259 379 283 379 283
14,000 334 359 268 388 290 388 290
16,000 340 375 280 397 296 397 296
18,000 345 390 291 405 302 405 302
20,000 349 404 302 412 307 412 307
25,000 359 435 325 427 319 427 319
30,000 367 463 345 440 329 440 329
35,000 374 487 364 451 337 451 337
40,000 380 508 380 461 344 461 344
50,000 389 521 389 479 357 479 357
60,000 397 532 397 493 368 493 368
70,000 404 541 404 506 378 506 378
80,000 410 549 410 517 386 517 386
90,000 415 556 415 527 393 527 393
100,000 420 562 420 536 400 536 400
120,000 427 573 427 552 412 552 412
140,000 434 582 434 567 423 567 423
160,000 440 589 440 579 432 579 432
180,000 445 596 445 590 441 590 441
200,000 450 603 450 601 448 601 448
250,000 460 616 460 623 465 623 465
500,000 490 656 490 698 521 698 521
I-A-155 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 12 - LOOK UP TABLE – PROGRESSIVE 1.2.1, 1.2.2 AND THERMAL
MASS PROGRESSIVE DISTANCE (m) PROGRESSIVE DISTANCE (m) THERMAL DISTANCE (m)
kg P1D1 P1D2 P1D3 P1D4 P2D1 P2D2 P2D3 P2D4 TD1 TD2 TD3 TD4
1 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
2 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
3 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
4 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
5 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
6 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
7 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 30 25 60 60 60
8 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 31 25 60 60 60
9 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 31 25 60 60 60
10 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 32 25 60 60 60
20 20 60 60 60 20 30 30 36 25 60 60 60
30 21 60 60 60 20 30 30 39 25 60 60 60
40 27 60 60 75 20 30 30 41 25 60 60 60
50 32 60 60 88 20 30 30 44 25 60 60 60
60 36 60 67 99 20 30 31 45 25 60 60 60
70 39 60 73 108 20 30 32 47 25 60 60 60
80 42 60 78 116 20 30 33 49 25 60 60 60
90 45 62 83 123 20 30 34 50 25 60 60 60
100 47 65 87 129 20 30 34 51 25 60 60 60
125 51 71 95 142 20 30 36 54 25 60 60 60
150 55 77 102 153 21 30 38 56 25 60 60 60
175 58 81 108 161 21 30 39 58 25 60 60 60
200 61 85 113 169 22 30 41 60 25 60 60 60
225 64 88 118 176 23 31 42 62 25 60 60 60
250 66 91 122 182 23 32 43 64 25 60 60 60
275 68 94 125 187 24 33 44 65 25 60 60 60
300 69 96 129 192 24 33 45 66 25 60 60 60
325 71 98 132 196 25 34 46 68 25 60 60 60
350 72 100 134 200 25 35 46 69 25 60 60 60
375 74 102 137 204 26 35 47 70 25 60 60 60
400 75 104 139 208 26 36 48 71 25 60 60 60
425 76 106 141 211 26 36 48 72 25 60 60 60
450 77 107 144 214 27 37 49 73 25 60 60 60
475 78 109 145 217 27 37 50 74 25 60 60 60
500 79 110 147 220 27 38 50 75 25 60 60 60
600 83 115 154 230 28 39 52 78 25 60 60 60
700 86 119 159 238 29 41 54 81 25 60 60 60
800 88 123 164 245 30 42 56 83 25 60 60 60
900 91 126 168 251 31 43 57 86 25 60 60 62
1,000 93 129 172 257 32 44 59 88 25 60 60 64
1,200 96 133 178 266 33 46 61 91 25 60 60 69
I-A-156 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 12 - LOOK UP TABLE – PROGRESSIVE 1.2.1, 1.2.2 AND THERMAL
MASS PROGRESSIVE DISTANCE (m) PROGRESSIVE DISTANCE (m) THERMAL DISTANCE (m)
kg P1D1 P1D2 P1D3 P1D4 P2D1 P2D2 P2D3 P2D4 TD1 TD2 TD3 TD4
1,400 99 137 184 274 34 47 63 94 25 60 60 72
1,600 101 141 188 281 35 49 65 97 25 60 60 75
1,800 104 144 192 287 36 50 67 100 25 60 60 78
2,000 106 146 196 292 37 51 68 102 25 60 60 81
2,500 110 152 203 303 39 54 72 107 25 60 60 87
3,000 113 157 210 313 40 56 74 111 25 60 63 93
3,500 116 160 215 320 41 57 77 114 25 60 66 98
4,000 118 164 219 327 43 59 79 118 25 60 69 102
5,000 122 169 226 337 45 62 83 123 25 60 74 110
6,000 125 173 232 346 46 64 86 127 25 60 79 117
7,000 128 177 237 354 48 66 88 131 25 62 83 123
8,000 130 180 241 360 49 68 90 135 25 64 86 128
9,000 132 183 245 365 50 69 93 138 25 67 90 134
10,000 134 185 248 370 51 71 94 141 25 69 93 138
12,000 137 190 254 379 53 73 98 146 25 74 99 147
14,000 139 193 259 386 54 75 101 150 27 78 104 155
16,000 141 196 263 392 56 77 103 154 28 81 109 162
18,000 143 199 266 397 57 79 105 157 30 84 113 168
20,000 145 201 269 402 58 80 107 160 32 87 117 174
25,000 148 206 276 412 60 83 112 166 35 94 126 188
30,000 151 210 281 420 62 86 115 172 39 100 134 199
35,000 154 213 286 426 64 89 118 177 42 105 141 210
40,000 156 216 290 432 65 91 121 181 44 110 148 219
50,000 159 221 296 441 68 94 126 188 50 118 159 236
60,000 162 225 301 449 70 97 130 194 54 126 169 251
70,000 164 228 305 455 72 100 133 199 59 132 178 264
80,000 166 231 309 461 73 102 136 203 63 138 186 276
90,000 168 233 312 466 75 104 139 207 66 144 193 287
100,000 170 235 315 470 76 105 141 210 70 149 200 298
120,000 172 239 320 477 78 109 145 217 77 158 213 316
140,000 174 242 324 483 80 111 149 222 83 167 224 333
160,000 176 245 328 489 82 114 152 227 88 174 234 348
180,000 178 247 331 493 83 116 155 231 94 181 243 362
200,000 179 249 333 497 85 118 157 235 99 188 252 375
250,000 182 253 339 506 88 122 163 243 110 202 271 404
500,000 192 266 356 532 97 135 181 269 156 254 342 508
I-A-157 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
ANNEX I-B
FLOWCHART SHOWING HOW TO USE QD TABLES
Interaction Matrix –
gives the formula
reference for each
explosive effect.
See also tables for
tabulated results.
Use Interaction
Matrix to
determine correct
formula for each
relevant Explosives
Effect
Use Interaction Matrix to determine correct
formula for each relevant Explosives Effect
I-B-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
ANNEX I-C WORKED EXAMPLES
WORKED EXAMPLES USING QUANTITY DISTANCE
TABLES TO CALCULATE MINIMUM SEPARATION
DISTANCES
WORKED EXAMPLE
ECM
?
Example A
50000kg
ECM
Example B ?
25000kg
1. To calculate the minimum separation distance between a PES and
an ES the flow chart at I-B-1 must be followed carefully. To calculate the
minimum separation distance the quantity of explosives in the magazine
must be known. In example A the magazine holds 50,000kg of HD1.1. In
example B, the magazine holds 25,000kg of SsD1.2.1. Two separate
loads have been considered to show how the tables differ between HD1.1
and other HDs.
Choosing the PES type
2. For each interaction, the correct PES type must be selected.
Determine which of the 4 magazine types applies to the PES in question.
It will be one of the 4 tables below.
PES Type Table Number Page Number
ECM Table 1 I-A-5
Heavy Walled Magazine Table 2 I-A-38
Medium Walled Magazine Table 3 I-A-71
Light Magazine and open stacks Table 4 I-A-105
I-C-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
3. In the examples above the PES type is an Earth Covered
Magazine.
Choosing the PES orientation
4. Now the Magazine type has been selected the directional effects
and/or the effects of barricades must be considered.
5. For ECM the orientation of HD1.1 and 1.3 explosives are from the
rear if the ES is with 135° of the rear corners of the structure (Not from the
earth cover), from the front if the ES is with 150°of the front corners of the
structure (Not from the earth cover) and from the side if the ES is outside
of these areas. For HD1.2 the orientation is from the front if the ES is
within 100° of the front corners of the structure and to the side or rear of
the ES is outside this area. Diagrams are at Annex 1-A, para 7. It is
entirely possible for the same ES to be in front of an ECM for HD1.1 and
HD1.3 and to the side for HD1.2.
6. For Heavy Walled Magazines, the directional effects are either
through a solid wall, through a wall with an aperture (such as a door or
loading bay) or in any direction if the building does not have a protective
roof.
7. Light structures and open stacks are either barricaded if there is a
compliant barricade on the line of site from the PES to the ES or
unbarricaded if there isn’t.
PES Type and Orientation Table and Column
ECB effects from the rear Table 1, Column a
ECB effects from the side Table 1, Column b
ECB Effects from the front Table 1, Column c
Heavy Wall and roof effects through solid wall Table 2, Column d
Heavy Wall and roof effects through wall with Table 2, Column e
aperture
Heavy Wall with light roof Table 2, Column f
Medium Wall Structure with Barricade Table 3, Column g
Medium Wall Structure without Barricade Table 3, Column h
Light Structure/open stack with Barricade Table 4, Column i
Light Structure/open stack with Barricade Table 4, Column j
8. In the example above the ES is to the Rear of the PES, so Table 1
Column a should be selected.
Choosing the ES type number
9. Determine which of the 28 ES types applies to the ES in question.
Each ES has its own type number within the table chosen previously.
10. In the example above the ES is an inhabited building (ES type 24).
Choosing the correct set of QD Interactions
11. The correct set of QD Interactions can now be found in the
Interaction matrix. These are the six Interactions on the Selected ES page
in the PES/Orientation column selected above.
I-C-2 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
12. The Interactions relate to the ‘list of formula’ at Tables 5-9 Annex 1-
A, that give a tolerable level of safety for BLAST, DEBRIS &FRAG,
PROGRESSIVE and THERMAL effects.
13. In the example above the references for the formula are given in
Table 1, column a, ES type 24.
Effect QD Interactions in Relates to actual
the Interaction formula in ‘list of
matrix formula’ (Tables 5-9)
BLAST BD31 22.2Q1/3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 0.21*Q0.72
PROG 1.2.1 60 m 60 m min dist.
PROG 1.2.2 30 m 30 m min dist.
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 6.4Q1/3
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 6.4Q1/3
Choosing the correct MCE
14. Before these calculations can be used to determine the minimum
separation distance the MCE (in kg) should be calculated for the most
significant HD1.2 items (i.e., 1.2.1 or 1.2.3) that will be stored in the
magazine using the process given in AASTP-1 Chapter 1.3.1.5. It is likely
that a default value of 50kg will cover all of the HD1.2 items so this value
is often used. Whichever MCE is used the licence must be annotated to
prevent any HD1.2 items with a greater MCE being stored in the
magazine.
15. In this example we will use the default value of 50kg.
Calculating the minimum separation distance
16. A different separation distance will exist for each HD stored in the
magazine. Starting with HD1.1 use the NEQ/MCE matrix to establish what
calculations are required. For example, A The HD1.1 column shows that
for HD1.1 storage both the BLAST (BD31) and DEBRIS & FRAG (DFD1)
calculations should be used with the NEQ stored in the magazine. The
calculations are given in the list of formula and come from the ‘calculating
distance from mass’ table. The answers are shown in the look up tables.
In this situation the HD1.1 min separation distances for 50000kg are:
I-C-3 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Effect Formula NEQ Formula Min
reference Separation
distance
BLAST BD31 50,000 kg 22.2Q1/3 818 m
DEBRIS & DFD1 50,000 kg 0.21*Q0.72 508 m
FRAG
17. For example B, the NEQ/MCE matrix shows that for SsD1.2.1
BLAST (BD31) and DEBRIS & FRAG (DFD1) effects will be calculated
with MCE of 50kg and PROG 1.2.1 effects (P1D4) will be calculated with
the NEQ of 25,000kg. In this example the SsD1.2.1 separation distances
for PROG1.2.1 (25000kg) are 412m. For the MCE of 50kg the required
separation distances are 94m and 21m
Effect Formula NEQ Formula Min
reference Separation
Distance
BLAST BD31 MCE 50 kg 1.5Q2/3 21 m
DEBRIS & DFD1 MCE 50 kg 41*Q0.21 94 m
FRAG
PROG 1.2.1 P1D4 NEQ 412 m
25,000 kg
18. In this example as no other HDs are to be stored no further
separation distances need be calculated.
19. In Example A the minimum separation distance to an inhibited
building is 818 m due to the Blast effect of the HD1.1.
20. In Example B only SsD 1.2.1 is stored, and an inhabited building
would be possible at 412 m from the rear of the ECM driven by the PROG
1.2.1 effect of 25,000 kg of SsD1.2.1 items.
I-C-4 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
USING SEPARATION DISTANCE TABLES TO CALCULATE MAXIMUM
PERMISSIBLE QUANTITY OF EXPLOSIVES THAT CAN BE PRESENT
WORKED EXAMPLE
ECM 750 m
1. To calculate the maximum permissible quantity of explosives in
each HD/SsD the flow chart at I-B-1 must be followed carefully. To
calculate the maximum permissible quantity of explosives the distance
between the PES and ES must be known and is taken from the nearest
point of the PES to the nearest point of the ES. In this example the ECM is
750m from the nearest point of the inhabited building.
Choosing PES Type, Orientation and ES Page
2. Choosing the PES type, choosing the PES orientation and choosing
the ES page are all done as described for Example A and B.
3. In this example the PES type is an Earth Covered Magazine, the
PES orientation is effects from the rear and the ES type is Type 24,
Inhabited building.
Choosing the correct QD Interactions
4. The QD Interactions are also selected in the same way but the
formula are taken from the calculating mass from distance list as shown
below.
Effect QD Interactions in Relates to actual formula
the Interaction in ‘list of formula’(Tables
matrix 5-9)
BLAST BD31 (D/22.2)3
DEBRIS & FRAG DFD1 (D/0.21)(1/0.72)
PROG 1.2.1 60 m 60 m min dist.
PROG 1.2.2 30 m 30 m min dist.
THERMAL 1.3.1 TD4 6.4*Q1/3 but distance is
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 >508 m so it is limited only
by capacity
Calculating the minimum separation distance
5. A different separation distance will exist for each HD stored in the
magazine. Starting with HD1.1 use the NEQ/MCE matrix to establish what
calculations are required. The 1.1 column shows that for HD1.1 storage
both the BLAST (BD31) and DEBRIS & FRAG (DFD1) calculations should
be used to calculate the maximum permissible quantity of explosives that
can be stored. The calculations are given in the list of formula and the
answers are shown in the look up tables. In this situation, the HD1.1
maximum quantity for 750 m are:
I-C-5 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Effect Formula Formula Maximum quantity (kg)
reference
BLAST BD31 (D/22.2)3 38,559 kg (by calculation) or
35000 kg using the lookup
table)
DEBRIS DFD1 (D/0.21)(1/0,72) 86000 kg (by calculation) or
& FRAG 80,000 kg using the lookup
table)
6. Repeat the process for SsD1.2.1. The NEQ/MCE matrix shows that
for SsD1.2.1 BLAST (BD31) and DEBRIS & FRAG (DFD1) effects give an
MCE quantity. The MCE is shown below. In this example the quantity
given (35000 kg) is far above any items actual MCE so the magazine may
be filled to capacity. PROG 1.2.1 effects will give an NEQ. In this situation,
the SsD1.2.1 gives a min distance of 60 m which is available, so the
magazine can be filled to capacity.
Effect Formula Formula Maximum
reference quantity (kg)
BLAST BD31 (D/22.2)3 To capacity
DEBRIS & DFD1 (D/0.21)(1/0,72) To capacity
FRAG
PROG 1.2.1 60 m - To capacity
7. Repeat the process for SsD1.2.2. BLAST and DEBRIS & FRAG are
the same as SsD1.2.1, so can simply be repeated. PROG 1.2.2 effects will
give an NEQ. In this situation, the SsD1.2.2 gives a min distance of 30m
which is available so the magazine can be filled to capacity.
Effect Formula Formula Maximum
reference quantity (kg)
PROG 1.2.2 30 m - To capacity
8. Repeat the process for SsD1.2.3. BLAST and DEBRIS & FRAG are
the same as SsD1.2.1, so can simply be repeated. THERMAL1.2.3 effects
will give an NEQ. In this situation, the SsD1.2.3 gives TD4, which is no QD
for distances below 60 m or 6.4Q1/3 Assuming a maximum MCE of 50 kg
gives a distance of 6 m, which exists, so the magazine can be filled to
capacity.
Effect Formula Formula Maximum
reference quantity (kg)
THERMAL TD4 No QD or To capacity
1.2.3 6.4Q1/3
9. Repeat the process for SsD1.3.1 The only effect of concern is
THERMAL 1.3.1 which gives TD4, which can be repeated from the
SsD1.2.3
Effect Formula Formula Maximum
reference quantity (kg)
THERMAL TD4 No QD or To capacity
1.3.1 6.4Q1/3
I-C-6 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
10. Repeat the process for SsD1.3.2 The only effect of concern is
THERMAL 1.3.2 which gives TD4, which can be repeated from the
SsD1.2.3
Effect Formula Formula Maximum
reference quantity (kg)
THERMAL 1.3.2 TD4 No QD or To capacity
6.4Q1/3
11. Repeat the process for HD1.6 The effects of concern are BLAST
and DEBRIS & FRAG for MCE which can be copied from SsD1.2.1 and
THERMAL 1.3.2 for NEQ which can be copied from that section.
12. Now each HD and SsD have been considered the maximum
quantity of explosives for each effect in each HS/SsD can be shown. In
this situation the maximum quantities are shown for each HD/SsD in the
bottom row and will be the smallest amount in each column. This gives the
maximum permissible limit for each class of explosives and shown which
explosive effect is driving that limit.
SsD SsD SsD SsD SsD
HD1.1 HD1.6
1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.2
To
To To To Cap
BLAST 35000 N/A N/A
Cap Cap Cap (MCE
Limit of
50kg)
To
DEBRIS & To To To Cap
86000 N/A N/A
FRAG Cap Cap Cap (MCE
Limit of
50kg)
PROG To To
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SsD1.2.1 Cap Cap
PROG
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SsD1.2.2
THERMAL To
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SsD1.3.1 Cap
THERMAL To To To
N/A N/A N/A N/A
SsD1.3.2 Cap Cap Cap
To To To To
Licence Cap Cap Cap To To Cap
35000
Limit (kg) (MCE
Limit of
(MCE
Limit of
(MCE
Limit of
Cap Cap (MCE
Limit of
50kg) 50kg) 50kg) 50kg)
13. This completes the assessment for the chosen PES/ES interaction,
this process must be repeated for every ES that is to be considered. Best
practice is to consider at least the closest example of every ES
type/orientation that is within a reasonably practicable distance and detail
ES types not considered.
14. Once every HD/SsD has been considered for every ES
type/orientation the licence can be completed and the exercise is
complete.
I-C-7 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
ALLIED MUNITION STORAGE AND TRANSPORT
PUBLICATION 1
(AASTP-1)
MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY GUIDELINES
FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY
MUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
PART II
EXPLOSIVES STORAGE MAGAZINE DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES
II-i Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
PART II - TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. II-1-1
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PART II ............................................................ II-1-1
CHAPTER CONTENT .................................................................................... II-1-1
CHANGE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... II-1-2
ABOVEGROUND STORAGE .............................................................. II-2-1
SECTION I - SPECIAL STORAGE CONFIGURATIONS ............................... II-2-1
2.2.1.1. Storage in Open Stacks/Buffered Storage ............................................... II-2-1
SECTION II - STORAGE BUILDINGS AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION .......... II-2-4
2.2.2.1. Structural Materials .................................................................................. II-2-4
2.2.2.2. Protection of ECM against Blast .............................................................. II-2-4
2.2.2.3. Protection against Projections ................................................................. II-2-6
2.2.2.4. Pressure Release .................................................................................... II-2-6
2.2.2.5. Lightning Protection ................................................................................. II-2-7
2.2.2.6. Rocket Storage Buildings ........................................................................ II-2-7
SECTION III - BARRICADES: DESIGN CRITERIA ........................................ II-2-8
2.2.3.1. Functions of Barricades ........................................................................... II-2-8
2.2.3.2. Geometry of Earth Barricades ................................................................. II-2-8
2.2.3.3. Material for Earth Barricades and for the Cover of Buildings ................. II-2-11
2.2.3.4. Walls as Barricades ............................................................................... II-2-12
SECTION IV – LIGHTNING PROTECTION ................................................. II-2-13
2.2.4.1. Lightning Protection Systems (LPS) Standards ..................................... II-2-13
2.2.4.2. Hazards of Lightning .............................................................................. II-2-14
2.2.4.3. IEC 62305 Protection Requirements ........................................................ 2-15
2.2.4.4. LPS requirements for earth-covered and underground (tunnel) magazines
and ISO containers ................................................................................ II-2-18
2.2.4.5. Inspections and Testing ......................................................................... II-2-19
2.2.4.6. Exclusions ............................................................................................. II-2-19
SECTION V - STANDARD OF INTERNAL LIGHTING IN EXPLOSIVES
STORAGE BUILDINGS .............................................................................................. II-2-19
2.2.5.1. General .................................................................................................. II-2-19
2.2.5.2. Minimum Standard................................................................................. II-2-19
SECTION VI – ELECTRICAL STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS ................... II-2-20
2.2.6.1. Electrical Equipment and its Installation in Explosives Facilities or Locations
............................................................................................................... II-2-20
2.2.6.2. Electrical Standards Directives .............................................................. II-2-20
2.2.6.3. Certification ............................................................................................ II-2-20
2.2.6.4. Hazards Presented by Dust, Liquids, Vapours, and Gases. .................. II-2-20
2.2.6.5. Temperature Classification .................................................................... II-2-22
2.2.6.6. Hazardous environments and their designations ................................... II-2-23
2.2.6.7. Safety surveillance................................................................................. II-2-23
2.2.6.8. Mitigation of hazards.............................................................................. II-2-23
2.2.6.9. Electrical equipment certification/labels ................................................. II-2-25
2.2.6.10. Current Certification Directives .............................................................. II-2-25
2.2.6.11. Electro-Magnetic (EM) Hazards ............................................................. II-2-25
2.2.6.12. Electrical equipment selection/installation/inspection ............................ II-2-26
2.2.6.13. Housekeeping/cleanliness of areas ....................................................... II-2-26
2.2.6.14. Vehicles and portable electrical items.................................................... II-2-26
II-ii Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
2.2.6.15. Non-Explosives support facilities ........................................................... II-2-27
2.2.6.16. Underground storage facilities ............................................................... II-2-27
FIRE-FIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES ......................... II-3-1
SECTION I - GENERAL ................................................................................. II-3-1
2.3.1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................. II-3-1
SECTION II - FIRE DIVISIONS ...................................................................... II-3-4
2.3.2.1. Involved munition and Explosives Hazard Divisions ................................ II-3-4
2.3.2.2. Involved Fire Divisions ............................................................................. II-3-4
2.3.2.3. Fire Division Symbols: ............................................................................. II-3-4
2.3.2.4. Supplementary Symbols: ......................................................................... II-3-5
2.3.2.5. Protective Clothing:.................................................................................. II-3-7
SECTION III – FIRE-FIGHTING PRINCIPLES ............................................... II-3-8
2.3.3.1. Fire Prevention (preventive fire protection) .............................................. II-3-8
2.3.3.2. Constructional Fire Prevention Measures ................................................ II-3-8
2.3.3.3. Organizational Fire Prevention Measures:............................................... II-3-8
SECTION IV - FIRE-FIGHTING PROCEDURES ......................................... II-3-10
2.3.4.1. General .................................................................................................. II-3-10
2.3.4.2. Detailed Fire-Fighting Procedures ......................................................... II-3-11
SECTION V - EMERGENCY PLANNING ..................................................... II-3-15
2.3.5.1. Standard Operating Procedures ............................................................ II-3-15
2.3.5.2. Withdrawal distance for emergency and rescue personnel ................... II-3-15
2.3.5.3. Hazard evacuation distance for nonessential personnel........................ II-3-16
OPERATIONS IN AN EXPLOSIVES AREA......................................... II-4-1
SECTION I - INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... II-4-1
2.4.1.1. General .................................................................................................... II-4-1
SECTION II – GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ...................................... II-4-1
2.4.2.1. Responsibilities of Commanding Officers/Superintendents ..................... II-4-1
2.4.2.2. Safety Responsibilities............................................................................. II-4-1
2.4.2.3. Admission to Explosives Areas ................................................................ II-4-2
2.4.2.4. Personnel Employed in Explosives Areas ............................................... II-4-2
2.4.2.5. Prohibited and Restricted Articles ............................................................ II-4-2
2.4.2.6. Food and Drink ........................................................................................ II-4-2
2.4.2.7. Smoking ................................................................................................... II-4-2
2.4.2.8. Employee Working Alone ........................................................................ II-4-3
2.4.2.9. Photography ............................................................................................ II-4-3
2.4.2.10. Portable Hand Lights ............................................................................... II-4-3
2.4.2.11. Wearing of Rings and Other Jewellery .................................................... II-4-3
2.4.2.12. Battery Operated Devices ........................................................................ II-4-3
2.4.2.13. Thunderstorms......................................................................................... II-4-3
2.4.2.14. Private Motor Vehicles ............................................................................. II-4-3
SECTION III - ARRANGEMENT OF MUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN A
BUILDING OR STACK.................................................................................................. II-4-4
2.4.3.1. Munition and Explosives Storage - General............................................. II-4-4
2.4.3.2. Use of Magazines .................................................................................... II-4-4
2.4.3.3. Munition Stacking .................................................................................... II-4-4
2.4.3.4. Ventilation of Magazines .......................................................................... II-4-5
2.4.3.5. Temperature ............................................................................................ II-4-5
2.4.3.6. Authorized Stores and Equipment ........................................................... II-4-5
II-iii Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
2.4.3.7. Aisles and Safety Exits ............................................................................ II-4-5
2.4.3.8. Isolation Magazines ................................................................................. II-4-6
2.4.3.9. Transit Magazines ................................................................................... II-4-6
SECTION IV - HANDLING OF MUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES ..................... II-4-7
2.4.4.1. Cleanliness of Buildings ........................................................................... II-4-7
2.4.4.2. Electrical Extensions................................................................................ II-4-7
2.4.4.3. Handling Equipment ................................................................................ II-4-7
2.4.4.4. Parking of Vehicles, Railcars and Barges ................................................ II-4-7
2.4.4.5. Munition Returned from Bases or Units ................................................... II-4-7
SECTION V - REPAIR, MODIFICATION, INSPECTION AND PROOF OF
MUNITION .................................................................................................................... II-4-8
2.4.5.1. Introduction .............................................................................................. II-4-8
2.4.5.2. Workshop and Laboratory Working Conditions ....................................... II-4-8
2.4.5.3. Standing Operating Procedures............................................................... II-4-9
2.4.5.4. Personnel and Explosive Limits ............................................................... II-4-9
2.4.5.5. Clean Working Areas ............................................................................. II-4-10
2.4.5.6. Clothing for Clean Conditions ................................................................ II-4-11
2.4.5.7. Static Electricity Precautions ................................................................. II-4-11
2.4.5.8. Painting Operations ............................................................................... II-4-11
2.4.5.9. Heat Sealing Equipment ........................................................................ II-4-11
2.4.5.10. Tools ...................................................................................................... II-4-12
2.4.5.11. Closedown of Explosives Workshops .................................................... II-4-12
2.4.5.12. Supervision ............................................................................................ II-4-12
2.4.5.13. Accident Involving Munitions ................................................................. II-4-12
SECTION VI - IN SERVICE SURVEILLANCE (ISS) .................................... II-4-14
2.4.6.1. General .................................................................................................. II-4-14
2.4.6.2. National Responsibility .......................................................................... II-4-14
2.4.6.3. Examination ........................................................................................... II-4-14
2.4.6.4. Specific Hazard...................................................................................... II-4-14
2.4.6.5. Safe Storage of Multinational Stocks ..................................................... II-4-15
2.4.6.6. References ............................................................................................ II-4-15
STORAGE FACILITIES’ DESIGN ENVIRONMENT
CONSIDERATIONS...................................................................................................... II-5-2
2.5.1.1. General .................................................................................................... II-5-2
2.5.1.2. General Principles ................................................................................... II-5-3
2.5.1.3. General Design Aspects .......................................................................... II-5-3
DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO HAZARDS FROM
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO MUNITIONS CONTAINING ELECTRICALLY-
INITIATED DEVICES .................................................................................................... II-6-1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ II-6-1
GENERAL ...................................................................................................... II-6-2
WAYS EM ENERGY CAN POSE A THREAT ................................................ II-6-2
STORAGE AND TRANSPORT ...................................................................... II-6-3
ASSESSMENT OF HAZARD ......................................................................... II-6-4
2.6.5.1. System Susceptibility ............................................................................... II-6-4
II-iv Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
FIGURES AND TABLES – PART II
Figure 2-1: Minimum Separation of Adjacent Stack of Certain Projectiles. ................... II-2-2
Figure 2-2: Determination of Barricade Height on Level Terrain ................................... II-2-9
Figure 2-3: Determination of Barricade Height on Sloping Terrain ............................... II-2-9
Figure 2-4: Determination of Barricade Length ........................................................... II-2-10
Figure 2-5: Reaction Boundaries Depiction for Vapour/air Mixtures ........................... II-2-22
Figure 3-1: Fire Division Symbols ................................................................................. II-3-2
Figure 3-2: Chemical Hazard Symbols ......................................................................... II-3-3
Figure 3-3: Supplemental Chemical Hazard Symbols ................................................ II-3-13
Table 3-1: Hazards of Fire Divisions ............................................................................. II-3-4
Table 3-2: Fire Divisions Symbols ................................................................................ II-3-4
Table 3-3: Compatibility Group and Chemical Hazard Symbols Required for Storage
of Chemical munition and Substances .......................................................................... II-3-6
Table 3-4: Hazard Evacuation Distances for Nonessential Personnel ........................ II-3-17
Table 5-1: Virtually Complete Protection ....................................................................... II-5-4
Table 5-2: High Degree of Protection ............................................................................ II-5-5
Table 5-3: Limited Degree of Protection ....................................................................... II-5-6
II-v Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PART II
This part of the Manual provides technical guidelines and considerations in support of
those of Part I, concerning aboveground storage in depots.
CHAPTER CONTENT
Chapter 2 provides guidelines associated with aboveground storage facilities including
considerations for: construction of storage buildings and barricades; lightning protection;
internal lighting; and, electrical standards. The guidelines are termed as “considerations”
because it is expected that national regulations will provide precise requirements in
accordance with national codes.
Chapter 3 provide guidelines for fire-fighting principles based upon Fire Divisions as they
related to munition and explosives hazard divisions. Included are such aspects as fire
prevention, emergency planning, and protection for emergency services.
Chapter 4 provides information with respect to the operation of an established munition
and explosives storage area, including: general safety precautions; guidelines for
arrangement of storage and handling; guidelines for maintenance; and, the importance of
in-service surveillance.
Chapter 5 provides basic design considerations for storage facilities. It includes
general design aspects and various design environment criteria and information about
levels of protection. Importantly, it refers to other publications that provide more
detailed technical guidelines and standards, including:
a. Nationally Approved Structures for Explosives Areas. PFP(AC/326-
SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures for Explosives Areas, 5
January 2010, provides participating Nations’ nationally approved structures
for explosives area. Those designs address many aspects associated with
this Part (e.g., design, protective construction, grounding, reduced QD,
lightning protection). These designs have been approved by nations for use
by their national forces and it is highly likely that if operating in one of those
participating nations or in a NATO multination operation that these will be
encountered. For additional information, contact the AC/326 SG C delegate
from that nation directly.
Check as additional reference AASTP-1.3 “Nationally Approved Structures
(NAS) for Explosives Areas”
b. AASTP-4. Provides information as to explosion effects and their impact
on persons or surrounding infrastructure.
c. Unified Facilities Code, Structures to resist the Effects of Accidental
Explosions. Is a document that addresses the fundamentals of
protective construction design for explosives safety
II-1-1 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
Chapter 6 provides guidelines with respect to the hazard of electro-magnetic radiation to
stored munition containing electro-explosive devices.
CHANGE SUMMARY
Nationally approved structures
Addtitional reference AASTP-1.3 “Nationally Approved Structures (NAS) for Explosives
Areas” added at CHAPTER 1 paragraph 2.1.2 bullet “a.” to improve background
information.
Protection of ECM against Blast - Design Load for Roof and Earth-Covered Walls
In paragraph 2.2.2.2. subparagraph 3 bullet “b” “taking into account” was replaced by
“considering” to improve readability.
ECM Design Curves - Define ECM Design Blast Load Shape
According to AC/326(SG/C)-(US)IWP [0001]-[2024] (PFP), after ongoing six weeks
Silence Procedure expired on 16 AUGUST 2024 without BoS-requests, paragraph
2.2.2.2. bullet 1c was added, bullet 2c was inserted and former bullet 2c was renamed
to bullet 2d, in harmonization between the custodians.
Walls as Barricades
In paragraph 2.2.3.4. bullet 2 “taking into account” was replaced by “considering” to
improve readability.
Electrical equipment selection/installation/inspection
In paragraph 2.2.6.12. bullet 3 “taking into account” was replaced by “considering” to
improve readability.
Fire Divisions - Involved munition and Explosives Hazard Divisions
To fulfill AC/326(SG/C)N(2023)0001 V2-Serial II-9, wording at CHAPTER 3 SECTION II
paragraph 2.3.2.1. bullet 1.3 was changed by adding a “not”.
Organizational Fire Prevention Measures
In paragraph 2.3.3.1 subparagraph 1 “taking into account” was replaced by “considering”
to improve readability.
Detailed Fire-Figthing Procedures - Munition Requiring Supplementary Symbols
In paragraph 2.3.4.2. sub-paragraph 2 “taking into account” was replaced by “considering”
to improve readability.
Detailed Fire-Figthing Procedures - Munition containing Depleted Uranium (DU) -
Combustion of DU
In paragraph 2.3.4.2. sub-paragraph 3 bullet “a” sub-bullet (1) “taken into account” was
replaced by “considered” to improve readability.
Withdrawal distance for emergency and rescue personnel
In paragraph 2.3.5.2. bullet 2 “taken into account” was replaced by “considered” to improve
readability.
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Munition Returned from Bases or Units
In paragraph 2.4.4.5 bullet 1 “given an inspection” was replaced by “inspected” to improve
readability.
Storage Facilities Design Environment Considerations
According to the RoD content about action item 23/16 as of 23rd SG C Meeting in April
2024 in Spain, and based on a DEU presentation of an extracted and revised CHAPTER 5
at the same meeting, CHAPTER 5 was reduced to the identified generic and valuable
content.
Additionally the reference description about historical documents, in paragraph 2.5.1.1
bullet 2, was updated as requested.
In this context the impact of change proposal “DEU011” was reduced and the custodians
agreed in a harmonization meeting to basically solve this change proposal by reducing it to
a possible small editorial change in Part IV.
Otherwise, in the same meeting the inclusion of change proposal “DEU009” has to be
postponed, because of the huge impact on Part I, Part II and Part IV.
Design Principles - Protection Against Sympathetic Detonation
The wording in CHAPTER 5 paragraph 3. “” bullet “a.” was harmonized between the
custodians to solve change proposal “DEU008” by adding “generally” when describing the
possibility of spalling effects in ECM.
Storage and Transport - Process and Storage Building
In paragraph 2.6.4. sub-paragraph 3 bullet c “taking into account” was replaced by
“considering” to improve readability.
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ABOVEGROUND STORAGE
SECTION I - SPECIAL STORAGE CONFIGURATIONS
2.2.1.1. Storage in Open Stacks/Buffered Storage
Storage in Open stacks
The projectiles should be filled only with TNT or Amatol. RDX/TNT is unsuitable.
a. The projectiles should have walls generally similar to the 155 mm M107 and the
8-inch Howitzer projectiles as regards robustness and ability to withstand
fragment attack. In particular, projectiles with thin noses (HESH or HEP) are
unsuitable.
b. The projectiles should be unfuzed or should be fitted with nose plugs of a
substantial design. The thickness of the plug must be at least 25 mm.
c. Each stack should be restricted to 6,800 kg NEQ and to 1,000 projectiles.
d. The projectiles in a stack should be arranged with axes parallel and noses in
the same direction.
e. The separation of adjacent stacks of the maximum size should be 1.3 m
between nearest parts (nose-plug rings or projectiles' bases). The separation of
smaller stacks should be that indicated in Figure 2-1 below. Adjacent stacks
may present the projectiles either nose-to-nose or base-to-base, but not nose-
to-base nor vice versa.
f. At the ends of each stack the side-walls of projectiles will be exposed. These
side-walls are relatively vulnerable to attack by fragments from another stack.
Care must be taken to ensure that the arrangement of the stacks on a site
(module) or in a building provides adequate protection against the risk of
propagation by this means. One method is to ensure that all stacks are parallel
and have the same dimensions, thus forming a rectangular arrangement.
Another method is to use the walls of the storage building or the barricade to
protect the ends of stacks. A third method is to observe the D9-distances in Part
I, Annex A, Table 1 but such a large separation is rarely practical.
g. These stacks should be restricted to open sites (modules) with minimal weather
protection or to aboveground buildings with walls and roofs of light construction.
Exceptionally existing buildings with light roofs but solid walls may be used
provided that these solidly constructed walls do not exceed 3 m in height. The
stacking technique is based on US and UK tests in the open air and is not
necessarily valid in an earth-covered building or an underground storage site
which imposes a much greater confining effect.
h. An accidental explosion of one stack would scatter and disarrange the
neighbouring stacks thus destroying the critical geometry upon which this
stacking technique relies. To minimize any risk of subsequent fires which could
cause the "cook-off" of one of these disarranged projectiles, and the resultant
mass explosion of many other projectiles, softwood should be avoided in any
pallets and dunnage. Combustible materials should be avoided as far as
possible in the structure of a building used for such stacks.
i. The total NEQ on a storage site (module) or in a building should be restricted to
110,000 kg.
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j. Each module or building should be surrounded by a barricade substantially of
earth. This may be the double-slope type or the single-slope with one vertical
wall type. The foot of the barricade should not be less than 2.4 m from the
nearest stack. Refer to Paragraph 2.2.3.2 to determine the minimum height of
the barricade.
k. Where adjoining modules or buildings are separated by a shared barricade, its
thickness, together with the distances from the stacks to that barricade are
considered to provide adequate protection. Normal Inter-Magazine Distances
do not apply.
Figure 2-1: Minimum Separation of Adjacent Stack of Certain Projectiles.
(Nose-to-Nose or Base-to-Base distances)
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Buffered Storage
The storage of bombs using the buffered storage concept is briefly described in Part I,
paragraph 1.3.3.1. This concept can be used in all types of above-ground storage facilities.
The special conditions for this type of storage are as follows:
a. The geometry of bomb and buffer stacks is critical and must be maintained at all
times. (The buffer stack must preclude any direct line of sight between stacks of
bombs.)
b. Vertical and horizontal offsets of rows and columns of containers in the buffer
stacks are to be used to prevent alignments of the containers which would allow
line of sight spaces through which fragments of a detonating bomb stack could
pass unimpeded to the other stack of bombs in storage.
c. Bombs must be orientated nose to nose in those portions of the stacks which
face each other. Metal nose and tail plugs must be used in all bombs.
d. In computing the maximum amount of explosives which could be involved in an
accidental explosion in a buffered storage arrangement, HD 1.4 munitions are
not included in the total NEQ.
e. The largest stocks of MK82/84 bombs authorized for buffered storage are
27,000 kg NEQ Bomb stacks will be separated by a minimum of 11.6 meters.
f. When otherwise authorized, inert material or HD 1.4 munitions may be stored in
the same structure or facility where buffered storage is in use.
Note: Use of buffered storage concept with MK82/84 bombs and the specific
arrangement and types of buffer material is to be determined in the national area of
responsibility. Inquiries regarding this concept and its implementation may be directed to
AC/326 SG C through NATO International Staff – Defence Investment Division.
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SECTION II - STORAGE BUILDINGS AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION
2.2.2.1. Structural Materials
Non-combustible materials must be used in the construction of buildings for storage
of munition and explosives.
Buildings for the storage of bulk explosives relatively sensitive to spark or friction
should not have any exposed iron, steel, aluminium or any aluminium alloy containing
more than 1 % of magnesium where it may come into contact with explosive substances.
Buildings for the storage of munition with a toxic chemical hazard should be
provided with a non-absorbing material on the floors and the walls to a height at least
equal to the top of the stack. The building should have a barricade (see 2.2.3). The
building must be well ventilated.
2.2.2.2. Protection of ECM against Blast
Performance Criteria
a. The primary objective is to prevent initiation of the contents. In order to qualify
for the reduced Inter-Magazine Distances (see paragraph 1.3.5.2.) an ECM at
an ES must be designed to a 90 % confidence level that it does not collapse
and its door(s)/door-frame does not fail although substantial plastic deformation
of the arch or portal, the head-wall, the rear-wall, the side-wall, and the door(s)
may occur. Deflection should be limited within the air gap around the contents
so that the deformed structure and door(s) do not strike the contents. Major
spalling into the ECM must be prevented. For spall with velocity exceeding 50
m/s the kinetic energy should not exceed 2,500 kg m2/s2; for spall with velocity
not exceeding 50 m/s the momentum should not exceed 100 kg m/s. These
values would not suffice for packaged primary explosive substances.
b. Ideally model or full-scale tests should be performed on a prototype structure or
the design should be compared analytically with the strength of ECM which
have been proof tested. In the case of model techniques, to assess structural
response, it is important that models accurately scale the actual conditions with
a linear scale of not less than 1 to 10. When reliance is completely placed on
testing, then it is important that all structural elements (i.e. roof, front-wall, rear-
wall and side-wall) are subjected to the anticipated blast loading. ECM should
be constructed in reinforced concrete or with corrugated steel arches.
c. In addition to experimentation, advanced numerical modeling methods can aid
in the design of ECMs. Numerical modeling techniques such as computational
fluid dynamics (CFD) can assist with understanding of the blast loading
expanding outwards from an accidental detonation from an ECM and the timing
and distribution variance of the load on adjacent ECM acceptor structural
components. The complex structural response to the dynamic loading can be
modeled with finite element analysis (FEA), which has the advantage of
capturing complex interaction mechanisms that are difficult to represent with
simplistic engineering methods. Note that a critical part of using advanced
techniques such as CFD and FEA is sequential validation of the tools against
experimental data or established engineering methods. This should be done on
a step-by-step approach to ensure the model is accurately predicting results at
the local level, component level, and then the system level. Finally, any blast
loading predictions generated from CFD shall not be used in place of the
prescribed ECM loads of Section 2.2.2.2.2, in the event they are lower than the
given blast loads. If lower blast design loads are used, the reduced separation
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distances prescribed for 3 bar and 7 bar ECMs within AASTP-1 are not
applicable and should not be used.
Design Load for Head-Walls and Doors
Measurements on model and full-scale ECM indicate that design loads should be based
upon the following values:
a. When ECM are constructed in parallel and subjected only to the risk from
another ECM at the side-to-side Inter-Magazine Distance of 0.5 Q1/3, the
expected peak positive overpressure is 3 bar, the positive duration (ms) is
1.0 Q1/3 and the positive impulse per unit area (bar ms) is 1.0 Q1/3.
b. When the head-wall and door(s) of an ECM are exposed face-on to the blast
from the rear-wall of another ECM at an Inter-Magazine Distance of 0.8 Q1/3, the
peak positive (reflected) overpressure is at least 7 bar, the positive duration
(ms) is 1.0 Q1/3 and the positive impulse per unit area (bar ms) is 2.0 Q1/3. The
value of 7 bar is suitable for the design of head-walls and doors at an ES when
the donor is similar to one of the ECM described in AASTP-1.3 “Nationally
Approved Structures (NAS) for Explosives Areas” and contains a NEQ not
exceeding 75,000 kg. The actual value in a particular case is a complex function
of the disposition and loading density of the explosives in relation to the
magazine at the PES, the type and proportion of explosive substance in the
munition, the mass and strength of the structure, and the mass and type of its
earth-cover. It should be noted that close to the PES the blast wave is
extremely complex and it is possible that a higher degree of loading on the
head-wall or other structural elements may occur with a NEQ exceeding 75,000
kg. These factors may require consideration in the design.
c. The shape of the blast load curve can be approximated with a Modified
Friedlander curve, given below. Time (t) = 0 is the point of peak pressure
expressed in bars, and to is the positive duration in ms. Approximating the
Modified Friedlander curve with segments is satisfactory, as long as there are a
sufficient number of segments to properly represent the curve and the impulse
in the approximate curve is equal to or greater than the design impulse. Using a
triangular load curve based on the pressure and impulse is a simplified
conservative approach.
−1.97∗𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
7 bar load curve: 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = 7 × �1 − 𝑡𝑡 � × 𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜
𝑜𝑜
−1.36∗𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
3 bar load curve: 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = 3 × �1 − 𝑡𝑡 � × 𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜
𝑜𝑜
d. Consideration of rebound conditions must be given in the design of the door(s).
Attack on the steel -door(s) and the head-wall of an exposed ECM which is
barricaded or faces the earth-covered side of another ECM is not expected to
be significant (hard rocks not exceeding 1 kg at 300 m/s).
Design Load for Roof and Earth-Covered Walls
a. The arch of a circular arch ECM should be statically designed to support the
dead load pressure from the earth-cover by methods adapted from US highway
design and should be compared with structures previously tested under blast
loading. The rear-wall should be designed with reference to the dead load and,
in addition, the anticipated dynamic loading in accordance with subparagraph
2.2.2.2.3.b. below.
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b. An ECM which is not a true arch, such as a portal type or "flat arch" structure,
should be designed for the likely blast loading on the earth-cover. Each
structural element (roof, side-wall or rear-wall) may require consideration
depending upon the type and orientation of the structure. Owing to the dearth of
data on the loading beneath the earth-cover, it may be necessary to design for
the anticipated worst case similar to the design loads for head-walls and doors,
see subparagraph 2.2.2.2.2.b above. Design authorities should base their work
upon applicable blast parameters from test references cited in AASTP-1.3
“Nationally Approved Structures (NAS) for Explosives Areas” considering the
maximum NEQ expected for the proposed facility and consulting at the earliest
practicable date with national explosives safety authorities of the host and user
nations.
Ventilation Openings
a. ECM ventilation is commonly provided by an airtake opening below mid height
in the front wall with an air outlet through the rear-wall above mid height into a
vertical shaft to induce natural draught and take air out above the earth mound.
These openings can be weak points in an ECM structure and consideration
should be given to validating the design of openings by testing or other suitable
means.
b. The design of openings should take account of potential ingress of direct blast,
fireballs, primary and secondary fragments from a PES as well as the hazards
from a slow burning fire. Some protection against physical entry or sabotage
should also be incorporated.
2.2.2.3. Protection against Projections
Buildings should preferably be constructed in such a manner that they give
protection against penetration by debris, comparatively low velocity fragments and lobbed
munition. This may be obtained by a building with protective roof and 0.15 m reinforced
concrete walls without windows, or a building of equivalent construction. The windows of
heavy-walled workshops must be effectively barricaded for the application of QD in the
tables.
When earth-covered buildings with one relatively weak wall, designed to vent (see
paragraph 2.2.2.4.) are exposed to the effects from an explosion or a fire in munition of HD
1.2 in neighbouring buildings or stacks, it is necessary that this relatively weak wall is
constructed in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph 2.2.2.3.1. to give
protection against penetration by debris, comparatively low velocity fragments and lobbed
munition. The door must also provide this equivalent protection for the application of the
reduced Inter-Magazine Distances of Part I, Annex A.
2.2.2.4. Pressure Release
Buildings for munition or explosives involving a mass fire risk should be constructed with a
relatively weak section to permit the release of internal pressure. In the case of an earth-
covered building the roof or one end-wall or side-wall should be designed to permit this
pressure release. An earth-covered building with a weak side-wall must not be sited with
this wall facing a stack or a building unless the separation is large enough to prevent
propagation of explosion by directional projection of burning propellants if the earth-
covered building is used for munition of HD 1.3. This does not apply when the second
building is also an earth-covered building whose weak side-wall is not exposed to this
directional projection.
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2.2.2.5. Lightning Protection
All permanent storage buildings and workshops for munition and explosives should be
provided with lightning protection. The method of assessment of need for such protection
and the details of suitable systems are given in 2.2.4 Section IV – Lightning Protection.
2.2.2.6. Rocket Storage Buildings
Buildings utilized for the storage of rockets in a propulsive state (i.e. unpackaged rockets
or missiles in the assembled condition) should be of sufficient strength to withstand their
thrust. Alternatively, the rockets should be provided with devices to secure them and
thereby eliminate the additional hazard arising from the flight of the rocket (see paragraph
1.3.3.4.).
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SECTION III - BARRICADES: DESIGN CRITERIA
2.2.3.1. Functions of Barricades
General. The design criteria for a barricade depend on its location and the intended
function.
Interception of High Velocity Projections
a. An effective barricade intercepts low-angle, high velocity projections from a PES
which otherwise may cause practically instantaneous propagation of explosion
to munition and explosives at an ES; the barricade therefore has sufficient
resistance to high velocity projections to reduce their speed to a tolerable level.
The geometry of the barricade in relation to the PES and the ES is such that it
intercepts the projections through a sufficient, solid angle. When the barricade
is subject to destruction by blast from the PES, it is designed to remain
substantially intact for a sufficient time to achieve its purpose.
b. An effective barricade reduces the number of low-angle, high velocity
projections which otherwise may endanger personnel and ES inside and
outside the explosives area, but this is usually a secondary function.
c. The barricade requirements described in this chapter apply to the prevention of
prompt propagation and application of reduced IMD (2a). For the protection of
personnel and application of reduced DFD (2b) other requirements apply.
These are described in the “SRD AASTP-1.2 Development of NATO DFD
curves for AASTP-1”
Lobbed munition and Fragments. An effective barricade also intercepts some
lobbed items of munition and lobbed fragments but this is an incidental benefit. It is not
usually practical to intercept items projected at a high angle.
Modification of Blast and Flame
a. A barricade at a PES may induce directional effects of the blast and flame or it
may merely perturb them. This is a secondary function of a barricade, unless it
is especially designed to achieve one or more of these purposes.
b. A barricade between a PES and an ES may shield the ES from blast and flame.
In order to have a marked shielding effect, the barricade is located close to the
ES. The barricade may be part of the building-wall at the ES.
2.2.3.2. Geometry of Earth Barricades
General. Proper barricade geometry is necessary to reduce the risk that low-angle,
high velocity projections escape above or around the ends of the barricade and so
produce an explosion in an adjacent site. Since such projections do not move along
perfectly linear trajectories, reasonable margins in barricade height and length must be
provided beyond the minimum dimensions which block lines of sight.
Height of Barricade
a. Line AB
(1) On level terrain point A is chosen as a reference on either of two stacks (see
Figure 2-2). If the stacks have different heights, point A is on the lower stack.
Point A is at the top of that face of the chosen stack which is remote from the
other stack. If the stacks are covered by protective roofs, point A may be at
the top of that face of the chosen stack which is nearer to the other stack
(see Figure 2-2).
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Figure 2-2: Determination of Barricade Height on Level Terrain
(2) On sloping terrain, point A is on the stack whose top face is at the lower
elevation (see Figure 2-3). Point A is at the top of that face of the chosen
stack which is remote from the other stack.
Figure 2-3: Determination of Barricade Height on Sloping Terrain
(3) If the stacks are covered by protective roofs, point A may be at the top of that
face of the chosen stack which is nearer to the other stack. Point B is on the
top face of the other stack (see Figure 2-3).
(4) Line AB must pass through at least 2.4 m of barricade material or
undisturbed natural earth between the two stacks, whether or not they are
contiguous.
b. Line CD (Barricade Height Determination)
(1) Point A is chosen in accordance with subparagraph 2.2.3.2.2.a.(2) above.
(2) On level or sloping terrain, a second parallel line (CD) is drawn 0.30 m above
line AB.
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(3) On level terrain, when stacks are separated by less than 5*Q1/3 whether or
not they are contiguous, line CD must pass through at least 1.0 m of
barricade material or undisturbed natural earth.
(4) On sloping terrain, when stacks are separated by less than 5*Q1/3 whether or
not they are contiguous, line CD must pass through at least 1.0 m barricade
material or undisturbed natural earth.
(5) On sloping terrain when two stacks are not contiguous but the quantity
distance between them is less than 5*Q1/3, the 0.30m distance is not
applicable.
c. Stacks separated by at least 5*Q1/3
(1) When stacks, contiguous or not, are separated by the quantity distance
5*Q1/3 or more, barricade requirements are assessed individually with respect
to each stack.
Length of Barricade. The barricade length is determined by extending the barricade
exclusive of the end slope to 1.0 m beyond lines between the extremes of the two stacks
of munition under consideration. These lines must pass through at least 2.4 m of barricade
material or undisturbed natural earth (see Figure 2-4).
Figure 2-4: Determination of Barricade Length
Distance from Stack to Barricade
a. The distance from a stack to the foot of a barricade is a compromise. Each case
is considered individually to achieve the optimum solution taking account of the
following factors.
b. A barricade close to a stack results in smaller dimensions for the barricade to
intercept high velocity projections through a given solid angle. However, on
sloping terrain the minimum separation may not result in the smallest barricade.
c. A barricade further away from the stack results in easier access for
maintenance and for vehicles, and the possibility to site the barricade outside
the predicted crater, when the PES contains munition and explosives of HD 1.1.
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Avoidance of the crater is an advantage in some circumstances, see paragraph
2.2.3.3.3. The barricade must be sited so that the crater does not undermine it
more than one third of its thickness at ground level.
2.2.3.3. Material for Earth Barricades and for the Cover of Buildings
Earth for barricades and for cover of buildings should be made of material as
prescribed below. When concrete or brick is used in conjunction with earth, either of these
materials may be taken as equivalent to 4 times its thickness of earth with regard to the
ability to stop fragments. The concrete or brick may be used to support the earth or it may
be those parts of the roof and walls of a building which intercept the high velocity
projections.
There are two types of precaution which are necessary in the construction of earth
barricades or the earth-cover for buildings used for storage of munition and explosives.
One type relates to the potential hazards to other munition and to personnel in the event
that the material is dispersed by an accidental explosion in the contained building. The
other type relates to the precautions necessary to ensure structural integrity of the earth
barricades or cover.
There is no need to consider the first type of precaution if it can be predicted that
the material would not be dispersed by the postulated explosion. This will be the case if
the barricade is sited beyond the crater radius. Scouring of the top surface by air blast can
be neglected. The crater dimensions would be determined by the geometry of the stored
explosives, their height above ground or depth of burial, and the nature of the ground.
Unless the arrangement is particular asymmetrical, a good working estimate of the crater
radius can be calculated from the formula:
Crater radius (m) = ½ (NEQ (kg))1/3
This radius is measured from the centre of the explosives. In certain soil
conditions (saturated soil or clay) the crater may be larger than calculated from
the above formula (more complete information on cratering phenomenology is
given in AC/326(SG/C)WP(2016)0005 (PFP) “AASTP-1, Chapter 5 on Storage
Facilities' Design Environment Considerations”. In such conditions,
consideration should be given to increasing the Inter-Magazine Distances.
Where it is possible that the material would be dispersed by an explosion,
precautions should be taken to reduce the hazard of large stones causing initiation by
impact upon munition or explosives in adjacent storage sites. Where the storage site under
consideration is near a densely occupied area, such as a group of explosives workshops,
consideration should also be given to the hazard to personnel from flying stones etc. The
selection of material and its use should be governed by the following prescriptions which
represent a reasonable compromise between undue hazards and excessive costs of
construction:
a. Do not deliberately use rubble from demolished buildings.
b. Ensure that stones larger than 0.20 m girth are removed during construction.
Other deleterious matter should also be eliminated.
c. In climates where the ground becomes severely frozen, consideration should be
given to the provision of an impermeable cover over the material or drainage to
keep out excessive moisture.
The second type of precaution mentioned in paragraph 2.2.3.3.2. above, relating to
structural integrity, applies in all cases. For this purpose, the material should be
reasonably cohesive and free from excessive amounts of trash and deleterious organic
matter. Compaction and surface preparation should be provided as necessary to maintain
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structural integrity and avoid erosion. Where it is impossible to use a cohesive material, for
example at a site in a sandy desert, the earth-works should be finished with either a layer
of cohesive soil or an artificial skin. On the other hand, one should avoid solid, wet clay
during construction since this is too cohesive and would result in an excessive debris
hazard.
2.2.3.4. Walls as Barricades
A building without windows and with walls with a thickness of 0.45 m reinforced
concrete (0.70 m of brick) or its equivalent is acceptable as a barricaded building with
regard to stopping fragments from an explosion in an adjacent building or stack. However,
consideration must be given to the necessary blast resistance of such walls, see
subparagraph 2.2.3.1.2.a. Furthermore, account should be taken of the increased debris
hazard from such walls at a PES. A 0.23 m brick wall protected by a 0.45 m brick wall is
preferable to a single wall of about 0.70 m brick. These buildings need not necessarily
have a protective roof.
Walls can often be used to divide a building into individual rooms or compartments
in accordance with paragraph 1.3.5.5. The function of each dividing wall is to prevent, or at
least delay substantially, transmission of explosion between explosives on opposite sides
of the wall. The main advantage is that quantity distances can then be based on the NEQ
in one compartment instead of the aggregate amounts in the building. A second advantage
is that an accidental explosion is less likely to render unserviceable all the stocks in the
building. The specification of such a wall depends upon the quantity, proximity and type of
munition or explosives on each side. The design must consider the likely blast loading,
including the effect of reflections, and the flame, ground shock, primary fragments and
secondary missiles (spalling and scabbing from the remote face of the wall). In order to
achieve an efficient and economical design for a particular situation, expert advice is
essential. Information on the scope and state of the art of designing dividing walls is given
in the United States’ „Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions,” Unified
Facilities Code (UFC) 3-340-02, 5 December 2008 or a newer edition.
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SECTION IV – LIGHTNING PROTECTION
2.2.4.1. Lightning Protection Systems (LPS) Standards
LPS for facilities and locations that contain munition and explosives shall comply
with national standards that are consistent with the commonly accepted international
standard International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62305, “Protection against
lightning.” IEC 62305 (2014) consists of a number of separate volumes called Parts (e.g.,
Part 1: “General principles,” Part 2, “Risk management,” Part 3: “Physical damage to
structures and life hazard,” Part 4: “Electrical and electronic systems within structures”)
that address the various aspects of lightning protection and point to other standards, as
necessary. Other important IEC LPS-related documents include:
a. IEC 62561, “Lightning Protection System Components (LPSC)” (all Parts)
b. IEC 61643, “Low Voltage Surge Protective Devices" (all Parts)
In the absence of a national standard, then IEC 62305, IEC 62561, and IEC 61643
should be used.
Other existing regional and national lightning protection standards include (may or
may not be fully compliant with the IEC documents listed above):
a. European Nations (EN) 62305 (all parts), “Protection against lightning,”
published by Comité Européen de Normalisation Électrotechnique (CENELEC)/
(English translation is European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardization).
b. British Standards Institution (BSI), BS EN 62305 (and its Parts), “Protection
against lightning” and BS EN 62561 (and its Parts), “Lightning Protection
System Components (LPSC)”
c. Canada/Canadian Standards Association (CAN/CSA) B72-M87, “Installation
Code for Lightning Protection Systems”
d. German Commission for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies
(DKE), DIN EN 62305-3 Supplement 2 (VDE 0185-305-3 Supplement 2): 2012:
“Lightning Protection – Part 3: Physical damage to structures and life hazard –
Supplement 2: Additional information for special structures”
e. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), NFPA 780, “Standard for the
Installation of Lightning Protection Systems” (United States)
f. Standards Australia (AS)/Standards New Zealand (SNZ), AS/ANZ-1768,
“Lightning Protection”
g. Singapore Standards (SS) 555 Series, “Code of practice for protection against
lightning,” Parts 1-4
h. South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), SANS 62305 (and its Parts),
Protection against lightning” and SANS 62561 (and its Parts), “Lightning
Protection System Components (LPSC)”
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2.2.4.2. Hazards of Lightning
Lightning is a massive electrostatic discharge between the electrically charged
regions within clouds or between a cloud and the surface of a planet. It is referred to as a
strike if it hits an object on the ground. Lightning can occur during thunderstorms, during
snow storms (in the form of ball lightning), and sometimes during dust storms and volcanic
eruptions. Lightning can also be generated during violent forest fires that generate
sufficient dust or wind to create a static charge. A bolt of lightning can travel at a speed of
220,000 km/h and can reach temperatures approaching 30,000 °C; hot enough to fuse
sand into glass.
Over 16 million lightning storms occur every year, causing significant damage and
loss. Lightning losses are among the top three causes of deaths and property damage
along with tornadoes, hurricanes (or typhoons), and floods. More importantly, lightning is
the only one where protection can be economically provided.
Lightning can present significant hazards to munition and explosives and facilities
and locations containing them in the following ways:
a. Electrical charges transferred in a lightning strike can directly initiate the
munition and explosives or damage the electronic components of a weapon
system making them unreliable or causing malfunctions.
b. Arc root temperatures at the attachment point can result in burn-through of
metallic surfaces or combustion of non-conductive surfaces that can then
initiate the munition and explosives directly by the heat, sparks, and molten
metal generated by the burn-through.
c. Arcing associated with potential differences between conductive objects can
cause fires or damage electrical fixtures and equipment.
d. Lightning-generated flashover can initiate a fire involving combustible materials,
including containers near munition and explosives.
e. Spalling generated by the heat of the current flowing through the structural
components of the facility can initiate, by impact, physically unprotected
munition and explosives. Such spalling may also present an injury risk to
personnel and equipment.
f. Overvoltages and overcurrents, both from a direct strike or from a nearby strike
coupling onto incoming conductors or overhead cables, can damage or cause
malfunction of support systems (e.g., fire protection alarm and sprinklers,
security, communication, controls).
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2.2.4.3. IEC 62305 Protection Requirements
In general, IEC 62305 requires facilities and locations that contain munition and
explosives to be protected to a minimum of a 97 % interception efficiency (Protection Level
I or II as given in Table 2-1 below), as determined through risk assessment methodology.
The risk assessment process identifies if LPS is required, and if so, to what extent.
Max Current Protection Interception
Exceeding the Peak Level Efficiency Striking distance
Value (%)
2.9 kA I 99 20 m
5.4 kA II 97 30 m
10.1 kA III 91 45 m
15.7 kA IV 84 60 m
Table 2-1: Lightning Protection Efficiency (Summarized from IEC 62305 Part I)
Risk Assessment
a. IEC 62305-2, “Risk Management” specifies that a first step in determining the
level of required LPS protection is to conduct a risk assessment.
b. Risk, as defined in IEC 62305-2, is the probable average annual loss in a
structure due to lightning flashes, and depends on:
(1) The annual number of lightning flashes influencing the structure.
(2) The probability of damage by one of the influencing lightning flashes.
(3) The mean amount of consequential loss.
c. Protection efficiency or “interception efficiency” is a quantitative measure used
to determine the protection level of an LPS. This is commonly defined as the
probability of the LPS intercepting the minimum value of the lightning current at
a given protection level. For an LPS design, IEC 62305-3, “Part 3: Physical
Damage and Life Hazards” presents four protection levels for structures (as
shown in Table 2-1 above). The level of LPS protection chosen depends on the
risk acceptance level. For example, for a 99 % interception efficiency
(Protection Level I), the protection system is expected to intercept all stroke
current from 2.9 kA and above. Stroke of currents below 2.9 kA may bypass the
protection system but will be of low energy and not create significant damage.
Most Nations’ LPS requirements for facilities that house munition and
explosives are designed to a protection level of I or II. LPS designed to protect
structure housing munition and explosives are required, at minimum, to be
based on a 30 m striking distance for the rolling sphere method that dictates the
placement of strike termination devices creating the zone of protection. This
effectively requires munition and explosives facilities to be protected from a
stroke current of about 5.4 kA and designed to capture about 97 % of all
lightning strikes. In some designs a higher level of protection may be required
commensurate to the hazards and risk assessment conducted.
d. Protecting facilities from lightning strokes with currents of about 5.4 kA (97%) to
2.9 kA (99%) may be achieved by improving the bonding, grounding, air
termination design, and surge suppression devices. The protection may also be
tailored and enhanced depending on the hazards of the munition and
explosives. For example, if working with sensitive small particle explosives in a
laboratory, the design of the LPS may need to be effective from a strike of 2.9
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kA (99%). On the other hand, if working with munition and explosives systems
that may be vulnerable to charge penetration, just providing appropriate
bonding and grounding may be an adequate solution.
LPS Design
If the risk assessment determines an LPS is necessary to protect facilities and locations
that contain munition and explosives, the LPS shall be based on a 30 m (or less) striking
distance for the rolling sphere method that dictates the placement of strike termination
devices creating the zone of protection. This gives a 97 % interception efficiency (see
paragraph 2.2.4.3.1.) and assures Lightning Protection Level II (LPL II) as given in Table
2-1 above. LPL II defines all the requirements for the LPS to include grounding system and
SPD parameters. The following pertain to LPS design:
a. Protection from lightning-induced hazards can best be achieved by enclosing
facilities and locations containing munition and explosives in an interconnected
network of conductors designed to intercept and direct the lightning energy
harmlessly into the earth, effectively reducing electromagnetic fields, currents,
and voltages.
b. As detailed in IEC 62561, a complete LPS will include:
(1) Strike termination devices
(2) Conductors (which could include conductive structural members)
(3) Grounding electrodes
(4) Interconnecting conductors
(5) Surge protective devices (SPD)
(6) Other connectors or fittings required to complete the system.
c. To provide minimum protection against direct lightning strikes, all of the
following must be provided:
(1) An air termination system capable of intercepting lightning stroke current of
about 5.4 kA (97%) or less. This system is that part of the LPS designed to
provide a primary attachment point for a lightning strike. (Note: Use of the 30
m or less striking distance arc as the LPS design basis will provide this level
of protection)
(2) A path for frequencies up to 5 MHz that connects the air termination system
to earth with such low impedance that the discharge follows it in preference
to any other discharge path.
(3) A low resistance connection with the earth electrode subsystem.
(4) A low impedance interface between the earth electrode subsystem and the
earth.
(5) Sideflash and surge protection.
d. Air termination system. There are currently only four types of standard air
termination systems permitted for the protection of facilities and locations that
contain munition and explosives:
(1) Metallic cage ("Faraday-Like” shield) system.
The best method to protect extremely sensitive operations from all sources of
electromagnetic radiation (not just lightning) is to enclose the operations or
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facility inside a metallic cage. A metallic cage or shield is an enclosure
composed of a continuous grid of conductors so that the voltage between
any two points inside the enclosure is zero when immersed in an
electrostatic field. A metallic cage or shield is a system where the protected
volume is enclosed by a heavy metal screen (similar to a birdcage) or
continuous metallic structure with all metallic penetrations bonded to the
structure where they cross (i.e., enter or exit the structure). The lightning
current flows on the exterior of the facility. Design parameters for a metallic
cage and shield may be based, as a minimum, on a Level II three-percent
(3%) threat level.
(2) Mast system.
A mast-type LPS consists of a single mast or multiple masts (either metallic
or wood) remotely located from the facility or location to provide a primary
attachment point for a lightning discharge. If the mast is constructed of wood,
install an air terminal or metal cap, connected to two down conductors, on
opposite sides of the pole approximately 180 ° apart to achieve maximum
separation. Metallic masts do not require down conductors; however, two
connections from the base of the mast to the earth electrode system are
required.
(3) Catenary (overhead wire) system.
A catenary LPS consists of grounded, elevated, horizontal, metallic wires
stretched between masts that surround a facility or location. These wires are
suspended at an elevation higher than the protected facility and connected at
each end to the primary ground ring electrode (or interconnected ground
rods). A minimum of two paths to ground are required. When more than two
masts are used, install a ground ring electrode in addition to the facility’s
secondary ground system. Support the overhead cable by masts to ensure
the calculated standoff distance and the minimum separation distance
requirements are met.
(4) Integral system.
An integral LPS is one that consists of strike termination devices mounted on
the facility to be protected. These strike termination devices are connected to
the earth electrode system via roof conductors and down conductors.
Metallic structural members can serve as parts of the LPS, provided they
meet applicable requirements.
e. Grounding. The purpose of a grounding system is to dissipate lightning current
into the earth by providing a low impedance path to earth. The grounding (or
earth termination system) is a critical part of all LPS, since it must dissipate the
lightning current into the ground without danger to people nor damage electrical
installations inside the protected structure. Lightning protection for structures
housing explosives may at times include a secondary grounding system to
enhance the grounding effectiveness.
f. Bonding. Bonding of metallic bodies and their interconnection to LPS grounding
systems are required to ensure that voltage potentials produced by lightning
currents are near-equal throughout the structure and no potential differences
exist that would be sufficient to produce a sideflash inside the protected facility
or location
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g. Sideflash protection. Sideflash is an electrical spark caused by difference in
voltage potentials, that can occur between two conductive metal items or
between a conductive metal item and a lightning protection component or
ground that have been energized by lightning. Sideflash is prevented by either
providing adequate separation distance between those two conductive metal
items or by proper bonding as described above to equalize voltage potentials.
h. SPD.
(1) Nearby lightning discharges will produce electromagnetic pulses that can be
coupled onto conductors servicing a facility or location. These induced
surges can cause dangerous over-voltages, resulting in fires or damage to
critical electrical and electronic hardware. A facility or location that contains
munition and explosives shall be protected from induced surges on power,
communication, data and process control lines, and any other electrical
conductor entering or exiting the facility or location, in addition to direct
lightning strikes to the facility or location.
(2) SPD provide a means by which lightning currents may enter or leave the
earth without passing through undesirable paths of high resistance. IEC
61643 “Low-Voltage Surge Protective Devices” (all Parts) provides standards
for SPD.
2.2.4.4. LPS requirements for earth-covered and underground (tunnel) magazines
and ISO containers
Earth-covered magazines. The reinforcing bars in all adjacent structural elements
must be joined in a manner to provide electrical bonding between the elements. This is an
absolute requirement for facilities that contain munition and explosives. Techniques
commonly used and approved in the construction industry to join reinforcing steel are
acceptable for this purpose. The steel arch of an ECM must be similarly joined to the rebar
in the floor. Steel doors, and other metal masses shall be bonded. External ground
conductors from outside the earth-covered magazine shall not be routed to and grounded
within the interior of the structure, but shall be connected to the external secondary
ground.
Underground (tunnel) magazines. An underground storage site normally requires
designed protection against lightning only for exposed or partially exposed parts. Metal
and structural parts of the site that have less than 0.6 m of earth cover shall be protected
as for an aboveground site.
ISO containers. ISO containers can be used for temporary storage of munition and
explosives (e.g., small arms in munition boxes, various system configurations in shipping
containers, commercial explosives, fireworks). In today’s operations, ISO-Containers are
the standard for the storage of munition. For further information about Lightning Protection
and Grounding of ISO Containers, refer to STANAG 4657/AASTP-5. Since the metal
frame of a properly maintained ISO container does not meet the metal thickness
requirement for strike termination devices, there is potential for burn-through in the event
of a direct strike. The metal frame will provide some shielding from lightning
electromagnetic effects, and the ISO-Container’s contact with the ground will provide some
impedance to earth. Based on these aspects, ISO containers can provide lightning
protection for some munition and explosives, based on the configuration involved (to
include packaging) and the sensitivity of those items to the potential lightning hazards
described in paragraph 2.2.4.2.3. In some cases, it may be necessary to provide a strike
termination device, additional bonding, and grounding of the ISO container. The decision
as to whether the ISO container is to be supplemented by an LPS is to be made by a
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Competent National Authority, based on a risk assessment that gives consideration to the
munition or explosives configuration involved and the sensitivity of the items.
2.2.4.5. Inspections and Testing
The effectiveness of any LPS depends on proper installation, maintenance, and accuracy
of test methods. LPS shall be inspected and tested by technically competent individuals to
verify compliance with national or IEC 62305 LPS standards, as applicable (see paragraph
2.2.4.1.), at initial installation, following modification or repair, and on a periodic basis as
specified by the National Competent Authority. LPS testing is recommended if a lightning
strike occurs or is suspected to have occurred. Resistance and earth testing shall be
conducted using approved methods of testing and results documented, as specified in
those standards.
2.2.4.6. Exclusions
LPS may be omitted for the following, as permitted by a Competent National Authority:
Explosives operations served by a local lightning warning system where:
a. Operations can be terminated and personnel evacuated to a safe distance, as
determined by a Competent National Authority, before the incidence of an
electrical storm, and
b. The potential damage from a lighting strike is acceptable to the authority having
jurisdiction.
Earth covered magazines, with a minimum of 0.6 m of earth cover and where
structural and reinforcing steel are bonded to a common earth ground (see paragraph
2.2.4.4.1.). Ventilation stacks and all metallic penetrations are to be bonded to a common
earth ground, and all incoming electrical and communication circuits are protected by
surge protective devices.
Buildings where the possible loss of the building and its contents are considered
acceptable, and where damage caused by lightning would not pose a serious risk to
adjacent personnel and facilities.
Buildings containing only HD 1.4 small arms munition in approved containers, or
other munition and explosive items or components that cannot be ignited by lightning (or
its indirect effects) or that if initiated present no risk to their surroundings.
SECTION V - STANDARD OF INTERNAL LIGHTING IN EXPLOSIVES
STORAGE BUILDINGS
2.2.5.1. General
In all explosives storage buildings there is a need to identify accurately stocks from
markings and to carry out documentation. This requires a minimum standard of
illumination.
2.2.5.2. Minimum Standard
Where fixed lighting is provided, the minimum acceptable standard for internal lighting in
explosives storage buildings is 75 lux, measured at floor level.
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SECTION VI – ELECTRICAL STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS
2.2.6.1. Electrical Equipment and its Installation in Explosives Facilities or
Locations
Electrical equipment can generate arcs, sparks or hot surfaces, which in the presence of a
dangerous mixture of flammable dust, vapour, or gas with air, could ignite/detonate that
mixture. Equipment that will be exposed to those environments must be specially
designed, constructed, and installed in a manner that eliminates that risk. This chapter
provides general information about electrical equipment and their installation in munitions-
related facilities/locations where a “hazardous environment” (i.e., ignitable concentrations
of flammable gases, vapours, liquids, easily ignitable fibers, or materials producing
combustible flyings) may or could be present within the atmosphere.
2.2.6.2. Electrical Standards Directives
Electrical equipment and their installation in or in proximity to hazardous
environments must comply with National statutory requirements and specifications. In the
absence of such, then internationally accepted standards shall be consulted prior to
purchasing electrical equipment or performing any electrical work. Examples of electrical
standards development organizations include:
a. Canada: Canadian Standards Association (CSA)
b. United States: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
c. Europe:
(1) European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (Cenelec)
(2) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
(3) ATEX Directive (94/9/EC) is the latest European regulation related to
equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive
atmospheres.
If a hazardous environment does not exist, then the selection of electrical
equipment and its installation shall be in accordance with required codes to ensure
personnel protection from electrical hazards and to prevent fires from unsafe or faulty
electrical equipment.
2.2.6.3. Certification
Only equipment that has been tested and certified by a testing agency (see 2.2.6.9.) shall
be used within a hazardous environment.
2.2.6.4. Hazards Presented by Dust, Liquids, Vapours, and Gases.
Dusts. Combustible dusts are fine particles that present an explosion hazard when
suspended in air, or layered on hot surfaces under certain conditions. Anticipated types of
operations and uses, or processing/handling activities that generate dusts shall be
considered and corresponding locations considered as hazardous locations, and treated
accordingly. These include operations and uses such as abrasive blasting, cutting,
grinding, polishing or crushing of materials; conveying, mixing, dumping, sifting or
screening dry materials; and the buildup of dried residue that remains from processing wet
materials.
Flammable or combustible liquids/vapours/gases
a. The flammability of combustible liquids is defined by their flash-point. It is a
critical data point in determining whether an area needs to be identified as a
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hazardous environment. A flammable liquid may have a relatively low auto-
ignition temperature, yet its flash-point may be above the ambient
temperature. If this is the case, then the area may not need to be classified.
Conversely, if the same material is processed (heated) above ambient
temperature or above its flash-point, then the area shall be identified as a
hazardous environment.
b. Flammable or combustible liquids are handled or used directly in many
explosives-related manufacturing operations such as mixing, drying, painting,
evapourating, filtering, distillation, and similar operations which do not involve
chemical reaction. They may also be used incidentally as part of the principal
business, such as storage of paint thinner in support of munition painting,
solvents used in assembly and cleaning of munitions components, and
flammable finishing materials used in final processing.
Range of hazard ignition
a. There are two primary hazards associated with flammable and combustible
liquids: explosion and fire. When vapours of a flammable or combustible
liquid are mixed with air in the proper proportions in the presence of a source
of ignition, rapid combustion or an explosion can occur. The proper
proportion is called the flammable range and is also often referred to as the
explosive range. The flammable range includes all concentrations of
flammable vapour or gas in air, in which a flash will occur or a flame will
travel if the mixture is ignited. There is a minimum concentration of vapour or
gas in air below which propagation of flame does not occur on contact with a
source of ignition. There is also a maximum proportion of vapour in air above
which propagation of flame does not occur. These boundary-line mixtures of
vapour with air are known as the lower and upper flammable limits (LFL or
UFL) respectively, also known as lower and upper explosive limits (LEL or
UEL). They are usually expressed in terms of percentage by volume of
vapour in air - see Figure 2-5 below. No attempt is made to differentiate
between the terms flammable and explosive as applied to the lower and
upper limits of flammability. However, hazardous environment designations
do differentiate between the two. No reaction (fire or explosion) will occur if
the vapour/air mixture is below the LFL or above the UFL.
(4) The flash point of a volatile material is the lowest temperature at which it can
vapourize to form an ignitable mixture in air.
(5) The auto ignition temperature' of a substance is the lowest temperature at
which it will spontaneously ignite in a normal atmosphere without an external
source of ignition, such as a flame or spark.
(6) Temperature considerations, e.g. flash point of a flammable substance shall
generally be available on the ‘Material safety data sheet’ for the hazardous
substance/liquid/gas.
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Figure 2-5: Reaction Boundaries Depiction for Vapour/air Mixtures
b. Special measures are necessary when explosives are liable to sublimation.
Electrical equipment should not be installed in the buildings where this
condition might occur, unless it is absolutely essential. In such circumstances
suitable standards shall be specified in conjunction with a technically
knowledgeable individual, generally an explosives chemist, who will need to
advise on the properties of the explosive in the process.
Hazardous Ignition. Flammable gases and vapours need only a very small amount
of energy to ignite, such as a spark from an electrostatic discharge or an arc from electrical
equipment. Burning of gaseous molecules in air can be very rapid if the flammable gas
concentration is in the explosive/flammable range. The fast burning of gases can spread to
areas adjacent to the origin of the ignition, resulting in flash fires or explosions. In the case
of long pipe lines such as vapour/gas exhaust headers, the acceleration of flame can
develop to detonations. Each chemical gas or vapour used in industry is classified into a
gas group.
2.2.6.5. Temperature Classification
An additional important factor for electrical equipment which is to be used in a
hazardous environment is consideration of its temperature classification (including any
other heat producing devices). Electrical standards organizations provide temperature
rating systems (e.g., T1, T3, G1) for equipment manufacturers when labelling equipment
for use in hazardous environments. This label will not only identify the hazardous
environment in which the electrical equipment can be used, but also the maximum
temperature that the internal components, or enclosure will reach during use. If this
information is not provided on the label, and there is a temperature consideration that has
to be addressed in the proposed hazardous environment, then the equipment must not be
used or the manufacturer requested to test the equipment for a temperature rating, along
with all other necessary tests to provide assurance that the equipment is safe for use
within the hazardous area.
The surface temperature or any parts of the electrical equipment that may be
exposed to the hazardous atmosphere should be rated such that it does not exceed 80%
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of the auto-ignition temperature of the specific gas, vapour, or dust in the area where the
equipment is intended to be used.
As a cautionary note about not only assessing electrical equipment for surface
temperature, be aware that the surface of a high-pressure steam pipe may be above the
auto-ignition temperature of some fuel/air mixtures.
2.2.6.6. Hazardous environments and their designations
Electrical standards include designations to identify hazardous environment threats
that might be present. The designation of the proper hazardous environment is very
important, because it will define the protection requirements that must be afforded by the
electrical equipment and wiring for the particular location involved. This will be further
addressed later in paragraph 2.2.6.8. Examples of hazardous environment designations
from two different standards are given below:
a. “Class 1, Division 1,” from NFPA 70 (also known as the National Electric
Code (NEC)), Article 500, means that flammable gases or vapours are or
may be present in the air during normal operations, and in quantities
sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.
b. “Category A, Zone 0,” from the EU’s EN 1127-1, Explosive atmospheres –
Explosion Prevention and Protection – Basic Concepts and Methodology,
means an explosive gas/vapour atmosphere is continuously present or is
present for long periods in an area.
2.2.6.7. Safety surveillance
The presence of munitions does not necessarily mean that there is a hazardous
condition involving the presence of combustible dusts, flammable vapours or gases.
However, there may be exceptions, such as a location where leaking, liquid-fuelled
munitions are being stored. The vaporization or pooling of leaking fuel could pose a
serious explosion or fire threat from installed electrical equipment. However, for the
purposes of this chapter, unless exposed explosives or possible hazardous atmosphere
threats are present (such as described above with the leaking fuel/vapours), explosives
operating facilities/locations are not to be considered hazardous (classified) locations.
Each room, section, or area must be considered separately in determining its
hazardous environment classification. The area classification process might require, as
appropriate, the participation of operations, maintenance, safety, electrical and
instrumentation professionals, the use of process diagrams and material flows, Material
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and any other pertinent documents, information and
knowledge to determine the hazards and their extent and the protection measures to be
used.
When changes occur in the use of a munitions-related facility/location, a re-
assessment of the hazardous environment must be accomplished. For example, electrical
equipment previously installed in an area that had a dust hazard, may not provide
protection from a new operation which creates a vapour hazard. Changes in chemicals
used in a process can also impact the hazardous environment because of the differences
in chemical properties. All changes must be carefully reviewed to ensure additional
hazardous conditions have not been introduced.
2.2.6.8. Mitigation of hazards
Explosive gases, vapours and dusts have different chemical properties that affect
the likelihood and severity of an explosion. Such properties include flame temperature,
minimum ignition energy, upper and lower explosive limits, and molecular weight. Though
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every substance has its own unique properties, they can be ranked into similar ranges,
simplifying the selection of equipment for hazardous areas.
Proper mitigation of hazards requires a very good understanding of the process and
operations being conducted, the hazardous environment that will be present and from
which electrical equipment must provide protection against, as well as possible equipment
solutions available.
Many strategies exist for safety in electrical installations. The simplest strategy is to
minimize the amount of electrical equipment installed in a hazardous area, either by
keeping the equipment out of the area altogether or by making the area less hazardous by
process improvements or the use of ventilation with clean (outside) air.
The selection of the correct electrical equipment requires that all potential ignition
sources that may occur when electrical and mechanical equipment are used in a
designated hazardous environment be controlled or eliminated.
Electrical standards will provide assistance in identifying the potential ignition
sources generated by the use of electrical equipment and the validated protection
mitigation concepts (“types of protection”) that are available. The following is a list of the
most common methods used:
a. Explosion-proof (increased safety) - equipment is designed to be very robust
and made of high-quality components to withstand an explosion from within,
without transmitting the flame to the outside.
b. Intrinsically safe equipment - an electrical device that is incapable of causing
an ignition of the prescribed flammable gas, vapour, or dust hazardous
environment, regardless of any spark or thermal effect that may occur in
normal use, or under any conditions of fault likely to occur in practice.
c. Purged or pressurized and suitably temperature-limited equipment -
Equipment is pressurized with a positive pressure or purged with a diluting
gas such as air or an inert gas. If air is used, it is ducted in from outside the
hazardous area.
d. Encapsulation - Equipment components of the equipment are usually
encased in a resin type material
e. Immersion - Equipment components are completely covered with oil, sand,
etc.
f. Exclusion of electrical equipment from the hazardous atmosphere – spark
producing equipment is placed outside the hazardous area. By careful design
of the electrical installation, it is frequently possible to locate much of the
electrical apparatus in less hazardous or non-hazardous areas.
g. Isolation of equipment from the hazardous atmosphere by means of dust,
vapour, or gas-free enclosures with surface temperatures positively
maintained at safe levels.
h. Controlling equipment surface temperature – heat producing elements such
as motor winding, electrical heaters, including heat tracing and lighting
fixtures are often designed to limit their maximum temperature below the
auto-ignition temperature of the material involved. Both external and internal
temperatures are taken into consideration.
i. Suitable for use in hazardous locations – provides the ability for a
manufacturer to demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, an alternative
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method to receive hazardous location approvals that cannot conform to
existing protection concepts.
2.2.6.9. Electrical equipment certification/labels
Electrical equipment to be used in a hazardous environment must be tested and
rated for that environment. It must also have a label affixed to it which clearly spells out the
hazardous environment for which it can safely be used. That label certifies the equipment
has been tested for a particular hazardous environment by a certified laboratory in
accordance with established, standardized test procedures. There are a number of such
laboratories that accomplish this work. Some examples include:
a. Canada: Canadian Standards Association (CSA)
b. France: Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques
(INERIS) and Bureau Veritas LCIE
c. Germany: Physikalisch-technische Bundesanstalt
d. Norway - Norges Elektriske Materiellkontroll (NEMKO)
e. United Kingdom: British Approvals Service for Electrical Equipment in
Flammable Atmospheres (BASEEFA) and SIRA Test and Certification Ltd
f. United States: Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM)
Research Corporation
g. Intertek (ETL)
2.2.6.10. Current Certification Directives
Refer to national regulations regarding acceptance of certifications from testing
laboratories outside your nation or region and/or the need to adhere to international or
regional electrical standards. For example, in Europe, ATEX Directive (94/9/EC) is the
latest European regulation related to equipment and protective systems intended for use in
potentially explosive atmospheres. Countries covered by this directive are all the European
Union (EU) countries plus the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries. The acronym
ATEX derives from the French title of the 94/9/EC directive, Appareils destinés à être
utilisés en ATmosphères Explosives.
2.2.6.11. Electro-Magnetic (EM) Hazards
To prevent EM radiation hazard problems, deliberate radio-frequency transmitters
should in general be prohibited from within explosives areas. This includes low power
transmitters such as those found in wireless local-area networks (LAN) and wireless-
fidelity (Wi-Fi) systems and personal radio (cellular phone) transmitters. If allowed, each
must be assessed on a case by case basis against the unit’s National/Military EM
Standards to ensure dangerous situations are not being introduced into the process.
Electromagnetic emissions from electrical equipment used in explosives buildings
should be controlled to ensure:
a. The protection of any nearby sensitive or susceptible electro-explosive
devices (EED).
b. The prevention of arcing in the presence of a hazardous environment.
c. Damage to electronics (e.g., receivers) within weapons. When packed in its
approved container, munitions are normally considered to be protected
against the EM environment; but when unpacked, under test or during
processing operations their EM vulnerability susceptibility may be
considerably increased.
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d. For more detailed directions, see CHAPTER 6 in this publication.
2.2.6.12. Electrical equipment selection/installation/inspection
The process description, the hazardous environments to be addressed, and the
electrical equipment and the required ratings of that equipment shall be included in an
area classification document. This becomes the baseline for electrical equipment selection
and its installation, as well as for inspections and subsequent repairs. Often an area
classification plan-view is developed to identify and document electrical equipment ratings
and installation techniques for each hazardous environment location. The plan may
contain the list of chemicals with their group and temperature rating, and elevation details
shaded to indicate Class, Division (Zone) and group combinations.
Area classification documentations will need to be reviewed and updated to reflect
any process changes.
The equipment has to be installed properly by considering specific local conditions
(e.g. ambient temperature, wet or dry environment, presence of potentially aggressive
materials) and the intended use of the equipment, specified in the product documentation.
It shall be installed in accordance with approved standards and manufacturer’s
documentation and subsequent inspection of that work to validate proper installation shall
be undertaken. Personnel selecting electrical equipment for use in hazardous
environments, installing it, or inspecting installation shall be competent and qualified to
accomplish these tasks.
Procedures must be prepared for the proper and correct maintenance and repair of
electrical equipment and for inspecting any work that was accomplished to ensure that the
protection offered by the equipment has not been compromised. The manufacturer’s
recommended maintenance guidance should be included. Maintenance of the equipment
should only be carried out by people who are competent to do so.
Manufacturer documentation accompanying the electrical equipment should be kept
in the records for future reference. It typically will provide instructions/information about the
intended use and details for installation and repair.
2.2.6.13. Housekeeping/cleanliness of areas
Hazardous environments should be kept free of dust, liquid and vapour
accumulations. This can be accomplished through the use of specifically designed
ventilation, in conjunction with frequent cleanings that remove any build-up of dust, pooling
of liquids, etc.
Caution should be exercised to ensure the cleaning methods selected are
compatible with the materials involved and do not introduce additional unintended risks.
For example; mixing water and powdered aluminium will generate hydrogen gas which can
produce a hazardous environment that equipment may not be rated for, or brushing loose
powder particles with a nylon broom could generate a static charge which could ignite the
material.
2.2.6.14. Vehicles and portable electrical items
The information given above was directed towards permanently installed electrical
equipment, but it also would apply to any portable electrical or spark producing equipment
brought into a hazardous environment, which must also be appropriately rated/certified as
safe to enter the area. Examples include forklifts, self-powered lifts, cell phones,
computers, lights, extension cords, scales, diagnostic and testing equipment, calculators.
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2.2.6.15. Non-Explosives support facilities
Explosives facilities quite often have nearby support facilities within which no explosives
operations are conducted. However, they could present a risk to explosives facilities
because of their proximity and the work being conducted in them. Examples are a forklift
battery charging station, where during the charging process hydrogen gas is generated,
and solvent storage where leakage could occur. It’s important that support facilities also be
assessed to determine if the work being conducted within them potentially presents a fire
or explosion hazard and if so, what electrical standards should be applied. Electrical
standards address these types of operations as well and identify the hazardous
environment considerations involved. Occupational and health safety standards will likely
address protection requirements as well.
2.2.6.16. Underground storage facilities
Generally, underground facilities are used only for the storage of assembled and packaged
munitions and as such do not require hazardous environment designations. If used for
operations that might produce a hazardous environment, then the requirements of this
chapter would apply.
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FIRE-FIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
SECTION I - GENERAL
2.3.1.1. Introduction
The aim of these principles is to establish measures and procedures to ensure a
minimum practicable risk in fighting fires involving munition and explosives at explosives
areas and also during the transport of conventional military munition and explosives by all
modes of transport.
These identification measures are based on the classification of fires into four fire
divisions according to the hazard they present. This chapter also establishes minimum
guidelines for the development of emergency plans, including safety, security, and
environmental protection, which have to be coordinated with local authorities.
Fire-fighting procedures, training of fire-fighting personnel, the use and
maintenance of fire-fighting equipment and vehicles, the provision of water supply and
alarm systems, the first aid measures, and other measures required in fire-fighting are
outside the scope of this chapter and shall be the responsibility of the national authority.
The munition hazard symbols and supplemental symbols including chemical agent
symbols (see Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2) are for fire-fighting situations only and are not
necessarily applicable to normal operating conditions.
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Fire Division 1 Fire Division 2
Fire Division 3 Fire Division 4
Sizes Large small
[mm] [mm]
a 600 300
b 200 100
c ~424 ~212
Letters (height) ~315 ~158
Letters (width) ~50 ~25
Colours*
Background orange
Numbers black
* The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety
signs")
Figure 3-1: Fire Division Symbols
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Symbol 1 Wear full protective clothing Symbol 2 Wear breathing apparatus
Colours:* Colours:*
Background is blue Background is blue
Figure and rim are white
Figure, rim and number are white when
set-no. is indicated by number;
Figure and rim when used to indicate
set-no. by colour:
• Red for Set 1 Protective Clothing
• Yellow for Set 2 Protective Clothing
• White for Set 3 Protective Clothing
Symbol 3 Apply no water
Colours:*
Background is white
Circle and diagonal are red
Figure is black
* The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and
safety signs")
Sizes Large small
[mm] [mm]
a 630 315
b 12 6
c 63 32
Figure 3-2: Chemical Hazard Symbols
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SECTION II - FIRE DIVISIONS
2.3.2.1. Involved Munition and Explosives Hazard Divisions
1.1 Mass explosion hazard
1.2 Projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard
1.3 Fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or minor projection hazard or
both, but not a mass explosion hazard
1.4 No significant hazard
1.5 Very insensitive substances which have a mass explosion hazard
1.6 Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard
2.3.2.2. Involved Fire Divisions
Fire division 1 indicates the greatest hazard. The hazard decreases with ascending
fire division numbers as follows:
Hazard Division Fire Division Hazard involved
1.1, 1.5 1 Mass explosion
1.2, 1.6 2 Explosion with projection
Mass fire, or fire with minor blast or
1.3 3
projections
1.4 4 No significant hazard
Table 3-1: Hazards of Fire Divisions
The fire divisions are synonymous with the Storage Hazard Divisions 1.1 through
1.4 munition and explosives. But in this case, as described in Part I, Chapter 2, the HD 1.5
belongs to Fire Division 1 (mass explosion) and HD 1.6 belongs to Fire Division 2 (non-
mass explosion).
2.3.2.3. Fire Division Symbols:
Each of the four fire divisions is indicated by distinctive symbols (see Figure 3-1) in
order to be recognized by fire-fighting personnel approaching a scene of fire. To assist
with identifying at long range, the symbols differ in shape as follows:
Shape Fire Division
Octagon 1
Cross 2
Inverted Triangle 3
Diamond 4
Table 3-2: Fire Divisions Symbols
The colour of all four symbols is orange in accordance with the colour on UN and
IMCO labels for Class 1 (Explosives).
The use of the specified fire division numbers is left to the discretion of national
authorities. When numbers are used they are painted in black.
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2.3.2.4. Supplementary Symbols:
Due to the peculiarity of hazardous substances in certain types of munition (e.g.
Storage Compatibility Groups G, H, J and L), the storage of this munition requires
supplementary symbols. Those supplementary “Chemical Hazards Symbols” are used to
indicate the precautions to be taken against the additional hazards proceeding from the
chemical agents of that munition (see Figure 3-2). The Chemical Hazard Symbols indicate
the following precautions:
a. wear full protective suit,
b. wear respirator facepiece,
c. apply no water.
d. All three Chemical Hazard Symbols are circular in shape. They correspond to
the ISO 3864 "Safety colors and safety signs". The symbols, their meanings
and their sizes are shown in Figure 3-2.
e. The Apply No Water (symbol No. 3 of Figure 3-2) may be placed together
with one of the other if required.
f. The indicating the requirement to wear full protective clothing should also
indicate the type of full protective clothing to be worn, as the different kinds of
chemical agents’ demand different protective measures. The type of full
protective clothing to be worn at a chemical munition storage site and the
method by which this is indicated are the responsibility of the nation
concerned.
g. The chemical agents mostly used in munition, the compatibility groups of that
munition and the required in storage are specified in Table 3-3.
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Breath-
Com- Apply
Chemical munition and Full Protective Clothing ing
patibility No
Substances Appara-
Group2 Water
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 tus
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Toxic Agents1 K X
Tear Gas, O-Chlorobenzol G X
Smoke, Titanium
G X
Tetrachloride (FM)
Smoke, Sulpher trioxide-
chlorosulphonic acid G X
solution (FS)
Smoke, Aluminum-zinc
oxide-hexachloroethane G X X
(HC)
White Phosphorous (WP) H X
White Phosphorous
H X
plasticized (PWP)
Thermite or Thermate (TH) G X X
Pyrotechnic Material (PT) 3
G X X
Calcium Phosphide L X X
Signaling Smokes G X
Isobutyl methacrylate with
J X
oil (IM)
Napalm (NP) J X X X
Triethylaluminium
L X X
(TEA)(TPA)
Notes:
1 Toxic Agents without explosives components that normally would be assigned to
Hazard Division 6.1 may be stored as compatibility group K.
2 See Part I Chapter 2.
3 Pyrotechnic Material (PT) are incendiary mixtures containing magnesium
Table 3-3: Compatibility Group and Chemical Hazard Symbols Required for Storage of Chemical
munition and Substances
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2.3.2.5. Protective Clothing:
The following sets of full protective clothing are recommended:
a. Set 1 – Protective clothing against casualty agents, consisting of protective
respirator facepiece, impermeable suit, hood and boots, protective footwear
and splash suit.
b. Set 2 – Protective clothing against harassing agents, consisting of protective
respirator facepiece.
c. Set 3 – Protective clothing against white phosphorus (WP) smoke, consisting
of fire-resistant gloves, chemical safety goggles and respirator facepiece.
The different sets of full protective clothing to be worn may be indicated by:
a. a white number, corresponding to the set-no., on the blue background of the
symbol, or
b. a white rectangular plaque placed below the symbol listing in black letters the
components of protective clothing to be worn.
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SECTION III – FIRE-FIGHTING PRINCIPLES
2.3.3.1. Fire Prevention (preventive fire protection)
Preventive fire protection comprises all measures suited to prevent the
development and spreading of a fire. These are to develop a plan based on an estimate of
the hazards and risk. This analysis should comprise:
a. employees,
b. infrastructure and stockpile,
c. exposed sites; and
d. public and the local environment.
The measures below are to be addressed in all cases.
2.3.3.2. Constructional Fire Prevention Measures
The following basic criteria apply:
a. Buildings designed for the processing or storage of munition shall be built of
non-combustible or at least fire-resistant, (according to national standards)
construction material. Supporting and surrounding structural elements shall
resist fire for at least 30 minutes in accordance with national standards.
b. Chimneys in an explosives area must be provided with a trap to prevent
flying sparks.
c. Heating systems must not have uncovered glowing parts. The temperatures
of exposed heating surfaces and lines must not exceed 120 °C.
d. An efficient fire alarm system shall be installed and maintained.
e. munition sites are to be equipped with an adequate fire-fighting water supply
according to national standards. Fire-fighting water supply points shall not be
sited closer than 25 m to any process or storage building. They are to be
positioned beside -not in - roads or traffic-ways and be provided with an area
of clearance, such that vehicles will not cause an obstruction. Where
alternative water supply points are not available, protection should be
provided for the fire fighting vehicle and its crew (e.g. barriers or barricades).
f. Type, quantity and locations of fire-fighting equipment are determined
according to facility-related assessments and shall be adapted to the local
conditions during annual fire-fighting demonstrations.
g. Fire prevention also includes lightning protection.
2.3.3.3. Organizational Fire Prevention Measures
These are to be organized according to national regulations within the scope of
general fire protection considering the following criteria:
a. order and cleanness as well as strict observance of safety precautions count
among the most effective fire prevention measures, equal to prohibition of
smoking, fire and naked light,
b. handling of flammable substances,
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c. prevention of additional fire loads such as stacking material, packaging
material and the like,
d. fire hazards of machines, equipment and tools during munition operations or
in the case of overload of electrical lines,
e. inflammable undergrowth, laying out fire lanes,
f. clear zones, trimming of branches and the like,
g. regular instruction of the personnel about actions to be taken in case of fire
and in the use of first aid fire-fighting equipment,
h. preparation of an emergency planning1 and an emergency map 2:
1 emergency planning: see 2.3.5 Section V - Emergency Planning
2 emergency map: a map containing the essential details of a facility or an installation from the point of view
of fire protection.
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SECTION IV - FIRE-FIGHTING PROCEDURES
2.3.4.1. General
According to the stage of the fire, munition fires are divided into:
a. Developing Munition Fires. Fires in the vicinity of munition, but which do not
immediately hazard it. The fire brigade should be notified as soon as possible
if a fire is developing in the vicinity of munition. Evacuate all non-essential
personnel and fight the fire for as long as it is safe to do so, in accordance
with the pre-arranged plan. On arrival of the fire brigade, the competent
person will advise them of the state of the fire. Provided that the explosives
are still not hazarded, they will take immediate action to fight it. A close watch
must be kept upon the fire, so that evacuation of the remaining personnel can
be ordered immediately if it appears that the explosives are about to become
hazarded.
b. Established Munition Fires. Fires which are hazarding or about to hazard the
explosives. The term is applied to all fires which cannot be positively
identified as “developing munition fires”.
The following guidelines deal with the special hazards connected with munition
fires:
a. Fire-fighters of munition and explosives fires shall have a thorough
knowledge of the specific reactions of munition and explosives exposed to
the heat or to the fire itself. The fire-fighting forces and other essential
personnel shall be briefed before approaching the scene of the fire. They
shall be informed of the known hazards and conditions existing at the scene
of the fire before proceeding to the location of the fire.
b. Fire involving munition and explosives shall be fought according to the
hazard classification, fire division, the stage of the fire, and the procedures
specified by the defense component concerned. Special fire-fighting
instructions addressing munition hazards shall be developed according to the
needs of the defense components.
c. All fires starting in the vicinity of munition or explosives shall be reported and
shall be fought immediately with all available means and without awaiting
specific instructions. However, if the fire involves explosive material or is
supplying heat to it, or if the fire is so large that it cannot be extinguished with
the equipment at hand, the personnel involved shall evacuate and seek
safety. Before fighting munition fires in an unknown situation, the fire brigade
has to analyze the situation.
d. The presence of buildings, earth barricades etc. to protect fire-fighting
personnel during operations is a crucial factor for effective fighting of fires
involving munition or explosives. The fire-fighting personnel, their vehicles
and equipment must not be endangered unnecessarily.
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2.3.4.2. Detailed Fire-Fighting Procedures
Fires of munition and explosives are fought according to their classification in fire
divisions and the stage of the fire.
a. Fire Division 1
(1) Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded
and all personnel must evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take
cover, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The fire brigade will be
called from the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that
the fire is fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g.
from the incident site during the developing stage), a further call must be
made to warn the fire brigade the fire is now fully developed. The brigade will
rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.
(2) Once the mass explosion has taken place, fire fighters should assess the
situation and extinguish any secondary fires, concentrating upon those which
hazard other explosives stores, as advised by the Control Officer, who
should be available by this time.
b. Fire Division 2
(1) Established munition fire: In the case of earth covered or heavy walled
munition storage magazines the effects of the exploding munition will be
contained within the magazine except possibly for those in the direction of
the headwall or doors. Therefore, external fires can be fought in close
proximity of the magazines except in the direction of the head-wall or doors.
An established fire must not be fought inside such a magazine nor external
fires in front of it and no fire-fighting at all in case of light structure
magazines. In all cases the fire alarm will be sounded, all personnel must
evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover, in accordance with
the pre-arranged that may take account of the above. The fire brigade is to
be withdrawn behind the front wall line of the magazine or completely from
the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that the fire is
fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the
incident site during the developing stage), a further call must be made to
warn the fire brigade that the fire is now fully developed. The brigade will
rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.
(2) Once the explosives have become involved, lobbed and self-propelled items
can be expected, some of which may function on impact. Secondary fires
may be started. Where these hazard other explosives, attempts should be
made to extinguish them without exposing crews to undue risk.
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c. Fire Division 3
(1) Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded
and all personnel will evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take
cover in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The fire brigade is to be
called from the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that
the fire is fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e.g.
from the incident site during the developing stage), a further call must be
made to warn the fire brigade that the fire is now fully developed. The
brigade will rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the
competent person.
(2) Once the explosives have become involved a particularly intense fire can be
expected, with high levels of radiant heat, probably with flame jets from
openings in the building. Packages may burst some violently, but there will
be no explosions. Secondary fires may be started by radiation or projected
fire brands. Once the main fire is seen to be reducing to a level that enables
these to be fought, action should be taken to extinguish them, keeping crews
away from openings in the building. Visors and gloves are advised.
d. Fire Division 4
(1) Fires involving items of Fire Division 4 may be fought as dictated by the
situation.
(2) After an extended period of time the munition may explode sporadically. For
protection against fragments and missiles the fire-fighting forces should not
approach the scene of fire any closer than necessity dictates, certainly not
any closer than 25 m. When possible, the fire should be fought from a
protected location.
Munition Requiring Supplementary Symbols
Munition containing explosives and additional hazardous agents (see Figure 3-3) requires
special attention and precautions in fire-fighting. Such munition belongs to different fire
divisions depending on the kind and quantity of explosives contained in the munition. Such
fires are fought in accordance with the fire division(s) involved considering the precautions
indicated by the supplementary l. The issue of the corresponding special fire-fighting
regulations is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
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G – Type Nerve Agents VX Nerve Agents H – Type Mustard Agents
Colours: *
Background: yellow
Letters: black
*The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and
safety signs")
large small
Diameter 630mm 315mm
Letters (height) 315mm 158mm
Letters (width) 50mm 25mm
Figure 3-3: Supplemental Chemical Hazard Symbols
Munition containing Depleted Uranium (DU)
a. Combustion of DU
(1) The combustion properties of DU metal must be considered when dealing
with a fire involving DU munition.
(2) The colour of smoke produced by burning DU may be yellow but the
absence of colour is not a reliable indication that DU metal is not involved;
therefore, it is prudent to assume from the outset that DU is burning and that
DU oxide smoke is being produced and to apply the appropriate precautions,
as follows.
b. Precautions
Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining oxidation
reaction is started, the application of small quantities of conventional
extinguishing agents is likely to be ineffective and may even add to the
spread of the fire by dispersing the burning uranium. For example, insufficient
water to cool the fire would react with hot uranium metal to form hydrogen.
For a small fire involving uranium and no explosives, the most effective
extinguishing agent is one of the inert powdered smothering agents (e. g.
Pyromet) but when explosives are present the closeness of approach
necessary to deliver such an extinguishing agent to the seat of the fire would
be hazardous to the firefighters. In particular, propellants, the most likely
explosives to be closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant
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heat, firebrands and some ejected fragments. The firebrands may be only
small glowing of packaging materials but it is possible that they could be fiery
fragments of burning propellant
c. Fire Fighting Methods
(1) In all cases, treat as a radiological risk - i.e. wear respirator facepiece,
ensure all parts of the body are covered and fight fire from up-wind
direction. Put down smoke with spray jet. Prevent water from flowing-
off, if possible (dikes).
(2) DU without an explosive component. Use copious water at optimum
jet/spray range. Do not use halons. No projections are likely, other
than the minor spallations associated with metal fires hit by water.
(3) DU with an explosive component. Fight in accordance with the fire
division concerned.
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SECTION V - EMERGENCY PLANNING
2.3.5.1. Standard Operating Procedures
Installations or responsible activities shall develop standard operating procedures
(SOP) or plans designed to provide safety, security and environmental protection. Plans
shall be coordinated with the applicable national, regional and local emergency response
authorities (e.g. law enforcement, fire departments and hospitals etc.) and any established
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC).
At a minimum, those SOP or plans shall include the following:
a. Specific sections and guidance that address emergency preparedness,
contingency planning and security. For security, those SOP or plans shall
limit access to trained and authorized personnel.
b. Procedures that minimize the possibility of an unpermitted or uncontrolled
detonation, release, discharge or migration of military munitions or explosives
out of any storage unit when such release, discharge or migration may
endanger human health or the environment.
c. Provisions for prompt notification to emergency response and environmental
agencies and the potentially affected public for an actual or potential
detonation or uncontrolled release, discharge or migration (that may
endanger human health or the environment).
To produce the necessary SOP is in the responsibility of national authorities.
The commanding leaders of the installations are responsible for the training of their
personnel and the coordination with the LEPC. They also have to ensure that all SOP and
Emergency Plans belonging to the special installation are reachable to external security
and emergency authorities.
Competent persons belonging to the depot or to an external fire brigade are to be
regularly trained to be available to advise the fire chief and external fire fighters.
2.3.5.2. Withdrawal distance for emergency and rescue personnel
The withdrawal distance for essential, primarily emergency and rescue personnel at
accidents shall be determined by emergency authorities on site. Emergency authorities
shall determine who are essential personnel.
Note: Withdrawal distances for emergencies during transport of munition
have been recommended in the past by NATO Accident Information Sheet
(AIS). Due to the availability of international agreed standard recommendations
(e.g. Emergency Response Information (ERI) cards or instructions in writing of
the ADR), NATO AIS are no longer provided by AASTP-1. Future provision may
be found in STANAG 4441/AMovP-6 based on the following recommendations.
Withdrawal distances depend on fire involvement and on whether or not the hazard
classification, fire division and quantity of munition (NEQ) are known. If no information is
available, worst case of munition of HD 1.1 has to be considered for further actions.
Withdrawal distances can be established with a high, medium or low risk for the
essential personnel.
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a. Withdrawal distances with a low risk correspond to the hazard evacuation
distances (HED) for nonessential personnel given in paragraph 2.3.5.3.
b. Withdrawal distances with a medium risk are based on the IBD calculated by
22.2 * NEQ 1/3.
c. Withdrawal distances with a high risk require an appropriate cover to exclude
the hazards of munitions directly and horizontal projected fragments and
other debris (e.g. in case of storage facilities – debris of the infrastructure, in
case of transportation debris of vehicle body parts). Hazards of vertical
projected fragments and debris falling behind the cover present the high risk.
Hazards of the blast should be cancelled out in a distance calculated by 9.6 *
NEQ 1/3.
2.3.5.3. Hazard evacuation distance for nonessential personnel
Hazard evacuation distance (HED) for nonessential personnel (e.g. public and non-
participants at accidents) are intended for application in emergency situations only and are
not to be used for facility siting.
HED depend on fire involvement and on whether or not the hazard classification,
fire division and quantity of munition are known.
If the involvement of munition in a fire has to be expected or is imminent, then the
initial evacuation distance applied shall be at least the IBD, while the appropriate HED for
nonessential personnel is being determined corresponding to Table 3-4 or to a safety
distance of 130.1 * NEQ 1/3 according to AASTP-1 Part IV Chapter 7 recommendation for a
demolition of fragmenting munition.
When emergency authorities determine that the fire is or may become
uncontrollable and may result in deflagration and/or detonation of nearby munition, all
nonessential personnel shall be evacuated to the appropriate HED listed in Table 3-4 or to
a safety distance of 130.1 * NEQ 1/3 according to AASTP-1 Part IV Chapter 7
recommendation for a demolition of fragmenting munition.
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Hazard Net Explosive Quantity
Division (NEQ)1
UNKNOWN KNOWN
(HD) Facility Transport Facility Transport
UNKNOWN
1 (Facility or Road 1,250m 1,250m
Transport)
UNKNOWN
2 (Railcar 1,500m 1,500m
Transport)
1,250m
(Road Transport)
3 1.1 2 and 1.5 1,250m 44.4 x NEQ1/3
1,500m
(Railcar
Transport)
5 1.2 2 and 1.6 540m 3 395m 1 540m 3 395m 1
6.4 x NEQ1/3
7 1.3 4 405m 5
(min. 120m)
8 1.4 100m 100m
Footnotes
1 The maximal permissible NEQ of the munition and explosives to be loaded on
one transport unit during road transport is limited as indicated in STANAG
4441/AMovP-6, Part II, Chapter 2, Table 2-2-1 “NEM Load Limits”
2 For HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 AE, if known, the maximum range fragments and debris
will be thrown (including the interaction effects of stacks of items, but excluding
lugs, strongbacks, and/or nose and tail plates) may be used to replace the
distances given.
3 Equal to AASTP-1 Part I, PES-ES relation “Inhabited Building – open stack,
unbarricaded”, maximum D2
4 Hazard Evacuation Distance do not consider the potential flight range of
propulsion units.
5 Equal to AASTP-1 Part I, PES-ES relation “Inhabited Building – open stack,
unbarricaded”, maximum D4
Table 3-4: Hazard Evacuation Distances for Nonessential Personnel
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OPERATIONS IN AN EXPLOSIVES AREA
SECTION I - INTRODUCTION
2.4.1.1. General
The purpose of this chapter is to provide management and administration considerations for
the guidance of National Authorities in the promotion of safe and efficient operations in
explosives areas. This chapter contains a list of considerations which may serve as an aid to
users in the preparation of national regulations on the subject.
SECTION II – GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
2.4.2.1. Responsibilities of Commanding Officers/Superintendents
The Commanding Officer/Superintendent of a munition facility has primary
responsibility for safe working and storage conditions within the facility. The following
actions should normally be taken:
a. Establish and enforce personnel limits for explosives facilities.
b. Establish and enforce explosives limits for all magazines, transit sheds/areas,
outside stacks or hardstands, workshops, laboratories and proof areas.
c. Ensure that SOP are prepared, displayed in buildings and enforced for all
examination, repair, renovation, modification, disassembly, assembly, proof
and disposal (by breakdown, burning, or demolition) of munition and
explosives.
d. Review periodically working conditions within the explosives area.
e. Maintain blueprints, maps, or drawings showing the locations of all buildings
in the explosives area, and the distances to public traffic routes, inhabited
and uninhabited buildings on and off defence property.
f. Maintain Standing Orders to take account of local conditions and supplement
national or other orders pertaining to the operation of the facility.
g. Implement a munition safety programme with a system of accident, incident,
defect and malfunction reports and investigations.
2.4.2.2. Safety Responsibilities
All personnel in the course of their duty who are required to handle munition or
explosives should have a detailed knowledge of orders or directives issued to reduce the
inherent hazards associated with the work.
A high degree of care must be demanded of personnel who are in charge of, or are
handling munition, where even a slight degree of negligence involves danger to life or
damage to property.
It is the responsibility of all personnel to maintain vigilance to improve and develop
safe practices, methods and attitudes.
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2.4.2.3. Admission to Explosives Areas
No person shall enter an explosives area except by authorized entrances and only
then under authority of a pass issued by the Commanding Officer, Superintendent or
Officer in charge.
Any person showing the least signs of intoxication or impairment from drugs shall
not be admitted to explosives areas.
2.4.2.4. Personnel Employed in Explosives Areas
A person should not be employed in the explosives area unless the Commanding Officer/-
Superintendent is satisfied that the person is suitable for such employment.
2.4.2.5. Prohibited and Restricted Articles
No stores, other than explosives, which have been properly classified and
authorized for storage therein, and such tools, appliances and materials as are authorized
from time to time, are to be permitted into an explosives area.
In particular admission of the following is to be prohibited or strictly controlled:
a. Oil or gas filled lighting, heating or burning appliances and all flame, spark or
fire producing appliances.
b. Matches, cigarettes and other portable means of producing spark or flame.
c. Radio transmitters and receivers.
d. Tobacco in any form and any article used for the purpose of smoking or
carrying tobacco.
e. Beers, wines and alcoholic liquor.
f. Motor spirit, flammable oils and solvents not contained in the fuel tank of a
vehicle or in a sealed container.
g. Fire arms.
h. Cameras.
i. Drugs and medicines.
j. Food and drink unless for sale in official canteens or refreshment areas.
k. Battery operated equipment e.g. hearing aids, calculators.
2.4.2.6. Food and Drink
When approved by national regulations canteens or lunch rooms may be located within the
explosives area. These may, under stringent controls, be authorized as smoking areas.
2.4.2.7. Smoking
Smoking inside explosives areas is strictly forbidden except in authorized smoking
areas.
Prominent signs should be displayed at each exit from the smoking area with the
wording "NO SMOKING BEYOND THIS POINT". A sign with the wording "WARNING NO
LIVE MUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES ARE PERMITTED IN THIS AREA" should be placed
on or near the doors leading into the smoking area.
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2.4.2.8. Employee Working Alone
No one person should be permitted to work alone (where another person cannot provide
immediate assistance in case of an accident) in explosives workshop or laboratory
operations which involve the assembly or breakdown of munition or the exposure of
explosive fillings, or in any other operation which involves the opening of packages and the
exposure of loose munition.
2.4.2.9. Photography
Photographs taken within the explosives area should be restricted to those required for
official purposes. Where explosives are exposed, electro-explosive devices (EED) are
involved or explosive or flammable gases may be present, the use of cameras with
electrically operated equipment should be avoided unless specially approved for the
purpose.
2.4.2.10. Portable Hand Lights
Portable hand lights may be used within the explosives area if they are of a design that
meets the national electrical requirements for the particular building/area in which they are to
be used.
2.4.2.11. Wearing of Rings and Other Jewellery
It is general good industrial safety practice to discourage the wearing of rings and other
jewellery by personnel employed in explosives workshops.
2.4.2.12. Battery Operated Devices
Battery operated devices may be used in locations within the explosives area at the
discretion of the Commanding Officer/Superintendent. Only "intrinsically safe" devices
should be approved for use in those areas where EED, explosive dust or other conditions
which might give rise to an explosion are present. To be "intrinsically safe" the device should
be incapable of producing sufficient energy to initiate an explosion.
2.4.2.13. Thunderstorms
At the discretion of National Authorities, work involving explosives and in buildings
containing explosives should cease during thunderstorms and personnel evacuated to a
suitable location at the appropriate distance from PES.
Truckloads of munition should be moved under cover. Loads which must be left in
the open should be covered with tarpaulins.
2.4.2.14. Private Motor Vehicles
Standing Orders should include regulations to cover local conditions for the certification,
control and use of private vehicles in the explosives area.
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SECTION III - ARRANGEMENT OF MUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN A
BUILDING OR STACK
2.4.3.1. Munition and Explosives Storage - General
Munition and explosives should be stored only in locations designated for that purpose. The
types and quantities of materiel which may be stored in these locations must be in
accordance with the quantity distance requirements prescribed in this manual or appropriate
national publications.
2.4.3.2. Use of Magazines
Magazines are intended for the storage of munition and explosives including
explosive components and should not be used for the storage of non-explosive stores
unless no other suitable accommodation is available. Explosive items and their related
non-explosive components may be stored together in the same magazine, for example,
aircraft bombs and their tail units. To preclude errors when issuing, dummy, display and
other inert munition should not be stored in the same building with their live counterpart.
Inert munition should normally be stored in non-explosive storehouses.
Munition and explosives, packages and containers should be properly marked, in
good repair and free from loose dirt, grit or other contamination before being stored in
magazines. Any broken or damaged packages or containers should be repacked, before
being accepted into a magazine, unless the damage is slight and does not adversely affect
the protective qualities of the package. Repacking should not be carried out in the
magazine.
2.4.3.3. Munition Stacking
Munition and explosives should be stored in stable stacks in magazines in an
approved manner which precludes toppling or collapse of the stacks, or the crushing or
deforming of the containers in the lower tiers. Dunnage should be used to secure the
stacks. When a specified method of stacking a particular item is not prescribed, explosives
and munition should be stacked in accordance with the following guidelines:
a. Munition and explosives should be stored in their approved containers and
should be separated in stacks by nature, type, and lot number. All containers
should be closed and sealed by suitable means.
b. Sufficient space should be left between munition stacks and the floor, ceiling
and walls of the magazine to permit air circulation. Additional space may be
provided for inspection etc., as required by national regulations.
c. Munition stacks should be placed at least 1 m from doorways to provide
protection from direct sunlight, rain etc. when doors are open.
d. Light cased phosphorus filled munition should be in double rows to permit
rapid identification and removal of leaking packages. Stack heights should
not exceed 2 m or one pallet. Pallets should be arranged in single lines with
sufficient room between each line to permit the removal of any container
showing signs of leakage. Suitable tools to cut the strapping should be
readily available in the building.
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e. Partly filled boxes should have a fraction tag attached, or be otherwise
marked, and the box placed conspicuously on the stack. There should be
only one fraction box per lot.
f. Munition stacks should be placed at an appropriate distance from heating
devices.
Records of storage arrangements should be maintained to aid in space control and
to ensure the authorized explosives limits are not exceeded.
2.4.3.4. Ventilation of Magazines
Magazines should be kept as dry and temperate as possible. To assist in the reduction of
condensation, magazines should be fitted with a ventilator; where the climate warrants, power
ventilators or dehumidification equipment may be necessary. The ventilators should be
designed to prevent the insertion into the magazine of any extraneous object, and to close
automatically in the event of a fire either inside or on the outside of the magazine. Older
magazines, or magazines with ineffective ventilating systems should be ventilated by opening
the doors and ventilators when atmospheric conditions and temperatures are favourable.
2.4.3.5. Temperature
Temperature control is important in magazines used for the storage of those types
of munition which are adversely affected by extremes of temperature.
Magazine temperature records should be maintained when:
a. Such records are useful for the selection of lots for proof or test.
b. Munition in the magazine has published temperature limitations which are
liable to be exceeded under prevailing climatic conditions.
2.4.3.6. Authorized Stores and Equipment
Only stores, tools and equipment authorized and required for use should be permitted in
magazines. A list of stores, tools and equipment approved for use should be displayed in the
building. In particular, empty pallets and dunnage should not be allowed to accumulate in
magazines containing munition.
2.4.3.7. Aisles and Safety Exits
Aisles and safety exits in magazines containing munition should not be blocked or
obstructed. When work is being conducted doors should not be fastened with other than
approved quick-release devices which shall be maintained in good working order. Where
quick-release devices are not fitted the doors shall be unlatched or open. All doors should
be outward opening.
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2.4.3.8. Isolation Magazines
Condemned or unserviceable munition presenting more than a normal storage
hazard should be removed to an isolation magazine pending destruction. In the absence of
an isolation magazine, outside storage may be used if national regulations permit.
Condemned or unserviceable munition not presenting more than normal storage
hazards may be stored in magazines with serviceable stores but should be clearly marked
as condemned or unserviceable to prevent inadvertent use or issue.
Munition and explosives of different compatibility groups may be mixed in isolation
magazines. Such mixing in isolation magazines should only be permitted when it is
unavoidable and does not significantly increase either the probability or severity of an
accident. An effective control when storing condemned or unserviceable munition is
required.
2.4.3.9. Transit Magazines
A transit magazine is defined as a magazine used for:
a. The receipt of small consignments which may be mixed prior to being placed
in permanent storage.
b. The assembly of small issues which may be mixed prior to dispatch.
In buildings authorized as transit magazines, munition and explosives of different
compatibility groups may be mixed in the same way as is permitted for the appropriate
mode of transport. If it is necessary to open packages, for acceptance, receipt or issue
inspections or for identification, verification of quantity, repack or other process, this should
be done in an adjacent building or separate compartment of the same building; only one
nature should be present in this building or compartment at any time. Remarking of the
outer packages and sorting of packages may be carried out in the main transit magazine.
Irrespective of the quantities of each hazard division present at any time the overall
explosive limit applied to the building should be that for the hazard division which permits
the least NEQ for the available quantity distances.
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SECTION IV - HANDLING OF MUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
2.4.4.1. Cleanliness of Buildings
The cleanliness of all magazines and other buildings containing explosives should
be maintained at a high standard. The following precautions shall be taken:
a. Dangerously combustible materials, such as paper, oily rags, cotton waste,
paints, solvents, volatile liquids, and painting cloths required for use in an
explosives storehouse or explosives workshop should be removed to a safe
storage place when not actually in use.
b. Particular care should be exercised to avoid the presence of steel wool,
sand, gravel, or any other abrasive substance upon the floors, tables, or
other working places where explosives are being handled.
c. Explosive dusts or vapours should not be allowed to accumulate inside or
outside a building.
d. Electrical fixtures and motors should be kept free from dust.
e. Special precautions (see paragraph 2.4.5.4) should be observed when
packages containing explosives liable to initiation by spark or friction are
stored and are not in dust tight containers.
2.4.4.2. Electrical Extensions
When not specifically prohibited and when it is necessary to use extension lights during the
handling, loading, or unloading of explosives or munition in magazines or other buildings or
on-board vessels, lighters, railroad cars, trucks, or other vehicles, portable electric extension
lights may be used provided they are in accordance with the national electrical code for use
in such locations. In the case of visiting forces, the electrical code of the host nation should
be the minimum standard.
2.4.4.3. Handling Equipment
Handling equipment should be in accordance with approved specifications, used in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, and maintained and inspected in
accordance with the manufacturer's recommended maintenance schedules.
2.4.4.4. Parking of Vehicles, Railcars and Barges
Vehicles, railcars and barges should be parked in the vicinity of magazines and workshops
only for the period of time required for loading or unloading; at all other times designated
holding or marshalling areas should be used for parking purposes. When such
vehicles/vessels are moving through explosives areas appropriate routes should be used to
minimize the risk of an explosion and propagation between PES.
2.4.4.5. Munition Returned from Bases or Units
All munition received from user units should be inspected to ensure that it is
suitable for storage and subsequent re-issue. The inspection sample size will depend upon
national practices.
All empty munition containers, packaging materials, empty cartridge cases, empty
munition components etc., received from user units should be given a 100 % inspection
and certified free from explosives before being declared as scrap, government provided
material as aids to production, or otherwise disposed of.
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SECTION V - REPAIR, MODIFICATION, INSPECTION AND PROOF OF
MUNITION
2.4.5.1. Introduction
This section contains special requirements for the repair, modification, inspection and proof
of munition and explosives in explosives workshops. These activities should only be
conducted in the locations designated. The NEQ of munition permitted in an explosives
workshop should be governed by the quantity distances in Part I, ANNEX A of the manual.
2.4.5.2. Workshop and Laboratory Working Conditions
Clean conditions should pertain to explosives workshops only when explosive
contents are exposed. See paragraph 2.4.5.5.1. for the definition of clean conditions.
Each work area should be thoroughly cleaned daily and each time work is changed
from one nature of explosives to another.
Before any article is taken into an explosives workshop operating under clean
conditions, it should be examined externally and any grit or objectionable substance
removed.
Work benches on which explosives are likely to be exposed should be so situated
that nothing can accidentally fall on the explosives; this is particularly important when
dealing with detonators or other sensitive materiel.
Work should be arranged so that explosives are never exposed to direct sunlight.
Explosives not being worked upon should be kept covered.
In explosives workshops, oils, spirits, paint, etc. should be in sound containers,
which in turn should be kept in a metal tray the size of, which should be adequate to
contain spilling. The quantity should be kept to a minimum and during non-working hours
should be kept in a metal locker outside the building or special fireproof room approved for
this purpose. These lockers should be included in the daily security check.
All doors in explosives workshops not equipped with quick release hardware shall
be unlocked when work is in progress.
Appropriate protective shielding should be erected around assembly or disassembly
apparatus, as required, to protect operators against flash and splinters in case of accident.
Protective shields should be proof-tested prior to initial use and only used for the purpose
for which they have been proof-tested.
When movement of unpacked munition is necessary care must be taken to ensure
that it is securely held and is protected against damage and dislodgement.
Munition containing exposed percussion caps or primers should have the caps
protected from accidental striking by means of the appropriate cartridge clips, or other
means.
Munition containing EED should not be removed from its package for longer than is
essential, so as to minimize the time during which it may be susceptible to electromagnetic
pick-up. Whenever it is necessary to remove munition of this kind from its package the
safe distances from RF-sources specified, in national regulations, should be fully
observed.
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Grenades, and other similar small stores, which are potentially dangerous when
fitted with initiators, should be dealt with in a room provided with a disposal chute or
equivalent facility.
Workshops or parts of workshops used for paint or rust removal should not be
considered as clean areas while being so employed. They should be thoroughly scrubbed
and cleaned before being included in the clean area.
Paint or rust removal and painting operations should not be conducted in the same
workshop room.
Ovens for drying non-explosive components should not be located in clean areas or
explosives workshops.
Non-ferrous metal receptacles should be appropriately located at workplaces when
there is a possibility of loose explosives or propellants being scattered on floors or work
benches.
2.4.5.3. Standing Operating Procedures
A SOP should prescribe step-by-step procedures to control operations and the
precautions to be taken in the course of workshop and laboratory operations. They should
be available in the building for the operation in progress.
A SOP should be approved by the Commanding Officer/Superintendent and include
as applicable:
a. Drawings, specifications, gauge schedules, tools, apparatus, and restriction
lists.
b. Static electricity grounding requirements.
c. Maximum and/or minimum humidity.
d. Clothing and foot-wear requirements.
e. The maximum number of personnel to be in the workshop or laboratory at
any one time.
f. The maximum quantity of explosive items permitted in the building and/or to
be worked on at any one time.
g. Any additional safety precautions necessary for the munition being worked
on.
Operations may proceed while the SOP are being printed provided a draft has been
approved by the Commanding Officer/Superintendent and is posted in the working area.
2.4.5.4. Personnel and Explosive Limits
To reduce the risk of injury of personnel and damage to property the number of
personnel employed, and the quantity of munition within an explosives workshop should
be kept to the minimum required to maintain the operation. Dividing the overall quantity
into separate bays or rooms, with substantial internal walls or barricades, will reduce the
risk of explosive propagation and probably reduce the effects of an explosives accident.
The personnel and explosive limits vary with each operation and should be included in the
SOP.
A personnel limit is to be assessed for each building, room or area in accordance
with the following principles:
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a. The number of persons employed should be the minimum compatible with
the highest standards of safety, quantity and an even flow of work.
b. The personnel limit should include all persons employed including those
employed on the movement of the munition or other tasks in the immediate
vicinity.
c. The limit may include up to two supervisors or inspectors even though their
presence is not continuous.
d. The limit should be related to the size of the building and number of exits.
Irrespective of other considerations, each person is to have ample working
space and suitable evacuation routes.
A working explosive limit for each building, room or area should be assessed in
accordance with the following principles:
a. It should not exceed the quantity permitted by available quantity distances.
b. The limit should represent the minimum number of containers or rounds
required to maintain an even and continuous flow of work.
c. The working limit should include all munition held within the building and the
immediate vicinity. It should also include munition that has been processed or
waiting to be processed, whether on vehicles or on the ground.
d. The possibility of reducing the hazard presented both inside and outside the
building by the use of adequate internal barricades should be considered.
Signs should be conspicuously posted to provide the following information:
a. The nature and type of munition being processed.
b. Details of the operation i.e. re-boostering.
c. The compatibility group, hazard division and fire class of munition.
d. Personnel and explosive limits.
This information should be repeated as necessary for rooms or confined areas
where special working conditions are prescribed. The explosive limits may be stated in
terms of NEQ and/or number of rounds or containers.
2.4.5.5. Clean Working Areas
Clean conditions may be described as a set of precautions that are taken in
explosives laboratories, workshops, proof areas, and certain magazines, to prevent the
introduction of, or the contact of explosives with, extraneous matter such as ferrous
metals, aluminium or aluminium alloys or grit which might cause an explosion through
friction or spark.
Working areas that are required to be maintained under clean conditions should be
provided with a changing lobby. The lobby should be divided by a barrier to indicate the
clean area.
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2.4.5.6. Clothing for Clean Conditions
Clothing used for wear in explosives workshops or laboratories maintained under clean
conditions should be specified by the appropriate National Authority, and will normally
include items such as spark-proof conductive footwear, fire retardant coveralls and suitable
hair covering.
2.4.5.7. Static Electricity Precautions
Munition workshops should be provided with conductive or anti-static flooring.
Conductive flooring is designed to provide a path of conductivity for the free movement of
electrostatic charges, thereby preventing a charge accumulation.
Anti-static flooring differs from conductive flooring in that it offers greater resistance
to the passage of electrical current.
Grounding points should be available for equipment, tools and munition in
explosives workshops, to prevent a difference of electrical potential between operators and
the material that they must handle.
Conductive flooring and grounding systems should be tested for continuity in
accordance with national specifications.
Personnel working in explosives workshops should wear conductive footwear or
copper chain, when conductive flooring is present. Such safety devices should be tested
frequently.
2.4.5.8. Painting Operations
Painting and stencilling operations should only be conducted in well ventilated
rooms or outdoors.
Spray painting operations, when conducted indoors, should be done in spray
painting booths, except for minor touch-up or stencilling using low pressure spray markers
or aerosol containers.
Operators and helpers should wear protective masks while spray painting is in
progress, unless the spray booths are properly exhausted so as to preclude exposure of
personnel to toxic atmosphere.
2.4.5.9. Heat Sealing Equipment
The use of heat-sealing equipment for packaging of munition in polyethylene is
permitted under the following conditions:
The munition is suited to heat sealing.
a. The heat-sealing apparatus is approved.
b. It is used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
c. It is properly maintained and inspected for serviceability and cleanliness
before initial use and at the beginning of each shift, and should be checked
for cleanliness (absence of any spillings) before each operation.
The sealing equipment should be restricted for use as permitted by the host country
within a transit magazine or explosives workshop in a room or segregated area apart from
other activities. However, heat sealing equipment must not be permitted in a room
maintained under clean conditions.
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Items to be heat sealed should be in serviceable condition and free of defects.
Detonators and heat sensitive items such as propellants or explosive samples
should be suitably packaged before heat sealing.
2.4.5.10. Tools
Only non-sparking tools should be used in direct contact with exposed explosives or
in rooms maintained under clean conditions.
Special or locally designed tools and equipment should not be used in munition
operations nor should modifications or alterations to approved tools or equipment be made
without prior approval.
Tools and appliances designed and provide for particular explosives operations
should not be used for other purposes without approval.
Only those tools authorized for use by the applicable SOP for the operation being
performed should be permitted in the room or area.
2.4.5.11. Closedown of Explosives Workshops
When an explosives workshop is vacated all electrical installations and powered
equipment other than essential services should be switched off or disconnected. At the
end of each working day the building should be secured.
Munition remaining in the building should be subject to the following:
a. During temporary breaks within the course of a working day, the munition
may be left in position provided it is safely stowed, and the explosive is not
exposed.
b. At the end of each working day munition may be left in the work area
providing it is packaged, (except for munition which is not normally stored in
packages) and placed on the floor. Items should be grounded (earthed) as
applicable.
2.4.5.12. Supervision
Constant supervision should be maintained by supervisory staff and all personnel should be
safety conscious. Each operator should be fully acquainted with any hazards associated
with the munition on which he is required to work. Before commencing an operation, each
operator should be familiarized with the particular task that he will perform.
2.4.5.13. Accident Involving Munitions
In the event of an accident or incident involving munition, all operations shall cease
immediately and the situation shall be reported to the Commanding
Officer/Superintendent. Nothing shall be disturbed, except in the interest of safety or as
may be necessary to give assistance to injured persons. Precautions should be taken to
prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the area.
Accidents involving munition shall be reported in accordance with national
regulations.
Accidents, if assessed correctly, can provide useful data to help validate the
adequacy of QD and protection requirements given in AASTP-1. Explosion effects and
damage associated with munitions fragmentation, structural debris, and blast can be
collected and analysed in accordance with the guidance given in PFP(AC/326-
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SG/6)D(2008)0001, “Procedures for the Collection, Analysis, and Interpretation of
Explosion-Produced Debris – Revision 1,” 27 May 2008. If such efforts are conducted, it is
strongly urged that national delegates communicate the results of that work to AC/326 and
Subgroup C, which has the responsibility for maintaining AASTP-1 and keeping it current.
Lessons learned from accidents can inform / warn others doing similar explosives
operations of areas they might need to be aware of, to prevent a similar occurrence.
Lessons learned may also identify additional requirements that need to be specified in
AASTP-1. If nations believe that this is the case, they should also bring such information to
AC/326 and SG C for review and consideration.
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SECTION VI - IN SERVICE SURVEILLANCE (ISS)
2.4.6.1. General
Munition contains components and substances which are subject to ageing. Ageing
effects can decrease the safety and reliability of munition. Knowing the functional reliability
or serviceability condition of munition is vital in order to fulfil the user requirements, but
also critical in order to prevent accidents that might occur due to aging and instability. A
well-planned ISS program will detect early degradation in energetic materials.
ISS is the observation, inspection, and test of munition, munition components, and
explosives. The object of an inspection is to find deterioration and determine the degree of
serviceability of the inspected item i.e., if the inspected item is serviceable as is, or
requires maintenance, disposal, priority of issue or restricted use.
2.4.6.2. National Responsibility
Munition surveillance and serviceability programs are a national responsibility.
Nationally approved programs should meet the guidance provided for In-Service-
Surveillance (ISS) of non-nuclear munitions within the promulgated NATO STANAG 4675
IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE (ISS) OF MUNITIONS.
For a variety of reasons, nations may not have such programs and may even
believe they are not necessary. It must never be assumed that all nations have such
programs or that existing programs are sufficient. If this is the case, an increased risk and
associated consequences from an accidental detonation/reaction occurring are very likely
due to “unknown” conditions. Relying on the shelf live is not the solution. High
temperature, humidity and exposure to other environmental conditions, improper handling
plus a host of other causes can have an impact on shelf life and consequently the safety
and reliability of munition and explosives. The numerous accidents that occur yearly
throughout the world due to “unknown cause” point to the importance of having
comprehensive stockpile management programs.
2.4.6.3. Examination
In addition to the physical damage caused by shocks and vibration, munitions also degrade
chemically. The energetic items that provide an explosive effect consist of organic chemical
compositions which may break-down, migrate or change over time. This change is normally
accelerated with increased temperatures.
2.4.6.4. Specific Hazard
Munitions containing nitrate esters (e.g., nitrocellulose) are particularly vulnerable to
accelerated degradation in high temperatures. At some point, the propellant may reach a
state where heat is generated at such an accelerating rate that it cannot be dissipated.
The accumulation of heat can lead to combustion (auto-ignition). Chemical stabilizers are
added to these propellants to slow the aging process. In time, the stabilizer levels will drop
to a point where the level of remaining effective stabilizer is not sufficient to prevent the
accelerated rate of decomposition of the nitrate esters. When this point is reached, the
propellant may auto ignite, with possible catastrophic results to property and life.
Monitoring the stability level of propellant is essential to ensure it is safe for issue and
continued storage.
In addition to munition items and components, munition packaging should also be
included in the ISS program particularly those packages designed to protect against
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electromagnetic radiation and packages designed to lessen the accidental reaction of
munition.
2.4.6.5. Safe Storage of Multinational Stocks
Until it is known that a Nation has ISS programs, the condition of munition from that
Nation will be considered “unknown”. 1 Unless absolutely required (and, generally only for
operational reasons), munition and explosives of unknown condition should never be
stored in the same storage location (e.g. cell, magazine) as munition and explosives items
and components that have been inspected and given a condition classification.
If such combined storage must be accomplished, munition and explosives should
be aggregated / treated in a worst-case situation (i.e., HD 1.1) and appropriate inter-
magazine distance applied to other munition and explosives storage locations. Only a
competent authority can decide this deviation. However, in the event that munition and
explosives from different Nations needs to be combined within the same storage
location/site (e.g. a nation does not have its own storage site), the following apply:
a. All nations combining their storage must accept the risk and consequences.
b. The munition and explosives have been hazard classified in accordance with
the UN Orange Book (Reference 1) and AASTP 3 (Reference 2).
c. The munition and explosives shall be actively managed/monitored by
National surveillance and propellant stability test programs. Nations will need
to document that they have such programs and their munition and explosives
is included in those programs.
d. Munition and explosives is packaged in a manner that meets applicable
requirements. A munition and explosives item’s assigned hazard
classification is only valid to that particular item in its tested packaged
configuration. If not stored in that configuration, the hazard classification is no
longer valid and the munition and explosives may actually present a very
different threat (e.g. HD 1.3 or SsD 1.2.1 may now be HD 1.1).
e. Munition and explosives that cannot meet a) through d) above shall be
separated by a minimum of HD 1.1inter-magazine distance from other
munition and explosives locations.
2.4.6.6. References
Items classified under the United Nations (UN) system within Classes 1 to 9 in
accordance with the UN Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations (Orange Book).
AASTP-3 (Edition 1 Version 4) - Manual of NATO Guidelines for the Hazard
Classification of Military Munition and Explosives - this publication is promulgated under
cover of STANAG 4123.
1 Unknown refers to the serviceability status of Munition items and components. For example, Munition
returned from users waiting for a condition classification. It includes Munition items that have been identified
by stock number and/or item name, but has not been examined for condition.
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STORAGE FACILITIES’ DESIGN ENVIRONMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
2.5.1.1. General
This chapter describes basic design considerations for storage facilities. Specific
information on explosion effects (e.g., air blast, fragmentation, debris, cratering, ground
shock, thermal effects) and their impact on persons or surrounding buildings and other
engineering works are described in AASTP-4, “Manual on Explosives Safety Risk
Analysis”.
Documented historical information on “Storage Facilities Design Environment
Considerations” can be found in AC/326(SG/C)WP(2016)0005 (PFP) which is based
mainly on his enclosure 2, AC/258(ST)WP/211-ADD1 as of 3rd August 2016 (Additional
Remark: AC/258(ST)WP/211 / PFP(CPG/TS-ST-STSG)WP(99)2 dates back to 2nd May
2000).
Note the following comments regarding the use of AC/326(SG/C)WP(2016)0005 (PFP)
information::
a. AC/258(ST)WP/211-ADD1 was developed to describe general principles
for the design of above-ground ammunition storage as well as explaining
physical explosion effects and lethality models that should allow the
establishing of quantity distances. Furthermore, AC/258(ST)WP/211-
ADD1 contained information to perform a quantitative risk analysis. Later
on, this document was embedded into AASTP-1, Chapter 5.
However, when using information, criteria and models from - AC/258(ST)
WP 211 that are not included in AASTP-4 - special care must be applied.
The models should always be checked for recent updates and applied
with great caution.
This applies especially parts of the sections covering ground shock,
thermal effects and lethality criteria;
b. PFP(AC/326-SG/C)(SWI)IWP088-13(A) turned out that some parts of
Chapter 5 of AASTP-1 still contain valuable information, other parts are at
least partially outdated, obsolete and should no longer be used. When
using information, criteria and models from Chapter 5 of AASTP-1
"Design Environment Criteria" - that are not included in AASTP-4 - special
care must be applied.
Whenever an explosion effect or lethality model is needed for risk
analysis and QD purposes, the NATO Manual on Explosives Safety
Risk Analysis (AASTP-4) should be consulted first. AASTP-4 contains
the current explosion effect and lethality models and is regularly
updated
Unified Facilities Code (UFC) 3-340-02, Structures to resist the Effects of
Accidental Explosions, is an open distribution document that addresses the fundamentals
of protective construction design for explosives safety. It is designed for use by structural
engineers who are primarily addressing blast and fragment protection. With respect to
design of underground, tunnel magazines, AASTP-1, Part III, provides those design
requirements.
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2.5.1.2. General Principles
Design Environment Criteria. The design environment criteria serve the purpose of:.
a. preparing risk analyses;
b. designing and dimensioning ammunition storage facilities;
c. defining quantity distances;
d. determining hazard parameters in terms of quality and quantity;
e. Note: The quantity distances are based on design environment criteria,
threat spectrum as well as performance and safety requirements;
f. verifying design drawings and detail specifications for facilities of a
particular site in order to assure compliance with the safety regulations;
g. modifying buildings originally constructed for other purposes to
ammunition storage buildings and explosives workshops; and
h. planning damage control, fire-fighting and rescue operations
Basic Data. There is further basic research to be done in order to complete the
technological basis required for exploiting all conceivable uses of explosives and
ammunition storage buildings. The technological developments with respect to ammunition
types, building materials as well as design and dimensioning make it necessary to
constantly improve the relevant data and knowledge base. For the economical handling of
the problem fields, special data banks with constant updating are required. Carefully
prepared scaled model and full-scale tests will provide these data, constitute the basis for
realistic risk analyses and help saving costs.
2.5.1.3. General Design Aspects
Design Principles
a. When seeking the optimum combination of construction type, required quantity
distance, and degree of protection, the following parameters shall be taken into
account:
(1) Availability of land for building purposes;
(2) Costs of land;
(3) Construction costs;
(4) Value of ammunition and explosives stored in the Exposed Site (ES)
which would become unserviceable in case of an explosion in the
potential explosion site. determining hazard parameters in terms of
quality and quantity;
b. For ammunition storage facilities exceeding the minimum strength and
blast resistance requirements the quantity distances may be reduced
provided qualified evidence has been furnished;
c. When designing a building for the storage of ammunition, in almost all
cases consideration should be given to the possible conflicting
requirements of the building as a PES and as an ES.
(1) A building when considered as a PES should be of lightweight in order to
minimize the size and mass of projections.
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(2) A building when considered as an ES must have a relatively high strength
in order to avoid sympathetic detonation due to airblast, projections,
shock or collapse of buildings;
Degrees of Protection
Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks
Protection Division
Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of
Virtually 1.1
explosion by ground shock, blast, flame and high
Complete velocity projections.
Protection
Results:
- Immediate sympathetic detonation not to be expected.
- Stored items largely remain serviceable.
- Individual evaluation required for sensitive stored items.
1.2 Against: All explosion effects from the PES.
Result:
- Ammunition and explosives will remain serviceable at
ES.
Against: Immediate or subsequent fires among the
1.3
contents of an ES by flame, radiant heat,
firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition.
Result:
- Immediate or delayed burning, deflagration or explosion
of stored items not to be expected.
- Inflammation of burnable external parts of the building.
- No propagation of fire to stored items.
Table 5-1: Virtually Complete Protection
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Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks
Protection Division
Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of explosion
High 1.1
by ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity
Degree of projections.
Protection
Result:
- High protection against immediate sympathetic detonation.
- Delayed fire and sympathetic detonation to be expected.
- Bulk of stored items probably remains serviceable.
Against: Most explosion effects from the PES.
1.2
Result:
- Ammunition and explosives are likely to remain
serviceable.
Against: Immediate propagation of fire to the contents of as
1.3
ES by flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections
and lobbed ammunition.
Result:
- Delayed burning, deflagration or explosion of stored items
cannot be excluded.
- Inflammation of burnable internal and external parts of the
building.
- Stored items may catch fire.
Table 5-2: High Degree of Protection
II-5-5 Edition D Version 1
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Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks
Protection Division
Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of explosion
Limited 1.1
by ground shock, flame and high velocity
Degree of projections.
Protection
Result:
- Immediate sympathetic detonation to be expected.
- Stored items severely damaged and unserviceable.
Against: Some explosion effects from the PES.
1.2
Result:
- Ammunition and explosives are unlikely to remain
serviceable.
Table 5-3: Limited Degree of Protection
Protection Against Sympathetic Detonation
a. Design measures should be taken to prevent spalling inside the building.
This applies primarily to buildings which are not earth-covered. Tests have
demonstrated that spalling velocities are usually overestimated except
when caused by contact detonations. Dangerous spalling effects are
generally not to be expected with earth-covered buildings.
b. Lobbed ammunition may explode upon impact. The explosion of
ammunition with a caliber of more than 155 mm impacting close to the
wall or on the roof of an exposed storage building may cause a
sympathetic detonation.
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DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO HAZARDS FROM
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO MUNITIONS CONTAINING
ELECTRICALLY-INITIATED DEVICES
INTRODUCTION
Technological advances have resulted in the increased use of communication-
electronic equipment such as portable electronic devices (PED), Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) and other low power devices and higher power equipment that radiate
electromagnetic (EM) energy. These advances, coupled with the trend to utilize more
sensitive, low-power electronic circuits in the design of ordnance systems, perpetuate a
long-standing hazard associated with adverse interactions between the Electromagnetic
Environment (EME) and electrical initiators or initiating systems contained within ordnance
systems. Such adverse interactions are often referred to as Hazards of Electromagnetic
Radiation to Ordnance (HERO).
The HERO hazard arises from a fundamental incompatibility between the
electrically initiated devices (EID) or EID firing circuits contained within ordnance and the
external radiated EME that a munition might encounter during its Stockpile to Safe
Separation Sequence (S4) progression. Distinct phases in that progression are:
transportation and storage; assembly/disassembly; staging; handling and loading; platform
loaded; and immediate post-launch. The HERO susceptibility of an ordnance system can
vary significantly within each of those phases.
The advice contained in this chapter represents the minimum precautions to be
observed in order to prevent hazards to ordnance containing EIDs resulting from exposure
to a radio frequency (RF) environment up to 10 kHz. It is intended that this chapter provide
guidance for the storage, movement and processing of EIDs or ordnance systems
containing EIDs and the control of RF equipment that may be used in proximity to them.
This chapter does not address precautions to be taken with regard to lightning or
electrostatic discharge.
More detailed information regarding NATO EM radiation management and
environment assessment programs can be found in Allied Environmental Conditions
Publication (AECP)-2. Though the focus of this publication is the naval environment, the
principles and concepts are similar for applications to land-based HERO environments.
AECP-2 provides general information regarding procedures to be taken to avoid the
hazards that can arise when personnel, ordnance systems containing EID, safety critical
electronic systems, or fuels and flammables are exposed to electromagnetic radiation
(EMR) from radio and radar frequency environments. In addition, methods are described,
or referenced, by which those hazards can be avoided or mitigated.
Further, Allied Environmental Conditions and Tests Publications (AECTP)-250
provides a series of leaflets to present the characteristics and sources for electrical and
electromagnetic environmental conditions that influence the design and operation of
defence materiel, and AECTP-500 provides a series of categories to cover the
electromagnetic environmental verification and tests for defence materiel. Both those
documents present detailed information regarding HERO.
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GENERAL
EIDs perform a variety of functions, such as initiating rocket motors, arming and
detonating warheads, and ejecting chaff and flares. The HERO problem arises when any
of these functions occur unintentionally or prematurely, as a result of exposure to EM
energy. Examples of EID include electro-explosive devices (EED) such as hot bridge-wire
(HBW), semiconductor bridge, carbon bridge, and conductive composition, as well as
exploding foil initiators (EFIs), laser initiators, burn wires, and fusible links.
There are two potential forms of unintentional, RF-induced EID responses:
a. Activation of the initiating device itself by EM energy coupled directly into the
device or upset of an energized firing circuit, resulting in a firing signal
erroneously being sent to the EID, and
b. Degradation or “duding” of the initiating device by EM energy coupled directly
into the device.
In case (a), accidental EID activation can have negative consequences on either
safety or performance; that is, reliability. A safety consequence is the inadvertent actuation
of an EID that creates an immediate catastrophic event that has the potential to either
destroy equipment or injure personnel, such as the firing of an inline rocket motor igniter;
or the inadvertent actuation of an EID that increases the probability of a future catastrophic
event by removing or otherwise disabling a safety feature of the ordnance item. This, for
example, might be caused by the RF-initiation of a piston actuator that removes a lock on
the Safe and Arm (S&A) rotor of an artillery fuze, thus allowing a sensitive detonator to
rotate in-line with the explosive train. Performance degradation can be any condition that
does not have safety implications and is referred to as “reliability.” Performance
degradation may also occur because an EID has been desensitized as a result of multiple
low-level exposures, which would prevent it from firing when needed or because it already
had been ignited. “Safety” and “reliability” categorizations should be determined by the
procuring activity.
WAYS EM ENERGY CAN POSE A THREAT
Any firing circuit associated with an EID, or other electrical conductors such as
wires, tools and fingers in contact with the EID, when placed in an EME will act as an
antenna with the inherent capability of picking up some electrical energy from the field.
When the leading wires of an EID are separated they could form a dipole antenna
and provide an optimum match between the dipole and the EID leading to maximum
transfer of power to the EID from the radiated source. Unseparated (short circuited)
leading wires could form circular antennas which may also constitute good receiving
systems.
Unless appropriate precautions are taken, the power/energy levels induced into the
firing circuits from the standing RF fields may be sufficient to inadvertently initiate the EID.
Design criteria for the modern EID when installed in weapon systems require some
degree of EM shielding and specified orientation of firing leads to reduce the effects of
HERO. For this reason, EIDs separated from their parent system are regarded as less
safe than when installed into the system with all leads connected as intended by the
designer.
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The attachment of external cables and test sets to systems containing EID will
usually increase their susceptibility to EM energy pick-up.
The protective switch in a circuit which prevents the initiation of an EID by direct
current until the desired time is not an effective barrier to EM energy.
STORAGE AND TRANSPORT
EIDs are encountered in a variety of configurations between their manufacturing
stage and their ultimate disposal. These configurations range from trade packaging in bulk,
military packaging and sub-packages, and installed in munitions, to various stages of
separate and exposed states which occur in processing and training.
It is important for users to understand how these configurations can influence the
basic precautions to be adopted in storage and transportation. Precautions in transport
should include measures to be covered in emergencies from straightforward vehicle
breakdown to accidents involving fire and/or casualty evacuation.
Process and Storage Building
a. Building materials are generally ineffective in affording EM protection to EIDs.
Structures provide no protection at all in transmission loss from frequencies
below 1 MHz but may provide some protection in the form of reflection loss if
the polarization and angle of incidence of the EM energy happens to be
favourable, although this is rarely the case. Also, bars in reinforced concrete
do not provide any significant degree of protection.
b. For all practical purposes, it should be assumed that the field strength which
exists inside a building is as high as it would be if the building did not exist.
However, if the shielding effectiveness, or protection level, across the
frequency spectrum for a specific building has been determined (e.g.,
screened room) then this level may be used to determine a safe distance
from sources of EMR although it should be borne in mind that, if doors or
windows are opened, the screening integrity may be adversely affected.
c. EIDs and systems containing EIDs should be stored/ processed in authorized
depot and unit process and storage areas. These areas should be sited
considering the following:
(1) The susceptibility of the EID, store or weapon system during
processing or storage as appropriate.
(2) The radiated power of transmitters in the area related to the
susceptibility radius of the most sensitive EID present.
With this information in hand, AECP-2 can be used to manage HERO through the
use of assigned Susceptibility RADHAZ Designator (SRAD) and Transmitter RADHAZ
Designator (TRAD) Codes. SRAD codes are assigned to ordnance to define a level of
susceptibility as a result of an evaluation and TRAD codes are assigned to transmitters to
define a level of radiated emissions. The two are then compared to identify HERO
concerns and establish safe separation distances. As a worst case, if no information is
available regarding the susceptibility of an EID or munition or weapon system containing
an EID, a susceptibility index of “0” can be assigned for all frequency bands and safe
separation distances can be calculated accordingly.
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ASSESSMENT OF HAZARD
It will be evident from the previous paragraphs that degrees of risk of unintended
operation arise in any situation in which EIDs are introduced in proximity to RF sources.
The degree of risk ranges from negligible to acute in terms of both the susceptibility of the
EID and the power output of the transmitters creating the RF field.
There are no simple rules or procedures for assessing risk. An Electromagnetic
Radiation Hazard Assessment should be conducted by a trained and competent person to
ensure the latest information and guidance found in AECP-2 is applied. AECTP 500
(category 508/3) addresses the evaluation of ordnance with regard to HERO, and AECTP-
250 (leaflet 258) provides a methodology for calculating EMEs.
2.6.5.1. System Susceptibility
Each situation requires individual examination which must consider the:
Susceptibility of EID throughout the S4 phases given below:
a. Installed (platform loaded or even staged).
b. Exposed (assembly/disassembly or handling and loading).
c. Packaged (transportation/storage).
d. Specifically protected.
e. Characteristics of transmitters (e.g., peak and average power, frequency
range, and antenna gain).
f. Distance between the EED and radiating systems such as radios, etc.
For systems with an unknown susceptibility pending a detailed inspection; that is,
structural or packaging, the restrictions below on RF emissions in the immediate vicinity
should be imposed:
a. Prohibit the use of RF devices inside magazines and assembly areas where
bare EIDs are exposed.
b. No portable, mobile, or handheld radios with an effective isotropic radiated
power (EIRP) greater than 5 watts to be allowed within 25 meters.
c. Silence all transmitters that create RF field levels in excess of 0.5 V/m
(frequencies less than 150 MHz) and 0.05 W/m^2 (for frequencies greater
than 150 MHz) or maintain an appropriate safe separation distance to
prohibit the EME from exceeding the aforementioned levels.
d. No radio to be allowed within 3 meters of munitions containing EIDs that
have been determined to be intrinsically safe from the effects of HERO (e.g.,
SRAD “susceptibility index of “7”).
II-6-4 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE
AND TRANSPORT PUBLICATION 1
(AASTP-1)
MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY
GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE
OF MILITARY AMMUNITION
AND EXPLOSIVES
PART III
UNDERGROUND AMMUNITION STORAGE
III-i
Edition D Version1
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PART III - TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL……………………………………………………………III-1-1
3.1.1. SECTION I – INTRODUCTION .......................................................... III-1-1
3.1.1.1. Purpose ......................................................................................... III-1-1
3.1.1.2. Design Environment Criteria ......................................................... III-1-1
3.1.1.3. Limitations ..................................................................................... III-1-2
3.1.1.4. Requirements ................................................................................ III-1-2
3.1.2 SECTION II - DEFINITIONS .............................................................. III-1-3
3.1.2.1. General ......................................................................................... III-1-3
3.1.2.2. Definitions ..................................................................................... III-1-3
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION …………………………….III-2-1
3.2.1. SECTION I – GENERAL .................................................................... III-2-1
3.2.1.1. Optimized Underground Ammunition Storage Site (General Description)
……………………………………………………………………………III-2-1
3.2.1.2. Explosion Effects in Underground Ammunition Storage Sites ....... III-2-4
3.2.1.3. Small-Scale Model Test and Validity of Scaling Laws ................... III-2-4
3.2.1.4. Advantages of Underground Storage ............................................ III-2-5
3.2.1.5. Disadvantages of Underground Storage ....................................... III-2-6
3.2.1.6. Work Prohibited in Underground Storage Sites............................. III-2-6
3.2.1.7. Storage Limitations ....................................................................... III-2-6
3.2.2. SECTION II - DESIGN ....................................................................... III-2-8
3.2.2.1. General ......................................................................................... III-2-8
3.2.2.2. Safety Requirements ..................................................................... III-2-8
3.2.2.3. Military Requirements ................................................................... III-2-9
3.2.2.4. Financial Aspects .......................................................................... III-2-9
3.2.3. SECTION III - EQUIPMENT ............................................................. III-2-10
3.2.3.1. Humidity Control and Ventilation ................................................. III-2-10
3.2.3.2. Electric Installations and Equipment ........................................... III-2-10
3.2.3.3. Lightning Protection .................................................................... III-2-10
3.2.3.4. Transport and Handling Equipment............................................. III-2-10
3.2.3.5. Fire-fighting Equipment ............................................................... III-2-11
3.2.4. SECTION IV - EXPLOSIVES HAZARDS MITIGATION METHODS. III-2-13
3.2.4.1. Facility Layout ............................................................................. III-2-13
3.2.4.2. Exits ............................................................................................ III-2-13
3.2.4.3. Branch Passageways .................................................................. III-2-13
3.2.4.4. Blast Closures ............................................................................. III-2-13
3.2.4.5 Expansion Chambers .................................................................. III-2-16
3.2.4.6 Constrictions ............................................................................... III-2-16
3.2.4.7 Debris Traps within the Underground Facility.............................. III-2-16
3.2.4.8. Blast Traps ................................................................................. III-2-19
3.2.4.9. Portal Barricade ......................................................................... III-2-19
CHAPTER 3 QUANTITY DISTANCES …………………………………….III-3-1
3.3.1. SECTION I - GENERAL ..................................................................... III-3-1
3.3.1.1. Types and Effects ........................................................................ III-3-1
3.3.1.2. Quantity Distances ....................................................................... III-3-3
3.3.1.3. Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) .................................................... III-3-3
III-ii
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3.3.1.4. Measuring Quantity Distances ..................................................... III-3-3
3.3.2. SECTION II – HAZARD DIVISION MATERIAL DEPENDENCE ........ III-3-5
3.3.2.1. Hazard Division 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 Materials ............................ III-3-5
3.3.2.2. Hazard Division 1.2 Materials....................................................... III-3-5
3.3.2.3. Hazard Division 1.4 Materials....................................................... III-3-5
3.3.3. SECTION III – CHAMBER INTERVAL .............................................. III-3-6
3.3.3.1. Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 ........................................ III-3-6
3.3.3.2. Hazard Division 1.2 ...................................................................... III-3-9
3.3.3.3. Hazard Division 1.4 ...................................................................... III-3-9
3.3.4. SECTION IV - INHABITED BUILDING DISTANCE (IBD) ................ III-3-10
3.3.4.1. Airblast [8-15] ............................................................................. III-3-10
3.3.4.2 Debris ......................................................................................... III-3-20
3.3.4.3 Ground Shock ............................................................................ III-3-49
3.3.5. SECTION V - PUBLIC TRAFFIC ROUTE DISTANCES (PTRD) ...... III-3-61
3.3.6. SECTION VI - EXPLOSIVES WORKSHOP DISTANCE (EWD) ...... III-3-62
3.3.6.1. General ...................................................................................... III-3-62
3.3.6.2. Potential Crater .......................................................................... III-3-62
3.3.6.3. Aboveground EW Located within the Maximum Dispersal AngleIII-3-62
3.3.6.4. Aboveground EW Located Outside the Maximum Angle of Dispersal
…………………….. ........................................................................................... III-3-62
3.3.7. SECTION VII – ABOVEGROUND EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINE (ECM)
……………………………………………………………………………. III-3-62
3.3.8. SECTION VIII - ABOVEGROUND MAGAZINE DISTANCE (AGMD) III-3-63
ANNEX A REFERENCES ……………………………………………………III-A-1
III-iii
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL
3.1.1. SECTION I – INTRODUCTION
3.1.1.1. Purpose
This part of the Manual [1] † deals with special types of storage of ammunition and
explosives such as underground storage and storage aboveground in circumstances
other than normal for an aboveground depot.
3.1.1.2. Design Environment Criteria
1. This part uses distances, specified by the criteria below, to achieve desired levels
of protection to personnel and property. Distances provided by the criteria do not
guarantee absolute safety. However, assuming an event, these distances do limit the
expectation of a severe injury or fatality to normally less than 1% for personnel in the
open or in a conventional building at Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).
2. Advisable criteria at IBD are:
a. Air blast overpressure: 5 kPa
b. Fragments and debris: 1 hazardous fragment per 56 m2
3. Actual particle velocity to be used at IBD for ground shock should depend on
the robustness of the structure under consideration and is discussed in page III-3-59
4. Special considerations that are not discussed in detail here are required to
provide levels of protection for historical monuments and sites, high-rise buildings,
and locations where many people are assembled.
5. When they are available, site-specific and configuration-specific tests and/or
analyses may be used to determine recommended distances.
† References are in Annex III A
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6. When deciding distances that provide protection for personnel, the
requirements of Section VI – Explosive Workshop distance should be considered.
These are:
a. Air blast overpressure: 20-kPa side-on overpressure will not cause
severe injury to persons in the open.
b. Ground shock: A velocity change of less than 3 m/s will not
cause severe injury to personnel.
7. Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD) is normally 2/3 of IBD because moving
traffic is not continuously exposed. However, IBD should be used instead of PTRD
where there is a heavy traffic.
3.1.1.3. Limitations
1. Configurations of underground facilities will vary from site-to-site. Only a limited
number of possible configurations have been investigated. Site-specific tests and
analyses will be necessary if high-levels of confidence are required for the more
complex configurations.
2. Recommendations for underground storage are based on the best-available,
worldwide database of information. Recommendations are based on accidents or
scaled tests with non-responding steel models (1/100th to 1/20th scale) or rock
tunnels (1/8th to 1/3rd scale).
3.1.1.4. Requirements
1. Engineered structures and devices related to explosives safety must be
designed to 90% confidence levels for collapse or failure with a given load.
2. QD distances provided in this document are based on TNT-equivalencies for
the energetic materials that are involved. Significant differences in the TNT-
equivalency must be considered [3].
3. See Part 1, pt. A.1.2 for rounding of Quantity Distances.
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3.1.2 SECTION II - DEFINITIONS
3.1.2.1. General
The following definitions are used in connection with underground storage. Other
terms and definitions are in line with the ones used in AASTP-1 part I.
3.1.2.2. Definitions
1. Adit – A passage or tunnel leading into an underground storage site
2. Chamber Interval – The interval between the natural or artificial walls of
adjacent underground storage chambers/sites
3. Cover – The solid ground situated between the ceiling or the wall of an
underground chamber and the nearest exterior surface
4. Crack - A short, primary discontinuity, which is not pervasive and may not be
visible
5. Crater – A hole or chasm in the cover (burden) caused by an underground
explosion.
6. Faulting – Motions in the earth’s crust resulting in failure of the rock mass
and concentrated displacements along failure planes, for instance discontinuities
(joints, fractures)
7. Filled Joints – A clearly visible, pervasive discontinuity of geological origin
which has a mineral filling of loose or porous materials and which may be several
tens of millimetres thick
8. Fissure – A short, hardly visible and partly irregular, secondary discontinuity,
which appears in conjunction with prepared planes, for instance a blasting fissure or
a rock pressure fissure
9. Joint – A term in rock mechanics for a mechanical discontinuity in rock, with a
thickness less than a few tens of millimetres. Joints (fractures, discontinuities) may
be open or filled with some material.
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10. Single Chamber Storage Site – A chamber storage site with one chamber,
which has its own entrance from the exterior and is not connected by air ducts or
passageways to any other storage chamber
11. Shot Gun Type Magazine – A single chamber storage site with one exit and a
direct line-of-sight from the chamber to the outside of the underground installation.
12. Underground Storage - Storage, normally in solid rock, in a cavern or
chamber storage
13. Venting – The reduction of internal pressure due to release of gases into a
passageway, other chambers, adits, and any aperture in the cover.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
3.2.1. SECTION I – GENERAL
3.2.1.1. Optimized Underground Ammunition Storage Site (General
Description)
1. Underground storage facilities may consist of a single chamber or a series of
connected chambers. The chamber(s) may be either excavated or natural geological
cavities. Figures 2-1 and 2-2† illustrate general concepts for several possible
configurations of underground facilities. Underground ammunition storage sites
should be located in sound rock. A storage site may consist of one or more storage
chambers with usually one access tunnel in each chamber. The number of chambers
depends upon prevailing topographical and geological circumstances and safety
aspects in the environment of the storage site. Potential blockage should be
considered for multi-chamber sites.
2. The thickness of the rock formation surrounding an underground storage site
should be designed so cratering hazards, in case of an explosion, can be practically
excluded. Then the only significant external hazards will be the ground shock and the
explosion effects coming from the adit tunnel. The effects coming from the adit may
be considerably reduced by means of structural measures in or in front of the tunnel
or even eliminated by the installation of tunnel closing devices.
3. Adequate separations and tunnel closing devices should be used to prevent the
propagation of an explosion from chamber-to-chamber.
4. Provided the access openings are adequately hardened, underground storage
is relatively well-protected against enemy attack.
5. Geological aspects have a great influence on building costs and, in terms of the
construction cost alone, underground storage is often more costly than aboveground
storage. However, when estate, operating, maintenance and lifetime costs are
considered, at least for larger underground facilities, it may be less than for
comparable aboveground facilities. Generally, the most economical are chambers
measuring from 100 to 200 m in length with a volume between 5,000 and 15,000 m3.
This provides a total gross capacity between 1000 and 2000 tonnes of ammunition.
† Figures are included in Text
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The length of the access tunnel may be 50 to 150 m, depending on topographical
conditions and the desired rock thickness.
Figure 2-1: Layouts of Underground Facilities
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Figure 2-2: Layouts of an Underground Storage Site
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3.2.1.2. Explosion Effects in Underground Ammunition Storage Sites
1. The blast wave originating from an explosion in an underground storage
chamber will surge through the rock formation as ground shock and will escape as
blast through the access tunnel into the open air. The strong confining effect of an
underground storage site and the large amount of hot explosion gases generated will
produce a relatively constant high pressure in the chamber. This pressure may break
up the rock formation and produce a crater. The kinetic energy (dynamic pressure
impulse) of the blast in the main passageway is very high compared to an explosion
in free air. Objects like unexploded ordnance, rock, gravel, equipment, and vehicles
will be picked up and accelerated up to velocities of several hundred metres per
second before leaving through adits. In addition, engineered features can collapse
and cause debris hazards. Break-up of the cover will cause projection of a heavy fall
of rock and earth in all directions onto the surrounding surface area.
2. The explosion gases will surge at a high velocity through the access tunnel into
the open air where they will burn completely. The escaping gases will carry along
ammunition, rock debris, installations, and lining onto surrounding areas.
3. A disturbance near the surface of the ground will emit compression P-waves,
shear S-waves, and Rayleigh surface R-waves in a semi-infinite elastic medium.
Deeply buried disturbances will emit only P-waves and S-waves, but in the far field,
interface effects will result in R-waves being produced. For all of these waves’ types,
the time interval between wave front arrivals becomes greater and the amplitude of
the oscillations becomes smaller with increasing standoff distance from the source.
4. The first wave to arrive is the P-wave, the second the S-wave, and the third
the R-wave. The P-wave and S-wave are minor tremors, as these waves are followed
by a much larger oscillation when the R-wave arrives. The R-wave is the major
tremor because: 1) about two-thirds of the ground shock energy at the source goes
into the R-wave, and 2) the R-wave dissipates much less rapidly with distance than
either the less energetic P-wave or S-wave. P-waves and S-waves dissipate with
distance r to a power of r-1 to r-2. At the surface, P-waves and S-waves dissipate
with distance as r-2, while R-waves dissipate with distance as r-0,5. The greater
energies being transmitted by R-waves and the slower geometric dissipation of this
energy causes R-waves to be the major tremor, the disturbance of primary
importance for all disturbances on the surface.
3.2.1.3. Small-Scale Model Test and Validity of Scaling Laws
1. A portion of the blast energy from an underground detonation is used to
compress the surrounding geological media. This allocation of energy should be
considered when evaluating the experimental results of underground tests.
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2. Small-scale, modeling tests that are constructed of non-responding materials do
not exhibit the non-linear energy loss effects typical of an underground explosion.
Therefore, air blast results from non-responding models tend to be safety
conservative for predicting hazards that would occur in an actual underground event.
In spite of this, small-scale model tests are still of value for design purposes.
3.2.1.4. Advantages of Underground Storage
Advantages of underground storage are:
a. A smaller total land area is required than for an aboveground storage.
b. A high degree of protection is afforded against bombing or terrorist attack.
c. The area is easier to camouflage and to guard than an aboveground area.
d. In case of an incident in an underground chamber, damage to ammunition
in other chambers is preventable. Damage to ammunition in aboveground
buildings, other than earth-covered magazines, is usually more extensive.
e. The temperature in underground storage sites is almost constant. The
deleterious aging effects on munitions, degradation caused by extreme
temperatures and temperature cycling is mitigated.
f. Effects of sand, snow, and ice, which may cause difficulties in
aboveground storage, may be avoided.
g. Inherent protection may be afforded against external fire.
h. Estate costs, as well as maintenance and operation may be less costly as
for an aboveground storage site, thus more than offsetting the construction
costs.
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3.2.1.5. Disadvantages of Underground Storage
Disadvantages of underground storage may be:
a. The choice of localities is restricted.
b. The costs of the original excavation or the modification of an existing
excavation and the installation and maintenance of special equipment may
increase the initial costs of underground storage over that of aboveground.
c. Extra handling equipment may be required.
3.2.1.6. Work Prohibited in Underground Storage Sites
The opening of packages or the removal of components from unpacked ammunition
or similar operations should be prohibited in the storage chamber, but could be done
in the loading/unloading dock or in a separate chamber if suitable measures are
taken to prevent a propagation into the storage chambers.
3.2.1.7. Storage Limitations
Limitations on underground storage are:
a. Ammunition containing Flammable Liquids or Gels. Ammunition containing
flammable liquids is only permitted in underground storage sites if proper
protection against fuel leakage is established. The possible energy release
of a stochiometric combustion should be considered as part of the total
energy release. Multi-chamber sites should be arranged and/or sealed in
such a way that fuel-fire or gas explosion should not increase the likelihood
of reaction in neighbouring chambers more than established through
interior distances to prevent detonation transfer.
b. Ammunition containing Toxic Agents. Because of the difficulties of
decontamination underground, ammunition containing toxic agents should
only be stored under special provisions.
c. Suspect Ammunition and Explosives. Suspect ammunition and explosives
should not be stored.
d. Ammunition containing Pyrotechnics. Ammunition containing pyrotechnics,
such as illuminating, smoke and signal ammunition, could in some cases
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be more vulnerable to mishaps or self ignition, and thereby increase the
likelihood of an accident. The decision to store ammunition that contains
pyrotechnics underground must be made on a site-specific basis and
provisions must be taken to mitigate the peculiar hazards of pyrotechnic
materials.
e. Ammunition containing Depleted Uranium. Before ammunition containing
depleted uranium is permitted in underground sites, the slight radioactivity
and chemical toxicity that would result from an accidental fire or explosion
should be assessed and accepted.
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3.2.2. SECTION II - DESIGN
3.2.2.1. General
Planning of new underground storage facilities must account for site conditions,
storage requirements, and operational needs. Only when these are established can
the design be developed. An optimal compromise between the sometimes-
contradictory demands for planning, construction and operation of storage sites must
consider safety, military and cost requirements.
3.2.2.2. Safety Requirements
Operational procedures should be planned and conducted so that, to the best extent
possible, explosives mishaps are prevented. Facility configurations are to be
designed so that, if an explosives mishap should occur, its hazards are mitigated to
acceptable levels. Safety efforts that are essential for ammunition storage sites
include:
a. Surveillance and maintenance to ensure that only safe ammunition is
stored
b. Well-designed and environmentally controlled chambers and facilities to
protect the ammunition against unintended events
c. Suitable structural designs and operating procedures (doors and guards,
for example) to protect the ammunition against deliberate action by third
parties
d. Structural designs and operating procedures to:
(1) mitigate explosion propagation outside the area of initial occurrence;
and
(2) provide desired levels of personnel, facility, and asset protection
e. The construction and operation of ammunition storage sites should only be
entrusted to qualified and trained personnel who have clearly defined
responsibilities.
f. Evaluate a suitable location for the installation taking into account the site-
specific use of surrounding (inhabited buildings, roads, etc.).
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3.2.2.3. Military Requirements
Functional requirements that dictate the geographical location of a storage site or its
storage and transfer capacity, may sometimes run counter to desirable safety
considerations, thereby requiring innovative designs to provide required levels of
explosives safety. Military requirements often involve protection against enemy
weapons, intruder protection, etc.
3.2.2.4. Financial Aspects
The lifetime cost of a storage facility (construction, operation, and maintenance)
should be considered during the planning phase. Where possible, designs should be
selected that minimize total cost while providing required safety and operational
capabilities.
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3.2.3. SECTION III - EQUIPMENT
3.2.3.1. Humidity Control and Ventilation
1. High humidity may be a problem in underground sites. Dehumidifying
equipment may then be necessary to control relative humidity to 60%. Certain types
of ammunition may require lower relative humidity (50%). The chambers may be
lined with concrete or coated fabric to better control humidity. The roof lining should
be strong enough to withstand minor rock falls.
2. The type of transportation equipment used may govern ventilation
requirements. Ventilation shafts to the exterior should be designed to prevent
trespass and sabotage.
3.2.3.2. Electric Installations and Equipment
1. Electric installations and equipment for underground storage sites should
conform to the national standards of the host nation.
2. An emergency lighting system should be installed. Otherwise transportable
battery operated lights of an appropriate standard should be provided and kept at
suitable points.
3. A portion of the personnel employed underground should be equipped with
hand lamps of an appropriate standard.
3.2.3.3. Lightning Protection
An underground storage site does not normally require a system of protection against
lightning. Metal and structural parts of the site which have less than 0.6 m cover
should be protected as for an aboveground site, see Part II, Chapter 3, Section IV.
However, each underground storage site should be considered individually to take
account of possible conducting faults in the cover.
3.2.3.4. Transport and Handling Equipment
Rail vehicles, road vehicles, mobile lifting or stacking appliances and cranes of the
fixed or gantry type, when operated electrically or by diesel engine, may be permitted
in underground storage sites subject to the following conditions:
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a. Electrical equipment should conform to the national standards of the host
nation for underground storage sites.
b. Diesel operated equipment should be fitted with an effective means of
preventing sparks or flames from exhaust outlets. Any portion of the
exhaust system or exposed parts of the engine, which may develop a
surface temperature exceeding 100o C, should be suitably screened to
ensure that all exposed Surfaces are below that temperature. If the engine
is to be kept running during loading and unloading within the storage site,
it should conform to the host nation standards for underground (confined
space) operations.
c. The flash point of the fuel oil for diesel engines should be not less than 55o
C. Fuel tanks should be filled only at authorized places and no spare fuel
should be carried.
d. Where fuel oil filling stations are authorized in the underground area, the
fuel should be taken underground in strong closed containers in quantities
not exceeding that required for one working day. The filling station should
have a concrete floor with a sill of sufficient height to contain the quantity
of fuel authorized to be stored there.
3.2.3.5. Fire-fighting Equipment
Equipment should conform to the national standards of the host country with
particular consideration given to the following:
a. Reduce the probability that a small fire will escalate by installing an
automatic smoke-detecting and fire-extinguishing system.
b. Consideration should be given to protecting reserve water tanks from
potential explosives effects.
c. An alarm system should be provided to operate throughout the whole
area, both above and below ground.
d. In air-conditioned sites or in sites provided with forced ventilation, the need
to shut these down on an outbreak of fire must be considered.
e. Fire-fighting equipment retained underground should be positioned for
accessibility and potential use.
f. For large underground areas, detector devices, to specify the location of a
fire, and communication capabilities, to issue instruction throughout the
underground facility, should be installed.
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g. Self-contained breathing apparatus and training in its use are essential for
underground firefighting or rescue operations, etc.
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3.2.4. SECTION IV - EXPLOSIVES HAZARDS MITIGATION METHODS
3.2.4.1. Facility Layout
1. A single-chamber facility with a straight access tunnel leading from the
chamber to the portal is a “shotgun” magazine because blast and debris behave as if
fired from a gun. More complex facility layouts will provide reductions in exit
pressures.
2. The side on pressure, the side on pressure impulse, dynamic pressure and the
dynamic pressure impulse decrease as the volume increases.
3. Distributing munitions over several storage chambers may control the size of
an initial explosion. Proper separation or hazard mitigating constructions can limit
subsequent damage.
3.2.4.2. Exits
1. The exits from underground storage sites should not emerge where they direct
blast, flame, and debris hazards to Exposed Sites, ES, such as other entrances,
buildings, or traffic routes.
2. Connected chambers and cave storage sites should have at least two exits.
Exits should be separated by at least the chamber interval.
3.2.4.3. Branch Passageways
1. When a main passageway has one exit, branch passageways should be
inclined at an angle where they join the main passageway to direct the flow field
towards the exit. This inclination should provide for vehicle access. Angles between
40 degrees and 70 degrees are normally appropriate.
2. The rock thickness between the chamber and the main passageway should be
at least equal to or greater than the chamber interval. Otherwise, an explosion in a
chamber might destroy the main passageway and prevent access to stocks of
ammunition and explosives in the other chambers.
3.2.4.4. Blast Closures
1. High-pressure closures are large blocks constructed of concrete or other
materials that can obstruct or greatly reduce the flow of blast effects and debris from
an explosion from or into a storage chamber. For chamber loading densities of about
10 kg/m3 or above, closure blocks will contain 40 percent or more of the explosion
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debris within the detonation chamber, provided the block is designed to remain intact.
If a closure block fails under the blast load, it will produce a volume of debris in
addition to that from the chamber itself. However, since the block’s mass and inertia
are sufficient to greatly reduce the velocity of the primary debris, the effectiveness of
other debris-mitigating features, such as debris traps, expansion chambers and
barricades is increased. Debris traps and expansion chambers intended to entrap
debris must be designed to contain the full potential volume of debris, based on the
maximum capacity of the largest storage chamber.
2. These debris mitigation features were investigated in the tests described in
Reference [7]. These tests showed that such measures can be very effective,
however, no quantitative figures for the reduction of the adit debris throw were
derived. Furthermore, it was shown that a proper design of the mitigation measures
is very important. Sample drawings of the features that proved to be effective for the
tested configurations are in Reference [5].
3. An alternative, full-scale tested; design for a high-pressure closure device, the
Swiss-Klotz [4], is shown in Figure 2-3. This device is highly effective up to chamber
loading densities of 28 kg/m3. A special advantage of this Klotz is that it is movable
and can be closed during times when access to the storage chamber is unnecessary.
4. In case of an explosion inside the storage chamber and a Klotz in closed
position, practically all of the hazardous debris as well as the explosion gases will be
trapped inside the storage chamber, thereby reducing these hazardous effects to
virtually insignificant levels. In case the Klotz is in open position, it will be pushed into
the closed position by the explosion gases within approximately 100 ms, letting pass
only a small fraction of the total amount of debris and gases.
5. In any case, using a properly designed high-pressure closure device in
conjunction with a portal barricade will lower the debris hazard to a level where
specific debris QD considerations will not be required. Other combinations of
mitigation features will also reduce adit debris throw to a great extent. The remaining
adit debris hazard has to be assessed based on the actual facility layout and
quantified by means of suitable tests.
6. Blast doors that are protected from primary fragments have proven effective for
loading densities up to 10 kg/m3.
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Ground Plan
0
1 .5
Storage
Chamber
Access
2.50
Tunnel
Klotz in "open" Klotz in "closed"
-position -position
Longitudinal Section
Storage
Chamber Hydraulic moving mechanism
Access
2.50 Tunnel
Moveable reinforced concrete Klotz
0m 10 m
Heavily reinforced concrete abutment
Figure 2-3: The Swiss-Klotz-Layout
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3.2.4.5 Expansion Chambers
1. Expansion chambers are so-named because of the volume they provide for
the expansion of the detonation gasses behind the shock front as it enters the
chamber from a connecting tunnel. Some additional degradation of the peak
pressure at the shock front occurs as the front expands into the chamber and reflects
from the walls.
2. Expansion chambers have other practical purposes. They serve as
loading/unloading chambers, as weather protected areas for the transfer of munitions
from trucks to storage chambers, and as turn-around areas for transport vehicles.
Figures 2-IV and 2-V illustrate underground facilities with and without expansion
chambers.
3.2.4.6 Constrictions
1. Constrictions, which may be used for mitigating explosives hazards, are short
lengths of tunnel with reduced cross sectional area.
2. A constriction at a chamber entrance reduces the magnitude of airblast and
thermal effects entering chambers near one in which an explosion might occur. A
constricted chamber entrance also reduces the area, and hence the size of a blast
door installed to protect the chamber contents.
3. A constriction intended to reduce airblast issuing from an exit of an
underground storage facility should be located within five tunnel diameters of the exit.
4. Although constrictions located more than five tunnel diameters from exits will
reduce pressures by delaying the release of energy [8, 9], their effects on pressure
versus distance must be considered on a site-specific basis.
3.2.4.7 Debris Traps within the Underground Facility
1. Debris traps are excavations in the rock at or beyond the end of sections of
tunnel, designed to catch debris from a storage chamber detonation. Debris traps
should be at least 20 percent wider and 10 percent taller than the branch
passageway from the chamber whose debris it is intended to trap, with a depth
(measured along the shortest wall) of at least one tunnel diameter.
2. An expansion chamber may be effective for trapping debris. Tunnels entering
or exiting the chambers must either be offset in axial alignment by at least two tunnel
widths or its axis must be offset at least 45 degrees from the centerline of the tunnel
associated with the chamber [5].
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Figure 2-4: Magazine with Expansion Chamber
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A Entrance
B Blast door
C Mechanical room
D Storage chamber
E Room for fuzes
ca. 100000
Figure 2-5:
B A
C
4000
D
B A
C
B
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E
3600
Dt
18000
Dc
3850
16m2
3000
4550
18000
C Section C-C 3300 4000
78300 5500
Ttphical magazine with straight tunnel and no Section A-A Section B-B
expansion chamber.
83800
Magazine without Expansion Chamber
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3.2.4.8. Blast Traps
1. Blast traps may be used to reduce the intensity of blast leaving or entering a
passageway. They may be used to attenuate the blast issuing from the adit of an
underground site, thus reducing hazard to people and property in the vicinity. They
may also be used to reduce the blast entering an adjacent underground site, and to
diminish the hazard to other ammunition. The effect of various blast traps will be a
function of the geometrical design of the blast traps, and the peak side on pressure,
the side on pressure impulse, the dynamic pressure and the dynamic pressure
impulse of the incident blast wave. Fixed reduction figures can therefore not be given.
The design of effective blast traps is a specialized subject.
2. Various types of blast traps are shown in Figure 2-6. The relative decrease of
pressure and impulse, and thereby the effect of these blast traps, is in most cases dependent
upon their locations. Some of the limitations are also indicated in the figure. It is noteworthy
that not all designs of blast traps are reversible.
3. For maximum blast reduction, the length of blast traps built as dead end tunnels
should be at least half the length of the blast wave. This may result in a considerable
extension of these traps in the case of large quantities of explosives.
3.2.4.9. Portal Barricade
1. Airblast
Airblast exiting the portal of an underground facility involve directional, very intense
gas flow fields along the extended centerline of the tunnel exit. Therefore, the shock
wave on the extended centerline does not attenuate as rapidly as that of a surface
burst. However, a barricade in front of the portal intercepts this intense flow field and
directs it away from the extended centerline axis. This redirection of the flow field
allows shock waves traveling beyond the portal barricade to attenuate as an above
ground distributed source so that isobar contours become more circular. Figure 2-7
provides an example of a portal barricade.
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Figure 2-6: Blast Traps
2. Turns, crossovers, obstacles and changes of cross section can be used to reduce the
peak overpressure and positive impulse of blast in passageways. The diagrams in this figure
illustrate some of the many possible designs. The Blast k assumed to travel from the point
indicated by a cross to that shown by a dot. Critical dimensions are indicated as multiples of
passage diameter “b”.
3. Some designs have comparatively little effect reducing the blast by only 10 %
compared with the straight-through passageway in Ref. No 1, whereas others reduce the
blast by as much as 80 %. It is therefore necessary to determine the actual effect of a
chosen design by measurements in a model using properly scaled and located explosive
charges.
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Figure 2-7: Portal Barricade Location, Height and Length
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CHAPTER 3 QUANTITY DISTANCES
3.3.1. SECTION I - GENERAL
3.3.1.1. Types and Effects
1. Types
a. This section details how to predict QD based on criteria given in para
3.1.1.2. for the underground storage of military ammunition and
explosives. Underground storage typically includes natural caverns and
excavated chambers. Recommendations in this section shall only be
used when the minimum distance from the perimeter of a storage area
to an external surface exceeds 600 mm and 0.1·Q1/3 (m, kg).
Otherwise, use aboveground siting criteria. This section addresses
explosives safety criteria both with and without rupture of the cover.
b. Ground shock, debris, and air blast from an accidental explosion in an
underground storage facility depend on several variables, including the
local geology and site-specific parameters. These parameters vary
significantly from facility to facility. Consequently, distances other than
those listed below may be used provided approved experimental or
analytical data indicate that the desired protection can be achieved.
See below for default methods to determine QD.
c. The QD for tolerable ground shock is the same in all directions for
homogeneous, geological media, whereas QDs for other hazards
(blast, thermal, impulse, etc.) vary markedly in different directions.
Variations in QDs in different directions arise from configuration-specific
features such as the locations of adits and ventilation shafts, hazards
mitigating designs, and terrain. The acceptable QD in a given direction
is generally taken as the maximum QD determined for the various
hazards.
d. QD siting requirements of this section may be determined from the
applicable equations or by interpolating between figure entries.
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2. Effects
The following effects, peculiar to underground storage sites, must be taken into
consideration for quantity distance purposes:
a. Inside the Underground Installation:
(1) The volume available to an expanding shock front is less in an
underground configuration than it is in an aboveground
configuration. Because of this limited space, an explosion in an
underground facility typically results in long-duration, high
pressures and temperatures that spread throughout the entire
volume available to the shock front. Unless robust engineered
designs (doors and/or other closing devices) are used to
separate various parts of the facility, these long-duration blast
effects spread throughout the entire underground complex.
Doors or other closing devices must be properly designed and, in
the case of doors, closed to provide the desired separation.
(2) An initial event in Hazard Division 1.2 and 1.4 materials usually
starts a fire, which is sustained by burning packages and
components of the ammunition. This process causes additional
explosions, likely at increasing frequency, until combustible
materials in the site have been consumed. The results of these
repeated explosions in the confined space underground will
depend on the type and quantity of the substances in each unit
of ammunition and the type of explosion produced.
b. Outside the Underground Installation:
(1) Blast waves from adits exhibit highly directional flow-fields along
the extended centerline of the passageway. Consequently, the
blast wave effects (overpressure and impulse) do not attenuate
as rapidly along the centerline axis as they do off the centerline
axis.
(2) The following effects should be considered for an external ES:
i. Blast from tunnel adits
ii. Blast from craters, if the rock cover is insufficient.
iii. Debris from tunnel adits
iv. Debris from cratering
v. Ground Shock
vi. Flame and hot gases
vii.
III-3-2 Edition D Version1
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3.3.1.2. Quantity Distances
1. Inside the UG Installation, QD should be determined for the following:
a. Chamber Intervals
b. Loading/Unloading Dock
c. Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)
d. Inspection
2. Outside the UG Installation, QD should be determined for the following:
a. Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)
b. Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)
c. Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)
d. Earth-covered Magazine Distance (ECMD)
e. Aboveground Magazine Distance (AGMD)
3.3.1.3. Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ)
For siting purposes, the NEQ is the total quantity of explosives material that must be
included in defining a potential event. Part I, paragraph 1.3.3. provides guidance for
finding the appropriate NEQ for sites containing materials with different Hazard
Classes.
3.3.1.4. Measuring Quantity Distances
1. Inside the Underground Installation. The Chamber Interval is the shortest
distance between the walls of two adjacent chambers. The subdivision of a cavern
requires construction of massive barricades to close the gaps in the natural rock and
to isolate one site or chamber from any other. The thickness of these barricades
should be equal to the chamber intervals.
2. Outside the Underground Installation. Distances to ESs outside the
underground facility are normally measured as radial distances (see below) unless
conditions make such a procedure clearly unreasonable:
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a. Distances determined for airblast, debris, and thermal effects issuing
from tunnel openings shall be the minimum distance measured from the
openings to the nearest wall or point of the location to be protected.
Extended centerlines of the openings should be used as reference lines
for directional effects.
b. A distance determined by ground shock should be measured from the
nearest wall of a chamber or a cavern containing ammunition or
explosives to the nearest wall or point of the location to be protected.
c. A distance determined for air blast and debris from a breached cover
shall be the minimum distance from the centre of the breach (CCB), at
ground surface level, to the location to be protected (See Figures 3-24
and 3-25).
III-3-4 Edition D Version1
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3.3.2. SECTION II – HAZARD DIVISION MATERIAL DEPENDENCE
3.3.2.1. Hazard Division 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 Materials
1. Distances shall be determined from the total quantity of explosives,
propellants, pyrotechnics, and incendiary materials in the individual chambers, unless
the total quantity is subdivided to prevent rapid communication of an incident
between subdivisions. All Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 material subject to
involvement in a single incident shall be assumed to contribute to the explosion yield.
2. A connected chamber or cavern storage site containing Hazard Division 1.1 or
1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 materials shall be treated as a single chamber site, unless explosion
communication is prevented by adequate subdivision or chamber separation.
3. HD 1.3 material should be treated as HD 1.1 material when it is stored
underground.
3.3.2.2. Hazard Division 1.2 Materials
1. The hazard to exterior ESs from primary fragments where a line-of-sight path
exists from the detonation point to the ES is the only explosives safety hazard of
concern for HD 1.2 materials.
2. When line-of-sight conditions exist, use distances common to aboveground
situations.
3. QD requirements do not apply if the exterior ES is located outside the line-of-
sight or if barricades (constructed or natural) intercept fragments issuing from an
opening.
3.3.2.3. Hazard Division 1.4 Materials
Exterior: Exterior explosives safety hazards are not normally significant for Hazard
Division 1.4 materials. Accordingly, QD requirements do not apply for Hazard Division
1.4 materials.
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3.3.3. SECTION III – CHAMBER INTERVAL
References [7] to [10] deal with chamber intervals.
3.3.3.1. Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6
1. Three modes by which an explosion or fire can be communicated are rock
spall, propagation through cracks or fissures, and airblast or thermal effects
traveling through connecting passages. Minimum storage chamber separation
distances are required to prevent or control the communication of explosions
or fires between donor and acceptor chambers.
The minimum chamber separation (Dcd) is 5 m for HD 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6
materials.
2. Prevention of major damage by rock spall.
a. The chamber separation distance is the shortest distance
(rock/concrete thickness) between two chambers. When an explosion
occurs in a donor chamber, a shock wave propagates through the
surrounding rock. The intensity of the shock decreases with distance.
For small, chamber separation distances, the shock may be strong
enough to spall the rock/concrete walls of acceptor chambers.
b. For hard rock with no specific protective construction, the minimum,
chamber separation distance, Dcd, required to prevent major damage by
spall depends on the chamber loading density (γ) as:
Dcd =1.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 ( γ ≤ 50 kg / m3 ) Eq. 3.3.3-1
and
Dcd = 2.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 ( γ > 50 kg / m3 ) Eq. 3.3.3-2
Example ( γ ≤ 50 kg / m3 ):
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 1.0 · 58.48 = 58.5 m
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c. For soft rock (See para 3.3.4.3), at all loading densities, the separation
distance is:
Dcd =1.4 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 3.3.3-3
Example:
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 1.4 · 58.48 = 82 m
3. Prevention of propagation by rock spall
a. If damage to stored munitions in the adjacent chambers is acceptable,
the chamber separation distance can be reduced to the distance
required to prevent propagation of the detonation by the impact of rock
spall against the munitions. For smaller distances, propagation is
possible. Propagation by rock spall is practically instantaneous because
time separations between donor and acceptor explosions may not be
sufficient to prevent coalescence of blast waves. Unless analyses or
experiments indicate otherwise, explosives quantities subject to this
mode must be added to other donor explosives to determine NEQ. For
loading densities up to 270 kg/m³, when no protective construction is
used, the separation distance, Dcd, to prevent explosion communication
by spalled rock is:
Dcd = 0.6 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 3.3.3-4
Example:
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.6 · 58.48 = 35 m
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b. When the acceptor chamber has protective construction to prevent spall
and collapse (into the acceptor chamber) the separation distance must
be determined on a site-specific basis but may be as low as:
Dcd = 0.3 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 3.3.3-5
Example:
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.3 · 58.48 = 17.5 m
4. Prevention of propagation through passageways
Blast, flame and hot gas may cause delayed propagation. Time separations
between the original donor event and the potential explosions of this mode will
likely be sufficient to prevent coalescence of blast waves. Consequently, for
purposes of QD siting, only the maximum credible explosives quantity need be
used to determine NEQ.
In order to protect assets, blast and fire resistant doors must be installed within
multi-chambered facilities. Evaluations of design loads on doors must be made
on a site-specific basis.
5. Propagation by Flame and Hot Gas through Cracks and Fissures
Consideration must be given to the long-duration action of the explosion gas.
These quasi-static forces might form cracks in the rock that extend from the
donor to an adjacent (acceptor) chamber, thus making it possible for hot gases
to flow into this chamber and initiate an event. Significant factors for this mode
of propagation include the strength of rock, the existence of cracks formed
before the explosion incident, the type of barriers in cavern storage sites, the
cover and the loading density in the chamber. This mode of propagation must
be considered when final decisions about chamber separation distances are
made.
Thus, because of these cracks and fissures, propagation may occur beyond
Dcd = 0.3 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 3.3.3-6
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Example:
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.3 · 58.48 = 17.5 m
but not likely beyond;
Dcd = 2.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 3.3.3-7
Example:
Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 2 · 58.48 = 117 m
Site-specific analyses, using a sound geological survey, should be made to
determine proper intervals between chambers.
3.3.3.2. Hazard Division 1.2
Intervals between a chamber containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 and
adjacent chambers should be at least 5 m of competent rock unless structural
considerations apply. This applies also to barriers used to isolate chambers in a
cavern storage site.
3.3.3.3. Hazard Division 1.4
Intervals between chambers containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.4 should be
determined from structural considerations with no regard to the content of
ammunition. This applies also to barriers used to isolate chambers in a cavern
storage site
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3.3.4. SECTION IV - INHABITED BUILDING DISTANCE (IBD)
IBD must be the largest of the distances for protection against airblast, debris, and
ground shock [1, 7].
3.3.4.1. Airblast [8-15]
1. The side-on overpressure of 5 kPa defines IBD.
2. An explosion in an underground storage chamber may produce external
airblast from two sources; the exit of blast from existing openings (tunnel entrances,
ventilation shafts, etc.) and the rupture or breach of the chamber cover by the
detonation. Required IBDs are independently determined for each of these airblast
sources, with the maximum IBD used for siting.
a. A breaching chamber cover will produce external airblast. Use the
following table to site for IBD due to airblast produced by breaching of
the chamber cover. Values of IBD for airblast through the ruptured
cover are:
Cover Thickness IBD Equation
Cover ≤ 0.1·Q1/3 IBD for Surface Burst Eq. 3.3.4-1(a)
0.1·Q1/3<Cover≤0.2·Q1/3 ½ IBD for Surface Burst Eq. 3.3.4-1(b)
0.2·Q1/3<Cover≤0.3·Q1/3 ¼ IBD for Surface Burst Eq. 3.3.4-1(c)
Cover>0.3·Q1/3 Negligible Airblast Eq. 3.3.4-1(d)
Hazard
b. This paragraph defines airblast IBDs from openings in an underground
storage facility. The IBD for airblast must be considered for any
opening. The method for calculation of air blast in underground storage
can be divided in the following 3 steps:
1. Calculation of air blast at the chamber exit
2. Calculation of air blast at the tunnel adit
3. Calculation of air blast outside the tunnel adit
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(1) To a first approximation, the overpressure in the storage chamber
could be estimated with an algorithm of the form:
2/3
Q
pc = 1200 ⋅ Eq. 3.3.4-1
VC
where:
pc: overpressure at the chamber exit, kPa
Q: Mass of explosives material, kg
Vc: Volume inside the chamber that is engulfed by
blast waves at the time the blast arrives at the
location of interest (m3).
(2) Air blast at the tunnel adit
The reduction of peak overpressure and change of duration from
the exit of a detonating chamber to the tunnel adit are calculated
by using different types of tunnel elements (see Figures 3-1 to 3-
6) to resemble the actual configuration of the tunnel.
The following parameters and Figures 3-3 and 3-4 are used to
calculate the reduction of peak overpressure in a tunnel element
(friction element) with a constant cross section and without
junctions and turns.
LR = LS – 5 ∙ d0 [8]
χ = α ∙ LR [9]
τ = α ∙ t1 [10]
2
2/3 1/ 3 d
t1 = 20 ⋅ Lk ⋅ d0 ⋅ k [11]
d0
Ls = Length of tunnel or tunnel element (m)
Lk =Length of chamber (m)
dk =Average equivalent diameter of the chamber(m)
LR =Effective length of tunnel (m)
d0 =Average equivalent diameter of the tunnel (m)
t = Overpressure duration (ms)
α =Friction coefficient for concrete (α = 1), shotcrete (α = 4) and
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rock (α = 6)
χ =Coefficient for distance (m)
p1, p2 =Peak overpressure at the beginning respectively end of
the tunnel element (atm).
Figure 3-1: Diagram for calculation of reduction of pressure in a tunnel
The change of duration will be calculated according to
-if the duration at the chamber exit is lower than 1000 ms, then
p
t 2 = 1 ⋅ t1
p2
-if the duration at the chamber exit is higher than 1000 ms, the
change of duration in the tunnel is calculated according to Figure
3-4.
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Figure 3-2: Diagram for calculation of change of duration in a tunnel
III-3-13 Edition D Version1
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α
p2 = 1 − ⋅ p1
180°
α
p3 = ⋅ p1
180°
t 2 = t 3 = 0.7 ⋅ t1
p 2 = 0.8 ⋅ p1
p3 = 0.25 ⋅ p1
t 2 = t 3 = 0.7 ⋅ t1
p 2 = 0.8 ⋅ p1
α
p3 = 0.8 ⋅ 1 − ⋅ p1
180°
t 2 = t 3 = 0.7 ⋅ t1
α
2
p2 = 0.9 − 0.6 ⋅
⋅p
1
180 °
α
p3 = 0.2 + 0.6 ⋅ ⋅ p1
180°
t 2 = t 3 = 0.7 ⋅ t1
If L0 ≥ 2 ⋅ Lss
p 2 = 0.9 ⋅ p1
t 2 = t1
If L0 < 2 ⋅ Lss
use tunnel elements ( junctions ) above
p 2 = 0.9 ⋅ p1
t 2 = t1
Figure 3-3: Description of tunnel elements
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t 2 = t1
F1 and F2 are tunnel
crossections
Figure 3-4: Change of pressure and duration for constriction and expansion
chambers
F1
t2 = ⋅ t1
F2
F1 and F2 are tunnel cross-
sections
Figure 3-5: Change of pressure and duration for sudden and continuously
expansion tunnel element
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t 2 = t1
F1 and F2 are tunnel
cross-sections
Figure 3-6: Change of pressure and duration for sudden and continuously
constriction tunnel element
Air blast outside tunnel adit
The resulting pressure in the tunnel adit could be expressed:
p p p
pe = pc ⋅ 2 ⋅ 3 n Eq. 3.3.4-3
p1 p2 pn −1
3. The required distances for inhabitant building distance, public traffic
route distance and explosive workshop distance could then be calculated. The
distances calculated are valid for the axis of the tunnel.
0.74
p
IBD = 1.64 ⋅ d te ⋅ e Eq. 3.3.4-4
5.0
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0.72
p
PTR = 1.64 ⋅ d te ⋅ e Eq. 3.3.4-5
9.0
0.66
p
EWD = 1.64 ⋅ d te ⋅ e Eq. 3.3.4-6
21.0
4A
Where dte is the equivalent diameter in the tunnel exit (dte = )
π
4. For a simple horizontal geometry (no barricade, a rapidly rising rock
face, an extended centerline normal to the rock face) the following equation for off
centerline axis can be used.
IBD(θ)=IBD(θ = 0) [1+(θ/56)2] –0.74 Eq. 3.3.4-7
where:
θ: horizontal angle off centerline in degrees
Large variations in directivity have been observed (Figure 3-VII).
Therefore, it is recommended that carefully constructed models and
realistic exit pressures should be used to investigate directivity for an
actual site.
5. High-Pressure Closure Block Designed to Remain Intact
References [4, 5] contain illustrative examples of a closure block designs
(Figure 3-7).
Figure 3-7: Example of a Closing Block
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F0
1.0
7 mbar
0.9 +
x
0.8
0.7
+
140 mbar
0.6
10-15 mbar x
0.5 x
Model test 5 to 50mbar
50 mbar
0.4
0.3 +
0.2 x
50 mbar +
+ x
0.1 +
0
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
LEGEND:
1. “Free field overpressures resulting from shock waves emerging from open-ended shock
tubes.” Ballistic Research Lab. Mem. Report 1965.
x 2. “An investigation of the pressure wave propagated from the open end of a 30 x 18 in. Shock
tube.” Atomic Weapons Research Establ. AWRE Report No. 0 – 60/65.
3. “Underground Explosion Trials at Raufoss 1968. Measurement of air blast outside the
+ tunnel.” Intern Report X – 124. FFI 1969.
4. U.S Navy Gun Blast Committee: “Survey of Research of Blast”. First Interim Report, 1946.
5. “Model tests to investigate external safety distances.” Fortifikatorisk notat 36/67, FBT
1967.
“One-dimensional blast wave propagation.” Fortifikatorisk Notat 49/69, FBT 196
Figure 3-8: Directivity Versus Azimuth with the Centre Line as Reference
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For chamber loading densities greater than or equal to 10 kg/m3, IBD
may be reduced by 50% when a high-pressure closure block, designed
to remain intact in case of an explosion, is used.
For chamber loading densities lower 10 kg/m3 (but greater than 1.0
kg/m3), determine the reduction by the formula:
y (%) = 50 ⋅ log10 (γ ) Eq. 3.3.4-5
where, y is the percentage reduction in IBD, and γ is loading density in
kg/m3. For loading densities lower than 1.0 kg/m3, use y(%) = 0.
6. Portal Barricade
When a properly designed and located portal barricade [5, 7] is in front of the opening,
IBD for airblast along the extended tunnel axis may be reduced up to 50 percent.
Although the total airblast hazarded area remains almost unchanged, its shape, for
explosives safety applications, becomes more circular.
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3.3.4.2 Debris
Debris from an explosion in an underground facility may issue from adits or other
openings; failure of nearby structures (portal, barricades, etc.); and breaching of the
geological cover over the PES (crater debris).
1. Adit Debris - Introduction
a. Debris throw from the adit is one of the most relevant hazardous effects
to be expected in case of an explosion in an underground installation in
rock. Adit debris consists of parts of ammunition and its packaging,
technical installations such as ventilation equipment, doors and fire
fighting installations, chamber and adit lining and other reinforced
concrete construction elements as well as of rock rubble produced by
the explosion effects. All these pieces of debris are accelerated by the
explosion gases escaping from the installation and are thrown into the
surroundings in front of the adit portal.
b. Adit debris throw mainly depends on the explosives weight Q (NEQ,
[kg]) stored in the installation and the geometry (ratio of length to
diameter - la/da-ratio) of the adit section just behind the portal.
c. Other factors, such as the loading density (explosives weight / chamber
or system volume), the centre of the explosion in the chamber, the
construction of the portal area and the geometry of the whole adit may
also influence adit debris throw. However, the available data from tests
and accidents was insufficient to derive reliable relations.
2. Form of the IBD Contour Line and Influences
a. The general shape - resembling a cloverleaf - of the IBD contour line for
adit debris throw is shown in Figure 1. The IBD contour line is defined
by points where the fragment density is one hazardous fragment
(energy greater than 79 Joules) per 56 m2 (≅ 0.0179 #/m2).
b. No closed formula exists for the shape of the IBD contour line.
c. Therefore, the line has to be constructed gradually, point per point.
d. The shape and size of the contour line is influenced by the following
three parameters:
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(1) Net explosives quantity of the stored ammunition NEQ (kg)
(2) Relevant length of the adit section behind the portal la (m)
(3) Average equivalent diameter of the adit (la) da (m)
e. The ratio la/da defines the portal parameter fp and the standard deviation
σ.
The portal parameter fp takes into account that a long small adit leads
to a more focused debris throw than a short adit with a large cross
section area. Large la/da values, therefore, lead to far reaching but
narrow IBD contour lines. The fp parameter influences the maximum
range of the IBD contour line.
The standard deviation σ defines the width of the IBD contour line.
3. Procedure to Calculate an IBD Contour Line
a. Calculate the maximum range Ro max of the IBD contour line (Figure 3-
9).
− 4.025 − A
Ro max = fp
B
The parameter fp is a function of the la/da ratio. It is to be calculated
according to Figure 3-10. Typical examples on how to define the
la/da ratio are given in Figure 3-11.
The A and B values are both a function of the NEQ.
A = -5.25 + 1.0 ln(NEQ)
0.25
B = -0.0085 -
NEQ
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A, B and fp values for typical amounts of NEQ and la/da ratios are
also given in the tables in Figure 3-12.
b. For a suitable number of Ro values (8 to 12, freely chosen, but Ro < Ro
max) calculate the reference value Do (Figure 3-9).
Do = exp(A + B Ro/fp) where: exp(x) = ex and e = 2.718
Do values for typical x (= A + B Ro/fp ) values are given in the table
in Figure 3-14.
Calculate the standard deviation σ according to Figure 3-13. Typical
values for σ as a function of the la/da ratio are given in Figure 3-12.
c. Calculate the corresponding α and Rs values for each Do value (Figure
3-9).
0.0179
α = − 2 ⋅ ln ⋅ σ 2
D 0
ln(x) values for typical x = 0.0179 / Do values are given in the table
in Figure 3-14.
Rs = Ro tan(α)
tan(α) values for typical α values are given in the table in Figure 3-
14.
d. Each related combination of Ro and Rs defines a point D on the IBD
contour line whre the debris density is one hazardous fragment (energy
greater than 79 Joules) per 56 m2. Therefore, drawing a line starting
and ending at the adit portal and connecting all the previously
calculated points D (and Ro max) establishes the IBD contour line.
4. Example
A typical example how to calculate an IBD contour line is given in Figure 3-15a
and 3-15b.
5. Special Cases
a. Barricade in Front of the Adit Portal
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(1) If an artificial or natural barricade is located within 10 to 20 m
from the portal, and if all of the following conditions for an
effective barricade are met, the form of the IBD contour line
approaches a semicircle according to Figure 3-16.
(2) Conditions for effective barricades are:
- The front facing the portal must be more or less vertical
- The front facing the portal must be normal to the extended adit
axis
- The barricade must be symmetrical to the extended adit axis
- It has to withstand the expected explosion effects
- The width of the barricade has to "cover" the IBD contour line as
calculated according to Chapter 1.3 to the side of the portal
(Figure 3-16, Ground Plan)
- The height of the barricade has to "cover" at least half of the
maximum initial vertical launch angle according to Figure 3-17
(Figure 2-7).
(3) If the conditions for an effective barricade are met, the maximum
range Ro max of the IBD contour line can be calculated according
to Chapter 1.3. However, regardless of the la/da ratio, the portal
parameter fp is always to be set as 0.4 for installations with an
effective barricade. The IBD contour line is a semicircle in front
of the adit portal with the centre at the adit portal. The IBD
contour line also extends a short distance backwards as
indicated in Figure 3-16.
(4) If the conditions for an effective barricade are not met, the debris
distribution may vary considerably. Therefore, only a
conservative approach for the calculation of the IBD contour line
can be given in this manual.
In such cases the IBD contour lines for adits with an effective
barricade and adits without a barricade in front of the portal have
to be calculated and superimposed. Exposed objects must be
outside of both IBD contour lines.
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Further information about the effects of barricades that are only
partially effective and especially barricades that are oblique to
the extended adit axes is given in AASTP-4 and [2, 3, 6].
(5) In addition to barricades located near the adit portal also hills
and mountains farther away may limit adit debris throw. In cases
where the application of the standard IBD contour line leads to
major restrictions, effects of such natural obstacles may be taken
into account. However, further information about the influence of
the topography on adit debris throw and a relatively complicated
calculation procedure are only given in AASTP-4.
b. Storage Chambers with Very Short Adits
(1) At installations with a very short adit, the relevant length of the
adit section just behind the portal (la) is to be measured from the
portal to the first ammunition stack (Figure 3-18).
(2) If the ratio la/da in this case is 2 or larger, the IBD contour line
can be calculated according to Figure 3-17.
(3) If the ratio la/da is smaller than 2, the following two cases have to
be distinguished:
(a) For very short chambers and ammunition stacks reaching
the portal (Figure 3-18), the IBD contour line is to be
calculated as for an installation with an effective barricade
in front of the adit portal, according to Figure 3-16.
(b) In all other cases, as a conservative approach, the IBD
contour lines for adits with an effective barricade and adits
without a barricade in front of the portal have to be
calculated and superimposed. Exposed objects must be
outside of both IBD contour lines.
(4) Further information about the effects from explosions in
chambers with short adits is given in AASTP-4 and [2, 3, 6]
c. Installations with more than one Adit Portal
(1) In certain cases storage chambers may have more than one adit
or an adit may have more than one portal, e.g. as a special
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protection measure against enemy attacks. In addition, such
adits may have different cross-section areas and the adit axis
may point in different directions.
(2) As a general conservative rule, for IBD purposes, the IBD
contour lines as calculated above for the various cases have to
be applied to each adit portal.
(3) In cases where the procedure according to b) leads to major
restrictions, a procedure described in AASTP-4 might be used to
take into account further effects, leading - depending on the
actual situation - to corresponding reductions of the IBD contour
lines.
6. Debris Mitigation Measures
a. Debris throw from underground installations on rock is a significant
threat to exposed persons outside and installation. Therefore, whenever
reasonable, measures should be taken to reduce debris throw.
However, if constructional measures are taken, they have to be
designed appropriately to withstand the explosion effects. Be aware
that failing installation parts may contribute to the debris throw and even
enhance the hazard.
b. Blast closures according to Chapter 3.2.4.4 and especially the so-called
Klotz-Device are very effective means to reduce not only the air blast
from underground installations but also the debris throw from the adits.
Information about possible reductions achievable with such devices is
given in AASTP-4.
c. Apart from barricades and self-closing devices (see Chapter 3.2.4.4
and Figure 2-3), there are also other elements reducing adit debris
throw such as blind tunnels and expansion chambers in the adit. In
general, a combination of such elements, especially with a self-closing
device, enhances the mitigation effect.
d. However, currently there are no models available taking such mitigation
measures in the adit into account (except for the Klotz-Device).
Therefore, the effectiveness of such elements has to be tested in
models with an appropriate scale or with computer simulations.
7. Range of Validity and Background Information
III-3-25 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
a. Special caution has to be applied if this adit debris throw model is used
outside the range of validity indicated below:
- explosives quantity NEQ: 100 - 500'000 kg
- chamber loading density γc : 1 - 100 kg/m3
- system loading density γs : 0.3 - 100 kg/m3
The chamber respectively system loading density (γc / γs) is
defined as the ratio between the NEQ and the storage chamber
volume respectively the system volume (chamber volume and adit
volume).
For applications below the lower limits, the model usually
overestimates the debris throw (IBD is conservative). This is
especially true for storage chambers with very low loading densities
in combination with very long adit tunnel systems with many bends
and other mitigation measures. In such cases the hazard from adit
debris throw may be much lower than indicated by the model
above. To establish reliable adit debris IDB for such cases
appropriate model or full-scale tests are necessary.
No such statement is possible for applications above the upper
limits.
b. The technical basis for the figures and formulas is mainly derived from
the following report (for additional background information see [37 -
42]):
NATO - AC/258 Storage Sub-Group - UGSWG
Debris Throw from Adits of Underground Installations in Rock
Basics for Risk Analysis
Technical Background
TM 174-9 // AC/258 CH(ST) IWP 024-02, 30 March 2002
III-3-26 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
IBD Contour D
Line
Rs
Q
α R0 R0 max
da
Extended D0
Adit Axis
la
Rs
Q : Explosives weight (NEQ) [kg]
la : Relevant length of the adit section behind the portal [m]
da : Average equivalent diameter of la [m]
R0 : Distance (range) on the extended adit axis from the portal [m]
R0 max : Maximum distance (range) of IBD [m]
Rs : Distance (range) to the side of the extended adit axis at R0 [m]
D : Point on IBD contour line (debris density 1 hazardous fragment per 56 m2)
[#/m2]
D0 : Reference value (debris density at R0) [#/m2]
α : Angle showing the deviation of D from the extended adit axis [°]
α = arctan (Rs/R0)
Figure 3-9: General Shape of the Adit Debris IBD Line
III-3-27 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
1.1
1.0
Portal Parameter fp [.]
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
2 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 20
la/da-Ratio [.]
fp = 0.7 for la/da ≤ 5 (wide debris zones)
fp = 0.55 + 0.03 la/da for 5 < la/da < 15
fp = 1.0 for la/da ≥15 (narrow debris zones)
la: Relevant length of the straight adit section just behind the portal [m]
da: Average equivalent adit diameter of la [m]
(da = (4 Fa / π)0.5)
Fa: Average cross-section of la [m2]
Figure 3-10: Portal Parameter
III-3-28 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
la
la la
la
da da da da
Figure 3-11: Determination of the la/da-Ratio
III-3-29 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
NEQ A B la/da-Ratio fp σ
[kg] [.] [.] [.] [.] [°]
100 -0.645 -0.0335 2.0 0.700 12.0
200 0.0483 -0.0262 3.0 0.700 12.0
300 0.454 -0.0229 4.0 0.700 12.0
400 0.741 -0.0210 5.0 0.700 12.0
500 0.965 -0.0197 5.5 0.715 11.7
600 1.15 -0.0187 6.0 0.730 11.3
700 1.30 -0.0179 6.5 0.745 11.0
800 1.43 -0.0173 7.0 0.760 10.6
900 1.55 -0.0168 7.5 0.775 10.3
1'000 1.66 -0.0164 8.0 0.790 9.90
2'000 2.35 -0.0141 8.5 0.805 9.55
3'000 2.76 -0.0131 9.0 0.820 9.20
4'000 3.04 -0.0125 9.5 0.835 8.85
5'000 3.27 -0.0120 10.0 0.850 8.50
6'000 3.45 -0.0117 10.5 0.865 8.15
7'000 3.60 -0.0115 11.0 0.880 7.80
8'000 3.74 -0.0113 11.5 0.895 7.45
9'000 3.85 -0.0111 12.0 0.910 7.10
10'000 3.96 -0.0110 12.5 0.925 6.75
20'000 4.65 -0.0103 13.0 0.940 6.40
30'000 5.06 -0.00994 13.5 0.955 6.05
40'000 5.35 -0.00975 14.0 0.970 5.70
50'000 5.57 -0.00962 14.5 0.985 5.35
60'000 5.75 -0.00952 15.0 1.00 5.00
70'000 5.91 -0.00944 16.0 1.00 5.00
80'000 6.04 -0.00938 17.0 1.00 5.00
90'000 6.16 -0.00933 18.0 1.00 5.00
100'000 6.26 -0.00929 19.0 1.00 5.00
200'000 6.96 -0.00906 > 20.0 1.00 5.00
300'000 7.36 -0.00896
400'000 7.65 -0.00890
500'000 7.87 -0.00885
Linear interpolation between values is permitted; but it may lead to deviations of up
to 3%, compared to the real values calculated with the corresponding formula
(for NEQ < 300 kg, the deviation of interpolation of parameter A is even
larger)
Figure 3-12: Auxiliary Tables for the Calculation of A, B, fp and σ
III-3-30 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
15
14
13
12
11
Standard Deviation σ [°]
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
la/da-Ratio [.]
σ = 12 for la/da ≤ 5 (wide debris zones)
σ = 15.5 - 0.7 la/da for 5 < la/da < 15
σ=5 for la/da ≥ 15 (narrow debris zones)
la: Relevant length of the straight adit section behind the portal [m]
da: Average equivalent adit diameter of la [m] (da = (4 Fa / π)0.5)
Fa: Average cross-section of la [m2]
Figure 3-8: Standard Deviation
III-3-31 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
x= D0 = e x x= ln (x) α
tan (α)
A + B x R0 / fp [pieces/m2] 0.0179 / D0 [.] [°]
-6.0 0.00248 7.5 2.015 0 0.0000
-5.5 0.00409 5.0 1.609 2 0.0349
-5.0 0.00674 3.0 1.099 4 0.0699
-4.5 0.0111 2.0 0.693 6 0.1051
-4.0 0.0183 1.0 0.000 8 0.1405
-3.5 0.0302 0.75 -0.288 10 0.1763
-3.0 0.0498 0.50 -0.693 12 0.2126
-2.5 0.0821 0.30 -1.204 14 0.2493
-2.0 0.1353 0.20 -1.609 16 0.2867
-1.5 0.2231 0.10 -2.303 18 0.3249
-1.0 0.3679 0.075 -2.590 20 0.3640
-0.5 0.6065 0.050 -2.996 22 0.4040
0.0 1.000 0.030 -3.507 24 0.4452
0.5 1.649 0.020 -3.912 26 0.4877
1.0 2.718 0.010 -4.605 28 0.5317
1.5 4.482 0.0075 -4.893 30 0.5774
2.0 7.389 0.0050 -5.298 32 0.6249
2.5 12.18 0.0030 -5.809 34 0.6745
3.0 20.09 0.0020 -6.215 36 0.7265
3.5 33.12 0.0010 -6.908 38 0.7813
4.0 54.60 0.00075 -7.195 40 0.8391
4.5 90.02 0.00050 -7.601 42 0.9004
5.0 148.4 0.00030 -8.112 46 1.036
5.5 244.7 0.00020 -8.517 48 1.111
6.0 403.4 0.00010 -9.210 50 1.192
6.5 665.1 0.000075 -9.498 52 1.280
7.0 1097 0.000050 -9.903 54 1.376
0.000030 -10.41 58 1.600
0.000020 -10.82 60 1.732
Linear interpolation between values is permitted; but it may lead to deviations of up
to 3%, compared to the real values calculated with the corresponding
formulas
(for the natural logarithm close to x=1, the deviation of interpolation is even larger)
Figure 3-14: Auxiliary Tables for the Calculation of D0, ln (x) and tan(α)
III-3-32 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Given:
Debris Density
D = 1 hazardous fragment / 56m2
Rs
α R0 R0 max
da
Extended D0
Adit Axis
la
Rs
Clover
Leaf
Shape
Q = 200'000 kg TNT la = 32 m, da = 4 m => la/da = 8
Wanted: IBD Contour Line (where Debris Density D = 1 Hazardous Piece per
56 m2 [#/m2])
Solution: 1) R0 max on the extended adit axis:
Portal Parameter (1.2 d) - Figure II or IV) fp = 0.790
Parameter A (1.3 a) - Figure IV) A = 6.96
Parameter B (1.3 a) - Figure IV) B = -0.00906
R0 max = fp (-4.025 - A) / B = 958 m
2) R0 (<Rmax) on the axis and the corresponding Rs normal to the side:
To determine the clover leaf shaped contour of the debris zone with a
density of D = 1 haz-#/56m2, R0 and the corresponding Rs have to be
calculated an appropriate number of times (starting with Rmax and
ending at the portal)
Example: R0 = 500 m
Debris Density at R0 (1.3 b) - Figure VI) D0 = 3.41 #/m2
Standard Deviation (1.3 c) - Figure IV or V) α = 9.90°
Deviation from the axis (1.3 d) - Figure VI) α = 32.09°
α = (-2 ln(D/D0) σ2)0.5
Rs = R0 tan(α) = 313 m for R0 = 500 m
Figure 3-15a: How to Calculate an IBD Contour Line for Adit Debris – Example
III-3-33 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
NEQ [kg] 200'000 A [.] 6.96
B [.] -0.00906
la / da [.] 8 fp [.]
0.790
σ [°] 9.90
R0 x= D0 = e x x= ln (x) α Rs
tan (α)
[m] A+BxR0/fp [#/m2] (1/56)/D0 [.] [°] [m]
900 -3.362 0.0347 0.515 -0.664 11.4 0.2018 182
800 -2.215 0.109 0.164 -1.811 18.8 0.3412 273
700 -1.068 0.344 0.0519 -2.958 24.1 0.4469 313
600 0.0790 1.082 0.0165 -4.104 28.4 0.5399 324
500 1.226 3.407 0.00524 -5.251 32.1 0.6269 313
400 2.373 10.73 0.00166 -6.398 35.4 0.7110 284
300 3.519 33.77 0.000529 -7.545 38.5 0.7942 238
200 4.666 106.3 0.000168 -8.692 41.3 0.8778 176
100 5.813 334.7 0.0000534 -9.839 43.9 0.9628 96
Figure 3-15b: How to Calculate an IBD Contour Line for Adit Debris – Example
III-3-34 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
IBD Contour Line
(other side symmetrical)
400
300
Rs [m]
200
100
Extended Adit Axis
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000
R0 [m]
Adit Portal R 0 max
III-3-35 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
IBD Contour Line
R = R0 max
Barricade
Portal
0.1 x R0 max
Adit
Section
α0 / 2
Adit Portal
Barricade
Ground
Plan IBD Contour Line
without Barricade
Portal
Figure 3-16: Influence of a Barricade
III-3-36 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
60
Max. Initial Vertical Angle α0 [°]
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 20
la/da-Ratio [.]
α0 = 50° for la/da ≤ 5 (wide debris zones)
α0 = 62.5° - 2.5° (la/da) for 5 < la/da < 15
α0 = 25° for la/da ≥ 15 (narrow debris zones)
la : Relevant length of the straight adit section just
behind the portal [m]
da : Average equivalent adit diameter of la [m]
(da = (4 Fa / π)0.5)
Fa : Average cross-section of la [m2]
Figure 3-17: Maximum Initial Vertical Angle α0
III-3-37 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Ammunition
stacks
Very short
chamber
la
la
da da
Figure 3-18: Installations with Very short Adits
8. Debris from Nearby, Failed Structures:
The dynamics of this debris will be highly dependent on site-specific
parameters. Site-specific analyses should be done when this type of debris is
of concern.
III-3-38 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
9. Debris Arising from Failure of Cover, Crater Debris [18-22, 34]
a. The chamber cover thickness is the shortest distance between the
natural rock surface at the chamber ceiling (or in some cases, a
chamber wall) and the ground surface. If the cover consists of part rock
and part soil, the effective thickness of the cover is determined based
on mass. A conservative estimate is to treat soil as having one-half the
mass of rock. Therefore, 10 m of rock and 2 m of soil, with one-half the
density of the rock, equals 11 m of equivalent rock cover. If the
percentage of soil to rock exceeds 20% a site-specific analysis should
be conducted.
Unless the cover is adequate, an underground explosion will cause
breaching of the cover. Rock, and to a lesser degree structural material,
is projected as debris in all directions from the breached cover into the
surroundings.
The hazard from this type of debris depends on the quantity of
explosives (Q) involved, the scaled cover depth (C/Q1/3), the chamber
loading density (γ), and the slope angle of the overburden (α) and the
type of rock.
b. The rock overburden of an underground installation is sufficient for a
scaled cover depth (C/Q1/3) equal to 1.2 m/kg1/3. For larger values, the
debris throw from the overburden can be neglected. This does not
mean that the surface is undisturbed after an accident. It simply means
that a crater is negligible and ejecta are unlikely. For more information,
see Part II, paragraph 2.5.6.2 and Figure 5-20b. For smaller values the
hazardous distance (Inhabited Building Distance) for installations in
hard and moderately strong rock can be calculated with the following
formula:
IBD=38.7 Q1/3• fγ • fc • fα Eq. 3.3.4.6
where:
IBD = Inhabited Building Distance [m]
Q = explosives quantity (effective NEQ) [kg]
fγ = loading density parameter [.]
fc = cover depth parameter [.]
fα = overburden slope angle parameter [.]
III-3-39 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
The loading density parameter, fγ can be taken from the graph in Figure
3-19 and the cover depth parameter, fc , from Figure 3-20. Both values
can also be calculated with the corresponding formula in Figures 3-24
and 3-20. To simplify the calculation process Figure 3-21 contains tables
for Q1/3, fγ and fc over a wide range of commonly required values.
The overburden slope angle parameter, fα and the Inhabited Building
Distance increase with an increase in loading density. The cover depth
parameter (fc) is maximum at a scaled depth of C/Q1/3 = approx. 0.5.
The biggest crater is formed and the largest amount of crater debris is
thrown out into the surroundings at this scaled depth, so the largest IBD
results. As the scaled overburden thickness increases above or
decreases below the optimum depth of burst, both the cover depth
parameter (fc) and Inhabited Building Distance decreases.
The influence of the slope angle of the overburden on the Inhabited
Building Distance is shown in Figure 3-22.
Figures 3-24 and 3-25 show in general how the final IBD contour line
has to be established and the consideration of the overburden slope
angle parameter fα.
Figure 3-23, which is an example, illustrates a quantitative
determination of IBD for crater debris.
c. IBD should be increased by 15% for an installation built in soft rock.
d. Additional information:
(1) The Inhabited Building Distance (IBD) has to be measured as a
horizontal distance from the crater-centre at the bottom of the
crater (CCB), at the level of the installation (Figure 3-24).
(2) The slope angle α shall be established in the area where the
crater-centre at the surface (CCS) has to be expected.
(3) An average value for the slope angle α over the whole crater
area shall be taken in case the surface is not plain in this area.
(4) The increase (fαI) and the decrease (fαD) factor must be applied
to the IBD in direction of the line with the largest gradient
intersecting the centre of the crater (CCB). This line does not
necessarily coincide with the axis of the adit tunnel.
III-3-40 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
(5) No increase or decrease factors need applied to the side of the
crater.
(6) The shape of the IBD contour is elliptical.
(7) In cases where more than one crater-centre is possible (e.g. in
cases of a flat rock overburden surface), the IBD has to be
applied from each possible crater-centre. The IBD contour shall
be the outer connection of the single lines (Figure 3-25).
e. Limitations:
(1) This crater debris throw model is based on an empirical
evaluation of the available data and engineering judgment of a
comparatively small number of tests and accidents. The overall
accuracy is therefore limited to the range of the investigated
cases. Thus, the crater debris throw model may be used only
within the following boundaries:
quantity of explosives NEQ = 1 t - 2000 t
chamber loading density γ = 1 kg/m3 - 300 kg/m3
scaled cover depth C/Q1/3 > 0.1 m/kg1/3
(2) In case of parameters exceeding these values it is appropriate to
take special care when applying the model.
III-3-41 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Loading Density Parameter fγ [.]
1
0.1
1 10 100 1000
Loading Density γ = Q / Vc [kg/m3]
fγ = (γ / 1600) 0.35
Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]
3
VC = Storage Chamber Volume [m ]
Figure 3-19: Loading Density Parameter fγ
III-3-42 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
1.0
0.9
Cover Depth Parameter fC [.]
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Scaled Cover Depth C / Q 1/3 [m/kg1/3]
fC = 0.45 + 2.15 ∗ x - 2.11 ∗ x2 ; x = C / Q 1/3
C = Overburden, Cover [m]
Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]
Figure 3-20: Cover Depth Parameter fc
III-3-43 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Scaled Loading
Q Q 1/3
Cover Depth fC Density fγ
1/3 1/3
[kg] [kg ] [m/kg ] [.] [kg/m³] [.]
1'000 10.0 0.10 0.64 1 0.08
1'500 11.4 0.15 0.73 3 0.11
2'000 12.6 0.20 0.80 5 0.13
2'500 13.6 0.25 0.86 10 0.17
3'000 14.4 0.30 0.91 15 0.20
4'000 15.9 0.35 0.94 20 0.22
5'000 17.1 0.40 0.97 25 0.23
6'000 18.2 0.45 0.99 30 0.25
7'000 19.1 0.50 1.00 40 0.27
8'000 20.0 0.55 0.99 50 0.30
0.60 0.98 60 0.32
10'000 21.5 0.65 0.96 70 0.33
15'000 24.7 0.70 0.92 80 0.35
20'000 27.1 0.75 0.88 90 0.37
25'000 29.2 0.80 0.82 100 0.38
30'000 31.1 0.85 0.75 120 0.40
40'000 34.2 0.90 0.68 140 0.43
50'000 36.8 0.95 0.59 160 0.45
60'000 39.1 1.00 0.49 180 0.47
70'000 41.2 1.05 0.38 200 0.48
80'000 43.1 1.10 0.26 220 0.50
1.15 0.13 250 0.52
100'000 46.4 1.20 0.00 300 0.56
150'000 53.1
200'000 58.5
250'000 63.0
300'000 66.9
400'000 73.7 Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ
500'000 79.4
600'000 84.3
700'000 88.8
800'000 92.8
1'000'000 100.0
1'500'000 114.5
2'000'000 126.0
Figure 3-21: Auxiliary Tables for the Calculation of Q1/3, Fc and fϒ
III-3-44 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
1.6
α f αI
constant 0.0 1.00
1.5 2.5 1.05
Inhabited Building Distance
5.0 1.10
fα I = 1 + 0.02 ∗ α 7.5 1.15
Increase Factor fαI
1.4 10.0 1.20
12.5 1.25
15.0 1.30
1.3 17.5 1.35
20.0 1.40
22.5 1.45
1.2 > 25 1.50
1.1
1.0
0 10 20 30 40
Slope Angle α [°]
1.0
α fαD
0.8 0.0 1.00
Inhabited Building Distance
2.5 0.94
Decrease Factor fαD
5.0 0.88
7.5 0.81
0.6 10.0 0.75
12.5 0.69
15.0 0.63
0.4 17.5 0.56
20.0 0.50
fα D = 1 - 0.025 ∗ α
constant 22.5 0.44
25.0 0.38
0.2 27.5 0.31
> 30 0.25
0.0
0 10 20 30 40
Slope Angle α [°]
ameter fαa
III-3-45 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Given:
VC = 5000 m3
NEQ = 200'000 kg = Q
C = 50 m
a = 20 °
Solution: Q1/3 (from Figure XII) = 58.5 kg1/3
Loading Density = Q / VC = 200'000 / 5000 = 40 kg/m3
Scaled Cover Depth = C / Q1/3 = 50 / 58.5 = 0.85 m/kg1/3
Loading Density Parameter (from Figure X or XII) fγ = 0.27
Cover Depth Parameter (from Figure XI or XII) fC = 0.75
IBDF = 38.7 ∗ Q1/3 ∗ fγ* fC
= 38.7 ∗ 58.5 ∗ 0.27 * 0.75 = 458 m
IBD Increase Factor (from Figure XIII) fαI = 1.4
IBD Decrease Factor (from Figure XIII) fαD = 0.5
IBD = IBDF ∗ fαD Line of Largest Gradient
229 m = 458 m ∗ 0.5 IBD = IBDF ∗ fαI
641 m = 458 m ∗ 1.4
Shape: Elliptical
IBD = IBDF = 458 m
Figure 3-23: How to Calculate IBD's for Crater Debris Throw - Example
III-3-46 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Cross Section of Installation
CCS
α
C
CCB
Inhabited Building Distance Contour (ground-plan)
IBD = IBDF ∗ fαD IBD = IBDF ∗ fαI
CCB Line of Largest Gradient
Shape: Elliptical
IBD = IBDF
α = Slope Angle of Overburden
C = Cover / Overburden
CCS = Crater-Center-Surface
CCB = Crater-Center-Bottom
IBDF = Inhabited Building Distance
for Flat Terrain / Overburden
fαI = Inhabited Building Distance Increase Factor
fαD = Inhabited Building Distance Decrease Factor
Figure 3-24: How to Establish Inhabited Building Distance Contours
III-3-47 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Cross Section of Installation
Flat Overburden
C C
Inhabited Building Distance Contour (ground-plan)
IBD = IBDF
IBD = IBDF IBD = IBDF
IBD = IBDF
C = Cover / Overburden
IBDF = Inhabited Building Distance
for Flat Terrain / Overburden
Figure 3-25: How to Establish Inhabited Building Distance Contrours
III-3-48 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
3.3.4.3 Ground Shock
1. Introduction. The prediction of ground shock and the derivation of its quantity
distances require careful consideration of the all factors affecting ground shock
propagation and the ground shock parameters.
a. Factors Affecting Ground Shock Effects. Ground shock is highly site-
dependent and is affected by the following factors:
(1) Geological structure and rock mass properties
(2) Explosives charge weight and scaled range
(3) Chamber loading density
(4) Charge distribution and chamber volume
b. Geological Classification. The geological classification presented in
Table 3-I should be used for the prediction of the ground shock
parameters. If the rock type is not clear, the classification should be
based on wave propagation properties rather than on strength.
Important rock mass properties affecting wave propagation include bulk
density, seismic wave velocity, and joints and their orientation.
c. Geology of Site. The geology of a site is further classified into the
following categories:
(1) Single medium – where the Potential Explosion Site (PES) and
Exposed Site (ES) are in the same rock mass.
(2) Mixed media – where the bedrock is overlain by a soil layer of a
significant thickness (typically with a soil-to-rock thickness ratio
of 0.2), which affects ground shock propagation and the
frequency content of the ground shock wave reaching the
structure, and PES is in rock where the storage chambers are
sited and ES in a soil overburden on which buildings are found.
(3) For cases where the soil cover is less than 0.05 of the
transmission distance or less than 5 m, the site geology may be
classified as single medium.
III-3-49 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
d. Ground Shock Parameters
(1) The prediction of ground shock must be done with a view for the
assessment of structural response. A complete definition of the
ground shock wave is the response spectra, which can be
generated either empirically or numerically.
(2) For assessment of structural response, the most important
parameters for ground shock are the magnitude and the
frequency content. The magnitude is often expressed by the
Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) while the frequency content can be
represented by the Principal Frequency (PF). If possible,
calculations should be made for both the vertical and horizontal
components of the ground shock wave.
2. Prediction Equations for PPV and PF
a. The Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) and Principal Frequency (PF)
equations can generally be described as follows, respectively:
−m
R
PPV = A 1 / 3
Q
−n
R
PF = B 1 / 3
Q
where:
PPV = Peak Particle Velocity [m/s]
PF = Principal Frequency [Hz]
R = Radial distance measured from the chamber wall along a line
drawn from the chamber centre to the point of interest on the
ground surface [m]
Q = Net Explosives Quantity [kg]
A and B are initial values at scaled range, R/Q = 1.0 m/kg1/3; and
1/3
m and n are the attenuation coefficients.
b. Summary tables of the initial values and attenuation coefficients for the
Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) and Principal Frequency (PF) prediction
equations are presented in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 respectively.
c. The results cover charge weights up to 500 tonnes, chambers of length
ranging from 45 to 120 m with maximum volume of 50,000 m3, and
span to length ratio between 1:2 and 1:4. The loading densities
considered range up to 50 kg/m3 with rock cover or equivalent cover of
about 1.0Q1/3 m.
III-3-50 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
3. Frequency-based Ground Shock IBD for Reinforced Concrete (RC) Structures
a. Response of Structures due to Ground Shock. The damage of a
building due to ground shock can be characterised by the reduction in
natural frequency of the structural system. This can be represented by
a building damage index (DI), which can be calculated using the
following equation:
fi2
BDI = 1 −
f p2
where
fi = Initial natural frequency [Hz]
fp = Post-event natural frequency of structure [Hz]
b. Classification of Building Damage. Building damage due to ground
shock can be classified into the following categories given in Table 3-I.
c. Prediction of Building Damage Index
(1) The building damage index (DI) of a typical reinforced concrete
structure up to ten storeys, with span up to 5 m and inter-storey
height up to 3m, can be obtained for a given Peak Particle
Velocity (PPV) and Principle Frequency (PF).
(2) The equations for the prediction of PPV and PF can be found in
Section 2. If other methods are used to predict the PPV in the
horizontal and vertical directions, the resultant PPV should be
used, and can be calculated from the following equation:
PPV = PPV x2 + PPV y2
where
PPVx = maximum peak particle velocity in the horizontal direction [m/s]
PPVy = maximum peak particle velocity in the vertical direction [m/s]
d. Criteria for Ground Shock IBD. The recommended building damage
index (DI) to adopt is 0.4. At this value, the building is expected to suffer
only repairable minor damage, where small cracks occur in the
concrete, but the reinforcement will remain in the elastic range. The
overall stiffness will be reduced by 20 – 40%. Collapse of buildings is
not expected and fatality is unlikely. If a higher damage index were to
be adopted, the ground shock IBD equations in Section 3.5 would have
to be adjusted accordingly. Studies related lethality rates and the
associated damage index could be used to guide the selection of the
acceptable damage index.
III-3-51 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
e. Ground Shock IBD for Reinforced Concrete (RC) Structures
(1) The response and damage of buildings are primarily governed
by the magnitude (PPV) and frequency content (PF) of the
ground shock. Based on an acceptable building damage index of
0.4 as given in the previous section, the allowable PPV for
reinforced concrete structures will be given as:
PPV < 0.4 m/s for 10 Hz < PF < 30 Hz
PPV < 0.0825 PF0.46 m/s for 30 Hz < PF < 100 Hz
PPV < 0.7 m/s for 100 Hz < PF
(2) The IBD for the siting of reinforced concrete structures is:
−1 1
IBD = ( 0A.4 ) m * (Q 3 ) for 10 Hz < PF < 30 Hz
1 1
IBD = ( 0.0825AB ) ( − m+0.46 n ) * (Q 3 ) for 30 Hz < PF < 100 Hz
0.46
IBD = ( 0A.7 ) m * (Q 3 )
−1 1
for 100 Hz < PF
(3) Where IBD is in metres, measured directly from the chamber
wall, and A, B, m and n are constants given in Table 3-2 and 3-3.
(4) Since the PF is also a function of the distance, the user should
check the PF and ensure that the correct IBD equation from the
above is used. Iterative calculations may be required to solve for
the ground shock IBD.
Example #1:
Given: Q = 125,000kg Loading density = 20kg/m3Span-length ratio
= 1:2
Geology: Single Medium, Good Rock
Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q1/3
Solution: From Table 3-2 and 3-3, A = 1.35, m = 1.23, B = 72, n = 0.84
−1 1 − 1 1
IBD = ( 0A.4 ) m * (Q 3 ) = ( 10.35
.4
) 1.23 * (125,000 3 ) = 134 metres
III-3-52 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Check PF = B ( Q1R/ 3 ) − n = 72 ( 125134
, 0001 / 3
) −0.84 = 31 Hz > 30 Hz => Not OK!
1 1 1 1
IBD = ( 0.0825A B ) ( − m+0.46 n ) * (Q 3 ) = ( 0.08251.35
0.46
) ( −1.23+0.46*0.84 ) * (125,000 3 ) = 133 metres
0.46
*72
Check PF = B ( Q1R/ 3 ) − n = 72 ( 125,133
0001 / 3
) −0.84 = 32 Hz > 30 Hz and < 100Hz =>
Ok!
Example #2:
Given: Q = 125,000kg,
Loading density = 20kg/m3 Span-length ratio = 1:2
Geology: Mixed media with Good Rock Soil to rock cover ratio = 0.2
Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q1/3
Solution: From Table 3-2 and 3-3, A = 1.54, m = 1.71, B = 51, n = 0.67
−1 1 − 1 1
IBD = ( 0A.4 ) m * (Q 3 ) = ( 10.54
.4
) 1.71 * (125,000 3 ) = 110 metres
Check PF = B ( Q1R/ 3 ) − n = 51 ( 125110
, 0001 / 3
) −0.67 = 31 Hz > 30 Hz => Ok!
4. Ground Shock IBD for non-RC Structures
a. For non-RC structures, the allowable ground shock peak particle
velocity PPVa criteria are given according to their foundation geology
as follows:
Foundation on Soil : PPV = 60 – 200 mm/s
(Sand, gravel, clay)
Foundation on Soft Rock : PPV = 115 – 400 mm/s
(Firm moraine slate, shale stone, soft limestone)
Foundation on Hard Rock : PPV = 230 – 800 mm/s
(Granite, gneiss, diabase, quartzite sandstone, hard limestone)
b. Based on the selected allowable PPVa value, the ground shock IBD for
non-RC structures can be calculated as follows.
1 1
IBD = ( PPVa ) m * (Q 3 )
−
A
c. Where IBD = Inhabited Building Distance in metres, measured directly
from the chamber wall. The ground shock parameters, A and m, can be
III-3-53 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
referred from Table 3-2 based on the geological classification in Table
3-1, and the cavern design parameters.
Example #1:
Given: Q = 125,000 kg Loading density = 10 kg/m3 Span-
length ratio = 1:4
Foundation on Hard Rock
Geology: Good Rock
Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q1/3
Solution: From Table 3-2, A = 0.75, m = 1.23
Chosen PPVa at IBD = 0.23 m/s
PPV −1 1 − 1 1
IBD = ( A a ) m * (Q 3 ) = ( 00..75 ) * (125,000 3 ) = 131 metres
23 1.23
Example #2:
Given: Q = 125,000 kg
Loading density = 10kg/m3 Span-length ratio = 1:4
Foundation on Soil
Geology: Mixed media with Good Rock
Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q1/3
Solution: From Table 3-2,
A = 1.29, m = 1.71
Chosen PPVa at IBD = 0.06 m/s
PPV −1 1 − 1 1
IBD = ( A a ) m * (Q 3 ) = ( 10..29 ) * (125,000 3 ) = 301 metres
06 1.71
III-3-54 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
5. Validity of Range
a. The range of validity for the IBD equations proposed in the following
cover charge weights up to 500 tonnes, chambers of length ranging
from 45 to 120 m with maximum volume of 50,000 m3, and span to
length ratio between 1:2 and 1:4. The loading densities considered
range up to 50 kg/m3 with rock cover or equivalent cover about 1.0Q1/3
m. Interpolations can be carried out between the recommended values
for different storage conditions.
b. The ground shock IBD given in this chapter is for a typical reinforced
concrete structure up to ten storeys, with span up to 5 m and inter-
height up to 3 m. Little work has been done to quantify the damage
criteria for other structure types of masonry, wooden and steel. A
specific analysis should be conducted and siting decisions should be
based on the foundation type and robustness of these structures to
withstand the ground shock.
c. For storage sites where the rock cover or equivalent cover is less than
1.0Q1/3, the equations given by Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 should not be
used to predict the ground shock parameters for scaled range less than
1 m/kg1/3. For cases where the rock cover or equivalent cover is
significantly more than 1.0Q1/3, Table 3-2 may under-predict the peak
particle velocities on the ground surface.
d. For storage sites that deviate very much from the conditions specified,
further study and analysis is recommended and detailed site specific
characterisations should be used to support the final construction and
explosives safety siting decisions.
6. Other Hazard Divisions
a. For HD 1.2, a single item (or that explosives weight for the maximum
number of items to react simultaneously) can be treated as HD 1.1 for
the purpose of ground shock prediction. Otherwise, ground shock
effects from HD 1.2 in bulk storage are negligible.
b. For HD 1.3 stored in underground caverns, it should be treated as HD
1.1 for the purpose of ground shock prediction.
c. The ground shock effects resulting from HD 1.4 items can be neglected.
III-3-55 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
d. For HD 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 items or storage where various HD’s are
mixed, it is safe and conservative to treat all items as HD 1.1 for the
purpose of ground shock prediction.
III-3-56 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Typical Rock Gabbro, Gneiss, Mudstone, Tuff, Chalk, Rock
Type Granite, Norite, Siltstone, Shale, Salt, Coal,
Andesite, Dolerite, Slate, Limestone*, Limestone*,
Diabase, Rhyolite, Sandstone* Sandstone*
Quartzite, Dolomite,
Rock Mass Marble,
Quality Limestone*,
Sandstone*
Good to Very good
quality rock mass with
few sets of
unweathered or
slightly weathered
discontinuity sets Good Fair Poor
Q > 10
RMR > 65
RQD > 75%
Vp > 4500 m/s
Fair to good quality
rock mass with several
sets of moderately
weathered
discontinuities
Fair Fair Poor
1 < Q < 10
50 < RMR < 65
50% < RQD < 75%
3500 < Vp < 4500 m/s
Poor quality rock mass
with numerous
weathered joints
Q<1
Poor Poor Poor
RMR < 50
RQD < 50%
Vp < 3500 m/s
where
RMR = Rock Mass Rating
RQD = Rock Quality Designation
Q = Rock Quality Index
Table 3-1: Classification of Site Geology for Ground Shock Analysis
III-3-57 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
A. For PPV in Single Medium Geology
A.1 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:2
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
Geology
A m
Good Rock 0.79 1.08 1.35 1.52 1.23
Fair Rock 1.00 1.19 1.40 1.62 1.56
Poor Rock 1.00 1.30 1.55 1.82 1.90
A.2 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:4
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
Geology
A m
Good Rock 0.56 0.75 1.08 1.20 1.23
Fair Rock 0.78 1.00 1.23 1.49 1.56
Poor Rock 0.78 1.01 1.39 1.64 1.90
B. For PPV in Mixed-Media Geology
B.1 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:2
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
Geology
A m
Good Rock 1.14 1.38 1.54 1.77 1.71
Fair Rock 1.41 1.69 2.01 2.37 2.01
Poor Rock 1.89 2.32 2.60 2.96 2.34
B.2 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:4
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
Geology
A m
Good Rock 1.08 1.29 1.45 1.70 1.71
Fair Rock 1.20 1.62 1.85 2.13 2.01
Poor Rock 1.78 2.10 2.47 2.77 2.34
Note: Peak Particle Velocity, PPV = A (R/Q1/3)–m
Table 3-2: Summary of Initial Value, A and attenuation coefficient, m forPeak
Particle Velocity (PPV) Prediction Equation
III-3-58 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
Geology and Chamber
Geometry B, Hz n
Single Medium Geology
Chamber with width-to- 85 76 72 65
length ratio of 1:2
0.84
Chamber with width-to- 96 86 79 73
length ratio of 1:4
Mixed Media Geology
Loading Density, kg/m3
5 10 20 50
B, Hz n
Chamber with width-to- 64 61 51 45 0.67
length ratio between 1:2
and 1:4
Note: Principal Frequency, PF = B (R/Q1/3)–n
Table 3-4: Summary of initial value, B and attenuation coefficient, n for
Principal Frequency (PF) Prediction Equation
III-3-59 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Damage Damage Description of Damage – High Frequency State of
Index Response Building
Minor < 0.4 Small cracks in concrete. Reinforcement still in Easily
elastic state. Overall stiffness reduction by about repairable
20-40%.
Moderate 0.4 – 0.6 Many small cracks occur along structural Repairable
members. Overall stiffness reduction by about
40-60%
Severe 0.6 – 0.9 Many large cracks, some areas with plastic hinge Non-
formation, reinforcement yields. Overall stiffness repairable
reduction by 60-100%.
Collapse > 0.9 Collapse. Complete loss of stiffness. Loss of
building
Table 3-5: Classification of Building Damage
III-3-60 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
3.3.5. SECTION V - PUBLIC TRAFFIC ROUTE DISTANCES (PTRD)
1. Public traffic route distance (PTRD) (for all Hazard divisions)
a. Ground Shock QD is 2/3 of IBD for ground shock.
b. Debris QD is 2/3 of IBD for debris.
c. The calculated distance according to Eq. 3.3.4-5 should be used,
alternatively the more conservative 2/3 of IBD could be used.
d. For heavy traffic use the maximum IBD determined in the previous
three paragraphs.
e. Because of the hazards arising from the strong on-axis jetting, special
considerations should be given when ES is on the extended centreline
of the main passageway.
III-3-61 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
3.3.6. SECTION VI - EXPLOSIVES WORKSHOP DISTANCE (EWD)
3.3.6.1. General
1. An Explosives Workshop (EW) may be either an aboveground structure or an
underground chamber with its own entrance tunnel. Except for HD 1.4 ammunition,
an underground EW should not be connected (air ducts, passageways, etc.) to other
underground storage chambers. Otherwise, an underground ES should be sited as a
storage chamber. Distances between PES and EW are intended to provide a
reasonable degree of personnel protection within the EW from the effects of a nearby
explosion (blast, flame, debris, and ground shock).
2. An explosion in an underground facility produces a directional impulsive load
along the extended centerline axis of an adit. This impulsive load is considerably
more intense at a given distance than that from a comparable above ground
detonation. Little work has been done to quantify the on-axis impulsive load as a
function of distance.
3.3.6.2. Potential Crater
An Aboveground EW should be sited so it is at least outside the potential crater of an
underground explosion.
3.3.6.3. Aboveground EW Located within the Maximum Dispersal Angle
An unhardened EW should be sited at the corresponding IBD found above.
3.3.6.4. Aboveground EW Located Outside the Maximum Angle of Dispersal
An EW may be sited at 1/3 of the corresponding IBD found above. Required distance
from the tunnel adit because of airblast could be determined from Eq. 3.3.4-6.
3.3.7. SECTION VII – ABOVEGROUND EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINE (ECM)
A site-specific analysis should be conducted and siting decisions should be based on
the protection the ECM provides.
III-3-62 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
3.3.8. SECTION VIII - ABOVEGROUND MAGAZINE DISTANCE (AGMD)
1. An unbarricaded AGM should be sited at 2/3 of the corresponding IBD found
above.
2. A barricaded AGM should be sited at 1/3 of the corresponding IBD found
above.
III-3-63 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
ANNEX A REFERENCES
A.1. UNDERGROUND STORAGE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY HAZARDS
[1] AASTP-1, “Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage of Military
Ammunition and Explosives” (May 1992)
[2] Wilfred E. Baker, Peter S. Westine, and Franklin P. Dodge, “Similarity
Methods in Engineering Dynamics, Theory and Practice of Scale Modeling”,
Published by Elsevier (1991)
[3] LLNL Explosives Handbook, “Properties of Chemical Explosives and
Explosive Simulants, Change 2, “Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA.;
Department of Energy, Washington, DC. (NTIS Order Number:
DE91006884INZ)
[4] Swiss Federal Buildings Office/Engineering Division - Swiss-Klotz Design,
Drawing Nos. 1036.SP.2.020/025/027
[5] US Army Corps of Engineers Drawings, "Definitive Drawings Underground
Storage Facility" (DEF 421-80-04)
[6] Royal Swedish Fortifications Administration - Klotz-Test Operation Block,
Report No. 119:5, 01.05.1974
[7] L. K. Davis and So-Young Song, “Technical Managers Final Report,” Joint
U.S./ROK R&D Program for New Underground Ammunition Storage
Technologies TR SL-97-10 and UAST-TR-97-002 (September 1997)
[8] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP)IWP 6-98 dated 24 November 1998 One-dimensional
Blast Wave Propagation
[9] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 8-98 dated 24 November 1998 Model Tests of
Accidental Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, II: Blast Wave
Propagation in Tunnel Systems
[10] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 7-98 dated 24 November 1998 Model Test of
Accidental Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, I: Chamber
Pressure
[11] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 9-98 dated 24 November 1998 Blast Propagation
outside a Typical Underground Storage Site
III-A-1 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
[12] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 10-98 dated 24 November 1998 Underground
Ammunition Storage Magazines, Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions.
(Norwegian Magazines Standard)
[13] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 11-98 dated 24 November 1998 Calculation of
Airblast from Underground Ammunition Storage Magazines. (Norwegian
Magazines Standard)
[14] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 12-98 dated 24 November 1998 Air Blast from
Tubes Meeting 27-28 October 1987
[15] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 13-98 dated 24 November 1998 Underground
Ammunition Storage. Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions
[16] UK(ST)IWP 311 dated 3 March 1998 - AASTP- I Advice on Adit Debris
Projections from Underground Storage Sites
[17] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 007 dated 30 October 1998 - Debris Throw from
Adit Tunnels. Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP- 1,
Part III Technical Background for Throw Distances
[18] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 005 dated 30 May 1998 – Debris Throw from
Craters - Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III -
Technical Background
[19] CH(ST) UGS/AHWP IWP 006 dated 30 October 1998 – Debris Throw from
Craters - Proposal Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III -
Proposed Wording
[20] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 008 dated 4 November 1998 - Proposed Changes
to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP- 1, Part III - Proposed Wording - Swiss
Contribution
[21] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 002 dated 24 September 1997 - Debris Throw from
Craters. – Pertinent Technical Reports
[22] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 003 dated I October 1997. - Debris Throw from
Craters.
[23] US MEMO, dated 30 July 1997 - Recommendations for Ground Shock
Criteria in NATO Documents
[24] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for
Ground Shock from an Underground Storage Facility
III-A-2 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
[25] US MEMO, dated 31 December 1997 - Proposal for Ground Shock
Explosives Safety Principles
[26] NO(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 1/98 dated 11 February 1998 - AASTP- I Part II,
Inhabited Building Distance, Ground Shock
[27] Fook-Hou Lee, Wee-Beng Koh, and Thiam-Soon Tan, "Numerical Back
Analysis of Field Measurements of Ground Vibration from Underground
Explosions," 28th DOD Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998,
Orlando, Florida
[28] Yingxin Zhou, Karen O Y Chong, and Yaokun Wu, "Small-Scale Testing on
Ground Shock Propagation in Mixed Geological Media," 28th DOD
Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida
[29] Yingxin Zhou, Hong Hao, and Guowei Ma, "Ground Shock Damage Criteria
for Inhabited Buildings," 28th DOD Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August
1998, Orlando, Florida
[30] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for
Ground Shock from an Underground Storage Facility
[31] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 14-98 dated 15 December 1998 - Ground Shock
in Rock-Full scale Tests in Norway
[32] US MEMO, dated 16 December 1998, Minutes of Special UGS/AHWP
meeting 15-16 October 1998
[33] Peter Westine, "Ground Shock from the Detonation of Buried Explosives,
"Journal of Terramechanics, Vol 15, No 2, pp 69-79 (1978)
[34] CH(ST) UG/AHWP IWP 4 dated 6 March 1998 – Debris Throw from Craters
– CH Status Report as of 6 March 1998
[35] PFP(AC_326-SG_5)(CUSTODIAN-UGAS)(NO)IWP(2006)0001
[36] PFP(AC_326-SG_5)(CUSTODIAN-UGAS)(NO)IWP(2006)0002.
[37] NATO - Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication (AASTP)
AASTP-4, "Explosives Safety Risk Analysis"
NATO AC/258 Risk Analysis Working Group (RAWG)
AC/258(ST)WP/214 / 27.02.2001 / NATO PFP unclassified
III-A-3 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
[38] Debris Throw from Adits of Underground Installations in Rock
Basics for Risk Analysis - Technical Background
Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Storage Sub Group - UGSWG
Defence Procurement Agency - General Staff, Switzerland
Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG
Kummer, P.; Willi, W.; Nussbaumer, P.
TM 174-9 // AC/258 CH(ST)IWP 024-02 / 30.03.2002
[39] Trümmerwurf aus Zugangsstollen von Felsanlagen
TLM 75/Teil 2 - Revision technische Anhänge
Grundlagen
Generalstab - Sektion SUR
Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG
Kummer, P.; Willi, W.; Nussbaumer, P.
B 150-12 / 30.11.2001
[40] Debris Throw from Adit Tunnels
Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III
Technical Background for Throw Distances
Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Underground Storage Ad hoc Working Party
Defence Procurement Agency, Switzerland
Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG
Kummer, P.
TM 158-9 // CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 007 / 30.10.1998
[41] Debris Throw from Adit Tunnels
Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III
Proposed Wording
Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Underground Storage Ad hoc Working Party
III-A-4 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
Defence Procurement Agency, Switzerland
Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG
Kummer, Peter
TM 158-10 // CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 008 / 04.11.1998
[42] Debris Throw from Adits
Basics for Risk Analysis
Proposed Wording for AASTP-4
CH Contribution to the NATO AC/258 Storage Sub-Group - UGSWG
Defence Procurement Agency / General Staff - Switzerland
Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG
Nussbaumer, P.; Kummer, P.
AC/258 CH(ST)IWP 030-02 // TM 174-15 / 28.02.2002 / NATO PFP
unclassified
III-A-5 Edition D Version1
AASTP-1
ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE AND TRANSPORT
PUBLICATION 1
(AASTP-1)
MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE
OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
PART IV
SPECIAL SITUATIONS
IV-i Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
PART IV - TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................. IV-1-1
4.1.1.1. SCOPE ............................................................................................................. IV-1-1
4.1.1.2. OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS................................................................................ IV-1-1
4.1.1.3. CHANGE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... IV-1-2
CHAPTER 2 AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES RISK MANAGEMENT ................ IV-2-1
4.2.1.1. SCOPE ............................................................................................................. IV-2-1
4.2.1.2. NATO AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES RISK MANAGEMENT ................................. IV-2-1
CHAPTER 3 MISSILE INSTALLATIONS .............................................................. IV-3-1
4.3.1.1. GENERAL ......................................................................................................... IV-3-1
4.3.1.2. ASSOCIATED PES ........................................................................................... IV-3-1
4.3.1.3. SURROUNDING ES ........................................................................................... IV-3-2
4.3.1.4. MEASURING OF QD ......................................................................................... IV-3-2
4.3.1.5. COMPUTING NEQ ............................................................................................ IV-3-2
CHAPTER 4 CONTENT WITHDRAWN .............................................................. IV-4-1
CHAPTER 5 AIRFIELDS USED BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT ............................... IV-5-1
4.5.1.1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE ................................................................................. IV-5-1
4.5.1.2. SCOPE ............................................................................................................. IV-5-1
4.5.1.3. APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. IV-5-2
4.5.1.4. EXCEPTIONS .................................................................................................... IV-5-2
4.5.1.5. PRINCIPALS FOR APPLICATION OF SEPARATION CRITERIA ................................... IV-5-2
4.5.1.6. APPLICATION OF QD ......................................................................................... IV-5-5
4.5.1.7. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................... IV-5-13
CHAPTER 6 NAVAL AND MILITARY PORTS ...................................................... IV-6-1
4.6.1. GENERAL .......................................................................................................... IV-6-1
4.6.1.1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE ................................................................................. IV-6-1
4.6.1.2. APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. IV-6-2
4.6.2. APPLICATION OF QD IN PORTS ..................................................................... IV-6-2
4.6.2.1. BASIS OF QDS ................................................................................................. IV-6-2
4.6.2.3. VESSEL AND BARRICADES ................................................................................. IV-6-4
4.6.2.4. PROCEDURES FOR QD ASSESSMENT ................................................................ IV-6-6
4.6.2.4.1. VESSEL AS A SINGLE PES WITH TOTAL NEQ OR ENEQ ................................. IV-6-6
4.6.2.4.3. VESSEL AS MULTIPLE PES EACH WITH NEQ OR ENEQ .................................. IV-6-8
4.6.2.5. EFFECTIVE NEQ (ENEQ) ................................................................................. IV-6-9
4.6.2.6. APPLICATION OF QD TABLES .......................................................................... IV-6-15
4.6.3. PORT OPERATIONS....................................................................................... IV-6-15
4.6.3.1. DRY DOCK OPERATIONS ................................................................................. IV-6-15
4.6.3.2. REFUELING .................................................................................................... IV-6-15
4.6.3.3. EMERGENCY PLANS........................................................................................ IV-6-15
4.6.4. RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR PORTS ............................................................... IV-6-15
CHAPTER 7 DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES ...................... IV-7-1
4.7.1.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. IV-7-1
4.7.1.2. DESIGN FOR DEMILITARIZATION AND DISPOSAL .................................................. IV-7-2
4.7.1.3. DESTRUCTION (OB AND OD) OPERATIONS ........................................................ IV-7-5
IV-ii Edition D Version 1
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
4.1.1.1. Scope
Part IV is intended to contain requirements for special situations involving ammunition
and explosives which fall outside the context of Parts I through III. Those will generally
fall into one of three categories listed below:
a. Ammunition and Explosives Risk Management. NATO policy is that during
NATO multinational operations, quantity distance (QD) requirements of
AASTP-1 and field distance (FD) requirements of AASTP-5 will be
followed. When those requirements cannot be met, NATO requires the
conduct of a risk assessment, the use of mitigation to lessen risk and
consequences, and a risk decision (acceptance) by the appropriate
authority(ies). Chapter 2 provides a summary of ammunition and
explosives risk management requirements and identifies the particular
NATO documents that address specific criteria and requirements.
b. Operational Situations. It’s not always possible to apply, without seriously
prejudicing operational effectiveness, the normal peacetime guidelines
detailed in Parts I through III of AASTP-1. As a result, there may be a
reduced level of protection due to operational requirements, and NATO-
agreed requirements have been developed and are contained herein.
Other area are related to operations but may fall outside the scope of
AASTP-5 and for that reason have been included in Part IV. This is the
case with Chapter 3, “Missile Installations“, Chapter 4, “Operational
Storage for Manoeuver Warfare“, Chapter 5, “Airfields Used Only by
Military Aircraft“, and Chapter 6, “Navy and Military Ports“.
c. Operations that do not fit Within the Context of Parts I through III of
AASTP-1. The primary focus of Parts I through III is ammunition and
explosives storage and handling. Other functions involving ammunition
and explosives exist outside of those areas. Consequently, when there is
a need for additional NATO explosives safety requirements and guidelines
beyond just the storage and handling functions, they will be included in
Part IV. An example is Chapter 7, “Destruction of Ammunition and
Explosives“.
4.1.1.2. Operational Situations
The following principles apply to the requirements associated with operational situations:
a. In peacetime the guidelines in Part IV must not reduce the normal level of
protection afforded to the general public as detailed in Parts I-III.
b. Some guidelines in Part IV may reduce the normal peacetime level of
protection afforded to personnel involved with military operations. Where
this increased risk is essential in the interests of operational effectiveness,
the nature of the operation and the possible consequences of an
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undesired event shall be taken into account as part of the decision to
proceed. Refer to Chapter 2 for risk assessment and decision maker
requirements.
4.1.1.3. Change Summary
This section provides a summary of Part IV changes made from Edition C Version 1 to
Edition D Version 1.
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL
No changes made.
CHAPTER 2 AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES RISK MANAGEMENT
No changes made.
CHAPTER 3 MISSILE INSTALLATIONS
No changes made.
CHAPTER 4 PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN
No changes made.
CHAPTER 5 AIRFIELDS USED ONLY BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT
References to AOP-38 were deleted because AOP-38 is “obsolescent”. Active
terms are now in NATOTerm, which is assumed to be the home of all definitions, so
no reference is required.
Within table footnotes on pages IV-5-28 and IV-5-31, changed "full protection" to
"asset preservation" for consistent terminology.
CHAPTER 6 NAVAL AND MILITARY PORTS
A complete revision of Chapter 6 was done. The change implements the work of the
Ports Criteria Working Group (PCWG). A summary of the changes follows:
a. This IWP updates the quantity-distances to be applied in ports and is
based on the latest revisions to the aboveground quantity-distance criteria in
AASTP-1 Part I. The aboveground quantity-distance criteria in the latest
revision in Part I is based on the latest testing and analysis of aboveground
accidental explosions. Additional advantages of linking the ports criteria in
Chapter 6 to the criteria of Part I are that it applies the analysis framework
from Part I, which is already familiar to users of AASTP-1, and users can
leverage existing software tools already programmed to apply the equations
and tables in Part I.
b. Another significant change to Chapter 6 includes removal of the
"Warship Exception." Although warships are not considered exempt from QD
by default in the proposed IWP, the proposed Chapter allows national
authorities to apply a safety management system to formally assess,
communicate, and accept explosives risk. In addition, it describes common
risk mitigations applied to military vessels as a part of a national safety and
risk management system such as ensuring that vessels are in a quiescent
state.
CHAPTER 7 DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
Website address updated for UFC 3-340-02.
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References to AOP-38 were deleted because AOP-38 is “obsolescent”. Active
terms are now in NATOTerm, which is assumed to be the home of all definitions, so
no reference is required.
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CHAPTER 2 AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES RISK
MANAGEMENT
4.2.1.1. Scope
Ammunition and explosives pose inherent risks to NATO and national operational
assets, conduct of military operations, related and unrelated military and civilian
personnel, infrastructure, materiel and the environment. NATO policies, methodologies,
and rules have been developed to manage those risks during both peacetime and
deployment.
4.2.1.2. NATO Ammunition and Explosives Risk Management
1. Within NATO, two fundamentally different approaches are used for managing
risks associated with storage, handling, and transport of NATO ammunition and
explosives. Those two approaches are: 1) QD-Based and 2) Risk-Based, and each has
a distinct role in the management of ammunition and explosives-related risks.
2. NATO explosives safety policy requires the application of QD requirements and
when those cannot be met, the Risk-Based approaches described below must be used.
a. QD-Based Approach.
(1) This approach requires the application of minimum QD given in
AASTP-1 and FD given in AASTP-5. As further amplified in
Chapter 1, Part 1, QD and FD represent a compromise deemed
tolerable by AC/326 nations between absolute safety and practical
considerations including costs and operational requirements. The
risk deemed tolerable depends upon many factors, such as:
(a) Hazard Division (HD) and Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ)
present.
(b) Potential Explosion Site (PES) type.
(c) Exposed Site (ES) types.
(d) Mitigation used (e.g., barricade)
(2) FD are the “operational” equivalent of AASTP-1 QD and as noted
previously are given in AASTP-5. The application of FD is limited
to a maximum of 4,000 kg NEQ of HD 1.1, beyond which AASTP-1
QD must be used.
(3) Allied Logistics Publication (ALP) 16 requires compliance with
AASTP-1 or AASTP-5, as applicable, for munitions or munitions
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related process associated with NATO military operations and
training.
b. Risk-Based Approach.
(1) With regards to Risk-Based approaches, risk management
incorporates the overall risk-based decision making process. This
includes risk assessment, risk mitigation, risk decision, and risk
communication.
(2) Risk-Based methods consider a much more complete set of factors
that can influence risk, including quantitative assessments of the
probability of event, consequences, and personnel exposure.
When time and resources permit, the use of Risk-Based techniques
provides the best available understanding of consequences and
resulting risks to support an informed risk decision and selection of
appropriate risk reduction measures. A few NATO nations have
elected to apply only a Risk-Based approach and therefore no
longer use QD or FD.
(3) NATO’s Risk-Based approach is described in AASTP-4. Part I of
AASTP-4 provides an overview designed for use by policy makers,
safety professionals, and analysts. Part II of AASTP-4 is designed
for the risk analyst and provides a compendium of detailed
munitions effects and consequence models.
(4) NATO operational risk-based management requirements are given
in ALP 16 which specifies requirements for an Explosives Safety
and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) approach that
integrates risk assessment into operations planning, military training
exercises, and contingency operations with the goal of identifying
adverse consequences associated with munitions operations, risk
reduction alternatives, and risk decision requirements for key
decision makers.
(a) ALP 16 dictates the use of the risk assessment process
contained therein, when explosives safety requirements of
AASTP-1 or AASTP-5, as applicable, cannot be met.
(b) ALP 16 outlines a risk assessment process which includes
the risk analysis methodology contained in AASTP-5. That
methodology represents a combination of quantitative
calculations, where the data and tools are available, and a
qualitative assessment of that information taking into account
other factors such as probability of event associated with the
operational environment.
(5) AASTP-5, in addition to the QD-approach discussed in paragraph
4.2.1.2.2.a) above, provides a risk methodology using a
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combination of qualitative probabilities and a quantitative
consequence prediction tools (based on AASTP-4 models and
data) that has been developed by AC/326 Subgroup C for the
storage of ammunition on deployed missions. The quantitative
consequence tools have limitations in that they were developed for
a deployed “camp” scenario and are limited to a maximum NEQ of
4,000 kg of HD 1.1 per storage cell. If operational scenarios involve
higher NEQ and/or different structures than those addressed in the
tools, options available to nations include:
(a) Qualitative risk assessments as detailed in AASTP-5 or in
nationally approved assessment methods.
(b) Quantitative risk assessments using AASTP-4 models and
data.
(c) A combination of both qualitative and quantitative risk
assessment methods and tools, based on available
information, models, and data as implemented in nationally-
approved software programs.
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CHAPTER 3 MISSILE INSTALLATIONS
4.3.1.1. General
1. The QD guidelines for missile installations, whether permanent, fixed, or
consisting of mobile missile systems used in a static, defensive role, are essentially
the same as those given in Part I, Chapter 4, for aboveground storage of ammunition.
Those QD do not address the inadvertent launch of a missile. Each missile
installation is treated as a PES requiring Interior and Exterior QD as given in Part I,
Annex 1-A, Section II. Judgment should be used to associate the missile installation
with an appropriate pictograph for a PES taking account of the particular design.
Reference to Part III, Chapter 2, may be necessary for determining appropriate QD
for in-ground missile silos.
2. Interior QD required for system-determined technical and/or operational
reasons are not taken into consideration in this chapter. They are part of the weapons
system regulations. However, the threats posed by missile systems and missile
installations need to be understood and considered before missile locations are
selected. Generally, missile replacement, missile storage, and other missile system
functions occur at the missile installation site. Because of this, missile installations
present potential hazards to surrounding operations, personnel, and facilities from:
a. The explosion effects from an accidental explosion involving the
munitions associated with missile installation.
b. Electromagnetic radiation being emitted by the system (see Part II,
chapter 7 for additional information related to hazards of
electromagnetic radiation to munitions containing electrically initiated
devices).
c. Backblast generated during the launch of a missile, which may place
nearby facilities at risk of collapse or damage from backblast pressures;
windows may break and generate hazardous glass fragments;
personnel within backblast distance may be severely injured.
4.3.1.2. Associated PES
1. Launching platforms, warheading buildings, ready-round storage areas and
other facilities where the missile with warhead is serviced or stored are to be treated
as PES for the HD and NEQ present.
2. The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation should include the
separation distances necessary to prevent propagation of explosion. Where
operational requirements for the missile system necessitate smaller distances, the
PES are aggregated and considered to be one PES as regards Exterior QD.
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3. Missile systems/installations shall be deployed in accordance with their
specific implementation documentation (e.g., field manual, pamphlet, standard
operating procedures (SOP)), to include establishing prescribed exclusionary
electromagnetic radiation hazard and backblast zones, as applicable.
4.3.1.3. Surrounding ES
1. Military sites such as operation centres, readiness structures, radar and
communication installations, fuel stations, parking areas and guard shelters may be
considered to be ES which are required to be afforded appropriate Interior QD
protection. Those ES may be inside the missile installation under consideration or
inside another military installation.
2. The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation are based on operational
requirements which may override the Interior QD and which must be taken into
account by additional infrastructure measures (e.g., site safety plans) or as part of a
risk acceptance decision as discussed in Part IV, Chapter 2.
3. An ES outside a missile installation, not being inside another military
installation, must be protected by Exterior QD given in Part I, Chapter 4.
4.3.1.4. Measuring of QD
QD at launcher platforms are measured from the extremities of the missile(s) when in
normal position on the platform. As regards assembly buildings and storage sites at
a missile installation the normal procedure in Part I, paragraph 1.3.2.2. applies.
4.3.1.5. Computing NEQ
The typical procedure given in Part I, subparagraphs 1.3.2.3., for computing the NEQ,
applies. Information on the effective NEQ of a particular type of missile should be
obtained from the design authority. Otherwise the actual NEQ must be calculated in
accordance with the definition as follows: The NEQ is the total explosives content of
ammunition unless it has been determined through testing (see AASTP-3) that the
effective quantity is significantly different from the actual quantity. NEQ does not
include such substances as white phosphorus, war gases or smoke and incendiary
compositions unless these substances contribute significantly to the dominant hazard
of the hazard division concerned.
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CHAPTER 4 CONTENT WITHDRAWN
IV-4-1 Edition D Version 1
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CHAPTER 5 AIRFIELDS USED BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT
4.5.1.1. Introduction/Purpose
This chapter provides Quantity-Distance (QD) guidelines for two types of airfields used by
military aircraft where Ammunition and Explosives (AE) are handled and stored:
a. Military airfields (i.e., utilized only by military aircraft to include combined
operations);
b. Joint-use airfields (i.e., utilized by commercial and military aircraft) where
runways, taxiways, parking areas, and facilities are shared by commercial and
military aircraft and operations.
Air Forces have a requirement for weapons to be on or in the vicinity of the airfield to
maintain required operations. This can be for both domestic and deployed operations
during peacetime or wartime. The exposure of personnel or facilities to unacceptable risk
from an accidental explosion or the detonation of AE must be mitigated.
The following guidance is intended to provide the minimum acceptable levels of
explosives safety.
Wherever possible, the greatest protection possible should be provided even
though specific QDs may not be defined.
4.5.1.2. Scope
The sections of this chapter are organized as described below.
a. Applicability - Provides guidance on how QD is applied to Potential Explosion
Site (PES) and Exposed Site (ES).
b. Exceptions - Provides guidance about aircraft for which the QD criteria does not
apply.
c. Application of Separation Criteria - Provides principles of how quantity and
separation distances are measured.
d. Application of QD - Provides QD requirements for aircraft loaded with AE.
e. Operational Considerations - Provides guidance on some operational
considerations.
f. QD Tables 5.2 -5.7 - Provides HD 1.1 QD for airfields, HD 1.1 QD for Asset
Preservation, HD 1.1 QD for Propagation Prevention and External QDs. In
addition, a limited number of HD 1.2 and HD 1.3 QD relationships (e.g., CAPA,
Ready Service, Inhabited Buildings, Roads/Runways, Holding areas (i.e., open
stack of AE) and workshops) are included.
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4.5.1.3. Applicability
1. The QD specified in this chapter apply to PES which exist in peacetime and
wartime. Commanders will need to decide the QD to be applied to sites which only
become PES in emergencies or wartime and such distances will need to be addressed in
the airfields' peacetime layout. To reach a decision, the Commander will need to balance
increased explosive safety risk to personnel, equipment and facilities, in the event of an
explosion at a PES, against meeting mission requirements.
2. Consequently, where the criteria in this chapter cannot be met, then risk
management as discussed in Part IV, Chapter 2 must be implemented. The appropriate
risk decision-makers must be fully aware of the risks associated with the use of this
chapter and must accept that risk prior to conduct of explosives operations.
3. Operational Commanders are advised that additional QD protection may be desired
depending on resource value. Applying the standards herein provides only the minimum
protection criteria for personnel and property, and greater protection should always be
provided when practicable.
4.5.1.4. Exceptions
The QD criteria detailed in this chapter do not apply to:
a. The transportation of explosives around the airfield,
b. Aircraft containing only installed explosives 1,
c. Explosives contained on the person of crew and passengers (e.g., AE for
mission use).
4.5.1.5. Principals for Application of Separation Criteria
1. Measurements of Quantity and other Separation Distances
Potential Explosion Sites (PES) to Exposed Sites (ES). All separation distances from a
PES are to be measured as indicated in Table 5.1 below.
To (ES) From (PES)
Aircraft / Open stacks AE Structures
Aircraft / Open Nearest points between Nearest points between
stacks WITH AE AE load (or from where that AE would walls and aircraft AE load / open stack
normally be loaded) and aircraft AE load*
Aircraft Nearest points between Nearest points between
WITHOUT AE AE load and aircraft walls and aircraft
1
Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), egress systems components, engine starter cartridges, fire extinguisher
cartridges and other such items necessary to flight operations.
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Structure Nearest points between Nearest points between
containing AE AE load and ES walls walls and ES walls
Nearest points between Nearest point between
Runway AE load and centerline of the runway walls and centerline of the runway
Nearest points between Nearest point between
Taxiway AE load and nearest point of the taxiway walls and nearest point of the taxiway
*If cargo aircraft, the distance must be determined from the outside of the fuselage
Table 5.1: Measurement of separation distances between relevant PES and ES
2. Areas requiring QD separation (Designated Areas) – General Comments
a. A Designated Area is an authorized area specifically designated for the use of
loading, unloading or parking of combat and/or cargo aircraft loaded with AE.
This represents an area with a recurring hazard as it is continuously or
frequently used for that purpose
b. Aircraft carrying AE must be loaded, unloaded or parked in a Designated Area.
Such an area should be separated from other such areas and from ES by the
QD given in paragraph 4.5.1.6
c. Combat Aircraft Parking Area (CAPA) / Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA)
are examples of designated areas
d. This does not include Forward Ammunition and Refueling Point (FARP) where
different criteria apply 2
3. Principles for Selecting Designated Areas
The following principles should be followed in selecting Designated Areas:
a. The safest possible area compatible with QD prescribed in this chapter and
operational requirements must be used.
b. CAPA/CALA - Any area that meets both the applicable explosives safety
criteria (prescribed in this chapter) and airfield (safety and operational) criteria
(e.g., runway clear zones). There may be other restrictions and/or regulations
that affect the selection of designated areas as CAPA. For example,
operational/tactical requirements, additional hazard from forward firing AE
(directional and potential long range), specific weapon systems, etc. AE
delivery trailers must not remain longer than needed at the CAPA to conduct
the loading or unloading operation.
c. Convoy routes, End-of-Runway, Hammerheads for lining up fighter aircraft
prior to take off and Arm/De-Arm pad activities are exempted from (in these
cases the aircraft is in transportation mode) licensing (i.e., siting). As such,
during arming/disarming, the firing direction should be blocked by a vertically
2
FARP criteria are available in AASTP-5 paragraph 2.6.4
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faced traverse 3(i.e., barricade). When a vertically faced traverse is not
available, directional AE should be armed/de-armed in an area specifically
designated with a safe weapon heading established. Additional guidance can
be found in paragraph (e) below. If Pads and Hammerheads are to be used
for loading and unloading, or designated for hung weapon other than hung
gun, they must be sited for the NEQ permitted.
d. The QDs given below in paragraph 4.5.1.6 should be observed between
adjacent loaded aircraft which are in the open. Where this is not possible,
consideration should be given to grouping several aircraft together and
separating the groups by greater distances than can be provided between
individual aircraft. There is the possibility that all aircraft in any particular
group will be lost. If an explosion should occur, aircraft in adjacent groups
may be damaged by fragments; however, the explosion is unlikely to
propagate simultaneously. Subsequent explosions may be caused by
fragments, debris or secondary fires. Three possibilities, illustrated below, for
protection of groupings of aircraft exist. Groups may be barricaded or un-barricaded.
(1) Asset Preservation for each Aircraft Group
If aircraft cannot be individually separated by asset preservation
distance, they should be grouped using propagation prevention
distance within the group and asset preservation distance between the
adjacent groups.
Figure 5-1: Asset Preservation for each Aircraft Group
(2) Asset Preservation between Groups without Propagation Prevention
within a Group
If aircraft cannot be individually separated by propagation prevention
distance within the group, then the ENEQ must be aggregated. Asset
preservation distances- using the aggregated ENEQ -should be used
for group separation.
Figure 5-2: Asset Preservation between Groups
without Propagation Prevention within a Group
3
See Barricade Design (UK) Nationally Approved Structures, Section 10.9 b.
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(3) Propagation Prevention Protection between Groups
If asset preservation distances between groups cannot be achieved,
the propagation prevention distances should be used between groups.
This is the least desirable explosives safety option and provides the
least asset protection.
Figure 5-3: Propagation Prevention Protection between Groups
e. Aircraft weapon systems such as guns, rockets, missiles, and flare dispensers
pose an additional hazard (beyond their explosives hazard) because of their
directional response and potential long range, if inadvertently activated on the
ground. As a result, aircraft AE posing a directional hazard should face the
direction involving least exposure of personnel, equipment and facilities to the
line of fire. Due to the agility, velocity and random nature of a missile’s (guided
or unguided) trajectory, the traditional safe direction may not mitigate the risk
to personnel, aircraft, equipment and facilities.
4.5.1.6. Application of QD
1. The following QD requirements have been based on scaled distances from historic
airfield criteria, extended with recent criteria for debris and fragments. The aforementioned
scaled distances may differ from those presented in AASTP-1, Part I. Where AASTP-1,
Part I provides different distances for same PES and ES, these may be used instead.
2. The following QD requirements assume HD 1.1 loads. However, they may also be
used for other HDs. Where AASTP-1, Part I Manual permits, lesser distances may be
used for HDs other than HD 1.1.
3. The QD tables provide distances for Asset Preservation (maintaining operational
mission capability) Table 5.3, Propagation Prevention, Table 5.4 and External QD, Table
5.5. Required QD associated with “Aircraft Quantity Distance (AD)” callouts below can be
found in Table 5.2.
4. In addition, a limited number of HD 1.2 and HD 1.3 QD relationships (e.g., CAPA,
Ready Service, Inhabited Buildings, Roads, Runways, Holding areas (i.e., open stack of
AE) and workshops) are provided in Table 5.6 and 5.7 respectively. As noted earlier,
where possible, the greatest protection possible should be provided even though specific
QDs may not be defined.
5. QD for Aircraft Loaded with HD 1.1 AE
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a. Exterior QD from Designated Areas
The appropriate Exterior QD given in Table 5.5 apply between Designated
Areas or AE aircraft and ES not related to the servicing and support of the
aircraft within the designated area.
b. QD between Aircraft Loaded with Explosives
(1) Un-barricaded - Individual aircraft, or groups of aircraft at Designated
Areas, loaded with AE must be separated as follows:
(a) AD9-distances (4.8 Q1/3) To protect against prompt propagation of
aircraft loaded with AE of comparable resistance to propagation as
robust shells 4
(b) AD10-distances (7.2 Q1/3) To protect against prompt propagation
of detonation.
(c) AD13-Blast Distances (BD) (12.0 Q1/3) To increase asset
preservation, where space and operational considerations permit,
should be used for aircraft to remain operable with minor fragment
damage.
(d) AD13-greater of the BD (12.0 Q1/3) or the Debris and Fragment
Distance (DFD) = Hazardous Fragment Distance (HFD) where
nearly complete protection against fragments is deemed
necessary.
Lesser- or different - distances may be used for specific weapons where trials
have shown that such distances are adequate to minimize the probability of
propagation.
(2) Barricaded - AD9-distances (4.8 Q1/3) between adjacent aircraft may
be reduced to AD6-distances (2.4 Q1/3), if the line of sight between AE
can be interrupted by a barricade, see AASTP-1, Part II, Chapter 3,
extending a minimum of 0.3m above the highest piece of AE being
separated. The barricade will prevent simultaneous propagation due
to high velocity, low angle fragments. It should be noted, however,
that a barricade does not necessarily prevent subsequent propagation
or damage caused by blast, lobbed items, debris or secondary fires.
c. QD between Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) and Associated Storage
Facilities
4
This provides a limited degree of protection.
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(1) HAS 5 and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5.3
“Asset Preservation “distances will prevent propagation between such
facilities. An explosion in one shelter or ready storage facility may
destroy it and its contents, but aircraft within adjacent HAS will be
undamaged, provided the doors are closed. Those aircraft may not be
immediately removable due to debris.
(2) HAS and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5.4
“Propagation Prevention” distances may be damaged. However, there
will be a high degree of protection against propagation. These
distances should be used only in wartime or during periods of
increased operational readiness.
(3) Areas of hazard to front, side or rear of HAS or igloos as PES or ES lie
in the arcs shown in Figure 5-4. A particular face of an ES is deemed
to be threatened by a PES face when both these faces lie within the
arc of threat or hazard of the other. In those cases, where an ES lies
on the line separating rear/side, etc. of a PES, the appropriate larger
QD should be observed.
5
Utilize “Nationally Approved Structures for Explosives Areas” document for specific country designs
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Figure 5-4: Areas of Hazard for HAS and Igloos
6. QD to Runways and Taxiways
a. It is recommended that the separation of the PES from runways and taxiways,
which are considered as operationally essential, should be large enough to
prevent them being rendered non-operational by ground shock as a result of
an explosion in a PES.
b. If the transient risk to military aircraft movement is accepted per AASTP-1,
Part IV, Chapter 2, the use of a distance equivalent to about three times the
crater radius is recommended. In normal soil, AD4-distances (1.8 Q1/3) should
be used; in saturated soils or clay, greater distances may be advisable
because of the increased crater radius.
c. If the transient risk is not accepted, AD13-distances BD (12.0 Q1/3) should be
used to provide protection to the aircraft on both runways and taxiways.
Whenever a higher level of asset preservation is required, use the greater of
the BD (12.0 Q1/3) or the DFD = Hazardous Fragment Distance (HFD).
7. Direct and Indirect Support Facilities and Activities
a. Direct Support. Facilities and activities directly related to maintaining,
servicing, controlling, and flying AE loaded aircraft are considered directly
related to AE on the flight line supporting those AE loaded aircraft and may be
sited per Table 5.2 and 5.5 as follows:
(1) Unhardened Facilities. AD10-distances (7.2 Q1/3) should be used for
direct support facilities.
(2) Hardened Facilities. If hardened to NATO criteria, reduced distances
of AD8 (3.6 Q1/3) should be used for direct support.
(3) Examples of non-explosives facilities and functions considered
related to AE loaded aircraft include:
(a) Activities and their operating facilities for handling AE on the flight
line
(b) Facilities to prepare and service armed aircraft, and those that
house personnel who fly combat aircraft (e.g., alert crew shelters)
(c) Flight line combat aircraft associated facilities, which may contain
field offices, break rooms, unit training rooms, and
equipment/supply rooms
IV-5-8 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
(d) Aircraft maintenance and operations functions
(e) Hot pit refueling areas, and civil engineer (CE) fire protection
stations
(f) POL Facilities, see AASTP-1, Part I, Chapter 4
(g) Forward supply points
(h) Intelligence, debriefing, and flight line security functions
(i) CE functions solely dedicated to maintaining the runway and
taxiways
b. Indirect Support. Indirect support facilities and activities are facilities and
functions that are not directly related to AE loaded aircraft flight line operating
requirements and should be sited per Tables 5.2 and 5.5 as follows:
(1) Unhardened Facilities. AD14-distances (16 Q1/3) should be used for
unhardened indirect support facilities.
(2) Hardened Facilities. If facilities are hardened to NATO criteria, reduced
distances of AD12 (9.6 Q1/3) should be used for indirect support
facilities.
(3) Examples of non-explosives facilities and functions not considered
directly related to AE loaded aircraft include:
(a) Maintenance Support Activities
(b) Engine shops
(c) Tire and wheel shops
(d) Aviation supply warehouses
(e) Support Equipment maintenance facilities
c. Unrelated Facilities. Facilities and activities unrelated to AE loaded aircraft
flight line operating requirements fall within the criteria of paragraph 6.
8. QD for Emergency Power Supply Shelter and POL Shelter for the support of
Hardened Aircraft Shelters
Refer to UFC 3-340-02 for structural requirements and see QD tables for QD guidance.
9. QD to Military Aircraft not Loaded with Explosives
IV-5-9 Edition D Version 1
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a. To protect military aircraft such as tankers, transports and reserve aircraft not
loaded with explosives from potential destruction from a PES, use AD13
distances-(12.0 Q1/3). At this distance, in most cases, aircraft may sustain
damage due to fragments but should remain operable.
b. Where operational requirements outweigh consideration of asset preservation,
distances may be reduced to that dictated by operational requirements.
However, minimum distances of:
(1) AD12 (9.6 Q1/3) for embarking/disembarking military personnel from
transport aircraft;
(2) AD10 (7.2 Q1/3) for tanker aircraft; and
(3) IBD specified in the appropriate tables if a structure is included where
passengers assemble, such as a passenger terminal building should be
maintained. It should be noted some passenger terminals can be
considered a Vulnerable Building. Consult a National Authority to
determine if increased distance should be implemented for a passenger
terminal.
10. QD to facilities and activities unrelated to AE loaded aircraft flight line operations (
i.e., IBD)
a. Use AD16-distances from the rear, and AD17a-distances from the sides, and
AD17b-distances from the front of ready service igloos6 containing up to 10000
kg NEQ at loading density of up to 20 kg/m3. If the ES provides sufficient
protection (barricade and protected roof) against debris and fragments, the BD
may be used. Otherwise use the greater of the BD or DFD (HFD). If the ES is of
vulnerable construction, use the greater of 2 times the BD and 1 times the DFD
b. When the PES is a US third-generation or similar HAS containing up to 5000
kg NEQ, the AD18-distances (20.0 Q1/3) from the front, the AD19-distances
(25.0 Q1/3) from the side and AD20-distances (16.0 Q1/3) from the rear may be
used to protect an unhardened ES against debris and blast.
c. Use AD15-distances for other PES where AE are present on a long-term basis.
If the ES provides sufficient protection (barricade and protected roof) against
debris and fragments, the BD may be used. Otherwise use the greater of the
BD or the DFD (HFD). If the ES is of vulnerable construction, use the greater of
2 times the BD and 1 times the DFD.
6
Reduced distance=only NATO standard igloos
IV-5-10 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
d. Where ES have been hardened, lesser distances may be used depending on
the degree of hardening provided.
11. QD for Aircraft Loaded with HD 1.2, 1.3
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 contain a limited number of HD 1.2 and HD 1.3 QD relationships.
12. QD for Aircraft Loaded with AE of more than one HD
Refer to AASTP-1, Part I Chapter 2, Section III for guidance on Aircraft loaded with AE of
more than one HD. The appropriate mixing and aggregation rules for Hazard Divisions
and Storage Sub-Divisions should be used.
13. Aircraft Effective Net Explosive Quantity (ENEQ)/Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
a. ENEQ - There are occasions where using scientific modeling that the ENEQ of
a given weapon can be determined and provide evidence that the resultant
detonation of the weapon may be considerably less than the Net Explosives
Quantity of the combined HD in the weapon. For example, a missile with 30
kg HD 1.1 warhead and a 100 kg HD 1.3 propellant charge may not produce a
combined 130 kg HD 1.1 event effect.
b. MCE - In addition to using the ENEQ of a particular weapon, there are certain
circumstances where it is possible to determine that the aggregated NEQ of an
Aircraft does not need to be used for the computation of QDs. Aircraft
fuselage and other parts of the airframe can act as effective barriers to
propagation caused by high velocity low angle fragmentation. Hence, a
reduced MCE value is possible. Appropriate reduced MCE values for Aircraft
types and weapon loads would have to be determined based on evidence on a
case-by-case basis.
14. AE Loaded Aircraft exempt from normal separation distance requirement
a. Aircraft configured only with the items listed below (i.e., basic load) are exempt
from QD siting requirements when evaluated as a PES but are still required to
be sited as an ES. The aircraft should be parked in a designated aircraft
parking area meeting airfield criteria and treat the aircraft as explosives-loaded
in all other respects. The following AE can be uploaded and downloaded at
the designated aircraft parking area provided that the quantity of AE being
loaded or unloaded is limited to a single aircraft load:
(1) HD 1.2. gun AE (30 mm or less).
(2) HD 1.3 captive carry training missiles, aircraft defensive flares or chaff,
practice and simulated bombs with spotting charges.
IV-5-11 Edition D Version 1
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(3) HD 1.4 AE.
b. Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft loaded with any combination of illumination,
spotting, marking, or other pyrotechnic articles up to 100 kg of HD 1.3.
c. Munitions delivery trailers (i.e., ALS, Universal Ammunition Loading System,
inert bombs, trailers modified to carry chaff & flare magazines) are considered
in the transportation mode (i.e., QD-exempt) provided the trailers do not
remain at the designated aircraft parking area longer than the loading or
unloading operation being conducted.
15. QD for Joint Use Airfields (commercial and military aircraft)
a. Joint use airfields where facilities are shared are airfield layouts that provides
scope for joint operations providing the maximum separation distances
between military and civilian air operations. Operations at joint use airfields
are to be conducted to provide the highest level of safety to the public. For
example, taxi routes for AE loaded aircraft should be separated as far as
possible from civilian terminal buildings and aircraft loaded with AE should be
separated as far as possible from civilian aircraft.
b. Aircraft are generally more vulnerable to the effects of blast overpressure
during take-off and landing than when taxiing or overflying a runway. Large
aircraft have larger control surfaces than light aircraft and take-off and land at
greater speeds, and therefore may receive higher stress loads from blast
overpressure. As it is not feasible to accurately predict how every type of
aircraft will behave, the application of separation distances for civil aircraft
operations should be based on personnel exposure rather than aircraft
preservation.
c. The following are the minimum public traffic route distances to be used
considering taxiways, runways, passenger terminals and combat alert crew
facilities as ES to AE storage facilities (magazines and explosives workshops)
and aircraft parking designated areas:
(1). From AE storage facilities at military airfields with cohabitated civilian air
passenger traffic, a separation distance of high density public traffic is
required to runways and taxiways with IBD required for passenger
terminals. However, many large passenger terminals can be classified as
a Vulnerable Buildings due to large glass facades, glass roof panels and
light metallic large span roof components. All of which, are vulnerable to
blast pressures. In such cases, National Authorities must be consulted to
decide whether increased distances specified in AASTP-1 Part I Chapter 3
paragraph 1.3.7.6 should be implemented.
IV-5-12 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
(2). From AE storage facilities at military airfields with infrequent civilian air
freight traffic but no civilian air passenger traffic, a separation distance of
medium density public traffic is required to runways and taxiways.
(3). Parking areas for civilian aircraft with no passengers require a minimum
separation distance of high density PTR from AE storage facilities
(magazines and workshops) and designated areas.
16. QD for Modern Aircraft
a. Fragment damage to modern aircraft (e.g., 4th, 5th, 6th generation), which have
significant carbon fibre sections, will result in battle damage repair being
required that might take the aircraft off line for considerable time.
b. Un-barricaded armed legacy aircraft or groups of legacy aircraft, including
transport aircraft and helicopters, are normally to be separated from other PES
by (12 Q1/3). At this distance, adjacent unsheltered aircraft may sustain
fragment damage
17. QD for National Approved Aircraft Infrastructure:
Nationally approved aircraft infrastructure can be found in SRD AASTP-1.3, Nationally
Approved Structures for Explosives Areas.
4.5.1.7. Operational Considerations
1. When operational requirements necessitate the use of Table 5-4 or distances less
than those prescribed above, particularly in the case of explosives of HD 1.1, the
operational Commander should be advised of any potentially serious risks in
accordance with AASTP-1, Part I, Chapter 3, Section VII, so that measures can be
taken to mitigate with the goal to eliminate or reduce the risk to personnel,
equipment and facilities. Refer to AASTP-1, Part IV, Chapter 2, which addresses
NATO explosives safety and munitions risk management requirements.
2. The aim should be to maintain the maximum practicable separation between
barricaded aircraft loaded with explosives of HD 1.1.
3. Safety is enhanced by towing aircraft- once loaded -to a safer area rather than close
to other aircraft being loaded or unloaded.
4. Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance must be considered. The
procedures required to avoid inadvertent initiation of electro-explosive devices
during handling and loading of AE onto aircraft are to be implemented during all
airfield AE operations. AASTP-1, Part II, Chapter 7 delineates minimum
precautions to be observed.
5. Marking of Airfield AE Facilities
IV-5-13 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
a. Directional Safe Heading Markings
Directional safe headings should be permanently marked on the ground and
can be marked in the manner described at Fig 5.5, indicating the direction of
the safe heading and showing the bearing.
Figure 5.5: Directional Weapon Safe Heading Marking
b. Display of Hazard Division and Safety Signs
Where practical and when it will not create an airfield obstruction or FOD
hazard, warning signs are to be posted when armed aircraft or transport
aircraft loaded with explosive freight are present on flight lines and dispersal or
within HAS or hangars displaying the appropriate hazard division and
supplementary hazards. (Examples at Fig 5.6). The positioning of signs is to
be agreed with the Unit Fire Officer and Senior Air Traffic Control Officer and
as a minimum they should be on all the normal approach routes to the PES.
There is no requirement to display safety signs for aircraft fitted only with
installed explosives.
Figure 5.6: Example Armed Aircraft Warning Sign.
IV-5-14 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
6. Rotary Wing Aircraft
Helicopter landing areas for loading and unloading AE within storage sites and quick
reaction alert sites will be considered aboveground magazines and may be sited at IMD
based only upon the NEWQD on board the helicopters. The following requirements apply
to these helicopter landing areas:
a. Flight clearance criteria are met.
b. Landing and takeoff approaches will not be over magazines.
c. Helicopter operations will be limited to ammunition support of the magazines
concerned.
d. Carrying passengers is not permitted.
e. Safety precautions normal to other modes of transportation are to be
observed.
f. Explosives operations will not be conducted in magazines or maintenance
buildings located within IBD from the helicopter landing area during takeoff,
landing or loading/off-loading of the helicopters. These magazines and
buildings will be closed during landing or takeoff.
g. AE upload exercises involving ground vehicles will not take place during
helicopter upload exercises unless the two exercises are separated by at
least Direct Support Facilities distance.
h. Safe weapon headings should be established.
7. Un-manned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
UAV are considered and treated as aircraft per the guidelines in this Chapter.
8. AE Prohibited Areas (Airfield Explosive Prohibited Area)
AE facilities shall be prohibited in areas within approach and departure zones at all fixed
and rotary wing aircraft landing facilities. The approach and departure zones for aircraft
are those areas designated and described in accordance with National Approved airfield
criteria for specific country.
IV-5-15 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
NEQ AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 AD5 AD6 AD7 AD8 AD9 AD10
(kg) 0.5 m/kg1/3 0.8 m/kg1/3 1.1 m/kg1/3 1.8 m/kg1/3 2 m/kg1/3 2.4 m/kg1/3 3.2 m/kg1/3 3.6 m/kg1/3 4.8 m/kg1/3 7.2 m/kg1/3
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 8
2 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 7 10
3 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 11
4 1 2 2 3 4 4 6 6 8 12
5 1 2 2 4 4 5 6 7 9 13
6 1 2 2 4 4 5 6 7 9 14
7 1 2 3 4 4 5 7 7 10 14
8 1 2 3 4 4 5 7 8 10 15
9 2 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 10 15
10 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 16
20 2 3 3 5 6 7 9 10 14 20
30 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 12 15 23
40 2 3 4 7 7 9 11 13 17 25
50 2 3 5 7 8 9 12 14 18 27
60 2 4 5 8 8 10 13 15 19 29
70 3 4 5 8 9 10 14 15 20 30
80 3 4 5 8 9 11 14 16 21 32
90 3 4 5 9 9 11 15 17 22 33
100 3 4 6 9 10 12 15 17 23 34
125 3 4 6 9 10 12 16 18 24 36
150 3 5 6 10 11 13 18 20 26 39
175 3 5 7 11 12 14 18 21 27 41
200 3 5 7 11 12 15 19 22 29 43
225 4 5 7 11 13 15 20 22 30 44
250 4 6 7 12 13 16 21 23 31 46
275 4 6 8 12 14 16 21 24 32 47
300 4 6 8 13 14 17 22 25 33 49
325 4 6 8 13 14 17 23 25 34 50
350 4 6 8 13 15 17 23 26 34 51
375 4 6 8 13 15 18 24 26 35 52
400 4 6 9 14 15 18 24 27 36 54
425 4 7 9 14 16 19 25 28 37 55
450 4 7 9 14 16 19 25 28 37 56
475 4 7 9 15 16 19 25 29 38 57
500 4 7 9 15 16 20 26 29 39 58
600 5 7 10 16 17 21 27 31 41 61
700 5 8 10 16 18 22 29 32 43 64
800 5 8 11 17 19 23 30 34 45 67
900 5 8 11 18 20 24 31 35 47 70
1000 5 8 11 18 20 24 32 36 48 72
1200 6 9 12 20 22 26 35 39 52 77
1400 6 9 13 21 23 27 36 41 54 81
1600 6 10 13 22 24 29 38 43 57 85
1800 7 10 14 22 25 30 39 44 59 88
2000 7 11 14 23 26 31 41 46 61 91
2200 7 11 15 24 27 32 42 47 63 94
2500 7 11 15 25 28 33 44 49 66 98
3000 8 12 16 26 29 35 47 52 70 104
3500 8 13 17 28 31 37 49 55 73 110
4000 8 13 18 29 32 39 51 58 77 115
4500 9 14 19 30 34 40 53 60 80 119
5000 9 14 19 31 35 42 55 62 83 124
6000 10 15 20 33 37 44 59 66 88 131
7000 10 16 22 35 39 46 62 69 92 138
8000 10 16 22 36 40 48 64 72 96 144
9000 11 17 23 38 42 50 67 75 100 150
10000 11 18 24 39 44 52 69 78 104 156
TABLE 5.2: HD 1.1 QD for Airfields (Page 1)
IV-5-16 Edition D Version 1
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NEQ (kg) AD11* AD12* AD13* AD14*
BD DFD BD DFD BD DFD BD DFD
8 m/kg1/3 RC/masonry 9.6 m/kg1/3 RC/masonry 12 m/kg1/3 Open/light 16 m/kg1/3 RC/masonry
1 8 61 10 61 12 121 16 61
2 11 61 13 61 16 136 21 61
3 12 61 14 61 18 145 24 61
4 13 61 16 61 20 152 26 61
5 14 61 17 61 21 158 28 61
6 15 61 18 61 22 162 30 61
7 16 61 19 61 23 166 31 61
8 16 61 20 61 24 170 32 61
9 17 61 20 61 25 173 34 61
10 18 61 21 61 26 177 35 61
20 22 95 27 95 33 198 44 95
30 25 130 30 130 38 211 50 130
40 28 155 33 155 42 222 55 155
50 30 175 36 175 45 230 59 175
60 32 191 38 191 47 237 63 191
70 33 204 40 204 50 243 66 204
80 35 216 42 216 52 248 69 216
90 36 226 44 226 54 253 72 226
100 38 235 45 235 56 258 75 235
125 40 255 48 255 60 267 80 255
150 43 271 52 271 64 275 86 271
175 45 284 54 284 68 282 90 284
200 47 296 57 296 71 289 94 296
225 49 306 59 306 73 294 98 306
250 51 315 61 315 76 299 101 315
275 53 324 63 324 79 304 105 324
300 54 331 65 331 81 308 108 331
325 56 338 67 338 83 312 111 338
350 57 345 68 345 85 316 113 345
375 58 351 70 351 87 320 116 351
400 59 356 71 356 89 323 118 356
425 61 362 73 362 91 326 121 362
450 62 367 74 367 92 330 123 367
475 63 371 75 371 94 332 125 371
500 64 376 77 376 96 335 127 376
600 68 392 81 392 102 345 135 392
700 72 405 86 405 107 354 143 405
800 75 417 90 417 112 362 149 417
900 78 427 93 427 116 369 155 427
1000 80 436 96 436 120 376 160 436
1200 86 452 103 452 128 387 171 452
1400 90 466 108 466 135 397 179 466
1600 94 477 113 477 141 406 188 477
1800 98 488 117 488 146 414 195 488
2000 101 497 121 497 152 421 202 497
2200 105 505 125 505 157 428 209 505
2500 109 516 131 516 163 437 218 516
3000 116 532 139 532 174 450 231 532
3500 122 546 146 546 183 461 243 546
4000 127 557 153 557 191 472 254 557
4500 133 567 159 567 199 481 265 567
5000 137 577 165 577 206 489 274 577
6000 146 593 175 593 219 504 291 593
7000 154 606 184 606 230 517 307 606
8000 160 618 192 618 240 528 320 618
9000 167 628 200 628 250 539 333 628
10000 173 637 207 637 259 548 345 637
*BD = Blast Distance, DFD = Debris and Fragment Distance. If an Exposed Site (ES) provides sufficient protection (barricade and
protected roof) against debris and fragments the BD may be used. Otherwise use the greater of the BD or the DFD (HFD).
TABLE 5.2: HD 1.1 QD for Airfields (Page 2)
IV-5-17 Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
NEQ (kg) AD15* AD16* AD17a* AD17b*
BD DFD BD DFD BD DFD BD DFD
22.2 RC/masonry 14 m/kg1/3 ECM 18 m/kg1/3 ECM 18 m/kg1/3 ECM front
m/kg1/3 side/rear side/rear
1 23 61 14 41 18 41 18 94
2 28 61 18 47 23 47 23 96
3 33 61 21 52 26 52 26 99
4 36 61 23 55 29 55 29 102
5 38 61 24 57 31 57 31 104
6 41 61 26 60 33 60 33 107
7 43 61 27 62 35 62 35 110
8 45 61 28 63 36 63 36 112
9 47 61 30 65 38 65 38 115
10 48 61 31 66 39 66 39 118
20 61 95 39 77 49 77 49 145
30 69 130 44 84 56 84 56 167
40 76 155 48 89 62 89 62 183
50 82 175 52 93 67 93 67 196
60 87 191 55 97 71 97 71 207
70 92 204 58 100 75 100 75 217
80 96 216 61 103 78 103 78 225
90 100 226 63 105 81 105 81 233
100 104 235 65 108 84 108 84 240
125 111 255 70 113 90 113 90 256
150 118 271 75 117 96 117 96 269
175 125 284 79 121 101 121 101 281
200 130 296 82 125 106 125 106 291
225 136 306 86 128 110 128 110 301
250 140 315 89 131 114 131 114 309
275 145 324 92 133 118 133 118 317
300 149 331 94 136 121 136 121 324
325 153 338 97 138 124 138 124 331
350 157 345 99 140 127 140 127 337
375 161 351 101 142 130 142 130 337
400 164 356 104 144 133 144 133 338
425 167 362 106 146 136 146 136 338
450 171 367 108 148 138 148 138 338
475 174 371 110 150 141 150 141 338
500 177 376 112 151 143 151 143 338
600 188 392 119 157 152 157 152 339
700 198 405 125 162 160 162 160 340
800 207 417 130 167 168 167 168 341
900 215 427 136 171 174 171 174 342
1000 222 436 140 175 180 175 180 342
1200 236 452 149 182 192 182 192 344
1400 249 466 157 188 202 188 202 346
1600 260 477 164 193 211 193 211 347
1800 271 488 171 198 219 198 219 349
2000 280 497 177 202 227 202 227 351
2200 289 505 183 206 235 206 235 352
2500 302 516 191 212 245 212 245 355
3000 321 532 202 220 260 220 260 359
3500 338 546 213 228 274 228 274 363
4000 353 557 223 234 286 234 286 367
4500 367 567 232 240 298 240 298 371
5000 380 577 240 245 308 245 308 375
6000 404 593 255 255 328 255 328 383
7000 425 606 268 263 345 263 345 391
8000 444 618 280 271 360 271 360 399
9000 462 628 292 277 375 277 375 407
10000 479 637 302 284 388 284 388 415
*BD = Blast Distance, DFD = Debris and Fragment Distance. If an Exposed Site (ES) provides sufficient protection (barricade and
protected roof) against debris and fragments the BD may be used. Otherwise use the greater of the BD or the DFD (HFD).
TABLE 5.2: HD 1.1 QD for Airfields (Page 3)
-IV-5-18- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
NEQ (kg) AD18 AD19 AD20
20 m/kg1/3 and AFMAN 25 m/kg1/3 and AFMAN 16 m/kg1/3 and AFMAN
1 16 16 16
2 16 16 16
3 16 16 16
4 71 16 16
5 71 16 16
6 71 16 16
7 71 16 16
8 71 16 16
9 71 16 16
10 71 16 16
20 71 16 16
30 71 16 16
40 71 16 16
50 71 16 16
60 71 16 16
70 71 16 16
80 71 16 16
90 71 16 16
100 71 16 16
125 71 16 16
150 71 16 16
175 71 16 16
200 71 16 16
225 71 16 16
250 71 121 50
275 71 121 50
300 71 121 50
325 71 121 50
350 71 121 50
375 71 121 50
400 71 121 50
425 71 121 50
450 71 121 50
475 71 121 50
500 159 199 127
600 169 211 135
700 178 222 143
800 186 233 149
900 194 242 155
1000 200 250 160
1200 213 266 171
1400 224 280 179
1600 234 293 188
1800 244 305 195
2000 252 315 202
2200 261 326 209
2500 272 340 218
3000 289 361 231
3500 304 380 243
4000 318 397 254
4500 331 413 265
5000 342 428 274
6000 364 455 291
7000 383 479 307
8000 400 500 320
9000 417 521 333
10000 431 539 345
TABLE 5.2: HD 1.1 QD for Airfields (Page 4)
-IV-5-19- Edition D Version 1
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TABLE 5.3: HD 1.1 QD for Asset Preservation (Table 1)
-IV-5-24- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5.3: HD 1.1 QD for Asset Preservation (Table 2)
-IV-5-25- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5.4: HD 1.1 QD for Propagation Prevention (Table 3)
-IV-5-26- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5.4: HD 1.1 QD for Propagation Prevention (Table 4)
-IV-5-27- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
FOOTNOTES FOR AD HD 1.1 TABLES 1 - 4
a Storage of primary explosives is not allowed in the ES
b Storage of primary explosives or items vulnerable to spall are not allowed in the ES
c Effect of lobbed ammunition
d DFD should be considered whenever possible to protect against fragment hazards (choose larger
of BD/DFD). Whenever asset preservation is required IBD criteria should be used.
e Barricades (only) protect against low-angle, high-speed fragments; side-rear of an ECM or arch of
a HAS suffice as barricade for this purpose
f Whenever asset preservation is required AD15 should be used
g Effect of high velocity projections (or primary fragments/debris)
h ES has a door barricade
i Limited degree of protection
j Robust shells
k Not for groups
l For robust stores or in wartime or emergency (moderate degree of protection instead of high)
m No QD for NEQ ≤ 50 kg
n The loading density limitation of 20 kg/m³ does not apply
o Use AD2 when load density > 20 kg NEQ / m³
-IV-5-28- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5.5: HD 1.1 QD for External Quantity Distances (Table 5)
-IV-5-29- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
TABLE 5.5: HD 1.1 QD for External Quantity Distances (Table 6)
-IV-5-30- Edition D Version 1
AASTP-1
FOOTNOTES FOR TABLES 5 - 6
a Barricades are required if protection from low-angle, high velocity fragments is desired; side-rear
of an ECM or arch of a HAS suffice as barricade for this purpose.
b At AD10 damage to unstrengthened buildings may be of a serious nature with resulting casualties.
Use AD12 where greater protection is required.
c Apply AD12 BD (BD = Blast Distance as shown in the table) for embarking/disembarking personnel -
Apply AD10 BD for exposed tanker aircrafts
d DFD should be considered whenever possible to protect against fragment hazards (choose larger
of BD/DFD). Whenever asset preservation is required IBD criteria should be used.
e Consider also DFD when protection is required against debris throw and primary fragments and
apply largest of BD and DFD.
f E.g. Squadron Ops, Flightline Maint, Fire & Rescue Stations, Alert Crew, POL & LOX facilities, …
g In transition to war and war, all facilities may be considered to be directly supporting and the
lesser distances used.
h Transient risk to military aircraft is accepted.
i Transient risk to aircraft is NOT accepted.
j Apply larger distances when saturated soils or clay (increased crater radius)(see AASTP-1 Part II §
2.3.3.33. page II-3-10)
k Reduced QD for large volume 7 or 3 bar ECM (≥500m³) with a NEQ content of < 45000 kg.
l Applies when doors of HAS are open (fragments can eject from the front without resistance when
doors are open)(except when doors are open for aircraft towing, fueling, servicing, run up or taxi
and during concurrent servicing operations or short periods when maintenance equipment or AE
are being moved into or out of shelters - during these operations doors may be considered being
closed)
m For quantities ≤ 100 l for operational needs only
n Burried, underground with earth cover ≥ 60 cm (included pipelines)
o Provided with structural protection against both blast and fragment hazards
p E.g. bulk storage, railroad tank cars, transfer points, fuel service unrelated, parking area for fuel
tank trucks, pipelines, fuel hydrants, fuel bladders, parking for fuel loaded tanker aircrafts
q Fix refueling points and Fuel Service Trucks both related to Combat Aircraft facilities, including hot
pit refueling areas
r Consider DFD where the POL-facilities are vital (choose the larger of BD and DFD)
s Public service or military emergency communication lines
t Overhead electrical power transmission lines > 15 kV or associated substations (UK ≥ 11 kV)
u Important installations such as the lines of a supergrid network and associated substations should
be given greater protection from fragments and debris; this is also appropriate for microwave,
ultra high frequency (UHF) reflectors.
v Such as those serving the buildings of the explosives area.
w QD should be greater than one span between the poles or pylons.
x For power generating stations and substations.
y Emergency Power Supply Shelter for the Support of HAS
-IV-5-31- Edition D Version 1
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Airfield Distances HD 1.2
a
PROPAGATION PREVENTION
AASTP-1 READY SERVICE
CAPA
Part IV ≤ 10 000 kg NEQ
≤ 10 000 kg NEQ ; load density ≤ 20 kg/m³
ECM MAGAZINE
AD Table 7 UNBAR BAR REAR SIDE
FRONT
FRONT BAR UNBAR BAR
UNBAR
(a ) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
bd bd bd
No QD No QD No QD
BAR (1)
2.4MCE1/3 2.4MCE1/3 2.4MCE1/3
CAPA No QD No QD No QD No QD
No QD b No QD b No QD b
UNBAR (2)
4.8MCE1/3 4.8MCE1/3 4.8MCE1/3
RS (3)
No QD No QD No QD
RS
READY SERVICE
(4)
No QD b No QD No QD b No QD No QD b
RS (5)
1/3 1/3
4.8MCE No QD 4.8MCE 4.8MCE1/3 No QD
RS (6) No QD No QD No QD
No QD bd No QD bd No QD bd
RS (7)
1/3 1/3
2.4MCE 2.4MCE 2.4MCE1/3
No QD No QD No QD No QD
10m b No QD b No QD b
RS (8)
4.8MCE1/3 4.8MCE1/3 4.8MCE1/3
½D1 b ½D1 b ½D1 b ½D1 b ½D1 b
No QD bd
(9) ½D2 ½D2 ½D2 d ½D2 ½D2
½D2 ≥ 270m
LOW DENSITY 135m c 200m c ½D2 ≥ 270m 135m c 200m c
D5 b D5 b D5 b D5 b D5 b
PTRD
20m bd
MEDIUM (10) D6 D6 D6 d D6 D6
D6 ≥ 200m
DENSITY 185m c
270m c
D6 ≥ 200m 185m c 270m c
30m b D1 b
(11) 60m d D2 d
D1 b D1 b D1 b D1 b
HIGH DENSITY D2 ≥ 400m D2 ≥ 400m
D2 D2 D2 D2
30m b D1 b
270m c 400m c 270m c 400m c
IBD
(12) 60m d D2 d
D2 ≥ 400m D2 ≥ 400m
D1 b D1 b 30m b D1 b D1 b D1 b
VULNERABLE d
(13) D2 D2 60m D2 d D2 D2
CONSTRUCTIONS
270m c 400m c D2 ≥ 400m D2 ≥ 400m 270m c 400m c
FOOTNOTES
a For asset preservation: use HD 1.1 tables
b Apply for for SsD 1.2.2
c Apply this distance when the PES is other than an open stack AND when PES contains AE of SsD 1.2.1 with an MCE>50 kg
d Apply for SsD 1.2.1 with MCE ≤ 50 kg
D1 = 28.127-2.364*LN(NEQ)+1.577*((LN(NEQ))²)
D2 = -167.648+70.345*LN(NEQ)-1.303*((LN(NEQ))²)
D3 = 0.36*D1
D4 = 0.36*D2
D5 = 0.67*D1
D6 = 0.67*D2
TABLE 5.6: HD 1.2 QD for Propagation Prevention (Table 7)
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b
Airfield Distances HD 1.3
AASTP-1 CAPA READY SERVICE
≤ 10 000 kg NEQ ; load density ≤ 20 kg/m³
Part IV ≤ 10 000 kg NEQ
PROPAGATION
ECM MAGAZINE
AD Table 8 PREVENTION e
FRONT
UNBAR BAR REAR SIDE FRONT BAR UNBAR BAR
UNBAR
(a ) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
BAR (1) 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m 60m c 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m
25m c 60m c
CAPA 0.22Q1/2 (25m≤D≤ 60m) 25m 0.22Q ≥25m 1/2 d
0.22Q1/2 (25m≤D≤ 60m)
ac
0.22Q1/2 ≥25m 240m
UNBAR (2) 240m ac
No QD c No QD c
RS (3) No QD
10m c 10m
No QD
No QD c No QD c 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m No QD c
RS (4)
1/2
0.22Q ≥ 25m 10m 0.22Q1/2 ≥ 25m
READY SERVICE
25m c
60m c No QD c 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m 60m c
RS (5)
1/2
240m 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m d
0.22Q ≥ 25m 25m 25m c
0.22Q1/2 ≥ 25m
240m
25m c No QD c 25m c 25m c
RS (6)
1/2 1/2
0.22Q ≥ 25m 10m 0.22Q ≥25m 0.22Q1/2 ≥ 25m
RS (7) 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m 60m c 0.22Q1/2 ≥25m
25m c 60m c
0.22Q 1/2
(25m≤D≤ 60m) 25m 0.22Q ≥25m 1/2 d
0.22Q1/2 (25m≤D≤ 60m)
0.22Q1/2 ≥25m 240m
RS (8) ac
240m ac
60m c
60m c 60m c
(9)
3.2Q1/3 ≥60m
1/3
3.2Q ≥60m 3.2Q1/3 ≥60m
LOW DENSITY
PTRD
MEDIUM (10) 4.3Q1/3 ≥60m 4.3Q1/3 ≥60m 4.3Q1/3 ≥60m
DENSITY
(11)
HIGH DENSITY
6.4Q1/3 ≥60m 6.4Q1/3 ≥60m 6.4Q1/3 ≥60m
IBD
(12)
VULNERABLE
CONSTRUCTION (13) 6.4Q1/3 ≥60m 6.4Q1/3 ≥60m 6.4Q1/3 ≥60m
S
FOOTNOTES
a Maximum capacity when D (distance) ≥ 60m
b This table only offers AD's that provide at least a high level of protection. For guidance on virtual complete protection see AASTP-1 Part I Tables
c Apply for AE of SsD 1.3.2
d The PES has a barricade with a vertical wall facing the door and is preferably backed with earth. Such a barricade permits the use of the
reduced QDs in Annex IA (§ 1.3.6.6)
e For Asset preservation apply HD 1.1 tables
TABLE 5.7: HD 1.3 QD for Propagation Prevention (Table 8)
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CHAPTER 6 NAVAL AND MILITARY PORTS
4.6.1. GENERAL
4.6.1.1. Introduction/Purpose
1. This chapter details the procedure to be followed when applying appropriate
explosives safety quantity-distances (QD) in port areas to ensure a minimum standard is
achieved for vessels carrying, loading or unloading military explosives at piers, jetties,
wharves or anchorages.
2. The aim of this chapter is to produce a practical and applicable technique for the
assessment of explosives limits in ports. The standards detailed are applicable to the
licensing authorities, regulatory authorities, port users and the ports authorities
themselves.
3. In general, QD guidelines in this chapter for the licensing of berths are based on
those in Part I for above-ground storage. This means, for example, that a vessel loaded
with AE should be treated as equivalent to a storage site for QD purposes.
4. It must be emphasized that the probability of propagation, damage and casualties
are all directly related to the separation distance applied. Distances beyond the QD
recommended in this chapter will result in improved levels of protection. In addition, good
working practices can do much to reduce the probability of propagation, for example
mooring vessels in tandem and closing hatches.
5. To arrive at appropriate QDs, one of the following two approaches has to be
selected:
a. Treat the vessel as a single PES, and apply QDs from AASTP-1 Part I.
Dependent on the desired level of complexity, either the total aggregated NEQ aboard the
vessel or an Effective NEQ (ENEQ) should be used.
b. Treat the vessel as multiple PES’s, and apply QDs from AASTP-1 Part I.
Dependent on the desired level of complexity, either the NEQ or an ENEQ should be used
for each PES.
6. Furthermore, it is important to understand the difference between maximum credible
event (MCE) and ENEQ. MCE is defined in Part I within the context of SsD 1.2.1, SsD
1.2.3, or HD 1.6 as the largest HD 1.1-like event for these HD/SsD which by definition will
not mass detonate. ENEQ on the other hand is the calculated reduced mass expressed in
kilograms used in place of the NEQ of a stack or stacks of munitions, taking into account
the mitigating effects of the arrangement or specific configuration of these stacks on the
magnitude of an explosive event/mix of munitions.
7. Suitable information on the AE holdings from visiting nation’s vessels will need to be
obtained to determine and apply appropriate QD. This may prove to be difficult to obtain
and may simply be a confirmation that the vessel’s (E)NEQ does not exceed a given limit.
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8. In the event QD guidelines cannot be met, it is the responsibility of the appropriate
authorities (National and/or NATO) to conduct a proper consequence analysis/risk
assessment, as delineated in Part IV Chapter 2 and subsequently decide an alternate level
of protection.
4.6.1.2. Applicability
1. These explosives safety principles apply to vessels loaded with AE when anchored,
moored or berthed in commercial, naval, or military ports.
2. These explosives safety principles do not apply (no QD is required) for minimum
required quantities of HD 1.3 and HD 1.4 safety of life at sea (SOLAS) and security/force
protection stores installed and ready for use.
4.6.2. APPLICATION OF QD IN PORTS
4.6.2.1. Basis of QDs
1. QDs to be applied in ports are those detailed in AASTP-1 Part I, Annex I-A, QD
tables for above ground storage. Just as for above ground storage, all hazard divisions
shall be addressed and mixing and aggregation rules in Part I are to be applied.
2. This section provides guidance on PES and ES selection, most notably for vessels
carrying, loading, or unloading AE at piers, jetties, and wharves. Also, the assessment of
the ENEQ and QD is addressed.
3. Each vessel loaded with AE is to be considered as a PES, and as an ES if it is at
risk from another PES. For definitions of other ES types see AASTP-1 Part I.
4.6.2.2. PES and ES Type Selection
1. To represent vessels and vessel-related magazines and related locations with AE,
the following two PES and ES types from Part I will be used:
a. Open-air stack or light structure, barricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or freight
container loaded with munitions, barricaded (PES = i, ES = 16).
b. Open-air stack or light structure, unbarricaded. Truck, trailer, railcar or freight
container loaded with munitions, unbarricaded (PES = j, ES = 17).
2. Vessel structures (may) differ significantly from these PES/ES types. However,
given the limited amount of testing that has been conducted with vessel structures, as well
as the large variety in vessel structures, this has been judged to be the most appropriate
approach. Requirements for barricading are presented in 4.6.2.3.
3. When additional testing or analysis is available for a specific scenario that supports
different QD, this information may be used to replace the above mentioned QD. Several
situations for which this is the case are listed below:
a. Where reduced hazardous fragment distances have been established for
handling discrete quantities of specific munitions in the open.
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b. Where a detailed analysis of a specific PES vessel compartment has shown
breakup and debris that deviates from the assumed PES and ES types from
Part I.
c. Where a blast analysis for a specific PES vessel type and AE load has
shown a significant directionality.
d. Where an analysis of the blast resistance for a specific ES vessel type has
been performed.
4. A number of relevant situations are illustrated in Figure 6-1 together with guidance
for PES and ES selection in Table 6-1.
Figure 6-1: Illustration of PESs and ESs in Port Areas Including Guidance on PES
and ES Selection From AASTP-1 Part I (See Table 6-1 for key notes)
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Key PES
Description ES Type QD Rationale
Note Type
Vessel/pier to Prevention of prompt
• aboveground storage propagation. If additional
(barricaded) Appendix
1 i protection is desired select
IA, Table 4
• vessel on the same pier/wharf a higher numbered Key
(IMD, barricaded) Note.
Vessel/pier to
• aboveground storage Prevention of prompt
(unbarricaded) propagation. If additional
Appendix
2 • vessel on the same pier/wharf j protection is desired select
IA, Table 4
(IMD, unbarricaded) a higher numbered Key
• vessels loading/unloading at Note.
same anchorage
(Optional) To provide protection from a i or j 19
vessel/pier to 1. Apply blast distance only
• Personnel on AE vessels on (BD18) without a barricade
another pier/wharf for limited protection
• Personnel in anchorage used for
3
AE loading/unloading only j 20 2. Debris and fragment
(Optional) To provide protection from distances may be applied
loaded vessels in anchorage to for increased levels of
• Personnel on loaded vessels in protection
same anchorage
1. Apply blast distance only
Vessel or anchorage to for limited protection
• non-explosives vessel/pier
4 • non-explosives anchorage i or j 24 2. Debris and fragment
• loaded section of another distances may be applied
explosives anchorage for increased levels of
protection
PES to other exposed sites (examples:
Appendix
5 inhabited buildings, public traffic routes, i or j
IA, Table 4
etc.)
Prevention of prompt
propagation.
Appendix
If additional protection is
6 Inland PES to vessel/pier or anchorage IA, Table 16 or 17
required (from
4
debris/fragments), treat
vessel/pier as ES 22 or 24
instead.
Table 6-1: Quantity-distances for ports based on AASTP-1 Part I (See Figure 6-1)
4.6.2.3. Vessel and Barricades
A vessel or a vessel-related magazine can be regarded as barricaded towards ES
(including other vessels and their magazines), subject to any necessary additional
analysis, in the following cases:
1. A PES and the AE it contains are located sufficiently below the waterline. This is
only applicable when treating a ship as multiple PES. In analogy to barricade design
requirements for prevention of prompt propagation in AASTP-1 Part II, 2.2.3, the body of
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water should exceed the line of sight between stacks at PES and ES by 0.3 m. The
required minimum “thickness of water” in the direction of the ES is 3 m which follows from
testing of water barricades 7 8. Figure 6-2 illustrates the above requirements and shows
how the result depends on the relative height of PES and ES. This should be evaluated
when the vessel is at minimum draft (worst case) with AE onboard. Where the top of the
stack is unknown compared to the waterline, assume the height of the stack is equal to the
deckhead of the magazine. The requirement assumes that prompt propagation between
PES and other PES at higher decks does not take place. If prompt propagation does take
place the barricade requirements should be applied to the highest deck of the PES
involved.
Figure 6-2: Illustration of Barricade Requirements in Relation to Water Between PES
and ES on Vessels (Side View). Solid black lines indicate the line of sight between the PES and ES
stacks, dashed lines are located 0.3 m above a particular line of sight. The “thickness of water” should be
determined on a dashed line.
2. Water barricading is not appropriate for the application of reduced DFD, because
compartments surrounding the PES above the waterline may create an unknown
additional debris hazard.
3. A magazine that is located behind a jetty wall, that meets the requirements of a
barricade, see AASTP-1 Part II, 2.2.3. This means the jetty wall should extend at least 0.3
m above the line of sight between stacks at PES and ES. Attention should be given to
tides, with the least amount of protection being offered at high tide (worst case).
4. When vessels are berthed in tandem (i.e. one behind the other), the bows and
sterns of the vessels may fulfill barricade requirements.
7
“Use of Water for Mitigation of Fragmentation and Blast Effects Due to Intentional Detonation of Munitions”, HNC-
ED-CS-S-00-3, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
8
“Water Barriers to Prevent Prompt Propagation”, HNC-ED-SY-T-06-3, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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5. Other materials/objects are present between the vessel/magazine and other ES that
fulfill barricade design criteria as given in AASTP-1 Part II, 2.2.3. This means those
materials/objects should extend at least 0.3 m above the line of sight between stacks at
PES and ES. The material/objects can include vessel’s construction, HD 1.4S munitions,
etc. Where the top of the stack is unknown compared to the ES, assume the height of the
stack is equal to the deckhead of the magazine (from the PES).
4.6.2.4. Procedures for QD Assessment
1. The two procedures to conduct the QD assessment with respect to vessel-related
magazines are further detailed in Table 6-2. The procedures apply to both IMDs and other
QD. It is recommended to start with the simplest procedure, and only move to a more
complex procedure (involving assessment of ENEQ) in case QD cannot be met.
Procedure 1 Procedure 2
Topic Treat vessel as Treat vessel as
single PES multiple PES
Multiple PES (groups
of magazines that
meet IMD or are
Number of PES
One PES shown to not promptly
represented
propagate (protects
from prompt
propagation)
NEQ for QD Total aggregated NEQ or ENEQ from
assessment NEQ or ENEQ each PES
From envelope From envelope
encompassing the encompassing each
QD vessel and PES and associated
measurement associated exterior exterior AE handling
AE handling areas, areas, and swinging
and swinging circles. circles.
Reference figure 6-3 through 6-7 6-8
Table 6-2: Procedures for QD Assessment of Vessel Magazines
4.6.2.4.1. Vessel as a Single PES with Total NEQ or ENEQ
In the first procedure the vessel is treated as a single PES. This procedure may be applied
for vessels being loaded or berthed. QD are based on the total NEQ present in the
vessel’s compartments, holds, on deck, etc. The total NEQ is aggregated according to
mixing and aggregation rules given in Part I, Chapter 2, section 1.2.3. The total NEQ to be
taken into account must include all AE where it does not meet IMD, e.g. AE on jetties or in
vehicles or other vessels. QD are measured from an area encompassing the vessel(s). For
locations where AE is being handled, the associated exterior AE handling areas must be
included in the PES footprint, as illustrated in Figure 6-3. Swinging circles must be
included within the footprint for explosives anchorages.
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Figure 6-3: PES Envelope Including AE Staging/Handling Areas and Berthed Vessel
Figure 6-4: PES Envelope for Two Vessels Including AE Staging/Handling Areas
Figure 6-5: Swinging Circle Envelope
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Figure 6-6: Single PES on a Vessel without AE Staging/Handling Area
Figure 6-7: Illustration of PES Envelope for Nested Vessels without AE
Staging/Handling Area
4.6.2.4.3. Vessel as Multiple PES each with NEQ or ENEQ
In the second procedure the vessel is represented by multiple PES, which are the (groups
of) magazines, compartments, holds, decks, and AE on the pier that mutually satisfy IMD
requirements. This procedure can be based on either the NEQ or ENEQ. This procedure
must consider AE handling on or to the vessel with the exception of nationally-approved
limited logistical AE movements. QD are now determined based on the (E)NEQ of each
PES and measured from the envelope encompassing each PES and associated exterior
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AE handling areas, and swinging circles. If IMD towards other vessels are not met, the
total (E)NEQ of those vessels also needs to be aggregated. Section 4.6.2.5 provides
guidance on the determination of the ENEQ.
Figure 6-8: Illustration of PES Envelopes for Distinct PESs on a Vessel
4.6.2.5. Effective NEQ (ENEQ)
1. In an ENEQ analysis various aspects are considered such as the spatial separation
of various magazines, compartments, holds, decks and prevention of prompt propagation
by the intermediate vessel’s structure or other materials (see also 4.6.2.3.). Also, it can be
assessed if the NEQ can be reduced by approved storage configurations including nose to
tail orientations, packaging and barrier materials. The procedure for determining the ENEQ
is visually outlined in Figure 6-9. For the aggregation of ENEQ use the rules outlined in
Part I, Chapter 2, section 1.2.3. This article will explain the various steps in more detail to
give guidance on determining the ENEQ for a vessel.
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Figure 6-9: Flow Chart Showing a Method of Calculating ENEQ for a Vessel
a. Step 1 – Gather Information: Identify the NEQ of all munition items. Determine if
ENEQ would be appropriate for any munition items.
Note
In the case of stowage areas aboard a vessel, the ENEQ can be adapted to
account for TNT equivalency depending on energetic materials, casing and stacking
effects. This may be done for all HD and SsD, except HD 1.4. In the case of an
internal explosion aboard a vessel, the vessel’s structural debris throw is mostly
governed by the quasi-static (gas) pressure (QSP). For example, for combined
storage of HD 1.1 shells and their HD 1.3 propelling charges this may be relevant,
as both contribute significantly to the QSP, and therefore to the structural debris
throw.
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b. Step 2 – Intramagazine: Within each stowage area (magazine, compartment,
hold, deck, etc.) determine whether sympathetic detonations are expected to
occur between munition items. Analyze this for all munition types in a single
stowage area. If sympathetic detonations can occur within a particular stowage
area, the (E)NEQ for that stowage area should be calculated. If it is determined
that no sympathetic detonations occur, only the largest (E)NEQ of single
munition item in that stowage area must be considered. Alternatively, all (E)NEQ
in single stowage area may be aggregated without analysis, for example when
analyses are not possible or considered to be too impractical. Any AE staging or
handling area should be treated as if it where a stowage area aboard the vessel.
Note
In general, it can be stated that the dominant factors for causing sympathetic
detonations are fragment impact and/or close-in blast effects. Insensitive munitions
are less susceptible to high velocity fragment impacts and may offer reduced
ENEQ. In this second step the construction of the vessel, stowage configurations,
barriers, packaging, nose to tail configurations, etc. may play a role.
c. Step 3 - Intermagazine: Analyze sympathetic detonations between all stowage
areas aboard the vessel, based on the aggregated (E)NEQ for each individual
stowage area. For this, the barricading requirements outlined in section 4.6.2.3.
provide guidance and Table 6-1 is used to determine the IMD to be satisfied.
Alternatively, upon approval of a National competent authority a different
approach may be used to show two stowage areas do not promptly propagate.
Once it has been determined which, if any, sympathetic detonations can occur
between stowage areas, the (E)NEQ for those stowage areas should be
aggregated. Alternatively, the (E)NEQ of two or more stowage areas may be
aggregated without any analyses. Any AE staging or handling area should be
treated as if it were a stowage area aboard the vessel. If it is determined two or
more stowage areas need to be aggregated, this must be accounted for in the
analysis of the remaining stowage areas (including staging/handling areas).
Note
Again, the construction of the vessel, stowage configurations, barriers, decks,
geometric alignment, etc. play a role in determining if sympathetic detonations can
occur between two particular stowage areas. Each stowage area must be
considered as both donor and acceptor, similar to the procedure for regular
munition magazines (IMD). In case of high velocity fragments, particular attention
should be given to the directionality, as this may indicate whether munition items in
a neighboring stowage area can be hit or not.
2. After Steps 1 - 3, the various PES aboard the vessel are identified, i.e. (groups) of
stowage area(s) that satisfy IMD requirements. Also, each PES is assigned an aggregated
(E)NEQ, and an envelope that encompasses the PES and associated exterior AE handling
areas. QD can now be applied to each particular PES envelope, bearing in mind the
correct PES/ES types to use.
3. Below an example is given for the ENEQ analysis of a vessel, to illustrate each step
in the analysis:
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In this example a frigate is analyzed, which has three stowage areas, see figure 6-
10:
• Area #1: Shells with propelling charges, located on one of the lower decks,
just above the waterline. In total 150kg NEQ of HD 1.1 shells and 350kg of
HD 1.3 propelling charges is stowed here;
• Area #2: VLS for missiles, with 10 canisters with one HD 1.1 missile per
canister, the ENEQ of each missile is 15kg;
• Area #3: Torpedoes, in the aft stowage 20 HD 1.6 torpedoes are stowed,
25kg NEQ per torpedo (MCE = 25kg as well).
This completes step 1, namely to gather the required information on the munition
items.
Figure 6-10: Example ENEQ analysis, location of the stowage areas aboard the
vessel
Next, step analyzes if sympathetic detonations are to be expected within each
stowage area:
• The torpedoes are classified as HD 1.6, so no sympathetic detonations are
expected. The MCE is already known, which is the maximum HD 1.1 like
event that is to be expected. This can be used in step 3. No further analyses
is needed for the aft stowage (Area 3);
• For the missiles in the VLS, test data is available on sympathetic detonations
tests which shows that no sympathetic detonations are to be expected in the
stowage configuration that is used on the vessel. Therefore, the NEQ of the
largest single item, 15kg HD 1.1, is to be used in step 3. No further analyses
is needed for the VLS (Area 2);
• For the gun shells, no test data is available. Also, the stowage configuration
aboard the vessel is deemed too complex to analyze fully, so it is decided to
aggregate all NEQ, i.e. the shells and propelling charges. Following the
aggregation rules from Part I, the total NEQ of this stowage area (Area 1) is
determined to be 500 kg HD 1.1, which is to be used in step 3.
Last, in step 3 it is analyzed if sympathetic detonations are to be expected between
the stowage areas:
• The unbarricaded IMD between the stowage areas (BD14 in this case) is
determined, this gives the most conservative results. It can be shown that
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IMD is satisfied between Areas 1 and 3, and 2 and 3, and vice versa, see
figure 6-12. So, Area 3 may be treated as a separate PES;
• Areas 1 and 2 are too close to meet IMD, so a more detailed analysis is
performed. Through analysis of the design fragments of the shells and
missiles, it can be shown that the blast bulkhead between Area 1 and 2 is
sufficient to prevent perforation by fragments. Hence, it can be shown that no
sympathetic detonations are to be expected between Areas 1 and 2, so they
also may be treated as separate PES.
4. Building on the previous example, the three stowage areas aboard the vessel may
be treated as separate PES, PES type (i) or (j), from which QD should applied. For this
example, three different QD will be shown: IMD to another AE loaded vessel, see figure 6-
11, IMD to a 7-bar ECM and the IBD, see figure 6-12. No staging or handling area is
involved, so the QD may be applied from the three separate PES. The example results will
be listed per PES:
• PES #1 (shells and propelling charges): The NEQ used is 500kg HD 1.1. This
PES may be considered barricaded on the side towards the pier (pier acts as
barricade, determined at high tide) and towards the stern of the vessel (due to
the construction of the vessel):
o The IMD to another AE loaded vessel is BD4 = 7m when a barricade is
present, and BD14 = 39m without a barricade;
o The IMD to a 7-bar ECM is BD5 = 9 m for a side or rear exposed ECM,
and BD11 = 29m for a front exposed ECM.
o The IBD is DFD7 = 155m with a barricade and DFD6 = 336m without a
barricade.
• PES #2 (VLS): The ENEQ to be used is 15kg HD 1.1. This PES may be
considered barricaded on the side towards the stern of the vessel (due to the
construction of the vessel).
o The IMD to another AE loaded vessel is BD4 = 2m when a barricade is
present, and BD14 = 12m without a barricade;
o The IMD to a 7-bar ECM is BD5 = 3 m for a side or rear exposed ECM,
and BD11 = 9m for a front exposed ECM.
o The IBD is DFD7 = 62m with a barricade and DFD6 = 189m without a
barricade.
• PES #3 (torpedoes): The NEQ to be used is 500 kg HD1.6, the MCE is 25kg.
This PES may be considered barricaded on the side towards the bow of the
vessel (due to the construction of the vessel).
o The IMD to another AE loaded vessel is TD1 = 25m;
o The IMD to a 7-bar ECM is BD5 = 4 m for a side or rear exposed ECM,
and BD11 = 11m for a front exposed ECM.
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o The IBD is DFD7 = 63m with a barricade and DFD6 = 206m without a
barricade.
Figure 6-11: Example, IMD to other stowage areas or another AE loaded vessel, all
unbarricaded.
Figure 6-12: Example, IBD shown for the three PES aboard the vessel.
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4.6.2.6. Application of QD Tables
1. Additional guidance follows for using the QD tables from Part I when applied within
the context of vessel magazines:
a. Some QDs refer to “Note 2.) No items vulnerable to spall.” This is not
relevant to vessel magazines, because metal structures generally do not
cause spall which is relevant to this footnote.
b. Some QDs refer to “Note 3.) Effect of lobbed munitions.” This will not be
relevant if the PES or ES are inside the vessel structure with overhead
compartments blocking incoming lobbed ammunition.
c. The BD1 distance for “open bomb bay” is not applicable.
2. Compatibility group mixing rules do not apply between cells of a launcher. For
example, national standards often consider the different launchers within a launching
system (e.g., VLS) as wholly self-contained magazines or equivalent.
4.6.3. PORT OPERATIONS
4.6.3.1. Dry Dock Operations
All AE (except for safety of life at sea (SOLAS) or HD 1.4 force protection munitions) must
be offloaded prior to dry-docking, except in emergency situations when authorized by the
National Authority.
4.6.3.2. Refueling
Simultaneous bulk fuel loading and ammunition handling shall not be conducted at the
same pier or anchorage. When refueling is conducted pier side or at anchorage,
ammunition handling shall be prohibited by all vessels located at the pier or in the
anchorage. Internal bulk fuel transfers shall not be conducted while handling ammunition
on the same vessel.
4.6.3.3. Emergency Plans
The national and port authorities shall have in place a suitable and sufficient emergency
plan to deal with any AE related incidents or accidents.
4.6.4. RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR PORTS
1. When QD cannot be met for reasons of operational necessity, national authorities
may apply a safety management system to formally assess, communicate, and accept
explosives risk.
2. NATO guidance for conducting a risk assessment is described in AASTP-1 Part IV,
Chapter 2. In a risk assessment, a number of aspects are taken into account that are not
addressed by QD. One aspect is the probability of the event, which is affected by the
(temporary) presence of vessels carrying AE, and the type and number of
loading/unloading operations in a given time frame. Furthermore, in a risk assessment the
consequences from vessel-related accidents are analyzed in a greater level of detail, and
the (temporary) exposure of personnel and third parties is taken into account.
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3. Common risk mitigations applied to military vessels as a part of a national safety
and risk management system may include ensuring that vessels are in a quiescent state.
The following contribute to achieving the quiescent state:
a. All AE is stowed in their designated magazines/explosives lockers and are
secured.
b. Activities such as AE movement, electrical testing, or reprogramming do not
take place on board.
c. Fully functioning AE firefighting capabilities are in place.
d. National and impacted nations’ authorities have accepted this alternative
safety management system.
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CHAPTER 7 DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
4.7.1.1. Introduction
1. This Chapter:
a. Briefly addresses the increased emphasis that NATO and many of its member
nations place on use of munitions disposal and demilitarization methods and
techniques that do not involve destruction (i.e., open burning (OB) or open
detonation (OD)), To satisfy best practice environmental and explosives safety
policy and regulations.
b. Provides safety guidelines for the destruction of ammunition and explosives,
when it has been determined that they cannot be disposed of through other
disposal or demilitarization means.
c. May be applied to the destruction of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO),
captured stockpiles, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations,
battlefield area clearance, and munitions recovered during range clearance,
subject to technical staff assessments and national approval.
2. For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions for disposal and
demilitarization apply:
a. Disposal. The end-of-life tasks and actions for residual materials resulting
from demilitarization operations.
Note 1 - Disposal encompasses the process of redistributing,
transferring, donating, selling, abandoning, or destroying military
munitions.
Note 2 - EOD activities are not included in this definition.
b. Demilitarization. The act of removing or otherwise nullifying the military
potential of a munition. Demilitarization is a necessary step for military items
prior to their release into a non-military setting.
3. Additional information regarding demilitarization equipment and techniques can be
found in:
a. NATO AC/326 Subgroup (SG) C’s PFP(AC/326-SG5)N(2008)0001
“Demilitarization Equipment and Techniques,” which is kept current based on
national input. Nations are encouraged to contribute informal working papers
(IWP) detailing their national demilitarization and disposal programs,
practices, and techniques.
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b. Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC) Report, L-118,
“Review of Demilitarization and Disposal techniques for Munitions and
Related Materials,” January 2006, which has been released by MSIAC to
AC/326 Nations.
4. EOD-related response activities are not covered by this chapter and requirements for
such are addressed in other national and NATO documents.
5. Unique munitions types
a. Chemical and nuclear. Special care must be taken when considering
disposal or demilitarization of unique types of munitions such as chemical
and nuclear. This chapter does not address these special circumstances.
b. Less vulnerable munitions (otherwise known as Insensitive munitions (IM)).
The development of disposal methods for IM are not well developed nor well
documented. A number of NATO nations now have national policies
specifying requirements to develop or procure munitions with reduced
vulnerability to certain stimuli. Their disposal and demilitarization may
require the use of processes different from those currently used for
conventional munitions. Because this is an important and relatively new
area, nations are encouraged to share methods, technologies, techniques,
studies and experiences involving IM disposal or demilitarization (paragraph
4.7.1.1.3.a).
4.7.1.2. Design for Demilitarization and Disposal
1. Growing international awareness of ecological and environments issues and the
impact of industrial waste disposal processes have resulted in NATO member nations
closely examining their munitions demilitarization and disposal programs and
processes. On that basis, STANAG 4518, “Safe Disposal of Munitions, Design
Principles and Requirements, and Safety Assessment”:
a. Encourages nations to move away from disposal processes that rely on
destruction and toward those that maximize the recovery and reuse of
component materials.
b. Specifies that disposal and demilitarization be considered as part of the
Whole Life Cycle of new or modified munitions.
c. Provides design and assessment principles for new munitions programs and
requires that nations developing a munition:
(1) Incorporate acceptable end-of-mission (EOM), end-of-operational-life
(EOOL), or end-of-life (EOL) disposal capabilities.
(2) Assess designs for its adherence to the guidance provided in
STANAG 4518.
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(3) Document the EOM/EOL disposal processes to be used on the
munition.
d. Requires, for new and modified munition development programs, that nations
prepare a demilitarization and disposal plan that identify the processes,
procedures, and equipment necessary to accomplish the safe and
environmentally acceptable demilitarization and disposal of a munition or its
components.
2. The disposal of ammunition and explosives can occur at any point throughout the
Whole Life Cycle. The demilitarization and disposal plan may be brought into use in
whole or in part at EOM, EOL, post operations, post component replacement, or at any
time to system retirement. Large scale disposals are often undertaken as a logistic
task through Logistic Support force elements or contracting.
3. Infrastructure required for the demilitarization of munitions.
a. The effort to provide for safe and environmentally responsible destruction of
munitions has led to many technological developments in recent years.
Further, many nations are striving for technologies that will maximize the
recovery, recycling and re-use (R3) of materials. Paragraph 4.7.1.1.3.a.
identifies available technologies that could potentially be used by nations to
safely and effectively destroy or remove the energetic materials and treat the
emissions and/or effluents streams resulting from these processes. The use
of any of those technologies requires Competent National Authority approval.
b. The variety of technologies available makes it impossible to cover all the
safety aspect involved with their use. Demilitarization operations need to be
carried out in installations where the risk is reduced to a nationally acceptable
level.
c. The following activities are generally associated with demilitarization
operation:
(1) Explosive storage magazines
(2) Size reduction or disassembly line
(3) Destruction activities (e.g., flashing furnaces, explosive waste
incinerators, contained detonation chambers)
(4) Scrap and waste handling and storage areas
(5) OB and OD (for safety reasons and when no other disposal options
are available)
d. The guidelines given in other parts of AASTP-1 for ammunition and
explosives activities and facilities (e.g., storage, workshops, QD) shall also be
applied to demilitarization activities. The following are additional guidelines
applicable to such operations:
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(1) Demilitarization operations can be extremely hazardous and require a
thorough knowledge of the activities involved, the hazards to be
guarded against, and the precautionary methods necessary for
greatest protection to personnel and property.
(2) The number of persons permitted at or near the operation will be kept
to a minimum (this is a basic rule for all explosives operations but
needs to be reiterated because of the high potential for increased
risk).
(3) The quantity of explosives or ammunition at an operating location shall
be kept to the minimum necessary to carry out the operation. This
particularly applies to explosives scrap and components which shall
be isolated (e.g., shields, barricades, hardened walls) from other
explosives and operations to the maximum extent possible. Such
materials shall be removed frequently from the operating location, to
minimize the amount being held at any one time, and placed in an
appropriate storage location specifically designated for that purpose
by the National Competent Authority.
(4) Determination of the maximum credible event for the materials and
operational scenario involved is an essential part of the evaluation of
the operator protection requirements.
(5) Operational shields or remote cells shall be provided when the
operation to be performed provides an unacceptable risk of exposure.
Shields and cells shall be designed to provide protection to operators
and surrounding personnel and facilities. Refer to 4.7.1.3.11.b. for
further information regarding an open-distribution design manual
available to help nations in the design of protective structures to resist
the effects from accidental explosions.
e. A number of national documents provide mitigation information (e.g., dividing
walls, safety walls, operating shields) that can be used to limit the size of
explosive events. Three of those are given below:
(1) USA Doc PAM 385_64 Ammunition and Explosives Safety
Standards
(2) GER ZDv 34_220 - Sicherheitstechnische Forderungen an
Munanlagen (Technical Safety requirements for Ammunition
Facilities)
(3) DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) Technical Paper (TP) 15,
“Approved Protective Construction“
4. Environmental considerations. The systems approach should also consider
environment aspects alongside safety with regards to the Whole Life Cycle. According
to STANAG 4518, environmental aspects should have been assessed as the project moves from
concept to production. Due to the complexities of different laws and regulations in different
countries, compliance is considered to be a national responsibility, and will not be
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discussed further in this chapter.
4.7.1.3. Destruction (OB and OD) Operations
1. The destruction guidelines given in this chapter are intended to minimize risk
associated with conducting such operations. All destruction operations must be
carried out in accordance with rules and regulations established by the
Competent National Authority.
2. Selection of destruction areas. Properly selected/designed destruction areas will
minimize risks associated with such sites. The following provides some
guidelines pertaining to such areas:
a. The ideal destruction area is one with deep soil, free from loose rocks, where
trenches and pits can be dug easily and in which the risk of fire is negligible.
b. In the selection of a permanent destruction area, the land should be above
rather than below the surrounding area and naturally draining.
c. Consideration should be given to the general weather conditions experienced
in the area. Avoid areas that experience excessive fog, heavy precipitation,
overcast, frigid temperatures and frequent inversions.
d. The destruction area should be as far as possible from:
(1) Ammunition and explosives storage magazines and other buildings in
the explosives area
(2) Administration buildings
(3) Public and inhabited buildings
(4) Congregation areas for people in the open (e.g., parks)
(5) Overhead and underground cables and utilities
(6) Land drainage systems, water mains, sewers and underground or
aboveground pipelines
(7) Railway and highway cuttings, tunnels and embankments where earth
shocks might undermine or cause debris to fall on the tracks or roads;
(8) Airfields
(9) Environmentally sensitive areas (e.g., wetlands, coastline, lakeshore,
endangered species, or threatened plants)
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3. Destruction area site plan and authorization
a. A current site plan of the destruction area showing its location and the
distances to surrounding exposures (e.g., magazines, dwellings, radar/radio
antennae, traffic routes, destruction area control point shelter and material
awaiting disposal) shall be maintained. The site plan shall include a
withdrawal distance template based on the minimum separation distances
specified later in paragraph 4.7.1.3.8. for OD and paragraph 4.7.1.3.12. for
OB, and those distances shall be included on local maps to prevent
encroachment and trespassers.
b. When minimum separation distance requirements cannot be met, then
appropriate mitigation measures shall be implemented to protect surrounding
exposures to an acceptable level. Any deviation from requirements, to
include mitigation measures being employed, shall be communicated to and
approved by the appropriate decision-maker.
4. OD operation explosives limits.
a. Local conditions can influence the size of intentional detonations, thereby
limiting detonations to lesser net explosive quantities (NEQ) than that
established per paragraph 4.7.1.3.8. When local conditions, as given in
paragraph 4.7.1.3.4.b. below exist or are suspected, it is important that a
deliberate process be used to determine an acceptable detonation quantity
that can be destroyed without risk to life and property, and without undue
disturbance to the surrounding population. That process begins by qualified
personnel first determining an initial limited quantity to be destroyed and then
gradually increasing that quantity until the acceptable limit (never to exceed
the destruction area’s sited NEQ) is reached.
b. When determining these additional limits due to local conditions,
consideration shall be given to:
(1) The maximum throw distance of fragment and debris
(2) The maximum radius of blast effects
(3) Shock transmission through the particular ground strata (e.g., high
water tables or rock formations)
(4) The effects of terrain (e.g., flat or surrounded by high ground)
(5) The effects of overcast weather conditions
(6) The effects of wind direction
5. Blast (sound) focusing prediction software for OD destruction areas. To minimize
the adverse effects that weather and wind conditions can have on detonation operations,
it is recommended that meteorological prediction software be employed to help prevent
disturbances and potential damage (e.g., enhanced noise due to sound focusing,
window breakage) to the surrounding population, limiting the impact of high order
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detonation activities and thereby ensuring the continued operation of the site. Limiting
the amount of explosive material to be detonated at any one time is a possible technique
to limit noise and blast effect impacts to the surrounding areas.
6. Destruction area maintenance. To minimize the spread of fire at destruction areas,
firebreaks must be maintained around and within destruction areas as required. A 60 m
clear zone that is free of all trees, dry grass and undergrowth should be maintained around
the designated destruction point. The area should be restricted and marked as required by
the Competent National Authority.
7. Record keeping. A record keeping system should be maintained that includes
location of destruction operations, summary of items destroyed including the NEQ, date of
operation and other data required by the Competent National Authority.
8. Withdrawal distances for OD operations.
a. When conducting OD operations, the control of fragments is critical as this is
the hazard that generally determines safety distances. OD generates
primary fragments from the targeted munitions and secondary
fragments/debris from the resultant effects of the explosion. Burial of
munitions as part of OD can be used to effectively control blast, thermal, and
fragment hazards. However, burial is not always an option and in such
cases, fragment distances will be significantly greater. Paragraph 4.7.1.3.12.
describes techniques that can be used to limit fragmentation distances.
b. Adequate withdrawal distances can be used to protect personnel involved in
the OD operations as well as personnel not involved, such as those
personnel located in surrounding magazines, explosives workshops and
laboratories, inhabited buildings, places of assembly, highways and railroads.
(Note: National Competent Authorities shall determine the required
separation distance for the protection of structures and equipment.)
Personnel withdrawal distances shall be determined as follows:
(1) If withdrawal distance is used to protect personnel, this withdrawal
distance is determined using paragraphs 4.7.1.3.8.d. below.
(2) If those personnel performing the OD operation must be located at
less than the 4.7.1.3.8.d. calculated withdrawal distance, then
protective structures shall be used to protect OD personnel and
materiel from explosion hazards associated with the OD area. The
protection afforded by such shelters shall meet paragraph 4.7.1.3.11.
c. Regarding Tables 7-1 and 7-2 below:
(1) The MFDs given are for individual munition items. These distances do
not consider “rogue” fragments that are produced by sections of nose
plugs, base plates, or lugs, and they do not directly apply to stacks of
munitions. In addition, shaped charge jets or slugs from directed
energy munitions can travel significantly greater distances than case
fragments; therefore, these munitions require specific analysis. See
paragraph 4.7.1.3.9. for more information regarding rogue fragments.
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(2) MFDs are controlled by whether a munition is treated as “robust” or
“non-robust”. These terms relate to munition characteristics that can
influence case-fragment throw. Those terms are defined as follows:
(a) Robust (thick-skinned) munitions. Munition items that meet
any two of the following criteria:
i. Ratio of explosive weight to empty case weight < 1.
ii. Have a nominal case thickness of at least 1 cm.
iii. Have a ratio of case thickness to NEQ1/3 > 0.165 cm/kg1/3
(b) Non-robust munitions. Items that do not meet the definition
of robust munitions.
d. The following methodology shall be used to calculate the required personnel
withdrawal distance:
(1) For non-fragmenting munitions or bare explosives, use d =130.1Q1/3,
but not less than 61 m. The maximum debris throw distance, with a
safety factor determined by the National Competent Authority may be
used to replace the 61 m minimum distance.
(2) For fragmenting munitions use the larger of the following:
1/3
(a) d = 130.1Q but not less than 61 m.
(b) The Maximum Fragment Distance (MFD) given in Tables 7-1
and 7-2, based on the case diameter or NEQ of the munition
being destroyed. A calculated or measured MFD (including the
interaction effects for stacks of items or single items, whichever
applies), with a safety factor determined by the National
Competent Authority, may be used to replace these distances.
(c) The distances given in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 are based on one
munition being detonated. When multiple munitions are
detonated, there are interaction effects that occur, which can
account for increased MFD. See paragraph 4.7.1.3.10. for
guidelines on how to address multiple munition detonations.
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DIAMETER MFD1 (m) DIAMETER MFD1 (m)
(mm) ROBUST2 NON-ROBUST3 (mm) ROBUST2 NON-ROBUST3
2.54 20.3 19.3 177.8 906.9 575.6
5.08 47.9 38.5 190.5 948.2 598.3
7.62 74.7 56.3 203.2 988.4 620.0
10.16 100.1 72.8 215.9 1027.7 640.9
12.70 124.0 88.4 228.6 1066.1 660.9
15.24 146.7 103.2 241.3 1103.8 680.2
17.78 168.2 117.2 254.0 1140.8 698.9
20.32 188.8 130.6 266.7 1177.1 716.9
22.86 208.5 143.5 279.4 1212.8 734.3
25.40 227.4 155.8 292.1 1247.9 751.1
38.10 313.1 211.8 304.8 1282.5 767.5
50.80 387.7 260.5 317.5 1316.6 783.4
63.50 454.9 303.8 330.2 1350.3 798.8
76.20 516.6 343.1 342.9 1383.6 813.8
88.90 574.1 379.2 355.6 1416.4 828.4
101.6 628.1 412.7 368.3 1448.9 842.6
114.3 679.4 443.9 381.0 1481.0 856.5
127.0 728.4 473.2 406.4 1544.3 883.2
139.7 775.3 500.9 457.2 1667.4 932.9
152.4 820.6 527.0 508.0 1786.6 978.5
165.1 864.4 551.9
Table 7-1 – Default MFD Based On Case Diameter
Notes for Table 7-1:
1. These values are for individual munitions and do not apply to stacks. They also do not address
“rogue” (non-case) fragments that can be produced from sections of nose plugs, base plates or
lugs. Rogue fragments can travel to significantly greater distances (i.e., > 3,048 m) than those
shown. Care must be taken to properly orient the munition or take other measures to minimize
rogue fragment hazards.
2. For robust Items (MFD in m, diameter (d) in mm; ln is natural logarithm):
MFD = exp [1.6165613 + (1.6539807 x ln(d)) + (-0.1827467 x ((ln(d))2)) + (0.011 x ((ln(d))3))]
Diameter = exp [-1.9759 + (0.98111 x ln(MFD)) + (-0.049786 x ((ln(MFD))2)) + (0.0085792 x ((ln(MFD))3))]
3. For non-robust Items (MFD in m, diameter (d) in mm; ln is natural logarithm):
MFD = exp [1.9478 + (1.138 x ln(d)) + (-0.055438 x ((ln(d))2))]
Diameter = exp [-0.444 + (0.41287 x ln(MFD)) + (0.074179 x ((ln(MFD))2))]
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NEQ MFD (m)
1
NEQ MFD (m)
1
(kg) ROBUST2 NON-ROBUST3 (kg) ROBUST2 NON-ROBUST3
0.005 160.7 60.5 0.68 648.7 278.5
0.007 186.4 69.6 0.91 685.8 300.1
0.009 206.2 76.7 1.36 739.0 332.6
0.014 236.4 87.7 1.81 777.4 357.1
0.018 259.4 96.4 2.27 807.5 377.0
0.023 278.1 103.5 2.72 832.2 393.9
0.027 294.0 109.7 3.18 853.3 408.5
0.032 307.8 115.2 3.63 871.6 421.5
0.036 320.1 120.1 4.08 887.8 433.2
0.041 331.1 124.6 4.54 902.3 443.8
0.045 341.2 128.7 6.80 958.6 486.4
0.068 381.4 145.6 9.07 998.8 518.1
0.091 411.3 158.7 13.61 1055.7 565.1
0.14 455.4 178.7 22.68 1128.1 627.9
0.18 487.9 194.1 31.75 1176.0 671.4
0.23 513.8 206.7 45.36 1227.2 719.2
0.27 535.3 217.5 68.04 1285.8 775.7
0.32 553.9 227.0 90.72 1327.7 817.1
0.36 570.1 335.4 136.08 1387.4 877.0
0.41 584.5 243.1 226.80 1463.9 955.1
0.45 597.6 250.1 317.51 1515.3 1007.7
Table 7-2 – Default MFD Based on NEQ
Notes for Table 7-2:
1. These values are for individual munitions and do not apply to stacks. They also do not address
“rogue” (non-case) fragments that can be produced from sections of nose plugs, base plates or
lugs. Rogue fragments can travel to significantly greater distances (i.e., > 3,048 m) than those
shown. Care must be taken to properly orient the munition or take other measures to minimize
rogue fragment hazards.
2. For robust Items (MFD in m, NEQ (Q) in kg; ln is natural logarithm):
MFD = exp [6.5488866 + (0.1869893 x ln(Q)) + (-0.012577 x ((ln(Q))2)) + (0.0006 x ((ln(Q))3))]
NEQ = exp [-11.909 + (0.89322 x ln(MFD)) + (-0.10506 x ((ln(MFD))2)) + (0.038091 x ((ln(MFD))3))]
3. For non-robust Items (MFD in m, NEQ (Q) in kg; ln is natural logarithm):
MFD = exp [5.729 + (0.255240 x ln(Q)) + (-0.008554 x ((ln(Q))2))]
NEQ = exp [-24.875 + (8.9619 x ln(MFD)) + (-1.4488 x ((ln(MFD))2)) + (0.11389 x ((ln(MFD))3))]
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9. Rogue fragments
Rogue fragments can travel significantly greater distances (> 3,048 m) than those shown
above in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. Care must be taken either to properly orient the munition
(e.g., lugs or strong-backs and nose or tail plate sections oriented away from personnel
locations), or to minimize or eliminate the hazard of rogue fragments (e.g., sand bagging
the munition prior to detonation or placement of munitions in a trench).
10. Multiple munition detonation
a For a detonation involving multiple munitions, the preferred approach is:
(1) Place the munitions in a single layer with their sides touching such that
their axis is horizontal.
(2) Place the munitions so that the nose of each munition is pointing in the
same direction.
(3) Orient the munitions so that lugs or strong backs and nose or tail plate
sections are directed downward or facing towards installed protection
(e.g., sandbags or sides of the trench) and/or away from areas to be
protected.
(4) Where munitions are not in single layers (i.e., are stacked), initiation of
the detonation is done so that all munitions detonate simultaneously.
The purpose of stacking (in a pit or trench) is to use sympathetic
detonation and reduce the serviceable explosive applied.
b Use the following when the procedures outlined in paragraph 4.7.1.3.10.a.
above cannot be met:
(1) If the orientation of the potential rogue fragments can be controlled,
then the ranges given in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 shall be increased by 33
percent (%) to account for the interaction effects.
(2) If the orientation of potential rogue fragments cannot be controlled,
fragment ranges must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
(3) If detonations involve stacks of mixed munitions, evaluate the distance
for each munition separately using the procedures in subparagraph
4.7.1.3.8.d. and use the largest calculated withdrawal distance and
then apply the 33 percent (%) as discussed in 4.7.1.3.10.b.(1) above.
11. Protective construction for personnel performing OD operations.
a. Where ammunition is being destroyed by detonation, a splinter-proof shelter
may be provided as a control point, to provide protection for personnel from
blast, fragments, and debris hazards if they are located at less than the
withdrawal distance determined using paragraph 4.7.1.3.8.d.
b. The siting and design of protective shelters for personnel is the responsibility
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of the National Competent Authority. The following describes an open-
distribution design manual available to help nations in the design of
protective structures:
(1) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-340-02, "Structures to Resist the
Effects of Accidental Explosions," 5 December 2008. This document
superseded the older United States (U.S.) Technical Manual (TM) 5-
1300 and is available from the Whole Building Design Guide website
https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc/ufc-3-340-02.
(2) UFC 3-340-02 presents methods of design for protective construction
used in facilities for development, testing, production, storage,
maintenance, modification, inspection, demilitarization, and disposal of
explosive materials. The manual establishes design procedures and
construction techniques to provide protection for personnel and
valuable equipment.
c. When required, personnel protection shall:
(1) Stop fragments
(2) Provide thermal protection, and
(3) Limit overpressure levels to ≤15.9 kPa in personnel-occupied areas.
Considerations should include (Note: ear plugs, ear muffs, etc. can be
used to provide the necessary protection):
(a) Decibel (dB) levels
(b) Duration (milliseconds)
(c) Frequency (number of exposures)
12. Methods for reducing OD fragmentation distances.
a. When conducting normal OD operations, it is prudent to prepare
destruction pits for disposal of ammunition and explosives in a manner to
protect the environment and human health. A destruction pit is dug into
the ground and an overhang is formed on the side facing the Control
Point to ensure that all fragments and debris from the disposal operation
will be contained. Once prepared for firing the destruction pit is then
covered with rock-free earth to a minimum depth consistent with the size
of the prepared charge. If done correctly, no high velocity fragments
should escape the destruction pit although some low-velocity crater
ejecta (soil) should be expected. An earth cover of 3 meters practically
guarantees that all primary fragments are stopped.
b. When the situation does not permit the burial of the ammunition or
explosives and initiation charge, there are other methods that can be
employed to reduce the velocity of the fragments. Sandbags, blast
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blankets, water barricades and water bladders can be used to reduce
fragmentation velocity or contain them completely. As those types of
operations are more likely in EOD type scenarios involving smaller NEQ,
they are not covered in any detail in this chapter. Use of such mitigation
would require National Competent Authority approval.
c. In the event that there is a requirement to calculate the MFD that
ammunition projectiles could generate if not properly contained, there are
a number of publications that can be utilized to calculate withdrawal
distances. Since there are a number of variables in the calculation of the
maximum fragment distance (used a basis for setting withdrawal
distances) such as: type of munitions, explosive fill and weight, thickness
of projectile body, and altitude, that a specific listing or table of maximum
fragment distances versus ammunition type is not possible. Listed below
are two documents that provide information and mathematical formulae
for determining fragmentation characteristics, hazards, and safe
distances for detonation of single as well as for multiple munitions:
(1) DDESB Technical Paper (TP) 16 “Methodologies For Calculating
Primary Fragment Characteristics” (Limited Distribution document)
(2) GBR Technical Ammunition Bulletin 21/3101, “Estimation Of Explosive
Danger Areas”
13. OB areas.
The following shall be used to determine minimum safe distances:
(1) For personnel involved in OB operations or those conducting unrelated
AE operations: d = 9.52Q1/3
(2) For persons not involved in OB operations:
(a) For NEQ of burn material < 204.1 kg, use the minimum Hazard
Fragment Distance (HFD) given in Table 7-3
(b) For NEQ of burn material > 204.1 kg, the minimum safe
distance shall be at least 381m
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NEQ (kg) HFD (m) NEQ (kg) HFD (m)
< 0.23 kg 71.9 m 13.6 kg 170.9 m
0.3 kg 80.2 m 14.1 kg 171.7 m
0.45 kg 88.8 m 22.7 kg 183.2 m
0.91 kg 105.5 m 31.8 kg 191.3 m
1.4 kg 115.3 m 45.4 kg 200.4 m
2.3 kg 127.7 m 68.0 kg 248.5 m
3.2 kg 135.6 m 90.7 kg 282.6 m
4.5 kg 144.4 m 136.1 kg 330.6 m
6.8 kg 154.2 m 204.1 kg 378.7 m
9.1 kg 161.1 m >204.1 kg 381.0 m
Table 7-3 – HD 1.1 HFD
Notes for Table 7-3:
(1) Equations to determine HFD based on NEQ (NEQ in kg, HFD in m, with a minimum distance of
71.9 m; ln is natural logarithm):
NEQ < 45.4 kg: HFD = 107.87 + [24.14 x ln(NEQ)];
NEQ > 45.4 kg: HFD = -251.87 + [118.56 x ln(NEQ)];
(2) Equations to determine NEQ based on available HFD (NEQ in kg, HFD in m; exp [x] is ex):
HFD < 200.5 m; NEQ = exp [ (HFD/24.14) – 4.4685];
200.5 m < HFD < 381 m; NEQ = exp [ (HFD/118.56) + 2.1244];
(3) Use of equations given in Notes (1) and (2), to determine other HFD-NEQ combinations, is
allowed.
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