Opinion No 05/2019

EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, XXX […](2019) XXX draft ANNEX TO EASA OPINION No 05/2019 COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) …/... of XXX amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 as regards the introduction of class C5 and C6 UAS EN EN  EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1. CONTEXT OF THE DELEGATED ACT Two new CE classes, C5 and C6, are established for UAS to be used in the ‘specific’ category under the conditions determined respectively by standard scenarios STS-01 and STS-02 as defined in the proposed amendement to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. 2. CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE ACT The proposed amendment has been consulted by EASA during a focused consultation held in July 2019 with the participation of national aviation authorities, operators and manufacturers of manned and unmanned aviation, and through an EASA Advisory Bodies’ consultation that took place from 25 September till 14 October 2019. 3. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE DELEGATED ACT [Briefly] EN 1 EN  COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) …/... of XXX amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 as regards the introduction of class C5 and C6 UAS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (1), and in particular Article 58 and Article 61 thereof, Whereas: (1) The unmanned aircraft systems (‘UAS’) whose operation presents a low risk and for which the UAS operator is allowed to submit a declaration based on the standard scenario listed in Appendix 1 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (2), should not be subject to classic aeronautical compliance procedures. The possibility to establish Community harmonisation legislation as referred to in paragraph 6 of Article 56 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 should be used for those UAS. Consequently, it is necessary to set out the requirements that address the risks posed by the operation of those UAS, taking full account of other applicable Union harmonisation legislation. (2) These requirements should cover the essential requirements set out in Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, in particular as regards the specific features and functionalities necessary to mitigate risks pertaining to the safety of the flight, privacy and protection of personal data, security or the environment, arising from the operation of these UAS. They lead to the creation of different classes of UAS characterised by different sets of requirements addressing different level of risks. (3) When manufacturers place a UAS on the market with the intention of making it available for operations under the rules and conditions applicable to the ‘open’ category or under an operational declaration and therefore affix a class identification label on it, they should ensure the compliance of the UAS with the requirements of that class. 1 OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45). EN 2 EN  (4) The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has prepared draft implementing rules and submitted them with Opinion No 05/2019 (3) in accordance with points (b) and (c) of Article 75(2) and with Article 76(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of experts established in accordance with Article 128(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 (1) Recital 1 is replaced by the following: ‘(1) The unmanned aircraft systems (‘UAS’) whose operation presents a low risk and that belong to the ‘open’ category of operations or for which the UAS operator is allowed to submit a declaration based on the standard scenarios listed in Appendix 1 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (4), should not be subject to classic aeronautical compliance procedures. The possibility to establish Community harmonisation legislation as referred to in paragraph 6 of Article 56 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 should be used for those UAS. Consequently, it is necessary to set out the requirements that address the risks posed by the operation of those UAS, taking full account of other applicable Union harmonisation legislation.’; (2) Recital 2 is replaced by the following: ‘(2) These requirements should cover the essential requirements set out in Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, in particular as regards the specific features and functionalities necessary to mitigate risks pertaining to the safety of the flight, privacy and protection of personal data, security or the environment, arising from the operation of these UAS. They lead to the creation of several classes of UAS characterised by different sets of requirements addressing different level of risk.’; (3) Recital 3 is replaced by the following: ‘(3) When manufacturers place a UAS on the market with the intention of making it available for operations under the conditions of the ‘open’ category or under an operational declaration and therefore affix a class identification label on it, they should ensure compliance of the UAS with the requirements of that class. Equally, when manufacturers place on the market an accessories kit transforming a class C3 UAS into a C5, they should ensure compliance of the UAS fitted with the accessories kit with all the requirements of class C5’; (4) Recital 10 is replaced by the following: ‘(10) Decision No 768/2008/EC (5) of the European Parliament and of the Council sets out common principles and horizontal provisions intended to apply to marketing of products that are subject to relevant sectorial legislation. In order to ensure consistency with other sectorial product legislation, the provisions on the marketing 3 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions 4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45). 5 Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82). EN 3 EN  of a UAS and a class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label should be aligned with the framework established by Decision No 768/2008/EC.’; (5) Recital 13 is replaced by the following: ‘(13) Member States should take the necessary steps to ensure that UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels are made available on the market and put into service only where they do not compromise the health and safety of persons, domestic animals or property, when normally used.’; (6) Recital 14 is replaced by the following: ‘(14) In order to provide citizens with a high level of environmental protection, it is necessary to limit the noise emissions to the greatest possible extent. Sound power limitations applicable to UAS intended to be operated in the ‘open’ category might be reviewed once more information on the impact of the noise produced by these UA becomes available.’; (7) Recital 16 is replaced by the following: ‘(16) In order to ensure a high level of protection of public interest, such as health and safety, and to guarantee fair competition on the Union market, economic operators should be responsible for the compliance of each UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label with the requirements laid down in this Regulation, in relation to their respective roles in the supply and distribution chain. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a clear and proportionate distribution of obligations, which corresponds to the role of each economic operator in the supply and distribution chain.’; (8) Recital 17 is replaced by the following: ‘(17) In order to facilitate communication between economic operators, national market surveillance authorities and consumers, economic operators supplying or distributing UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels should provide a website address in addition to the postal address.’; (9) Recital 18 is replaced by the following: ‘(18) The manufacturer, having detailed knowledge of the design and production process, is best placed to carry out the conformity assessment procedure of a UAS placed on the market with a class identification label. Conformity assessment should therefore remain solely the obligation of the manufacturer.’; (10) Recital 19 is replaced by the following: ‘(19) This Regulation should apply to any UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label that is new to the Union market, whether a new UAS made by a manufacturer established in the Union or a new or second-hand UAS imported from a third country.’; (11) Recital 20 is replaced by the following: ‘(20) It is necessary to ensure that UAS from third countries that enter the Union market comply with the requirements of this Regulation if they bear class identification labels. In particular, it should be ensured that manufacturers carry out appropriate conformity assessment procedures. Provision should therefore be made for importers to make sure that the UAS they place on the market comply with the requirements of this Regulation and that they do not place on the market UAS which EN 4 EN  do not comply with these requirements or present a risk. Provision should also be made for importers to make sure that the conformity assessment procedures have been carried out and that the CE marking and technical documentation drawn up by the manufacturers is available for inspection by the competent national authorities.’; (12) Recital 21 is replaced by the following: ‘(21) The distributor who makes a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label available on the market should act with due care to ensure that its handling of the product does not adversely affect its compliance. Both importers and distributors are expected to act with due care in relation to the requirements applicable when placing or making products available on the market.’; (13) Recital 22 is replaced by the following: ‘(22) When placing on the market a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label, every importer should indicate on the UAS their name, registered trade name or registered trademark and the address at which they can be contacted. Exceptions should be provided for cases where the size of the UAS does not allow this. This includes cases where importers would have to open the packaging to put their name and address on the UAS.’; (14) Recital 23 is replaced by the following: ‘(23) Any economic operator that either places a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label on the market under their own name or trademark, or modifies a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label in such a way that compliance with the applicable requirements may be affected, should be considered to be the manufacturer and should assume the obligations of the manufacturer.’; (15) Recital 24 is replaced by the following: ‘(24) Distributors and importers, being close to the market place, should be involved in market surveillance tasks carried out by the competent national authorities, and should be prepared to participate actively, providing those authorities with all the necessary information relating to UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels.’; (16) Recital 25 is replaced by the following: ‘(25) Ensuring the traceability of a UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label throughout the whole supply chain helps to make market surveillance simpler and more efficient. An efficient traceability system facilitates the market surveillance authorities’ task of tracing economic operators who make non-compliant UAS available on the market.’; (17) Recital 26 is replaced by the following: ‘(26) This Regulation should be limited to the setting out of the essential requirements. In order to facilitate the assessment of conformity of each UAS bearing a class identification label with those requirements, it is necessary to provide for a presumption of conformity for products, which are in conformity with harmonised standards that are adopted in accordance with Regulation (EU) No EN 5 EN  1025/2012 (6) of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purpose of setting out detailed technical specifications of those requirements.’; (18) Recital 27 is replaced by the following: ‘(27) The essential requirements applicable to a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label should be worded precisely enough to create legally binding obligations. They should be formulated so as to make it possible to assess conformity with them even in the absence of harmonised standards or where the manufacturer chooses not to apply a harmonised standard.’; (19) Recital 28 is replaced by the following: ‘(28) Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 provides for a procedure for objections to harmonised standards where those standards do not entirely satisfy the requirements of the harmonisation legislation applicable to a UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label under this Regulation. This procedure should apply where appropriate in relation to standards which reference have been published in the Official Journal as providing presumption of conformity with the requirements laid down in this Regulation.’; (20) Recital 29 is replaced by the following: ‘(29) To enable economic operators to demonstrate and the competent authorities to ensure that each UAS and class C5 accessories kit made available on the market with a class identification label complies with the essential requirements of its class, it is necessary to provide for conformity assessment procedures. Decision No 768/2008/EC sets out modules for conformity assessment procedures, which include procedures from the least to the most stringent, in proportion to the level of risk involved and the level of safety required. In order to ensure inter-sectorial coherence and to avoid ad hoc variants of conformity assessment, conformity assessment procedures should be chosen from among those modules.’; (21) Recital 30 is replaced by the following: ‘(30) Market surveillance authorities and UAS operators should have easy access to the EU declaration of conformity. In order to fulfil this requirement, manufacturers should ensure that each UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label is accompanied either by a copy of the EU declaration of conformity or by the internet address at which the EU declaration of conformity can be accessed.’; (22) Recital 31 is replaced by the following: ‘(31) To ensure effective access to information for market surveillance purposes, the information required to identify all the applicable Union acts for a UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label should be available in a single EU declaration of conformity. In order to reduce the administrative burden on economic operators, it should be possible for that single EU declaration of conformity to be a dossier made up of relevant individual declarations of conformity.’; 6 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12). EN 6 EN  (23) Recital 32 is replaced by the following: ‘(32) The CE marking indicating the conformity of a product is the visible consequence of a whole process of conformity assessment in the broad sense. The general principles governing the CE marking are set out in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 (7) of the European Parliament and of the Council. The rules governing the affixing of the CE marking to a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label should be laid out in this Regulation.’; (24) Recital 33 is replaced by the following: ‘(33) Some UAS classes covered by this Regulation require the intervention of conformity assessment bodies. Member States should notify the Commission of these.’; (25) Recital 34 is replaced by the following: ‘(34) It is necessary to ensure a uniformly high level of performance of bodies performing conformity assessments of UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels throughout the Union, and that all such bodies perform their functions at the same level and under conditions of fair competition. Therefore, obligatory requirements should be set for conformity assessment bodies wishing to be notified in order to provide conformity assessment services.’; (26) Recital 35 is replaced by the following: ‘(35) If a conformity assessment body demonstrates the conformity of a UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label with the criteria laid down in harmonised standards, it should be presumed to comply with the corresponding requirements set out in this Regulation.’; (27) Recital 39 is replaced by the following: ‘(39) Conformity assessment bodies frequently subcontract parts of their activities linked to the assessment of conformity or have recourse to a subsidiary. In order to safeguard the level of protection required for the UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels to be placed on the Union market, it is essential that conformity assessment subcontractors and subsidiaries fulfil the same requirements as notified bodies do in relation to the performance of conformity assessment tasks. Therefore, it is important that the assessment of the competence and performance of bodies to be notified, and the monitoring of bodies already notified, also cover activities carried out by subcontractors and subsidiaries.’; (28) Recital 44 is replaced by the following: ‘(44) Manufacturers should take all appropriate measures to ensure that UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label may be placed on the market only if, when properly stored and used for their intended purpose or under conditions, which can be reasonably foreseen, it does not endanger people’s health or safety. UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing a class identification label should be considered as non-compliant with the essential requirements set out in this Regulation only under conditions of use which can be reasonably foreseen, that is when such use could result from lawful and readily predictable human behaviour.’; 7 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30). EN 7 EN  (29) Recital 45 is replaced by the following: ‘(45) In order to ensure legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that the rules on Union market surveillance and control of products entering the Union market provided for in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, including the provisions regarding the exchange of information through the Rapid Alert System (RAPEX), apply to each UAS and class C5 accessories kit placed on the market with a class identification label. This Regulation should not prevent Member States from choosing the competent authorities to carry out those tasks. In order to ensure a smooth transition as regards the implementation of this Regulation, appropriate transitional measures should be provided.’; (30) Recital 47 is replaced by the following: ‘(47) Each UAS placed on the market with a class identification label should comply with the certification requirements for UAS operated in the ‘specific’ or ‘certified’ categories of operations, as applicable, if the UAS is used outside the ‘open’ category of operations or the standard scenarios defined in Appendix 1 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947.’; (31) Paragraph 2 of Article 1 is replaced by the following. ‘2 It also establishes rules on making UAS and class C5 accessories kit bearing class identification labels and with remote identification add-ons available on the market and on their free movement in the Union.’; (32) Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 are replaced by the following. ‘1. Chapter II of this Regulation applies to the following products: (a) UAS intended to be operated under the rules and conditions applicable to the ‘open’ category of UAS operations or under operational declarations in the ‘specific’ category of UAS operations pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/947, except privately built UAS, and bearing a class identification label as set out in Parts 1 to 5, 16 and 17 of the Annex to this Regulation indicating to which of the seven UAS classes referred to in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 it belongs; (b) remote identification add-ons as set out in Part 6 of the Annex to this Regulation. 2. Chapter III of this Regulation applies to UAS operated under the rules and conditions applicable to the ‘certified’ and ‘specific’ categories of UAS operations pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 except when conducted under a declaration.’; (33) The title of Chapter II is replaced by the following: ‘UAS intended to be operated in the ‘open’ category or in the ‘specific’ category under operational declarations and with remote identification add-ons’; (34) The following point (38) is added to Article 2: ‘(38) ‘control unit’ (‘CU’) means the equipment or system of equipment to control unmanned aircraft remotely as defined in point 32 of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, with the exception of any infrastructure supporting the C2 link service, which supports the control or the monitoring of the unmanned aircraft, or both, during any phase of flight;’; EN 8 EN  (35) The following point (39) is added to Article 2: ‘(39) ‘C2 link service’ means a communication service between the unmanned aircraft and the CU provided by a third party;’; (36) Article 4 is replaced by the following: ‘1. The products referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 2 shall meet the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex. 2. UAS that are not toys within the meaning of Directive 2009/48/EC shall comply with the relevant health and safety requirements set out in Directive 2006/42/EC only in relation to risks other than those linked to the safety of the UA flight. 3. Any updates of software of the products that have already been made available on the market may be made only if such updates do not affect the compliance of the product.’; (37) The following paragraph 3 is inserted to Article 5: ‘3. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply as from 16 July 2021.’; (38) Paragraph 1 of Article 6 is replaced by the following: ‘1. When placing their product on the Union market, manufacturers shall ensure that it has been designed and manufactured in compliance with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex.’; (39) Paragraph 2 of Article 6 is replaced by the following: ‘2. Manufacturers shall draw up the technical documentation provided for in Article 17 and carry out the relevant conformity assessment procedure referred to in Article 13 or have it outsourced. Where compliance of the product with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex has been demonstrated by that conformity assessment procedure, manufacturers shall draw up an EU declaration of conformity and affix the CE marking.’; (40) Paragraph 5 of Article 6 is replaced by the following: ‘5. Manufacturers of UAS shall ensure that the UA bears a type within the meaning of Decision 768/2008/EC and a unique serial number allowing for its identification, and if applicable, compliant with the requirements defined in the corresponding Parts 2 to 4, 16 and 17 of the Annex. Manufacturers of remote identification add-ons shall ensure that the remote identification add-on bears a type and a unique serial number allowing for their identification and compliant with the requirements defined in Part 6 of the Annex. In both cases, manufacturers shall ensure that a unique serial number is also affixed to the EU declaration of conformity or to the simplified EU declaration of conformity referred to in Article 14.’; (41) Paragraph 7 of Article 6 is replaced by the following: ‘7. Manufacturers shall ensure that the product is accompanied by the manual and information notice required by Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex in a language which can be easily understood by consumers and other end users, as determined by the Member State concerned. Such manual and information notice, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and legible.’; EN 9 EN  (42) Paragraph 2 of Article 8 is replaced by the following: ‘2. Before placing a product on the Union market, importers shall ensure that: (a) the appropriate conformity assessment procedure referred to in Article 13 has been carried out by the manufacturer; (b) the manufacturer has drawn up the technical documentation referred to in Article 17; (c) the product bears the CE marking and, when required, the UA class identification label and the indication of the sound power level; (d) the product is accompanied by the documents referred to in paragraph 7 and 8 of Article 6; (e) the manufacturer has complied with the requirements set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 6. Where an importer considers or has reasons to believe that a product is not in conformity with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex, they shall not place the product on the market until it has been brought into conformity. Furthermore, where the product presents a risk for the health and safety of consumers and third parties, the importer shall inform the manufacturer and the competent national authorities to that effect.’; (43) Paragraph 4 of Article 8 is replaced by the following: ‘4. Importers shall ensure that the product is accompanied by the manual and information notice required by Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex in a language which can be easily understood by consumers and other end users, as determined by the Member State concerned. That manual and information notice, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and legible.’; (44) Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is replaced by the following: ‘2. Before making a product available on the market, distributors shall verify that the product bears the CE marking and, when applicable, the UA class identification label and the indication of the sound power level, is accompanied by the documents referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 6 and that the manufacturer and the importer have complied with the requirements set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 6 and in paragraph 3 of Article 8. Distributors shall ensure that the product is accompanied by the manual and information notice required by Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex in a language which can be easily understood by consumers and other end users, as determined by the Member State concerned. That manual and information notice, as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and legible. Where a distributor considers or has reason to believe that a product is not in conformity with the requirements set out in Article 4, they shall not make the product available on the market until it has been brought into conformity. Furthermore, where the product presents a risk, the distributor shall inform the manufacturer or the importer to that effect, as well as the competent market surveillance authorities.’; (45) Article 12 is replaced by the following: EN 10 EN  ‘A product which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be presumed to be in conformity with the requirements covered by those standards or parts thereof set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex.’; (46) Paragraph 1 of Article 13 is replaced by the following: ‘1. The manufacturer shall perform a conformity assessment of the product using one of the following procedures with a view to establishing its compliance with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex. The conformity assessment shall take into account all intended and foreseeable operating conditions.’; (47) Paragraph 1 of Article 14 is replaced by the following: ‘1. The EU declaration of conformity referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6 shall state that compliance of the product with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex has been demonstrated and, for UAS, identify its class.’; (48) Paragraph 2 of Article 16 is replaced by the following: ‘2. The UA class identification label shall be affixed visibly, legibly and indelibly to the UA or, when relevant, the class C5 accessories, and its packaging and shall be at least 5 mm high. The affixing to a product of markings, signs or inscriptions which are likely to mislead third parties regarding the meaning or form of the class identification label shall be prohibited.’; (49) Paragraph 1 of Article 17 is replaced by the following: ‘1. The technical documentation shall contain all relevant data and details of the means used by the manufacturer to ensure that the product complies with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex. It shall, at least, contain the elements set out in Part 10 of the Annex.’; (50) Paragraph 4 of Article 17 is replaced by the following: ‘4. Where the technical documentation does not comply with paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 of this Article, the market surveillance authority may ask the manufacturer or the importer to have a test performed by a body acceptable to the market surveillance authority at the expense of the manufacturer or the importer within a specified period in order to verify compliance of the product with the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex which applies to it.’; (51) Paragraph 3 of Article 30 is replaced by the following: ‘3. Where a notified body finds that the requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17 of the Annex or in corresponding harmonised standards or other technical specifications have not been met by a manufacturer, it shall require the manufacturer to take appropriate corrective measures and shall not issue an EU-type examination certificate or a quality system approval.’; (52) Paragraph 1 of Article 36 is replaced by the following: ‘1. Where the market surveillance authorities of one Member State have sufficient reason to believe that a product presents a risk to the health or safety of persons or to other aspects of public interest protection covered by this Chapter, they shall carry out an evaluation in relation to the product concerned, covering all applicable EN 11 EN  requirements laid down in this Chapter. The relevant economic operators shall cooperate as necessary with the market surveillance authorities for that purpose. Where, in the course of the evaluation referred to in the first subparagraph, the market surveillance authorities find that the product does not comply with the requirements laid down in this Chapter, they shall, without delay, require the relevant economic operator to take all appropriate corrective actions to bring the product into compliance with those requirements, to withdraw the product from the market, or to recall it within a reasonable period, commensurate with the nature of the risk, as they may prescribe. The market surveillance authorities shall inform the relevant notified body accordingly. Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 shall apply to the measures referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph.’; (53) The title of Chapter III is replaced by the following: ‘Requirements for UAS operated in the ‘certified’ the ‘specific’ categories except when conducted under a declaration’; (54) Article 40 is replaced by the following: ‘Article 40 Requirements for UAS operated in the ‘certified’ and ‘specific’ categories except when conducted under a declaration. 1. The design, production and maintenance of UAS shall be certified if the UAS meets any of the following conditions: (a) it has a characteristic dimension of 3 m or more, and is designed to be operated over assemblies of people; (b) it is designed for transporting people; (c) it is designed for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods and requiring a high level of robustness to mitigate the risks for third parties in case of accident; (d) it is used in the ‘specific’ category of operations defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and the operational authorisation issued by the competent authority, following a risk assessment provided for in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947, considers that the risk of the operation cannot be adequately mitigated without the certification of the UAS. 2. A UAS subject to certification shall comply with the applicable requirements set out in Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/640 and Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. 3. Unless it needs to be certified in accordance with paragraph 1, a UAS used in the ‘specific’ category shall feature the technical capabilities set out in the operational authorisation issued by the competent authority or as defined by the Light UAS EN 12 EN  Operator Certificate (LUC) pursuant to Part C of the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. 4. All UAS not subject to registration according to Article 16 of the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 shall have a unique serial number compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers; 5. Each UA intended to be operated in the ‘specific’ category and at a height below the height defined in paragraphs (1) and (2) of point (f) of point SERA.5005 of Regulation (EU) 923/2012 (8) shall be equipped with a remote identification system that allows, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the periodic transmission of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received by existing mobile devices: (a) the UAS operator registration number; (b) the unique serial number of the UA compliant with Standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A unless the UA is privately built; (c) the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; (d) the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and (e) the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take- off point.’; (55) The Annex to the Regulation is amended according to the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, For the Commission The President […] 8 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 255/2010 (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1). EN 13 EN European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 Standard scenarios for UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category RMT.0729 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of this Opinion is to provide cost-efficient rules for low-risk unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in the ‘specific’ category. This Opinion proposes the addition of two standard scenarios (STSs) in Appendix 1 to the Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, defining the conditions when UAS operators can start an operation after having submitted a declaration to the competent authority. Moreover, the Opinion proposes the introduction of two new Parts in the Annex to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, including the technical requirements that UAS need to meet in order to be operated in the STSs, and establishing two new UAS classes — classes C5 and C6. The conditions to conduct the STSs are based on the in-service experience of some Member States (MSs) and they have been validated through the application of the specific operations risk assessment (SORA). The proposed changes are expected to increase the cost-effectiveness for UAS operators, manufacturers and competent authorities, and to improve the harmonisation of UAS operations in the MSs. Action area: Regular updates Affected rules: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third- country operators of unmanned aircraft systems Affected stakeholders: Operators (private and commercial); competent authorities; flight crews; remote pilots; maintenance staff; design and production organisations; other airspace users (manned aircraft); providers of air traffic management/air navigation services (ATM/ANS) and other ATM network functions; air traffic services (ATS) personnel; aerodrome operators; general public; model aircraft associations; EASA (on a case-by-case basis) Driver: Efficiency/proportionality Rulemaking group: No Impact assessment: None Rulemaking Procedure: Accelerated 26.7.2019 25.9.2019 6.11.2019 2020/Q1 TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this Opinion ................................................................................................................ 3 1.1. How this Opinion was developed ............................................................................................. 3 1.2. The next steps .......................................................................................................................... 3 2. In summary — why and what ................................................................................................ 4 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale .............................................................. 4 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ................................................................................... 4 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals........................................................ 5 2.4. What are the stakeholders’ views — outcome of the consultation ...................................... 24 2.5. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals ........................................ 25 2.6. How we monitor and evaluate the rules ................................................................................ 25 3. References .......................................................................................................................... 26 3.1. Affected regulations ............................................................................................................... 26 3.2. Affected decisions .................................................................................................................. 26 3.3. Other reference documents ................................................................................................... 26 4. Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 27 Appendix 1: Risk assessment for STS-01 ...................................................................................... 27 1. Step #1 — ConOps description ............................................................................................... 27 2. Step #2 — determination of the intrinsic UAS ground risk class ........................................... 27 3. Step #3 — final GRC determination ....................................................................................... 28 4. Steps #4 to 6 — air risk assessment ....................................................................................... 28 5. Step #7 — SAIL determination ............................................................................................... 29 6. Step #8 — identification of operational safety objectives (OSOs) ......................................... 29 7. Step #9 — adjacent area/airspace considerations ................................................................. 31 8. Step #10 — comprehensive safety portfolio .......................................................................... 31 9. Compliance with OSOs ........................................................................................................... 32 Appendix 2: Risk assessment for STS-02 ...................................................................................... 47 1. Step #1 — ConOps description ............................................................................................... 47 2. Step #2 — determination of the initial UAS ground risk class ............................................... 47 3. Step #3 — final GRC determination ....................................................................................... 48 4. Steps #4 to 6 — air risk assessment ....................................................................................... 48 5. Steps #7 — SAIL determination .............................................................................................. 49 6. Step #8 — identification of operational safety objectives (OSOs) ......................................... 49 7. Step #9 — adjacent area/airspace considerations ................................................................. 51 8. Step #10 — comprehensive safety portfolio .......................................................................... 51 9. Compliance with OSOs ........................................................................................................... 52 TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 1. About this Opinion 1.1. How this Opinion was developed The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this Opinion in line with Regulation (EU) 2018/11391 (the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2019-2023 under rulemaking task (RMT).0729. The scope and timescales of the task were defined in the related ToR3. The text of this Opinion has been developed by EASA with the support of a group of experts made up of members of selected national aviation authorities (NAAs), with experience at the national level in UAS operations to be covered by these STSs. These experts were also members of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) team that developed the methodology for SORA. This Opinion underwent consultation with the Advisory Bodies in accordance with Article 16 ‘Special rulemaking procedure: accelerated procedure’ of MB Decision No 18-2015. EASA took the decision to follow the procedure laid down in said Article as this regulatory proposal affects a limited group of stakeholders. Prior to the consultation with the Advisory Bodies, EASA performed a focused consultation on this regulatory proposal with all the interested parties, including UAS manufacturers, NAAs, UAS and manned aircraft operators, providers of ATM/ANS and other ATM network functions, and aerodrome operators on 1 July 2019. The major milestones of this rulemaking activity are presented on the title page. 1.2. The next steps The Opinion contains the proposed amendments to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/9474 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/9455 (from now on referred to as the ‘IA’ and ‘DA’ respectively). It is submitted to the European Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to prepare EU regulations. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1) (https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1535612134845&uri=CELEX:32018R1139). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the- agency/management-board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/ToR%20RMT.0729%20Issue%201%20.pdf 4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0947). 5 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 1) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1570531993621&uri=CELEX:32019R0945). TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2. In summary — why and what 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale With EASA Opinion No 01-2018 on the introduction of a regulatory framework for operations of unmanned aircraft systems in the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories, EASA presented the concept of STSs for UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category that are characterised by a low risk. Those UAS operations can be conducted based on a declaration submitted by the UAS operator to the NAA. The approach proposed in the EASA Opinion was to define in the Regulation the process to allow such types of UAS operations, and then include it in a Decision issued by EASA, including the acceptable means of compliance (AMC), and the detailed description of the mitigation measures to be put in place. During the discussion within the EASA Committee, leading to the approval of the regulation, it was decided to also include in the text of the Regulation the above-mentioned mitigation measures. Since a final version of an STS was not yet available at that time, it was decided to approve the IA with a provision for an Appendix 1 to be filled in as soon as the first STS was proposed by EASA. As a transitional measure, Article 23(2) was introduced to allow MSs to accept declarations based on national STSs until the IA is amended to include the first EU STS. In order to identify the UAS operations to be covered by the STS, EASA carried out a survey among all MSs to identify the UAS operations which are allowed, according to national regulations, based on a declaration submitted by the UAS operator. Two types of UAS operations were then identified, and they led to the development of two STSs — STS-01 and STS-02. These two STSs were developed based on the experience gained in some MSs6 and in addition, a risk assessment, based on SORA (see AMC1 to Article 117 of the IA), was carried out to validate the approach. Since it was decided to also impose for STSs the use of UAS with particular CE class marks, an amendment to the DA was also necessary, to define the requirements for the two new UAS CE classes — C5 and C6 — to be used with STS-01 and STS-02 respectively. Lastly, some improvements to the IA and the DA were introduced as described in Sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6. 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 1 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Section 2.1. The specific objective of this proposal is, therefore, to: — ensure that (emerging) safety issues are addressed; — incorporate improvements that result from relevant developments in new technologies and from the application of the IA and the DA; and — develop STSs for those UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category that are considered mature enough, based on a declaration by the UAS operator. 6 Especially in France, Spain, Denmark and Finland. 7 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/agency-decisions/ed-decision-2019021r TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals According to point UAS.SPEC.020 of the IA, STSs will be developed only for UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category with a low risk (i.e. with a specific assurance and integrity level (SAIL), as defined in SORA, not greater than 2). For these UAS operations, UAS operators will be allowed to start the operation as soon as they have submitted a declaration to the NAA of registration and have received the receipt of confirmation and completeness. Since the NAA is not required to make any additional checks before the start of the operation (the UAS operator will, however, be included in the oversight programme of the NAA), it was decided to define the requirements for these UAS operations in a prescriptive way. Therefore, they have been developed with a structure and a level of detail similar to those listed in the ‘open’ category. The two STSs included in this Opinion have been derived from the in-service experience gained in some MSs where large numbers of UAS operations have been conducted and many flight hours have been accomplished (in the order of tens of thousands8) without any accidents being recorded. In some of these MSs, such UAS operations are subject to an operational declaration (as defined by the national regulations) or are even conducted without the need for a declaration. The two STSs are related to the following UAS operations: — STS-01: visual line of sight (VLOS) operations at a maximum height of 120 m, at a ground speed of less than 5 m/s in the case of untethered UA, over controlled ground areas that can be in populated (e.g. urban) environments, using UAS with maximum take-off masses (MTOMs) of up to 25 kg; and — STS-02: beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations with the UA at not more than 2 km from the remote pilot, if visual observers (VOs) are used, at a maximum height of 120 m, over controlled ground areas in sparsely populated environments, using UA with MTOMs of up to 25 kg. The requirements proposed in the STSs have been developed to ensure that the resulting level of risk of UAS operations is consistent with the declarative regime defined in Article 5(5) and point UAS.SPEC.020 of the IA. The template of the declaration to be submitted by UAS operators is proposed in Appendix 2 to the the Annex to the IA. 2.3.1. Description of STS-01 STS-01 may be considered as an extension of the UAS operations in the ‘open’ subcategory A29, since it allows UAS operations in VLOS, in urban environments, below 120 m, with a UA having an MTOM of less than 25 kg. Therefore, several of the requirements defined in STS-01 are similar to those for the ‘open’ subcategory A2. 2.3.1.1 Maximum flight height under normal operations The UAS operator is required to define the volume within which the UAS can operate, called the ‘flight geography’. The maximum vertical limit that the UAS operator can define for the flight geography for 8 For instance, in France, the number of flight hours in 2018 for operations in national scenario S-3 (equivalent to STS-01) was 94 577. 9 VLOS operations at a maximum height of 120 m, in an urban environment, using a UAS with an MTOM of up to 4 kg. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what UAS operations under STS-01 is 120 m (from the closest point on the surface of the earth). From an air risk point of view, STS-01 is considered equivalent to subcategories A2 and A3 of the ‘open’ category; therefore, the operational limitations and the technical requirements imposed on the UAS are consistent (e.g. VLOS and a maximum height of 120 m, except when overflying an artificial obstacle). This limitation is a little more conservative than the in-service experience of some MSs where UAS operations similar to STS-01 are allowed up to a height of 150 m (500 ft). In STS-01, a 30 m margin above the maximum height has been considered for use in abnormal situations. As in the ‘open’ category, the possibility to operate the UA close to or above an artificial obstacle taller than 105 m (e.g. for building or infrastructure inspections) under the same conditions was kept. 2.3.1.2 Ground risk: controlled ground area UAS operations in a populated environment, with a UA with an MTOM of up to 25 kg, may expose the overflown people to risk. Since the intrinsic ground risk needs to be kept low, a requirement to conduct such UAS operations over a controlled ground area is established. As defined in Article 2(21) of the IA, a controlled ground area is ‘the ground area where the UAS is operated and within which the UAS operator can ensure that only involved persons are present’. The UAS operator is required to define the limit of the controlled ground area and to control the access of people to it. The controlled ground area comprises the flight geography area, the contingency area and the ground risk buffer as depicted in Figure 1. For additional information on the contingency area and ground risk buffer, please refer to Section 2.3.5. Figure 1: Notional depiction of the areas to be covered by the controlled ground area Before conducting UAS operations under STS-01, UAS operators must ensure that the controlled ground area is in place, effective and compliant with the minimum distance defined in the proposed point UAS.STS-01.020(3) of the IA. For this purpose, the UAS operator must at least: — be familiar with the intended area of operations and with all the factors that may affect the operation, especially in terms of safety, security, privacy and environmental protection; — measure properly the required distances for effective implementation of the areas encompassed in the controlled ground area, identifying where necessary, the elements that can assist the remote pilot in rapidly and visually estimating the distance from the UA; TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what — secure the perimeter of the controlled ground area in the most effective way to prevent uninvolved people from entering the area10; and — coordinate with the appropriate authority11, when required. Also, in order to protect any persons present in the controlled ground area, a requirement is established to have those persons informed of the risks of the operation, briefed, and, if applicable, trained on the safety precautions and measures established by the UAS operator for their protection. Besides that, these persons must have explicitly agreed to participate in the operation in the manner established by the UAS operator. The UAS operator should take all precautionary measures needed to ensure safety considering the level of risk (i.e. consider the need for personal protective equipment, acoustic alarms, shelters, etc.). Since keeping the UAS at a safe distance from uninvolved people is considered a critical safety aspect, the requirement has been expressed with a higher degree of prescriptiveness, and minimum values are established. To determine those values, the following aspects were considered: — for the ground risk buffer, ‘low’ robustness is considered sufficient in UAS operations with a low intrinsic ground risk. In this case, SORA indicates the 1:1 rule12 to select the minimum horizontal distance. However, the 1:1 rule may lead to a buffer size such that the size of the controlled ground area might be impractical — in most cases, in a populated environment13. Therefore, the decision was made to propose more suitable values considering the following elements: — to better ensure that the UA flight can be terminated without exceeding the ground risk buffer, UAS operations under this STS are limited to: — any configuration except fixed-wing UA. With this limitation, UAS operations at low speed can be better ensured, and the likelihood of the UA gliding a distance great enough for it to fall outside the controlled ground area is minimised; — the ground speed in normal operation is limited to 5 m/s (which must be set in the UAS, see paragraph 2.3.1.9) so that the controllability of the UA is increased. — there is more in-service experience with UA with MTOMs of less than 10 kg, so two sizes of ground risk buffer have been identified, taking a more conservative approach for heavier UA; — for UA with MTOMs of up to 10 kg, in-service experience from MSs14 has been considered. In particular, the main reference is French scenario S-3, where a safety area is calculated assuming a ballistic fall once the flight termination system is triggered, and therefore, the size of that area is dependent on the flight height and speed15 of the UA. 10 Means may be fencing off the area, installing signs, using operations staff or law enforcement agents to interdict the area, or others. 11 For instance, municipality, law enforcement, etc. 12 Example: If the UA is planned to operate at a height of 20 m, the ground risk buffer should at least be 20 m. 13 For instance, in a city, that size could mean securing an area too wide to be allowed by the municipality due to the consequent disruption, and also complex for the operator to implement. 14 For example, France (where S-3 is limited to 8 kg) and Italy. 15 Ground speed, but wind must be considered by the UAS operator when establishing the areas. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what This approach was preferred to a fixed distance, as prescribed in other MSs, which allows less flexibility and might be too conservative for UAS operations at low-flight heights; — for UA with MTOMs above 10 kg, in-service experience is also considered, but since this experience is more limited, a more conservative approach is followed. In this case, the values considered were half of those derived from the 1:1 rule, except that a minimum of 20 m is considered in the case of a height of up to 30 m (thus, the values for UA above 10 kg are at least double those for the ones below 10 kg); and — for tethered UA, the size of the controlled ground area considers a radius equal to the tether length plus 5 m, and centred on the point where the tether is fixed over the surface of the earth. This is derived from in-service experience, in particular from tethered UAS operations in France, where this margin of 5 m was considered sufficient to account for the potential projection of debris in a crash subsequent to a flight termination. — For the contingency area, it was considered that this area was primarily conceived to cope with abnormal situations that could take the UA outside the flight geography (e.g. wind gusts), where by performing appropriate contingency procedures, the UA can be brought back to a normal situation. In addition, in the case of a flyaway of the UA, it is expected that the flight termination system will be activated while the UA is still in the contingency area. This is the reason why a minimum distance of 10 m was considered necessary for the contingency area. Considering the ground speed limitation of 5 m/s, the remote pilot would have 2 seconds to react, which is consistent with the in-service experience of the MSs. 2.3.1.3 Remote pilot competency In order to ensure an adequate level of competency for remote pilots, the following approach was followed. Since STS-01 covers UAS operations with a low intrinsic risk, similar to the level for ‘open’ subcategory A2, a similar approach to the one used for that subcategory is followed for remote pilot competency. For the theoretical knowledge part, similarly to the requirements for ‘open’ subcategory A2, the student remote pilot will be granted a certificate issued by a competent authority or by an entity recognised by a competent authority of a MS after: — having passed the online theoretical knowledge examination as required for ‘open’ subcategories A1 and A3; and — having passed a classroom theoretical knowledge examination provided by the competent authority or by the entity recognised by the competent authority. Compared with the one defined for ‘open’ subcategory A2, more subjects and topics need to be covered, and two options are possible: — if student remote pilots do not hold a certificate of remote pilot competency required for ‘open’ subcategory A2, the subjects to be covered by the examination are those listed in the proposed Attachment A to STS-01; or — if student remote pilots hold a certificate of remote pilot competency for ‘open’ subcategory A2, they are only required to pass the examination on the reduced number of subjects indicated in point 1(b) of the proposed Attachment A to STS-01. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what With this modular approach, credit can be taken from the knowledge already acquired by student remote pilots when they have already completed the training for the ‘open’ category. For the practical skill part, the self-training and assessment by the student remote pilot allowed in ‘open’ subcategory A2 is not deemed sufficient. The particular operational provisions and limitations of STS-01 to ensure that UAS operations remain at low risk are more critical than in ‘open’ subcategory A2 and, therefore, a higher level of robustness is required for the practical skill training and assessment. Consequently, an external party is required to provide the practical skill training and assessment. This approach is consistent with the current experience in most MSs. However, discussions within the expert group indicated that the preference on the type of external party providing the training could vary significantly across the EU, ranging from being a UAS operator (excluding self-training and assessment) to entities recognised by the competent authority. Consequently, it was decided to propose both options. UAS operators that intend to provide practical skill training and assessment to remote pilots (including their own pilots) must comply with a specific set of requirements, defined in the proposed Appendix 3 the Annex to the to the IA, and declare their compliance using the form in the proposed Appendix 4 the Annex to the to the IA. Unlike the theoretical knowledge part, practical skills are peculiar to the specific scenario. Consequently, each accreditation of completion of the practical training and assessment issued by the UAS operator or the entity recognised by the competent authority will be for one STS. The main areas related to the practical skill to be covered are included in the proposed Attachment A to STS-01. There is no requirement for a final practical assessment, just a continuous evaluation. The personnel responsible for the practical skill training and assessment will follow the remote student and keep records. The assessor will let the student know when the practical skill assessment is completed. At the end of the process, the UAS operator shall produce an assessment report, and an attestation of completion will be issued. The verification for the NAA that UAS operators are meeting the requirements of the regulation will be ensured during the oversight. In addition, according to point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(d) of the IA, the UAS operator needs to ensure that the remote pilot has the necessary skills required to safely conduct the particular UAS operations, through the training and familiarisation with the UAS and with the procedures defined by the UAS operator. 2.3.1.4 Operations manual In most MSs where UAS operations that would fall under the scope of STS-01 are being conducted, UAS operators are required to develop an operations manual (OM). This is further supported by SORA. Therefore, a decision was made for STS-01 to require the UAS operator to compile its procedures in an OM, which shall contain at least all the elements defined in the proposed Appendix 5. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what The operational volume and ground risk buffer for the intended operations, including the controlled ground area, are some of the elements to be defined in the OM, together with the procedures for normal, contingency and emergency conditions. To ensure the adequacy of the contingency and emergency procedures, these should be evaluated by the UAS operator through either dedicated flight tests or simulations (provided that the representativeness of the simulation means is appropriate for the intended purpose). This is based on the current practices established in some MSs16. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the ‘medium’ level of integrity required by SORA for operations with a risk corresponding to STS-01. As required in points (1)(d) and (1)(e) of point UAS.SPEC.050 of the IA, UAS operators must ensure that remote pilots, the personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation, including any staff member authorised to perform maintenance activities, are trained and assessed in accordance with the procedures, which for STS-01 are included in the OM. 2.3.1.5 Contingency and emergency procedures The UAS operator is required to develop contingency and emergency procedures, to be described in the OM, and the remote pilot is required to put them in place immediately in the following situations: — contingency procedures: in abnormal situations, which includes situations that can lead to the UA exceeding the limits of the flight geography; and — emergency procedures: in emergency situations, which includes situations that can lead to the UA exceeding the limits of the operational volume. Remote pilots are expected to react immediately, performing the relevant emergency procedures as soon as they have an indication of those situations. Furthermore, when the emergency situation is perceived as likely to lead to the UA being outside the operational volume, remote pilots are required to trigger the flight termination system (FTS17) at least 10 m before the unmanned aircraft reaches the limits of the operational volume. 2.3.1.6 Emergency response plan An emergency response plan (ERP) is considered an important element to ensure that the UAS operator’s personnel participating in an operation are aware of what to do in case of an emergency in order to avoid an escalation of the effects. In the discussions within the JARUS group, it was concluded that, even for UAS operations with the lowest risk in the ‘specific’ category, this plan should be required. Furthermore, in SORA, there is a penalty when this plan is not available or does not achieve a sufficient level of integrity. Consequently, a requirement was established including the criteria provided by SORA for a ‘medium’ level of integrity, which is consistent with the level required for operational procedures. Further guidance is provided in the AMC to the IA. 16 For instance, in Spain, Royal Decree 1036/2017 (national regulation for civil UAS operations) Article. 27 (1)(b) requires UAS operators to conduct, prior to UAS operations, ‘the necessary test flights to prove that the intended operation can be performed safely’. 17 For additional information, please refer to 2.3.1.9. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2.3.1.7 Externally provided services UAS operators must ensure that externally provided services, which are necessary for the safety of UAS operations (e.g. external C2 services, GNSS services, U-Space services, etc.), reach a level of performance that is adequate for the operation. In order to ensure this, UAS operators must consider: — the information provided by the UAS manufacturers18; — specific requirements that might be applicable in the intended area of operation19; — how performance might be affected by the environmental conditions20; and — what level of performance can be provided and adequately supported by the external service provider. It is also important to ensure that adequate service is provided, and the allocation of roles and responsibilities between the operator and the external service provider(s) needs to be defined, if applicable21. 2.3.1.8 Level of human involvement There is currently no experience with autonomous UAS operations (without remote pilot intervention); thus, this kind of UAS operations is not allowed under STS-01. Therefore, it is always required to identify a remote pilot responsible for the flight. Furthermore, the remote pilot must have the ability to maintain control of the UA, except in the case of a lost command and control link22. In addition, in order to avoid a level of complexity that might lead to a higher level of risk for STS-01, the following operational limitations were included: — operate only one UA at a time; — do not operate from a moving vehicle; and — do not hand over the command of the UA to an other remote pilot station. This means that for each flight, the pilot in command should be always the same and the control cannot be transferred to another control unit during flight. 2.3.1.9 Technical requirements in STS-01 It is proposed that UAS to be operated under STS-01 should bear a C5 class mark. Such UAS will have to comply with the technical requirements included in the proposed Part 16 of the Annex to the DA. The technical requirements of class C5 UAS are listed starting from those defined for class C3 with some exclusions and some additions. This approach was chosen to avoid unnecessary repetitions. A 18 For example, the minimum signal strength of GNSS satellites from which signals must be received to conduct a safe operation under a specific flight mode. 19 For example, a certain U-space service with a certain level of performance might be required to operate in a certain area. 20 For example, electromagnetic fields, meteorological conditions, obstacles, etc. 21 Typically, this is part of a service level agreement (SLA), but for some services, this may not be necessary, e.g. an open GNSS service (free of charge) does not require any SLA between the UAS operator and the GNSS service provider and therefore there is no need to define those roles and responsibilities. 22 For other failures, the remote pilot must be able to perform contingency or emergency procedures (depending on the nature and potential effects of the failure(s)). In case of a loss of the C2 link, there is a requirement for the UAS to include a predictable method to recover the link or terminate the flight — see Section 2.3.1.9) TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what UAS manufacturer may in any case develop a class C5 UAS starting from a class C3 or C2 UAS. The technical requirements defined for class C3 UAS that were excluded are: — the maximum height limitation, since the provision of height information to the remote pilot (see below) is considered sufficient, taking into account in-service experience with similar operations in some MSs and the fact that a higher competency is required for remote pilots operating under this STS compared with the ‘open’ category; and — geo-awareness: the need to require a geo-awareness function was extensively discussed, and it was decided to keep this technical requirement as optional. UAS operators shall only operate UAS equipped with a geo-awareness function when they intend to operate in a geographical zone where the MSs mandate it. In any case, if the manufacturer decides to equip the UAS with a geo-awareness system, this needs to comply with the same requirements as those for a class C3 UAS. The following additional technical requirements were added: — the characteristic dimensions23 of the UA are limited to 3 m, in accordance with the limit established in point UAS.SPEC.020(1)(a)(i) of the IA. The MTOM is limited to 25 kg since most MSs do not have relevant experience with UA with a higher mass in UAS operations under the scope of STS-01. In addition, the UA is limited to rotorcraft or tethered aircraft other than fixed- wing aircraft, as explained in Section 2.3.1.2. The MTOM threshold, combined with the UA configuration and the maximum characteristic dimension, ensures that the expected kinetic energy is consistent with a low ground risk classification (see Section 2.3.1.2); — a requirement is established for the UA, unless tethered, to be equipped with a reliable and predictable means for the remote pilot to terminate the flight of the UA (FTS). The FTS needs to allow the remote pilot to: — prevent the UA from exiting the controlled ground area. Thus, the FTS should force the descent of the UA and prevent it from continuing its horizontal trajectory (e.g. by cutting the propulsion power); and — avoid a single failure in the UA disabling the activation of the FTS. Therefore, the activation system is required to be independent from the on-board automatic flight control and guidance system of the UA. Experience with this type of UAS operations24 has shown that human factors may play a role in reducing the effectiveness of the FTS. In particular, there is a risk that the remote pilot does not activate the FTS in time, fearing the damage and the potential destruction of the UA. To mitigate this risk, a requirement to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics (e.g. a parachute, autorotation, etc.) has been added; — provide information on the speed and flight height of the UA. This is based on the current in-service experience and considering the need to assist the remote pilot in keeping the UA within the planned flight geography; 23 For example, main rotor diameter in a helicopter or gyroplane, distance between opposite rotors in a multi-rotor, longitude of body in an airship, etc. 24 Mainly French scenario S-3. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what — provide information on the signal strength of the command and control link, and receive an alert from the UAS when it is likely that the signal is going to be lost, and another alert when the signal is lost; — a selectable low-speed mode to reduce the ground speed to no more than 5 m/s to ensure that the remote pilot can keep the UA within the controlled ground area (as described in Section 2.3.1.2); and — the user’s manual for a class C5 UAS shall contain all the information required in the user’s manual for a class C3 UAS; in addition, it shall contain a description of the means to terminate the flight. The possibility to develop an accessories kit that may convert a class C3 UAS into a class C5 UAS was also included. Consistently with the requirements imposed on UAS class C5, only rotorcraft UAS marked class C3 can qualify to be equipped with such an accessories kit. In addition, the class C3 UAS, in order to qualify for the installation of the accessories kit, needs to be equipped with a suitable interface. In this way, manufacturers, even if different from the one designing and producing the class C3 UAS, may put on the market the accessories kit. However, they are responsible for verifying that the UAS equipped with the accessories kit complies with all the requirements listed for class C3 UAS and the requirements for class C5 UAS, with the exclusion of the information on the height, since a class C3 UAS already includes a height limitation system. In addition, manufacturers of the accessories kit shall put it on the market as a single kit in order to have a clear split of responsibilities between the manufacturer of the class C3 UAS (responsible for the original class C3 functionalities) and the manufacturer of the accessories kit (responsible for the additional functionalities and for the verification that the accessories kit does not alter the original class C3 functionalities). Manufacturers shall make sure that the UAS operator does not need any special skill to install the kit on the UAS (the instructions shall be included in the user’s manual). Moreover, each element of the accessories kit shall be identified to ensure a complete and correct installation by a UAS operator (e.g. each element should be identified with a number and should show also the total number of the elements composing the accessories kit). Lastly, the class C5 mark should be affixed on the accessory so that the UAS displays both the C3 and C5 class marks. Manufacturers of the UAS may mark their product with a C3 and C5 class label if it complies with all the requirements defined in Parts 4 and 16 of the Annex to the DA. An accessory to transform a class C2 UAS into a class C5 UAS is not proposed since the limitations defined for the A2 open subcategory are less restrictive than those defined for STS-01. 2.3.2. Description of STS-02 STS-02 refers to a UAS operation with an increased intrinsic risk compared with STS-01 because it allows BVLOS operations. The launch and recovery of the UAS is, in any case, required to be performed in VLOS. The main mitigation means is provided by VOs who assist the remote pilot in scanning the airspace for the presence of other airspace users. 2.3.2.1 Maximum flight height It is proposed that the UAS operations covered by STS-02 should have the same height limitation as for STS-01. Therefore, the considerations included in Section 2.3.1.1 apply. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2.3.2.2 Ground risk: controlled ground area STS-02, in comparison with STS-01, has an increased ground risk due to the larger area that the UA can cover. Therefore, the combination of the following main limitations is established to lower the intrinsic ground risk, based on the current experience in some MSs25: — operations shall be conducted over a controlled ground area, and — that controlled ground area shall be entirely located in a sparsely populated area. It should be noted that when a controlled ground area is in place, SORA does not distinguish, in the intrinsic ground risk classification, between UAS operations being conducted in a populated environment and those over sparsely populated areas, or between VLOS and BVLOS. However, SORA assumes that such a controlled ground area is established, without any further considerations (it is up to the UAS operator to ensure it is in place and effective). Furthermore, it is clear that the difficulty in ensuring control over an area (being able to detect and react to the intrusion of people who are not involved) increases from operations in VLOS to those in BVLOS. This can be compensated for by the population of the environment (with a lower likelihood of intrusion in the case of sparsely populated areas). Therefore, requiring UAS operations under STS-02 to be conducted over sparsely populated areas reduces the likelihood of intrusion into the controlled ground areas, making it easier to ensure control. In addition, to further ensure this control over the area, and considering also the still relatively limited experience with larger ranges in BVLOS operations, the distance between the UA and the remote pilot is limited. As illustrated in Figure 2, remote pilots may fly at a distance that exceeds the VLOS26 range. Without the assistance of a VO in BVLOS, the range can be up to a range of 1 km, when the UA flies a pre- programmed flight, allowing them to scan the airspace themselves. When VOs are employed, the range of the operation can be extended up to 2 km. 25 For example, in France and Spain, UAS operations allowed in BVLOS under declaration are required to be conducted in sparsely populated areas. In addition, S-3 (BVLOS scenario under declaration) in France requires establishing a safety area, equivalent to a controlled ground area. 26 The VLOS range may vary depending on the characteristics of the UA (size and colour) and on the weather conditions, up to a distance such that the remote pilot can clearly distinguish the UA in the sky. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what Figure 2: Range of STS-02 When more experience has been gained, this STS may be amended to alleviate this limitation. Unlike STS-01, operations under STS-02 have the possibility to be conducted over wider areas, using a wider range of UAS (not limited to rotorcraft, if untethered) and without a restrictive speed limitation. Therefore, establishing minimum distances for the ground risk buffer as in STS-01 was not deemed reasonable. Besides, the criterion in SORA to use the 1:1 rule as a minimum was not deemed satisfactory either, as it might be too conservative in some cases, and fall short in other cases. It was considered more appropriate to require the UAS manufacturer to provide information, in the user’s manual, on the maximum distance that the UA is likely to travel once the means to terminate the flight has been activated. This will be the information that the UAS operator needs to use to determine the minimum size for the ground risk buffer. The launch (e.g. take-off) and the recovery (e.g. landing) are also required to be performed in VLOS. That is in order to mitigate the ground risk, especially for people involved in the UAS operation. This requirement also facilitates visually detecting during the launch any potential failure or unexpected performance that might have worse consequences if not detected during this phase. 2.3.2.3 Air risk: mitigations for BVLOS To mitigate the increased air risk posed by BVLOS operations, the following requirements are established: — an amendment to point UAS.SPEC.020(1)(b) of the IA, which defines the airspace where operations covered by STS may take place, is proposed to highlight the need to ensure a low probability of encounter with manned aircraft (see further explanation under the risk assessment in Appendix 2); — a minimum visibility of 5 km is proposed to ensure the detection of any potential hazard in the air. This was proposed by JARUS in the frame of the SORA development and is also established TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what in the regulations covering UAS operations in some states27. It is up to the UAS operator to establish how to obtain the most suitable information to comply with this requirement. Guidance material (GM) will be provided indicating that operators may use meteorological reports to obtain visibility data. — someone is always required to scan the airspace to detect any potential hazards in the air. If no VO is used, then the scanning must be conducted by the remote pilot. From experience in some states28, having the UA at not more than 1 km from the remote pilot (in combination with the 120 m height limitation) is considered a suitable distance to see the surrounding airspace and react promptly if required. However, if the remote pilot is required to perform the airspace scanning, the management of the flight must be such that it does not require too much attention. For this reason, the requirement to have a pre-programmed trajectory for the UA is established when operating without VOs. However, the remote pilot must always have the ability to intervene in order to manoeuvre the UA (e.g. for collision avoidance). — If VOs are used, the UAS operator is required to ensure that: — the VOs are positioned so that they can provide adequate coverage of the operational volume and the surrounding airspace with the minimum flight visibility indicated, and there are no potential terrain obstructions; — the distance between any VO and the remote pilot is not more than 1 km, to ensure better control of VOs and their communication with the remote pilot; — robust and effective communication means are available for the communication between the remote pilot and the VOs; — if means are used by the VOs to determine the position of the UA, those means are functioning and effective; and — the VOs have been briefed on the intended path of the UA and the associated timing. It should be noted that a definition of a VO is proposed in Article 2 of the IA. The responsibilities of VOs are proposed in point UAS.STS-02-050 of the IA as follows: — to perform unaided visual scanning of the airspace in which the UA is operating for any potential hazards in the air; — to maintain awareness of the position of the UA through direct visual observation or through assistance provided by electronic means (e.g. a display providing the geographical position of the UA); and — to alert the remote pilot in case a hazard is detected, and assist in avoiding or minimising the potential negative effects. VOs need to know where the UA is flying but they do not need to have the UA at sight because the objective is to scan the airspace where the UA is flying to detect potential conflict with another aircraft. 27 For instance, in the USA, Part 107 establishes for VLOS operations a visibility of at least 3 statute miles (~ 5 km). 28 For instance, the closest scenario in France to STS-02 is S-2 (under declaration) in which a maximum distance of 1 km is established between the UA and the remote pilot. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what Besides. regarding the STS-01, the ground risk derived from the potential collision with another UA, bird, etc is minimised by the UA being operated over a controlled ground area (where no uninvolved people are present). The distance of 1 Km stems from the experience with current operations (in particular from French scenario S-2). The distance of the UA from the remote pilot is proposed to be limited to not more than 2 km if VOs are used. In this way, the area to be covered by VOs is also limited, reducing their number and/or workload and, and therefore reducing the complexity and related risk of the operation. To further ensure that the ground and air risks remain low, a technical requirement is established to ensure that the flight of the UA is contained in the flight geography through a function allowing the programming of the flight volume and preventing the UA from exceeding it. This requirement, also known as geo-caging, stems from in-service experience with current operations in BVLOS29. It should be noted that the geo-caging requirement has a different purpose compared to the geo-awareness requirement. The former ensures that the UA will stay within the flight geography defined by the UAS operator, while the latter provides an alert to the remote pilot when it is approaching a protected UAS geographical zone. 2.3.2.4 Remote pilot competency For STS-02, the same theoretical knowledge training and assessment as for STS-01 is established, resulting in a common certificate issued by the competent authority or an entity recognised by that authority, after the remote pilot student has passed the online test and classroom examination at that authority or entity. The same scheme for the practical skill training and assessment is also proposed, but in this case, there are some differences in the elements to be covered: STS-02 includes the elements defined for STS-01 plus additional topics related to BVLOS and the use of VOs, as indicated in point 2 of Attachment A to STS-02. 2.3.2.5 Operations manual It is proposed that the UAS operations covered by STS-02 should have the same requirements for the OM as those for the UAS operations covered by STS-01. Therefore, the considerations presented in Section 2.3.1.4 apply. However, the UAS operator is required to take into consideration the peculiar elements of the operation, including but not limited to the communication requirements between all personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation. 2.3.2.6 Contingency and emergency procedures The same considerations as in Section 2.3.1.5 are valid for STS-02 except that for STS-02, as the area is wider and less populated, no specific value is defined for when the remote pilot should put in place the emergency procedures. The UAS operator is required to define it on a case-by-case basis. 2.3.2.7 Emergency response plan It is proposed that the UAS operations covered by STS-02 should have the same requirements for the ERP as those for the UAS operations covered by STS-01. Therefore, the considerations in Section 2.3.1.6 apply. 29 In particular, in France the declarative French scenario S-2 (BVLOS up to 1 km) includes the requirement to equip the UA with a system to ‘prevent in real time the aircraft to exceed the horizontal limits of a programmable flight volume’. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2.3.2.8 Externally provided services It is proposed that the UAS operations covered by STS-02 should have the same requirements for the externally provided services as those for the UAS operations covered by STS-01. Therefore, the considerations in Section 2.3.1.7 apply. 2.3.2.9 Level of human involvement It is proposed that the UAS operations covered by STS-02 should have the same requirements for the level of human intervention as those for the UAS operations covered by STS-01. Therefore, the considerations in Section 2.3.1.8 apply. 2.3.2.10 Technical requirements in STS-02 It is proposed that UAS to be operated under STS-02 should bear a C6 CE class mark. This can be affixed once it is demonstrated that the UAS complies with the technical requirements included in the proposed Part 17 of the Annex to the DA. As for the technical requirements of class C5 UAS, also for class C6 UAS, the technical requirements are listed starting from those defined for class C3 UAS, with some exclusions and some additions. Also in this case, a UAS manufacturer may develop a class C6 UAS starting form a class C3 or C2 UAS. The technical requirements defined for class C3 UAS that were excluded for class C5 UAS, are the same as those listed in Section 2.3.1.9, while the additional requirements are: — as for class C3, the UA characteristic dimension30 is proposed to be limited to 3 m, and the MTOM to 25 kg. To ensure that the expected kinetic energy is consistent with a low ground risk classification (see Section 2.3.1.2), for C6 class UAS, the maximum ground speed is proposed to be limited to 50 m/s; — a geo-caging function is proposed, as explained in Section 2.3.2.3, in order to ensure the containment of the UA within the flight geography; — an FTS is proposed as for class C5, with the exception that in the case of a class C6 UAS, considering the environment of the operation, the human factors aspect is less important in the effectiveness of the means to terminate the flight. Therefore, the requirement on the means to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics (e.g. a parachute) is not proposed; — provide information on the speed and flight height of the UA as proposed for class C5; however, since STS-02 covers BVLOS operations, for class C6, it is proposed to also provide the geographical position of the UA. It should be noted that, even if STS-02 covers BVLOS operations, as the range is still relatively short (maximum 2 km distance from the remote pilot), the use of the take-off point as the reference for the height information is still considered valid, as shown by the in-service experience; — as explained in Section 2.3.2.3, a means to programme the UA flight trajectory is proposed; — as for class C5 UAS, provide information on the signal strength of the command and control link and receive an alert from the UAS when it is likely that the signal is going to be lost, and another alert when the signal is lost; 30 For example, the main rotor diameter in a helicopter or gyroplane, distance between opposite rotors in a multi-rotor, longitude of body in an airship, etc. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what — in addition to the information required in the user’s manual for class C3, it is also proposed to add for class C6: — a description of the FTS; — a description of the function that limits UA access to certain airspace areas or volumes, which includes the ‘geo-caging’ function; and — the distance most likely to be travelled by the UA after the activation of the means to terminate the flight, to be considered by the UAS operator when defining the ground risk buffer (see Section 2.3.2.2). For C6 class, it was decided not to propose the possibility to develop an accessory transforming a class C3 UAS into class C6 UAS. Some requirements mandated for the C6 class highly depend on the software of the flight control system (e.g. the geo-caging) and only the original manufacturer of the UAS will be able to develop it. 2.3.3. Verification of compliance of the technical requirements The verification of compliance of the UAS with the technical requirements will be ensured via the CE mark process, using the same approach defined for UAS operated in the ‘open’ category. This decision was taken because for low-risk operations (i.e. SAIL I and SAIL II), SORA considers a declaration by the UAS operator as an acceptable means to demonstrate compliance with the mitigation measures and the operational suitability objectives (OSOs) required to make the operation safe. When the UAS operators are not the manufacturers of the UAS, they do not necessarily have the competency to assess the compliance of the UAS with the technical requirements, and therefore they cannot systematically take the responsibility that belongs to the manufacturer. According to the Basic Regulation, a ‘certificate’ may be granted to the manufacturer through the ‘aviation regulation’ (i.e. Part 21) or the ‘CE’ mark process. Considering the risk of the UAS operations covered by STSs, the CE mark process is considered the most proportionate approach. Therefore, two new classes of UAS, C5 and C6, have been developed, and the requirements are listed in two new Parts, 16 and 17, of the Annex to the DA. The requirements for these new classes are based on those already defined for class C3; however, in some cases, it was considered that a requirement defined for the ‘open’ category was not essential for safe operations of these STSs (e.g. the height limitation). It is envisaged that future STSs may not necessarily drive the creation of new UAS classes; rather than that, they may accept the use of a UAS of an already existing class, reducing thus the proliferation of classes. It should be noted that a manufacturer may mark a UAS with multiple CE markings (e.g. C3 and C5) if it complies with the technical requirements defined in the relevant parts. The possible conformity assessment procedures (called ‘modules’) that the manufacturer can use to demonstrate that a class C5 and C6 UAS conforms to the technical requirements are defined in Decision No 768/2008/EC31. The modules allowed were selected based on the consideration that the level of risk of UAS operations covered by STS-01 and ST-02 is at least similar to that related to the ‘open’ category, and that the availability of some of the technical requirements imposed may directly 31 Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82) (https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1570531772632&uri=CELEX:32008D0768). TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what affect the safety of the UAS operation (e.g. the FTS). Similarly to UAS classes C1, C2 and C3, it was therefore decided to impose on UAS classes C5 and C6 the verification by notified bodies that the design complies with the technical requirements or the implementation of a quality assurance system. The possibility to accept also a declaration by the manufacturer of demonstration of compliance with technical requirements was also considered; however, it was deemed that this would not provide sufficient assurance. Finally, it should be noted that UAS operations similar to those defined in STS-01 and STS-02, conducted with a UAS not marked as class C5 or C6 (e.g. with a privately built UAS), may still be conducted under the authorisation of an NAA. For these UAS operations, EASA will develop a predefined risk assessment, mirroring STS-01 and STS-02, allowing a simplified process for the UAS operator to receive an authorisation. 2.3.4. Applicability The amendment introducing the STSs cannot be made applicable immediately after the date of entry into force of the regulation, since manufacturers may need some time to develop and put on the market UAS marked class C5 and class C6. It was therefore decided to postpone the applicability to 18 months after the entry into force (i.e if the amendment is adopted by the end of 2020, the entry into force will be 20 days after the entry into force date, and the applicability will be from June 2022). This means that until the date when the amendement becomes applicable, UAS operators may appy national regulations and they may submit declarations based on national STSs, if the national regulatory framework allows it. After this date (i.e. June 2022), only declarations based on the EU STSs can be submitted. Declarations based on national STSs, submitted until the date of applicability (i.e. June 2022), may still be valid for 2 years (i.e. until June 2024). 2.3.5. Additional improvements proposed for Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (IA) The following improvements to the IA are proposed. — According to some commenters, the definition of ‘uninvolved person’ was not clear, since the conditions to fit within the definition are all expressed in a negative way. It is therefore proposed to replace this definition with ‘involved person’ having a similar content with the conditions made positive. Therefore, the text ‘uninvolved person’ was replaced with ‘involved persons’ in all instances where it appears in the IA. — STS-02 introduces the role of ‘visual observer’. This role should not be confused with the ‘UA observer’ mentioned in point UAS.OPEN.060(4). Therefore, the definitions of both roles have been introduced. The UA observer supports the remote pilot in keeping the UA in VLOS to make sure that the operation is conducted safely in regard to both ground and air risk. The UA observer needs to be situated alongside the remote pilot. This role was introduced to allow operations in first-person view (FPV) when the remote pilot does not have a wide view of the area where the UA is flying. Visual observers instead have the role to scan the sky and inform the remote pilot when they see other airspace users or obstacles (such as paragliders, parachutes, search and rescue (SAR) operations, etc.). The VO does not play any role in the mitigation of the ground risk since this is already ensured by using the ground-controlled area. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what — The definitions of ‘flight geography’, ‘flight geography area’, ‘contingency volume’, ‘contingency area’, ‘operational volume’ and ‘ground risk buffer’ have been introduced to support the identification of the areas where the UAS needs to be operated when applying an STS. The UAS operator is required to identify: — the flight geography, where the UAS operator plans to conduct the operation under normal procedures; — the contingency volume, in which the UA will be contained when the contingency procedures are applied; and — the ground risk buffer to protect third parties on the ground in the event of any unexpected behaviour of the UA that could result in the UA leaving the operational volume. Figure 3 provides a representation of the flight geography, the contingency volume and the ground risk buffer. Figure 3: Flight geography, contingency volume and ground risk buffer — Paragraph 5 of Article 5 has been modified to specify that the declaration to be submitted by the UAS operator is defined in Appendix 2 to the Annex to the IA. — Points UAS.OPEN.020 and UAS.OPEN.030 have been modified to clarify that the training can be provided by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of one EU Member State, not necessarily the Member State of registration. — Point UAS.OPEN.040 has been modified to require the remote pilot to be familiar with the user's manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS. — Point UAS.OPEN.050 has been modified to specify that the UAS operator is responsible for the identification of a remote pilot for each flight and not for each operation, since an operation may be made up of multiple flights. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what — Point UAS.SPEC.020 has been modified to limit the operations of UAS to the airspace where the probability of encountering manned aircraft is considered low, when in uncontrolled airspace. Member States are required to make this determination through geographical zones. Operations in controlled airspace still require coordination in accordance with the published procedure for the area of operation, but an individual authorisation may not always be necessary. Moreover, it has been clarified that this requirement is to ensure a low probability of encountering a manned aircraft. — Point UAS.SPEC.050 has been modified to require the UAS operator to keep, and maintain up to date for a minimum of 3 years, a record of the qualifications of the personnel employed and the maintenance activities conducted on the UAS. In addition, a requirement was added to ensure that the UAS is equipped with a green flashing light when operating at night and at a height lower than 120 m. This decision was based on the need for the enforcement authority to differentiate a UAS from a manned aircraft, consistent with the requirement imposed on the UAS operated in the ‘open’ category. Therefore, the purpose of this light is not to make the UAS visible from other traffic but rather to allow the UAS to be seen from ground during night. The decision on the type and colour of the light to be used for these UAS was based on the capability of the human eye to distinguish colours and on the schemes already used on manned aircraft. It was considered that manned aircraft already use white and red flashing lights, while blue flashing lights are used for emergency purposes. According to the 1931 CIE chromacity diagram32, the colours that the human eye can best distinguish are green, blue and red. Therefore, the only available possibility to use a distinguishable flashing light on a UAS is to mandate a green one. The requirement has been imposed on the UAS operator rather than on the manufacturer to leave the flexibility to add this type of light to the UA using an add-on kit provided by the manufacturer, to be installed when needed. Operations conducted at higher altitude will be subject to a risk assessment and different requirements on lights may be applicable, considering the airspace where they will operate. — Point UAS.SPEC.060 has been modified to require the remote pilot to be familiar with the user's manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS. — A new point UAS.SPEC.085 has been added to define the fixed duration and validity of the operational declaration as being for 2 years. 2.3.6. Additional improvements proposed for Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 (DA) The following improvements to the DA have been proposed: — Several recitals, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 30, 36 and 40 have been modified to introduce the concept that the market regulation also applies to UAS used in STS, and two new Parts, 16 and 17, have been added. — Article 5 has been modified to introduce a new paragraph extending the applicability of Regulation (EU) 2019/102033 to UAS covered by the IA. Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (the 32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIE_1931_color_space 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what enforcement Regulation), adopted on 20 June 2019, amends Regulation (EC) No 765/200834 to strengthen the market surveillance of products covered by the Union harmonisation legislation. Article 4 of the enforcement Regulation requires that, for each product placed on the EU market, a responsible economic operator is established in the EU, and it defines the precise obligations on such economic operators. The applicability of this Article is, however, restricted to products that are subject to a limited amount of Union harmonisation legislation, some of which is already applicable to UAS (i.e. the Radio Equipment Directive). — Article 40 has been modified to clarify in the title that it is only applicable to UAS operated in the ‘certified’ and in the ‘specific’ categories, except when conducted under a declaration. Moreover, a new paragraph has been added to mandate a remote identification system for all UA intended to be operated below 120 m, to address primarily the security and privacy risks. Such a requirement had been extensively discussed during the development of the text of the DA; however, at that time, only the requirement for a ‘direct’35 remote identification system was proposed for UAS to be operated in the ‘open’ category. It was indeed considered not proportionate to mandate all UAS (including those operated in the ‘specific’ category) to be equipped with a ‘direct’ remote identification system. With the development of the new regulation on U-space, the requirements for a ‘network’ remote identification system are being developed. While the ‘network’ remote identification will be developed mostly to address the safety risk, it may also fit the purpose of addressing the security and privacy risks if the signal may be detected by a mobile device without the need to be connected to a service provider. It was therefore decided to keep the requirement flexible and mandate, for all UAS intended to be operated in very low level (VLL36), a remote identification system transmitting data in a way that it can be received by existing mobile devices. This system can be ‘direct’ or ‘network’. — The term ‘data link’ used in Parts 1 to 5 has been replaced with the term ‘command and control link’ to be consistent with the terminology used in aviation. — The requirements of the ‘direct remote identification’ in Parts 2 to 4 have been slightly amended to allow additional information to be broadcast, and to include the time stamp. — The requirement for a green flashing light has been added to Parts 2 to 4 to make it applicable to UAS classes C1, C2 and C3. — The information to be included in the user’s manual defined in Parts 2 to 4 has been updated to clarify that the description of the method for the UA to recover the command and control link needs to be provided, and, in addition, that the procedures to upload the airspace limitations into the geo-awareness system need to be provided. No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011 (OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 1) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1570630772254&uri=CELEX:32019R1020) 34 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1570631076377&uri=CELEX:32008R0765). 35 The term ‘direct’ remote identification refers to a system broadcasting a signal that can be directly received by a mobile device (i.e. using Bluetooth or Wi-Fi). On the contrary, a ‘network’ remote identification is a system that transmits information through a connection with a network (i.e. the Internet). In this case, the receiver does not receive the information directly, but through the network. 36 VLL is the minimum height below which a VFR flight needs to have a permission as defined in paragraph f of point SERA.5005 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2.4. What are the stakeholders’ views — outcome of the consultation The draft opinion was consulted with advisory bodies and representatives of UAS industry. More than 300 comments were received and lead to the following changes: Delegated act:  a definiton of ‘control unit’ has been added. The definition provided in the Basic Regulation related to the ‘equipment to control the unmanned aircraft remotely’ is very broad and it includes also the infrastructure supporting the C2 link service between the UA and the control unit (e.g. 5g network, satellite, etc.). It is necessary therefore to add the definition of ‘control unit’ as an element of the ‘equipment to control the unmanned aircraft remotely’, excluding the C2 link service;  a definition of ‘C2 link service’ has been added to clarify the term used in the definition of contol unit. The C2 link is the service, provided by a third party, which may be used to establish a communication between the UA and the control unit;  the reference to the ‘A’ edition of the ANSI/CTA-2063 standard, published in September 2019 was added. The ‘A’ version of the standard includes only one type of serial number, corresponding to the one that in the previous version was referred as ‘physical’ serial number. In addition, the applicability of this requirement has been extended to all UAS not subject to registration, as defined by Article 16 of the IA, in order to allow the trasmission of the unique serial number by the electronic identification;  both ‘geo-awareness system’ and ‘geo-awareness function’ were used to refer to geo- awareness function. As there is no reason to use both, it was decided to consistenlty use ‘geo- awareness function’;  the definiton of very low level (VLL) has been introduced, replacing the term with the reference to Regulation (EU) 923/2012 (SERA) and in particular to paragraphs (1) and (2) of point (f) of point SERA.5005;  for all UAS with CE class mark the local electronic identification system has been complemented with an optional network electronic identification system, to allow them to be used in areas where the U-space will be deployed, as it will be defined by a future regulation. The system is required to check the validity of the UAS registration number by verifying the compatibility with a checksum that will be provided to the UAS operator by the registration system. In addition the requirement to upload the UAS operator registration number into the electronic identification system has been included in the user’s manual;  the table in Part 15 has been replaced with a new one to cover also the class C2 UAS with a MTOM < 900g;  tethered aircraft were excluded for class C6 UAS since they were considered not applicable to BVLOS operations;  the text related to the requirement for class C5 and C6 UAS to provide the remote pilot with means to continuously monitor the status of the command and control link, was improved including the provision of an alert when the signal is degraded to the extent of compromising the safe conduct of the operation; TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 2. In summary — why and what  it has been clarified that the accessory kit to transform a class C3 UAS into a class C5 cannot include software changes to the class C3 UAS since only the UAS manufacturer is able to update the software and verify it. This means that some requirements such as the selectable low speed mode cannot be included in the accessories kit, therefore only class C3 UAS already developed with such requirements are eligible for an accessory kit. The manufacturer of the accessory kit will be anyway responsible to demonstrate that the UAS, upgraded with the accessory kit, meet all requirements defined in Part 16. Lastly, the requirement to ensure that the UAS cannot be operated when one element of the kit is not properly installed has been removed since this is technically difficult to implement. The manufacturer of the accessories kit is still responsible to identify all elements of the kit in such a way that the UAS operator, and a possible enforcement officer, can ensure that they are all installed (e.g. mark each piece with a number and specifying the total number of the components such as 1 of 3, 2 of 3 etc.). Implementing act  the definition of control station has been added as in the Delegated Act;  the text in point (1)(b) of point UAS.SPEC.020 was improved to specify that Member States are required to define UAS geographical zones to limit or forbid operations in areas where the probability of encountering manned aircraft is not low;  the requirement for record keeping of the relevant qualifications, experience and/or training courses completed by the remote pilot and the other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation and by the maintenance staff, has been amended to extend the period to at least 3 years after the persons have ceased employment with the organisation or has changed their position in the organisation;  a brief title to each STS has been added;  a validity of 5 years for the certificate of of remote pilot theoretical knowledge for operations in the standard scenarios has been added;  a requirement was added for the visual observer to maintain a thorough visual scan of the airspace surrounding the unmanned aircraft in order to identify any risk of a collision with any manned aircraft. 2.5. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals The impact of STSs was already discussed in the impact assessment published with Opinion No 01/2018. 2.6. How we monitor and evaluate the rules Please refer to Chapter 8 ‘Monitoring and evaluation’ of NPA 2017-05 (B). Cologne, 6 November 2019 Patrick KY Executive Director TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 3. References 3. References 3.1. Affected regulations — Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 1). — Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45). 3.2. Affected decisions n/a 3.3. Other reference documents n/a TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 4. Appendices 4. Appendices Appendix 1: Risk assessment for STS-01 The following risk assessment has been conducted by applying SORA (AMC1 to Article 11 of the IA). 1. Step #1 — ConOps description UAS operators that intend to perform a UAS operation under STS-01 are required to elaborate a concept of operations (ConOps) and describe it in the OM as required in point 4 of the proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to the IA. The ConOps needs to fit the operational limitations defined in STS- 01. As part of the ConOps, the UAS operator will need to define the required operational volume and ground risk buffer. 2. Step #2 — determination of the intrinsic UAS ground risk class The intrinsic UAS ground risk relates to the unmitigated risk of a person being hit by the UA (in case of a loss of control of the UA) and it can be represented by the UAS ground risk class (GRC). The GRC is derived from the intended operation and the UAS lethal area, as shown in Table A11.1. Intrinsic UAS ground risk class (GRC) Max UAS characteristic dimension 1m 3m 8m >8m Typical kinetic energy expected < 700 J < 34 kJ < 1 084 kJ > 1 084 kJ Operational scenarios VLOS/BVLOS over a controlled ground 1 2 3 4 area VLOS in a sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 environment BVLOS in a sparsely populated 3 4 5 6 environment VLOS in a populated environment 4 5 6 8 BVLOS in a populated environment 5 6 8 10 VLOS over a gathering of people 7 BVLOS over a gathering of people 8 Table A1.1: Determination of the intrinsic UAS GRC Considering the operational scenario defined for STS-01 (VLOS over a controlled ground area) and the UA characteristics: — a rotorcraft or a tethered aircraft other than a fixed-wing aircraft; — a characteristic dimension37 of up to 3 m; and — an MTOM up to 25 kg; 37 Considering the above characteristics, the typical kinetic energy can be expected to be less than 34 kJ. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 4. Appendices as highlighted in Table A1.1, the intrinsic GRC is 2. 3. Step #3 — final GRC determination Table A1.2 lists the mitigations that need to be evaluated. Robustness Mitigation Mitigations for ground risk Correction sequence Low / None Medium High M1 — Strategic mitigations for 0: None 1 -2 -4 0 ground risk38 -1: Low M2 — Effects of ground impact are 2 0 -1 -2 0 reduced39 M3 — An emergency response plan 3 (ERP) is in place, validated by the 1 0 -1 0 operator and effective Total correction 0 Table A1.2: Mitigation measures for determination of the final GRC An evaluation of the different possible ground risk mitigations was made: — M1 (strategic mitigations for ground risk): in the assessment of the initial GRC, credit is already taken for operations over controlled ground; if a tether is used, M1 may be claimed, but SORA does not allow the GRC to be reduced to a lower value than the lowest value in the applicable column. Thus, a correction of 0 is determined. — M2 (effects of ground impact are reduced): even if the UAS is equipped with a system to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics (e.g. a parachute), it was decided to not take any credit for that, since no further technical requirements are imposed on the system used to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics. The system is required only for human factors considerations. No specific requirements are included for its robustness. Therefore, also for this case, a correction of 0 is determined. — M3 (ERP): in order to keep the GRC at 2, an ERP is required with a ‘medium’ level of robustness. This medium level is achieved through the requirements defined in the proposed point UAS.STS-01.030(4) of the IA, ensuring a medium level of integrity, and may be complemented by the remote flight crew training defined in GM1 UAS.SPEC.050(1)(d). Therefore, the final intrinsic GRC is 2. 4. Steps #4 to 6 — air risk assessment The strategic mitigation consists of complying with the requirements of the proposed amendment to point UAS.SPEC.020(1)(b) of the IA, according to which the airspace where operations are intended to be conducted must have a low probability of the UA encountering manned aircraft or other airspace users. Therefore, Member States are required to establish the appropriate measures (e.g. UAS geographical zones) to ensure this low probability of encounter. 38 This mitigation is meant as a means to reduce the number of people at risk. 39 This mitigation is meant as a means to reduce the energy absorbed by the people on the ground upon impact. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 4. Appendices Such a low probability of encounter is equivalent to an ARC that is no higher than ARC-b. Thus, ARC-b is to be considered here as the highest residual (final) ARC. These considerations lead to a final ARC-b. 5. Step #7 — SAIL determination Considering that for the ground risk, the final GRC is 2, and for the air risk, the final ARC is not more than ARC-b, and the resulting SAIL for STS-01 is SAIL II, as indicated in Table A1.3 below: SAIL determination Residual ARC Final a b c d GRC ≤2 I II IV VI 3 II II IV VI 4 III III IV VI 5 IV IV IV VI 6 V V V VI 7 VI VI VI VI >7 Category C operation Table A1.3: SAIL determination 6. Step #8 — identification of operational safety objectives (OSOs) The purpose of this step is to evaluate the defences within the UAS operation in the form of OSOs and the associated level of robustness depending on SAIL. Table A1.4 provides a qualitative methodology to make this determination. In this table, ‘O’ means optional, ‘L’ means recommended with low robustness, ‘M’ means recommended with medium robustness, and ‘H’ means recommended with high robustness. SAIL II corresponding to STS-01 is highlighted in yellow in Table A1.4 to show the required level of robustness for the different OSOs. For the discussion on how the OSO are met in STS-01, please refer to paragraph 9 of this Appendix. OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI Technical issue with the UAS OSO#01 Ensure that the operator is competent and/or O L M H H H proven OSO#02 UAS manufactured by competent and/or O O L M H H proven entity OSO#03 UAS maintained by competent and/or proven L L M M H H entity TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 4. Appendices OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI OSO#04 UAS developed to authority-recognised design O O O L M H standards OSO#05 UAS is designed considering system safety and O O L M H H reliability OSO#06 C3 link performance is appropriate for the O L L M H H operation OSO#07 Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to L L M M H H ensure consistency with the ConOps OSO#08 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to OSO#09 Remote crew is trained, current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#10 Safe recovery from technical issues L L M M H H Deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations OSO#11 Procedures are in place to handle the deterioration of external systems supporting L M H H H H UAS operations OSO#12 The UAS is designed to manage the deterioration of external systems supporting L L M M H H UAS operations OSO#13 External services supporting UAS operations are L L M H H H adequate for the operation Human error OSO#14 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to OSO#15 Remote crew is trained, current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#16 Multi-crew coordination L L M M H H OSO#17 Remote crew is fit to operate L L M M H H OSO#18 Automatic protection of the flight envelope O O L M H H from human error OSO#19 Safe recovery from human error O O L M M H OSO#20 A human factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI has been found O L L M M H appropriate for the mission Adverse operating conditions TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 4. Appendices OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI OSO#21 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to OSO#22 The remote crew is trained to identify critical L L M M M H environmental conditions and to avoid them OSO#23 Environmental conditions for safe operations L L M M H H are defined, measurable and adhered to OSO#24 UAS is designed and qualified for adverse O O M H H H environmental conditions Table A1.4: Recommended OSOs 7. Step #9 — adjacent area/airspace considerations Since each operation under STS-01 is performed over a controlled ground area and in a populated environment, the following three requirements apply: 1. the probability of leaving the operational volume should be less than 10-4/FH. 2. no single failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation should lead to operation outside the ground risk buffer. 3. software (SW) and airborne electronic hardware (AEH) whose development error(s) could directly lead to operations outside the ground risk buffer should be developed to an industry standard or methodology recognised as adequate by the competent authority. Regarding requirement #1, despite the fact that the scenario is built based on experience in some Member States, there is a lack of statistical data to estimate the order of magnitude expected for the probability of the UA leaving the operational volume. However, the technical requirements proposed for the UAS used in STS-01 are deemed sufficient to bring that likelihood down to a tolerable level, probably in the order indicated by SORA. Requirements #2 and #3 are considered to be met through the mandate to use a UA equipped with a means to terminate the flight, with its activation independent from the on-board automatic flight control and guidance system. 8. Step #10 — comprehensive safety portfolio Not applicable. This step is only necessary when the operator is requested to present an operational risk assessment to its competent authority. This explanatory note can be considered to be the safety portfolio supporting the declarations made under STS-01 and STS-02. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices 9. Compliance with OSOs SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness Point UAS.SPEC.050 of the IA requires the UAS operator to ‘establish procedures and limitations adapted to the The applicant is knowledgeable about the UAS being type of the intended operation and the risk involved’. LEVEL of used and as a minimum has the following relevant Furthermore, the proposed point UAS.STS-01.030 of the INTEGRITY operational procedures: checklists, maintenance, IA requires the UAS operator to develop an OM. The OSO #01 training, responsibilities, and associated duties. proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to the IA includes all Ensure that the operator Low is competent and/or the aspects to be considered and it covers those indicated proven by SORA. The proposed point UAS.STS-01.030 of the IA requires the LEVEL of The elements delineated in the level of integrity are UAS operator to develop an OM. The proposed Appendix ASSURANCE addressed in the ConOps. 5 to the Annex to the IA includes elements of the description of the ConOps. The UAS maintenance instructions are defined and, The requirements of this OSO are included in point when applicable, cover the UAS designer’s instructions UAS.SPEC.050(1)(i) that requires ‘the UAS operator to OSO #03 and requirements. maintain the UAS in a suitable condition for safe UAS maintained by operation, to define maintenance instructions and LEVEL of The maintenance staff are competent and have competent and/or Low employ an adequately trained and qualified maintenance INTEGRITY received an authorisation to carry out UAS proven entity (e.g. staff’. maintenance. industry standards) In addition, the AMC to point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(e)(ii) The maintenance staff use the UAS maintenance specifies that ‘The UAS operator should ensure that the instructions while performing maintenance. personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness operation apply the procedures contained in the operations manual.’  Criterion#1: The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to  Criterion #1 (Procedure): the IA requires the UAS operator to include in the OM  The maintenance instructions are documented. the maintenance instructions required to keep the UAS in safe condition.  The maintenance conducted on the UAS is recorded in a maintenance log system.  Criterion#2: The proposed amendment to point UAS.SPEC.050 of the IA requires the UAS operator to  A list of the maintenance staff authorised to LEVEL of keep and maintain up to date, for a minimum of 3 carry out maintenance is established and kept ASSURANCE years, a record of all relevant qualifications, up to date. experience and/or training completed by the  Criterion #2 (Training): maintenance staff and a record of the maintenance A record of all the relevant qualifications, activities conducted on the UAS. Moreover, the experience and/or training completed by the proposed amendment to point UAS.SPEC.050 of the IA maintenance staff is established and kept up to requires the UAS operator to establish and keep up to date. date a list of maintenance staff authorised by the operator to carry out maintenance activities. OSO #06 The applicant determines that performance, RF Point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(c) of the IA requires the UAS C3 link performance is LEVEL of spectrum usage1 and environmental conditions for C3 operator to ‘ensure that all operations effectively use and Low appropriate for the INTEGRITY links are adequate to safely conduct the intended support the efficient use of radio spectrum in order to operation operation. avoid harmful interference’. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness The UAS remote pilot has the means to continuously In addition, the proposed amendment to the DA includes monitor the C3 performance and ensure that the for class C5 the compliance with the following performance continues to meet the operational requirements of class C3: requirements2.  ‘be safely controllable with regards to stability, 1 For a low level of integrity, unlicensed frequency manoeuvrability and performance of command and bands might be acceptable under certain control link […]’; and conditions, e.g.:  ‘unless tethered, be equipped with a command and  the applicant demonstrates compliance with control link protected against unauthorised access to other RF spectrum usage requirements (e.g. the command and control functions’. Directive 2014/53/EU), by showing that the UAS Furthermore, a requirement is proposed to also provide equipment is compliant with these information on the health of the command and control requirements, and link.  the use of mechanisms to protect against Regarding the use of ‘unlicensed frequency bands’, as interference (e.g. FHSS, frequency deconfliction indicated in recital (8) of the DA, Directive 2014/53/EU by procedure). applies to UA that are not subject to certification, 2 The remote pilot has continual and timely access to according to Part 21, and are not intended to be operated the relevant C3 information that could affect the only on frequencies allocated by the Radio Regulations of safety of flight. For operations with a low level of the International Telecommunication Union for integrity for this OSO, this could be achieved by protected aeronautical use. monitoring the C2 link signal strength and receiving Moreover, point UAS.SPEC.060(2)(b) of the IA requires an alert from the UAS HMI if the signal becomes too the remote pilot to ‘ensure that the operating low. environment is compatible with the authorised or declared limitations and conditions’. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness A declaration form for the UAS operator is proposed in Appendix 2 to the Annex to the IA. LEVEL of The applicant declares that the required level of ASSURANCE integrity has been achieved. The level of assurance of the compliance with the technical requirements is ensured by the CE mark process. Point UAS.SPEC.060(2)(c) of the IA requires the remote pilot to ‘ensure that the UAS is in a safe condition to complete the intended flight safely’. The remote crew ensures that the UAS is in a condition The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to the IA requires: LEVEL of for safe operation and conforms to the approved  in point 4, the UAS operator to describe the concept INTEGRITY concept of operations. of operations including the intended operations; OSO #07  in point 6(c)(i)(H), the UAS operator to include in the Inspection of the UAS OM the procedures to verify that the UAS is in a (product inspection) to Low condition to safely conduct the intended operation. ensure consistency with the ConOps  Criterion #1: The verification that the UAS is in safe  Criterion #1 (Procedure): condition for the intended operation is included in the Product inspection is documented and accounts for OM. LEVEL of the manufacturer’s recommendations if available.  Criterion #2: Point UAS.SPEC.050 of the IA requires ASSURANCE  Criterion #2 (Training): The remote crew is trained that the UAS operator ensures that remote pilots to perform the product inspection, and that ‘have been informed about the UAS operator's training is self-declared (with evidence available). operations manual’ and that personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation, other than the TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness remote pilots, ‘have completed the on-the-job- training developed by the operator, and have been informed about the UAS operator's operations manual’. The proposed point UAS.STS-01.020(5) of the IA defines the minimum training for the remote pilot. Pre-flight activities are part of the training. Both the theoretical and practical skills training are accredited (with a certificate of remote pilot theoretical knowledge and an accreditation of completion of STS-01 practical skills training, respectively). Thus, evidence of basic training is available. The declaration proposed in Appendix 2 to the Annex to the IA covers all the requirements defined in each STS; it thus covers the competencies of the personnel involved in the operation.  Criterion #1 (Procedure definition):  Criterion #1: Point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(a) of the IA requires the UAS operator to ‘establish procedures Operational procedures  Operational procedures appropriate for the LEVEL of and limitations adapted to the type of the intended (OSO #08, OSO #11, OSO Medium proposed operation are defined and as a INTEGRITY operation and the risk involved, including operational #14 and OSO #21) minimum cover the following elements: procedures to ensure the safety of the operations’.  Flight planning, The proposed point UAS.STS-01.030(1) of the IA TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness  Pre- and post-flight inspections, requires the UAS operator to develop an OM, which as described in the proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to  Procedures to evaluate the environmental the IA, includes all the elements indicated in SORA conditions before and during the mission (i.e. criterion #1. real-time evaluation),  Criterion #2: Since this is still under JARUS discussion  Procedures to cope with unintended adverse (as indicated in the note), it has not been fully operating conditions (e.g. when ice is considered in the assessment. However, since in the encountered during an operation not case of an emergency situation in which the UA may approved for icing conditions), leave the operational volume, there is a requirement  Normal procedures, for the remote pilot to terminate the flight, and the  Contingency procedures (to cope with activation of this flight termination can be considered abnormal situations), as a ‘manual control’ by the remote pilot, then this criterion could also be considered (at least partially)  Emergency procedures (to cope with addressed. emergency situations), and  Criterion #3: The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex  Occurrence reporting procedures. to the IA requires the UAS operator to include in the  Normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures operational procedures considerations to minimise are compiled in an operations manual. human errors.  The limitations of the external systems used to support UAS safe operations are defined in an operations manual.  Criterion #2 (Procedural complexity which could jeopardise adherence): Operational procedures TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness involve the remote pilot taking manual control(1) when the UAS is usually automatically controlled. (1) This is still under discussion since not all UAS have a mode where the pilot could directly control the surfaces; moreover, some people claim it requires significant skill to not make things worse.  Criterion #3 (Consideration of potential human error): Operational procedures take human errors into consideration. At a minimum, operational procedures provide:  a clear distribution and assignment of tasks, and  an internal checklist to ensure staff are performing their assigned tasks. Operational procedures are validated against EASA will provide, in future AMC applicable to the STS, standards considered adequate by the competent the standard(s) or means of compliance considered authority and/or in accordance with a means of adequate by the Agency. LEVEL of compliance acceptable to that authority. The proposed point UAS.STS-01.030(4) of the IA requires ASSURANCE The adequacy of the contingency and emergency the UAS operator to prove the adequacy of the procedures are proved through: contingency and emergency procedures through dedicated flight tests or simulations.  dedicated flight tests, or TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness  simulation, provided the simulation is proven valid for the intended purpose. The competency-based theoretical and practical Article 8 of the IA lists the competencies required for training ensures knowledge of: remote pilots operating UAS in the ‘specific’ category; these are further detailed in the proposed Attachment A a) UAS regulations, to STS-01 and they cover the knowledge of the items b) UAS airspace operating principles, listed in this OSO. c) Airmanship and aviation safety, Point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(d)(i) of the IA requires the UAS LEVEL of d) Human performance limitations; operator to ensure before conducting operations that the INTEGRITY remote pilot has the appropriate competency. e) Meteorology, The proposed amendment to point UAS.SPEC.060(1)(b) Remote crew training f) Navigation/charts, Low of the IA requires the remote pilot to be familiar with the (OSO #09, OSO #15 and g) UA knowledge, and user’s manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS. OSO #22) h) Operating procedures and is adequate for the operation. In line with the approach used in subcategory A2 of the ‘open’ category, in the proposed point UAS.STS-01.020(d) LEVEL of of the IA, the remote pilot is allowed to conduct self- Training is self-declared (with evidence available) ASSURANCE study. However, the examination for the theoretical knowledge is required to be held at an entity recognised by the competent authority. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness Regarding the practical training, it is required that an external party provides the practical skill training and assessment. Then, the UAS operator can declare compliance with STS-01, which therefore also includes a declaration that the remote pilot(s) have the necessary competencies and is (are) familiar with the procedures. The objective of these OSOs is to complement the STS-01 includes operations in populated environments technical containment safety requirements by but over ground controlled areas. Therefore, the Safe design: addressing the risk of a fatality occurring while condition of the requirement ‘When operating over operating over populated areas or gatherings of populous areas or gatherings of people’ is not met and OSO #10 people. the requirement is considered not applicable to STS-01. Safe recovery from technical issue External systems supporting the operation are defined LEVEL of as systems that are not already part of the UAS but are Low OSO #12 INTEGRITY used to: The UAS is designed to  launch/take-off the UAS, manage the deterioration of external  make pre-flight checks, or systems supporting UAS  keep the UA within its operational volume (e.g. operations GNSS, satellite systems, air traffic management, UTM). TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness External systems activated/used after the loss of control of the operation are excluded from this definition. When operating over populated areas or gatherings of people, a fatality will not occur from any probable1 failure2 of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation. 1 The term ‘probable’ needs to be understood in its qualitative interpretation, i.e. ‘Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire system/operational life of an item.’ 2 Some structural or mechanical failures may be excluded from the criterion if it can be shown that these mechanical parts were designed according to aviation industry best practices. A design and installation appraisal is available. In The requirement is not applicable to STS-01. particular, this appraisal shows that: LEVEL of ASSURANCE  the design and installation features (independence, separation and redundancy) satisfy the low- integrity criterion; TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness  particular risks relevant to the ConOps (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic interference, etc.) do not violate the independence claims, if any. The applicant ensures that the level of performance of Those requirements are included in points (5) and (6) of any externally provided service necessary for the the proposed point UAS.STS-01.030 of the IA. LEVEL of safety of the flight is adequate for the intended OSO #13 INTEGRITY operation. External services Roles and responsibilities between the applicant and supporting UAS Low the external service provider are defined. operations are adequate for the operation The applicant declares that the requested level of The declaration included in the proposed Appendix 2 to LEVEL of performance for any externally provided service the Annex to the IA ensures compliance with this ASSURANCE necessary for the safety of the flight is achieved requirement. (without evidence necessarily being available).  Criterion #1: The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex  Criterion #1 (Procedures): to the IA requires the UAS operator to include in the OM a clear distribution and assignment of tasks and to A procedure (or procedures) to ensure coordination define the required communication procedures between the crew members and to ensure that LEVEL of among remote crew members and with external OSO #16 Low robust and effective communication channels is INTEGRITY parties, when needed. Multi-crew coordination (are) available and at a minimum cover:  Criterion #2: The proposed Attachment A to STS-01  the assignment of tasks to the crew, and includes the subject ‘operational procedures’, under  establishment of step-by-step communications. which the training on multi-crew coordination is addressed. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness  Criterion #2 (Training): Remote crew training covers multi-crew coordination.  Criterion #1: Multi-crew coordination, when relevant for the operation, is required to be included as part of the OM operational procedures.  Criterion #1 (Procedures): As indicated above for the related OSOs (OSO #08,  Procedures are not required to be validated OSO #11, OSO #14 and OSO #21), EASA will provide, in against a recognised standard. the future AMC applicable to STS, the standard(s) or LEVEL of means of compliance considered adequate by the  The adequacy of the procedures and checklists ASSURANCE Agency. is declared.  Criterion #2: The declaration proposed in Appendix 2  Criterion #2 (Training): to the Annex to the IA covers all requirements defined Training is self-declared (with evidence available). in each STS; it thus covers compliance with the requirements on procedures and training, and therefore also the corresponding part for multi-crew coordination, when relevant. The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to the IA requires OSO #17 The applicant has a policy defining how the remote LEVEL of the UAS operator to include a policy defining how the Remote crew is fit to Low crew can declare themselves fit to operate before INTEGRITY remote crew can declare themselves fit to operate before operate conducting any operation. conducting any operation. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness The policy to define how the remote crew declares This policy is documented as it is part of the OM. LEVEL of themselves fit to operate (before an operation) is ASSURANCE documented. The UAS information and control interfaces are Part 4 of the Annex to the DA already includes for UAS in succinctly presented and do not confuse, cause class C3 a requirement for the UAS manufacturers to unreasonable fatigue, or contribute to remote crew ensure that the UAS can be safely controlled and errors that could adversely affect the safety of the manoeuvred by a remote pilot with the competency operation. defined in the IA. The same requirement is also applicable to UAS in class C5. Comments/notes: OSO #20 No visual observers are mandated in STS-01. If an electronic means is used to support potential A human factors visual observers in their role to maintain awareness of evaluation has been LEVEL of the position of the unmanned aircraft, its HMI: performed and the HMI Low INTEGRITY has been found  is sufficient to allow the visual observers to appropriate for the determine the position of the UA during operation; mission  does not degrade the visual observer’s ability to:  scan the airspace where the unmanned aircraft is operating for any potential collision hazard; and  maintain effective communication with the remote pilot at all times. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness The applicant conducts an evaluation of the UAS Compliance with the technical requirement will be considering and addressing human factors to ensured through the CE mark process. LEVEL of determine that the HMI is appropriate for the mission. ASSURANCE The HMI evaluation is based on engineering evaluations or analyses.  Criterion #1: Part 4 of the Annex to the DA includes already for UAS in class C3 a requirement for the UAS manufacturers to include in the user’s manual the:  ‘operational limitations (including but not limited  Criterion #1 (Definition): Environmental conditions to meteorological conditions and day/night for safe operations are defined and reflected in the operations)’; and flight manual or equivalent document. OSO #23  ‘appropriate description of all the risks related to  Criterion #2 (Procedures): Procedures to evaluate Environmental UAS operations’; the environmental conditions before and during conditions for safe LEVEL of Low the mission (i.e. real-time evaluation) are available The same requirements are applicable also to UAS in operations are defined, INTEGRITY and include assessment of the meteorological class C5. measurable and adhered conditions (METAR, TAFOR, etc.) with a simple  Criterion #2: The proposed Appendix 5 to the Annex to recording system. to the IA requires the UAS operator to include in the  Criterion #3 (Training): Training covers assessment OM the environmental and weather conditions of the meteorological conditions. adequate to conduct the UAS operation, as well as contingency procedures to cope with adverse operating conditions.  Criterion #3: The proposed Attachment A to STS-01 includes ‘meteorology’ as one of the subjects. Future TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-01 level of robustness AMC & GM will include more details, to address obtaining and assessing weather information.  Criterion #1 (Definition): The applicant declares  Criterion #1: Compliance with the UAS requirements that the required level of integrity has been will be ensured through the CE mark process. (1) achieved . Standards will be developed. Supporting evidence may or may not be available.  Criterion #2: See the ‘level of assurance’ for (1) LEVEL of operational procedures (OSO #08, OSO #11, OSO #14  Criterion #2 (Procedures): See the ‘level of ASSURANCE and OSO #21)’ assurance’ for operational procedures (OSO #08, OSO #11, OSO #14 and OSO #21)’  Criterion #3: See the ‘level of assurance’ for remote crew training (OSO #09, OSO #15 and OSO #22).  Criterion #3 (Training): See the ‘level of assurance’ for remote crew training (OSO #09, OSO #15 and OSO #22)’ TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices Appendix 2: Risk assessment for STS-02 The following risk assessment has been conducted by applying the SORA (AMC1 to Article 11 to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947). 1. Step #1 — ConOps description As in STS-01, UAS operators that intend to perform an operation under STS-02 are required to elaborate a ConOps and describe it in the OM as required in point 4 of the proposed Appendix 5. The ConOps needs to fit the operational limitations defined in STS-02. As part of the ConOps, the UAS operator will need to define the required operational volume and ground risk buffer. 2. Step #2 — determination of the initial UAS ground risk class The intrinsic UAS ground risk relates to the unmitigated risk of a person being hit by the UA (in case of a loss of control of the UA), and it can be represented by the UAS ground risk class (GRC). The GRC is derived from the intended operation and the UAS lethal area, as shown in Table A1. Intrinsic UAS ground risk class (GRC) Max UAS characteristics dimension 1m 3m 8m >8 m Typical kinetic energy expected < 700 J < 34 kJ < 1 084 kJ > 1 084 kJ Operational scenarios VLOS/BVLOS over a controlled ground 1 2 3 4 area VLOS in a sparsely populated 2 3 4 5 environment BVLOS in a sparsely populated 3 4 5 6 environment VLOS in a populated environment 4 5 6 8 BVLOS in a populated environment 5 6 8 10 VLOS over a gathering of people 7 BVLOS over a gathering of people 8 Table A2.1: Determination of the intrinsic UAS GRC Considering the operational scenario defined for STS-02 (BVLOS over controlled ground area) and the UA characteristics: — a rotorcraft or a tethered aircraft other than a fixed-wing aircraft; — a characteristic dimension40 of up to 3 m; — an MTOM up to 25 kg; and — a ground speed of up to 50 m/s; 40 Considering the above characteristics, the typical kinetic energy can be expected to be less than 34 kJ. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices as highlighted in Table A1, the intrinsic GRC is 2. 3. Step #3 — final GRC determination Table A2.2 lists the mitigations that need to be evaluated. Robustness Mitigation Mitigations for ground risk Correction Sequence Low / None Medium High M1 — Strategic mitigations for 0: None 1 -2 -4 0 ground risk41 -1: Low M2 — Effects of ground impact are 2 0 -1 -2 0 reduced42 M3 — An emergency response plan 3 (ERP) is in place, validated by the 1 0 -1 0 operator and effective Total correction 0 Table A2.2: Mitigations for Final GRC determination An evaluation of the different possible ground risk mitigations was made: — M1 (strategic mitigations for ground risk): in the assessment of the initial GRC, credit is already taken for operations over controlled ground; if a tether is used, M1 may be claimed, but SORA does not allow the GRC to be reduced to a lower value than the lowest value in the applicable column when using M1. Thus, a correction of 0 is determined. — M2 (Effects of ground impact are reduced): no system to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics is proposed. Therefore, also for this case, a correction of 0 is determined. — M3 (ERP): in order to keep the GRC to 2, an ERP is required with a ‘medium’ level of robustness. Such a medium level is achieved through the requirements defined in the proposed UAS.STS- 02.030(5), ensuring a medium level of integrity. They may be complemented by the remote flight crew training defined in GM1 UAS.SPEC.050(1)(d). Therefore, the final intrinsic GRC is 2. 4. Steps #4 to 6 — air risk assessment The strategic mitigation consists of complying with the requirements of the proposed amendment to point UAS.SPEC.020(1)(b) of the IA, according to which the airspace in which operations are intended to be conducted must have a low probability of the UA encountering manned aircraft or other airspace users. Therefore, Member States are required to establish the appropriate measures (e.g. UAS geographical zones) to ensure this low probability of encounter. Such a low probability of encounter is equivalent to an ARC that is no higher than ARC-b. Thus, ARC-b is to be considered here as the highest residual (final) ARC. 41 This mitigation is meant as a means to reduce the number of people at risk. 42 This mitigation is meant as a means to reduce the energy absorbed by the people of the ground upon impact. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices The main tactical mitigation is the use of visual observers, as explained in Section 2.3.2.2. 5. Steps #7 — SAIL determination Considering that for the ground risk, the final GRC is 2 and for the air risk, the final ARC is not more than ARC-b, the resulting SAIL for STS-02 is SAIL II, as indicated in Table A1. below: SAIL determination Residual ARC Final a b c d GRC ≤2 I II IV VI 3 II II IV VI 4 III III IV VI 5 IV IV IV VI 6 V V V VI 7 VI VI VI VI >7 Category C operation Table A2.3: SAIL determination 6. Step #8 — identification of operational safety objectives (OSOs) The purpose of this step is to evaluate the defences within the UAS operation in the form of OSOs and the associated level of robustness depending on SAIL. Table A1. A2.4 provides a qualitative methodology to make this determination. In this table, ‘O’ means optional, ‘L’ means recommended with low robustness, ‘M ‘means recommended with medium robustness, and ‘H’ means recommended with high robustness. SAIL II corresponding to STS-02 is highlighted in yellow in Table A2.4 to show the required level of robustness for the different OSOs. For the discussion on how the OSOs are met in STS-02, please refer to paragraph 9 of this Appendix. OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI Technical issue with the UAS OSO#01 Ensure that the operator is competent and/or O L M H H H proven OSO#02 UAS manufactured by competent and/or O O L M H H proven entity OSO#03 UAS maintained by competent and/or proven L L M M H H entity OSO#04 UAS developed to authority-recognised design O O O L M H standards TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI OSO#05 UAS is designed considering system safety and O O L M H H reliability OSO#06 C3 link performance is appropriate for the O L L M H H operation OSO#07 Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to L L M M H H ensure consistency with the ConOps OSO#08 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to OSO#09 Remote crew is trained, current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#10 Safe recovery from technical issues L L M M H H Deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations OSO#11 Procedures are in place to handle the deterioration of external systems supporting L M H H H H UAS operations OSO#12 The UAS is designed to manage the deterioration of external systems supporting L L M M H H UAS operations OSO#13 External services supporting UAS operations L L M H H H are adequate for the operations Human error OSO#14 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to OSO#15 Remote crew is trained, current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#16 Multi-crew coordination L L M M H H OSO#17 Remote crew is fit to operate L L M M H H OSO#18 Automatic protection of the flight envelope O O L M H H from human error OSO#19 Safe recovery from human error O O L M M H OSO#20 A human factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI has been found O L L M M H appropriate for the mission Adverse operating conditions OSO#21 Operational procedures are defined, validated L M H H H H and adhered to TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E to SORA) I II III IV V VI OSO#22 The remote crew is trained to identify critical L L M M M H environmental conditions and to avoid them OSO#23 Environmental conditions for safe operations L L M M H H are defined, measurable and adhered to OSO#24 UAS is designed and qualified for adverse O O M H H H environmental conditions Table A2.4: Recommended OSOs 7. Step #9 — adjacent area/airspace considerations Operations under STS-02 are performed over a controlled ground area and in sparsely populated environments; however, since it cannot be excluded that adjacent areas will include gatherings of people or ARC-d airspace, the same three requirements listed for STS-01 in paragraph 7 of Appendix 1 apply. Moreover, the technical requirements proposed for this purpose for class C5 are also proposed for UAS to be used in STS-02 (class C6). 8. Step #10 — comprehensive safety portfolio As in STS-01, this step is not applicable. The same considerations apply as those in paragraph 8 of Appendix 1. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices 9. Compliance with OSOs SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness The applicant is knowledgeable about the UAS being The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of used and as a minimum has the following relevant The proposed point UAS.STS-02.030 of the IA provides OSO #01 INTEGRITY operational procedures: checklists, maintenance, requirements equivalent to the proposed point Ensure that the operator Low training, responsibilities, and associated duties. UAS.STS-01.030 of the IA. is competent and/or proven The elements delineated in the level of integrity are The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of ASSURANCE addressed in the ConOps. The UAS maintenance instructions are defined, and The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. when applicable, cover the UAS designer’s instructions and requirements. LEVEL of The maintenance staff are competent and have OSO #03 INTEGRITY received an authorisation to carry out UAS UAS maintained by maintenance. competent and/or Low The maintenance staff use the UAS maintenance proven entity (e.g. instructions while performing maintenance. industry standards)  Criterion #1 (Procedure): The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of  The maintenance instructions are documented. ASSURANCE  The maintenance conducted on the UAS is recorded in a maintenance log system. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  A list of the maintenance staff authorised to carry out maintenance is established and kept up to date.  Criterion #2 (Training): A record of all the relevant qualifications, experience and/or training completed by the maintenance staff is established and kept up to date. The applicant determines that the performance, RF The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. spectrum usage1 and environmental conditions for C3 Moreover, the technical requirements proposed for this links are adequate to safely conduct the intended purpose for class C5 are also proposed for UAS to be used operation. in STS-02 (class C6). The UAS remote pilot has the means to continuously OSO #06 monitor the C3 performance and ensure that the C3 link performance is LEVEL of performance continues to meet the operational Low requirements2. appropriate for the INTEGRITY operation 1 For a low level of integrity, unlicensed frequency bands might be acceptable under certain conditions, e.g.:  the applicant demonstrates compliance with other RF spectrum usage requirements (e.g. Directive 2014/53/EU), by showing that the UAS TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness equipment is compliant with these requirements, and  the use of mechanisms to protect against interference (e.g. FHSS, frequency deconfliction by procedure). 2 The remote pilot has continual and timely access to the relevant C3 information that could affect the safety of flight. For operations with a low level of integrity for this OSO, this could be achieved by monitoring the C2 link signal strength and receiving an alert from the UAS HMI if the signal becomes too low. LEVEL of The applicant declares that the required level of The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. ASSURANCE integrity has been achieved. The remote crew ensures that the UAS is in a condition The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of for safe operation and conforms to the approved OSO #07 INTEGRITY concept of operations. Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to Low The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply.  Criterion #1 (Procedure): ensure consistency with The proposed point UAS.STS-02.020(8) of the IA defines LEVEL of the ConOps Product inspection is documented and accounts for ASSURANCE the minimum training for the remote pilot as described in the manufacturer’s recommendations if available. Section 2.3.2.4. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  Criterion #2 (Training): The remote crew is trained Both the theoretical and practical skills training are to perform the product inspection, and that accredited (with a certificate of remote pilot theoretical training is self-declared (with evidence available). knowledge and an accreditation of completion of the STS- 02 practical skills training, respectively).  Criterion #1 (Procedure definition): The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply.  Operational procedures appropriate for the proposed operation are defined and, as a minimum cover, the following elements:  Flight planning,  Pre and post-flight inspections,  Procedures to evaluate the environmental Operational procedures LEVEL of conditions before and during the mission (i.e. (OSO #08, OSO #11, OSO Medium INTEGRITY real-time evaluation), #14 and OSO #21)  Procedures to cope with unintended adverse operating conditions (e.g. when ice is encountered during an operation not approved for icing conditions),  Normal procedures,  Contingency procedures (to cope with abnormal situations), TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  Emergency procedures (to cope with emergency situations), and  Occurrence reporting procedures.  Normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures are compiled in an operations manual.  The limitations of the external systems used to support UAS safe operations are defined in an operations manual.  Criterion #2 (Procedural complexity which could jeopardize adherence to): Operational procedures involve the remote pilot taking manual control(1) when the UAS is usually automatically controlled. (1) This is still under discussion, since not all UAS have a mode where the pilot could directly control the surfaces; moreover, some people claim it requires significant skill to not make things worse.  Criterion #3 (Consideration of Potential Human Error): Operational procedures take human errors into consideration. At a minimum, operational procedures provide: TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  a clear distribution and assignment of tasks, and  an internal checklist to ensure staff are performing their assigned tasks. Operational procedures are validated against The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. standards considered adequate by the competent The proposed point UAS.STS-02.030(4) of the IA requires authority and/or in accordance with a means of the UAS operator to prove the adequacy of the compliance acceptable to that authority. contingency and emergency procedures through LEVEL of The adequacy of the contingency and emergency dedicated flight tests or simulations. ASSURANCE procedures are proved through:  dedicated flight tests, or  simulation, provided the simulation is proven valid for the intended purpose. The competency-based theoretical and practical The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. training ensures knowledge of: i) UAS regulations; Remote crew training j) UAS airspace operating principles; LEVEL of (OSO #09, OSO #15 and Low k) Airmanship and aviation safety; INTEGRITY OSO #22) l) Human performance limitations; m) Meteorology; n) Navigation/charts; TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness o) UA knowledge; and p) Operating procedures and is adequate for the operation. The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply; LEVEL of Training is self-declared (with evidence available) however, the accreditation of completion of practical ASSURANCE skills training is for STS-02. The objective of these OSOs is to complement the Not applicable as STS-02 is for operations in a sparsely technical containment safety requirements by populated environment. Safe design: addressing the risk of a fatality occurring while operating over populated areas or gatherings of OSO #10 people. Safe recovery from technical issue External systems supporting the operation are defined LEVEL of as systems that are not already part of the UAS but are Low used to: OSO #12 INTEGRITY The UAS is designed to  launch/take-off the UAS, manage the deterioration of external  make pre-flight checks, or systems supporting UAS  keep the UA within its operational volume (e.g. operations GNSS, satellite systems, air traffic management, UTM). TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness External systems activated/used after the loss of control of the operation are excluded from this definition. When operating over populated areas or gatherings of people, a fatality will not occur from any probable1 failure2 of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation. 1 The term ‘probable’ needs to be understood in its qualitative interpretation, i.e. ‘Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire system/operational life of an item.’ 2 Some structural or mechanical failures may be excluded from the criterion if it can be shown that these mechanical parts were designed according to aviation industry best practices. A design and installation appraisal is available. In Not applicable, as STS-02 is for operations in a sparsely particular, this appraisal shows that: populated environment. LEVEL of  the design and installation features (independence, ASSURANCE separation and redundancy) satisfy the low- integrity criterion; TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  particular risks relevant to the ConOps (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic interference, etc.) do not violate the independence claims, if any. The applicant ensures that the level of performance for The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. any externally provided service necessary for the safety of the flight is adequate for the intended LEVEL of OSO #13 operation. INTEGRITY External services Roles and responsibilities between the applicant and supporting UAS Low the external service provider are defined. operations are adequate for the operation The applicant declares that the requested level of The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of performance for any externally provided service ASSURANCE necessary for the safety of the flight is achieved (without evidence necessarily being available)  Criterion #1 (Procedures): The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply; however, for STS-02, more detailed information is A procedure (or procedures) to ensure coordination planned to be issued in the future in the form of guidance between the crew members and to ensure that material, for aspects such as the communications OSO #16 LEVEL of robust and effective communication channels are Low between the remote pilot and visual observers. Multi-crew coordination INTEGRITY available and at a minimum cover:  assignment of tasks to the crew,  establishment of step-by-step communications. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness  Criterion #2 (Training): Remote crew training covers multi-crew coordination.  Criterion #1 (Procedures): The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply.  Procedures are not required to be validated against a recognised standard. LEVEL of  The adequacy of the procedures and checklists ASSURANCE is declared.  Criterion #2 (Training): Training is self-declared (with evidence available) The applicant has a policy defining how the remote The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. LEVEL of crew can declare themselves fit to operate before OSO #17 INTEGRITY conducting any operation. Remote crew is fit to Low The policy to define how the remote crew declares The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. operate LEVEL of themselves fit to operate (before an operation) is ASSURANCE documented. OSO #20 The UAS information and control interfaces are The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. A human factors succinctly presented and do not confuse, cause The requirement regarding the use of electronic means LEVEL of unreasonable fatigue, or contribute to remote crew evaluation has been Low by the visual observer is included in the proposed point INTEGRITY errors that could adversely affect the safety of the performed and the HMI UAS.STS-02(10)(b)(v) of the IA. has been found operation. TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness appropriate for the Comments/notes: mission If an electronic means is used to support potential visual observers in their role to maintain awareness of the position of the unmanned aircraft, its HMI:  is sufficient to allow the visual observers to determine the position of the UA during operation;  does not degrade the visual observer’s ability to:  scan the airspace where the unmanned aircraft is operating for any potential collision hazard; and  maintain effective communication with the remote pilot at all times. The applicant conducts an evaluation of the UAS The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. considering and addressing human factors to LEVEL of determine whether the HMI is appropriate for the ASSURANCE mission. The HMI evaluation is based on engineering evaluations or analyses.  Criterion #1 (Definition): The environmental The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. OSO #23 Environmental LEVEL of conditions for safe operations are defined and Moreover, the technical requirements proposed for this Low reflected in the flight manual or equivalent conditions for safe INTEGRITY purpose for class C5 are also proposed for UAS to be used operations are defined, document. in STS-02 (class C6). TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 63 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 05/2019 6. Appendices SAIL II expected Operational safety objectives (OSOs) Criteria in SORA for SAIL II Requirements applicable to STS-02 level of robustness measurable and adhered  Criterion #2 (Procedures): Procedures to evaluate The proposed theoretical training is the same as that to the environmental conditions before and during proposed for STS-01. the mission (i.e. real-time evaluation) are available and include assessment of the meteorological conditions (METAR, TAFOR, etc.) with a simple recording system.  Criterion #3 (Training): Training covers assessment of the meteorological conditions.  Criterion #1 (Definition): The applicant declares The same considerations as provided for STS-01 apply. that the required level of integrity has been achieved(1). (1) Supporting evidence may or may not be available. LEVEL of  Criterion #2 (Procedures): See the ‘level of ASSURANCE assurance’ for operational procedures (OSO #08, OSO #11, OSO #14 and OSO #21)  Criterion #3 (Training): See the ‘level of assurance’ for remote crew training (OSO #09, OSO #15 and OSO #22) TE.RPRO.00036-009 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 63 An agency of the European Union EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, XXX […](2019) XXX draft ANNEX TO EASA OPINION Νο 05/2019 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/... of XXX amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 as regards the adoption of standard scenarios EN EN  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/... of XXX amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 as regards the adoption of standard scenarios THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (1), and in particular Article 57 thereof, Whereas: (1) Appendix 1 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (2) should contain standard scenarios supporting a declaration. (2) Two standard scenarios have been developed by EASA, based on the experience gained by some Member States. Standard scenario 1 (STS-01) covers operations executed in visual line of sight (VLOS), at a maximum height of 120 m over a controlled ground area in a populated environment using a CE class C5 UAS. Standard scenario 2 (STS-02) covers operations that might be conducted beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), with the UA at a distance of not more than 2 km from the remote pilot if visual observers are used, at a maximum height of 120 m over a controlled ground area in a sparsely populated environment, and using a CE class C6 UAS. (3) The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has prepared draft implementing rules and submitted them with Opinion No 05/2019 (3) in accordance with points (b) and (c) of Article 75(2) and with Article 76(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the committee established in accordance with Article 128(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, 1 OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45). (3) https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions EN 1 EN  HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 (1) Point (18) of Article 2 is replaced by the following: ‘(18) ‘involved persons’ means persons who participate in the UAS operation and who are aware of the instructions and safety precautions given by the UAS operator;’; (2) The following point (24) is added to Article 2: ‘(24) ‘unmanned aircraft observer’ means a person, situated alongside the remote pilot, who, by unaided visual observation of the UA, assists the remote pilot in keeping the UA in VLOS and safely conducting the flight;’; (3) The following point (25) is added to Article 2: ‘(25) ‘visual observer’ means a person who assists the remote pilot by performing unaided visual scanning of the airspace in which the unmanned aircraft is operating for any potential hazard in the air;’; (4) The following point (26) is added to Article 2: ‘(26) ‘control unit’ (‘CU’) means the equipment or system of equipment to control unmanned aircraft remotely as defined in point 32 of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, with the exception of any infrastructure supporting the C2 link service, which supports the control or the monitoring of the unmanned aircraft during any phase of flight;’; (5) The following point (27) is added to Article 2: ‘(27) ‘C2 link service’ means a communication service between the unmanned aircraft and the CU provided by a third party;’. (6) The following point (28) is added to Article 2: ‘(28) ‘flight geography’ means the volume(s) of airspace defined spatially and temporally in which the UAS operator plans to conduct the operation under normal procedures.’; (7) The following point (29) is added to Article 2: ‘(29) ‘flight geography area’ means the projection of the flight geography on the surface of the earth.’; (8) The following point (30) is added to Article 2: ‘(30) ‘contingency volume’ means the volume outside the flight geography where contingency procedures are applied.’; (9) The following point (31) is added to Article 2: ‘(31) ‘contingency area’ means the projection of the contingency volume on the surface of the earth;’; (10) The following point (32) is added to Article 2: ‘(32) ‘operational volume’ is the combination of the flight geography and the contingency volume;’; EN 2 EN  (11) The following point (33) is added to Article 2: ‘(33) ‘ground risk buffer’ is an area over the surface of the earth, which surrounds the operational volume and that is defined to minimise the risk to third parties on the surface in the event of the unmanned aircraft leaving the operational volume.’; (12) Paragraph 5 of Article 5 is replaced by the following ‘5. Where the UAS operator submits a declaration to the competent authority of the Member State of registration in accordance with point UAS.SPEC.020 laid down in Part B of the Annex for an operation complying with a standard scenario as defined in Appendix 1 to that Annex, the UAS operator shall not be required to obtain an operational authorisation in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, and the procedure laid down in paragraph 5 of Article 12 shall apply. The UAS operator shall use the declaration referred to in Appendix 2 to that Annex.’; (13) Article 23 is replaced by the following: ‘1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It shall apply from 1 July 2020. 2. Paragraph 5 of Article 5 shall apply from [OP: please insert 18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation- i.e. June 2022] 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of Article 21, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 5, Member States may accept declarations made by UAS operators based on national standard scenarios or equivalent, if those scenarios meet the requirements of point UAS.SPEC.020 of the Annex, until [OP: please insert 18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation — i.e. 1 June 2022]. Such declarations shall not be valid after [OP: please insert 42 months after the entry into force of this Regulation — i.e. 1 June 2024]. 4. Paragraph 3 of Article 15 shall apply from 1 July 2021.’; (14) Point (1) of point UAS.OPEN.020 is replaced by the following: ‘(1) for unmanned aircraft referred to in point (5)(d), be conducted in such a way that a remote pilot of the unmanned aircraft does not overfly assemblies of people and reasonably expects that only involved persons will be overflown. In the event of unexpected overflight of persons who are not involved, the remote pilot shall reduce as much as possible the time during which the unmanned aircraft overflies those persons;’; (15) Point (2) of point UAS.OPEN.020 is replaced by the following: ‘(2) in the case of an unmanned aircraft referred to in points (5)(a), (5)(b) and (5)(c), be conducted in such a way that the remote pilot of the unmanned aircraft may overfly persons who are not involved, but shall never overfly assemblies of people;’; (16) Point (4)(b) of point UAS.OPEN.020 is replaced by the following: ‘(b) in the case of an unmanned aircraft class C1, as defined in Part 2 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945, who has completed an online training course followed by completing successfully an online theoretical knowledge examination provided by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of EN 3 EN  a Member State. The examination shall comprise 40 multiple-choice questions distributed appropriately across the following subjects: i. air safety; ii. airspace restrictions; iii. aviation regulations; iv. human performance limitations; v. operational procedures; vi. UAS general knowledge; vii. privacy and data protection; viii. insurance; ix. security.’; (17) Point (1) of point UAS.OPEN.030 is replaced by the following: ‘(1) be conducted in such a way that the unmanned aircraft does not overfly persons who are not involved and the UAS operations take place at a safe horizontal distance of at least 30 metres from them; the remote pilot may reduce the horizontal safety distance down to a minimum of 5 metres from persons who are not involved when operating an unmanned aircraft with an active low speed mode function and after evaluation of the situation regarding: (a) weather conditions, (b) performance of the unmanned aircraft, (c) segregation of the involved area.’; (18) Point (2) of point UAS.OPEN.030 is replaced by the following: ‘(2) be performed by a remote pilot who is familiar with the user’s manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS and holds a certificate of remote pilot competency issued by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State. This certificate shall be obtained after complying with all of the following conditions and in the order indicated: (a) completing an online training course and passed the online theoretical knowledge examination as referred to in point (4)(b) of point UAS.OPEN.020; (b) completing a self-practical training in the operating conditions of the subcategory A3 set out in points (1) and (2) of point UAS.OPEN.040; (c) declaring the completion of the self-practical training defined in point (b) and passing an additional theoretical knowledge examination provided by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State. The examination shall comprise at least 30 multiple-choice questions aimed at assessing the remote pilot’s knowledge of the technical and operational mitigations for ground risk, distributed appropriately across the following subjects: EN 4 EN  (a) meteorology; (b)UAS flight performance; (c) technical and operational mitigations for ground risk.’; (19) Point (1) of point UAS.OPEN.040 is replaced by the following: ‘(1) be conducted in an area where the remote pilot reasonably expects that no person who is not involved will be endangered within the range where the unmanned aircraft is flown during the entire time of the UAS operation; (20) Point (3) of point UAS.OPEN.040 is replaced by the following: ‘(3) be performed by a remote pilot who is familiar with the user’s manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS and who has completed an online training course and passed an online theoretical knowledge examination as defined in point (4)(b) of point UAS.OPEN.020;’; (21) Point (3) of point UAS.OPEN.050 is replaced by the following: ‘(3) designate a remote pilot for each flight;’; (22) Point (1)(e) of point UAS.OPEN.060 is replaced by the following: ‘(e) if the UAS is fitted with an additional payload, verify that its mass exceeds neither the MTOM defined by the manufacturer nor the MTOM limit of its class.’; (23) Point (4) of point UAS.OPEN.060 is replaced by the following: ‘(4) For the purposes of point (2)(b), remote pilots may be assisted by an unmanned aircraft observer. Clear and effective communication shall be established between the remote pilot and the unmanned aircraft observer.’; (24) Point (1)(b) of point UAS.SPEC.020 is replaced by the following: ‘(b) performed below 120 metres from the surface of the earth, and: i. in uncontrolled airspace (class F or G) unless different limitations are provided by Member States through UAS geographical zones in areas where the probability of encountering manned aircraft is not low; or ii. in controlled airspace after coordination and flight authorisation in accordance with published procedures for the area of operation, so that a low probability of encountering manned aircraft is ensured.’; (25) Point (1)(b) of point UAS.SPEC.050 is replaced with the following: ‘(b) designate a remote pilot for each flight or, in the case of autonomous operations, ensure that during all phases of the flight, responsibilities and tasks especially those defined in points (2) and (3) of point UAS.SPEC.060 are properly allocated in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to point (a) above;’ (26) Point (1)(g) of point UAS.SPEC.050 is replaced with the following: ‘(g) keep and maintain up to date a record of: i. all the relevant qualifications, experience and/or training courses completed by the remote pilot and the other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation, as defined within the operations manual, and by the maintenance staff, for EN 5 EN  at least 3 years after the persons have ceased employment with the organisation or have changed their position in the organisation; ii. the maintenance activities conducted on the UAS for a minimum of 3 years; iii. the information on the UAS operations as required by the declaration or the operational authorisation for a minimum of 3 years;’; (27) The following points (1)(j), (1)(k), and 1(l) are added to point UAS.SPEC.050: ‘(j) establish and keep up to date a list of the designated remote pilots for each flight; (k) establish and keep up to date a list of the maintenance staff employed by the operator to carry out maintenance activities; and (l) ensure that each individual UA is equipped with at least one green flashing light for the purpose of conspicuity of the UA, to allow a person on the ground to distinguish the UA from a manned aircraft, when the UAS operation takes place at night and at a height not exceeding 120 m above the closest point on the surface of the earth.’ (28) Point (1) of point UAS.SPEC.060 is replaced by the following: ‘(1) The remote pilot shall: (a) not perform duties under the influence of psychoactive substances or alcohol or when it is unfit to perform its tasks due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other causes; (b) have the appropriate remote pilot competency as defined in the operational authorisation, in the standard scenario defined in Appendix 1 or as defined by the LUC, and carry a proof of competency while operating the UAS; and (c) be familiar with the user’s manual provided by the manufacturer of the UAS.’; (29) The following point UAS.SPEC.085 is inserted: ‘UAS.SPEC.085 Duration and validity of an operational declaration: The operational declaration shall have a limited duration of 2 years. It shall remain valid unless: (1) during the oversight of the UAS operator, the competent authority has found that the UAS operation is not conducted in accordance with the operational declaration; (2) the conditions of the UAS operation are changed such that it no longer complies with the applicable requirements of this Regulation; or (3) the competent authority is not granted access in accordance with point UAS.SPEC.090.’; ’ (30) Appendix 1 is amended according to the Annex to this Regulation. (31) The new Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5 are added according to the Annex to this Regulation. EN 6 EN  Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, For the Commission The President […] EN 7 EN Draft Annex to draft Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) …/… amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 as regards the introduction of class C5 and C6 UAS (1) Paragraph 4 of Part 1 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(4) be safely controllable with regard to stability, manoeuvrability and the command and control link performance, by a remote pilot following the manufacturer's instructions, as necessary under all anticipated operating conditions including following the failure of one or, if appropriate, more systems;’; (2) Point (a) of paragraph (8) of Part 1 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(a) the characteristics of the UA including but not limited to the: — UA class; — UA mass (with a description of the reference configuration) and the maximum take-off mass (MTOM); — general characteristics of allowed payloads in terms of mass, dimensions, interfaces with the UA and other possible restrictions; — equipment and software to control the UA remotely; and — a description of the behaviour of the UA in case of a loss of the command and control link;’; (3) Paragraph 4 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(4) be safely controllable with regard to stability, manoeuvrability and the command and control link performance, by a remote pilot following the manufacturer's instructions, as necessary under all anticipated operating conditions including following the failure of one or, if appropriate, more systems;’; (4) Paragraph 7 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(7) in case of a loss of the command and control link, have a reliable and predictable method for the UA to recover the command and control link or terminate the flight in a way that reduces the effect on third parties in the air or on the ground;’; (5) Paragraph 11 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: (6) ‘(11) have a unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA- 2063-A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers;’; (7) Paragraph 12 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(12) have a direct remote identification system that: (a) allows the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively 1  following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensures, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, thedirect periodic broadcast from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received directly by existing mobile devices within the broadcasting range: i the UAS operator registration number; ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point; and (c) ensures that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v;’; (8) Paragraph 13 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: (13) be equipped with a geo-awareness function that provides: (a) an interface to load and update data containing information on airspace limitations related to UA position and altitude imposed by the geographical zones, as defined by Article 15 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, which ensures that the process of loading or updating such data does not degrade its integrity and validity; and (b) a warning alert to the remote pilot when a potential breach of airspace limitations is detected; and (c) information to the remote pilot on the UA's status as well as a warning alert when its positioning or navigation systems cannot ensure the proper functioning of the geo-awareness function;’; (9) Paragraph 16 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(16) be equipped: (a) with lights for the purpose of controllability of the UA; and (b) with at least one green flashing light for the purpose of conspicuity of the UA at night to allow a person on the ground to distinguish the UA from a manned aircraft;’; (10) Point (a) of paragraph 18 of Part 2 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(a) the characteristics of the UA including but not limited to the: — class of the UA; 2  — UA mass (with a description of the reference configuration) and the maximum take-off mass (MTOM); — general characteristics of allowed payloads in terms of mass, dimensions, interfaces of with the UA and other possible restrictions; — equipment and software to control the UA remotely; — the procedures to upload the UAS operator registration number into the electronic identification system; — reference of the transmission protocol used for the direct remote identification emission; — sound power level; — description of the behaviour of the UA in case of a loss of the command and control link, and the method to recover the UA; and — the procedures to upload the airspace limitations into the geo-awareness function;’ (11) A new paragraph 20 of Part 2 of the Annex is added: ‘(20) if equipped with a network remote identification system it shall: (a) allow the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensure, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the transmission from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received through a network; i the UAS operator registration number; ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point; and (c) ensure that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v.’; (12) Paragraph 3 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: 3  ‘(4) be safely controllable with regard to stability, manoeuvrability and the command and control link performance, by a remote pilot with adequate competency as defined in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and following the manufacturer's instructions, as necessary under all anticipated operating conditions including following the failure of one or, if appropriate, more systems;’; (13) Paragraph 7 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(7) unless tethered, in case of a loss of the command and control link, have a reliable and predictable method for the UA to recover the command and control link or terminate the flight in a way that reduces the effect on third parties in the air or on the ground;’; (14) Paragraph 8 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(8) unless tethered, be equipped with a command and control link protected against unauthorised access to the command and control functions;’; (15) Paragraph 13 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(13) have a unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063- A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers;’; (16) Paragraph 14 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(14) have a direct remote identification system that: (a) allows the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensures, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received directly by existing mobile devices within the broadcasting range: i the UAS operator registration number; ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point; and (c) ensures that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v.’; 4 (17) Point (c) of paragraph 15 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(c) information to the remote pilot on the UA's status as well as a warning alert when its positioning or navigation cannot ensure the proper functioning of the geo- awareness function;’; (18) Paragraph 18 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(18) be equipped: (c) with lights for the purpose of controllability of the UA; and (d) with at least one green flashing light for the purpose of conspicuity of the UA at night to allow a person on the ground, to distinguish the UA from a manned aircraft;’; (19) Point (a) of paragraph 19 of Part 3 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(a) the characteristics of the UA including but not limited to the: — class of the UA; — UA mass (with a description of the reference configuration) and the maximum take-off mass (MTOM); — general characteristics of allowed payloads in terms of mass, dimensions, interfaces of with the UA and other possible restrictions; — equipment and software to control the UA remotely; — the procedures to upload the UAS operator registration number into the electronic identification system; — reference of the transmission protocol used for the direct remote identification emission; — sound power level; — description of the behaviour of the UA in case of a loss of the command and control link, and the method to recover the UA; and — the procedures to upload the airspace limitations into the geo-awareness function;’; (20) A new paragraph 21 of Part 3 of the Annex is added: ‘(21) if equipped with a network remote identification system it shall: (a) allow the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensure, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the transmission from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received through a network; 5  i the UAS operator registration number; ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point.’; and (c) ensure that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v.’; (21) Paragraph 3 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(3) be safely controllable with regard to stability, manoeuvrability and the command and control link performance, by a remote pilot with adequate competency as defined in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and following the manufacturer's instructions, as necessary under all anticipated operating conditions including following the failure of one or, if appropriate, more systems;’; (22) Paragraph 5 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(5) unless tethered, in case of a loss of the command and control link, have a reliable and predictable method for the UA to recover the command and control link or terminate the flight in a way that reduces the effect on third parties in the air or on the ground;’; (23) Paragraph 8 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(8) have a unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063- A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers;’; (24) Paragraph 9 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(9) have a direct remote identification system that: (a) allows the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensures, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received directly by existing mobile devices within the broadcasting range: i the UAS operator registration number; 6  ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point; and (c) ensures that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v;’; (25) Point (c) of paragraph 10 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(c) information to the remote pilot on the UA's status as well as a warning alert when its positioning or navigation cannot ensure the proper functioning of the geo- awareness function;’; (26) Paragraph 12 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(12) unless tethered, be equipped with a command and control link protected against unauthorised access to the command and control functions;’; (27) Paragraph 14 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(14) be equipped: (e) with lights for the purpose of controllability of the UA; and (f) with at least one green flashing light for the purpose of conspicuity of the UA at night to allow a person on the ground to distinguish the UA from a manned aircraft;’; (28) Point (a) of paragraph 15 of Part 4 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(a) the characteristics of the UA including but not limited to the: — class of the UA; — UA mass (with a description of the reference configuration) and the maximum take-off mass (MTOM); — general characteristics of allowed payloads in terms of mass, dimensions, interfaces with the UA and other possible restrictions; — equipment and software to control the UA remotely; — the procedures to upload the UAS operator registration number into the electronic identification system; — reference of the transmission protocol used for the direct remote identification emission; — sound power level; 7  — description of the behaviour of the UA in case of a loss of the command and control link, and the method to recover the UA; and — the procedures to upload the airspace limitations into the geo-awareness function;’; (29) A new paragraph 17 of Part 4 of the Annex is added: ‘(17) if equipped with a network remote identification system it shall: (a) allow the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (b) ensure, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the transmission from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received through a network; i the UAS operator registration number; ii the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A; iii the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; iv the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and v the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point;’; and (c) ensure that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (b) points ii, iii, iv and v.’; (30) Point (a) of paragraph 4 of Part 5 of the Annex is replaced by the following: ‘(a) the characteristics of the UA including but not limited to the: — class of the UA; — UA mass (with a description of the reference configuration) and the maximum take-off mass (MTOM); — general characteristics of allowed payloads in terms of mass dimensions, interfaces of with the UA and other possible restrictions; — equipment and software to control the UA remotely; and — description of the behaviour of the UA in case of a loss of the command and control link;’; (31) Part 6 of the Annex is replaced by the following: 8  PART 6 Requirements for a direct remote identification add-on A direct remote identification add-on shall comply with the following: (1) allow the upload of the UAS operator registration number in accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively following the process provided by the registration system. The system shall not accept an invalid UAS operator registration number; (2) have a unique serial number compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers, affixed to the add-on and its packaging or its user's manual in a legible manner; (3) ensure, in real time during the whole duration of the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open and documented transmission protocol, of at least the following data, in a way that it can be received directly by existing mobile devices within the broadcasting range: (a) the UAS operator registration number; (b) the unique serial number of the UA compliant with standard ANSI/CTA- 2063-A; (c) the time stamp, the geographical position of the UA and its height above the surface or take-off point; (d) the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground speed of the UA; and (e) the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point; (4) ensure that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under paragraph (3) points ii, iii, iv and v; and (5) be placed on the market with a user's manual providing the reference of the transmission protocol used for the direct remote identification emission and the instruction to: (a) install the module on the UA; and (b) upload the UAS operator registration number.’; (32) Paragraph 1 of Part 8 Module B is replaced by the following. ‘1. EU-type examination is the part of a conformity assessment procedure in which a notified body examines the technical design of the product and verifies and attests that the technical design of the product meets the applicable requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17.’; (33) Paragraph 1 of Part 9 is replaced by the following: 9  ‘1. Conformity based on full quality assurance is the conformity assessment procedure whereby manufacturers fulfil the obligations set out in paragraphs 2 and 5, and ensure and declare on their sole responsibility that the product concerned satisfies the applicable requirements set out in Parts 1 to 6, 16 and 17.’; (34) Paragraph 4 of Part 11 is replaced by the following: ‘4. Object of the declaration [identification of the product allowing traceability; it may include a colour image of sufficient resolution where necessary for the identification of the products; in case of a kit of accessories, indicate the type of UAS to which the kit ensures the conversion].’; (35) Paragraph 5 of Part 11 is replaced by the following: ‘5. The object of the declaration described above is of class … [include for UAS the class number as defined by Parts 1 to 5, 16 and 17 of this annex; for a kit of accessories, indicate the class into which the UAS is converted].’; (36) Part 15 is replaced by the following: ‘Part 15 Maximum sound power level per class of UA (including transition periods) UA class MTOM m in Maximum sound power level LWA in dB gram as from entry into as from 2 years after entry as from 4 years after entry into force into force force C1 and C2 m < 900 85 83 81 𝑚 𝑚 𝑚 C2 900 ≤ m < 4000 85 + 18,5 lg 83 + 18,5 lg 81 + 18,5 lg 900 900 900 (37) Two new Parts, Part 16 and Part 17, are added to the Annex to the Regulation. Part 16 Requirements for a class C5 unmanned aircraft system and C5 accessories A class C5 UAS bears the following class identification label on the UA: 10  5 A class C5 UAS shall comply with the requirements defined in Part 4, except paragraphs (2) and (10). In addition, it shall comply with the following: (2) be a rotorcraft or a tethered aircraft other than a fixed-wing aircraft; (3) if it is equipped with a geo-awareness function, comply with paragraph (10) of Part 4; (4) during flight provide the remote pilot with clear and concise information on the height of the UA above the surface or take-off point; (5) unless tethered, be equipped with a low-speed mode selectable by the remote pilot and limiting the ground speed to not more than 5 m/s; (6) unless tethered, provide means for the remote pilot to terminate the flight of the UA, which shall: (a) be reliable, predictable and independent from the automatic flight control and guidance system; this applies also to the activation of this means; (b) force the descent of the UA and prevent its powered horizontal displacement; and (c) include means to reduce the effect of the UA impact dynamics; (7) unless tethered, provide the remote pilot with means to continuously monitor the quality of the command and control link and receive an alert when it is likely that the link is going to be lost or degraded to the extent of compromising the safe conduct of the operation, and another alert when the link is lost; and (8) in addition to the information indicated in point (15)(a) of Part 4, include in the user’s manual a description of the means to terminate the flight. A class C5 UAS may consist in a class C3 UAS fitted with an accessories kit that ensures the conversion of the UAS into a class C5 UAS. In this case, the class C5 label is affixed on the accessories kit. An accessories kit may only ensure conversion of a class C3 UAS that complies with (1) and provides the necessary interfaces to the accessories. The accessories kit shall not include changes to the software of the class C3 UAS. The accessories kit shall be designed, and each accessory shall be identified, to ensure a complete and correct installation by a UAS operator on a class C3 UAS following the instructions provided by the manufacturer of the accessories kit. 11 The accessories kit may be placed on the market independently from the class C3 UAS of which they ensure the conversion. In this case, the manufacturer of the accessories kit shall place on the market a single conversion kit that shall: (1) not alter the compliance of the class C3 UAS with the requirements of Part 4; (2) ensure compliance of the UAS fitted with the accessories kit with all additional requirements defined in this Part with the exception of paragraph 3; and (3) be accompanied by a user’s manual providing: (a) the list of all class C3 UAS to which the kit can be applied; and (b) instructions on how to install and operate the accessories kit. 12  Part 17 Requirements for a class C6 unmanned aircraft system A class C6 UAS bears the following class identification label on the UA: A class C6 UAS shall comply with the requirements defined in Part 4, except paragraphs (2) and (10). In addition, it shall comply with the following: (1) have a maximum ground speed in level flight of not more than 50 m/s; (2) if it is equipped with a geo-awareness function, comply with paragraph (10) of Part 4; (3) during flight provide the remote pilot with clear and concise information on the geographical position of the UA, its speed and its height above the surface or take-off point; (4) provide means to prevent the UA from breaching the horizontal and vertical limits of a programmable flight volume; (5) provide means for the remote pilot to terminate the flight of the UA, which shall: (a) be reliable, predictable and independent from the automatic flight control and guidance system; this applies also to the activation of this means; and (b) force the descent of the UA and prevent its powered horizontal displacement; (6) provide means to programme the UA trajectory; (7) provide the remote pilot with means to continuously monitor the quality of the command and control link and receive an alert when it is likely that the link is going to be lost or degraded to the extent of compromising the safe conduct of the operation, and another alert when the link is lost; and (8) in addition to the information indicated in point (15)(a) of Part 4, include in the user’s manual: (a) a description of the means to terminate the flight; 13 (b) a description of the function that limits the access of the UA to certain airspace areas or volumes; and (c) the distance most likely to be travelled by the UA after activation of the means to terminate the flight defined in paragraph (5), to be considered by the UAS operator when defining the ground risk buffer. 14 Draft Annex to draft Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) .../... amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 as regards the adoption of standard scenarios (1) Appendix 1 to the Annex is replaced by the following: Appendix 1 for standard scenarios supporting a declaration Chapter I — STS-01 – VLOS over a controlled ground area in a populated environment UAS.STS-01.010 General provisions (1) During flight, the unmanned aircraft shall be maintained within 120 m from the closest point of the surface of the earth. The measurement of distances shall be adapted according to the geographical characteristics of the terrain, such as plains, hills, mountains. (2) When flying an unmanned aircraft within a horizontal distance of 50 m from an artificial obstacle taller than 105 metres, the maximum height of the UAS operation may be increased up to 15 m above the height of the obstacle at the request of the entity responsible for the obstacle. (3) The maximum height of the operational volume shall not exceed 30 m above the maximum height allowed in points (1) and (2). (4) During flight, the unmanned aircraft shall not carry dangerous goods. UAS.STS-01.020 UAS operations in STS-01 UAS operations in STS-01 shall be conducted: (1) keeping the unmanned aircraft in VLOS at all times; (2) in accordance with the operations manual referred to in point (1) of point UAS.STS- 01.030; (3) over a controlled ground area comprising: (a) for the operation of an untethered unmanned aircraft, the: (i) flight geography area, (ii) contingency area, with its external limit(s) at least 10 m beyond the limit(s) of the flight geography area, and (iii) ground risk buffer, which shall cover a distance beyond the external limit(s) of the contingency area that is at least as defined below: Minimum distance to be covered by the ground risk buffer for untethered unmanned aircraft 1  Maximum with an MTOM up to with an MTOM above height above 10 kg 10 kg ground 30 m 10 m 20 m 60 m 15 m 30 m 90 m 20 m 45 m 120 m 25 m 60 m (b) for operation of a tethered unmanned aircraft, a radius equal to the tether length plus 5 m and centred on the point where the tether is fixed over the surface of the earth. (4) at a ground speed of less than 5 m/s in the case of untethered unmanned aircraft; (5) by a remote pilot who: (a) holds a certificate of remote pilot theoretical knowledge for operations in the standard scenarios issued by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State. (i) This certificate shall be obtained after: (A) having completed an online training course and passed the online theoretical knowledge examination as referred to in point (4)(b) of point UAS.OPEN.020; and (B) having passed an additional theoretical knowledge examination provided by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State in accordance with Attachment A to this Chapter. (ii) This certificate shall be valid for five years. The renewal is subject to the demonstration of competencies in accordance with point (i); and (b) holds an accreditation of completion of the STS-01 practical skill training, in accordance with Attachment A to this Chapter and issued by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State or by a UAS operator that has declared compliance with STS-01 and that has declared compliance with the requirements in Appendix 3; and (6) with an unmanned aircraft which is marked as class C5 and complies with the requirements of that class, as defined in Part 16 of the Annex to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, and is operated with active and updated direct remote identification. UAS.STS-01.030 Responsibilities of the UAS operator In addition to the responsibilities defined in UAS.SPEC.050, the UAS operator shall: (1) develop an operations manual including the elements defined in Appendix 5; 2 (2) define the operational volume and ground risk buffer for the intended operations, including the controlled ground area covering the projections on the surface of the earth within both the volume and the buffer; (3) ensure the adequacy of the contingency and emergency procedures through: (a) dedicated flight tests; or (b) simulations, provided that the representativeness of the simulation means is appropriate for the intended purpose; (4) develop an effective emergency response plan (ERP) suitable for the operation that includes at least: (a) the plan to limit any escalating effects of the emergency situation; (b) the conditions to alert the relevant authorities and organisations, if needed; (c) the criteria to identify an emergency situation; and (d) clear delineation of the duties of the remote pilot(s) and any other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation; (5) ensure that the level of performance for any externally provided service necessary for the safety of the flight is adequate for the intended operation; (6) define the allocation of the roles and responsibilities between the operator and the external service provider(s), if applicable; (7) upload updated information into the geo-awareness function, if the system is installed on the UAS, when required by the UAS geographical zone for the intended location of operation; (8) ensure that, before starting the operation, the controlled ground area is in place, effective and compliant with the minimum distance defined in UAS.STS-01.020(3) and, when required, coordination with the appropriate authorities has been conducted; (9) ensure that, before starting the operation, all persons present in the controlled ground area: (a) have been informed of the risks of the operation; (b) have been briefed or trained, as appropriate, on the safety precautions and measures established by the UAS operator for their protection; and (c) have explicitly agreed to participate in the operation; and (10) ensure that the: (a) UAS is accompanied by the corresponding EU declaration of conformity, including the reference to class C5; and (b) class C5 identification label is affixed to the unmanned aircraft. UAS.STS-01.040 Responsibilities of the remote pilot In addition to the responsibilities defined in UAS.SPEC.060, the remote pilot: 3 (1) before starting a UAS operation, shall verify that the means to terminate the flight of the unmanned aircraft and the direct remote identification system are operational; (2) during the flight: (a) shall keep the unmanned aircraft in VLOS and maintain a thorough visual scan of the airspace surrounding the unmanned aircraft in order to avoid any risk of a collision with any manned aircraft. The remote pilot shall discontinue the flight if the operation poses a risk to other aircraft, people, animals, environment or property; (b) for the purposes of point (a), may be assisted by an unmanned aircraft observer. Clear and effective communication shall be established between the remote pilot and the unmanned aircraft observer; (c) shall have the ability to maintain control of the unmanned aircraft, except in the case of a lost command and control link; (d) shall operate only one unmanned aircraft at a time; (e) shall not operate the unmanned aircraft while operating a moving vehicle; (f) shall not hand over the control of the unmanned aircraft to an other control unit; (g) shall perform the contingency procedures defined by the UAS operator for abnormal situations, including when the remote pilot has an indication that the unmanned aircraft may exceed the limits of the flight geography; and (h) shall perform the emergency procedures defined by the UAS operator for emergency situations, including triggering the means to terminate the flight when the remote pilot has an indication that the unmanned aircraft may exceed the limits of the operational volume. The means to terminate the flight shall be triggered at least 10 m before the unmanned aircraft reaches the limits of the operational volume. 4 ATTACHMENT A: REMOTE PILOT THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL SKILL FOR STS-01 1. Theoretical knowledge examination (a) The examination referred in point (5) of point UAS.STS-01.020 shall comprise at least 40 multiple-choice questions aimed at assessing the remote pilot’s knowledge of the technical and operational mitigations, distributed appropriately across the following subjects: (i) aviation regulations; (ii) human performance limitations; (iii) operational procedures; (iv) technical and operational mitigations for ground risk; (v) UAS general knowledge; (vi) meteorology; (vii) the flight performance of the UAS; and (viii) technical and operational mitigations for air risks. (b) If the student remote pilot already holds a certificate of remote pilot competency as referred to in point (2) of point UAS.OPEN.030, the examination shall comprise at least 30 multiple-choice questions distributed appropriately across the subjects in points (1)(a)(i) to (1)(a)(v). (c) To pass the theoretical knowledge examination, the remote pilot student shall achieve at least 75 % of the overall marks. 2. Practical skill training and assessment The training and assessment of the practical skill for operations under any standard scenarios shall cover at least the subjects and areas identified in Table 1 below: Table 1: Subjects and areas to be covered for practical skill training and assessment Subject Areas to be covered (a) Pre-flight actions (i) Operation planning, airspace considerations and site risk assessment. The following points are to be included: (A) identify the objectives of the intended operation; (B) make sure that the defined operational volume and relevant buffers (e.g. ground risk buffer) are suitable for the intended operation; (C) spot the obstacles in the operational volume that could hinder the intended operation; 5 Subject Areas to be covered (D) identify whether the wind speed and/or direction may be affected by topography or by obstacles in the operational volume; (E) select relevant data on airspace information (including on UAS geographical zones) that can have an impact on the intended operation; (F) make sure the UAS is suitable for the intended operation; (G) make sure that the selected payload is compatible with the UAS used for the operation; (H) implement the necessary measures to comply with the limitations and conditions applicable to the operational volume and ground risk buffer for the intended operation in accordance with the operations manual procedures for the relevant scenario; (I) implement the necessary procedures to operate in controlled airspace, including a protocol to communicate with ATC and obtain clearance and instructions, if necessary; (J) confirm that all the necessary documents for the intended operation are on site; and (K) brief all participants about the planned operation. (ii) UAS pre-flight inspection and set-up (including flight modes and power-source hazards). The following points are to be included: (A) assess the general condition of the UAS; (B) ensure that all the removable components of the UAS are properly secured; (C) make sure that the UAS software configurations are compatible; (D) calibrate the instruments in the UAS; (E) identify any flaw that may jeopardise the intended operation; (F) make sure that the energy level of the battery is sufficient for the intended operation; 6  Subject Areas to be covered (G) make sure that the flight termination system of the UAS and its triggering system are operational; (H) check the correct functioning of the command and control link; (I) activate the geo-awareness function and upload the information to it (if geo-awareness function is available); and (J) set the height and speed limitation systems (if available). (iii) Knowledge of the basic actions to be taken in the event of an emergency situation, including issues with the UAS, or if a mid-air collision hazard arises during the flight. (b) In-flight procedures (i) Maintain an effective look-out and keep the unmanned aircraft within visual line of sight (VLOS) at all times to include: situational awareness of the location in relation to the operational volume and other airspace users, obstacles, terrain and persons who are not involved at all times. (ii) Perform accurate and controlled flight manoeuvres at different heights and distances representative of the corresponding STS (including flight in manual/non- GNSS assisted mode or the equivalent, where fitted). At least the following manoeuvres shall be performed: (A) hover in position (only for rotorcraft); (B) transition from hover into forward flight (only for rotorcraft); (C) climb and descent from level flight; (D) turns in level flight; (E) speed control in level flight; (F) actions after a failure of a motor/ propulsion system; and (G) evasive action (manoeuvres) to avoid collisions. 7  Subject Areas to be covered (iii)Real-time monitoring of the UAS status and endurance limitations. Flight under abnormal conditions: (A) manage a partial or complete power shortage of the unmanned aircraft propulsion system while ensuring the safety of third parties on the ground; (B) manage the path of the unmanned aircraft in abnormal situations; (C) manage a situation in which the unmanned aircraft positioning equipment is impaired; (D) manage a situation of an incursion by a person not involved into the operational volume or the controlled ground area, and take appropriate measures to maintain safety; (E) manage the exit of the unmanned aircraft from the flight geography (contingency procedures) and from the operational volume (emergency procedures) as defined during the flight preparation; (F) manage the situation when an aircraft approaches the operational volume; and (G) demonstrate the recovery method following a deliberate (simulated) loss of the command and control link. (c) Post-flight actions (i) Shut down and secure the UAS. (ii) Post-flight inspection and recording of any relevant data relating to the general condition of the UAS (its systems, components and power sources) and crew fatigue. (iii) Conduct a debriefing about the operation. (iv) Identify situations when an occurrence report was necessary and complete the required occurrence report. 8  Chapter II — STS-02 – BVLOS with VOs over a controlled ground area in a sparsely populated environment UAS.STS-02.010 General provisions (1) During flight, the unmanned aircraft shall be maintained within 120 m from the closest point of the surface of the earth. The measurement of distances shall be adapted according to the geographical characteristics of the terrain, such as plains, hills, mountains. (2) When flying an unmanned aircraft within a horizontal distance of 50 m from an artificial obstacle taller than 105 m, the maximum height of the UAS operation may be increased up to 15 m above the height of the obstacle at the request of the entity responsible for the obstacle. (3) The maximum height of the operational volume shall not exceed 30 m above the maximum height allowed in points (1) and (2). (4) During flight, the unmanned aircraft shall not carry dangerous goods. UAS.STS-02.020 UAS operations in STS-02 UAS operations in STS-02 shall: (1) be conducted in accordance with the operations manual referred to in point (1) of point UAS.STS-02.030; (2) be conducted over a controlled ground area entirely located in a sparsely populated area. Such a controlled ground area shall include a ground risk buffer covering a distance that is at least equal to the distance specified by the UAS manufacturer in the user’s manual, considering the operational conditions within the limitations specified by the UAS manufacturer; (3) be conducted in an area where the minimum flight visibility is more than 5 km; (4) be conducted with the UA in sight of the remote pilot during the launch and recovery of the UA, unless the latter is the result of an emergency flight termination; (5) if no visual observer is used in the operation, be conducted with the unmanned aircraft flying no further than 1 km from the remote pilot, with the unmanned aircraft following a pre-programmed trajectory when the unmanned aircraft is not in VLOS of the remote pilot; (6) if one or more visual observers are used in the operation, comply with the following conditions: (a) the visual observer(s) shall be positioned so as to provide adequate coverage of the operational volume and the surrounding airspace with the minimum flight visibility indicated in point (3); (b) the unmanned aircraft is operated no further than 2 km from the remote pilot; (c) the unmanned aircraft is operated no further than 1 km from the visual observer who is nearest to the unmanned aircraft; 9  (d) the distance between any visual observer and the remote pilot is not more than 1 km; and (e) robust and effective communication means are available for the communication between the remote pilot and the visual observer(s); (7) be conducted by a remote pilot who: (a) holds a certificate of remote pilot theoretical knowledge for operations in standard scenarios, issued by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State. (i) This certificate shall be obtained after: (A) having completed an online training course and passed the online theoretical knowledge examination as referred to in point (4)(b) of point UAS.OPEN.020; and (B) having passed an additional theoretical knowledge examination provided by the competent authority or by an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State in accordance with Attachment A to this Chapter; (ii) This certificate shall be valid for five years. The renewal is subject to the demonstration of competencies in accordance with point (i); (b) holds an accreditation of the STS-02 practical skill training, in accordance with Attachment A to this Chapter and issued by a an entity recognised by the competent authority of a Member State or by a UAS operator that has declared compliance with STS-02 and that has declared compliance with the requirements in Appendix 3; and (8) be conducted with an unmanned aircraft which is: (a) marked as class C6 and complies with the requirements of that class, as defined in Part 17 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945; (b) operated with an active system to prevent the unmanned aircraft from breaching the flight geography; and (c) operated with active and updated direct remote identification. UAS.STS-02.030 Responsibilities of the UAS operator In addition to the responsibilities defined in UAS.SPEC.060, the UAS operator shall: (1) develop an operations manual including the elements defined in Appendix 5; (2) define the operational volume and ground risk buffer for the intended operations, including the controlled ground area covering the projections on the surface of the earth of both the volume and the buffer; (3) ensure the adequacy of the contingency and emergency procedures through: (a) dedicated flight tests; or 10  (b) simulations, provided that the representativeness of the simulation means is appropriate for the intended purpose; (4) develop an effective emergency response plan (ERP) suitable for the operation that includes at least: (a) a plan to limit the escalating effects of the emergency situation; (b) the conditions to alert the relevant authorities; (c) the criteria to identify an emergency situation; and (d) clear delineation of the duties of the remote pilot(s) and any other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation; (5) ensure that the level of performance for any externally provided service necessary for the safety of the flight is adequate for the intended operation; (6) define the allocation of the roles and responsibilities between the operator and the external service provider(s), if applicable; (7) upload updated information into the geo-awareness, if the function is installed on the UAS, when required by the UAS geographical zone for the intended location of the operation; (8) ensure that, before starting the operation, the controlled ground area is in place, effective and compliant with the minimum distance defined in UAS.STS-02.020(2) and, when required, coordination with the appropriate authorities has been conducted; (9) ensure that, before starting the operation, all persons present in the controlled ground area: (a) have been informed of the risks of the operation; (b) have been briefed and, if applicable, trained on the safety precautions and measures established by the UAS operator for their protection; and (c) have explicitly agreed to participate in the operation; (10) before starting the operation, if visual observers are used: (a) ensure the correct placement and number of visual observers along the intended flight path; (b) verify: (i) that the visibility and the planned distance of the visual observer are within acceptable limits as defined in the operations manual; (ii) the absence of potential terrain obstructions for each visual observer; (iii) that there are no gaps between the zones covered by each of the visual observers; (iv) that the communication with each visual observer is established and effective; and 11  (v) that if means are used by the visual observers to determine the position of the unmanned aircraft, those means are functioning and effective; and (c) ensure that the visual observers have been briefed on the intended path of the unmanned aircraft and the associated timing; and (11) ensure that the: (a) UAS is accompanied by the corresponding EU declaration of conformity, including the reference to class C6; and (b) class C6 identification label is affixed to the unmanned aircraft. UAS.STS-02.040 Responsibilities of the remote pilot In addition to the responsibilities defined in UAS.SPEC.060, the remote pilot shall: (1) before starting a UAS operation: (a) set the programmable flight volume of the unmanned aircraft to keep it within the flight geography; and (b) verify that the means to terminate the flight and the programmable flight volume functionality on the unmanned aircraft are operational; (2) during flight: (a) unless supported by visual observers, maintain a thorough visual scan of the airspace surrounding the unmanned aircraft in order to avoid any risk of a collision with any manned aircraft. The remote pilot shall discontinue the flight if the operation poses a risk to other aircraft, people, animals, environment or property; (b) have the ability to maintain control of the unmanned aircraft, except in the case of a lost command and control link; (c) operate only one unmanned aircraft at a time; (d) not operate from a moving vehicle; (e) not hand over the control of the unmanned aircraft to an other control unit; (f) inform the visual observer(s), when employed, in a timely manner of any deviations of the unmanned aircraft from the intended path, and the associated timing; (g) perform the contingency procedures defined by the UAS operator for abnormal situations, including when the remote pilot has indication that the unmanned aircraft may exceed the limits of the flight geography; and (h) perform the emergency procedures defined by the UAS operator for emergency situations, including triggering the means to terminate the flight when the remote pilot has an indication that the unmanned aircraft may exceed the limits of the operational volume. UAS.STS-02.050 Responsibilities of the visual observer A visual observer shall: 12 (1) maintain a thorough visual scan of the airspace surrounding the unmanned aircraft in order to identify any risk of a collision with any manned aircraft; (2) maintain awareness of the position of the unmanned aircraft through direct visual observation or through assistance provided by an electronic means; and (3) alert the remote pilot when a hazard is detected and assist in avoiding or minimising the potential negative effects. 13 ATTACHMENT A: REMOTE PILOT THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL SKILL FOR STS-02 1. Theoretical knowledge examination The examination shall be defined in accordance with point 1 of Attachment A to Chapter I. 2. Practical skill training and assessment In addition to the areas defined in point A.2 of Attachment A to Chapter I, the following areas shall be covered: Table 1: Additional subjects and areas to be covered for practical skill training and assessment for STS-02 Subject Areas to be covered (a) BVLOS operations conducted (i) Pre-flight actions — operation planning, airspace under STS-02 considerations and site risk-assessment. The following points are to be included: (A) airspace scanning; and (B) operations with visual observers (VOs): adequate placement of VOs, and a deconfliction scheme that includes phraseology, coordination and communications means; and (ii) The in-flight procedures, defined in point 2.(b)(ii) of Attachment A to Chapter I, shall be performed in both VLOS and BVLOS. (2) The following new Appendices, 2, 3, 4 and 5, are added to the Annex: 14  Appendix 2: Operational declaration STS-x Operational declaration Data protection: Personal data included in this declaration is processed by the competent authority pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). It will be processed for the purposes of the performance, management and follow-up of the oversight activities according to Regulation (EU) 2019/947. If you require further information concerning the processing of your personal data or you wish to exercise your rights (e.g. to access or rectify any inaccurate or incomplete data), please refer to the contact point of the competent authority. The applicant has the right to make a complaint regarding the processing of the personal data at any time to the national Data Protection Supervisory Authority. UAS operator registration number UAS operator name I hereby declare that:  I comply with all the applicable provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and with STS.x; and  appropriate insurance cover will be in place for every flight made under the declaration, if required by Union or national law. Signature or other Date verification 15 Appendix 3: Additional requirements for operators that conduct practical skill training and assessment of remote pilots for operations covered by STS A UAS operator that intends to conduct practical skill training and assessment of remote pilots for an STS, in addition to submitting the operational declaration for that STS, shall declare to the competent authority compliance with the following requirements using the declaration form in Appendix 4. If the UAS operator intends to conduct a training activity in a Member State other than the Member State of registration, a copy of the declaration form in Appendix 4 shall be submitted to the competent authority of the Member State where the training is conducted. (1) There shall be a clear separation between the training activities and any other operational activity such that the objectivity of the UAS operator is not called into question. (2) The UAS operator shall have the capability to adequately perform the technical and administrative activities linked with the entire task process, including the adequacy of personnel and the use of facilities and equipment appropriate to the task. (3) The UAS operator shall have an accountable manager, with the responsibility for ensuring that all tasks are performed in compliance with the information and procedures identified in point (8). (4) The personnel responsible for the practical skill training and practical skill assessment tasks shall: (a) have the competence to conduct these tasks; (b) be impartial and shall not participate in assessments if they feel that their objectivity may be affected; (c) have a sound theoretical knowledge and practical skill training experience, and satisfactory knowledge of the requirements for the practical skill assessment tasks they carry out as well as adequate experience of such processes; (d) have the ability to administer the declarations, records and reports that demonstrate that the relevant practical skill assessments have been carried out and the conclusions of those practical skill assessments; and (e) not disclose any information supplied by the operator or remote pilot to any person other than the competent authority upon their request. (5) The training and assessment shall cover the practical skills corresponding to the STS for which the declaration is made, included in Attachment A to the relevant Chapter. (6) The practical skill training and assessment location(s) shall be conducted in an environment representative of the conditions of the STS. (7) The practical skill assessment shall consist of a continuous evaluation of the student remote pilot. (8) The UAS operator shall produce an assessment report after completing the practical skill assessment, which shall: (a) include at least: 16  (i) the student remote pilot’s identification details; (ii) the identity of the person responsible for the practical skill assessment; (iii) the identification of the STS for which the practical skill assessment has been performed; (iv) performance marks for each action performed by the student remote pilot; (v) an overall practical skill assessment of the student remote pilot’s competencies; and (vi) practical skill assessment feedback providing guidance on areas for improvement where applicable; (b) be appropriately signed and dated by the person responsible for the practical skill assessment once complete; and (c) be recorded and made available for inspection by the competent authority upon request. (9) An accreditation of completion of the practical skill training for the STS shall be delivered to the student remote pilot by the UAS operator if the assessment report concludes that the student remote pilot has achieved a satisfactory level of practical skill. (10) The issuance of the accreditation of completion of point (9) shall be notified to the competent authority including the student remote pilot’s identification details, the STS covered, the date of issuance and the identification details of the UAS operator issuing it. (11) The UAS operator shall include in the operations manual, developed in accordance with Appendix 5, a separate section covering the training elements, including the following: (a) the nominated personnel conducting practical skill training and assessment, including: (i) descriptions of the respective personnel’s competence; (ii) the personnel’s duties and responsibilities; and (iii) a chart of the organisation showing the associated chains of responsibility; (b) the procedures and processes used for practical skill training and assessment, including the training syllabus covering the practical skill corresponding to the STS for which the declaration is made, defined in Attachment A to the relevant Chapter; (c) a description of the UAS and any other equipment and tools used for the practical skill training and assessment; (d) a description of the facilities for practical skill training and assessment, including the physical location; and (e) a template for the assessment report. 17  Appendix 4: Declaration of UAS operators that intend to provide practical skill training and assessment of remote pilots in STS-x STS-x Declaration of UAS operators that intend to provide practical skill training and assessment of remote pilots Data protection: Personal data included in this declaration is processed by the competent authority pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). It will be processed for the purposes of the performance, management and follow up of the oversight activities according to Regulation (EU) 2019/947. If you require further information concerning the processing of your personal data or you wish to exercise your rights (e.g. to access or rectify any inaccurate or incomplete data), please refer to the contact point of the competent authority. The applicant has the right to make a complaint regarding the processing of the personal data at any time to the national Data Protection Supervisory Authority. UAS operator registration number UAS operator name I hereby declare that:  I have submitted the operational declaration for STS-x;  I comply with the requirements defined in Appendix 3 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947; and  when operating a UAS in the context of training activities for STS.x, I comply with all the applicable provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/947, including requirements for operations under STS.x Signature or other Date verification EN 18 EN  Appendix 5: Operations manual The operations manual shall contain at least the following: (1) a statement that the operations manual complies with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and with the declaration, and contains instructions that are to be complied with by the personnel involved in flight operations; (2) an approval signature by the accountable manager or the UAS operator in the case of a natural person; (3) an overall description of the UAS operator’s organisation; (4) a description of the concept of the operation, including at least: (a) the nature and description of the activities performed in the UAS operations, and the identified associated risks; (b) the operational environment and geographical area for the intended operations, including: (i) the characteristics of the area to be overflown in terms of the population density, topography, obstacles, etc.; (ii) the characteristics of the airspace to be used; and (iii) the environmental conditions (i.e. the weather and electromagnetic environment); and (iv) the definition of the operational volume and risk buffers to address the ground and air risks; (c) the technical means used and their main characteristics, performance and limitations, including the UAS, external systems supporting the UAS operation, facilities, etc.; and (d) the required personnel for conducting operations, including the composition of the team, their roles and responsibilities, selection criteria, initial training and recent experience requirements and/or recurrent training; (5) the maintenance instructions required to keep the UAS in a safe condition, covering the UAS manufacturer’s maintenance instructions and requirements if applicable; (6) operational procedures, which shall be based on the user’s manual provided by the UAS manufacturer, and shall include: (a) consideration of the following to minimise human errors: (i) a clear distribution and assignment of tasks; and (ii) an internal checklist to check that staff are performing their assigned tasks adequately; (b) consideration of the deterioration of external systems supporting the UAS operation; EN 19 EN  (c) normal procedures, including at least: (i) pre-flight preparations and checklists, covering: (A) the assessment of the operational volume and related buffers (the ground risk buffer, and air risk buffer when applicable), including the terrain and potential obstacles and obstructions that may reduce the ability to keep the unmanned aircraft in visual line of sight or to scan the airspace, the potential overflight of persons who are not involved and potential overflight of critical infrastructure; (B) the assessment of the surrounding environment and airspace, including the proximity of UAS geographical zones and potential activities by other airspace users; (C) the environmental conditions suitable for conducting the UAS operation; (D) the minimum number of personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation who are required to perform the operation, and their responsibilities; (E) the required communication procedures between the remote pilot(s) and any other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation and with any external parties, when needed; (F) compliance with any specific requirements from the relevant authorities in the intended area of operations, including those related to security, privacy, data and environmental protection, and the use of the RF spectrum; (G) the required risk mitigations in place to ensure the safe conduct of the operation; in particular, for the controlled ground area: (a) determination of the controlled ground area; and (b) securing the controlled ground area to prevent third parties from entering the area during the operation, and ensuring coordination with the local authorities, when needed; (H) the procedures to verify that the UAS is in a suitable condition to safely conduct the intended operation; (ii) launch and recovery procedures; (iii) in-flight procedures, including those to ensure that the unmanned aircraft remains within the flight geography; (iv) post-flight procedures, including the inspections to verify the condition of the UAS; EN 20 EN  (v) procedures for the detection of potentially conflicting aircraft by the remote pilot and, when required by the UAS operator, by visual observer(s) or unmanned aircraft observer(s), as applicable; (d) contingency procedures, including at least: (i) procedures to cope with the unmanned aircraft leaving the designated ‘flight geography’; (ii) procedures to cope with persons who are not involved entering the controlled ground area; (iii) procedures to cope with adverse operating conditions; (iv) procedures to cope with the deterioration of external systems supporting the operation; (v) if visual observers are employed, the phraseology to be used; and (vi) avoidance procedures to avoid any conflict with other airspace users; (e) emergency procedures to cope with emergency situations, including at least: (i) procedures to avoid, or at least minimise, harm to third parties in the air or on the ground; (ii) procedures to cope with the unmanned aircraft leaving the ‘operational’ volume; and (iii) procedures for the emergency recovery of the unmanned aircraft; (f) security procedures as referred to in UAS.SPEC.050(1)(a)(ii) and (iii); (g) the procedures for the protection of personal data referred to in UAS.SPEC.050(1)(a)(iv); (h) the guidelines to minimise nuisance and environmental impact referred to in UAS.SPEC.050(1)(a)(v); (i) occurrence reporting procedures; (j) record-keeping procedures; and (k) the policy defining how the remote pilot(s) and any other personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation can declare themselves fit to operate before conducting any operation. EN 21 EN