Opinion 02/2019

Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 Draft Annex X to draft Decision 201X/XXX/R Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0695 The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: 1. deleted text is struck through; 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Page 1 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX IV COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS [PART-CAT] SUBPART B OPERATING PROCEDURES SECTION 1 Motor-powered aircraft AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval OPERATION OF NON-ETOPS-COMPLIANT TWIN TURBO-JET AEROPLANES WITH MOPSC OF 19 OR LESS AND MCTOM LESS THAN 45 360 KG BETWEEN 120 AND 180 MINUTES FROM AN ADEQUATE AERODROME (a) For operations between 120 and 180 minutes, due account should be taken of the aeroplane’s design and capabilities as outlined below and the operator’s experience related to such operations. the operator should include the relevant Relevant information should be included in the its operations manual and the operator’s its maintenance procedures. The term ‘the aeroplane’s design’ in this AMC does not imply any additional type design approval specifications beyond the applicable original type certificate (TC) specifications. (b) The aeroplane should be certified to CS-25 or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25).Systems capability Aeroplanes should be certified to CS-25 as appropriate or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25). With respect to the capability of the aeroplane systems, the objective is that the aeroplane is capable of a safe diversion from the maximum diversion distance with particular emphasis on operations with OEI or with degraded system capability. To this end, the operator should give consideration to the capability of the following systems to support such a diversion: 1. Propulsion systems: the aeroplane engine should meet the applicable specifications prescribed in CS-25 and CS-E or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25, FAR-E), concerning engine TC, installation and system operation. In addition to the performance standards established by the Agency or competent authority at the time of engine certification, the engines should comply with all subsequent mandatory safety standards specified by the Agency or competent authority, including those necessary to maintain an acceptable level of reliability. In addition, consideration should be given to the effects of extended duration single-engine operation (e.g. the effects of higher power demands such as bleed and electrical). 2. Airframe systems: with respect to electrical power, three or more reliable as defined by CS- 25 or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25) and independent electrical power sources should be Page 2 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 available, each of which should be capable of providing power for all essential services which should at least include the following: (i) sufficient instruments for the flight crew providing, as a minimum, attitude, heading, airspeed and altitude information; (ii) appropriate pitot heating; (iii) adequate navigation capability; (iv) adequate radio communication and intercommunication capability; (v) adequate flight deck and instrument lighting and emergency lighting; (vi) adequate flight controls; (vii) adequate engine controls and restart capability with critical type fuel (from the stand-point of flame-out and restart capability) and with the aeroplane initially at the maximum relight altitude; (viii) adequate engine instrumentation; (ix) adequate fuel supply system capability including such fuel boost and fuel transfer functions that may be necessary for extended duration single or dual-engine operation; (x) such warnings, cautions and indications as are required for continued safe flight and landing; (xi) fire protection (engines and auxiliary power unit (APU)); (xii) adequate ice protection including windshield de-icing; and (xiii) adequate control of the flight crew compartment and cabin environment including heating and pressurisation. The equipment including avionics necessary for extended diversion times should have the ability to operate acceptably following failures in the cooling system or electrical power systems. For single-engine operations, the remaining power electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic should continue to be available at levels necessary to permit continued safe flight and landing, and to provide those services necessary for the overall safety of the passengers and crew. As a minimum, following the failure of any two of the three electrical power sources, the remaining source should be capable of providing power for all of the items necessary for the duration of any diversion. If one or more of the required electrical power sources are provided by an APU, hydraulic system or air driven generator/ram air turbine (ADG/RAT), the following criteria should apply as appropriate: (i) to ensure hydraulic power (hydraulic motor generator) reliability, it may be necessary to provide two or more independent energy sources; (ii) the ADG/RAT, if fitted, should not require engine dependent power for deployment; and (iii) the APU should meet the criteria in (b)(3). Page 3 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 (3) APU: the APU, if required for extended range operations, should be certified as an essential APU and should meet the applicable CS-25 and CS-APU provisions or equivalent (e.g. FAR- 25). (4) Fuel supply system: consideration should include the capability of the fuel supply system to provide sufficient fuel for the entire diversion taking account of aspects such as fuel boost and fuel transfer. (c) Engine events and corrective action (1) All engine events and operating hours should be reported by the operator to the airframe and engine supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, as well as to the competent authority. (2) These events should be evaluated by the operator in consultation with the competent authority and with the engine and airframe (S)TC holders. The competent authority may consult the Agency to ensure that worldwide data isare evaluated. (3) Where statistical assessment alone is not applicable, e.g. where the fleet size or accumulated flight hours are small, individual engine events should be reviewed on a case- by-case basis. (4) The evaluation or statistical assessment, when available, may result in corrective action or the application of operational restrictions. (5) Engine events could include engine shutdowns, both on-ground and in-flight, excluding normal training events, including flameout, occurrences where the intended thrust level was not achieved or where crew action was taken to reduce thrust below the normal level for whatever reason, and unscheduled removals. (6) The operator should Arrangements to ensure that all corrective actions required by the Agency competent authority are implemented. (d) Maintenance The maintenance programme in accordance with Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/20141 (Part-M) should be based upon reliability programmes including, but not limited to, the following elements: (1) engine oil consumption programmes: such programmes are intended to support engine condition trend monitoring; and (2) engine condition monitoring programme: a programme for each engine that monitors engine performance parameters and trends of degradation that provides for maintenance actions to be undertaken prior to significant performance loss or mechanical failure. (1) The operator’s oil-consumption-monitoring programme should be based on engine manufacturer’s recommendations, if available, and track oil consumption trends. The monitoring should be continuous and take account of the oil added. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 of 26 November 2014 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks (OJ L 362, 17.12.2014, p. 1). Page 4 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) The engine monitoring programme should also provide for engine condition monitoring describing the parameters to be monitored, the method of data collection and a corrective action process, and should be based on the engine manufacturer’s instructions. This monitoring will be used to detect propulsion system deterioration at an early stage allowing corrective action to be taken before safe operation is affected. (e) Flight crew training The operator should establish a flight Flight crew training programme for this type of operation that should includes, in addition to the requirements of Subpart FC (Flight Crew) of Annex III (Part-ORO)(ORO.FC), particular emphasis on the following: (1) Fuel management: verifying required fuel on board prior to departure and monitoring fuel on board en-route, including calculation of fuel remaining. Procedures should provide for an independent cross-check of fuel quantity indicators, e.g. fuel flow may be used to calculate the fuel burned, which may be compared with the indicated fuel remaining. It should be confirmed that the fuel remaining is sufficient to satisfy the critical fuel reserves. (2) Procedures for single and multiple failures in flight that may give rise to go/no-go and diversion decisions — policy and guidelines to aid the flight crew in the diversion decision- making process and emphasising the need for constant awareness of the closest weather- permissible alternate aerodrome in terms of time. (3) OEI performance data: drift-down procedures and OEI service ceiling data. (4) WeatherMeteorological reports and flight requirements: meteorological aerodrome reports (METARs) and terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) reports and obtaining in-flight weather updates on the en-route alternate (ERA), destination and destination alternate aerodromes. Consideration should also be given to forecast winds, including the accuracy of the forecast compared to actual wind experienced during flight and meteorological conditions along the expected flight path at the OEI cruising altitude and throughout the approach and landing. (f) Pre-departure check A pre-departure check, additional to the pre-flight inspection required by Part-M and designed to verify the status of the aeroplane’s significant systems, should be reflected conducted. Adequate status monitoring information on all significant systems should be available to the flight crew to conduct the pre-departure check. The content of the pre-departure check should be and described in the operations manual. The operator should ensure that flight Flight crew members who are responsible for the pre-departure check of an aeroplane should arebe fully trained and competent to conduct a pre-departure check of the aeroplane do it. The operator’s required training programme required should cover all relevant tasks, with particular emphasis on checking required fluid levels. (g) MEL The operator should establish in its MEL the minimum equipment that has to be serviceable for non-ETOPS operations between 120 and 180 minutes. The operator should ensure that the The MEL should takes into account all items specified by the manufacturer relevant to this type of operations in accordance with this AMC. Page 5 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 (h) Dispatch/flight planning rules The operator’s should establish dispatch procedures rules should that addressing the following: (1) Fuel and oil supply: for releasing an aeroplane should not be dispatched on an extended range flight, the operator should ensure that unless it carries sufficient fuel and oil to meet comply with the applicable operational requirements and any additional reserves fuel that may be determined in accordance with the following: (i) Critical fuel scenario: — in establishing the critical fuel reserves, the applicant is to determine the fuel necessary to fly to the most critical point of the route and execute a diversion to the critical point is the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome assuming a simultaneous failure of an engine and the cabin air pressurisation system. For those aeroplanes that are type certificated to operate above flight level 450, the critical point is the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome assuming an engine failure. The operator should carry additional fuel for the worst-case fuel burn condition (one engine vs two engines operating) if this is greater than the additional fuel calculated in accordance with the fuel requirements in CAT.OP.MPA, as follows, in order to: (A) fly from the critical point to an alternate aerodrome: (a) at 10 000 ft; or (b) at 25 000 ft or the single-engine ceiling, whichever is lower, provided that all occupants can be supplied with and use oxygen for the time required to fly from the critical point to an alternate aerodrome; or (c) at the single-engine ceiling, provided that the aeroplane is type- certified to operate above flight level 450; (B) descend and hold at 1 500 ft for 15 minutes in international standard atmosphere (ISA) standard conditions; (C) descend to the applicable MDA/DH followed by a missed approach (taking into account the complete missed approach procedure); followed by (D) a normal approach and landing. (ii) Ice protection: additional fuel used when operating in icing conditions (e.g. operation of ice protection systems (engine/airframe as applicable)) and, when manufacturer’s data isare available, take account of ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces if icing conditions are likely to be encountered during a diversion. (iii) APU operation: if an APU has to be used to provide additional electrical power, consideration should be given to the additional fuel required. (2) Communication facilities: the operator should ensure the availability of communications facilities in order to allow reliable two-way voice communications between the aeroplane and the appropriate ATC unit at OEI cruise altitudes. Page 6 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 (3) Aircraft technical log review to ensure that proper MEL procedures, deferred items, and required maintenance checks have been completed. (4) ERA aerodrome(s): the operator should ensure ensuring that ERA aerodromes are available for the intended route, within the distance flown in 180 minutes based upon the OEI cruising speed, which is a speed within the certificated limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by the competent authority, confirming that, based on the available meteorological information, the weather conditions at ERA aerodromes are at or above the applicable minima for the applicable period of time , in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.185during which the aerodrome(s) may be used. Table 1: Planning minima Approach facility Alternate aerodrome ceiling Weather minima RVR/VIS PA DA/H + 200 ft RVR/VIS + 800 m NPA MDA/H + 400 ft RVR/VIS + 1 500 m Circling approach GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS (a) Definition: Significant systems to be checked are the aeroplane propulsion system and any other aeroplane systems whose failure could adversely affect the safety of a non-ETOPS diversion flight, or whose functioning is important to continued safe flight and landing during an aeroplane diversion. (b) When defining the pre-departure check, the operator should give consideration, but not limited, to the following systems: (1) electrical; (2) hydraulic; (3) pneumatic; (4) flight instrumentation, including warning and caution systems; (5) fuel, including potential leakage, fuel drains, fuel boost and fuel transfer; (6) flight control; (7) ice protection; (8) engine start and ignition; (9) propulsion system instruments; (10) engine thrust reversers; Page 7 of 8  Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019 (11) navigation and communications, including any route specific long range navigation and communication equipment; (12) back-up power systems (i.e. emergency generator and auxiliary power-unit); (13) air conditioning and pressurisation; (14) cargo fire detection and suppression; (15) propulsion system fire detection and suppression; (16) emergency equipment (e.g. ELT, hand fire extinguisher,…). CHAPTER I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 4: TERMINOLOGY e. Extended Range Entry Point The extended range entry point is the first point on the aeroplane’s route which is: - For two-engined aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, or with a maximum take-off mass of 45360 kg or more, at 60 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. - For two-engined aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 19 or less and a maximum take-off mass of less than 45360 kg, at 180 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. (…) Chapter III OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS Section 1: APPLICABILITY This acceptable means of compliance is for operators seeking an ETOPS operational approval to operate either: (1) Ttwo-engined aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, or with a maximum take-off mass of 45 360 kg or more, in excess of 60 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome; (2) or Ttwo-engined aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less and a maximum take-off mass of less than 45 360 kg, in excess of 180 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. (…) Page 8 of 8 European Union Aviation Safety Agency Comment-Response Document 2017-03 Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 RELATED NPA: 2017-03 — RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) — 21.2.2019 Table of contents 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 2 2. Individual comments and responses 7 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 1. Summary of the 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 108 comments were received on NPA 2017-03 from 20 commentators from the following categories of stakeholders: Comments per category of commentators NAA 40 (37%) A/C Manufacturer 21 (19.4%) Manufacturer of navigation equipment 16 (14.8%) Operator associations 13 (12%) A/C Manufacturer association 6 (5.5%) European Cockpit Association (ECA) 5 (4.8%) Other 4 (3.7%) Balloon federations 2 (1.9%) Air accident investigation branch 1 (0.9%) The comments focused mainly around the following topics: Comments on removing the commercial specialised operations (SPO) from the regulatory proposal The comments of one NAA argued that the impact assessment published in NPA 2017-03 did not provide sufficient justification to propose any requirements for in-flight recording for light aircraft involved in commercial SPO activities. Several counter-arguments were brought into discussion, among which the unjustified costs in the case of specialised operations with a low level of risk, such as aerial photography, or the fact that the new requirements would be too burdensome for light aeroplane manufacturers from third countries. The review group discussed this issue at length. The work on the NPA considered from the very beginning commercial operations in comparison with non-commercial operations, in order to establish the area of application of the new rules. Since the aim was to cover commercial operations, it was decided to retain commercial SPO in the scope, as this is the only other-than-CAT type of commercial operations. The impact assessment published in the NPA showed that extending the requirement to commercial SPO ‘captures three times more historical accidents with aeroplanes (22 instead of 7) and three times more accidents with helicopters (14 instead of 5)’ (see Section 4.5.1 of NPA 2017-03). Furthermore, ICAO recommends that light turbine-engine aeroplanes used for operations other than CAT should carry a flight recorder capable of recording flight parameters (see Annex 6 Part II). Moreover, three of the safety recommendations presented in Appendix C of the Explanatory Note of NPA 2017-03 are related to in-flight recording equipment for light aircraft engaged in SPO activities. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 1. Summary of the Since the new rules will apply only to newly manufactured aircraft (applicable 3 years after the date of publication of the new regulation), and by similarity with other forward-fitted equipment, the scale effect is expected to lower the purchasing price and the certification cost, no cost will be generated by aircraft downtime, and the number of hours needed to install the equipment will be reduced. In conclusion, given the expected impacts on safety and economics, it was decided to maintain the initial proposal – to keep SPO in the new requirements. For more details, please see the response to comment #33 in this document. Comments proposing to include audio recording as mandatory recording Another significant topic addressed by several comments — mainly the comment #103 by AAIB-UK — was that audio recording, although required by ICAO Annex 6, was not considered for inclusion in the new rules, despite the benefits it would bring to the understanding of the causes of an accident or a serious incident. EASA reviewed the safety statistics of HEMS flights in EASA Member States, having in mind the issue raised by the review group that accidents occurring in HEMS operations have a higher numbers of fatalities and that audio recording might improve understanding of the causes of such accidents and further help preventing accidents in HEMS operations. The purpose of the new statistics developed was to identify any possible correlation or trend supporting the safety benefit brought by the carriage of a CVR on board helicopters involved in HEMS operations. In particular, the safety figures involving helicopters with a MCTOM of over 3 175 kg (required to carry a CVR) were compared with the safety figures of helicopters with a MCTOM of 3 175 kg or less (not required to carry a CVR and most often not carrying any kind of flight recorder). However, the available figures indicated stable safety trends since 2005 and did not contain any positive evidence of safety benefit brought by the carriage of a CVR. Since audio recordings and image recordings have an intrinsic privacy content (with information that is private and unrelated to the accident), their use is more restricted than it is for the flight data recording. This in turn restricts the possible use by the operator. Finally, while there probably is some safety benefit to recording cockpit audio on board light helicopters, a requirement does not seem justified at this stage. Therefore, instead of a requirement new GMs to CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 have been introduced to recommend the cockpit audio recording. Comments on protection of privacy when images are recorded A concern raised by a pilot association and an association of commercial operators was the protection of privacy if image recording is permitted in the flight crew compartment. To address these comments, the new subpoints in paragraph (f) in CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and respectively SPO.GEN.145 and the associated AMC (and GM) enhance the requirements to protect the privacy of the crew members. Moreover, CAT.IDE.A/H.191 and SPO.IDE.A/H.146 include a new requirement that the flight recorders in the range of aircraft covered by these rules are provided with a function enabling the commander to modify the image or audio recordings in the cockpit beyond normal possibilities of copying or replaying the image or audio recordings. Comments on the function of a flight recorder, which may inadvertently erase image or audio recordings TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 1. Summary of the Several comments raised the issue of the ‘erasure function’ as was published in NPA 2017-03, in CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191 SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 and the inadvertent erasure of an image or audio recording of the flight crew compartment. In order to address this concern, the text of the OPS rules has been amended to state ‘a function to modify the [audio or image] recording’ to protect the privacy of the flight crew. An additional GM has been created to each of those implementing rules, which explains that the purpose of this function is to make impossible the retrieval of image or audio recordings by using normal replay or copying techniques. Comments on the recording duration of the flight recorder Several comments questioned the need for a recording duration capability of 10 hours (proposed in new CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146). The comments stated that the entire flight duration of most light aircraft used in general aviation rarely exceeds a few hours. The review group also discussed technical aspects such as storage space needed for 10-hour recording, which might be too burdensome in the case where images are recorded. When examining aeroplane and helicopter models within the scope of the new requirements, it was found that the majority of models have a flight endurance of less than 5 hours, and even those models with an endurance exceeding 5 hours seldom perform commercial flights with such a long duration. It was then concluded that 5 hours recording duration is sufficient. Comments on the need to define a lightweight flight recorder A few comments requested that the new rules include a definition of a lightweight flight recorder. In order to clarify what should be understood by a lightweight flight recorder, the proposed GM16 Annex I published in NPA 2017-03 was amended to include more explanations for a clear distinction between the crash-protected flight recorders and the lightweight flight recorders. Comments on recording the main rotor speed for helicopter operations in CAT operations and SPO Two comments from a NAA requested EASA to add the recording of the main rotor speed as one of the mandatory parameters for helicopters. The main rotor speed is essential in understanding the flight path of a helicopter and initial airworthiness requirements require that the revolutions per minute (rpm) of the main rotor are displayed by an instrument.Therefore it was decided to add the recording of this parameter in the list of AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 and respectively AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 in point (c), when flight parameters are captured by means of image recording. It was, however, not included in point (b), when the flight parameters are recorded by means of flight data, because any recording solution that requires interfacing with the aircraft systems may increase the complexity of the installation and the associated certification cost. Comments on seven days of operation vs 150 flight hours between operational checks of the flight recorder Several comments challenged the change proposed to the inspections and checks of recordings in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and respectively AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b), whereby the operator should perform an operational check of the flight recorder at intervals not exceeding seven calendar days of operation whenever the aural or visual means for preflight check of the flight recorders are not available/installed. When the preflight check was first transposed from ICAO Annex 6 into the Air OPS rules, the measure contained in the AMC was developed as a mitigation to ensure the serviceability of recorders on some older models of aircraft for which the means to perform a preflight check were not available. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 1. Summary of the The NPA proposed to replace the seven-days-of-operation interval with ‘150 flight hours’ because ‘days of operation’ are not commonly used by operators. 150 flight hours correspond to more than 7 days of operation, assuming that the aircraft is operated 21 hours per day However, this change triggered more discussions in the review group, because the issue can be viewed from two perspectives – of the flight operations and of maintenance. From the point of view of maintenance, specifying an interval in flight hours is more appropriate, whereas when the task can be performed by the flight crew, it is easier to measure the time in days of operation. In order to offer sufficient flexibility, it was agreed to create a compromise solution and amend the text of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) to include both intervals, and leave the operator to decide which one is more suitable to its operation. Comments on balloons Two comments (from a balloon association and a balloon manufacturer) addressed the issue of balloons as presented in NPA 2017-03. The comments heavily opposed any regulatory action on balloon operators, although the NPA does not contain any such proposal. The proposal in NPA 2017-03 related to operations with balloons was to encourage voluntary installation of means to record data and images on board balloons via safety promotion activities. EASA decided to request an assessment of Option B.1 of the NPA from the Balloon Collaborative Analysis Group (BCAG). The BCAG is one of the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs) supporting EASA Safety Risk Management Process. The task of each CAG is to evaluate and, if possible, augment new accident and incident information within their domain, identify candidate safety issues, assess them and propose actions to mitigate the risks. The BCAG is composed of experts from the industry, balloon associations and national aviation authorities. The written assessment made by the BCAG concluded the following: ‘(…) the Balloon Collaboration Analysis Group (BCAG) considers this to be a very low priority issue and recommends to delete the paragraph on promoting data recording for all categories of balloons from the proposed recommended text of the NPA.’ Given this conclusion and the fact that other safety issues with a higher priority have been identified for balloons, EASA decided to not invest efforts in encouraging the voluntary installation of means to record data and images on board balloons. For a more detailed answer, please see comment #3. Statistics on the comments received 40 percent of the comments were submitted by the national aviation authorities. The other approx. 40 percent of the comments were submitted by manufacturers of aircraft or of navigation equipment or aircraft manufacturer associations. 20 comments were received from air operators, operator associations and pilot associations, of which one operator association comes from the general aviation sector. Of the 108 comments received, 15 were accepted, 36 were partially accepted, 38 were noted and 19 were not accepted. The acceptance of comments in percentage is shown below: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 1. Summary of the Acceptance of comments 19, 18% 15, 14% 36, 33% 38, 35% Accepted Partially accepted Noted Not accepted TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses 2. Individual comments and responses In responding to comments, a standard terminology has been applied to attest EASA’s position. This terminology is as follows: (a) Accepted — EASA agrees with the comment and any proposed amendment is wholly transferred to the revised text. (b) Partially accepted — EASA either agrees partially with the comment, or agrees with it but the proposed amendment is only partially transferred to the revised text. (c) Noted — EASA acknowledges the comment but no change to the existing text is considered necessary. (d) Not accepted — The comment or proposed amendment is not shared by EASA. (General Comments) - comment 3 comment by: European Ballooning Federation The comments made are the result of internal consultation of the EBF (European Ballooning Federation) members. General: We are disappointed to read that we have not been consulted on the subject under discussion regarding the chapters about balloons. We could have provided you with the consensus view of all our members and given your proposals more balloon expert content. We are always prepared to provide a balanced view on any topic involving balloons and balloon safety. We represent the commercial balloonists and operators as well as the hobby and competition pilots. On topic: We have read the proposals to "promote" the presence of cameras and trajectory parameter recorder. Reading from the RIA the people who have discussed this in the RMT 271 and 272 were not quite sure how to attack the problem for balloons. It is clear that only a few balloons (in only a few countries) operate under CAT. Other commercial operations are under a declaration or unregulated. There are initiatives such as RMT 674 that is addressing these topics. We expect Commercial Passenger Ballooning to be introduced including the associated rules and regulations. Let us start with the problem for which an on board camera and trajectory recorders are the solution. It was stated in the NPA under 2.1 that CAT balloons are more vulnerable to or involved in incidents and accidents than non-CAT balloons. This must be a misunderstanding for not many (if any) countries have balloons under CAT. How these statistics came to life is unclear and we have serious question marks as to their correctness and interpretation for all European countries. For training purposes a set of Go-Pros is used by some FI’s in one or two countries on an individual FI’s initiative. They record the basket during the flight including one additional Go Pros recording the flight direction. These Go-Pros are linked to GPS systems. They can simultaneously be viewed after the flight on one single screen. What we cannot see on the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses recordings is the most relevant "other" data such as changes in the wind, weather, visibly, cloud base, state of mind of the pilot and FI. The experience with those recordings is that they are a rather technical way of instructing a new pilot. The experience is that recording the basket is not conclusive because they do not record anything else than the basket. On the recording you can see what the pilot actually did but not why he felt action should be taken and it does not say anything about the timing of the actions in relation to the surroundings. We feel that these recordings are of limited value even for training purposes. Most of the pilots today use GPS trackers and or IPad with appropriate software for navigation and data storage without using a camera. Most of the data is stored on the IPad or GPS. The advantage is that it is much less privacy sensitive than recording the passengers and the pilot (who is in the same area as the passengers). The position of the pilot is quite different from other aircraft namely physically near or in-between the passengers. The equipment used is not fixed to the basket and not installed permanently. Therefore the cost are quite acceptable. After an incident this equipment can be used for an investigation. What fear that these recordings could be used for monitoring commercial pilots working for a balloon operators in the sense that their interactions with the passengers and entertainment value is monitored by an in-basket recorder. In order to prevent his it will involve formal rules and regulations for the access, use and storage of these recordings. One other issue is the privacy of the passengers. Ballooning has a substantial entertainment component which can involve people and situations that are very privacy sensitive. Some passengers do not want to be recorded during their leisure trip with business associates or the like. We feel that the recording involves a considerable list of other issues besides the recording itself. Structural changes to the airframe: The operator will have to make changes to the structure of the burner frame. This is costly and may involve certification issues. This may be a costly exercise. Looking at the countries ( UAE ) in which the recording is compulsory we can see that changes to the burner frame have to be made in order to get a clear picture of the entire balloon basket including the workspace of the pilot. This is an issue for all sizes and shapes of balloons. Storage access and administration: The second issue is the storage and access to the recordings. Most operators are small (part time) pilot/operators. They have very limited resources. All recordings need to be administered and stored and kept for a certain period of time. They may need to be stored in a "safe" environment. This may also need additional investments. The matter of access and usage of the data is an issue that would need further detailed rules and regulations. The investment: The operator will have to purchase a recording device with the possibility to record other data than the visual. The trajectory data derive from a GPS logger for speed, course and altitude. This needs to be synchronised with the recording of the basket pictures. This involves additional investments as well. Legal framework: As you will appreciate, if EASA makes a “recommendation” to use additional equipment during a flight it is often seen as an obligation to install and use this equipment. The operator will not want to explain why he/she did not install this equipment to the NAA or the insurance company whilst EASA recommends such instalment. Recommendation in practise almost means an obligation to install. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Conclusion: Considering: - That under the current national rules and regulations there are only a few countries that operate balloons under CAT. In most countries CAT is not applicable to balloons. In the new proposed rules this will remain so. - the very limited additional safety achieved by introducing camera and trajectory recordings and - the limited effectiveness of recordings for accident investigation and - the substantial investment in changes to the equipment such as the burner frame and - the safe keeping and use of data and - the privacy sensitive nature of recording passengers and - the legal issues as described - the absence of the possibility to permanently install equipment in or on a balloon airframe and all equipment therefore must be portable. We would recommend to delete the paragraph on promoting data recording for all categories of balloons from the proposed recommended text of the NPA. The comments made by the undersigned on behalf of EBF (European Ballooning Federation). European Ballooning Federation Karel Abbenes [email protected] response Partially accepted. Given the concerns expressed by EBF in this comment, it was decided to request an assessment of Option B.1 of the NPA from the Balloon Collaborative Analysis Group (BCAG). The BCAG is one of the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs) supporting EASA Safety Risk Management Process. There are Collaborative Analysis Groups for most aviation domains. The task of each CAG is to evaluate and, if possible, augment new accident and incident information within their domain, identify candidate safety issues, assess them and propose actions to mitigate the risks. The BCAG is composed of experts from the industry, balloon associations and national aviation authorities. The written assessment made by the BCAG concluded the following: ‘the Balloon Collaboration Analysis Group (BCAG) considers this to be a very low priority issue and recommends to delete the paragraph on promoting data recording for all categories of balloons from the proposed recommended text of the NPA.’ Given this conclusion and the fact that other safety issues with a higher priority have been identified for balloons (refer to EASA Annual Safety Review 2017), EASA will not invest efforts in implementing Option B.1, unless new data or a need expressed by the stakeholders require revisiting this assessment. However, the following is brought to the attention of the commenter: 1. Option B.1 of the NPA means promoting the benefits of recording trajectory parameters as well as images of the basket interior. Safety promotion is a different activity, developed outside the rulemaking framework, and safety promotion TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses material is not considered as binding recommendations. As explained on EASA Safety promotion webpage: 'Safety Promotion is a set of means, processes and procedures that are used to develop, sustain and improve aviation safety through awareness raising and changing behaviours.' Examples of safety promotion material can also be consulted on this webpage. Each organisation or individual can decide whether to make use of the safety promotion material or not. In addition, an EU Member State may not introduce requirements ‘on top of the EU rules’ in the areas covered by Regulation (EC) 216/2008, except by invoking an exemption (Art 14 by Regulation (EC) 216/2008). However, even in this case, exemptions are reserved for addressing regulatory gaps or if practical implementation of an EU rule is impossible or very difficult. For these reasons, we disagree with the statement that safety promotion ‘almost means an obligation’. 2. It is not stated in the NPA that ‘CAT-balloons are more vulnerable to or involved in incidents and accidents than non-CAT balloons’, but that CAT statistics indicate a significantly higher rate of accidents with balloons compared to aeroplanes and helicopters (see section 2.1 of the NPA). EASA Annual Safety Review 2017 indicates that the rate of fatal accidents with aeroplane airline operations (for EASA Member States operators) is less than 2x10-7 per flight. EASA Opinion 01/2016 (Revision of the European operational rules for balloons) indicates in Appendix 2, Table A2.2 that in 2015, 5 fatal occurrences affected commercial air transport operations with balloons. In 2015, 94 093 CAT flights with balloons were performed. Hence the rate of fatal accidents of balloons operated under CAT in EASA MS was 5/94 053=5. 10-5 per flight. 3. The relevance of recorded data for the safety investigation should not be underestimated or minimised. While flight recorders on board large aeroplanes and helicopters do not record every action of the flight crew or the cabin crew, they have proven to be essential investigation tools. In the absence of flight recorders, data recorded by other aircraft systems or coincidental recordings made by passengers or witnesses were often instrumental to identify the probable causes of an accident. In addition, recorded data is usually not analysed in isolation but combined with other sources of information (witness statement, wreckage examination, weather data, etc.). Hence statements such as ‘recording the basket is not conclusive’ are questionable, and we don’t concur with EBF general statement about ‘the limited effectiveness of recordings for accident investigation’. 4. Section 4.1.4 of the NPA explains why ‘relying on GPS trackers and/or IPad’ is not considered an appropriate alternative: ‘One should also not rely on coincidental recordings from portable electronic devices (portable GNSS receiver, action camera, smartphone) to replace dedicated in-flight recording, because the data formats used by these devices are proprietary and data is encrypted; this makes retrieval of any useful data very challenging when the device is damaged (often the case after an accident). Also retrieving data from these devices on a day-to-day basis for operational purposes is difficult for technical and privacy reasons. The manufacturers of these electronic devices usually provide little assistance to the investigation authorities.’ 5. Regarding the risk of misuse of image recordings, it should be noted that personal data protection is now covered by Regulation (EU) 2016/6791 (General Data 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Protection Regulation). The legal framework provided by this regulation is sufficient to protect the privacy of a balloon pilot and of balloon passengers. 6. The technical difficulties in installing and managing the storage of the equipment are acknowledged, but since Option B.1 of NPA 2017-03 is about voluntary installation, it is assumed that a balloon operator would make its own impact assessment and that it would eventually decide against installation if the cost and the administrative burden exceed the expected benefit. For this reason, the economic impact of Option B.1 is considered neutral (refer to section 4.5.4.1 of the NPA). comment 8 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports Europe Air Sports, on behalf of all members thanks the Agency's Rulemaking Group for the careful preparation of this Notice of Proposed Amendment. We particularly welcome the proposal for voluntary installations of recorders on light aircraft and light helicopters not engaged in commercial air transport or in commercial operations. Being familiar with the topic as directly concerned stakeholders we put a special accent on the conclusions drawn by the authors. Our communities operating aircraft at the lower end of the weight classes welcome the outcome of work done, we only have a handful of remarks or questions which we integrate in this CRT. response Noted. Thank you. comment 18 comment by: Luftfahrt-Bundesamt LBA comment: In our opinion the implementation of the ideas of the NPA 2017-03 will be only a positive impact for investigation authorities. The industry, owner and pilots of aircraft and balloons will have to bear an additional burden to modify their light aircraft and balloons. We assume that the relation between accidents and incidents and the prosed in-flight recording will not be effective. The efforts and costs for change all light aircraft will not avoid additional incidents, but only make the investigation easier. Investigations of accidents with aircraft below 2 t and gliders have shown that these accidents were related to inadequate flight preparation, fuel mismanagement, excessive risk taking etc. This circumstance is well known among aviation experts. Flight records most often would not improve investigations as the knowledge about these accidents caused by inexperienced or risk taking pilots already exist. Finally, the financial capacity of non-commercial operators and private owners are limited. Those owners have to bear the arising costs. The result might be a decrease of flight hours conducted by private pilots. That lack of practice may amplify the possibility of an accident. Regarding Option A.3 (SPO, CAT) the impact is acceptable as these aircraft operating commercially. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. The concerns expressed in this comment were taken into account in the analysis of the issue. The comment is consistent with the conclusion taken in the NPA. The option A.3 was indeed retained as the preferred option. NPA 2017-03 does not propose any requirement for sailplanes, balloons, aeroplanes with a MCTOM of less than 2250 kg and helicopters with a MCTOM of less than 2250 kg. NPA 2017- 03 does not propose any requirement for aircraft used for non-commercial operations. comment 22 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association ASTM approved F3228-17 Standard Specification for Flight Data and Voice Recording in Small Aircraft. GAMA recommends this specification be considered for an equivalent ED-155/112 standard for the “lightweight” FDRs discussed in the NPA. response Not accepted. ASTM F3228-17 contains a section “cockpit voice recorders” and a section “flight data recorders”. The content of the section “flight data recorders” is almost the same as FAR Part 25, 25.1459 flight data recorders. ASTM F3228-17 is covering installation aspects, not equipment performance aspects, so it is not equivalent to ED-155 or ED-112. In addition, ASTM F3228-17 contains additional specifications which are not justified for a lightweight recorder installed on a light aircraft, such as: o ‘receive its electrical power from the bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation of the flight data recorder without jeopardizing service to essential or emergency loads’, o ‘There must be an aural or visual means for preflight checking of the recorder for proper recording of data in the storage medium’ o ‘there must be an automatic means to simultaneously stop a recorder that has a data erasure feature and prevent each erasure feature from functioning, within 10 min after crash impact’ o ‘each nonejectable record container must be located and mounted so as to minimize the probability of container rupture resulting from crash impact and subsequent damage to the record from fire.’ Finally, ASTM F3228-17 contains no specification regarding image recorders, while this is an option proposed by NPA 2017-03. Therefore, reference to ASTM F3228-17 is not considered appropriate. comment 23 comment by: Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA), Switzerland The Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA) appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPA and would like to thank the Agency. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses FOCA believes that it is of utmost importance that the new regulation regarding In-flight recording for light A/C is proportionate and reasonable in order to minimize the burden for the General Aviation community, which have limited human and financial resources. In our opinion, the installation of in-flight recording into light A/C is debatable because with the new concept lightweight flight recorders are required to meet less demanding crash- protection requirements, hence the data might not be available or is lost in case of a serious incident or accident. With this in mind, a cost-benefit-analysis might not support the purposes of the NPA regarding the tremendous high installation costs for purchasing the lightweight recorder unit, installation design and test certification (STC) and equipment installation. The involved costs seem to be a significant burden for the GA community. Furthermore, we would like to add that the provided data quality and availability is also questionable, as the data is not picked-up from a standardized data bus such as ARINC 429 (MCDU, datalink) or ARINC 717 (FDR, QAR, WQAR). response Noted. This comment probably refers to the text of draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191: ‘(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash- protected flight recorders.’ First, NPA 2017-03 proposes requirement only for CAT and commercial SPO operations, not for general aviation operations. In addition, the crashworthiness specifications of lightweight recorders (ED-155) are less stringent than those of crash-protected recorders (ED-112), because lightweight recorders are meant to be installed on aircraft that are lighter and slower than aircraft on which crash- protected recorders are installed (reduced kinetic energy in case of impact and reduced risk that the recorder is crushed by the airframe). Such light aircraft also carry limited quantities of fuel (reduced probability that the recorder is exposed to a high-temperature fire or a long lasting fire). With regard to data bus standards: the proposed requirements do not require the use of any data bus, because they were designed so that picking flight parameters from the aircraft systems is not necessary. For example, they could be met with just images from the main instrument panel (using a camera) or using dedicated sensors (such as GNSS receiver and inertial sensors). Refer to AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191. comment 27 comment by: Austro Control Dear all, Austria offers the following general comments to this NPA: The intent of this NPA is not fully comprehensible and raises some questions, which should generally be discussed. Please find below our questions and recommendations: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses 1) 1. Due to the fact that the requirements for ADS-B is already defined, it would make more sense that ADS-B records its data as substitute for an FDR. In addition to that ACG is of the opinion that there is a need for active safety promotion, which would lead at least to the same result. 2) 2. We are missing a comprehensive impact assessment where all areas had been considered. (keeping current regulations - MCTOM of more than 5 700 for aeroplanes and MCTOM of more than 3 175 kg for helicopters, impact on the general aviation community and operation of such aircraft including cost and benefit analysis, etc.) 3) 3. CAT.IDE.A/H.191 point b) requires aircraft speed to be recorded. That is very difficult, as from technical side you have to ensure that e.g. no interference arises etc. We recommend to require that the ground speed is being recorded? 4) 4. Where do the 150 hours in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) come from? This value is not a common interval and should be type related (refer e.g. functioning and described in Part- M). 5) 5. What are the structural/design limits for a “light FDR”? ETSO? ASTM? response Comment No 1: Partially accepted Promoting the voluntary installation of in-flight recording equipment is part of the options discussed in NPA 2017-03: refer to chapter 4, section 4.3.2, Option A.1. The safety impact of this option is considered just slightly positive, for reasons which are explained in chapter 4, section 4.5.1, Option A.1. By comparison, the safety impact of requiring in-flight recording equipment for commercially operated light aeroplanes and light helicopters is considered medium positive: see chapter 4, section 4.5.1, Option A.3. Hence the retained Option A.4 is a combination of requirements (for commercially operated aeroplanes and helicopters only) and promotion. Relying on a SSR transponder to record the position of the aircraft on the ground is discussed in NPA 2017-03, Appendix F: see 7.6.1, 7.6.2.1 and table F.1. However, this alternative solution has several drawbacks compared to carrying a lightweight flight recorder, in particular: - Data is not necessarily stored for a long time (only 3 days for some ANSPs) and the ICAO Standards in ICAO Annex 11 section 6.4.1 prescribing that this data is automatically recorded and preserved for at least 30 days have not yet been transposed into EU rules (at this date, they are part of the proposals in EASA Opinion 03/2018). - Data may be missing if the aircraft is not in the range of an SSR or an ADS-B station. It should be noted that the coverage of commercial ADS-B receivers networks such as flightradar24 at low altitude (where most light aeroplanes and helicopters operate) is not known and not guaranteed. - Data is not recorded in a unique place, but may be scattered over several ANSPs, which usually means time-consuming reconstruction work for investigation authorities. Comment No 2: Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Chapter 4 of NPA 2017-03 contains a detailed RIA which includes assessments of the likely evolution of the issue if nothing is done (refer to section 4.1.4), of the options’ impacts on the general aviation community (refer to section 4.5.5) and of the economic impact (refer to section 4.5.4). The methodology used for comparing options is the multi-criteria analysis, which applies cost-benefit thinking to cases where there is a mixture of qualitative, quantitative, and monetary data and varying degrees of certainty (refer to section 4.4.1). Comment No 3: Noted. Draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 (refer to section 3.2.1) lists the flight parameters to be recorded. ‘Aircraft speed’ may be the ground speed when flight data are recorded because the most convenient data source is typically a GNSS receiver (refer to point (b)(10) of draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191) and it may be the indicated airspeed when images are recorded because according to CAT.IDE.A.125 and CAT.IDE.A.130, measuring and displaying the indicated airspeed is mandatory on-board all aeroplanes (refer to point (c)(4) of draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191). The same reasoning was applied to helicopters and to Part-SPO. See also subsection 3.2.2.3.1. Comment No 4: Noted. An operational check of the flight recorders is recommended by point (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) to be performed every day by the flight crew using pre-flight check means. However, when this is not made possible by the recorder installation, then a looser time interval is permitted by point (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b), and it is currently 7 days of operation. The justification for changing the time interval from 7 days to 150 flight hours is provided in subsection 3.2.2.3.2 of the NPA: ‘If, however, no means for preflight checking of the flight recorder is available, an operational check should be performed at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours, instead of previously ‘7 calendar days of operation’. Indeed ‘days of operation’ is not commonly used metrics. 150 flight hours correspond to more than 7 days of operation, assuming that the aircraft is operated 21 hours per day (case of large aeroplanes which are flying most of the time). For a light aircraft which is usually less used, the operational check can be performed at longer time intervals. ’ However, after reviewing this comment and comment No 97, it was decided to change the current wording of point (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) so that operators are given the possibility to choose between 7 days and 150 flight hours at their convenience. Comment No 5: Noted. The operational performance of the flight recorder, including design specifications, are provided in point (f) of draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, point (f) of draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191, point (f) of draft AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 and point (f) of draft AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146. All these points contain the following text: ‘(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected flight recorders.’ Section 2 of EUROCAE Document 155 contains common design specifications for a lightweight flight recorder, including crash survival and the associated test procedures. Section 2 of EUROCAE Document 112 contains common design specifications for a crash-protected flight recorder, including crash survival and the associated test procedures. comment 28 comment by: UK CAA Page No: General Paragraph No: N/A Comment: The UK CAA welcomes and supports the principals behind this comprehensive NPA to introduce flight recording facilities to aircraft that are not yet required to carry such equipment. Analysis by the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) and others has demonstrated the need to improve the recording of information to help accident investigation but the same data can also be used for safety promotion, training and management of aircraft. Alignment with ICAO Annex 6 is also supported for CAT aeroplanes and helicopters but the Impact Assessment as presented raises some concerns, particularly with regard to the inclusion of commercial SPO and we have made comment and alternative options to address this. The promotion of voluntary recording of data for other aircraft not covered by the proposed regulation changes should be actively encouraged throughout Europe. response Noted. Thank you. comment 60 comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department (Transportstyrelsen, Luftfartsavdelningen) The Swedish Transport Agency supports the proposal. We only have some comments of editorial nature. At page 30 in AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 (c) and at page 36 in AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 (c) the word “aeroplane” is used when it should be “helicopter”. response Accepted. Thank you. comment 102 comment by: DGAC France DGAC France fully supports the content of this NPA and thanks the Agency. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. Thank you. comment 114 comment by: Danish Aviation Association We support the specific objectives of this rulemaking and the CRD/NPA proposal to carry lightweight flight recorders, as set out in the NPA. However, it is important to emphasize that this rulemaking must be carried out with respect to proportionality and based on risk assessment, and the installation of a light device can be made without too much expenses. The owner of such an aircraft / helicopter is typical a small or medium size enterprise. response Noted. Proportionality was carefully considered during the development of this NPA. We thank you for this comment. comment 115 comment by: Textron Aviation Comment: We see no discussion of harmonization activities with the US or other authorities. This is disappointing given the work and cooperation of the authorities for recent rule making activity aimed at simplifying and improving light aircraft design rules. Suggested Change: Please address harmonization efforts with the US or other authorities, if any. response Noted. According to the Basic Regulation, Article 17(2)(e), the Agency shall ‘in its fields of competence, carry out, on behalf of Member States, functions and tasks ascribed to them by applicable international conventions, in particular the Chicago Convention.’ The proposed requirements are better aligning the EU rules for air operation with Standards in ICAO Annex 6 Part I and III (refer to NPA 2017-03, Appendix A). Harmonisation between EU air operation rules and the air operation rules of non-EU States is achieved through the worldwide alignment with ICAO standards. U.S. regulations were indeed checked and there is, in FAR Part 135 Subpart L paragraph 135.607 (Helicopter Air Ambulance Equipment, Operations, and Training Requirements), a requirement on helicopters operated after 23 April 2018 to be ‘equipped with an approved flight data monitoring system capable of recording flight performance data’. The text of draft CAT.IDE.H.191 does not contain any inconsistency with FAR 135.607, however it should be noted that:  The equivalent of FAR 135.607 requirement regarding power source reliability can be found in the CS-27, 27.1459 point (a)(3) (draft CAT.IDE.H.191 does not contain any requirement regarding power source reliability); TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses  FAR 135.607 prescribes that the flight data monitoring system shall be operated ‘from the application of electrical power before take-off’ (while draft CAT.IDE.H.191 only requires that the flight recorder starts recording ‘prior to the helicopter being capable of moving under its own power’);  Draft CAT.IDE.H.191 contains a requirement regarding the recording duration and a requirement to provide an erasure function, which are not addressed in FAR 135.607. Apart from FAR 135.607, U.S regulations do not contain any requirement to carry a flight recorder on board a light aeroplane or a light helicopter. To this date, the Agency is not aware of any FAA announcement to adopt such requirements. It should also be noted that FAA and EASA design rules applicable to light aeroplanes and light rotorcraft only specify how to install a flight recorder when this equipment is required by the operating rules. Refer to FAR Part 23, 23.1457 point (a) and 23.1459 point (a), to FAR Part 27, 27.1457 point (a) and 27.1459 point (a), and to CS-23, 23.2555. However, certification specifications are out of the scope of RMT.0271. comment 116 comment by: Textron Aviation Comment: Semi Positive comment. It appears that it limits the application to CAT which would exempt most of GA. I think that the industry would be better served by requiring ADS-B out and then recording it than adding a recording system to get almost the same data. Suggested Change: Offer recording ADS-B out on the ground as a compromise. response Not accepted. See reply to comment 27. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY p. 1 comment 11 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports Executive summary page 1/178 General comment Please integrate in the best possible way new powerplant and propulsion systems technologies, .i.e. electric power, when it comes to preparing adequate provisions. We think it is the moment to start doing so e.g. by replacing "turbine engined" or "turbine engines" with "powerplants and/or propulsion systems other than piston engines" throughout the entire set of provisions. The sentence now is a bit longer, but it leaves room for new technologies. response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses While the Agency agrees with this comment, it is considered more appropriate to update OPS rules altogether for enabling the use of new technologies. Rulemaking task RMT.0392, Regular update of OPS rules, is expected to address such comment. comment 29 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 1 Paragraph No: Executive Summary Comment: The title of this NPA refers to “light aircraft” which is understood but which is a term that is not formally defined. Indeed the only explanation of the terminology appears in Section 4 Impact Assessment at page 43. If it is intended to use these descriptions in the regulations then it would be appropriate for the definitions to appear in ‘Annex I Definitions’. Only the similar term European Light Aircraft (ELA 1 or 2) is currently defined but these are not the target aircraft for this NPA. It is suggested that either the accepted term ‘other than complex motor-powered aircraft’ be used or the explanations of ‘Light aeroplane’ and Light helicopter’ be added to Annex I. Justification: Clarification of terminology to ensure the regulations are pertinent. response Partially accepted. The term ‘light aeroplanes’ and ‘light helicopters’ have been explained as early as possible in the Explanatory Note of the Opinion. However, adding corresponding definitions in Annex I ‘Definitions’ could create a conflict with the definitions used for the certification specifications (CS-23, CS-27). Instead it would be easier to modify the titles of CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, etc. With regards to the proposed rules, AMC & GM: the terms ‘light aeroplane’ and ‘light helicopter’ have been removed from the titles of CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146, SPO.IDE.H.146 and associated AMC and GM. The new titles of the paragraphs CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146, SPO.IDE.H.146 are ‘Lightweight flight recorder’. The new titles are consistent with similar provisions in Subparts CAT.IDE and SPO.IDE. comment 103 comment by: Air Accidents Investigation Branch Please find below the general AAIB comments on NPA 2017-03 Introduction EASA issued NPA 2017-03 regarding flight recorder requirements for smaller aircraft; the outcome of which will affect the future ability of investigators to determine causal and contributory factors. In addition, EASA’s response to AAIB Safety Recommendation 2015-035 (for EASA to mandate recorders for HEMS operations) stated that this would be considered in the RMTs that TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses generated the NPA. A focus of the comments in this document relate to the need for audio recorders to be fitted to EC135-sized helicopters which are in the 2,250 kg to 3,175 kg weight category and used for HEMS operations. The G-SPAO report identifies that limited trajectory information was available from radar but no audio or image recordings were available to support the investigation. The outcome of the investigation was unsatisfactory as there was no evidence to support the understanding of decisions made and so the opportunity to identifying safety issues was significantly restricted. G-SPAO was engaged on a police operation and hence is State regulated. However, the risks are not dissimilar to those for helicopters operated for HEMS and which are regulated by EASA. This document provides comments on the rationale used by EASA in NPA 2017-03 with regard to the proposal not to include a requirement for audio and image recording for helicopters engaged on such operations. Comments The NPA includes proposed amendments to CAT.IDE.H (page 13) and SPO.IDE.H (page 16) requiring helicopters greater than 2,250kg (forward fit only) to record only trajectory information; no audio, no image and no retrofit. The NPA provides no comparison of the risks associated with commercial A to B flight against those of the specialist nature of HEMS operation, and hence provides no evidence or justification as to why these two types of operation, and a proposed recorder fit, should be comparable. Although it is ‘industry standard practice’ to base equipage levels partly on the weight category of aircraft, the type of operation and associated risks should also be taken into account and included in the relevant cost benefit analysis. The NPA provides no evidence that this has been done and does not address the specialist nature of HEMS operations. One fundamental failing of the NPA is that it does not propose to mandate audio recording for certain categories of helicopter, especially those engaged in HEMS operations. The results of Study 3 on page 58 of the NPA clearly state that; ‘For all investigation reports analysed, the CVR was instrumental in determining some significant events or significant contributory factors, in particular: - information on chronology and timeline; - information on communication and CRM; - information on the application of procedures and checklists; and - information on alarms and technical failures.’ The AAIB has also noted, through a number of helicopter investigations, the benefit of audio recordings which, following a catastrophic event, have greatly assisted the investigation such that preventative Safety Recommendations could be made. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses The EASA assessment of the results of Study 3 appear to rely heavily on the fact that the value of this essential information is greatly reduced as there is no clear link to Safety Recommendations. The AAIB considers that it is inappropriate to include the list of all contributing information sources within a Safety Recommendation in order to justify it being made. In fact, the NPA makes that very point in the summaries of all the other Studies. Study 1 states ‘since the primary purpose of an accident report is not to express investigation needs, no factual conclusion as regards the need for in-flight recording for the investigation can be drawn from this figure alone.’ Study 2 (page 141) and Study 4 (page 146) contain similar sentiments. Study 3, addressing the benefit of CVRs on helicopters, does not mention this fact and thus the conclusions drawn appear to be somewhat unbalanced. The AAIB respectfully request that the conclusions of Study 3 are reviewed to ensure that the criteria being used to assess the results are consistent across all four Studies. The NPA categorises ‘catastrophic’ as an accident involving more than two fatalities. On page 58 of the NPA, HEMS operations appear to be included in the ‘light aviation’ category with an associated maximum severity of ‘hazardous’. However, HEMS operations, by their nature, are likely to have more than two persons on-board (including paramedic/flight crew/casualty) and so, an accident to such an operation would, by EASA’s definition be ‘catastrophic’. Additionally, the NPA has classified HEMS accidents, amongst light aviation accidents, as ‘remote’ (page 59 refers). According to the general principles of the safety risk assessment contained in Appendix H, Table H.3, such a combination of ‘catastrophic’ and ‘remote’ indicates that the current status is unacceptable and rulemaking action is required. In light of this, and the other comments made above, the AAIB respectfully requests that EASA consider the specialist nature of HEMS operations as being inappropriate to include in ‘light aviation’ and so review the current lack of proposal in the NPA to mandate CVRs for such operations. Summary The AAIB welcomes the move by EASA to extend the range of aircraft required to be fitted with some form of recording. However, the AAIB considers that, when the above comments are taken into consideration, it would be appropriate for EASA to include mandatory audio recording, in particular for HEMS operations. However, the AAIB was disappointed that the NPA did not take the opportunity to also address the benefits that image recording could bring at relatively little cost. response Partially accepted. It is decided to recommend in GM to CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 the fitment of the flight recorder with a cockpit audio recording capability for the following reasons: - such capability adds limited purchase cost (it has been already implemented on several lightweight flight recorders models in the market); - it does not require connection to the audio system of the aircraft (if it relies on a dedicated microphone); and - it can bring valuable information for the analysis of significant events. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Moreover, the privacy aspects have been covered by CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) by extending the audio recording protection to all systems installed in the cockpit. In addition, the recording of audio is proposed to be promoted by NPA 2017-03 (see section 4.3 and Option A.1). However, the conclusions of the impact assessment (chapter 4 of NPA 2017-03) are still considered valid, and in particular Option A.3 has a better rating than Option A.2. Further to that, a review of safety statistics for HEMS was performed in order to address this comment and to check whether there is a difference in the level of safety of HEMS operations between helicopters with a MCTOM of over 3 175 kg (required to carry a FDR and a CVR when the helicopter was first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 1987, according to Part-CAT, CAT.IDE.H.185/CAT.IDE.H.190 and to JAR-OPS 3) and helicopters with a MCTOM between 2250 kg and 3 175 kg (not required to carry a FDR or a CVR, and most often not carrying any kind of flight recorder). With the available data (accidents and serious incidents in EU Member States since 1 January 2005 and HEMS EU-registered fleet data since 2015), no relevant trend or correlation could be found. Broad safety studies pertaining to helicopters, such as EHEST Analysis of 2000-2005 European helicopter accidents, unfortunately don’t specify the type of information to be recorded. In conclusion, while introducing a requirement to record cockpit audio on board light helicopters does not seem justified at this stage, the following text has been introduced in GM to CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 (example for Part- CAT helicopters): ‘GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on other than complex helicopters ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION (a) Experience has shown the usefulness, for analysing incidents and for training purposes, of recording cockpit audio, additional instrument indications (such as position of flight controls, position of engine controls, fuel and oil indications, aircraft configuration selection), and an external view. To capture such information, simple equipment such as an integrated microphone and integrated camera may be sufficient. (b) If the flight recorder includes optional capabilities such as described in (a), their recording duration is recommended to be at least 2 hours for maximum usefulness. (c) if the flight recorder is capable of acquiring data from some aircraft system, it is advised to record in priority the flight parameters listed in Annex II-B of ED-155 or the flight parameters listed in Annex II-A of ED-112. Indeed, these flight parameters were selected based on their relevance in many safety investigations.’ In addition, because it is advised to record cockpit audio in guidance material, the wording of point (e) of CAT.IDE.A.191 has been changed as follows: ‘(e) If the flight recorder referred to in (a) records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a erasure function shall be provided which can be operated by the commander and which modifies image recordings and audio recordings of these images made before the operation of this function, so that they these recordings cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.’ Regarding the arguments detailed in this AAIB UK comment, the following should be considered: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses  Safety Recommendation UNKG-2015-035 was taken into consideration: see section 4.1.1.2 and Appendix C of the NPA. However, the rulemaking group decided to not base the safety risk assessment only on safety recommendations for reasons explained in section 4.1.2.4 of the NPA.  Police flights are not in the scope of the NPA, because such flights are excluded by Article 1 point 2 of Regulation (EC) 216/2008, and subsequently EASA is not competent for regulating police flights. Such flights remain an exclusive competence of the Member States.  The level of risk associated to a particular type of operations (such as HEMS) is not a main driver for justifying carriage of a flight recorder. Indeed flight recorders are not meant to directly reduce operational risks, but to facilitate the reconstruction of a sequence of events leading to an accident and the identification of causal factors. There are other aircraft systems which have a direct and demonstrated positive impact on some categories of risk (e.g. TAWS reduces the risk of CFIT, ACAS reduces the risk of mid-air collision) and identification of particular risk would justify mandating the installation of such systems rather than flight recorders.  The sentence quoted related to the results of Study 3 (see NPA 2017-03, subsection 4.1.2.4, page 58) needs to be read in a wider context. It is also stated that: ‘a link to corrective actions (safety recommendations or other) was not clearly demonstrated.’ And the conclusion regarding Study 3 is: o ‘while recordings indisputably provide useful data for reconstructing trajectories and flight instrument indications, as well as determining some significant events or significant contributory factors,, their potential benefits for accident prevention seems moderate because they do not significantly influence the number of corrective actions.’  According to AMC 25.1309, ‘hazardous’ means ‘Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants other than the flight crew’. When considering a helicopter of less than 3 175 kg used for HEMS operation, there are usually 3 or less occupants other than the flight crew (1 patient and max 2 medical staff members). Hence, the ‘hazardous’ severity category is considered more relevant than ‘catastrophic’ when considering an accident with such an aircraft. Table H.2 presented in Appendix H of NPA 2017-03 is not fully accurate and it would need to be corrected accordingly. (Note: no severity classification is specified in CS-23 or CS-27, hence the reference to AMC25.1309). Table of contents p. 2-3 comment 7 comment by: [email protected] this is a test response Noted. 2. In summary — why and what — 2.1. Why we need to change the rules—issue/rationale p. 5 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 1 comment by: Balóny Kubíček Petr Kubicek Kubicek Balloons Czech Balloon Federation We were hoping that one of the current EASA goals is to develop "simple and proportional rules for balloons". This is really against this goal and we are very very strong against to any kind of in-flight recording ideas. We see no practical reasons or any the safety benefit. If we want to destroy our sport we can continue in the proposed direction. No we will not support this even on promotional/voluntary level. Please stop this activity and save EASA manpower to fields where it is needed. PS I can speak only about balloons but feel the same for any kind of small aviation response Noted. See reply to comment No 3. comment 9 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 2.1. Why we need to change... page 5/178 Remark CAT, commercial air transport, commercial operations are used in this set of provisions, this makes it difficult to understand the exact field of applicability. We think clarification is needed throughout the NPA. response Noted. In the NPA, the following definitions are used.  Commercial Air Transport: an aircraft operation to transport passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or other valuable consideration. (Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Article 2)  Commercial Operation: any operation of an aircraft, in return for remuneration or other valuable consideration, which is available to the public or, when not made available to the public, which is performed under a contract between an operator and a customer, where the latter has no control over the operator. (Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, Article 3). comment 30 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 5 Paragraph No: 2.1 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Comment: With regards to balloons, the statement “Finally, CAT statistics indicate a significantly higher rate of accidents with balloons compared to aeroplanes and helicopters, which raises the question of the need for in-flight recording on-board balloons with a large passenger capacity” needs to be considered in the right context. There are two significant issues here, which are repeated through this NPA. Firstly, statistical comparison between different types of aircraft, specifically with reference to CAT is not comparing similar types of operations or hazards and risks. Passenger hot-air balloons do not undertake CAT in the true sense of the phrase. The purpose of a hot-air balloon flight is not to travel from “A” to “B” but rather the flight itself. Many of the rule requirements attached to CAT are not appropriate for ballooning. Therefore, the RMT.0674 expert group developed a new category specifically for passenger ballooning called “Commercial Passenger Ballooning” [CPB], which is fully detailed in EASA Opinion 01/2016. Secondly, the risk exposure to passengers in a larger balloon is not necessarily greater than in a smaller balloon. In fact, the opposite applies and stronger baskets with specific passenger compartments and, perhaps, rearwards facing “seats”, offer much greater passenger safety in larger balloon baskets. The proposal to not specifically address any mandatory requirement to equip balloons with flight recorders as in the preferred Option B.1 is fully supported. Similarly to the other alleviated sectors, the benefits should be promoted leading to voluntary fitment of some form of device solely at the discretion of the operator. Justification: Proportionality and work already undertaken by the RMT.0674 expert group in so far as CPB ‘v’ CAT. response Noted. Thank you. For clarification purposes, proportionality has been carefully considered in the NPA 2017-03, which is reflected by preferring option B.1 for balloons. In particular, it is not stated in the NPA that CAT balloons are more vulnerable than non-CAT balloons, but that 'CAT statistics indicate a significantly higher rate of accidents with balloons compared to aeroplanes and helicopters'. See also section 4.1.1.2.3 of the NPA. 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals p. 6-7 comment 12 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 2.3.1.2. New recording requirements... page 6/178 Question Why did the Rulemaking Group choose the 2250 kg MTOM preferring this to the 2000 kg of the ELA2 or the 2730 kg MTOM of Part-M/Part-ML? response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses 2 250 kg is the mass threshold chosen in Standards related to lightweight flight recorders in ICAO Annex 6 Part I and Part III. Therefore this value was also retained for regulatory harmonisation with ICAO. comment 31 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 6 Paragraph No: 2.3.1.1 Comment: The explanation of why there needs to be new definitions to describe flight recorders in Annex I is appreciated but it might be more appropriate to use the proposed GM at ‘GM16 Annex I Definitions’ to provide a more comprehensive description of the range of equipment, including FDR and CVR, that encompasses recorders meeting the international standards under ED112A and ED155 for example. The new definition of “Flight Recorder” is sufficient supported by the GM which is how it is accomplished in ICAO Annex 6 for instance. Justification: Clarity and simplicity with easier means of amendment in the future as equipment changes. Proposed Text: Add to new GM16 Annex I Definitions “Crash protected flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: a flight data recorder (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), an airborne image recorder (AIR) or a data link recorder (DLR). Lightweight flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: an aircraft data recording system (ADRS), a cockpit audio recording system (CARS), an airborne image recording system (AIRS) or a data link recording system (DLRS).” response Partially accepted. The first proposed sentence is added in the text of the GM 16 Annex I Definitions, because there already exist requirements related to crash-protected flight recorders (FDR, CVR and DLR) in Part-CAT, Part-NCC and Part-SPO: GM16 Annex I Definitions FLIGHT RECORDER ‘A flight recorder may be crash-protected or lightweight. Crash-protected flight recorders are capable of withstanding very severe crash conditions such as those encountered during some accidents of large aeroplanes and large helicopters. Crash protected flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: a flight data recorder (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), an airborne image recorder (AIR) or a data link recorder (DLR). Lightweight flight recorders are usually designed to meet less demanding crash-protection requirements, which allows them to be lighter.’ However, the second proposed sentence would introduce more terms, which are not intended to be used in Part-CAT or Part-SPO at this time (ADRS, CARS, etc.). Therefore, it is not considered appropriate to introduce them for the time being. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 32 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 6 Paragraph No: 2.3.1.2 Comment: In this section, the EUROCAE standard ED112 is introduced which also appears elsewhere. Whilst this is an accepted standard it has been superseded by ED112A and as the proposed regulations will affect new aircraft in the future it is recommended that this standard be applied throughout where otherwise ED112 is mentioned. Justification: Application of current standards to new aircraft Proposed Text: Replace ED112 with ED112A wherever mentioned. response Not accepted. With regard to the performance of the flight parameters, see 3.2.2.3.1: ‘It should be noted that although ED-112 was superseded by ED-112A in 2013, compliance with ED-112 is still considered acceptable: this is because the flight parameters performance provided by ED-112 is considered sufficient for investigation purposes in the case of a light aircraft. ’ With regard to the operational performance of the flight recorder, similarly the specifications in ED-112 are considered sufficient in the case of a light aircraft. In any case, the text of the draft AMC to CAT.IDE.A.191/CAT.IDE.H.191 specifies ‘or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected flight recorder’, hence they implicitly include ED-112A. 2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals p. 8-9 comment 33 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 8 Paragraph No: 2.4.1 Comment: The preferred option A.4 for aeroplanes and helicopters is not supported. Whilst the promotion of the use of flight recorders under Option A.1 is supported, the extension within Option A.3 to include commercial SPO aeroplanes and helicopters is not considered to have been adequately justified within the Impact Assessment and should not be adopted. Aligning the Ops Rules with ICAO Annex 6 for CAT aeroplanes and helicopters together with the proposed changes is acceptable. Therefore it is strongly recommended in light of this that revised options A.3A and A.4A as shown below are adopted. When experience and better justification can be realised together with more proportionate modification schemes under TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses CS-STAN then perhaps the inclusion of commercial SPO aeroplanes and helicopters might be re-considered. The preferred option should now be Option A.4A. Justification: Capturing aircraft that may be used for commercial SPO and requiring them to meet the same requirements as for CAT has not been fully justified when considering the additional costs against the likely benefits. This additional need for FR equipment will have a significant financial impact on commercial SPO operators and they should remain covered by the benefits expected by Option A.1 alone at this stage. Proposed Text: Amend Options to include: “Option A.3A: Transpose ICAO Standards in Annex 6 with some differences: · include aeroplanes which have an MOPSC of more than 9; and · do not require the recording of audio. Option A.4A: Implement Options A.1 and A.3A together.” response Not accepted. The approach taken in NPA 2017-03 was to classify the cases between commercial operations and non-commercial operations (refer to subsection 4.1.2.3). Commercial operations are regulated only in Part-CAT and Part-SPO. The justification for the requirement has been reconsidered in the light of this comment. First, it should be noted that the carriage of a flight recorder capable of recording flight parameters is recommended by ICAO Annex 6 for light turbine-engine aeroplanes used for other operations than commercial air transport: refer to ICAO Annex 6 Part II, 2.4.16.1. Second, three of the safety recommendations presented in Appendix C of the Explanatory Note of NPA 2017-03 are related to in-flight recording equipment for light aircraft engaged in aerial work activities:  IRLD-2008-014: ‘EASA should initiate a study of the necessity for aerial work aircraft in the General Aviation category to have installed a simple on-board device to record basic flight parameters. ‘  BELG-2015-001: ‘It is recommended that EASA mandates the installation of a lightweight recording system in aircraft used for parachuting activities ’  Spain recommendation to ICAO: ‘It is recommended that the International Civil Aviation Organisation establish as an essential requirement for skydiving operations that the aircraft utilized for this activity have onboard a flight data recorder capable of logging at least the basic parameters of the operation.’ In addition, the regulatory impact assessment in NPA 2017-03, chapter 4, 4.5.1 shows that extending the requirement to commercial SPO ‘captures 3 times more historical accidents with aeroplanes (22 instead of 7) and 3 times more accidents with helicopters (14 instead of 5).’ Regarding the economic impact, Option A.3 is only applicable to aeroplanes and helicopters manufactured three years after the publication of the rule, therefore it is assumed that the equipment will be installed by aircraft manufacturers during the production (as it is already TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses the case for some aircraft models: see Appendix G of NPA 2017-03). Similar to other forward- fitted equipment, the scale effect is expected to bring down the purchase price and the certification cost, no cost will be generated by aircraft downtime, and the number of hours needed to install the equipment will be reduced. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the requirements proposed under the new SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 are applicable to turbine-engine aeroplanes and helicopters with a MCTOM greater than or equal to 2 250 kg and to aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9. The aircraft within the scope of new SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 have unit purchase prices ranging from 1 500 000 to 5 000 000 Euro, thus the relative cost impact of installing in-flight recording equipment may be considered low. More details are provided in NPA 2017-03, chapter 4, sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5. Moreover, it should be noted that Issue 2 of the certification specifications for standard changes and repairs (CS-STAN) includes in Subpart B (Standard Changes) a new paragraph CS- SC104a — Installation of lightweight in-flight recording systems. All non-complex aeroplanes and non-complex helicopters2 are eligible to CS-SC104a. This means in practice that CS- SC104a can be used for most aeroplane and helicopter models in the scope of Option A.3, because these models are not considered complex. The list of flight parameters to be recorded according to SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 was defined in a way so that they could be obtained without having to connect the flight recorder to aircraft systems or instruments, which is one of the main technical limitations for using CS-SC104a. Given the expected impacts on safety and economics, it is still considered appropriate to include commercial SPO in the proposed requirements. Therefore it has been decided to not modify Option A.3 and Option A.4. 3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail — 3.1. Draft Regulation (Draft EASA opinion) p. 10 — 3.1.1. Draft resulting text — 3.1.1.1. Annex I (Definitions) comment 34 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 10 Paragraph No: 3.1.1.1 Comment: As previously mentioned in the comment against 2.3.1.1, it is recommended that the new definitions for FDR and CVR be removed and placed in a modified “GM16 Annex 1 Definitions”. This reflects the method of description in ICAO Annex 6 and seems more flexible and comprehensive. 2 Note: according to Regulation (EC) 216/2008 (Basic Regulation), (i) a complex aeroplane is an aeroplane: — with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg, or — certificated for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than nineteen, or — certificated for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots, or — equipped with (a) turbojet engine(s) or more than one turboprop engine, or (ii) a complex helicopter is a helicopter certificated: — for a maximum take-off mass exceeding 3 175 kg, or — for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than nine, or — for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Justification: Better explanation of all the terms used within the context of Flight Recorders and alignment with ICAO. Proposed Text: As shown in previous comment against 2.3.1.1. response Partially accepted. The terms ‘FDR’ and ‘CVR’ are already used throughout the Annexes to Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012. When a term is used in an implementing rule, the definition should be found in Annex I rather than in a GM to Annex I. However GM16 has been expanded to ensure that suitable explanations are provided. See also reply to comment No 31. 3.1.1.2. Annex IV (Part-CAT) — CAT.GEN.MPA.195 Handling of flight recorder recordings: p. 11-12 preservation, production, protection and use comment 82 comment by: Airbus Helicopters There does not seem to be a rationale for numbering last sub-paragraph (f)(3a), instead of (f)(4). response Noted. This is for organising the provisions in a more consistent manner, because (1) and (1a) are dedicated for the CVR, (2) for the FDR. comment 104 comment by: IATA IATA General Comment CAT.GEN.MPA.195 Introduction of the image provisions in CAT.GEN.MPA.195 which deals with flight recorders in general and is applicable to all commercial aircraft (higher than 5.7 tons MTOW) might lead to misinterpretation and confusion. It would be more appropriate to indicate that "images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder in a light aircraft..." etc. Another solution would be to introduce a separate article specifically addressing "light aircraft". response Not accepted. The requirements on the protection of image recordings are intended to be the same whatever the category of the aircraft. Indeed, the protection of such recordings is justified by the fact that they may contain elements of privacy. The sensitivity of these privacy elements does not depend on the aircraft in which they were recorded. In addition, the proposed requirements give practical means to implement Regulation 2016/679 (on personal data protection) in this case. comment 105 comment by: IATA IATA Comments item (3) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses EASA mentions the protection of images showing the body parts of the crew members only in respect to the processes to ensure serviceability of the flight recorder. The protection should however refer to all instances and usage of the images. IATA would suggest the introduction of a separate point stating: "There should be no video recording on the flight deck used to capture any part of a flight crew member’s body while they are seated, in order to avoid personal identification." response Partially accepted. The protection of flight crew privacy in other instances than serviceability is already addressed by point (f)(3) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (refer to section 3.1.1.2 of the NPA) and draft AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) (refer to section 3.2.1.3 of the NPA), which are similar to already published point (f)(1) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) for the protection of CVR recordings. Points (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and the proposed AMC are considered a sufficient framework for the protection of recorded images. However, the following recommendation has been added into GM paragraphs (example for CAT.IDE.A.191): GM2 CAT.IDE.A.191 INSTALLATION OF CAMERAS ‘It is advised, when practicable, to install any camera so that it does not capture images of head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position, in order to avoid identification of persons.’ comment 106 comment by: IATA IATA comments item (3)(i) Although image recording might bring useful information for accident investigations, the usage of image recordings for other purposes should be carefully considered by EASA. In commercial operations where Flight Data Monitoring programs are implemented for decades there is enough experience and practice to properly protect the information and the individuals, and the use of the most appropriate data sources for safety analysis and investigation. The facility of video usage might lead to misuse, over-usage, etc by organizations not having the proper experience. This ease of access to video recordings might lead to negative effects in the implementation of Safety Management Systems. response Noted. The proposed additions in points (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 are precisely meant to set up a framework for the protection of image recordings. In addition the proposed AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) and AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) provide comprehensive means to comply with the protection requirement. Furthermore, CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 include a requirement to offer an erase function when images of the flight crew compartment are recorded. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 107 comment by: IATA IATA comments item (3a)(iii) IATA proposed text: "There should be no video recording on the flight deck used to capture any part of a flight crew member’s body while they are seated, in order to avoid personal identification." response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 105. comment 109 comment by: European Cockpit Association CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (f) (3) (3) Images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used except for ensuring the flight recorder serviceability, or if: (i) a procedure related to the handling of images is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) these images are used only for maintaining or improving safety. ECA's comment Flight recorder shall record print screen of EFIS displays. In aircraft not equipped with EFIS instruments, it is acceptable means of compliance to record images of information presented on analogue instruments. The recording of such images shall not capture the head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position. This MPA 195 is a general rule and must make distinction between light CAT.IDE.191 and CAT.IDE.190 aircraft and Helicopters. Proposed ECA's amendments Article 3 and 3a are applicable only for CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191. "(3a) (ii) The recording of such images shall not capture the head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position." New article (4) "For CAT.IDE.A.190 and CAT.IDE.H.190 flight recorders shall be able to record printscreen of EFIS instrument panels. These flight recorder records shall not be disclosed or used for ensuring flight recorder serviceability unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of recordings is in place and (ii) this procedure is agreed upon by flight crew members or their representative organisations, or all crewmember and maintenance personnel have given their prior consent and (iii) these recordings are used for only for improving safety. Reasoning TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses ECA and IFALPA oppose the use of image recordings and support the use of technical alternatives like recording of print screens and switch settings by flight recorders. response Partially accepted. The requirements on the protection of image recordings are intended to be the same whatever the category of the aircraft: indeed, the protection of such recordings is justified by the fact that they may contain elements of privacy. The sensitivity of these privacy elements does not depend on the aircraft in which they were recorded. Therefore, points (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 should not be restricted to some categories of aeroplanes or helicopters. The text proposed by ECA for point (3a)(ii) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is not appropriate because it contains a requirement on the installation of the recorder image sensors, which is out of the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is only the handling of flight recorder recordings). However, adding such text in CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 is not appropriate either because when considering the cockpit of a light aircraft, it is not technically possible to capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station(s) without capturing parts of the pilot’s body. The point (f)(4) proposed by ECA for CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is not relevant, because it is an equipment-related requirement which is out of the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.195. In addition CAT.IDE.A.190 and CAT.IDE.H.190 are out of the scope of this RMT. However a recommendation has been added into GM paragraphs to CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 (and corresponding paragraphs in Part-SPO): see reply to comment No 105. SUBPART D — SECTION 1 — CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes p. 12-13 comment 25 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association GAMA questions the recording duration suggested, as most light-aircraft / general aviation flight don't exceed a few hours. Therefore, can the Agency please clarify the use of the collected data - a new FOQA program, accident investigation etc. response Accepted. 10 hours minimum recording duration was proposed in order to ensure that the flight recorder is capable of recording a complete flight. Indeed, as indicated in section 4.1.1.1 of NPA 2017-03, ‘Since 2010, almost all accidents and serious incidents that occur over the territory of an EASA MS must be subject to safety investigation’. Experience with the FDR and the CVR required on-board large aeroplanes has shown that in order to record all serious incidents, the recording duration should exceed the maximum duration of a flight. However, after re-assessment, it was decided to reduce the required minimum recording duration of the flight recorder to 5 hours in CAT.IDE.A.191 and SPO.IDE.A.146. Please see also reply to comment No 67. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 35 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 12 Paragraph No: CAT.IDE.A.191 Comment: The use of the term ‘light aeroplane’ needs to be defined, as previously mentioned in comment against page 1 ‘Executive Summary’, or replaced with the accepted and defined term of ‘other than complex motor-powered aeroplane’. This comment is equally applicable to the proposed CAT.IDE.H.191 and associated AMC/GM. [This would also be applicable to SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 if retained]. Justification: Clarity of terminology. Proposed Text: See previous comment for Page 1 ‘Executive Summary’ response Partially accepted. Instead of defining the term ‘light aeroplane’, this term has been removed from the title of CAT.IDE.A.191 and associated AMC and GM paragraphs, and instead these paragraphs have been re-titled. See also reply to comment No 29. comment 36 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 12 Paragraph No: CAT.IDE.A.191 Comment: There is no mention of requiring a location device for the Flight Recorders as detailed in CAT.IDE.A.190(e), for instance, for non-deployable ones. Under ICAO Annex 6, FRs should have location devices fitted individually whether deployable or not. It is not clear if this is an oversight or an intentional difference from the ICAO standard. The same comment is equally relevant to the proposal for CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 and should be resolved. Justification: Consistency and compliance with ICAO Annex 6 response Noted. No underwater locating device (ULD) is required because, according to draft AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, the flight recorder may be a lightweight flight recorder compliant with ED- 155, and the latter industry standard does not specify the fitting of the recorder with a ULD. comment 37 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 13 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Paragraph No: CAT.IDE.A.191 (e) Comment: Within the new regulations, there is an erasure function intended for when any images are recorded by the ‘flight recorder’. This is important but so too is the prevention of intended or unintended in-flight erasure and the retention of such recordings until the aircraft is on the ground and in particular during any crash sequence. Amendments to ICAO Annex 6 propose suitable text that could be added to the new rule to accommodate this function. However, erasure functions are not normally applicable to FRs collecting parametric data and this should be carefully considered. This recommendation is equally applicable to the proposed CAT.IDE.H.191(e). [This would also be applicable to SPO.IDE.A.146(e) and SPO.IDE.H.146(e) if retained]. Justification: To ensure the prevention of loss of recordings during normal operation and during accident sequences. Proposed Text: Add new sentence at the end of sub-para (e) “…..or copying techniques. The erasure function shall be designed to prevent activation during flight and minimize the probability of an inadvertent activation during an accident.” response Noted. The proposal is to be addressed by certification specifications rather than rules for air operations. For comparison, such requirement can be found in the certification specifications for large aeroplanes and large rotorcraft (see for example CS-25.1457(f) in the CS-25). In addition, according to point (a)(10) of CAT.GEN.MPA.105, it is the responsibility of the commander to ensure that ‘flight recorders are not disabled or switched off during flight’. comment 67 comment by: Garmin International CAT.IDE.A.191 (c): Suggest shortening the length of required recording duration: “…at least the preceding 10 hours”. The intent of this amendment is to facilitate accident investigation with better flight data; however, 10 hours of data contains an excess of data for what would be relevant in an investigation since general aviation flights tend to have a duration of a few hours at most. There are also technical considerations when recording video images. The storage space required for 10 hours of high definition video could become unmanageably large. A shorter required recording duration would support better quality video recordings. response Accepted. 10 hours minimum recording duration was proposed in order to ensure that the flight recorder is capable of recording a complete flight on most aeroplane models that are within the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Indeed, as indicated in section 4.1.1.1 of NPA 2017-03, ‘Since 2010, almost all accidents and serious incidents that occur over the territory of an EASA MS must be subject to safety investigation’. Experience with the FDR and the CVR required on-board large aeroplanes has shown that in order to record all serious incidents, the recording duration should exceed the maximum duration of a flight. This is because when a serious incident occurs, the flight is usually continued as planned, meaning that hours may elapse between the time of the serious incident and the completion of the flight. It should also be considered that recording starts ‘when the aeroplane is capable of moving under its own power’ and stops ‘after the aeroplane is incapable of moving under its own power’ (refer to point (d) of draft CAT.IDE.A.191), which means that the taxi phases before take-off and after landing should also be included the computation of the flight duration. Furthermore, EU air operation rules forbid that a flight recorder is stopped during the flight (refer to Part-CAT, CAT.GEN.MPA.105 point (a)(10)). The aeroplane models within the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191 are turbine-engine aeroplanes with a MCTOM comprised between 2 250 kg and 5 700 kg and piston-engine aeroplanes with a MOPSC of more than 9 and a MCTOM of less than 5 700 kg. When examining aeroplane models within the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191, it was found that the majority of aeroplane models have a flight endurance comprised between 3 and 5 hours. In addition, even when considering those aeroplane models with an endurance exceeding 5 hours, they seldom perform commercial flights with duration exceeding 5 hours. Hence, 5 hours recording duration is considered sufficient recording duration for the flight recorder. Therefore, the text of point (c) of CAT.IDE.A.191 (and of SPO.IDE.A.146) has been replaced by the following: ‘(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least the preceding 5 hours.’ comment 68 comment by: Garmin International CAT.IDE.A.191 (d): Regarding the phrases “capable of moving under its own power” and “incapable of moving under its own power”: Since the equipment is recording aircraft data provided by avionics or other systems, beginning/ending equipment recording based on avionics power or other electrical bus may be more appropriate. response Not accepted. ICAO Annex 6 prescribes for all types of flight recorders (including the lightweight flight recorders) that they ‘start to record prior to the aeroplane moving under its own power and record continuously until the termination of the flight when the aeroplane is no longer capable of moving under its own power’ (the same for helicopters). In addition EUROCAE Document 155 specifies the following in 2.1.5: ‘The flight recording systems shall start to record prior to the aircraft moving under its own power and record continuously, in accordance with the requirements of this MOPS, until the termination of the flight when the aircraft is no longer capable of moving under its own power.’ TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Hence, the current wording of point (d) of CAT.IDE.A.191 is maintained because it ensures regulatory harmonisation and it also corresponds to industry specifications. In addition, the wording of this point is objective-based, which is more sustainable than a technology- prescriptive wording. comment 73 comment by: Garmin International CAT.IDE.A.191 (e): The combination of the terms “erasure function” and “modifies the recording” are in conflict. Suggest using language such as “hide”, “hidden”, or “protect” to reduce confusion of an “erasure function” that does not technically erase anything. Additionally, the phrase “erasure function shall be provided…” does not consider the situation where a normal recovery method may not usually be available such as an inaccessible device or a device without a viewing screen. response Partially accepted. With regards to the first part of the comment: partially accepted. The word ‘erasure’ is removed in point (e) of CAT.IDE.A.191 and point (e) of CAT.IDE.H.191 to prevent confusion. In addition, a GM is created to clarify the purpose of point (e): refer to comment No 85. With regards to the second part of the comment: noted. The technical possibility for the flight crew to erase image recordings is considered essential for the protection of their privacy. The proposed applicability is for aircraft first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the amending regulation + 3 years], which is considered sufficient notice for the industry to find compliant solutions. Regarding the availability of a ‘normal recovery method’, it should be noted that means to recover the recording files from the flight recorder will be needed to perform the recording inspection: refer to draft AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) (section 3.2.1.3 of the NPA). comment 86 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #83 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 83. comment 89 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #84 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 84. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 92 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #85 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 85. comment 110 comment by: European Cockpit Association CAT.IDE.A.191 (b) & (c) (b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. (c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least the preceding 10 hours. ECA's comment Flight recorder shall record print screen of EFIS displays. In aircraft not equipped with EFIS instruments, it is acceptable means of compliance to record images of information presented on analogue instruments. The recording of such images shall not capture the head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position. ECA's proposed amendment  delete in (b) 'and/or images'  delete in (c) 'images' Reasoning ECA and IFALPA oppose the use of image recordings and support the use of technical alternatives like recording of print screen and switch settings by flight recorders. response Partially accepted. The term ‘image’ appears in CAT.IDE.A.191 to include camera-based solutions, which are often more cost-effective and easier to achieve than solutions based on recovering digital information from the aircraft systems and instruments. When considering the cockpit of a light aircraft, it is often not technically possible to capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station(s) without capturing parts of the pilot’s body. In order to facilitate the protection of privacy, a requirement to offer an “erasure function” is already included in CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191. In addition, a recommendation has been added in GM paragraphs to CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 (and corresponding paragraphs in Part-SPO). See reply to comment No 105. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters p. 13 comment 64 comment by: Garmin International CAT.IDE.H.191 (c): Suggest shortening the length of required recording duration: “…at least the preceding 10 hours”. The intent of this amendment is to facilitate accident investigation with better flight data; however, 10 hours of data contains an excess of data for what would be relevant in an investigation since general aviation flights tend to have a duration of a few hours at most. There are also technical considerations when recording video images. The storage space required for 10 hours of high definition video could become unmanageably large. A shorter required recording duration would support better quality video recordings. response Accepted. 10 hours minimum recording duration was determined in order to ensure that the flight recorder is capable of recording a complete flight on most helicopter models which are within the scope of CAT.IDE.H.191, i.e. turbine-engine helicopters with a MCTOM comprised between 2 250 kg and 3 175 kg. When examining helicopter models within the scope of CAT.IDE.H.191, it was found that most models have a flight endurance comprised between 2 and 4 hours. In addition, it was determined that when considering aeroplane models in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191, 5-hour recording duration would be sufficient (see reply to comment No 67). For facilitating the approval of equipment that can be installed on aeroplanes and helicopters, it is considered preferable to require the same recording duration in CAT.IDE.A.191 and in CAT.IDE.H.191. Therefore, the minimum recording duration required by point (c) of CAT.IDE.H.191 and point (c) of SPO.IDE.H.146 has been reduced to 5 hours. comment 69 comment by: Garmin International CAT.IDE.H.191 (d): Regarding the phrases “capable of moving under its own power” and “incapable of moving under its own power”: Since the equipment is recording aircraft data provided by avionics or other systems, beginning/ending equipment recording based on avionics power or other electrical bus may be more appropriate. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 68. comment 72 comment by: Garmin International TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses CAT.IDE.H.191 (e): The combination of the terms “erasure function” and “modifies the recording” are in conflict. Suggest using language such as “hide”, “hidden”, or “protect” to reduce confusion of an “erasure function” that does not technically erase anything. Additionally, the phrase “erasure function shall be provided…” does not consider the situation where a normal recovery method may not usually be available such as an inaccessible device or a device without a viewing screen. response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 73. comment 83 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Comment Item (c) states: “The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least the preceding 10 hours.“ This requirement might be interpreted as: if both data and images are recorded, at least the preceding 10 hours should be retained for both. As a matter of fact, retaining 10 hours for an image recorder is not practical. If both data and images are recorded, it should be considered enough to retain 10 hours of flight data, while a period of 2 hours should be enough for images (consistently with ED-155 section III-2.1.3 for Airborne Image Recording Systems). Recommendation Add a clarification in GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191 or create a new GM CAT.IDE.H.191(c), e.g.: “When both flight data and images are recorded, the requirement that the flight recorder shall be capable of retaining at least the preceding 10 hours does not apply to images.“ response Partially accepted. The provision on the minimum recording duration required by point (c) of CAT.IDE.H.191 has been modified to require only 5 hours. Given that CAT.IDE.H.191 is meant to be applicable to helicopters first issued with an individual CofA at least 3 years after the date of publication of the amending regulation (which would mean under the most optimistic assumptions, to helicopters produced as of 1 January 2022), it is believed that 5-hour recording duration is not challenging for the industry. See also reply to comment No 64. comment 84 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Comment The proposal is to record flight data and/or images. Audio recording is not considered. Although it is not part of the new ICAO Annex 6 standards, recording of cockpit audio is a key feature for accident investigation. Recommendation TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Add a requirement for light helicopters in the scope to be equipped with a recorder capable of recording cockpit audio and retaining at least the preceding 2 hours. response Partially accepted. A requirement is not added, but instead a GM paragraph is introduced, where it is advised that the flight recorder is fitted with cockpit audio recording capability and that the recommended duration for audio recording is at least 2 hours. See also reply to comment No 103. comment 85 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Comment The description of the “erasure function” in item (e) may be misleading, especially for unadvertised persons, especially due to the mix of the words “erase” and “modify”. Recommendation We suggest making this function more explicit, for example by using the wording “bulk erase function” (which is used commonly in ED-112, ED-112A and ED-155), and possibly by clarifying the concept in a GM to CAT.IDE.H.191 (see for example the clarification which is provided in section 3.1.2.2.1 of this NPA, page 18). response Partially accepted. The use of the term ‘bulk erase’ is specific for magnetic-tape recording technology and not relevant any more for a solid-state flight recorder. According to ICAO State Letters AN 11/1.3.32 -18/12 (Adoption of Amendment 43 to Annex 6, Part I) and AN 11/32.3.14-18/14 (Adoption of Amendment 22 to Annex 6, Part III), ‘bulk erasure device’ will be replaced by ‘erasure device’ in ICAO Annex 6 Parts I and III. However, the word ‘erasure’ in point (e) of CAT.IDE.A/H.191 is removed. In addition a GM has been added to clarify the purpose of point (e), with the following text (example for CAT.IDE.A.191): GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191(e) ‘FUNCTION TO MODIFY THE RECORDINGS OF IMAGES AND AUDIO The purpose of the function modifying the image recordings and audio recordings is to allow the flight crew to protect their privacy by making the recording of images and audio inaccessible using normal techniques. The activation of this function is subject to the commander’s approval (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.105). However, the equipment manufacturer or a safety investigation authority might still be able to retrieve the recorded data using special techniques.’ comment 111 comment by: European Cockpit Association CAT.IDE.H.191 (b) & (c) (b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses (c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least the preceding 10 hours. ECA's comment This only applies to CAT.IDE.H.190. ECA's amendment  delete in (b) 'and/or images'  delete in (c) 'images' Reasoning ECA and IFALPA oppose the use of image recordings and support the use of technical alternatives like recording of print screen and switch settings by flight recorders. response Partially accepted. See reply to comment 110. 3.1.1.3. Annex VIII (Part-SPO) — SUBPART A — SPO.GEN.145 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use — operations with complex motor- p. 14-15 powered aircraft comment 38 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 14 and 31 Paragraph No: 3.1.1.3 and 3.2.1.4 Comment: In view of UK CAA proposed Options A.3A and A.4A, delete all references to Part- SPO. Justification: Proportionality and balance of benefits. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 33. comment 95 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Comment The scope of SPO.GEN.145 is limited, through the title of the requirement itself, to “complex motor-powered aircrafts". However, new equipment requirements extend the need for flight recorders to some “other than complex motor-powered aircraft". We don’t see any reason to still limit the scope of SPO.GEN.145 to "complex motor-powered aircraft", and not to extend it to all aircraft required to have a flight recorder. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Recommendation Recommendation is to:  Remove “operations with complex motor-powered aircraft“ from the title of SPO.GEN.145,  Possibly precise the scope, as done in AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b), by an introductory condition like “Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried:”. response Partially accepted. Regarding the first recommendation: accepted. The mention ‘operations with complex motor-powered aircraft’ is removed from the title of SPO.GEN.145. Regarding the second recommendation: not accepted. When equipment is installed which is not required, maintenance to prevent failure modes of this equipment which might affect the airworthiness of the aircraft may still be necessary. Example: a CVR is installed on a light aeroplane while CVR carriage is not required for this aeroplane. The underwater locating device (ULD) attached to the CVR still needs to be replaced according to the recommendations of the ULD manufacturer in order to prevent any hazard stemming from the ULD lithium battery. SUBPART D — SECTION 1 — SPO.IDE.A.146 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes p. 16 comment 26 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association GAMA questions the recording duration suggested, as most light-aircraft / general aviation flight don't exceed a few hours. Therefore, can the Agency please clarify the use of the collected data - a new FOQA program, accident investigation etc. response Accepted. The text of point (c) of CAT.IDE.A.191 (and of SPO.IDE.A.146) has been replaced by the following: ‘(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least the preceding 5 hours.’ Please see also the reply to comment No 67. comment 39 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 16 Paragraph No: SPO.IDE.A.146(a)(2) Comment: If retained and in the context of the section, it is suggested that the sentence is re-phrased to ensure clarity of the type of operations being conducted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Additionally, the next sub-paragraph is also numbered (2) which should be changed to (3). Justification: Clarity of intent. Proposed Text: Amend (a)(2) to read: “(2) they are commercially operated conducting commercial operations; and” response Partially accepted. The text of (a)(2) is modified as follows: ‘(2) they are used for commercial operations’. comment 65 comment by: Garmin International SPO.IDE.A.146 (c): Suggest shortening the length of required recording duration: “…at least the preceding 10 hours”. The intent of this amendment is to facilitate accident investigation with better flight data; however, 10 hours of data contains an excess of data for what would be relevant in an investigation since general aviation flights tend to have a duration of a few hours at most. There are also technical considerations when recording video images. The storage space required for 10 hours of high definition video could become unmanageably large. A shorter required recording duration would support better quality video recordings. response Accepted. The minimum recording duration is reduced to 5 hours. See the response to comment No 67. comment 70 comment by: Garmin International SPO.IDE.A.146 (d): Regarding the phrases “capable of moving under its own power” and “incapable of moving under its own power”: Since the equipment is recording aircraft data provided by avionics or other systems, beginning/ending equipment recording based on avionics power or other electrical bus may be more appropriate. response Not accepted. See the response to comment No 68. comment 74 comment by: Garmin International TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses SPO.IDE.A.146 (e): The combination of the terms “erasure function” and “modifies the recording” are in conflict. Suggest using language such as “hide”, “hidden”, or “protect” to reduce confusion of an “erasure function” that does not technically erase anything. Additionally, the phrase “erasure function shall be provided…” does not consider the situation where a normal recovery method may not usually be available such as an inaccessible device or a device without a viewing screen. response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 73. comment 87 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #83 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 83. comment 90 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #84 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 84. comment 93 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #85 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 85. comment 96 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Typo in numberings of sub-paragraph (a): second (2) should be (3). response Accepted. Thank you. SECTION 2 — SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters p. 16 comment 40 comment by: UK CAA TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Page No: 16 Paragraph No: SPO.IDE.H.146(a)(2) Comment: If retained and in the context of the section, it is suggested that the sentence is re-phrased to ensure clarity of the type of operations being conducted. Justification: Clarity of intent. Proposed Text: Amend (a)(2) to read: “(2) they are commercially operated conducting commercial operations; and” response Partially accepted. The text of (a)(2) is modified as follows: ‘(2) they are used for commercial operations’ comment 66 comment by: Garmin International SPO.IDE.H.146 (c): Suggest shortening the length of required recording duration: “…at least the preceding 10 hours”. The intent of this amendment is to facilitate accident investigation with better flight data; however, 10 hours of data contains an excess of data for what would be relevant in an investigation since general aviation flights tend to have a duration of a few hours at most. There are also technical considerations when recording video images. The storage space required for 10 hours of high definition video could become unmanageably large. A shorter required recording duration would support better quality video recordings. response Accepted. The minimum recording duration has been reduced to 5 hours when the flight recorder is installed on board a helicopter. See also reply to comment No 64. comment 88 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #83 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 83. comment 91 comment by: Airbus Helicopters TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Same as comment #84 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 84. comment 94 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #85 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 85. SECTION 2 — SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters p. 17 comment 71 comment by: Garmin International SPO.IDE.H.146 (d): Regarding the phrases “capable of moving under its own power” and “incapable of moving under its own power”: Since the equipment is recording aircraft data provided by avionics or other systems, beginning/ending equipment recording based on avionics power or other electrical bus may be more appropriate. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 68. comment 75 comment by: Garmin International SPO.IDE.H.146 (e): The combination of the terms “erasure function” and “modifies the recording” are in conflict. Suggest using language such as “hide”, “hidden”, or “protect” to reduce confusion of an “erasure function” that does not technically erase anything. Additionally, the phrase “erasure function shall be provided…” does not consider the situation where a normal recovery method may not usually be available such as an inaccessible device or a device without a viewing screen. response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 73. 3.2.1.3. Draft AMC & GM to Part-CAT (Annex IV) — SUBPART A — SECTION 1 — AMC1 p. 24 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 97 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Comment The new proposal is that, when no means are available for preflight check, the operator “should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours”. The previous recommended period was “seven calendar days of operation“. A justification is given in section 3.2.2.3.2 page 40, based on the observations that: ‘days of operation’ is not commonly used metrics, 150 flight hours correspond to more than 7 days of operation assuming the aircraft operates 21 hours a day, which may be the case for large aeroplanes. However, for light aircrafts, 150 flight hours may represent several months, possibly leading to ignore the malfunction of the recorders for a long period. Moreover, ‘days of operation’ is a relevant metrics in the operational domain. Recommendation We recommend going back to the initial text. In case proportionality is still sought for light aircraft, for example considering 2 weeks of operation instead of 1 week, we recommend specifying “at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or fourteen calendar days of operation, whichever comes first“. response Partially accepted. It is recognised that for a light aircraft which is operated only a few hours per day, the time interval between two operational checks might be longer than 7 days (in the case where no means for preflight checking the recorder for proper operation is installed). There are pro’s and con’s for using ‘flight hours’ instead of ‘days of operation’. In order to offer sufficient flexibility to the operator, the second sentence of point (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) has been changed as follows: ‘When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or seven calendar days of operation, whichever is considered more suitable by the operator.’ AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, p. 25 protection and use comment 112 comment by: European Cockpit Association GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) (e) The inspection of recorded images usually consists of the following: (1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable and in compliance with paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195, a sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses ECA's comment Only for CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 ECA's amendment e) recorded images are limited to CAT.IDE.A.191. The inspection of… response Partially accepted. The scope of point (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is the continued serviceability of flight recorders when they are required to be carried. The nature of the information to be recorded is out of the scope of point (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195. Hence it cannot be recommended in a GM to point (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 that images should only be recorded in certain cases. It should also be noted that published GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) does not refer to equipment requirements in section CAT.IDE of Part-CAT. However, point (d) of draft GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is modified for a more consistent wording with point (a) and point (c): ‘(d) When inspecting images recorded by a flight recorder, the operator needs to ensure compliance with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a). The inspection of such images usually consists of the following: (1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable, a sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.’ Point (d) of GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) is modified in the same manner as point (d) of the new GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b). AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, p. 25-26 protection and use comment 108 comment by: IATA IATA Comments AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA195(f)(3) Although image recording might bring useful information for accident investigations, the usage of image recordings for other purposes should be carefully considered by EASA. In commercial operations where Flight Data Monitoring programs are implemented for decades there is enough experience and practice to properly protect the information and the individuals, and the use of the most appropriate data sources for safety analysis and investigation. The facility of video usage might lead to misuse, over-usage, etc. by organizations not having the proper experience. This ease of access to video recordings might lead to negative effects in the implementation of Safety Management Systems. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. See reply to comment No 106. comment 113 comment by: European Cockpit Association AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) & AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) ECA's comment These sections must be consistent with the restriction that image recordings are only allowed for CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191. response Noted. The recording of images is not forbidden for other aircraft than those in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191. SUBPART D — SECTION 1 — AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light p. 28-29 aeroplanes comment 20 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association Please provide a clearer definition of what is considered a "lightweight" FDR. response Not accepted. Draft GM16 Annex I Definitions already provides an explanation of the terms ‘lightweight flight recorder’ and ‘crash-protected flight recorder’ (see section 3.2.1.1 of the NPA). comment 24 comment by: Embraer S.A. The Embraer believes there is no need to record the parameters "time" and "relative time count", concurrently. The parameters "time" and "relative time count" are related parameters and there is no need to record both of them. It is such that Appendix M to FAA 14 CFR Part 121; Appendix D and E to FAA 14 CFR Part 125; Appendix 8 to Annex 6 to ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation; and EASA AMC1.1 CAT.IDE.A.190 in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Annex IV Commercial air transport operations [Part-CAT] of Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012 on air operations require just one parameter and not both of them. The Embraer suggests the following text: SUBPART D SECTION 1 AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses (...) (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) relative time count, (...) (9) time, (10) ground speed, (11) positioning system: track (if available), (12) normal acceleration, (13) longitudinal acceleration, and (14) lateral acceleration." To: SUBPART D SECTION 1 AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes (...) (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) time or relative time count, (...) (9) ground speed, (10) positioning system: track (if available), (11) normal acceleration, (12) longitudinal acceleration, and (13) lateral acceleration." response Not accepted. In the case where flight parameters are obtained by the means of flight data (AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, point (b)), the parameter source will necessarily include a GNSS receiver (for latitude, longitude, etc.) which also offers a GNSS time indication. comment 76 comment by: Garmin International AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 (f): Overall it is not clear what type of equipment would satisfy the proposed amendment, from ED-155 recorders to any other peripheral equipment. The “operational performance requirements…” meeting ED-155/ED-112 restricts the Draft Regulation Annex 1 definition of “flight recorder”. The presence of this item within the AMC1 heading “Recording of flight parameters…” infers only the parameter performance specifications are required, which is already specified in (e). Referencing Operational Considerations in ED-155 (I-1.3.2, III-1.3.3, IV-1.3.2) may be more appropriate for this item. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Additionally, requiring equipment meet ED-155/ED-112 contradicts the alternative means listed in 7.6 Appendix F. Based on the language in CAT.IDE.A.191 (and others), it is assumed that these alternative means are acceptable provided they can meet the recommendations in section 7.6.3. Clarify what is intended by “operational performance requirements” or remove this item. response Not accepted. The term ‘operational performance requirement’ is already used in published AMC to flight recorder provisions and we are not aware of any issue with the interpretation of this term in the industry or among EASA Member States. See for example AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.185 (cockpit voice recorder), AMC1.1 CAT.IDE.A.190, AMC1.2 CAT.IDE.A.190, AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.190 (flight data recorder). In addition, the term ‘operational performance requirements’ was already used for flight recorders in section 2 of JAR-OPS 1 (see for example ACJ OPS 1.700, ACJ OPS 1.705/1.710, ACJ OPS 1.715): hence this term has been used in air operation requirements for at least 15 years and there is no need to clarify or change it. Point (f) of AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 clearly specifies that the operational performance requirements are applicable to the flight recorder and not just to the flight parameters. Some alternative solutions to a flight recorder were indeed reviewed by the rulemaking group and Appendix F of NPA 2017-03 presents a summary of this review. However, these alternative solutions showed limitations such that they could not be retained in the AMC. The recommendations in section 7.6.3 of Appendix F might be used to develop alternative means of compliance for CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191, i.e. others means to comply with CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 than those defined in the AMC. However, this is out of the scope of this rulemaking task. GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes p. 29 comment 41 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 29 Paragraph No: GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Comment: It is recommended that further information is added explaining that other parameters, as detailed in the relevant ED112A or ED155 standard, or equivalent, be recorded when the equipment is capable of doing so over and above the minimum set out in the AMC. This is equally valid for GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191, [and GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146 and GM1 SPO.IDE.H.146 if retained]. Justification: To promote the recording of wider parameters than the bare minimum when the equipment being used is capable. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses A sentence mentioning the table of parameters in ED-112 and ED-155 documents has been added in GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191, GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191, GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146, GM1 SPO.IDE.H.146: refer to reply to comment No 103. SECTION 2 — AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters p. 29-30 comment 42 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 29/30 Paragraph No: AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Comment: It is strongly recommended that the helicopter main rotor speed be recorded in both section (b) and (c) parameters. Justification: Helicopter main rotor speed is essential information when determining the flight profile of the helicopter. response Partially accepted. The main rotor speed will not be added to the parameters listed in point (b) of AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191. This is because these parameters were selected so that they can be obtained by means of standalone sensors (e.g. accelerometric sensor or GNSS receiver). This principle was established in order to limit the cost impact of the recorder installation (refer to NPA 2017-03, subsection 3.2.2.3.1. Since the main rotor speed cannot be obtained by means of a standalone sensor, it should not appear in point (b). However, FAR Part 27 and CS-27 require the rpm of the main rotor to be displayed by a tachometer (refer to 27.1305, point (k)). Therefore it has been added to the list of flight parameters in point (c) of AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 and AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146. In addition, since an indication of propulsive thrust or power is required to be installed according to FAR Part 23 and CS-23, and this whatever the type of engine, the following parameter is added to point (c) of AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 and AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146: ‘tachometer indication or equivalent indication of propulsive thrust or power’. comment 43 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 30 Paragraph No: AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191(c) Comment: This text appears to have been copied from the aeroplane section but has not been adapted to helicopters. Justification: Editorial. Proposed Text: Amend to as follows: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses “(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane helicopter is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight:” response Accepted. Thank you. comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department (Transportstyrelsen, 61 Luftfartsavdelningen) Change to "helicopter" in AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 (c) instead of aeroplane. response Accepted. Thank you. comment 77 comment by: Garmin International AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 (f): Overall it is not clear what type of equipment would satisfy the proposed amendment, from ED-155 recorders to any other peripheral equipment. The “operational performance requirements…” meeting ED-155/ED-112 restricts the Draft Regulation Annex 1 definition of “flight recorder”. The presence of this item within the AMC1 heading “Recording of flight parameters…” infers only the parameter performance specifications are required, which is already specified in (e). Referencing Operational Considerations in ED-155 (I-1.3.2, III-1.3.3, IV-1.3.2) may be more appropriate for this item. Additionally, requiring equipment meet ED-155/ED-112 contradicts the alternative means listed in 7.6 Appendix F. Based on the language in CAT.IDE.A.191 (and others), it is assumed that these alternative means are acceptable provided they can meet the recommendations in section 7.6.3. Clarify what is intended by “operational performance requirements” or remove this item. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 76. comment 98 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Typo in item (c): the word “aeroplane” should be replaced by “helicopter” or “aircraft”. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Thank you. 3.2.1.4. Draft AMC & GM to Part-SPO (Annex VIII) — AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight p. 31-32 recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use comment 38 ❖ comment by: UK CAA Page No: 14 and 31 Paragraph No: 3.1.1.3 and 3.2.1.4 Comment: In view of UK CAA proposed Options A.3A and A.4A, delete all references to Part- SPO. Justification: Proportionality and balance of benefits. response Not accepted. Duplicated comment. See reply to comment No 33. comment 99 comment by: Airbus Helicopters Same as comment #97 response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 97. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, p. 32 protection and use comment 100 comment by: Airbus Helicopters “AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)” is an incorrect reference and should be replaced by “AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)“ response Accepted. Thank you. SUBPART D — SECTION 1 — AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 Recording of flight parameters on light p. 34-35 aeroplanes comment 79 comment by: Garmin International AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 (f): TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Overall it is not clear what type of equipment would satisfy the proposed amendment, from ED-155 recorders to any other peripheral equipment. The “operational performance requirements…” meeting ED-155/ED-112 restricts the Draft Regulation Annex 1 definition of “flight recorder”. The presence of this item within the AMC1 heading “Recording of flight parameters…” infers only the parameter performance specifications are required, which is already specified in (e). Referencing Operational Considerations in ED-155 (I-1.3.2, III-1.3.3, IV-1.3.2) may be more appropriate for this item. Additionally, requiring equipment meet ED-155/ED-112 contradicts the alternative means listed in 7.6 Appendix F. Based on the language in CAT.IDE.A.191 (and others), it is assumed that these alternative means are acceptable provided they can meet the recommendations in section 7.6.3. Clarify what is intended by “operational performance requirements” or remove this item. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 76. SECTION 2 — AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters p. 35-37 comment 44 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 35/36 Paragraph No: AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Comment: If retained, it is strongly recommended that the helicopter main rotor speed be specifically recorded in both section (b) and (c) parameters. Justification: Helicopter main rotor speed is essential information when determining the flight profile of the helicopter. response Partially accepted. See reply to comment No 42. comment 45 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 36 Paragraph No: AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146(c) Comment: This text appears to have been copied from the aeroplane section and, if retained, should be adapted for helicopters. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Justification: Editorial. Proposed Text: Amend as follows: “(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane helicopter is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight: response Accepted. Thank you. comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department (Transportstyrelsen, 62 Luftfartsavdelningen) Change to "helicopter" in AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 (c) instead of aeroplane. response Accepted. Thank you. comment 78 comment by: Garmin International AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 (f): Overall it is not clear what type of equipment would satisfy the proposed amendment, from ED-155 recorders to any other peripheral equipment. The “operational performance requirements…” meeting ED-155/ED-112 restricts the Draft Regulation Annex 1 definition of “flight recorder”. The presence of this item within the AMC1 heading “Recording of flight parameters…” infers only the parameter performance specifications are required, which is already specified in (e). Referencing Operational Considerations in ED-155 (I-1.3.2, III-1.3.3, IV-1.3.2) may be more appropriate for this item. Additionally, requiring equipment meet ED-155/ED-112 contradicts the alternative means listed in 7.6 Appendix F. Based on the language in CAT.IDE.A.191 (and others), it is assumed that these alternative means are acceptable provided they can meet the recommendations in section 7.6.3. Clarify what is intended by “operational performance requirements” or remove this item. response Not accepted. See the reply to comment No 76. 4.1. What is the issue p. 44-49 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 13 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 4.1.1.1. The need for investigation page 44/178 Remark "Since 2010 almost all accidents..." is stated. Earlier, under 2.1. Why we need to change the rules, page 5/178, we find "Since 2010 accidents and serious incidents....". What is correct? response Noted. Chapter 2 of the NPA contains a summary of the issue and the proposals, as its title indicate. Therefore, some statements were simplified for this chapter, and in particular the statement in the first sentence of 2.1. Chapter 4 contains a deeper analysis of the issue and of the impact of options. Hence the statement in section 4.1.1.1 is the correct one. In particular, some accidents and serious incidents are outside of the scope of Regulation (EU) 996/2010, such as State flights, flights performed with historic aircraft, non-commercial flights performed with amateur-built aircraft, etc. 4.1.2. Safety risk assessment p. 50-61 comment 46 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 52 Paragraph No: Text below 4. Comment: This paragraph states: “When applying the proportionality across categories of aircraft and types of operations the following approach is proposed: · The target level of equipment should be higher for commercial operations and lower for non-commercial.” For CAT this may be justifiable and aligns with ICAO Annex 6, but sufficient justification has not been presented to include commercial SPO. Therefore the presumption that light aeroplanes and helicopters for such operations be fitted with FRs is not proven. Justification: Proportionate evidence has not been provided to include commercial SPO in the proposed regulations. The Impact Assessment does not adequately substantiate the safety need or benefit for extending the requirement beyond CAT light aeroplanes and helicopters. response Not accepted. See reply to comment No 33. comment 47 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 57/58 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Paragraph No: Last bullet of 1 Comment: This paragraph summarises the perceived benefit of recordings against noted corrective actions. The information, as presented, does not appear to provide strong evidence of the safety benefits to support any change to the regulations. However, in Annex E under 7.5.3.2 and 7.5.5.2 the note below is shown: “Note: There is no obligation (or even guidance) to specify, when writing an investigation report, whether the information obtained from a recording was useful to establish a given corrective action. In addition, corrective actions generally relate to several significant events and factors that are established based on the analysis of several sources of data. It is then difficult to assess a posteriori the contribution of a given recording to the identification of corrective action.” This is an important point and one which should be developed more comprehensively to contextualise the findings and explain the limitations of analysing such accident reports especially as the style and nature of such reporting across Europe has had wide variation and depth. Further justification for any change, particularly with regard to the inclusion of commercial SPO, should then be made to substantiate any decisions. Justification: Clear and substantiated argument for justifying the change to the regulations and the preferred options. response Noted. The content of section 4.1.2.4 of NPA 2017-03 (Assessing the safety risk) and of Appendix E should be considered in their totality. Section 4.1.2.4 explains why studies of batches of investigation reports were the preferred approach. The rulemaking group was aware of the differences in ‘style and nature’ among authors of the safety investigation reports, and therefore the four studies presented in Appendix E went well beyond searching statements in the reports regarding the usefulness of in-flight recordings to identify corrective actions. Each investigation report reviewed in Study 1 was screened through 20 questions (presented in table E.1 of Appendix E), each investigation report reviewed in Study 2 was screened through 15 questions (presented in table E.3. See also table E.7 for Study 3 and table E.9 for Study 4). Hence the considerations reflected in the note of sections 7.5.3.2 and 7.5.5.2 were taken into account in the development of the studies’ questions and the analysis of studies’ results. 4.1.4. How could the issue/problem evolve p. 62-63 comment 48 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 63 Paragraph No: 2, beginning ‘One should also not rely …’ Comment: There would be significant benefit if a way could be found, and specifications developed, that would enable accident investigators to retrieve data from cameras, GNSS TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses devices, smartphones etc. and EASA/MS CA’s should engage with manufacturers to seek to find a equitable solution. This should be promoted. Justification: More proportionate and wider availability of recorded information useful to accident investigations or operator use. In GA there is a greater chance of one of these facilities being used on-board an aircraft during flight. response Noted. More and more the portable electronic devices (PEDs) used in general aviation are devices designed for the general public (e.g. smartphone, tablet, action camera) and not specifically for aviation purposes. Although we sympathise with the intent of this comment, the Agency has little leverage to bring these manufacturers to upgrade their equipment so that data can be more easily retrieved after an accident. However, safety promotion of in-flight recording toward light aircraft users is part of the retained option in the impact assessment. 4.3. How it could be achieved — options — 4.3.1. Requiring, facilitating or promoting p. 64-65 comment 49 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 64 Paragraph No: 4.3.1.1. Comment: The ability for a voluntary installation of FR equipment to be conducted under CS- STAN is fully supported. Justification: Proportionality. response Noted. Thank you. comment 50 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 64 Paragraph No: 4.3.1.2. Comment: The establishment and promotion of the benefits of FR equipment for all operators is fully supported. Justification: Improvement in safety and better understanding of the cost effective use of aircraft. response Noted. Thank you. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses 4.5. What are the impacts — 4.5.1. Safety impact p. 70-75 comment 51 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 70/71 Paragraph No: Option A.1 Comment: This option recognises the limiting factors of promoting in-flight recording and suggests a “fit and forget” approach should be possible which is supported. This proposal has reached a slightly positive impact which seems appropriate. Justification: Proportionate/better regulation principles response Noted. Thank you. comment 52 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 72 Paragraph No: Last bullet on page Comment: There appears to be an error in the Annex 6 Part III references in the final sentence which may have been copied from the earlier bullet related to aeroplanes. Justification: Accuracy Proposed Text: Amend “6.3.1.2.1” in final sentence to read ‘4.3.1.2.4’. response Noted. Thank you. comment 53 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 73 Paragraph No: Option A.3 Comment: The scale used for ranking the impacts is given as -5 to +5 but there is no indication of the percentage of an issue that would represent a very positive/negative impact. Whilst the suggestion is that 16% more aeroplane accidents would be captured if this option had been implemented, based on a scale of -5 to +5 it is not clearly explained how 16% can be considered to be ‘slightly to medium positive’. Justification: If not fully justified this would tend to support the promotion and voluntary installation of FR rather than mandatory installation. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. As explained in section 4.4.1 of NPA 2017-03, the methodology applied for the impact assessment is the multi-criteria analysis (MCA). MCA ‘applies cost-benefit thinking to cases where there is a need to present impacts that are a mixture of qualitative, quantitative, and monetary data, and where there are varying degrees of certainty’. The applied scale, from very negative (-5) to very positive (+5) is also presented in section 4.4.1. With regard to options proposing a requirement (options A.4, A.3 for aeroplanes and helicopters, option B.2 for balloons), the criterion for assessing their potential safety impact was based on assessing the proportion of historical accident investigations where the involved aircraft would have been equipped with in-flight recording equipment if the proposed requirement had already been in force. When the aircraft was from a model in the scope of the proposed requirement:  in 2% or less of historical accidents (1 out of 50 or less), the safety impact was considered negligible  in about 10% of historical accidents (1 out of 10), the safety impact was considered slightly positive  in about 25% of historical accidents or more (1 out of 4 or more), the safety impact was considered medium positive  for values in between these thresholds, a range of safety impact assessment was proposed, e.g. ‘slightly to medium positive’ when the proportion was found to be 16%. Note: as explained in section 4.1.2.4 of NPA 2017-03, ‘equipping all light aircraft registered in Europe and within the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0271 with in-flight recording equipment would actually result in just a moderate reduction of the number of fatal accidents per year.’ Therefore, the safety impact of options proposing an in-flight recording requirement was capped at ‘medium positive’ (see conclusion of 4.1.2.4 on page 60 of the NPA). 4.5.3. Social impact p. 76-78 comment 54 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 76 Paragraph No: 4.5.3 Option A.0 Comment: There is no assessment on the social impact yet the expectation is that it will be, and therefore is, neutral. Justification: There should be an assessment and a conclusion. response Noted. Justification of the social impact of Option A.0 is not provided in NPA 2017-03, because option A.0 is the baseline option (‘do nothing’) for light aeroplanes and light helicopters, and therefore it was considered that the impact of this option on considered aspects is neutral by TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses default. For the safety impact of Option A.0, a non-neutral impact was assumed and therefore justification was provided in this case (see section 4.5.1). 4.5.4. Economic impact p. 78-86 comment 55 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 78 Paragraph No: 4.5.4 Option A.0 Comment: There is no assessment on the economic impact yet the expectation is that it will be, and therefore is, neutral. Justification: There should be an assessment and a conclusion response Noted. See reply to comment No 54. comment 56 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 78/79 Paragraph No: 4.5.4 Economic Impact Option A.1 Comment: This section states that “in only half of the cases where test and research were performed would a limited set of flight parameters ( …) be sufficient to avoid performing test and research”. In other words, this says that in ‘only half’ i.e. 50% of cases it would avoid the need for test and research and this only results in a ‘slightly positive’ expectation, yet under the safety impact assessment a result of 16% produced a ‘slightly to medium positive’ conclusion. Justification: More information on the percentages associated with the scale used is needed to ensure consistent application. response Noted. This comment partially quotes a sentence in section 4.5.4 of NPA 2017-03. The whole sentence is: ‘Study 1 also showed that test and research are performed in about a quarter of the investigations of light aircraft accidents, and in only half of the cases where test and research were performed would a limited set of flight parameters (such as those recorded by a lightweight flight recorder) be sufficient to avoid performing test and research.’ The logical conclusion is that in ½ × ¼ =⅛ (about 13%) of investigations, Option A.1 would make a difference with regard to test and research activities when considering light aircraft accident investigations (and assuming that all operators and owners in the scope of Option A.1 voluntarily equip their aircraft with in-flight recording equipment). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses In addition, the economic impact of Option A.1 on investigation authorities was determined to be ‘slightly positive’ because the main benefit for them would be to ‘accelerate the investigations, in particular by saving on test and research’ (see section 4.5.4). In other terms, Option A.1 would save human resource and money for a moderate proportion (about 13%) of investigations of light aircraft accidents. Option A.1 would not have any effect on investigations of large aircraft accidents, which mobilise a large proportion of the resources of a safety investigation authority. With these considerations, it is rather appropriate to rate the economic impact of Option A.1 slightly positive for the investigation authorities. comment 57 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 81/82 Paragraph No: Table 11 Comment: As it remains unknown whether the installation of FR equipment will require a major mod, a minor mod or can be done as a standard change, the economic impact remains unknown and may potentially be significant. The summary in Table 13A indicates that whilst there is a slightly positive impact for (+1) for Authorities, there is a greater negative impact on industry. As the reduction in fatalities is estimated to be moderate and the anticipated increase in the number of accidents captured is only 16%, this would support the promotion of voluntary installation especially for commercial SPO. Justification: Proportionality response Not accepted. According to table 11 in section 4.5.4 of NPA 2017-03, the total cost per individual aircraft of Option A.2 and A.3 could be up to about 25 000 Euros in the worst case considered by NPA 2017-03 (STC required and aircraft model produced in small series). However, as shown in table 11, if only a minor change is required or if the aircraft model is produced in larger series, the total cost per individual aircraft would significantly decrease. It should also be noted that Issue 2 of the certification specifications for standard changes and repairs (CS-STAN) was issued since the publication of the NPA. This CS-STAN includes in Subpart B (Standard Changes) a new paragraph CS-SC104a — Installation of lightweight in- flight recording systems. All non-complex aeroplanes and non-complex helicopters are eligible to CS-SC104a. This means in practice that CS-SC104a can be used for most aeroplane and helicopter models in the scope of Option A.3, because these models are not considered complex. See also reply to comment No 33. 4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues p. 87-89 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 64 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses comment 16 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 4.5.5.1. Impact of the options for aeroplanes and helicopters page 87/178 Option A.2 Remark According to information available to us the MCTOM of the Pilatus PC-6 Porter is 2800 kg, the MCTOM of this aircraft therefore is not less than 2250 kg. (The MCTOM of the other aircraft we did not check.) response Noted. The maximum take-off weight of the PC-6 is indeed 2 800 kg. Thank you. comment 58 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 87 Paragraph No: 4.5.5.1 Option A:3 Comment: This imposes a significant financial burden on CAT and particularly commercial SPO operators using ‘light aircraft’. It is difficult to see how the impact of this can be considered to be neutral. Justification: Capturing aircraft that may be used for commercial SPO and requiring them to meet the same requirements as for CAT is not warranted. The adoption of the proposed Options A.3A and A.4A are strongly promoted. response Noted. See reply to comment No 33. 4.5.6. Impact on better regulation and harmonisation p. 89-93 comment 59 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 91 Paragraph No: 4.5.6.1 Option A.3 Comment: The impact of option A.3 is stated to be slightly positive as it introduces less complexity into the regulations for aeroplanes. However, the overall impact might be better addressed as ‘neutral’ when considering harmonisation with ICAO and the other effects. Proposed Option A.3A supports a more proportionate approach. Justification: The Impact Assessment should accurately reflect the current situation and the effects of the proposed changes in a proportionate way. response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 65 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses The harmonisation with ICAO standards is already considered in section 4.5.6.1 of NPA 2017- 03, in particular for Option A.3, and the scope of 4.5.6 is broader than alignment with ICAO Annexes: it encompasses aspects such as simplification of the rules, side-effect on other (non- aviation) Union legislation, harmonisation with the requirements of third countries, etc. It is agreed that the scope of section of 4.5.6 may not be obvious for a reader. This comment has been shared internally with a view to improve the template for regulatory impact assessment. 7.4. Appendix D: Promoting the benefits of in-flight recording for light aircraft p. 126-132 comment 21 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association reference 7.4.2.1. Flight parameters: Replace with: "Flight parameters or data-link messaged recorded by a flight recorder shall only be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or in an incident that is subject mandatory reporting if such records are: Used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes; or In a manner that promotes aviation safety If recorded data is used for commercial use, the use of such records shall be: De-identified; or Disclosed under secure procedures; or Require the explicit permission from the owner/operator." This would enable an operator to volunteer to provide the data, which isn’t clearly allowed under the proposed language. response Not accepted. Section 7.4.2.1 quotes point (f)(2) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195. The quote of a regulation is not to be distorted. 7.6. Appendix F: Alternatives to dedicated in-flight recording equipment p. 147-161 comment 14 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 7.6.2.1. Aeroplanes and helicopters page 148/179 Question You state "...and their manufacturers usually provide little assistance to investigation authorities. What could the Agency do to change this, what could we as users do to improve the situation? response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 66 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses The Agency has little leverage in this respect: see reply to comment No 48. 7.8. Appendix H: General principles of the safety risk assessment p. 171-174 comment 15 comment by: René Meier, Europe Air Sports 7.8.2. Special considerations related to general aviation page 173/178 1 Control of the risk Remark Many thanks for this statement about the justified high autonomy to be granted to a pilot-in- command. response Noted. Thank you. 7.10. Appendix J: Examples of in-flight recording systems p. 178 comment 17 comment by: EASAPUBLIC test response Noted. comment 19 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association The examples for Appareo GAU 3000 and Vision 1000 currently don't meet the ED-155 standard; therefore why have they been included in this list? Are they included as they will meet a later equivalent standard. Please clarify. response Noted. Examples of in-flight recording systems provided in section 7.10 of NPA 2017-03 are provided only to illustrate that such systems may already be purchased. They were not checked against compliance with ED-155. Flight recording systems which are fully compliant with ED-155 are expected to have a TSO-C197 approval an ETSO-2C197 approval or an equivalent approval. At this stage, only one flight recorder model is known to the Agency to have such approval, however certification projects are on-going. comment 101 comment by: Airbus Helicopters For information, MDU 379 from Flight Data Vision is not an in-flight recording systems but a ground device for real-time reading and equipment downloading. response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 67 of 68 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-03 2. Individual comments and responses Thank you. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 68 of 68 An agency of the European Union Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 Draft Annex X to draft Decision 201X/XXX/R Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: 1. deleted text is struck through; 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Page 1 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII GM16 Annex I Definitions FLIGHT RECORDER A flight recorder may be crash-protected or lightweight. Crash-protected flight recorders are capable of withstanding very severe crash conditions such as those encountered during some accidents of large aeroplanes and large helicopters. Crash protected flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: a flight data recorder (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), an airborne image recorder (AIR), or a data link recorder (DLR). Lightweight flight recorders are usually designed to meet less demanding crash-protection requirements, which allows them to be lighter. ANNEX III ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS [PART-ORO] SUBPART AOC AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATION AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes (...) (l) Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data should range from an already installed full quick access recorder (QAR), in a modern aircraft with digital systems, to a basic crash-protected flight recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft. (...) AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general CONTENTS — CAT OPERATIONS (...) 11 HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES AND USING THE CVR RECORDING (...) (g) Procedures for the preservation of recordings of the flight recorders following an accident or a serious incident or when so directed by the investigating authority. These procedures should include: (1) a full quotation of point (a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a); and Page 2 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) instructions and means to prevent inadvertent reactivation, repair or reinstallation of the flight recorders by personnel of the operator or of third parties, and to ensure that flight recorder recordings are preserved for the needs of the investigating authority. ANNEX IV COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS [PART-CAT] SUBPART A GENERAL REQUIREMENTS SECTION 1 Motor-powered aircraft AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried: (…) (c) The operator should perform, at time intervals not exceeding 2 years, an inspection of the recording of flight recorders other than an FDR, which are carried on an aircraft in order to ensure compliance with CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191; (dc) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day on each day when the aircraft is operated. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or seven calendar days of operation, whichever is considered more suitable by the operator. (ed) (...) GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDINGS (a) The inspection of recorded flight data the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. Page 3 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters — this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range — for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) (only applicable to an FDR) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable, a sample of in-flight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (c) (…) (d) When inspecting images recorded by a flight recorder, precautions need to be taken to comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a). The inspection of such images usually consists of the following: (1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining a sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. Page 4 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF AUDIO CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure related to the handling of audio recordings from flight recorders cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a document which should be documented and signed by all parties (airline management aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/6791 and as a minimum, define: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to audio recordings from flight recorders and identified transcripts thereof CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts to specifically authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to be taken to ensure the security of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and CVR transcripts and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which such audio CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts are destroyed; (4) a description of the uses made of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts; (5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings or their transcripts; (6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and (7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern. (b) Each time an audio recording file from flight recorders a CVR recording file is read out under the conditions defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1): (1) parts of the CVR recording file that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and (2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide to the competent authority: (i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording; and (ii) evidence that the persons concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording file. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). Page 5 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts, as well as the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of audio recordings from flight recorders CVR recordings, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The CVR is primarily a tool for the investigation of accidents and serious incidents by investigating authorities. Misuse of CVR recordings is a breach of the right to privacy and it works against an effective safety culture inside the operator. (b) It is noteworthy that the flight data recorder (FDR) may be used for a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme; however, in that case the principles of confidentiality and access restriction of the FDM programme apply to the FDR recordings. Because the CVR is recording the voices of the crew and verbal communications with a privacy content, the CVR recordings must be protected and handled with even more care than FDM data. (c) Therefore, the use of a CVR recording, when for purposes other than CVR serviceability or those laid down by Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, should be subject to the free prior consent of the persons concerned, and framed by a procedure that is endorsed by all parties and that protects the privacy of crew members and (if applicable) maintenance staff. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR RECORDING INSPECTION OF AUDIO RECORDING FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When an inspection of the audio recording from a flight recorder the CVR recording is performed for ensuring audio quality and intelligibility of recorded communications: (1) the privacy of the audio CVR recording should be ensured (e.g. by locating the CVR replay equipment in a separated area and/or using headsets); (2) access to the CVR replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons; (3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the CVR recording medium, the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof; (4) the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than two months and not later than one year after completion of the CVR recording inspection, except that audio samples with no privacy content may be retained for enhancing the CVR recording inspection (e.g. for comparing audio quality); Page 6 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (5) only the accountable manager of the operator, and when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the audio CVR recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the audio CVR recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF IMAGE RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure laid down in point (f)(3)(i) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 should be documented and signed by all parties involved (aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image recordings and their protection from misuse; (4) a description of the uses made of the image recordings; (5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of the image recordings; (6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and (7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern. (b) Each time a recording file containing images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes other than ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, the operator should retain, and when requested, provide the competent authority with: (1) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the recording files; and (2) evidence that the crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the flight crew compartment images. (c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of the recordings of flight crew compartment images, as well as the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of recordings of flight crew compartment images, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). Page 7 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use IMAGE RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these images, then: (1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a separated area); (2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to authorised persons; (3) provisions should be made for the secure storage of the image recording medium, the image recording files and copies thereof; (4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and not later than 1 year after completion of the image recording inspection; images that do not contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing the image recording inspection (e.g. for comparing image quality); and (5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the ‘flight crew compartment’ in point (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 should be understood as the area including: (a) the flight crew seats; (b) aircraft and engine controls; (c) aircraft instruments; (d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty station; and (e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station. SUBPART D INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT Page 8 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 SECTION 1 Aeroplanes AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Lightweight flight recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof. (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) pitch attitude or pitch rate, (2) roll attitude or roll rate, (3) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate, (4) latitude, (5) longitude, (6) positioning system: estimated error (if available), (7) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system, (8) time, (10) ground speed, (11) positioning system: track (if available), (12) normal acceleration, (13) longitudinal acceleration, and (14) lateral acceleration. (c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight: (1) magnetic heading, (2) time, (3) pressure altitude, (4) indicated airspeed, (5) vertical speed, (6) turn and slip, (7) attitude, (8) Mach number (if displayed), and (9) stabilised heading, and Page 9 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (10) tachometer indication or equivalent indication of propulsive thrust or power. (d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be recorded as flight data or by means of images. (e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read- out) as defined in the relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA. (f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash- protected flight recorders. GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Lightweight flight recorder ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION (a) Experience has shown the usefulness, for analysing incidents and for training purposes, of recording additional information. In particular, audio of the flight crew compartment, additional instrument indications (such as position of flight controls, position of engine controls, fuel and oil indications, aircraft configuration selection), and an external view are very useful for such purposes. To capture such information, simple equipment such as an integrated microphone and integrated camera can be sufficient. (b) If the flight recorder includes optional capabilities such as described in (a), their recording duration is recommended to be at least 2 hours for maximum usefulness. (c) If the flight recorder is capable of acquiring flight parameters from some aircraft system, it is advised to give priority to the flight parameters listed in Annex II-B of ED-155 or the flight parameters listed in Annex II-A of ED-112. Indeed, these flight parameters were selected based on their relevance in many safety investigations. GM2 CAT.IDE.A.191 Lightweight flight recorder INSTALLATION OF CAMERAS It is advised, when practicable, to install any camera so that it does not capture images of head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position, in order to avoid identification of persons. Page 10 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM3 CAT.IDE.A.191 Lightweight flight recorder RECORDING ACCURACY OF ATTITUDE RATE PARAMETERS In the case of attitude rate parameters (pitch rate parameter, yaw rate parameter, roll rate parameter), the accuracy limit specified in EUROCAE Document 155 dated July 2009 was found to be unclear. Therefore the following additional guidance is provided: (a) If the attitude rate parameter is provided by an approved system of the aeroplane, accuracy greater than as provided by this system is not expected for this attitude rate parameter. (b) If the attitude rate parameter is provided by a dedicated gyroscope, it is advisable that the gyroscope meets the following performance: (1) errors due to linear accelerations less than ±3°/sec (equivalent to ±1% of 300°/sec recording range) for all combinations of parameter values and linear acceleration values in the respective ranges [-300°/sec; +300°/sec] and [-3g; +6g]; (2) errors due to temperature less than ±5°/sec for all combinations of parameter values and temperature values in the respective ranges [-300°/sec; +300°/sec] and [-40°C; +85°C]; (3) angular random walk of the gyroscope equal to or less than 2°/sqrt(hour); and (4) bias stability of the gyroscope significantly less than 360°/hour (for instance, 50°/hour). GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191(e) Lightweight flight recorder FUNCTION TO MODIFY THE RECORDINGS OF IMAGES AND AUDIO The purpose of the function modifying the image recordings and audio recordings is to allow the flight crew to protect their privacy by making the recording of images and audio inaccessible using normal techniques. The activation of this function is subject to the commander’s approval (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.105). However, the equipment manufacturer or a safety investigation authority might still be able to retrieve the recorded data using special techniques. SECTION 2 Helicopters AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Lightweight flight recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof. (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) relative time count, (2) pitch attitude or pitch rate, (3) roll attitude or roll rate, (4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate, (5) latitude, (6) longitude, Page 11 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (7) positioning system: estimated error (if available), (8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system, (9) time, (10) ground speed, (11) positioning system: track (if available), (12) normal acceleration, (13) longitudinal acceleration, and (14) lateral acceleration. (c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the helicopter is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight: (1) magnetic or true heading, (2) time (if presented on the front instrument panel), (3) pressure altitude, (4) indicated airspeed, (5) vertical speed, (6) slip, (7) outside air temperature, (8) attitude (if displayed), and (9) stabilised heading (if displayed), and (10) main rotor speed. (d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be recorded as flight data or by means of images. (e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read- out) as defined in the relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA. (f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash- protected flight recorders. Page 12 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Lightweight flight recorder ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION Refer to GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191. GM2 CAT.IDE.H.191 Lightweight flight recorder INSTALLATION OF CAMERAS Refer to GM2 CAT.IDE.A.191. GM3 CAT.IDE.H.191 Lightweight flight recorder RECORDING ACCURACY OF ATTITUDE RATE PARAMETERS Refer to GM3 CAT.IDE.A.191. GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191(e) Lightweight flight recorder FUNCTION TO MODIFY THE RECORDINGS OF IMAGES AND AUDIO Refer to GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191(e). ANNEX VI NON-COMMERCIAL AIR OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT [PART-NCC] SUBPART A GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried: (…) (c) The operator should perform, at time intervals not exceeding 2 years, an inspection of the recording of flight recorders other than an FDR, which are carried on an aircraft in order to ensure compliance with CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191; (dc) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day on each day when the aircraft is operated. When no such Page 13 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or seven calendar days of operation, whichever is considered more suitable by the operator. (ed) (…) GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDING (a) The inspection of recorded flight data the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters – this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range – for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) (only applicable to an FDR) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with NCC.GEN.145(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable, a sample of in-flight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (c) (…) (d) When inspecting images recorded by a flight recorder, precautions need to be taken to comply with NCC.GEN.145(f)(3a). The inspection of such images usually consists of the following: Page 14 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining a sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF AUDIO CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure related to the handling of audio recordings from flight recorders cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a document which should be signed documented and signed by all parties (aircraft operator, crew members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/6792 and, as a minimum, define: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to audio recordings from flight recorders and identified transcripts thereof CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts to specifically authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to be taken to ensure the security of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and CVR transcripts and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which such audio CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts are destroyed; and (4) a description of the uses made of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts.; (5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof; (6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and (7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern. (b) Each time an audio recording file from flight recorders a CVR recording file is read out under the conditions defined by NCC.GEN.145(f)(1): (1) parts of the CVR recording file that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). Page 15 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide to the competent authority: (i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording; and (ii) evidence that the persons concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording file. (c) The person who fulfils the role of a safety manager should be responsible for the protection and use of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of audio recordings from flight recorders CVR recordings, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). GM1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The CVR is primarily a tool for the investigation of accidents and serious incidents by investigating authorities. Misuse of CVR recordings is a breach of the right to privacy and it works against an effective safety culture inside the operator. (b) Therefore, the use of a CVR recording, when for purposes other than CVR serviceability or those laid down by Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, should be subject to the free prior consent of the persons concerned, and framed by a procedure that is endorsed by all parties and that protects the privacy of crew members and (if applicable) maintenance staff. AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR RECORDING INSPECTION OF AUDIO RECORDING FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When an inspection of the audio recording from a flight recorder the CVR recording is performed for ensuring audio quality and intelligibility of recorded communications: (1) the privacy of the audio CVR recording should be ensured (e.g. by locating the CVR replay equipment in a separated area and/or using headsets); (2) access to the CVR replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons; (3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the CVR recording medium, the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof; (4) the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than two months and not later than one year after completion of the CVR recording inspection, except that audio samples with no privacy content may be retained for enhancing the CVR recording inspection (e.g. for comparing audio quality); Page 16 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (5) only the accountable manager of the operator, and when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the person fulfilling the role ofsafety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the audio CVR recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the audio CVR recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF IMAGE RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure laid down in point (f)(3)(i) of NCC.GEN.145 should be documented and signed by all parties involved (aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image recordings and their protection from misuse; (4) a description of the uses made of the image recordings; (5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of the image recordings; (6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and (7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern. (b) Each time a recording file containing images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes other than ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, the operator should retain, and when requested, provide the competent authority with: (1) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the recording file; and (2) evidence that the crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the flight crew compartment images. (c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of the recordings of flight crew compartment images, as well as the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of recordings of flight crew compartment images, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). Page 17 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use IMAGE RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these images, then: (1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a separated area); (2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to authorised persons; (3) provisions should be made for the secure storage of the image recording medium, the image recording files and copies thereof; (4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and not later than 1 year after completion of the image recording inspection; images that do not contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing the image recording inspection (e.g. for comparing image quality); and (5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. GM1 NCC.GEN.145(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the ‘flight crew compartment’ in point (f) of NCC.GEN.145 should be understood as the area including: (a) the flight crew seats; (b) aircraft and engine controls; (c) aircraft instruments; (d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty station; and (e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station. Page 18 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX VIII SPECIALISED OPERATIONS [Part-SPO] SUBPART A GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried: (…) (c) The operator should perform at time intervals not exceeding 2 years, an inspection of the recording of flight recorders other than an FDR, which are carried on an aircraft in order to ensure compliance with SPO.IDE.A.146 or SPO.IDE.H.146. (dc) When installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day on each day when the aircraft is operated. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or seven calendar days of operation, whichever is considered more suitable by the operator. (ed) (...) GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDINGS (a) The inspection of the recorded flight data FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters. This could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range. For this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and Page 19 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (ii) (only applicable to an FDR) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with SPO.GEN.145(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable, a sample of in-flight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (c) (...) (d) When inspecting images recorded by a flight recorder, precautions need to be taken to comply with SPO.GEN.145(f)(3a). The inspection of such images usually consists of the following: (1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining a sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF AUDIO CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure related to the handling of audio recordings from flight recorders cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a document which should be documented and signed by all parties (aircraft operator, crew members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; Page 20 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to audio recordings from flight recorders and identified transcripts thereof CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts to specifically authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to be taken to ensure the security of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and CVR transcripts and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which such audio CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts are destroyed; and (4) a description of the uses made of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts.; (5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof; (6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and (7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern. (b) Each time an audio recording file from flight recorders a CVR recording file is read out under the conditions defined by SPO.GEN.145(f)(1): (1) parts of the CVR recording file that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and (2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide to the competent authority: (i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording; and (ii) evidence that the persons concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording file. (c) The person who fulfils the role of a safety manager should be responsible for the protection and use of audio recordings from flight recorders and transcripts thereof the CVR recordings and of their transcripts. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of audio recordings from flight recorders CVR recordings, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). AMC12 SPO.GEN.145(f)(1a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR RECORDING INSPECTION OF AUDIO RECORDING FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When an inspection of the audio recording from a flight recorder the CVR recording is performed for ensuring audio quality and intelligibility of recorded communications: (1) the privacy of the audio CVR recording should be ensured (e.g. by locating the CVR replay equipment in a separated area and/or using headsets); Page 21 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (2) access to the CVR replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons; (3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the CVR recording medium, the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof; (4) the audio CVR recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than two months and not later than one year after completion of the CVR recording inspection, except that audio samples with no privacy content may be retained for enhancing the CVR recording inspection (e.g. for comparing audio quality); (5) only the accountable manager of the operator, and when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the person fulfilling the role of safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the audio CVR recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the audio CVR recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. GM1 SPO.GEN.145(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The CVR is primarily a tool for the investigation of accidents and serious incidents by investigating authorities. Misuse of CVR recordings is a breach of the right to privacy and it works against an effective safety culture inside the operator. (b) Therefore, the use of a CVR recording, when for purposes other than CVR serviceability or those laid down by Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, should be subject to the free prior consent of the persons concerned, and framed by a procedure that is endorsed by all parties and that protects the privacy of crew members and (if applicable) maintenance staff. AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use USE OF IMAGE RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure indicated in point (f)(3)(i) of SPO.GEN.145 should be documented and signed by all parties (aircraft operator, crew members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image recordings and their protection from misuse; (4) a description of the uses made of the image recordings. Page 22 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (b) Each time a recording file containing images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes other than to ensure the serviceability of the flight recorder, the operator should retain and, when requested, provide the competent authority with: (1) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the recording file; and (2) evidence that the flight crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the flight crew compartment images. (c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of the recordings of flight crew compartment images, as well as the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of recordings of flight crew compartment images, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b). AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use IMAGE RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these images, then: (1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a separated area); (2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to authorised persons; (3) provisions should be established for the secure storage of the image recording medium, the image recording files and copies thereof; (4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and not later than 1 year after completion of the image recording inspection. Images that do not contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing the image recording inspection (e.g. for comparing image quality); and (5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects. Page 23 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 SPO.GEN.145(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the ‘flight crew compartment’ in point (f) of SPO.GEN.145 should be understood as the area including: (a) the flight crew seats; (b) aircraft and engine controls; (c) aircraft instruments; (d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty station; and (e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station. SUBPART D INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT SECTION 1 Aeroplanes AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 Lightweight flight recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof. (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) relative time count, (2) pitch attitude or pitch rate, (3) roll attitude or roll rate, (4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate, (5) latitude, (6) longitude, (7) positioning system: estimated error (if available), (8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system, (9) time, (10) ground speed, (11) positioning system: track (if available), Page 24 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (12) normal acceleration, (13) longitudinal acceleration, (14) lateral acceleration. (c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight: (1) magnetic heading, (2) time, (3) pressure altitude, (4) indicated airspeed, (5) vertical speed, (6) turn and slip, (7) attitude, (8) Mach number (if displayed), and (9) stabilised heading, and (10) tachometer indication or equivalent indication of propulsive thrust or power. (d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be recorded as flight data or by means of images. (e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read- out) as defined in the relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA. (f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash- protected flight recorders. GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146 Lightweight flight recorder ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION (a) Experience has shown the usefulness, for analysing incidents and for training purposes, of recording additional information. In particular, cockpit audio, additional instrument indications (such as position of flight controls, position of engine controls, fuel and oil indications, aircraft Page 25 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 configuration selection), and an external view are very useful for such purposes. To capture such information, simple equipment such as an integrated microphone and integrated camera can be sufficient. (b) If the flight recorder includes optional capabilities such as described in (a), their recording duration is recommended to be at least 2 hours for maximum usefulness. (c) If the flight recorder is capable of acquiring flight parameters from some aircraft system, it is advised to give priority to the flight parameters listed in Annex II-B of ED-155 or the flight parameters listed in Annex II-A of ED-112. Indeed, these flight parameters were selected based on their relevance in many safety investigations. GM2 SPO.IDE.A.146 Lightweight flight recorder INSTALLATION OF CAMERAS It is advised, when practicable, to install any camera so that it does not capture images of head and shoulders of the flight crew members whilst seated in their normal operating position, in order to avoid identification of persons. GM3 SPO.IDE.A.146 Lightweight flight recorder RECORDING ACCURACY OF ATTITUDE RATE PARAMETERS In the case of attitude rate parameters (pitch rate parameter, yaw rate parameter, roll rate parameter), the accuracy limit specified in EUROCAE Document 155 dated July 2009 was found to be unclear. Therefore the following additional guidance is provided: (a) If the attitude rate parameter is provided by an approved system of the aeroplane, accuracy greater than as provided by this system is not expected for this attitude rate parameter. (b) If the attitude rate parameter is provided by a dedicated gyroscope, it is advisable that the gyroscope meets the following performance: (1) errors due to linear accelerations less than ±3°/sec (equivalent to ±1% of 300°/sec recording range) for all combinations of parameter values and linear acceleration values in the respective ranges [-300°/sec; +300°/sec] and [-3g; +6g]; (2) errors due to temperature less than ±5°/sec for all combinations of parameter values and temperature values in the respective ranges [-300°/sec; +300°/sec] and [-40°C; +85°C]; (3) angular random walk of the gyroscope equal to or less than 2°/sqrt(hour); and (4) bias stability of the gyroscope significantly less than 360°/hour (for instance, 50°/hour). GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146(e) Lightweight flight recorder FUNCTION TO MODIFY THE RECORDINGS OF IMAGES AND AUDIO The purpose of the function modifying image recordings and audio recordings is to allow the flight crew to protect their privacy by making the recording of images and audio inaccessible using normal techniques. The activation of this function is subject to the approval of the pilot-in-command (refer to Page 26 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 SPO.GEN.107). However, the equipment manufacturer or a safety investigation authority might still be able to retrieve the recorded data using special techniques. SECTION 2 Helicopters AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Lightweight flight recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof. (b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters: (1) relative time count, (2) pitch attitude or pitch rate, (3) roll attitude or roll rate, (4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate, (5) latitude, (6) longitude, (7) positioning system: estimated error (if available), (8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system, (9) time, (10) ground speed, (11) positioning system: track (if available), (12) normal acceleration, (13) longitudinal acceleration, and (14) lateral acceleration. (c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot station, or at both pilot stations when the helicopter is certified for operation with a minimum crew of two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the flight: (1) magnetic or true heading, (2) time (if presented on the front instrument panel), (3) pressure altitude, (4) indicated airspeed, (5) vertical speed, Page 27 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 (6) slip, (7) outside air temperature, (8) attitude (if displayed), (9) stabilised heading (if displayed), and (10) main rotor speed. (d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be recorded as flight data or by means of images. (e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read- out) as defined in the relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA. (f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in: (1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight flight recorders; or (2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash- protected flight recorders. GM1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Lightweight flight recorder ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION Refer to GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146. GM2 SPO.IDE.H.146 Lightweight flight recorder INSTALLATION OF CAMERAS Refer to GM2 SPO.IDE.A.146. GM3 SPO.IDE.H.146 Lightweight flight recorder RECORDING ACCURACY OF ATTITUDE RATE PARAMETERS Refer to GM3 SPO.IDE.A.146. Page 28 of 29  Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 SPO.IDE.H.146(e) Lightweight flight recorder FUNCTION TO MODIFY THE RECORDINGS OF IMAGES AND AUDIO Refer to GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146(e). Page 29 of 29 European Union Aviation Safety Agency Comment-Response Document 2016-11 Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 RELATED NPA: 2016-11 — RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) — 21.2.2019 Table of contents 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 2 2. Individual comments and responses 5 3. Appendix A — Attachments 224 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 357 comments were received on NPA 2016-11 from 39 commentators from the following categories of stakeholders: Comments per category of commentators OEM 102 (28.6%) Organisations (5 in total) 81 (22.7%) NAA 74 (20.7%) Individuals (10 in total) 50 (14%) Operators (10 in total) 50 (14%) Several comments were repetititve and in those cases the response is simply referring to the original comment. Comments were submitted to all parts of the NPA and they were mixed in nature, ranging from support to the proposals, to proposals for changes or improvements and, in some cases, expressing disagreement. The majority of commentators focused on the following topics: Comments of the proposal for a global reporting format of runway surface conditions and in-flight assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival On the overall proposal there were some general comments requesting consistency and synchronization with the aerodrome rules, better harmonisation with the ICAO definitions for the terminology in use and extension of the proposal to non-commercial operations. Those type of comments were generally agreed by EASA and the review group. On the definitions, it was decided to adopt the exact ICAO definitions for the purpose of global harmonisation. As regards consistency with the relevant aerodrome rules, which are an essential part of this global effort, the review group worked in close coordination with the other EASA rulemaking group of rulemaking task RMT.0704, by having cross-participation to both groups of certain members and constantly updating each other on the respective work. The applicability date of both set of rules will be kept in line with the ICAO target of November 2020. Also the need of extending the proposal to non- commercial operations was acknowledged by EASA and agreed by the review group. The necessary provisions will be added in a proportionate manner to the scope of those operations. Several stakeholders highlighted the difficulty for certain categories of aircraft to comply with the new proposed standards for landing performance at the time of arrival. Particularly smaller aircraft or older TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation designs may not have the required performance data and may be too penalised by the use of the generic corrective factors. This was already envisaged at the level of the NPA by introducing alleviations for Performance Class B and Class C aeroplanes but further to the comments, even within Performance Class A aeroplanes some alleviations were introduced, along with the possibility to use other existing performance data. As regards the generic factors they were developed by the TALPA ARC and endorsed in the ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual, therefore they will be kept as a baseline option. Another issue that was raised by certain stakeholders, namely from those countries systematically exposed to cold weather and heavy contamination of the runways, is the difficulty to comply with the proposal in challenging environments (short runways, heavy runway contamination, steep approaches, etc.) which may lead in some cases, with the use of the new runway condition codes (RCC), to stop operations. Those commenters are proposing to introduce the possibility, for those aerodromes having sufficient capabilities, to upgrade the runway code under given conditions. Such proposal is more suitable for inclusion in the aerodrome rules, where the concept of “specially prepared winter runways” will be developed and then referenced to in the rules for air operations. Furthermore steep approaches will be included in the airworthiness standards for landing performance at the time of arrival. Comments on the proposal for the use of a reduced required landing distance (80% landing factor) This proposal, while supported by a good number o stakeholders, attracted the most controversial comments. Particularly some stakeholders opposed the justification for the proposal and questioned the mass threshold that defines its applicability. The reasons for the proposal on reduced required landing distances are clearly explained in the RIA with regards to business aviation operations and the need for harmonisation with the corresponding US rules. Such operations have been conducted in the US over the last 10 years with a satisfactory safety record. Considering that the conditions proposed by EASA to conduct the said operations are more restrictive than those in the US, the safety level is expected to remain at the same level or to improve. As regards the aircraft eligibility for the said operations, the mass threshold will be changed to an AFM eligibility statement. Other comments requested to make mandatory the use of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) in order to obtain the approval for such operations. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it is recommended to be used also for the purposes of reduced required landing distance operations. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, when FDM is not available, alternative means for data collection will be considered. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation Statistics on the comments received In summary, of the 357 comments received, 129 were accepted, 60 were partially accepted, 96 were noted and 72 were not accepted. The acceptance of comments in percentage is shown below: Acceptance of comments 96, 27% 129, 36% 72, 20% 60, 17% Accepted Partially Accepted Not Accepted Noted TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 2. Individual comments and responses In responding to comments, a standard terminology has been applied to attest EASA’s position. This terminology is as follows: (a) Accepted — EASA agrees with the comment and any proposed amendment is wholly transferred to the revised text. (b) Partially accepted — EASA either agrees partially with the comment, or agrees with it but the proposed amendment is only partially transferred to the revised text. (c) Noted — EASA acknowledges the comment but no change to the existing text is considered necessary. (d) Not accepted — The comment or proposed amendment is not shared by EASA. (General Comments) - comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department 20 (Transportstyrelsen, Luftfartsavdelningen) The proposals in this NPA are of a horizontal nature since it affects OPS, ADR and Airworthiness provisions. It is therefore essential that provisions in all domains enter into force at the same time with synchronised applicable dates. Expected opinion is set to Q3/2017 and publication date of EASA-decision is set to Q3/2018 while expected publication of decision of ADR provisions in RMT.0704 is set to Q2/2020. Acceptable means of Compliance and Guidance Material for ADR operations on how to deal with runway surface condition assessment and reporting issues is absolutely essential and should be developed in collaboration with the Rulemaking group responsible for NPA 2016-11. response Accepted. The two EASA rulemaking tasks RMT.0296 and RMT.0704 are conducted in close coordination and, regardless the date of publication of the deliverables of each task, the appplicability date of the amended provisions in the various domains will be consistent. comment 32 comment by: Austro Control Dear all, Austro Control explicitly welcomes this NPA and has no objections or any other comments. best regards Franz Graser response Noted. comment 165 comment by: Luftfahrt-Bundesamt The LBA has no comments on NPA 2016-11. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. comment 167 comment by: UK CAA Page No: Whole document Paragraph No: Whole document Comment: Dates for Applicability and Implementation. The dates for the applicability and implementation of the proposals have not been addressed in the NPA. Recognising that the implementation of the ICAO State Letters 2016/12 and 2016/29 provisions is 5 November 2020, and also that the reduced required landing distance factors proposals are inter-related with them, it is vital that EASA works within the ICAO timetable for both of these provisions. Justification: This is a global change of processes and procedures that will affect airlines, ANSPs and aerodromes, coordination with ICAO and its planned timescale is vital so as not to have individual States or regions developing new procedures early or late. response Accepted. The date of applicability will be specified in the Amending Regulation and it will be in line with the ICAO implementation timelines, not only for the air operations provisions but also across the other domains concerned. comment 168 comment by: UK CAA Page No: Various Paragraph No: Those relating to reduced required landing distance proposals. Comment: In Chapter 3 of the NLR Safety Assessment, it is stated that unstabilised approaches are far more prevalent for business operators compared to commercial operators - there are significantly more overspeed events at the threshold during unstable approaches. The flight data also shows that for business aircraft the speed deviations at the threshold are much higher than with landings of commercial airlines. FAA AC No: 91-79A (Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing) states that a 10 percent increase in final approach speed results in a 20 percent increase in landing distance). Thus it’s not surprising that the same flight data from business operators also shows that compared to commercial operators; long landings occur more often within the business aircraft operations. Justification: If the mitigating measures related to these parameters only have the effect of enabling business operators to achieve the same landing accuracy as commercial operators, then it would seem that this is not sufficient to justify the former being able to take credit for any reduction in landing distance factors due to those parameters, compared to the latter, who do not. The proposals would benefit from further explanation of this aspect. response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Business jet operators as intended by Part-CAT and the proposal for reduced required landing distance in CAT.POL.A.255 are commercial operators that normally have to observe the same landing distance that apply to all commercial operators as prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230 (i.e. 60% of the LDA for jets and 70% of the LDA for turbo-props). The proposed mitigating measures are intended to achieve, when using 80% of the LDA, the same level of safety of when using the traditional factors. This apply only to those aircraft and operators eligible to be approved for reduced required landing distance and not to all commercial operators. comment 169 comment by: UK CAA Page No: Various Paragraph No: Those relating to proposals to align with the ICAO SARPS and Recommended Practices for the new Global Runway Condition Reporting Format. Comment: As the proposed alignment with the new ICAO SARPS and Recommended Practices for the Global Runway Condition Reporting Format will affect runway condition reports to all aircraft, the introduction of similar proposals to the operating regulations for non-commercial air operations needs to be considered Justification: Consistency. response Accepted. The new provisions on the Global Runway Condition Reporting Format will be extended to non-commercial operations. comment 190 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation General comment: The main concern is the EASA depoyment of the TALPA arc through operational requirements which make it mandatory not only for new TC but also for in-service aircraft. This NPA is creating a different appraoch between FAA (current use of the TALPA is on a voluntary manner from the operator whatever commercial or not) and EASA (use of the new CS 15.1592 is mandatory retroactively through AMC1 CAT OP 303 reserve to CAT operators. response Partially accepted. The approach followed by EASA in the implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations is in line with ICAO. It is however recognised the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 191 comment by: Dassault-Aviation TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Dassault-Aviation General comment: The way that EASA propose to introduce the TALPA has major negative effects for Business aviation manufacturers and operators:  Introduction of the new table of coefficient (AMC CAT OP 303) will prohibit the use of non-negligible quantities of corporate aurfield used mainly by corporate operators (impact non correctly evaluated ine the corresponding RIA)  Creates a gap in performance capabilities between FAA and EASA CAT operators for airpalne not having this new operational performance data approved in their AFM. EASA CAT operators will have to use a new table with conservative coefficients while FAA operators may continue to use current operational data from their manufacturer including material already approved by JAA or EASA (AC 25-32 paragraph 11)  Creates a confused situation for EASA CAT operators for in-service airplanes on contaminated runway using: o current CS25.1591 (or older regulation) for preflight assessment at take-off and landing o new CS 25.1592 (or coefficient table) for in-flight assessment hence, for the same reported runway condition, they will have to use different assumptions between preflight and in-flight assessment. response Accepted. EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 192 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassaullt-Aviation General comment: Introduction of "reduced required landing distance operation" includes requirement for approval and training. The large number of requirements for EASA operators compared to FAA operators for the same type of operation will bring excessive burden to EASA CAT operators. response Noted. In general terms an approval is also required by the FAA for eligible on demand operations under Part-135 and 91K. The specific training requirements proposed by EASA are considered an important element to achieve an equivalent level of safety in this kind of operations. comment 217 comment by: Federation of Norwegian Aviation Industries TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The Federation of Norwegian Aviation Industries fully supports the comments submitted by our Norwegian member airlines and by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority. We are concerned that some of the proposed changes may have as a result that winter operations in Norway in many cases will be very difficult to carry out causing a large number of delays, cancellations and diversions. Both Norwegian air carriers and airport operators have a vast experience conducting winter operations in all types of weather. In the propsal a -15C threshold value is proposed for friction coefficients, RwyCC 4. We ask that this temperature threshold is reevaluated and raised accordingly. response Noted. The concerns expressed in this comment will be addressed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704 by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 222 comment by: ERAA GENERAL COMMENTS Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS support the notion that alignment of EU rules and ICAO SARPs, and harmonization between EU and US rules can increase safety for operators operating on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the NPA in its current form is imposing restrictions that are both too conservative, and for some runway conditions, not sufficiently restrictive, resulting in a negative economic impact as well as degraded safety. The objections are expressed as comments to the relevant section and/or paragraph of the NPA. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS operates in a part of the world where extensive winter conditions prevail for more than half of the year.The weather is characterized by frequent low pressure systems with associated frontal activity. Transportation of mild moist air gives rise to frequent showers of snow. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS operates on 830 metre runways as steep approach 4.5 degrees with 35 ft screen height using Dash-8-100/200, and much of the material in the NPA is not applicable for this type of operation. Widerøe operates a Public Service Obligation network with clear public interest. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS is of the opinion that the proposed NPA may have the effect of making winter landing operations impossible. The proposed regulation may very well be prohibitive. We are concerned that it will be difficult to have revised performance documentation developed. The cost may be prohibitively high, especially if a new test flight campaign needs to be carried out. The proposed landing distance factors that may be used in lieu of manufacturer data are prohibitive. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses We believe that the proposed changes should be coordinated with other regulatory material, e.g. new AMC and GM to ADR. We expect that material for aerodrome personnel would need to be revised. response Noted. See response to comment 285. comment 268 comment by: FNAM The FNAM (Fédération Nationale de l’Aviation Marchande) is the French Aviation Industry Federation / Trade Association for Air Transport, gathering the following members: CSTA: French Airlines Professional Union (incl. Air France) SNEH: French Helicopters Operators Professional Union CSAE: French Handling Operators Professional Union GIPAG: French General Aviation Operators Professional Union GPMA: French Ground Operations Operators Professional Union EBAA France: French Business Airlines Professional Union And the following associated members:  FPDC: French Drone Professional Union  UAF: French Airports Professional Union Introduction: The comments hereafter shall be considered as an identification of some of the major issues the French industry asks EASA to discuss with third-parties before any publication of the proposed regulation. In consequence, the following comments shall not be considered:  As a recognition of the third-parties consultation process carried out by the European Parliament and of the Council;  As an acceptance or an acknowledgement of the proposed regulation, as a whole or of any part of it;  As exhaustive: the fact that some articles (or any part of them) are not commented does not mean FNAM has (or may have) no comments about them, neither FNAM accepts or acknowledges them. All the following comments are thus limited to our understanding of the effectively published proposed regulation, notwithstanding their consistency with any other pieces of regulation. General comments : Reduced required landing distance operations The FNAM thanks the EASA for listening to the industry by introducing the « reduced required landing distance operations » possibility. In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival - aeroplanes TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses However, the FNAM is strongly against the implementation of the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and its AMC & GM. Indeed, there are a lot of inconsistencies between the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303, its AMC & GM and the spirit of the Air Ops regulation. This requirement is far too complex because it is not consistent with the logic described in the IR CAT.POL.A.230. This new measure may appear dangerous to implement since it is introducing additional workload for pilots at a critical phase of flight. This additional period of consultation would allow:  A simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit  A reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32). Furthermore, this measure creates discrepancies between European operators and the other ones without knowing what will happen for TCO holders. response Partially accepted. The support of the proposal on reduced required landing distance operations is noted. The introduction of a requirement for an in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival is part of a global effort at ICAO level consequent to the new standard for assessing and reporting runway surface condition. For this reason it needs to be implemented at EU level. On the specific issues raised by the comment:  Consistency with existing rules such as CAT.POL.A.230 will be ensured.  The methodology and timing for the inflight-assessment will be better explained at AMC and GM level  The factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of: o 5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations) o 3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and o 12 sample flight conditions The resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. Though not explicitly mentioned in the AC 25-32, they are proposed for use in the FAA order 8900 when OEM data developed in accordance with AC 25-32 are not available. They are also recommended by the ICAO Aeroplane Performance Manual (Doc. 10064). EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. For such cases alternatives to the generic factors will be offered. See also the response to comment 270 for more detailed explanations. comment 285 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS GENERAL COMMENTS TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS support the notion that alignment of EU rules and ICAO SARPs, and harmonization between EU and US rules can increase safety for operators operating on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the NPA in its current form is imposing restrictions that are both too conservative, and for some runway conditions, not sufficiently restrictive, resulting in a negative economic impact as well as degraded safety. The objections are expressed as comments to the relevant section and/or paragraph of the NPA. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS operates in a part of the world where extensive winter conditions prevail for more than half of the year.The weather is characterized by frequent low pressure systems with associated frontal activity. Transportation of mild moist air gives rise to frequent showers of snow. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS operates on 830 metre runways as steep approach 4.5 degrees with 35 ft screen height using Dash-8-100/200, and much of the material in the NPA is not applicable for this type of operation. Widerøe operates a Public Service Obligation network with clear public interest. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS is of the opinion that the proposed NPA may have the effect of making winter landing operations impossible. The proposed regulation may very well be prohibitive. We are concerned that it will be difficult to have revised performance documentation developed. The cost may be prohibitively high, especially if a new test flight campaign needs to be carried out. The proposed landing distance factors that may be used in lieu of manufacturer data are prohibitive. We believe that the proposed changes should be coordinated with other regulatory material, e.g. new AMC and GM to ADR. We expect that material for aerodrome personnel would need to be revised. response Accepted. The concerns expressed in this comment will be addressed by adding assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches and by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 326 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports this NPA and would like to thank the RMT for the NPA produced. response Noted. Executive summary, Applicability — Process map p. 1 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 29 comment by: Horst Nentwich Comment 1. General Short Landing Operation using a reduced Factor should be foreseen for CAT Operator and Part NCC Operator without any difference. The focus should be on the Business Aviation having an Aircraft in Operation with a MOPSC 19 or less, a MTOM of 45.360 kgs or less. Comment 2. General The exclusion of "holiday charter" is not justifiable. It should be no difference if a Business Aviation Aircraft (e.a. MOPSC 19 or less, MTOM 45.360 kgs) is used for Transportation of Passengers doing Business or going on Holidays. EASA shall make a clear difference in regards of Short Landing Operation between commercial Scheduled/Non Scheduled Airline Industries vs commercial and NCC Business Aviation Operator. Comment 3. Risk Assessment or Criteria for CAT POL A 255 Explain more in details what EASA expects to be included in the risk assessment and also make it more detailed what criteria according CAT POL A 255 (b)(2) shall be considered. Maybe a combination of both is also a solution in order to combine steep approaches with short Landing Operations Comment 4: CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(i) The exclusion of steep approaches in general is much too restrictive because some airports in the Alps have a combination of a steep approach and a short runway (like Lugano e.a.). Since these airports are amongst those for which this type of operation is very much required it would be very helpful to increase this limit according to the approved AFM / AFM Supplemental Data by the Manufacturer (most of the Business Aircraft are certified for steep approach of 4.5 up to 6.0 degrees). Comment 5. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) – Recurrent Training and Checking (c)(4): Since a reduced required landing distance operation is not allowed to be performed with a defect that affects the landing performance, the Recurrent Training/Checking should be more focused on the specialities of such an operation. A more detailed description would be neceassary. Comment 6: ALAP: What does EASA require from an ALAP. A more precise Rule should be established Comment 7: Recency vs. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) – Recurrent Training and Checking The Rule should include the possibility to keep recency when a real landing took place; but latest every three years a Simulator Recurrent should be performed. Comment 8: FDM FDM is required if the MTOM is 27.000 kgs or more, this should be considered also for Short Landing Operation. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Regards Horst Nentwich response Partially accepted. Comment 1: Part-NCC does not require any factor. Comment 2: The definition of holyday charter re-called in this GM is already existing and used in Reg. (EU) 965/2012 and it does not apply to business jet operators. Comment 3 and 4: Steep approach operations, as well as other special approach procedures outside of stabilised approach criteria, are not intended to be combined with reduced required landing distance operations. Each one of these options, under the conditons prescribed by the relevant rule, may be used by an operator to benefit of some flexibility under appropriate mitigating conditions, but they are not meant to be combined. Comment 5: An adequate training description will be provided at AMC and GM level. Comment 6: Clarifications on the intent and the content of the ALAP will be provided. Comment 7: It will be included. Comment 8: FDM for aircraft having a MCTOM below 27 000 kg will be recommended. comment 166 comment by: CAA Norway General: The main threat to safe operation on contaminated runways is the presence of contamination. Consequently, the main focus for aerodrome operators will always have to be removal, so as to provide runway surface conditions equal to runway surface condition code 6 or 5, i.e. Dry or Wet conditions. CAA Norway has decided to focus on the part of the NPA concerning operation on other than dry runways. On the aspect of allowing an 80 % rule for some landing operations, there are only a couple of comments to the AMC/GM material. response Noted. comment 206 comment by: CAA Norway Relationship with other regulatory tasks CAA-N is of the opinion that the rulemaking task in hand must be seen in conjunction with the rulemaking task on the same subject related to other Parts relevant to the introduction of the new reporting format and caused by changes to ICAO Annex 3, 11, 14 and 15. (MET, ATS, ADR, AIS). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Rationale: The chain from runway preparation and condition assessment through the condition report promulgation via AIS (strategically) and ATIS / ATC Voice for tactical purpose, and subsequent use of the information by operators and flightcrew for performance calculation/assessment and reporting of perceived braking performance is long. It is seen as vital that the interfaces are properly managed, and that the possibility of errors or misunderstandings is kept as low as possible and must not leave anything to chance. response Accepted. The two EASA rulemaking tasks RMT.0296 and RMT.0704 are conducted in close coordination to ensure consistency of the new provisions proposed in each domain. Table of contents p. 2 comment 265 comment by: Tom Wike The proposed perfomance limitations are applicable to CAT operations only. NCC operations should be included as well. In reality, NCC operators are often direct competitors to CAT operators. They even might appear to customers as CAT operators, but with less restrictive performance limits. That is a flight safety issue. response Accepted. The new provisions on the Global Runway Condition Reporting Format will be extended to non-commercial operations in line with ICAO Annex 6 Part II. 2. Explanatory Note p. 5-18 comment 10 comment by: Aliparma/FOPh Usually "on demand" operations do not allow enough time for such approval process by the competent autority . Furthermore, considering the purpose of this flights, it may be impossible to have determined the "public interest" by some States, specially out of Europe. response Noted. It should be noted that two types of approval of reduced required landing distance operations are being proposed. The first, proposed under CAT.POL.A.255, applies to non-scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations of Performance Class A aeroplanes only. This approval is not aerodrome specific and is given to the operator in general. The operator may then choose where to exercise it. The second, proposed under CAT.POL.A.355, applies to Performance Class B aeroplanes only. This approval is aerodrome specific, is valid only for aerodromes where there is a public interest, but applies to all CAT operations (i.e. scheduled and non-scheduled) conducted at that aerodrome. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 26 comment by: Gabriel Arroyo · Regarding the method of calculation of crosswind limits by aircraft manufacturers, even when it is accepted that is out of the scope of this NPA, we suggest to ask them to refer those limits to a certain runway width. Unlike runway slope limits, minimum runway width do not use to appear on the AFM limitations. Therefore, some limits that have been proven in a 45m width runway could not be equally acceptable for 30 m. response Noted. This is being done on recently certified aircraft types. comment 102 comment by: Stefan The reduction to 80% is a good idea to harmonize EU to US. Someone would probably see this as an example of "decrementalism" allowed by regulation: operators, that are under high commercial pressure, will be approved based on risk assessments evaluated by national CAA that has (probably) no guidelines on how evaluate such a risk assessment and sometimes no specific knowledge on the aircraft types, operations, etc. It is interesting. Statistics will be provided in the future at EU level about the effects of such a change, the RIA will be therefore updated based on the data on serious incidents, accidents vs approvals accepted? The very well done study of NLR, full of interesting information, will be then updated in few years? response Noted. Evaluation of the rules will be performed systematically by EASA in the future. New studies may be conducted on the same subject when the need arises. comment 108 comment by: Conrad Reference: 2. Explanatory Note 2.4.4. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to the Air OPS Regulation AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a);(b)(1);(c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival - aeroplanes Suggested Change: A new AMC is proposed, based on the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32, for the use of corrective factors for the in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival when no manufacturer’s data are provided in the AFM for performance class A aeroplanes. Rationale: The main point is that manufacturers provide the required data. However, the data need not be provided in the AFM. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses This is actually in contradiction to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a), where we find: "(a) Performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival should be developed in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent, and included in the operations manual (OM)." (Emphasis is mine) Actually I wouldn’t like to have the at-time-of-arrival data in the AFM, as long as they are different from the dispatch data, since that would leave us with two sets of contaminated landing data in the same (certified) document. The operations manual is a good place for the at-time-of-arrival data. response Accepted. comment 121 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 5 Paragraph 2.2 – Objectives Assuming these objectives are in order of importance, the prime objective is to reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor. However, in the case of the third objective, the proposal is to reduce safety factors. This is in direct opposition to the first objective. It may be argued that private operators have not been required to adhere to the current CAT safety factors in the past, but those factors are currently the standard published by the safety authority. Aircraft insurers may have required private operators to adhere to the CAT factors as a condition of their insurance cover. Changing the rule to allow reduced multiplying factors will restrict insurers from requiring the use of higher safety factors, because the lower runway length safety factors would be specified in the Implementing Rules. Should there be overrun incidents in the future that would have not occurred had the current rules remained in force, there may be some difficult post-accident discussions with respect to liability for the losses incurred. The proposed reduction in the safety factors will expose all operators in this category of aeroplane (19 passengers, 45,360kg) to reduced runway distance safety factors. This must increase the risk of runway excursions, regardless of enhanced crew training and other proposed mitigations. The crew can still get it wrong, no matter how well-trained they are; but the additional 67% of Landing Distance Available currently set out in the CAT rules is always there whatever may happen during a particular landing. It is the expectation of a passenger that the paying of money should ensure the same level of safety for their safe arrival as if with a large commercial airline. Operators taking advantage of the reduced factors will not include in their advertising the fact that reduced safety margins are being used. It is claimed in this document that the mitigations added by the proposed rule change will compensate for the reduction in the multiplying factors for landing distance and so the level of safety will be 80 equivalent to the existing CAT rules. If the Agency truly believes this, why is the use of the new rules restricted to aeroplanes with no more than 19 passengers and a Maximum Certificated Take Off Mass not exceeding 45,360kg? TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Many of the major airlines would be able to demonstrate greater consistency and accuracy in landing operations and better assurance of quality of crew training than the operators of these smaller aircraft. If a major airline could show compliance with all of the mitigations and asked for the rules to be amended to remove the passenger and mass restrictions (and so allow the Airbus A380 and other airliners to operate to factors based on 80% / 1.25 instead of 60% / 1.67) how would the Agency refuse to do so, given that the NPA claims that the level of safety is the same? If there were to be universal use of the proposed lower factors the overall safety record would undoubtedly be affected adversely. The Agency should not risk misleading the public and the Commission on this point. The Agency should be open and honest about the proposal and state in the NPA/Opinion that the change is being made to harmonise with the reduced safety margins that are permitted by FARs, which, so far, have not led to an accident rate that is unacceptable in the USA. It can also be stated that harmonisation with FARs will avoid putting European operators at a commercial disadvantage when competing with similar operators who are complying with FARs. But the Agency should not claim that the new rules will provide a level of safety that is equivalent to the current rules. response Partially accepted. The reasons for the proposal on reduced required landing distances are clearly explained in the RIA with regards to business aviation operations and the need for harmonisation with the corresponding US rules. The RIA figures will be also updated with data gathered from operations conducted in the US over the last years with a satisfactory safety record. Considering that the conditions proposed by EASA to conduct the said operations are more restrictive than those in the US, the safety level is expected to remain at the same level or to improve. As regards the aircraft eligibility for the said operations, the mass threshold will be changed to an AFM eligibility statement. comment 122 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 6 Paragraph 2.3 – Summary of the RIA - Reduced Landing Distance The paragraph that deals with ‘Reduced required landing distance for Performance Class A and B aeroplane operations” is both confusing and misleading. It is confusing because it does not define the options clearly – (this is a public consultation NPA, not a discussion document between specialists). It is misleading because it states that the reduction in landing distance factors with the specified mitigations will provide the same level of safety as the current rules. How can a reduction in the minimum Landing Distance Available (a 25% reduction for Class A jet aeroplanes) offer the same level of safety? (See also comment made against paragraph 2.2) This paragraph 2.3 claims social and economic benefits that are difficult to understand given that the proposal is to reduce the multiplying factors for landing distance. The passengers on these smaller aircraft are likely to be paying considerably more for their journey compared TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses with airline passengers over a similar route; potentially many times more. How can it be more proportionate to allow reduced runway safety factors for aeroplanes carrying passengers who are paying the highest fares? The requirement for these operations to be approved by the competent authority of the operator is of limited value. Any competent authority within EASA who refuses approval will be accused of “gold plating” the rules by requiring a more rigorous level of compliance compared with other Member State authorities. The supporting safety assessment produced by NLR presents evidence that there are significantly more “long landings” and a greater variation in touchdown point position in ‘business type aircraft‘ operations compared with airline operations. It does not make logical sense that this is presented as evidence for allowing smaller landing distance multiplying factors for business aircraft operators. Surely this evidence is a clear justification for keeping the existing 60% / 1.67 factors for business operators? The NPA is proposing to introduce reduced runway distance factors without presenting any evidence that the proposed mitigations will be effective. What evidence is there to support the claim that these mitigations will compensate for the reduced landing distance factors? response Not accepted. Paragraph 2.3 is a short summary of the RIA. The full details are given in the RIA chapter of the NPA. As regards the options they are only two: Option 0 i.e. do nothing (the baseline option) and option 1, which is the regulatory proposal for reduced landing distance operations. The mentioned social benefits are intended mostly for performance class B aeroplanes where reduced landing distance operations will be allowed only for aerodromes where a public interest exists. The economic benefit will be for the potential traffic increase at certain aerodromes where those operations may be conducted. As regards competent authority approvals, already today special limitations may be imposed at aerodromes where a specific safety concern exists. The NLR study, after highlighting certain risks proposed the measures to mitigate those risks to a level comparable to that of the traditional landing factors. comment 123 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 11 – AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311, The use of words like ‘should consider’ in the AMC material may cause significant problems in an operational environment when things go wrong. There is a known case (an overrun incident in January 2016) leading to a dispute between an operator and an aerodrome as to whether the runway state report reflected the actual conditions. It is believed that this matter is being referred to the local legal courts. Whilst it is understood that AMC material cannot use terms such as ‘must’ or ‘shall’ It is recommended that the AMC wording be strengthened where possible and that definitions are made more precise. To take an example - if a runway is cleared, but there are ice patches on the runway that total less than 25% of one third of the runway, is this really to be considered DRY? response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses As correctly mentioned the use of the verb “should” is part of the drafting conventions for AMCs. However, while more precise information may be provided at GM level, further details are also provided in the aerodrome regulation which is being concurrently and consistently amended in regard to these matters by the rulemaking task RMT.0704. comment 124 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 13 CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations. The proposal to change the landing distance factors for smaller aeroplanes (not more than 19 passengers and 45,360 kg MTOM) is presented in a very confusing way. We believe that the description in the NPA makes the proposal difficult to understand even by experts. This undermines the purpose of the NPA, which is a ‘public consultation’. The use of percentages and multipliers to refer to the same limitations is extremely confusing, especially if the reader is not a performance specialist. For example the same factor appears as the multiplier 1.43 and as 70%. In particular, the use of percentages where an increased percentage means a reduced runway length available is very confusing. It is accepted that this is how the FAA expresses distances, but we recommend that EASA does not do this. Using the ‘traditional’ terms ‘Landing Distance Available’ (which is completely fixed and unambiguous) and ‘Landing Distance Required’ (which can either be unfactored or expressed with a multiplying factor) gives much greater clarity. Always expressing the safety landing distance factors as multipliers, so that factors that are greater than 1 increase the distance required, is logical and may be understood more easily. It is recommended that the entire NPA, Opinion and regulation text should be adjusted to do this. We also recommend that a clearly written statement explaining the proposed changes to the runway distance factors should be included when this proposal is published again, whether it is published as a revised NPA or as an ‘Opinion’. It is suggested that the following text could be inserted just after the list of four mitigating measures to provide a clearer explanation – particularly for a non-specialist reader --------------------------------------------- Explanation of the rules for aeroplane landing distances. Aircraft/Actual Landing Distances (ALD) - For each aircraft type the manufacturer will provide performance data in the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). This should include the Aircraft/Actual Landing Distances (ALD) for the full range of landing conditions that may be encountered in service. i.e. ALD values are provided for the appropriate range of values of aircraft operating mass, runway altitude, wind speed and direction etc. The ALD is the distance from the position of the approach ‘screen height’ to the aircraft coming to a full stop - on a DRY runway. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The calculation of ALD assumes that the landing is performed precisely in accordance with the procedures set out in the AFM, meaning that: the aircraft crosses the runway screen height position at the correct altitude and speed; it touches down at the correct point on the runway; and maximum braking is used to bring the aircraft to a stop. Landing Distance Available (LDA) – The Landing Distance Available is the length of the runway at the destination aerodrome that is available to be used safely. It is measured from the position of the screen height to the opposite end of the runway. The operating rules recognise that any particular landing may be different to the landing technique that is assumed in the AFM performance calculations. The aircraft may approach the runway faster and/or higher than assumed; the aircraft may touchdown further along the runway than the optimum point; the actual winds and other weather factors may be different to those assumed in the calculation of ALD; and maximum braking may not be achievable. For this reason the Landing Distance Available (LDA) must always be greater than the predicted Aircraft/Actual Landing Distance (ALD) that is provided in the AFM performance data. The amount by which the LDA must exceed the ALD is defined in the Operating Rules. For aeroplanes operating for Commercial Air Transport the current rules for landing distance factors may be found in CAT.POL.A.225, CAT.POL.230 and CAT.POL.235. For a turbo-jet powered aeroplane in Performance Class A that is to land on a dry runway the current CAT.POL.A.230 requires that the ALD must not exceed 60% of the LDA. This means that the Landing Distance Available must be at least 1.67 x ALD – (i.e. 1.67 times the distance that will be used by the aircraft according to the AFM data if the landing is precisely in accordance with the calculation assumptions). The crew will look up the ALD in the AFM for the aircraft weight and for the altitude, wind etc. that is forecast at the destination aerodrome and then multiply this by 1.67 to obtain the minimum permitted runway length that must be available at the destination, (the Landing Distance Available). If the runway is wet, CAT.POL.A235 requires that a further factor of 1.15 must be applied. So for a turbo-jet powered aeroplane landing on a wet runway the Landing Distance Available (LDA) must be at least 1.67 x 1.15 x ALD = 1.92 x ALD. For a turbo-propeller powered aeroplane in Performance Class A the ALD must not exceed 70% of the LDA. So the equivalent factors for a turbo-propeller powered aeroplane are 1.43 x ALD for a dry runway and 1.64 x ALD for a wet runway. The proposed amendment to the rules - The amendment that is proposed in this document would allow the operators of small Performance Class A aeroplanes (with not more than 19 passengers and Maximum Take Off Mass not exceeding 45,360kg) to use smaller landing distance factors. The rule change would permit these aeroplanes to land on shorter runways. The new factors for these smaller aircraft are based on the dry ALD not exceeding 80% of the LDA, for both turbo-jet and turbo- propeller powered aeroplanes. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The resulting multiplying factors for Performance Class A aeroplanes are compared with the existing factors as follows: Landing Distance Factors Percentage reduction in LDA must be at least [factor] x minimum LDA at ALD destination Aeroplane Runway Existing Proposed rules for condition rules smaller aeroplanes Turbo-jet Dry 1.67 1.25 25% powered Wet 1.92 1.44 25% Turbo-propeller Dry 1.43 1.25 12.5% powered Wet 1.64 1.44 12.5% This means that, under the proposed new rules, small turbojet-powered aeroplanes will be allowed to land on runways that are 25% shorter than currently; and small turbo-propeller powered aeroplanes will be allowed to land on runways that are 12.5% shorter. To give an example: Assume that the crew of a turbo-jet powered aeroplane look up the aircraft/actual landing distance in the Aircraft Flight Manual for the aircraft mass and other conditions expected at the destination and they find that the value of ALD is 1000 metres. Under the existing rules for turbo-jet powered aeroplanes, the minimum landing distance available at the destination must be 1,670m if the runway is dry or 1,920m if the runway is wet. If the aeroplane can carry fewer than 19 passengers and its maximum certificated take-off mass does not exceed 45,350kg, the proposed new rules will reduce the minimum landing distance that must be available at the destination to 1,250m if the runway is dry or 1,440m if the runway is wet. (i.e. A reduction of 420m for dry conditions and 480m for wet conditions). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is recommended that a clear explanation, similar to the above, be included in any revised NPA and in any Opinion on this subject. It is further recommended that any revised NPA and the Opinion should refer throughout to the factors 1.67, 1.92, 1.25 and 1.44. This should then avoid causing any confusion by the use of percentages and words such as ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ etc. response Accepted. The text proposed in the comment will be used as a basis to provide more explanations in the AMC/GM to the relevant rules. comment 125 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 13 – Paragraph 2.4.4 – CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses It is difficult to understand how reduced factors are needed “to achieve proportionality of the rules for business aviation operators”. What is being proposed is a lower safety standard for Business Aviation relative to that required for other forms of Commercial Air Transport (CAT). The supporting NLR report shows that Business Aviation Operators currently fall far short of the standards achieved by Commercial Air Transport Operators for touchdown dispersal accuracy and the target approach speeds. To compensate for the reduced factors, the mitigation measures must improve the performance of the flight crews to a standard that is better than that currently achieved by the airlines operating to CAT rules, It is considered that the proposed mitigation measures will not achieve this for the following reasons: · Operational Conditions - see CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(3) and CAT.POL.A.235 (a). The current dry landing distance factor is 1.67 (land within 60% of the distance available) for turbojet powered aircraft and 1.43 (land within 70% of the distance available) for turbo- propeller powered aeroplanes. For turbojet powered aircraft, an additional 15% factor for wet gives an overall factor of 1.92 which means that the specific increase for a wet runway is 25% of the un-factored landing distance. If the proposed landing distance factor (80%) is used, this corresponds to a 25% factor and an additional 15% factor for wet giving an overall factor of 43.8%. This means that the specific increase in landing distance for a wet surface reduces from 25% to 18.8% and the overall factor for a wet surface is considerably less than that originally applied to a dry surface for turbojet powered machines. · Flight Crew The same crew complement is proposed as was previously required for turbojet powered aircraft. Additional training on simulators is unlikely to enhance the crew skills significantly as business jet simulators rarely have limiting runways modelled. (The European certified airfields for many of these simulation devices include Heathrow, Gatwick and Amsterdam). Also, the contaminated runway modelling in these simulators is generally not consistent with the TALPA ARC matrix. The wheel brake system characteristics for the smaller business jets are generally not as effective as those for the larger aircraft and for the flight crew there is also a greater emphasis on smooth landings and moderate braking for executive customers. · Aerodrome Conditions The proposed change is targeted at business operations, which are likely to be flying into smaller aerodromes that are less well-equipped. Compared with airline operations these operations are likely to be landing at aerodromes with: shorter runways; less equipment available (i.e. a lack of precision approach aids); runway surfaces that are not as well maintained and monitored; and less frequent aircraft movements resulting in runway surface reporting that is less up to date. In addition, the surrounding environment including terrain and obstacles can be more challenging at these smaller airports. Reliance on external visual cues would limit operations to good VMC and daylight! · Aeroplane Characteristics and Performance The small business aircraft in question tend to be less capable in marginal conditions compared with large transport aeroplanes. They have fewer supporting systems such as autobrake and auto-throttle and many do not have thrust reversers - or because of their configuration they have reversers that are less effective. In addition, speed control can be TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses more challenging in these smaller aircraft; (even the more sophisticated autopilots of large transport aircraft use an approach speed of VREF + 5 knots to address speed variation). The NPA proposes to change the Operating Rules significantly, but only to modify the Airworthiness Certification rules with respect to operations from Contaminated Runways, and to make changes in the AMC to the details for deriving Landing Distance information in flight. The NPA does not modify the Airworthiness Certification Rules for the landing distance determination made before departure. This will lead to inconsistences as will now be illustrated. The following assessment uses the AFM data for a real mid-range business jet. For this aircraft type the certification tests for dispatch data used the parametric method with a 3½° approach at VREF, a touchdown rate of 8 ft/sec and maximum manual braking. In real operations the techniques that were used to establish the scheduled landing distance are unlikely to be reproduced. For normal operations (where passenger comfort is a significant factor) a 3° approach at VREF + 7 knots, a touchdown rate of 1-4 ft/sec (see the last line of page 44 – AMC 25.1592 paragraph 6.1) and autobraking would be typical. A calculation of the total effect of these deviations from the certification technique (actually using 6 ft/sec touchdown due to software constraints) gives an expected landing distance on a dry runway that is 25.9% greater than the AFM value. This means that a typical normal landing would use all of the landing distance available based upon the proposed 25% factor, with no margin. These assumptions may be optimistic if other factors are present, such as lack of precision approach guidance. This calculation used AFM data for a standard ISA day. Current operating rules allow standard conditions to be used for landing distance calculations, because the pressure/density and temperature variations are considered to be covered by the existing 1.67 factor. For this aircraft type we have calculated that a warm summer temperature of 35°C (ISA+20) would result in the 25.9% factor derived above increasing to 31.8%. This would clearly exceed the Landing Distance Available based on the proposed 1.25 factor. Even though the existing landing distance factors are in place to cover these variabilities in technique and weather conditions, runway excursions are one of the most frequent kinds of accident or serious incident. A casual look at the accident statistics suggests that business jets have a much poorer record than other commercial aircraft in this respect. Therefore the proposal goes against the stated objective of reducing the number of performance related accidents and we recommend that the reduced factors are not permitted for any CAT operations. response Not accepted. The issues mentioned in the comment have been considered in the NLR study, and the results indicate that, the current average standard of business aviation operators is certainly lower than that of traditional large CAT operators. However, enhanced flight crew training, to the same standard of CAT operations and a number of additional mitigating measures (such as no operations on contaminated runways, plus others included in the conditions required for the approval) will allow to attain an equivalent level of safety. comment 126 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 16 – TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses CAT.POL.A.355, Paragraph 3 This paragraph states: “The intent of the rule is to achieve proportionality of the rules for small CAT operators under a set of conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of this NPA, are considered to attain a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230.” If it is considered to be an equivalent level of safety why is the use of the reduced factors restricted to aircraft with 19 passengers and a mass of 45,360 kg? If the level of safety will be unchanged or will even be increased with the new rule, it must be acceptable to operate larger/heavier aeroplanes to the factors based on 80% of landing distance available. The application of the passenger and mass limitations is a clear admission by the Agency that the level of protection provided by the proposed runway distance factors for the smaller aeroplanes will be lower than is provided by the current rules. This should be made clear in the NPA and any Opinion to the Commission. response Partially accepted. The mass threshold will be replaced by an aircraft AFM eligibility statement. comment 127 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 16 Paragraph 2.4.4 – CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations. (Performance Class B aeroplanes) Our comments made against CAT.POL.A.255 (Class A Aeroplanes) also apply here, but with additional concerns because it is stated that the training will be simplified compared with that provided for the pilots of Class A aeroplanes. What are the further limitations proposed for the ‘control of the touchdown area’? response Noted. The control of the touchdown area should be identified by references on the runway visible from the flight deck. Adequate go-around and balked landing instructions should be also provided in case touchdown in the designated area is not achieved. comment 170 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 5 Paragraph No: Explanatory note Comment: The UK CAA appreciates the considerable amount of effort that has obviously gone into providing such a comprehensive explanatory note. This helped considerably in understanding rationale and principles intended with the proposed changes. response Noted. comment 171 comment by: UK CAA TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page No: 6 et seq. Paragraph No: Those relating to reduced required landing distance proposals. Comment: Before approval can be given for use of required landing distance it is essential that there is a measurable demonstration that all the enhanced mitigating measures have had an effect on achieved landing parameters cited in the NLR justification. Especially for those relating to crew performance, there needs to be some demonstration that they have had some measurable effect on the improvement in accurate approach and landing criteria. FDR evidence would be the best method of assessment criteria that should be introduced into the rule proposal. Justification: The NLR Safety Study highlights in Table 2 on page 16 that only two of the four types studied would meet theoretically the equivalent level of safety for the normally- factored dry case cases, and this assumes that all the enhanced mitigation measures have their intended effect. In the case of the measures relating to crew performance, (e.g. enhanced training, accuracy of approach and landing speed control) these are not directly measurable quantities and are difficult to assess. Recognising that, as the NLR Safety Study says “Flight data from business operators show that compared to commercial operators a larger percentage of unstabilised approaches are continued”, and also that for business aircraft, the speed deviations at the threshold are much higher than for commercial airlines, it would appear that FDR evidence would be the best method of assessment criteria. response Partially accepted. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of more general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it should be used also for the purposes of CAT.POL.A.255. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, alternative means for data collection will be considered and the analysis of operator’s performance in relation to unstable approaches and long landings will be included in the risk assessment. comment 188 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Page 6: Reduced required landing distance Comment: Dassault supports this evolution but profusion of requirements for approval and training may dissuade operators. Requirements should be harmonized with Part 91K and part 135 EOD. response Noted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The training requirements, along with the other conditions required for the approval of this kind of operations, are an essential part of the balanced approach enabling an equivalent level of safety. comment 189 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Page 10: In flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival. Comment: This evolution is a necessary step in the way of providing and using performance data for in flight assessment. Dassault position is to support these evolutions in parallel to the activities in process of the “Flight Test Harmonization Working Group”. We would highlight the fact, that the introduction of this proposal concerning the certified data should be delayed and introduced simultaneously with the results of the “Flight Test Harmonization Working Group "for consistency of the full package related to preflight and in flight performance assessment. response Noted. Though the work of the FTHWG has been followed and acknowledged during this RMT, there is not yet a final decision and a schedule on the implementation at regulatory level of its proposals on landing performance for wet runways. Therefore they may only be considered at a general level by re-wording the EASA rules on wet runways in a performance-based manner that can host the future availability of new landing performance standards for wet runways. comment 223 comment by: ERAA CAT.OP.MPA.303 p. 10: Performance class A: Is the 15% margin applicable to the unfactored landing distance? response Noted. See response to comment 286. comment 224 comment by: ERAA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Pilot advisory report TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The NPA is stating that pilot advisory report of braking action should be used for downgrading a braking action category. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is questioning how this is envisioned as this concept introduces challenges related to pilot evaluation and standardization. Experience, being an airline operating turbo prop aircraft, with mass between 15-30 tonnes, is that pilots of medium weight jet aircrafts, typically Boeing 737, are reporting braking action that are more slippery than the values observed by our flight crew. The difference in observed braking action is likely related to the aircraft characteristics. The jet, which is 2-4 times heavier than the turbo prop in question, also has a touchdown speed which is approximately 30-40 knots higher. The resulting kinetic energy that has to be dissipated for the jet is thereby 3,5 to 8 times higher for the jet than for the turbo prop. A jet aircraft is mainly relying on wheel brakes for stopping, whereas a turboprop employ much more effective aerodynamic braking by propellers in disc or reverse. Flight crew operating jets will likely observe activation of the anti skid function of the brakes when auto brake is selected before landing, while flight crew of turbo prop will not use brakes other than for management of taxi speed and setting of parking brake. The NPA does not indicate means for standardized pilot reports, neither within an airline nor between different aircraft types. This may be difficult to achieve and most likely some kind of standardized aircraft system is required to obtain reliable and consistent data. Hence, too much reliance on pilot reports can have two important consequences that should be considered: 1. 1. Pilot report issued from a turbo prop can confirm that the braking action is better than it really is, which may introduce stopping and/or control problems for a jet 2. 2. Pilot report issued from a jet aircraft may downgrade the RWYCC so that the runway must be closed for treatment, leading to unnecessary holding and possible diversion and low fuel scenario for turbo prop aircraft Runway Friction Measurements (Mu) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The NPA quotes the TALPA ARC that; “reported friction values should no longer be reported to pilots,……. .. Furthermore, an ICAO SARP recommends not to consider friction readings in winter conditions, except for hard contaminants.” Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is arguing that such practice may benefit flight crew not accustomed to winter operation as it reduces possible confusion, but it definitively has a negative impact on the total situational awareness for experienced flight crew operating in the same environment. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is operating 130000 flights per year in Norway, Scandinavia and UK, to aerodromes that in 2012/2013 produced a total of 34000 SNOWTAMS. This means that our flight crew has considerable knowledge of, and experience in winter operation and as such can anticipate what the runway condition should be based on weather reports, precipitation, temperature, forecast etc. In our view presentation of the measured friction coefficient and type of measuring device in the remark field of the Runway Condition Report, RCR; will enhance the possibility for an experienced flight crew to increase his overall situational awareness when evaluating the runway conditions. The flight crew will then know if the reporter has upgraded or downgraded the RWYCC both from the RCAM and in relation to the measured value. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is suggesting that friction measurements performed by competent personnel may be presented in the remark field of the RCR. The presented data is only to be used for increased situational awareness, not performance calculation. response Noted. See response to comment 289. comment 247 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes the NPA's reference to the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC) which met in 2008-2009 and in which the agency directly participated together with all the turbine aeroplane OEMs. GAMA is providing several specific comments about areas where NPA 2016-11 seems to diverge from FAA generated guidance material which causes concern for divergent requirements being established between the two regulators. GAMA recommends that the agency work closely with its trans-Atlantic partners at the U.S. FAA to achieve a harmonised set of requirements for runway performance, because diverging standards that are not harmonised will significantly increase cost on manufacturers and cause confusion in the operator community. response Noted. Harmonisation will be pursued to the maximum possible extent. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 272 comment by: IATA 2.2 Objectives […] “- contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations” IATA Comments: It is proposed that Harmonization should be mentioned as follows: “contribute to the global harmonization of regional, notably FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in support of CAT operations” response Accepted. It will be mentioned in the Opinion. comment 273 comment by: IATA EAPPRE Ref 3.7.2 EASA reply “Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG)” IATA Comments: It is proposed to mention under which governance this Group is working. It should then be read as follows:... “it was recognised that the issue is currently being addressed by the [???] Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG), etc” response Accepted. The Opinion will specify that the FTHWG is a working group which answers to the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. comment 286 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS CAT.OP.MPA.303 p. 10: Question to EASA: Performance class A: Is the 15% margin applicable to the unfactored landing distance? response Noted. Yes the 15% margin is applicable to the unfactored landing distance calculated using performance data for the time of arrival. comment 289 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS P11 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Pilot advisory report The NPA is stating that pilot advisory report of braking action should be used for downgrading a braking action category. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is questioning how this is envisioned as this concept introduces challenges related to pilot evaluation and standardization. Experience, being an airline operating turbo prop aircraft, with mass between 15-30 tonnes, is that pilots of medium weight jet aircrafts, typically Boeing 737, are reporting braking action that are more slippery than the values observed by our flight crew. The difference in observed braking action is likely related to the aircraft characteristics. The jet, which is 2-4 times heavier than the turbo prop in question, also has a touchdown speed which is approximately 30-40 knots higher. The resulting kinetic energy that has to be dissipated for the jet is thereby 3,5 to 8 times higher for the jet than for the turbo prop. A jet aircraft is mainly relying on wheel brakes for stopping, whereas a turboprop employ much more effective aerodynamic braking by propellers in disc or reverse. Flight crew operating jets will likely observe activation of the anti skid function of the brakes when auto brake is selected before landing, while flight crew of turbo prop will not use brakes other than for management of taxi speed and setting of parking brake. The NPA does not indicate means for standardized pilot reports, neither within an airline nor between different aircraft types. This may be difficult to achieve and most likely some kind of standardized aircraft system is required to obtain reliable and consistent data. Hence, too much reliance on pilot reports can have two important consequences that should be considered: 1. Pilot report issued from a turbo prop can confirm that the braking action is better than it really is, which may introduce stopping and/or control problems for a jet 2. Pilot report issued from a jet aircraft may downgrade the RWYCC so that the runway must be closed for treatment, leading to unnecessary holding and possible diversion and low fuel scenario for turbo prop aircraft Runway Friction Measurements (Mu) The NPA quotes the TALPA ARC that; “reported friction values should no longer be reported to pilots,……. .. Furthermore, an ICAO SARP recommends not to consider friction readings in winter conditions, except for hard contaminants.” Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is arguing that such practice may benefit flight crew not accustomed to winter operation as it reduces possible confusion, but it definitively has a negative impact on the total situational awareness for experienced flight crew operating in the same environment. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is operating 130000 flights per year in Norway, Scandinavia and UK, to aerodromes that in 2012/2013 produced a total of 34000 SNOWTAMS. This means that our flight crew has considerable knowledge of, and experience in winter operation and as such can anticipate what the runway condition should be based on weather reports, precipitation, temperature, forecast etc. In our view presentation of the measured friction coefficient and type of measuring device in the remark field of the Runway Condition Report, RCR; will enhance the possibility for an experienced flight crew to increase his overall TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses situational awareness when evaluating the runway conditions. The flight crew will then know if the reporter has upgraded or downgraded the RWYCC both from the RCAM and in relation to the measured value. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is suggesting that friction measurements performed by competent personnel may be presented in the remark field of the RCR. The presented data is only to be used for increased situational awareness, not performance calculation. response Partially accepted. The remark filed of the RCR can be always used to provide additional information to increase the flight crew situational awareness. Part of the concerns expressed in the comment will be also addressed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704 by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 333 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the in-flight check of landing distance at the time of arrival and teh harmonisation with the FAA. response Noted. comment 343 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the increased safety due to more accurate assumptions and supports the accompanying reduction from 60% to 80% of the LDA. response Noted. comment 344 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets suports teh objectives. The Accident Investigation Board Norway and UK Civil Aviation Authority highlight risks of operating on contaminated and slippery runways. This NPA address these highlighted risks response Noted. comment 345 comment by: US FAA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Comment summary Sentence: Runway condition codes are to be reported for each third of the runway when more than 25% of one third of the runway surface is contaminated. FAA implementation of TALPA ARC requires RCC to be reported when 25% of the entire runway is contaminated. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses EASA (and ICAO) recommended practice may greatly increase the number of occurrences when airplane performance will be affected adversely without a commiserate increase in safety. Suggested resolution Recommend EASA adopt FAA and traditional standard of reporting RCC’s only when more than 25% of the entire surface is contaminated. response Not accepted. The reporting criteria are an important element agreed at ICAO level for the global implementation of the new set of rules on runway condition assessment and reporting and therefore are kept. The new reporting format leads to an assumption of dry runway below the coverage threshold where previously the operator would have calculated with a wet runway assumption. This reduces the margins available in operations. To ensure that the existing margins are sufficient for (unreported) worse case contamination of the runway, the reporting threshold had to be reduced to 25% of one third. comment 346 comment by: US FAA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Comment summary Sentence: The concept of reporting runways as ‘slippery wet’, when the measured friction drops below the maintenance threshold, was previously recommended for enforcement by the States in ICAO Annex 14, but no associated aeroplane performance was so far available to allow flight crew to take this information into account in their performance assessment at the time of arrival. ICAO Annex 14 Attachment A and FAA AC 150-5320-12C refer to reporting slippery wet runway conditions when the friction falls below the established ‘minimum’ level not the ‘maintenance’. This threshold is also called out in the draft version of the ICAO Airplane Performance Manual being created to support TALPA. Suggested resolution Change the phrase “below maintenance threshold” to “below minimum threshold” response Noted. The explanatory note of the NPA cannot be re-issued. However the correct terminology will be used in the Opinion. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 347 comment by: US FAA AMC 25.1591 Comment summary Sentence: Information and explanatory material is amended in accordance with the TALPA ARC recommendations and FAA AC 25-31, taking into account ICAO standards for runway condition codes and contaminant descriptors. AMC 25.1591 refers to takeoff only as does FAA AC 25-31. Takeoff performance is only referred to contaminant descriptors, type and depth. Runway condition codes are not referred in AMC 25.1591 nor are they referred to in FAA AC 25-31. Suggested resolution Delete: “runway condition codes and” from the sentence. response Not accepted. The text in question is only a summary explaining in general terms the background of the changes. Runway condition codes do not appear in AMC 25.1591. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.1. Definitions p. 19-21 comment 4 comment by: KLM Definitions to be in line with Annex 6 – 14 Contaminated / dry rwy and delete damp response Accepted. Definitions will be harmonised. comment 11 comment by: Aliparma/FOPh "Dry Runway" definition needs a more clear and observable state as the words "visible moisture" concept is subject to personal interpretation. "Damp Runway" definition is needed (and should not be deleted) the "shiny appareance" concept was appropriated response Not accepted. These definitions are kept in line with the relevant ICAO standards for the global reporting format. The definition of “damp runway” is deleted as this condition is included in the definition of “wet runway”. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 31 comment by: safe-runway.GmbH (103a) ‘Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’ means a matrix allowing the assessment of the runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed or measured runway surface condition(s) and pilot report of braking action. Motivation: Adding “or measured” opens the possibility for (future) technical development and innovations capable of providing and disseminating automated measurements of braking actions from e.g. aircraft. response Not accepted. The proposed definition is in line with ICAO SARPs and does not preclude the introduction of future technologies. comment 47 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Definition of RWYCC 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.1 Definitions 1. (103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Replace definition with: “means a number that describes the effect of the runway surface condition(s) on aeroplane deceleration performance and lateral control.” Amend the Note to say: “the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane landing performance calculation by the flight crew.” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The definition taken from ICAO is misleading and does not define well what the Runway Condition Code is. It does not as such describe the runway condition. That is achieved by the Runway surface descriptors. It quantifies the effect of the runway condition on available braking action and lateral control of the aeroplane. The change to the note is necessary to make clear that RWYCCs are not a direct input into a takeoff computation, but can only used for landing. response Accepted. The Definition will be changed. comment 84 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Slippery wet runway for Takeoff TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: General 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: The Definitions section correctly identifies that a Slippery wet runway is not a contaminant, but a runway state, just like dry or wet (smooth). As such, the performance for slippery wet runways should not be described in AMC25.1591, which is for takeoff operations on contaminated runways only. Removing it from the scope of this AMC also ensures that slippery wet runways are appropriately deal with under the limitations set out in AMC25-13 5 f. (1): “(…) take-offs utilising reduced take-off thrust settings – (1) Are not authorised on runways contaminated with standing water, snow, slush, or ice, and are not authorised on wet runways unless suitable performance accountability is made for the increased stopping distance on the wet surface.” It is thus recommended to insert a new paragraph in CS25.109 before (e): “The slippery wet runway effective friction is defined as 0.16 for a fully modulating anti-skid system. The maximum tyre to ground wet runway friction must be adjusted to take into account other types of anti-skid systems. For quasi-modulating systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.625. For on-off systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.375. For the classification of anti-skid systems, please refer to AMC 25.109(c)(2). Aeroplanes without anti-skid systems will need to be addressed separately on a case-by-case basis.” Consequently, the following changes should be made to AMC 25.1591: Remove definition 4.7 of Slippery Wet Remove line for Slippery Wet from Table 1 Remove line for Slippery Wet from Table 2 For clarification, amend AMC CS-13 5 f. (1) to say: “(...) runways unless suitable performance accountability is made for the increased stopping distance on the wet and wet slippery surface.” Since CS25.1592 and the associated AMC already considers both states and contaminants, it is proposed to include slippery wet more explicitly into its scope, as detailed in a separate comment. 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: ICAO classifies Slippery Wet as a Runway State rather than a Contaminant. Including this state into the Supplemental information would make the provision of data for takeoff optional. The lack of this information carries the risk that operators and flight crew are not appropriately made aware that braking action on slippery wet conditions is degraded below the level assumed in CS 25.109(c). Additionally, including this state in CS 25.109 clarifies that operations with reduced thrust are permissible on slippery wet conditions when appropriate performance data is furnished. response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The line for “Slippery Wet” will be removed from Table 2. It is however preferable to keep “Slippery Wet” in the supplemental data, since the definition of a slippery wet runway remains relatively vague from an aerodrome point of view. comment 85 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Harmonization of AMC 25-13 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: Out of current scope 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Change Definitions in AMC 25-13 5 d. and e.: “d. A wet runway is one whose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm deep within the intended area of use. e. A contaminated runway is one of which a significant portion of the runway surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the following substances: - Compacted Snow - Dry Snow of a Depth of more than 3mm - Heavy Frost - Ice - Slush of a Depth of more than 3mm - Standing Water of a Depth of more than 3mm - Wet Snow of a Depth of more than 3mm” Add definition for “Wet slippery runway”: “f. A slippery runway is a wet runway where the surface friction characteristics of a significant portion of the runway have been determined to be degraded” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Harmonization with the definitions in AMC 25.1591 and AIROPS. The proposed definitions are slightly changed to make them self-contained. Definition of wet slippery is added in line with the comment to amend AMC 25-13 6 f. response Accepted. comment 86 comment by: Stefan Defintion for "wet grooved" runways is at the moment missing even if it is cited in GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 response Not accepted. There is no definition of “wet grooved” because “grooved” refers to the way the runway has been constructed (by mechanically making grooves on its surface) and it is independent from the presence of water or contaminants on it. A grooved runway may be dry, wet or contaminated in accordance with the existing definitions of these conditions. comment 95 comment by: CAA Norway TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3.1.1 Definitions Comment: There is a need for an editorial review of the whole document to ensure that terminology in the definitions and the proposal as a whole is used consistently and in line with ICAO terms and definitions compliant with the 5th November 2020 SARPs and PANS. Rationale: The prime importance of using the same concepts, terminology and definitions world-wide, as these are the basic building blocks which should mean the same to aircraft designers, performance engineers aerodrome operators and staff as well as aircraft operators and flight crew worldwide and provide one common understanding of the issue at hand. Proposal: Include New definitions as follows: ‘Approved’, means Accepted by a Contracting State as suitable for a particular purpose. (Source ICAO) Rationale: There are several important references to approved data. Therefore, there is a need for an ICAO compliant definition. In this context there is also a need for clarification as to “approved by whom” in order to avoid misunderstandings, as there might be several possibilities. Reference is made to our comments to CAT.OP.MPA.303. ‘Distance at Time of Landing’ means Landing distance achievable in normal line operations following recommended procedures furnished for the prevailing conditions (Source: Draft ICAO Doc 10064 Aeroplane Performance Manual.) Rationale: This term is used extensively in the proposed regulatory material, and thus a formal definition is required. ‘Factored Distance At Time of Landing’ A factored landing distance derived from the distance at time of Landing used for the check at Time of Landing. (Source: Draft ICAO Doc 10064 Aeroplane Performance Manual.) Rationale: This term is used extensively in the proposed regulatory material, and thus a formal definition is required. ‘Unfactored Landing Distance’ Rationale: This term is used extensively in the proposed regulatory material, and thus a formal definition is required. Especially as there is uncertainty about whether this should be the unfactored landing distance on a level runway or if it should be adjusted for negative slope and possibly other factors. This should be seen in context with and not be in conflict with the terms (undefined) in ICAO Annex 8, 11th edition – July 2016, amendment 108-B; Landing performance data at the time of take-off and At the time of landing performance data response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The general definition of approval is out of the scope of the present rulemaking task. However the Agency is aware that work is on-going at ICAO level on the concepts of “approval”, “acceptance” and “authorization. The deliverables of this work will be considered in the future. The definition of “landing distance at the time of landing” will be added. Some of the other proposed definitions may better placed, when necessary, as guidance material to the appropriate operational requirements where they are used. comment 105 comment by: Regional Director (103a) ‘Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’ means a matrix allowing the assessment of the runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed runway surface condition(s) and pilot or aircraft report of braking action Adding “or aircraft” allows for consideration of using live aircraft landing data to provide an objective report of braking action. response Not accepted. The proposed definition, which is kept in line with the relevant ICAO standards for the global reporting format, does not preclude the use of future technologies. A braking action measured by aircraft systems may be reported by the pilot. comment 107 comment by: Regional Director (103a) ‘Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’ means a matrix allowing the assessment of the runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed runway surface condition(s) and pilot or automated report of braking action Justification: Adding “or automated” allows for consideration of using live aircraft landing data or other automated sources to provide an objective report of braking action. response Not accepted. The proposed definition, which is kept in line with the relevant ICAO standards for the global reporting format, does not preclude the use of future technologies. A braking action measured by aircraft systems may be reported by the pilot. comment 109 comment by: Conrad Reference: 3. Proposed Amendments 3.1.1. Definitions (103b) 'Runway condition code (RWYCC)' Suggested Change: (103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number describing the runway surface condition to TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses be used in the runway condition report to be used in the runway condition report (RCR), describing the level of deceleration performance that can be achieved. Note: the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane landing performance calculation by the flight crew. Rationale: The proposed definition is not correct and the added Note does not help much. The current wording states that the RWYCC describes the “runway surface condition”. However, “runway surface condition” is a well defined term (defined in the subsequent section (103d)), meaning the actual descriptive condition of a runway, like slippery when wet, slush, ice, etc. Thus, the current wording insinuates, that the RWYCC describes directly the descriptive condition. This, however is not the case, for two reasons: 1. one RWYCC can correlate to multiple runway surface conditions, and 2. the RWYCC, due to down/up-grading, might not match the actual runway surface condition at all The runway contaminant type and depth (i.e. "runway surface condition") can give a RWYCC, but a RWYCC can never give contaminant type and depth. The RCAM can and must not be read backwards! However, the proposed definition of the RWYCC insinuates that backward reading was possible. response Accepted. The definition will be changed. comment 128 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 20 – 3.1.1 – Definitions The “Note 2” on page 20 with respect to the contamination of the runway with de-icing chemicals and other contaminants is not particularly helpful as it gives no guidance on what should be done. It should state that the runway should be cleared of de-icing chemicals and contaminants or a conservative approach be applied. response Not accepted. The intent of this note is to raise awareness of the issue. The application of de-icing fluids creates a temporarily worse situation but eventually results in a runway that is wet instead of contaminated. Therefore the flight crew should be aware that unexpected slippery conditions may be encountered, however it is not possible to give specific guidance on the transient condition of the runway in such cases. comment 172 comment by: UK CAA TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page No: 19 Paragraph No: 3.1.1 Definitions (25) Comment: It is unclear what ‘significant’ means, now that 25% appears to have been deleted from the definition Earlier in the NPA (AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 (on page 11), 25% is still used. The proposals would benefit from guidance on what ‘significant’ means in this context. Justification: Clarity. response Accepted. The clarification will be given at GM level. comment 173 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 20 Paragraph No: 3.1.1 Definitions (103d), Note 2 Comment: The Note with respect to the contamination of the runway with de-icing chemicals and other contaminants gives no guidance on what should be done as a result. It should state that the runway should be cleared or a conservative approach be applied. Justification: Clarity. response Not accepted. The intent of this note is to raise awareness of the issue. The application of de-icing fluids creates a temporarily worse situation but eventually results in a runway that is wet instead of contaminated. Therefore the flight crew should be aware that unexpected slippery conditions may be encountered, however it is not possible to give specific guidance on the transient condition of the runway in such cases. comment 200 comment by: Thomson Airways 3.1.1 (32) The deletion of the facility to use dry runway performance when damp runway conditions prevail - this can be overly limiting. Many runways have excellent friction characteristics (equivalent to dry) with low levels of dampness. The proposed change could result in restrictive performance and crosswind limitations with unclear safety benefits. response Not accepted. The Definition of “damp runway” has been included in the definition of “wet runway” because the physical effects causing reduced friction forces begin to take effect from very small film TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses thickness of water, therefore damp conditions are considered to provide no better braking action than a wet runway (No response entered yet) comment 202 comment by: Embraer S.A. (103e) - (b) Definition of Dry Snow. Embraer suggests using the same definition of Dry Snow provided on paragraph 6.3.1 of AC 25.32. response Not accepted. These definitions are kept in line with the relevant ICAO standards for the global reporting format. comment 203 comment by: Embraer S.A. (103e) - (h) Definition of Wet Snow. Embraer suggests using the same definition of Wet Snow provided on paragraph 6.3.2 of AC 25.32. response Not accepted. These definitions are kept in line with the relevant ICAO standards for the global reporting format comment 262 comment by: AIR FRANCE (25) ‘contaminated runway’ means a run-way of which a signifi-cant portion of the run-way surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the sub-stances listed under the runway surface condi-tion descriptors. Typically non operational definition! Once I have read it I have to search elsewhere what is meant by “significant portion” and “whether in isolated areas or not”. I pilot would like to read something directly usable like: ‘contaminated runway’ means a run-way where more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface area is covered by one or more of the sub-stances listed under the runway surface condi-tion descriptors. response Not accepted. The definition will be kept in line with the ICAO standard, which leaves procedural information such as the percentage of contaminated runway surface at GM level. comment 263 comment by: AIR FRANCE (103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition report. Note: the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane performance calculation by the flight crew. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Suggest to clarify: The RWYCC is a number It does not describe the contaminant but the braking capability. So a customization of the ICAO wording would be: ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number which reflects the runway braking capability as a function of the surface conditions. This number allows the flight crew to calculate, from the performance information provided by the aeroplane manufacturer, the necessary stopping distance of an aircraft on the approach under the prevailing conditions. response Accepted. The definition will be changed. comment 264 comment by: AIR FRANCE (103c) ‘Runway condition report (RCR)’ means a comprehensive standardised report relating to runway surface conditions and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance. Comprehensive and standardized report? Suggest “based on table 1 below” RWYCC Braking Description Action 6 N/A 5 GOOD Braking deceleration is normal for the wheel braking effort applied AND directional control is normal. 4 GOOD TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between good and MEDIUM medium. 3 MEDIUM Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced. 2 MEDIUM TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between medium POOR and poor. 1 POOR Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is significantly reduced. 0 LESS THAN Braking deceleration is minimal to non-existent for the wheel POOR braking effort applied OR directional control is uncertain. response Partially accepted. This definition is general. Further guidance and samples will be provided in the operational rules along with references to the relevant aerodrome rules. comment 269 comment by: FNAM TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses No definition of a « winter runway » is described within this AirOps regulation whereas it is mentioned several times in this NPA. Therefore, for clarity reasons, the FNAM suggests to add such definition in the Part DEF of the regulation EU n°965/2012. response Accepted. A definition of “specially prepared winter runways” will be added. comment 274 comment by: IATA 3.1.1. 1. Definitions is amended as follows: Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII (103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition report. Note: the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane performance calculation by the flight crew. The wording is taken from the ICAO SL30 descriptions but is incorrect: the Runway Condition Code does not describe the runway surface condition because for one code there could be several very different surface conditions. For example RWYCC 5 is associated with:  · FROST  · WET (water less than 3 mm) Less then 3 mm of:  · SLUSH  · DRY SNOW  · WET SNOW. So RWYCC 5 describes the runway surface condition as…? To avoid using an ill constructed ICAO definition, but to remain ICAO compliant, it is suggested to use the description of the RWYCC contained in the ICAO SL30 Attachment C, page C-6 point 1.1.1.4. There it is stated: “RWYCC reflects the runway braking capability as a function of the surface conditions. With this information, the flight crew can derive, from the performance information provided by the aeroplane manufacturer, the necessary stopping distance of an aircraft on the approach under the prevailing conditions.” This is important, it is not just a formal issue. Pilots need the braking capability, that is what should be highlighted, especially because they are requested to evaluate it during the landing in order to report if what they experienced was less than the reported one. The type and depth of contaminants is also important but only as a way to determine the braking capability. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The definition will be changed. comment 282 comment by: IATA 3.1.1. 1. Definitions is amended as follows: Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII (103c) ‘Runway condition report (RCR)’ means a comprehensive standardised report relating to runway surface conditions and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance. IATA Comments: The RCR is defined but is nowhere explained. It is going to be the fundamental tool for the awareness of the runway surface conditions. It is going to be a task for the Aerodrome domain, but a quick reference for the operators is highly recommended. response Accepted. The RCR is fully explained and samples are provided in the aerodrome rules. However further guidance will be added. comment 295 comment by: Finnish Transport Safety Agency Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII p. 19 Point (25) ‘contaminated runway’ Finnish Transport Safety Agency recommends to keep the requirement ‘more than 25%’ in the definition instead of GM material. response Not accepted. The definition will be kept in line with the ICAO standard, which leaves procedural information such as the percentage of contaminated runway surface at GM level. comment 296 comment by: Finnish Transport Safety Agency Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII p. 19 Please notice point (103a) is already in use for ‘required navigation performance (RNP) specification’. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Numbering will be revised at the time of publication of the Opinion to take into account the latest version of the rules. comment 298 comment by: Finnish Transport Safety Agency Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII p. 20 Points (103b), (103d) and (103e) Notes have been added to certain definitions. What is the legal status of a note? If the status of a note is same as status of GM material, we consider the note text should rather be GM. response Accepted. The content of the notes will be put in guidance material to Annex I. comment 348 comment by: US FAA 3.1.1 AMC 25.1591 AMC 25.1592 Comment summary Definitions/Runway surface condition descriptors There have been 3 recent regulatory efforts on the reporting of runway conditions: FAA, ICAO, EASA. All three use slightly different runway surface definitions/descriptions. None of these differences are significant and do not add value to any of the products. Suggested resolution We recommend that EASA, ICAO, and FAA work together to harmonize on one set of runway surface definitions/descriptors. response Noted. EASA has adopted the ICAO definitions. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-ARO p. 21 comment 129 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page 21 Part-ARO Appendix II. Reduced landing distance operations. Our comments against CAT.POL.A.255 sections on pages 13 and 27 also apply here. response Noted. See responses to comments on CAT.POL.A.255. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 21 CAT.OP.MPA.300 comment 12 comment by: Landauer Aviation Consulting Ltd "....assessment shall be done in accordance...." Suggest that "carried out" is better than "done". response Accepted. The text referred to in the comment is in the explanatory note of the NPA 2016-11 which will not be re-issued. However the comment is valid and will be taken into account in the rule text. comment 278 comment by: FNAM The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow: - a simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit - a reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) response Noted. See response to comment 268. comment 334 comment by: NetJets Europe TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses NetJets supports the changes to Part CAT in general. response Noted. comment 335 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the revised text as it helps to clarify the landing distance assessment requirement. response Noted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 22 CAT.OP.MPA.301 comment 131 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 22 – CAT.OP.MPA.301 This sentence is difficult to read and to understand. We recommend replacement with the following: Before commencing an approach to land, the commander of the aircraft, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM) and other information available to him or her, shall be satisfied that the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway or final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used should not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach. response Partially accepted. This rule is unchanged from the pre-existing CAT.OP.MPA.300. The original rule applied both to aeroplanes and helicopters. CAT.OP.MPA.301 was created only with the purpose of uncoupling helicopters from aeroplanes and so allow the introduction of those changes in the new aeroplane rule not affecting helicopters. However some remaining information non helicopter-relevant will be deleted from CAT.OP.MPA.301. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 22 CAT.OP.MPA.303 comment 7 comment by: KLM AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA 303 table 2 RWYCC 6 has a name ‘DRY’ as mentioned in table 1 response Not accepted. The runway surface condition “Dry” is mentioned in the first column of the table. The second column contains the runway surface descriptors when relevant (i.e. not for dry). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 15 comment by: KLM Cityhopper The requirement to add 15% to the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway results is unnecessarily large landing distances. The Talpa data is already quite conservative (it results in an extra 40-70 % margin on top of the unfactored certified landing distances). Adding another 15% as a requirement often results in the Landing distance based on Talpa Arc becoming larger than the dispatch landing distances (based on 1.67 and 1.92xULD), depending on the contaminant. This can lead to unworkable network operations. The TALPA ARC material clearly speaks only about a recommendation to add 15% (and not a requirement) and leaves that up to the operator, depending on experience level of crews and variance in the inputs used to calculate the landing distance (such as wind and runway contaminant). Inflight assesment data from manfactures, based on Talpa requirements, already covers the fact that this is for an average crew. The commander is able to decide if he calculates the inflight assesment based on the weather or contaminant provided by e.g. ATIS or based on an added margin for expected changing circumstances. It should be left to the commander or at least the operator to add a 15% margin and not by EASA requirement. response Not accepted. The definition of a fixed factor ensures uniform implementation of the rule. The purpose of the in-flight check of landing performance at the time of arrival is mainly to take into account variations occurred during the flight and to perform an actual calculation with the latest information available on the runway condition at the time of arrival. On short flights this is expected to have a minimal impact. Provisions will be added to allow compliance with the rule on dry and wet runways in those cases where conditions have not changed compared to the time of dispatch, by simply confirming that, at the time of arrival, the dispatch calculation is still valid. Overall, for wet runways the Agency expects that, at the time of arrival, longer distances will be obtained only in marginal cases. For dry runways the Agency does not expect a significant impact. comment 48 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Operational Factor for Time of Arrival Assessment 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 3. New CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Add a note below paragraph (a): „If this 15% margin is detrimental to the overall safety of the flight, it may be disregarded“ TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: CAT.OP.MPA303 is very directive regarding the applicability of the margin and may be interpreted such that the margin must be present even in cases of landing after in-flight system failures or events that require to land as soon as possible. While this eventuality is in principle covered by CAT.OP.MPA.105 (b) (“The commander, or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated, shall, in an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action, take any action he/she considers necessary under the circumstances in accordance with 7.d of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. In such cases he/she may deviate from rules, operational procedures and methods in the interest of safety.”) inclusion of this note reminds of the priority of safe conduct of the flight. response Not accepted. As mentioned in the comment, the ultimate authority of the commander/pilot-in-command to act as he/she considers necessary in the interest of safety in emergency situations is already stipulated. comment 49 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Approved data for time of arrival assessment 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 3. New CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) And 3.3.3 Part CAT 3. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Clarify the intent of the requirement for approved data in CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a): „ determined in accordance with the approved by the competent authority of the member state landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment. “ And define minimum compliance criteria for equivalent data in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a): „Performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival should be developed in accordance with AMC 25.1592 or equivalent and included in the operations manual (OM). Such data should at the minimum include an operational airborne distance, cover the range of braking action specified in AMC CS25.1592, and account for the effects of approach speed increments, temperature and runway slope. Data developed in compliance with AMC CS 25.191 at Amdt 2 or later is considered appropriate.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The requirement for approved data is easily read as exclusively allowing fully AMC 25.1592 compliant data developed by a manufacturer and certified by EASA. The only alternative to such data would be the use of the LDFs specified under AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (b). This is not the intent as far as Airbus understands it. Any data should be approved by the state of the AOC holder as part of the Operations Manual of the operator, but the minimum compliance criteria should be relaxed as proposed to allow use of reasonable data that has been developed for TALPA-compliance previously. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Partially accepted. The intentof the comment is shared by the Agency, however the proposed wording needs to be adapted, in order to account for existing cases where data developed in accordance with previous standards that may be acceptable and other cases where compliance with AMC CS- 25.1592 is difficult to achieve. comment 87 comment by: Stefan Why the concept of ACTUAL landing distance is not included here like already done by FAA (see SAFO 06012 cited also in the AC 25-32). Using the reference to the actual landing distance will better clarify what data we are considering, the sentence written in prposed text seems to be more the expression of a lawyer ("determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment"). Obviously this should be added also to the definition. The copy and paste from FAA regulation could help. For example: "A safety margin of 15% shall be added to the actual landing distance and require that the resulting distance be within the landing distance available of the runway used for landing." definition, to be adapted for cosnistency to this NPA "Actual Landing Distance. The landing distance for the reported meteorological and runway surface conditions, runway slope, airplane weight, airplane configuration, approach speed, use of autoland or a Head-up Guidance System, and ground deceleration devices planned to be used for the landing. It does not include any safety margin and represents the best performance the airplane is capable of for the conditions." response Not accepted. Definitions are needed for the terminology in use in the Regulation and related AMC/GM. The “Required” landing distance is self-defined as being that required by the rules. The “actual” landing distance is a general concept that is used sometimes to explain landing performance but would require a more consistent definition of that proposed in the comment, which is not necessary, as the concept is not used in the Regulation. comment 98 comment by: Stefan Someone is already thinking to use the option to replan during the flight a diversion to shorter airports (not defined before the flight as alternate, therefore not applying the full factors) adopting a reduced safety factor. Many real life examples can be proposed but, without mentioning specific airports: your initial scheduled destination is A but before departure it starts raining at A, the flight therefore is reschedule to B with alternate airport C. As soon as airborne, the flight requests a diversion to A becasue now, with the reduced safety factors, this airport is operable even if with runway wet. Something like this could be included someway in the regulation to bind operators (and CAA) to monitor such info? If a trend then is noted on a specific airport, an action should be required by CAA and ideally by the operator. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Not accepted. Regulations are not drafted with the implicit assumption of misuse. General provisions for oversight and enforcement exist and are applied by competent authorities. comment 99 comment by: Stefan I was not able to find any reference in the Air Ops and to this NPA about the emergency conditions: the 15% margin would apply also in these conditions? FAA says clearly say no, worth probably to specify in the NPA than just leave it as a generic statement (aka "captain can do what he deems necessary in the interest of safety"). response Not accepted. The authority of the pilot in command to take any action he/she considers necessary in the interest of safety in an emergency situation is stated in the essential requirements of the Basic Regulation. comment 100 comment by: CAA Norway CAT.OP.MPA.303 CAT.OP.MPA.303 Comment/Question 1: Reference is made to the term “Approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment”. Does this mean certified performance data, or can it comprise non-certified data in one form of another (advisory data, supplementary information etc.) CAA Norway has identified a need to add a definition of “Approved”, and how the term should be applied in this context. See comment to Chapter 3.1.1, Definitions. Rationale: The term “approved” must be clearly defined. An ICAO compliant definition (as proposed) would be preferable. A clarification of the term in context is necessary because the definition refers to ‘a contracting State’. Since the data should be approved in accordance with AMC CS 25.1592, the natural “contracting State’ would be the ‘State of design’. However, since, apparently there is no regulatory requirement to produce certified data for contaminated runways, the proposed paragraph could be read as “approved by the State of the operator” if the data provided are supplementary, advisory or other forms of non- certified data. If the latter is the case (i.e. the intention is ‘State of the operator’), will that be EASA since the basis is CS 25, or will it be left to the National Authorities during the approval process of the AOC holders’ OM B? If it is left to the national authorities, what would then the competency requirements be for the part of the national authorities dealing with the subject? TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Comment/Question 2 There is a need to include a statement/clarification as to the applicability of the requirements in CAT.OP.MPA.303 in relation to steep approach operations, reference CAT.POL.A245, 345 and short landing operations, reference CAT.POL.A.250, 350. Special provisions could be made for operations where there is a specific public interest. Rationale: These types of operation require a tighter control of speed and profile than normal approaches, and availability of approved data for landing distance at the estimated time of arrival for landing distance assessment may be even less readily available than for normal operation. Further, the reason for having these types of operations is, in many cases, a clear public interest in sustaining both scheduled operations with performance class A and air ambulance flights with performance class B aeroplanes to aerodromes where an extension of declared distances are either physically or economically extremely difficult, and where operations under present rules have not shown any safety issues related landing overruns during normal operations. (In Norway we have this situation with more than 500.000 landing operations over the last couple of decades.) This is elaborated upon in comments to AMC 1 CAT.OP.MPA.303. response Accepted. Comment1: EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data that are compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives based on existing manufacturer data will be offered for those cases Comment 2: Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added in CS-25. comment 130 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 22 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In flight check. The principle of an in-flight assessment of the “landing distance” required is strongly endorsed. However, paragraph (a) should be more explicit in identifying the timing for this check. · AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions – aeroplanes (page 51) draws attention to what is intended. · Historically, the ‘top of descent’ has been used. · GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (page 53) says ‘usually around top of descent’. · AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 (page 51) states ‘no more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time’. · GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In flight check (page 22) does suggest that a ‘quick decision .... just prior to landing’ is allowed, although such a decision is inherently risky. However, an early check when the runway condition is deteriorating also adds risk. In general the NPA should provide better guidance on the risks and the decision making process. The whole point of specifying top of descent for a check is to avoid late decision TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses making and go-arounds from the landing configuration which inherently will be less controlled and more dangerous. The guidance as written is confusing and contradictory. Also, it is noted that the text has not been amended for helicopters. Is this intended? response Partially accepted. The concern expressed in the comment is understood, however, as a matter of fact a pilot report from the preceding aircraft may be obtained just prior to landing and therefore the flight crew should be prepared to deal with it at that moment. The GM is meant to make sure that the flight crew is prepared to this eventuality by having done the relevant considerations beforehand. These elements should be anyway addressed by proper training. However, further explanations will be considered to improve the AMC and the GM to this respect. Finally It is not intended to amend the corresponding rule for helicopters as they are not concerned by the new runway condition reporting format. comment 199 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Comment: For in-service aircraft, Dassault-Aviation proposes to remove the reference to approved data in CAT OP MPA 303 and associated AMC and to recognize the acceptability of existing data in order to limit the burden associated with developping and producing new data packages. response Accepted. The approach followed by EASA in the implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations is in line with ICAO. It is however recognised the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 225 comment by: ERAA New CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) p. 22: What is meant by ‘approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment’? Is it envisaged that an authority shall ‘approve’ landing distance data? - Under CS-25.1592 p. 32 (b) a reference is made to performance information that ‘may be used to assist operators’, which would point to advisory status of the data. - Which means of retardation are considered? Is the landing distance factored? response Noted. See response to comment 292. comment 246 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes that an enroute check of landing distance at time of arrival is an operational requirement per CAT.OP.MPA.303. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Operational requirements are different than the airworthiness certification standards which are dependent on the type certification basis of an airplane model for applicability. Therefore, it is understood that this operational requirement to provide performance information in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent, is applicable to both existing models where CS 25.1592 is not part of the certification basis, as well as future models, where CS 25.1592 is part of the model's certification basis. It is a significant burden for an OEM to generate and certify new performance information as well as a departure from the intent of AC 25-32 where existing, approved data would remain accepted. Furthermore, some ongoing certification programs have specific wet runway Certification Review Items (CRI) applied to them which are not consistent with AMC 25.1592 which would result in increased burden. Data created in accordance with prior amendments of 25.1591, or in accordance with wet runway CRIs, should remain acceptable. GAMA requests that EASA confirm that existing Smooth Wet Runway CRI is considered an acceptable data basis for providing wet runway operational material as an alternative to CS 25.1592/AMC 25.1592. Additionally, GAMA requests that EASA allow existing time of arrival performance information to remain as is and require the proposed data standards for new certification models only. response Accepted. EASA recognises the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 270 comment by: FNAM Attachment #1 The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow: - a simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses - a reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) 1/ Over conservative factors defined in the AMC1 Regarding the AMC1, the FNAM would like some clarification regarding the meaning of “or equivalent” in the sentence “in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent”. Indeed, it should be confirmed that airplanes certified before the release of the AMC 25.1592 and airplanes certified before the release of CS 25 (e.g. JAR 25 certification or catch-up of previous national certifications) are deemed to be equivalent. Besides, some factors described in the AMC1 are a misfit (cf. table in Annex 1):  For dry runways, there is no case where there is no demonstrated Landing Distance. Therefore, the FNAM is wondering why for a RWYCC of 6, the LDF is equal to 1.67 whereas the corresponding factor to apply in-flight defined in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 is equal to 1.15. There are inconsistencies between the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and its AMC1.  Moreover, on wet runways, the factors described in the AMC1 are outliers and not consistent with the spirit of the AirOps regulation. Indeed, if we apply the data certified in the AFM (1.15.LDDry for most old certified aircrafts) the factor that needs to be applied is equal to (1.15)2, which means 1.32, and not 2.6. Equally, if there is no certified data on wet runway condition, the FNAM does not understand the discrepancy between the 2.6 factor described in this AMC1 and the application of CAT.POL.A.235 that requires a wet factor of 1.15 on which CAT.OP.MPA.303 supplement another safety margin of 1.15. This equals to the same (1.15)2, which means 1.32, total factor.  In other cases, some factors seems to be outliers since they are far too complex to implement and lead to inapplicable landing distances. 2/ Additional workload for pilots at a critical phase of flight This measure may appear dangerous for flight safety because it brings an additional workload for pilots at a critical moment: the approach preparation. Indeed, with an unusual representation for pilots, they are required to do 2 complex calculations which are not matching the usual Charts presentation in the AFM and the FCOM, when such Charts exist, which is not the case for most old generation airplanes:  Ensure that 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA or LDF.LDDemonstrated on dry runway ≤ LDA  Compute the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing In practice, this is unrealistic and may cause critical over workload in the cockpit during the approach. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3/ Measure only conceived for modern turbojets If this measure concerns all performance class A aeroplanes, it seems to have only been conceived for modern turbojets such as A320, B737-800, etc. It clearly does not take into account turbopropellers such as Beech1900 nor old ones such as Fokker 50, ATR 42-500 old generation. This measure does not take into account old Business Aviation turbojets such as the Falcon 50. First, these aircrafts do not have devices allowing the computation of performance landing distance assessment. Secondly, for most old airplanes, the certified data contained in the AFM do not include landing distances for wet / contaminated runways, requiring the use of the LDFs which have been demonstrated to be over conservative. As a conclusion, if modern turbojets may not be impacted by this new constraint, no RIA has been made to measure the impact on smaller / older aircrafts, including old turbojets. 4/ Current status of the regulation Until now, the logic has been to ensure first at dispatch that the demonstrated certified landing distance, depending on the runway condition, the altitude, the wind, the temperature, was below 0.6.LDA (Landing Distance Available) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes or 0.7.LDA for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes with the following particularity for wet runways: in the absence of demonstrated data, the landing distance chosen on a wet runway is the landing distance necessary on a dry runway increased by 15%. Then during the flight, the commander, already taking into account ICAO recommendations, has to ensure that the landing weight satisfies all the constraints depending on the real conditions such as:  The demonstrated landing distance is below the LDA  The go-around limitation during the approach is taken into account  Etc. In essence, at dispatch, the landing distance depending on the conditions at the estimated time of arrival has to be below 0.6.LDA or 0.7.LDA. This condition was taken into account in the accessibility of an adequate aerodrome during pre-flight planning. 5/ New additional constraints on landing distance through the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 The IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 adds additional constraints before the approach phase. The commander shall ensure that: At the estimated time of arrival weather conditions 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA When demonstrated landing distances (LDDemonstrated) do exist for the expected conditions, the landing distance to be taken into account is therefore 1.15.LDDemonstrated. If this data is not available, the landing distance to be taken into account is LDF.LD Demonstrated with LDF the landing distance factor defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Besides, in addition to the above, the commander shall compute during the approach preparation, the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing. To that extend, the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 requires 2 complex calculations during a critical phase of flight, while not requested before in flight. NB : More, this 1.15 factor appears confusing, as similar to the 1.15 factor required at dispatch in case of wet / contaminated runway when demonstrated landing distances for such conditions are not available. 6/ Margin added to already existing margins The implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 is adding a margin on already existing margins. Indeed:  A minima, with this new requirement, the commander has to add, in real conditions, a 15% margin on the certified landing distance, whereas the certified landing distances are already taking into account safety margins  The regulation EU n° 139/2014 (IR-ADR) applying to aerodromes, is already imposing RESA to prevent runway excursions 7/ Complex computing methodology The method to compute landing distances described in the IR.CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is complex and may appear dangerous. Indeed:  The logic to compute the constraint on the runway length necessary at dispatch: LD ≤ k.LDA (with k a factor) is contrary to the new constraint on the necessary runway length, in real conditions, computing method: k’.LD ≤ LDA (with k’ a factor) which is source of error  This computing method may appear dangerous because it does not match the operating practices. Indeed, usually, the commander computes the maximum operational landing weight depending on all the constraints, among which the runway length, the landing distance, the go-around limitation during the approach, etc. on an aggregated basis, and he makes sure that the real landing weight is below this computed mass Thus, this new intermediate calculation, described in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is not matching current operational practices and is not a usual representation for pilots. 8/ No impact assessment conducted whereas it is necessary This measure is ludicrous. No impact assessment on this new measure has been conducted regarding: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  The old generation airplanes for which the performance information for landing distance assessment are not available in the AFM  The runway lengths computed according to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA. 303 (a) (b)(1) and (c)(1)  The number of runway excursions that would have been avoided if this measure, which leads in most of the cases to distances much longer than most of the existing runways, had been implemented 9/ Lack of common sense This measure is contrary to common sense. Indeed, if in-flight the conditions taken into account at dispatch are not satisfied anymore, what should the commander do? Does he have to divert to a smaller and with reduced facilities aerodrome? Besides, current requirements are already compliant with the ICAO recommendations. No ICAO requirement is asking for in- flight additional margins, and above all, with such an absurd methodology. Furthermore, this measure creates discrepancies between European operators and the other ones without knowing what will happen for TCO holders: it is reasonable to think that TCO holders will unlikely propose alternative means of compliance warranting the same level of safety. 10/ Conclusion For all these reasons, as stated above: The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. response Partially accepted. 1. On the comment on paragraph (a): Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added in CS-25. On the comment on paragraph (b): The generic factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations)  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and  12 sample flight conditions They have been accepted as the resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. For such cases alternatives to the generic factors will be offered. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 2. The computation of the landing distance at time of arrival has to be carried out using data and methodologies that have to be provided in the OM in a manner that is easy to use and observes human factor principles. It is then not require to perform a second calculation for the mots unfavourable runway condition but rather to consider which deterioration may be acceptable. As a matter of fact a pilot report from the preceding aircraft may be obtained just prior to landing and therefore the flight crew should be prepared to deal with it at that moment. The GM is meant to make sure that the flight crew is prepared to this eventuality by having done the relevant considerations beforehand. These elements should be anyway addressed by proper training. 3. See point 1. 4. and 5. For the most unfavourable condition see point 2. The 1.15 required in CAT.OP.MPA.303 is applicable to the landing distance at time of arrival and is not a double application of the 1.15 factor for wet runways, which is meant to be applied at dispatch. 6. The certified distance for the time of arrival is based on different assumptions and therefore needs the application of the 1.15 factor. 7. See point 2. And 6. 8. EASA has acknowledged the impact on old designs, as explained in point 1. This will be taken into account also in the RIA. 9. The application of a factor is a consequence of how the data for landing distance at time of arrival are derived. If a factor is necessary it needs to be indicated at rule level 10. The proposal of CAT.POL.A.303 will be kept with a number of amendment as explained above and additional information and clarifications at AMC/GM level. comment 292 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) p. 22: Question to EASA: What is meant by ‘approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment’? Is it envisaged that an authority shall ‘approve’ landing distance data? - Under CS-25.1592 p. 32 (b) a reference is made to performance information that ‘may be used to assist operators’, which would point to advisory status of the data. - Which means of retardation are considered? Is the landing distance factored? TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. An AMC will clarify the nature of the data. comment 310 comment by: Textron Aviation 3. New CAT.OP.MPA.303 is added: (a) For performance class A aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be... Performance Class A (ME turboprops with MTOW >5700 kg or >9 pax) includes a number of aircraft types that were not certified to 14 CFR Part 25 or CS-25 airworthiness standards. As recognized here for Class B & C, data is not available for these aircraft as no relevant airworthiness standards exist. The TALPA ARC recognized this situation, and also noted that many of the recommendations for Part 25 aircraft would not translate well to small Part 23 aircraft. In the absence of a specific identified safety issue, TALPA ARC recommended that the enroute assessment be applicable only to multi-engine turbojets and large (commuter category) turboprops, and not applicable to small turboprops. It is therefore recommended that CAT.OP.MPA.303 be applicable to a subset of Performance class A aeroplanes, consisting of multi-engine turbojets, and turbo-propeller powered aircraft with a MTOM exceeding 8616 kg and more than 19 passengers. response Accepted. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 336 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the new text as it helps to clarify the in-flight check of landing distance at time of arrival response Noted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 23 CAT.POL.A.105 comment 226 comment by: ERAA CAT.POL.A.200 (c) p. 23: What is meant by ‘applicable standards on certification’? response Noted. See response to comment 293. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 23 CAT.POL.A.200 comment 8 comment by: KLM AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 Table 1 Not in line with Annex 15 Snowtam and so not workable within cockpit. response Accepted. Annex 15 has also been revised by ICAO, with regard to the SNOWTAM format, in line with the changes introduced in the other Annexes. References to annex 15 will be added. comment 293 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS CAT.POL.A.200 (c) p. 23: Question to EASA: What is meant by ‘applicable standards on certification’? response Noted. Explanations are provided in GM1 CAT.POL.A.200. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 23-24 CAT.POL.A.215 comment 2 comment by: KLM page 24 (d) it says at least required navigation performance 5(RNP5) this has to be RNAV5 as there is no valid notation that says RNP5. response Accepted. A consistency check will be carried out to correct other similar occurrences. comment 50 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Nomination of en-route alternates 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 7. CAT.POL.A.215 (c) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend CAT.POL.A.215 (c): „ The net flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue flight from the cruising altitude to an aerodrome where a landing can be made in accordance with CAT.POL.A.22530 or CAT.POL.A.2305, as appropriateCAT.OP.MPA.303. The net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track in accordance with the following (...)“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The current requirement in CAT.POL.A.215 (c) states that the nomination of en-route alternates should be based on the dispatch criteria for landing performance. This seems inappropriate for several reasons: Aeroplane mass at time of arrival at the en-route alternate is likely to be above the maximum certificated landing mass, for which no dispatch landing performance data for application of CAT.POL.A.230 and 235 may be furnished in the flight manual. Overweight procedures may be accounted for in time of arrival data only. A diversion to an en-route alternate is likely to be for reasons involving an emergency in which case time of arrival performance will be used for selection of the diversion airport by the commander. Unnecessarily large margins on the selection of en-route alternates may exclude reasonable aerodromes along the route. response Not accepted. CAT.POL.A.215(c) is normally applied at dispatch with a route analysis as explained in the related AMC1. The intent of the rule is to ensure that, in case of loss of one engine, the aeroplane is still able to clear the obstacles and reach an alternate where a safe landing can be made. These criteria orientates the flight planning based on the forecast available at the time of dispatch, i.e. the only information available at that time. A calculation with CAT.OP.MPA.303, in order to be meaningful, is supposed to be done with the latest information available at time of arrival. comment 51 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Net en-route flight path data 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 7. CAT.POL.A.215 (c) 5 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: The NPA proposes addition of an option to derive the net flight path from gross OEI data, if the net has not been furnished in the AFM. It is understood that this option applies to aeroplanes certificated before it was required to consider the net flight path. It should be noted that making such a derivation from tabulated data would necessarily be approximate since it involves the reduction of the gradient at all points of the drift-down flight path. response Noted. comment 132 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page 23 CAT.POL.A.215 En-route – one engine inoperative. Paragraph (c) For clarity and consistency with (c)(5) this should begin - “The en-route net flight path shall permit the aeroplane.....”. response Accepted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 24 CAT.POL.A.220 comment 3 comment by: KLM page 24 8 (b) here is also mentioned RNP5 which is not a valid RNP notation and this has to be changed to RNAV5 response Accepted. A consistency check will be carried out to correct other similar occurrences. comment 5 comment by: KLM CAT POL A 220 en idem dito 420. Delete requirement If the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNP 5. Reason: not conform Annex 6 and RNP 5 is even not existing response Partially accepted. The navigation specification will be changed to RNAV 5 consistently with other similar cases. comment 133 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 24 CAT.POL.A.220(a) En-route....two engines inoperative. The proposal amends the rule to state: At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate, at standard temperature in still air,............ We do not agree with the change from “all engines long range cruising speed” to “all engines operating at cruising power or thrust”. This seems to undermine the basis of the 90 minute EROPS threshold limit and so reduces safety. By allowing speeds other than long range cruise speed an aircraft can achieve a greater range at the expense of greater fuel usage. If, for example, the long range cruise speed is 270 kts, and then, following engine failure the aircraft descends and cruises at 330 kts, the 90 minute flight will take it further, thereby subverting the intent of the original regulation with no technical justification being offered. There seems no point in writing a regulation and then permitting a ‘get-out’ clause. response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 64 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The proposed change, while achieving harmonisation with the corresponding FAA rule, in whose context there is no evidence of safety issues related to the application of this criterion, will allow operational flexibility to those operators that are able to substantiate the use of a speed other than the long-range cruising speed to comply with the entire CAT.POL.A.220 rule. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 25 CAT.POL.A.230 comment 52 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Operations with a Reduced Landing Field Length Factor 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 9. CAT.POL.A.230 (a) (3) And 3.3.3 Part-CAT 8. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend paragraph (a) of CAT.POL.A.230: “notwithstanding (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, for aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non-scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations, within 80 % of the LDA when the aeroplane is approved for eligibility and CAT.POL.A.255 is complied with.” Append the following to AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230: “ELIGIBILITY FOR REDUCED REQUIRED LANDING DISTANCE OPERATIONS The AFM should state whether the aeroplane is eligible for operations with reduced required landing distances. When the factors prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) and (a)(2) are the basis for compliance with certifications standards such as CS 25.1309 the aeroplane should not be operated with reduced required landing distances.” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Airbus does not oppose the principle of the alleviation on field length factors proposed for business jet operations. It should however be ensured that the usual field length factors of 60% and 70% for turbojets and turboprops respectively have not been the basis for demonstration of compliance with CS25, notably CS 25.1309. Whether this is the case or not can only be declared by the manufacturer, so a statement of eligibility for reduced field length factor operations in the AFM should be a prerequisite. response Accepted. An aircraft eligibility criterion based on an AFM statement will be added. comment 53 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Incorrect references TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 65 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.1.3 Part-CAT 13. CAT.POL.A.330 (g) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Correct (g) as follows: „If the operator is unable to comply with (f)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall only be dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that permits full compliance with (a) to (f).“ response Accepted. References will be corrected. comment 101 comment by: CAA Norway Supported. response Noted. comment 134 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 25, CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runway Page 27 CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations. We do not agree with the proposal to reduce the required landing distances for aeroplanes not exceeding 45,360 kg or 19 passengers. We do not agree with the proposal because the justification for it is not adequately safety based. Any arbitrary decrease in landing distance available is, by definition, an increase in risk. The justification of maintaining safety while harmonising with FARs is only valid if the FAA adoption of the FARs was based on specific safety measures. The Appendix Report No NLR- CR-2014-206 states that the FAA landing factor was not determined by a safety assessment. The mitigation measures listed may be beneficial to improve the consistency of landings, but they are largely aspects of commonly applied airmanship, available to everyone, including the pilots of large aeroplanes. If an operator of an aircraft that is over 45360kg and/or has more than 19 passenger seats asked for a rule change to allow them to use factors based on 80% of landing distance and agreed to apply the required mitigations, what would be the argument to deny the request? Restricting the use of the factors based on 80% of landing distance available to aircraft with 19 seats or less is really saying that - equivalent safety has not been shown, but when the accidents happen they will have fewer fatalities and hence they will be of less concern to the general public. The group of aeroplanes identified for this concession (business/corporate aircraft) is already responsible for a higher proportion of overrun accidents per flying hour than other aeroplanes, so this change proposal does not make logical sense. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 66 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses It also defies logic that the proposal to permit lower ‘landing distance required’ factors than for larger CAT aeroplanes does not make mandatory the use of approach path guidance. The use of such systems could result in a safety benefit that might justify some reduction in the distance factors. response Partially accepted. A number of mitigating measures proposed to attain an equivalent level of safety are not qualitative, but rather precise barriers against certain risks, such as prohibiting operations on contaminated runways, operations with tailwind and approaches outside of stabilised criteria. Furthermore it is not the individual measure that achieves the result but rather the combination of all. As regards the mass threshold initially proposed for these operations, it will be changed to an aircraft eligibility statement in the AFM. comment 244 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) appreciates the agency proposing establishing a mechanism for operators to establish a landing mass on dry runways of 80 percent of the landing distance available (LDA) for business jets operations that comply with CAT.POL.A.255. The 80 percent allowance builds in experience gained in commercial on-demand business aviation operations in the United States in accordance with 14 CFR 135.4, Eligible-On-Demand (EOD) operations which have shown not only to increase operational flexibility but enhance safety. GAMA, however, recommends that the agency update the maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) proposed in the NPA (i.e., 45 360 kg) to align with new business jet products on the market. As the agency knows, there are several new business jet with an MCTOM above 45 360 kg including the Bombardier Global 7000 and 8000 as well as the Gulfstream G650ER (see, rulemaking underway in RMT.0695 for additional background). GAMA recommends that EASA increase the allowable MCTOM to accommodate these new business jets for 80 percent LDA operations. The RMT.0695 draft NPA proposes to increase the MCTOM for non-ETOPS business jet operations to 60 000 kg as the new threshold. GAMA recommends that the agency align the MCTOM in the runway performance regulation to establish a common set of thresholds between the two rules to ensure all business jet operators in Europe can benefit from the increased safety and operational flexibility that the 80 percent LDA runway achieves in concert with the requirements in CAT.POL.A.255. response Partially accepted. The aircraft eligibility for these operations will be changed in order to be established on the basis of certification criteria. comment 245 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes that the data basis for dry runway time of arrival landing performance is different from what is shown in CS 25.125. The manufacturer certifying two different sets of TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 67 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses landing performance could be a potential source of confusion for operators and would be an additional burden for the OEM that does not seem to have been considered fully in the analysis. The development and maintenance of two different sets of dry runway landing performance will require separate AFMSs and databases which will add unnecessary complexity and cost for what is considered a minimal increase of safety given the existing dry runway dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.230. GAMA recommends that the agency limit the proposed required time of arrival assessments to non-dry runways only as there should be sufficient margin from dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.235. response Not accepted. The current standard for landing distance on dry runways at time of dispatch is not suitable for in-fight checks at time of arrival. This unfortunately leads to two different data sets for dry and wet runways. However it should be noted that the operational requirement for in-flight check at time of arrival, for the case of dry runways may be limited to simply confirm the dispatch calculation. comment 281 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig EASA proposes to update CAT.POL.A.230 with respect to destination and alternate aerodromes by striking the existing (f) and updating the existing requirement in (g) (which is now changed to a new (f)). The agency, as part of this change, updates the requirement for the alternate aerodrome and limits the compliance for the alternate to not include (e). This seems to be an editorial error. GAMA recommends that the agency determine if the elimination of having to comply with (e) was intentional or editorial. response Noted. The CAT.POL.A.230 rule will be completely re-drafted for consistency with other rules and will be checked against eventual omissions. comment 311 comment by: Textron Aviation 9. CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows: (f) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall be only dispatched if an alterate aerodrome is designated that allows full compliance with (a) to (d). It's not clear why this was changed to (d). Is compliance with (e) not necessary for the alternate? response Accepted. The intent of the rule with respect to alternates will be clarified. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 68 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 337 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the new provision. Just one further comment related to the maximum mass. It is our understanding that this new provision is meant to include business aviation type operations. Please note that there are business aviation aeroplane types that are currently operating and others that are in the certification/production phase that will have MCTOMs above the 45 360kg. We believe that this mass limitation for other requirements like the Non-ETOPS 180 min may be being reviewed in a different RMT and we suggest that this is monitored for consistency. response Noted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 26 CAT.POL.A.235 comment 24 comment by: Gabriel Arroyo New paragraph CAT.POL.A.235, coming from a copy-paste of CAT.POL.A.230, is in this place difficult to read and understand. A clearer wording shall be appreciated. For instance, “If the operator is unable to comply with the CAT.POL.A.235 (a) to (e) requirements for the weight and runway conditions expected at the estimated time of arrival, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with either CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e) or CAT.POL.A.235 (a) to (e)” response Accepted. Wording and intent of the rule will be clarified. comment 27 comment by: Gabriel Arroyo · CAT.POL.A.235 states that “when the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet…”. Some doubts could arise about the way in which a forecast should be interpreted. There is no guide material similar to GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.185 “Planning minima for IFR flights” which instructions about how to take into account the different wordings used in a TAF/TREND regarding planning minima. response Not accepted. The requirement established in CAT.OP.MPA.185 explicitly calls for consideration of a time window of one hour before and one hour later for the planning minima, hence the need for guidance on the interpretation of the forecast. The same does not happen in the particular provision on weather report/forecast of CAT.POL.A.235, furthermore this has not been changed by the NPA. In any case a new provision requiring an in-flight check of landing performance, based on the latest information available at the time of arrival, is introduced. comment 28 comment by: Gabriel Arroyo TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 69 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses · CAT.POL.A.235 appears to refer only to the destination aerodrome. It could happen that the runway is forecasted to be dry in the aerodrome destination, but wet in the destination alternate. The question is how should be addressed this subject regarding alternate planning? response Accepted. The rule is intended to apply to destination alternates as well and will be clarified in this respect. comment 103 comment by: CAA Norway CAT.POL.A.235 CAA-N proposes to delete the requirement to consider contamination for the purpose of landing distance dispatch calculation in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data or equivalent. Rationale: Since the estimated time of arrival usually will be somewhere between two and fourteen hours, depending amongst other factors, the estimated flying time, later than the time when the dispatch calculations are performed, the quality/accuracy of the expected runway surface conditions at the estimated time of arrival will be questionable at best. This because the conditions are liable to change based on improvement actions taken by the aerodrome operator, and the fact that meteorological conditions can change at short notice. This is not only applicable to a situation with showery conditions, but also in a situation when there is a possibility of rapid temperature changes, such as at temperatures around freezing and time of day around sunrise or sunset. Furthermore, the at the time of take-off landing performance data as outlined in ICAO Annex 8, 11th edition – July 2016, amendment 108-B, paragraph 2.2.7.3 does only call for; The at time of take-off landing performance data need only to be determined with standard day temperature and level, dry landing surfaces for landplanes, Safety is considered to be assured through the detailed requirement for an “in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival – aeroplanes”, CAT.OP.MPA.303, with associated AMC and Guidance Material. Operational common sense suggests A) That it could be wise to take on extra fuel to allow for possible aerodrome closure for contaminant clearance with associated traffic congestions. This could be reflected in a GM on fuel policy.’ B) That it could be wise to perform a preliminary “in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival” according to CAT.OP.MPA.303 prior to take off, especially if the estimated time of landing is reasonably close. This could also be handled through a GM. Thus, a removal of this requirement would increase harmonisation with the US FAR 121.195. Dispatch calculations will be simplified because there would be only two different cases. a) Dispatch to a runway forecasted to be dry b) Dispatch to a runway forecasted be other than dry (wet or contaminated). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 70 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Proposed new text for CAT.POL.A.235 – Landing other than dry runway (alternatively wet or contaminated runway. (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at estimated time of arrival may not be dry (alternatively, wet or contaminated), the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230. (b) DELETED (c) Retained, but renumbered (d) DELETED (e) For (old c) above, the criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly. (f) If the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permits compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e). Consequences: For dispatch towards forecasted WET runway conditions, there are no changes, as the possibility to use a distance shorter than prescribed in (a) may still be used. For dispatch towards runways anticipated to be not dry or wet, i.e. contaminated, the 15 % margin on top of the dry runway requirement (CAT.POL.230) is retained. Alternative proposal if dispatch towards runways forecasted to be contaminated at the estimated time of arrival, and in accordance with approved data is retained. Change (d) as follows: (d) A landing distance on a contaminated runway shorter than required by (b), but not less than required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways. Rationale: The term “specially prepared winter runways)” has been proposed to be deleted as, Runway Condition Code will be used as the basis for the calculation. A runway contaminated by compacted ice or snow, which has been prepared by chemical or mechanical means to provide better friction, will be reported as a higher Runway Condition Code, than ice or compacted snow based on criteria, which has to be developed as part of the rulemaking task for PART ADR in collaboration with the rulemaking group for the Part OPS. An in depth rationale for the deletion of this term, is found in CAA-N comments to AMC 25.1591. Additional Proposals: A) Develop a GM on how to use information from both weather forecasts and SNOWTAM in the fuel planning process to consider the need for extra fuel required to cover possible closures for runway clearance and preparation procedures and associated extra holding time caused by any associated congestion. B) Develop a GM on the advisability to perform a preliminary “in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival” according to CAT.OP.MPA.303 prior to take off, especially if the estimated time of landing is reasonably close. This should be a task for the rulemaking group, Part OPS. response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 71 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The requirements of CAT.POL.A.235 will be completely re-drafted, consistently with those proposed inCAT.OP.MPA.303 and CAT.POL.A.230, partly endorsing the suggestions of this comment. It should be noted, however, that most of the concerns expressed in the comment will be addressed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704 by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 245 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes that the data basis for dry runway time of arrival landing performance is different from what is shown in CS 25.125. The manufacturer certifying two different sets of landing performance could be a potential source of confusion for operators and would be an additional burden for the OEM that does not seem to have been considered fully in the analysis. The development and maintenance of two different sets of dry runway landing performance will require separate AFMSs and databases which will add unnecessary complexity and cost for what is considered a minimal increase of safety given the existing dry runway dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.230. GAMA recommends that the agency limit the proposed required time of arrival assessments to non-dry runways only as there should be sufficient margin from dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.235. response Not accepted. The current standard for landing distance on dry runways at time of dispatch is not suitable for in-fight checks at time of arrival. This unfortunately leads to two different data sets for dry and wet runways. However it should be noted that the operational requirement for in- flight check at time of arrival, for the case of dry runways may be limited to simply confirm the dispatch calculation. comment comment by: Norwegian Air (Norwegian Air Norway, Norwegian Air International, 256 Norwegian Air UK and Norwegian Air Shuttle) CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet or contaminated, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230. The 1.92 (or 1.64 for turboprop) factor is conservative with regards to dispatch performance. As it is impossible to forecast contaminated runway conditions with constantly changing conditions it makes no sense calculating weight for the adverse conditions. A mandatory inflight check using the “at the time of landing” performance data will safeguard the landing calculations, even if the conditions require a higher factor than 1.92/1.64 (meaning worse than expected at the time of dispatch). (b) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be contaminated, the LDA shall be at least the landing distance determined in accordance with (a), or at least 115 % of the landing distance determined in TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 72 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data or equivalent, whichever is greater. The operator shall specify in the operations manual if equivalent landing distance data are to be applied. We propose to delete this paragraph as it is impossible to forecast contaminated runway conditions. Flight times can vary from less than 1 hour to 10+ hours. The 1.92/1.64 factor should normally provide enough margin. The mandatory inflight check will safeguard that the required landing distance for the actual landing mass + 15% is within LDA. (c) A landing distance on a wet runway shorter than that required by (a), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on wet runways. The criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly. Paragraph (e) is moved up, provided (b) and (d) are deleted. (d) A landing distance on a specially prepared contaminated runway shorter than that required by (b), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways. Further, we propose to delete paragraph (d) together with (b). However, if deleting paragraph (b) is too radical, we propose to alter paragraph (d) to the following: A landing distance on a specially prepared contaminated runway shorter than that required by (b), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways. If the AFM has the data prescribed, a RWYCC should be enough to do the calculation regardless of how the runway is treated. (e) For (b), (c) and (d), the criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly, except that CAT.POL.A.230(a) shall not be applied to (b) above. Paragraph is moved up to (c). (f) For (b) and (d) (a) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e). This will include WET runways in the alternates alleviation, as current regulation opens for. response Partially accepted. This rule will be re-drafted consistently with the changes proposed in CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways and clarifying the intent of the rule with respect to alternate aerodromes. comment 267 comment by: Conrad Reference: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 73 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. Proposed Amendments 3.1 Draft Regulation - 3.1.2. Part-CAT 10. CAT.POL.A.235 Landing - wet and contaminated runways Suggested Change: CAT.POL.A.235 Landing - wet and contaminated runways (a) (unchanged) (b) (this paragraph should be deleted) (c) (b) A landing distance on a wet runway shorter than that required by (a), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on wet runways. The criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly. ((c) becomes (b), the former (e) is included) (d) (this paragraph should be deleted) (e) (this paragraph moves to (b)) (f) (c) For (b) and (d) (a) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e). ((f) becomes (c)) Rationale: It is questionable, whether due to weather reports/forecast an operator can predict if a runway at the time of arrival will be contaminated. Moreover, it is impossible to judge some hours in advance, which exact runway conditions to expect at time of arrival. Especially in dynamic weather situations this is just guesswork. Contaminated runway conditions might range from "Compacted Snow" (close to "Good") down to Ice. How would you decide, what to expect at landing? Always going to the conservative side will impact your operation. Furthrmore, if you planned on e.g. Slush on landing runway, this might reduce your takeoff weight and thus, reduce the amount of extra fuel you can carry. Extra fuel however opens up options for other alternates. It is impossible to predict, if a destination airport (eg. on the US east coast in winterly conditions) won't be closed down by the time you arrive. Planning for alternates is what you do in that case. Thus, extra fuel is necessary and you wouldn't want to restrict it by planning for e.g. Slush runways in the first place. Correctly guessing which runway condition to expect at time of landing, might only work for very short flights. The FAA approach is to only account for Wet at dispatch. With the "At-time-of-landing" assessment now made mandatory, it is ensured, that landings won't be done at conditions that exceed the performance capabilities of the aircraft. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 74 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The "At-time-of-landing" assessment was made mandatory precisely for the fact, that runway conditions could deteriorate during the flight. Thus, a dispatch to wet runways would be sufficient. response Accepted. This rule will be re-drafted consistently with the changes proposed in CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways and clarifying the intent of the rule with respect to alternate aerodromes. comment 284 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The agency introduces a new (f) in CAT.POL.A.235, Landing - wet and contaminated runways. The new text states that "For (b) and (d) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternative aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e)." The reference to (e)(1) seems to be a typo or error, because (e)(1) is the most favorable runway and still air, and does not consider a wind component. GAMA recommends that the agency determine if this reference should be to CAT.POL.A.230(e)(2) instead. response Accepted. This rule will be completely re-drafted consistently with the changes proposed in CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways and clarifying the intent of the rule with respect to alternate aerodromes. comment 303 comment by: Finnish Transport Safety Agency CAT.POL.A.235 p. 26 Point (f) states: For (b) and (d) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e). Is the intention that when dispatching the aeroplane in accordance with point (f), the possible contamination at the alternate aerodromes is not taken into account? The point requires only full compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e) and not CAT.POL.A.235. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 75 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The requirement is intended to include dispatch on contaminated runways and will be clarified in this respect. comment 312 comment by: Textron Aviation 10. CAT.POL.A.235 is amended as follows: (f) For (b) and (d) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a destination aerodrome... Should this be (e)(2)? Dispatching in accordance with (e)(1) does not require a specified wind component. response Accepted. The intent of the rule with respect to destination and alternate aerodromes will be clarified. comment 338 comment by: NetJets Europe in paragraph d) what is the definition of a 'specially prepared winter runway'? If it the same as the definition in CS25, then we suggest that it is included in the AIR OPS definitions. response Accepted. A definition will be added. comment 349 comment by: US FAA Comment summary Item: (a) (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230. As currently written CAT.POL.A.235 may be interpreted as applying to CAT.POL.A.230 (a) (3) and therefore that it is acceptable to schedule wet runway operations based on a 1.15 factor applied to a landing distance based on 80% as called out in (a)(3) only. This is not the intent and is inconsistent with CAT.POL.A.255 (b)(2)(iv)(B). Suggested resolution Add the italized text below to CAT.POL.A.235(a) CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 (a) (1) or (a)(2) or CAT.POL.A.255 (b)(2)(iv)(B) as appropriate. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 76 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Partially accepted. Operations with reduced required landing distance are entirely dealt with in the newly proposed provisions CAT.POL.A.255 and 355 under a “prior approval” regime.However, as the rule CAT.POL.A.235 is being entirely re-drafted, consistency with other rules will be ensured. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 26-27 CAT.POL.A.250 comment 1 comment by: Gheorghe Oprea Dear EASA team, Please clarify what means "Short landing operations" and which is the purpose of this approval and explain the purpose of "Approval of reduced required LDA". If I will obtain Short landing operations doesn't means that I can land within a reduced LDA? Or, if I obtain approval of reduced LDA, doesn't means that I will land on short runway (anyway from my point of view it will be difficult to obtain approval for short landing due to the fact that in CAT.POL.A.230(c) is stated that even will comply with CAT.POL.A.250 we have to comply also with CAT.POL.A.230(a)). Regards, Gheorghe Oprea response Noted. “Short landing operations” are those requiring approval under CAT.POL.A.250 where the approved operator is allowed to use in the landing performance calculation the length of the declared safe area in addition to the LDA. “Reduced required landing distance operations” are those proposed by the NPA to be approved under CAT.POL.A.255” where the approved operator is allowed to land within 80% of the LDA. The two types of operations cannot be conducted at the same time. comment 174 comment by: UK CAA TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 77 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page No: 26 Paragraph No: CAT.POL.A.250 Approval of short landing operations Comment: As is the case for the Class B proposals, steep approach operations should not be permitted when using reduced required landing distance factors. Justification: As the NLR Safety Study itself says (on page 15), the special procedures of steep approaches are outside the scope of this analysis, consequently, they should be precluded for all reduced required landing distance permissions. response Accepted. Steep approach operations are not intended to be combined with reduced required landing distance operations. This is clarified in CAT.POL.A.255. comment 193 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Page 27: CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) Comment: This requirement could be alleviated with only one pilot qualified and trained for these operations, indeed the only critical point of the reduced landing distance operations is during the landing phase for the pilot flying. We recommend the folowing requirement: "the flight crew is composed of at least one qualified and trained commander having recency in reduced required landing distance operations. if the commander is the only pilot qualified, trained and having recency for these oerations, he shall be the pilot flying". response Not accepted. The proposed requirements on crew composition and training are considered an important element to achieve an equivalent level of safety in this kind of operations. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 27-28 CAT.POL.A.255 comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department 22 (Transportstyrelsen, Luftfartsavdelningen) CAT.POL.A.255 Regarding approval of reduced required landing distance operations the phrase “non- scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations” might need to be defined. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 78 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The mentioned phrase exist in Article 2 (6) but only for the purpose of flight and duty time limitations. For reasons of clarity EASA should consider to rephrase or define “non-scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations” in the context of performance. response Accepted. A GM explaining the intent of this wording will be added. comment comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation 34 law) Ad CAT.POL.A.255(a): The distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled operation is not justifiable. On the one hand in the past all distinctions between those two types of operations were abolished and it doesn't make any sense to re-introduce such distinction. On the other hand the passengers of scheduled operations and non-scheduled operations should enjoy the same level of safety. But if reduced required landing distance operations are considered to be safe, then the distinction is not justifiable. response Not accepted. The applicability of the proposed rule has been built around the concept of eligible on- demand operations to achieve harmonisation with the FAA on this specific type of CAT operations. comment comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation 36 law) Ad CAT.POL.A.255(b): A new paragraph c should be added, so that a combination of par. (b)(1) [i.e. risk assessment] and par. (b)(2) [criteria] is possible. For example the general criteria of par. (b)(2) are fulfilled but the reduced required landing distance operations should be eligible for steep approaches. In such case a risk assessment – restricted to the special issues of a steep approach - should be conducted, whereas in general the meeting of the criteria in par. (b)(2) is sufficient. response Not accepted. Steep approach operations, as well as other special approach procedures outside of stabilised approach criteria, are not intended to be combined with reduced required landing distance operations. Each one of these options, under the conditions prescribed by the relevant rule, may be used by an operator to benefit of some flexibility under appropriate mitigating conditions, but they are not meant to be combined. comment comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation 38 law) Ad CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(i): TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 79 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The exclusion of steep approaches in general is too restrictive because some airports in the alps have a combination of steep approach and short runway [Sion, Chambery, London City, Lugano, Althenrhein, Bolzano]. We suggest, that steep approaches are permitted in case the AFM of the aircraft used provides special performance data (such as GL5000, F900B and F7X). response Not accepted. Steep approach operations, as well as other special approach procedures outside of stabilised approach criteria, are not intended to be combined with reduced required landing distance operations. Each one of these options, under the conditions prescribed by the relevant rule, may be used by an operator to benefit of some flexibility under appropriate mitigating conditions, but they are not meant to be combined. comment 39 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) Ad CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv)(C): It would be better (and in line with (A), (B), and (D)) to change the wording to: "no forecasted contaminated runway…" response Accepted. comment 40 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) Ad CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii): It should be clarified that this rule addresses the competent authority of the aerodrome (and not the competent authority issuing the approval for the operator). Not only because they know best about the local specialities, but also because otherwise it is not guaranteed that all competent authorities grant approvals for the same airport under the same conditions… response Accepted. The authority certifying the aerodrome will be indicated in the rule. comment 44 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) AD CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv): 1. Please determine in an AMC what you exactly expect from the ALAP. 2. Please clarify that this ALAP is just a part of the dispatch (and not of the flight watch) process. It "sounds" as if there was a special programme to be established by the operator whereas in fact there are simply 4 items to be checked during dispatch. response Accepted. Clarifications on the intent and the content of the ALAP will be provided. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 80 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 135 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 25, CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runway Page 27 CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations. We do not agree with the proposal to reduce the required landing distances for aeroplanes not exceeding 45,360 kg or 19 passengers. We do not agree with the proposal because the justification for it is not adequately safety based. Any arbitrary decrease in landing distance available is, by definition, an increase in risk. The justification of maintaining safety while harmonising with FARs is only valid if the FAA adoption of the FARs was based on specific safety measures. The Appendix Report No NLR- CR-2014-206 states that the FAA landing factor was not determined by a safety assessment. The mitigation measures listed may be beneficial to improve the consistency of landings, but they are largely aspects of commonly applied airmanship, available to everyone, including the pilots of large aeroplanes. If an operator of an aircraft that is over 45360kg and/or has more than 19 passenger seats asked for a rule change to allow them to use factors based on 80% of landing distance and agreed to apply the required mitigations, what would be the argument to deny the request? Restricting the use of the factors based on 80% of landing distance available to aircraft with 19 seats or less is really saying that - equivalent safety has not been shown, but when the accidents happen they will have fewer fatalities and hence they will be of less concern to the general public. The group of aeroplanes identified for this concession (business/corporate aircraft) is already responsible for a higher proportion of overrun accidents per flying hour than other aeroplanes, so this change proposal does not make logical sense. It also defies logic that the proposal to permit lower ‘landing distance required’ factors than for larger CAT aeroplanes does not make mandatory the use of approach path guidance. The use of such systems could result in a safety benefit that might justify some reduction in the distance factors. response Noted. See response to comment 134. comment 136 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 27 – CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2). The word ‘forecasted’ is not commonly used in modern English. ‘Forecast’, ‘forecasting’ and ‘forecaster’ are the forms of the word commonly in use. Examples of usual and expected use in the English language, that are relevant to this NPA, are: “No tailwind is forecast” “No tailwind was forecast” “No tailwind had been forecast” “The forecast for today does not include a tailwind” “It is expected that no tailwind will be forecast for tomorrow”. These are all correct usage. We recommend that “forecasted” be replaced by “forecast” throughout the text. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 81 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. comment 137 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 27 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv)(D) Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations Under paragraph (D), what is the definition of ‘no forecasted adverse weather conditions’? response Noted. “Adverse weather conditions are explained in a GM. comment 175 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 27 Paragraph No: CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations (b) Comment: CAA UK does not support the principle of extrapolating the conclusions of the NLR study to a wider population of aircraft operators who do not have an FDM programme. Therefore an FDM programme should be a mandatory condition for each operator requiring this approval. Justification: The competent authority needs quantitative evidence about the current level of safety of each operator before granting an approval for further reducing the safety margins. Also, the data from an FDM programme is the only credible evidence to support the required risk assessment. Finally, the operator needs an effective monitoring process to assess the effectiveness of the new mitigating measures on a continued basis and close the SMS loop. The only reliable tool to deliver such evidence is a Flight Data Monitoring programme, specifically tailored to monitor the risk of runway excursions for each operator. Therefore the implementation of an FDM programme should be a requirement for those operators wishing to conduct reduced landing distance operations. Proposed Text: Amend to read: (b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that: (1) a risk assessment has been conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, is achieved; or (1) an FDM programme specifically tailored to monitor the risk of runway excursions has been implemented and integrated in the operator’s SMS (2) the following conditions are met: (2) One of the following conditions are met: (a) a risk assessment has been conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, is achieved; or (b) the following conditions are met: (i) special-approach procedures, such as steep approaches, planned screen heights higher than 60 ft or lower than 35 ft, low-visibility operations, planned operations outside stabilised approach criteria, are prohibited; TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 82 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses (ii) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 are prohibited; (iii) an adequate training, checking and monitoring process for the flight crew is established; (iv) an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure that the following conditions are met: (A) no tailwind is forecasted at the expected time of arrival; (B) if the runway is forecasted to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) or be at least 115 % of the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(3), whichever is longer; (C) no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; and (D) no forecasted adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; (v) all the equipment affecting landing performance is operative before commencing the flight; (vi) the flight crew is composed of at least two qualified and trained pilots having recency in reduced required landing distance operations; vii) the commander shall make the final decision to conduct reduced required landing distance operations and may decide not to do so when they consider this to be in the interest of safety; and (viii) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids, missed-approach and balked-landing considerations. response Partially accepted. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of more general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it should be used also for the purposes of CAT.POL.A.255. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, alternative means for data collection will be considered and the analysis of operator’s performance in relation to unstable approaches and long landings will be included in the risk assessment. comment 176 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 27 Paragraph No: CAT.POL.A.255 Comment: Reduced landing distance factors - wet runways: The reduced factor rule is potentially currently applicable to runways ‘forecasted to be wet’. For normal despatch calculation, the wet despatch factor is 52% (1/(1.15*1.67)) for jets and 60% (1/(1.15*1.43) for turboprops. The check against the wet TOA calculation is appropriate, but is only required if the CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2) is followed which is currently optional (and may not necessarily be limiting anyway). Even then, if the runway is grooved or has PFC, the check may be simply TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 83 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses confirming that the runway meets the criteria used for dispatch. Either way, the reduced factor effect would be retained. It is recommended that further work on the applicability of the reduced factor to wet runways needs to be done, or the proposals limited to the dry case only. Justification: The NLR Safety Assessment does not demonstrate for the wet runway condition that that the mitigating measures restore the equivalent level of safety to the normal (wet) despatch criteria. response Not accepted. The use of reduced required landing distance in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255 is not supposed to be cumulated with any performance credit for grooved or PFC wet runways. comment 177 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 27 Paragraph No: CAT.POL.A.255 Comment: Fitment of additional retardation devices other than wheel brakes: The NLR Safety Study quantifies the benefit from various systems in terms of sustaining reduced landing distance factors i.e. ground spoilers and thrust reversers. Such items are fitted at the option of the manufacturer. Therefore, there should be a requirement that such equipment should be fitted and operable on the aircraft before reduced factors could be authorised. Specifically, the benefits of reverse thrust is often quoted, but its fitment is optional at the aircraft design stage, so it cannot be relied upon in a operational safety analysis, unless there is a requirement that reduced factors can only be applied if they are fitted. Nevertheless if it is fitted, then the credit given in the current approved field length distances (to which the reduced factor will be applied) is limited to the one-engine inoperative condition. Hence in normal operations with all-engine-operating, there is an additional safety margin available because of the better stopping capability with all-engines providing reverse. Justification: Use of reverse thrust is necessary to meet the assumptions in the safety justification for reduced factors. Proposed Text: It is suggested that an additional condition to CAT.POL.A.255(b) is included:- (x) the aircraft must be equipped with ground spoilers, anti-skid and thrust reversing systems, response Not accepted. A variety of aircraft types and circumstances were considered in the NLR study. These aircraft varied in size and in installed stopping devices. The 6-8 passenger jet used in the analysis did not have thrust reversers or ground spoilers installed and the deceleration mainly came from the brakes. The 14 passenger turbo-prop also did not have ground spoilers installed. Only the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 84 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses larger business jets had thrust reversers and ground spoilers. Thrust reversers are most effective on contaminated runways rather than on dry/wet runways. However reduced landing distance operations are not allowed on contaminated runways. Moreover the study includes several of the conditions suggested in the comment, and further to other comments an aircraft eligibility criterion, based on AFM statement will be introduced. comment 204 comment by: Embraer S.A. Embraer agrees with EASA-proposed inclusion of requirement CAT.POL.A.255. Nonetheless, Embraer does not see why the applicability of this requirement should be limited to MCTOM of 45,360 kg as one of the purposes of the Airplane Performance Review in the NPA is to attain harmonization with FAA’s operational requirements (14CFR Part 91, 14CFR Part 135). In FAA’s requirements there is no limit on airplane weight (MCTOM) for the consideration of a reduced landing factor (1/0.60 → 1/0.80). Embraer understands that only the passenger seat configuration (MOPSC) limitation is adequate to achieve the objective of this NPA. response Accepted. The mass threshold will be changed to an aircraft eligibility criterion based on an AFM statement. comment 219 comment by: DGAC France DGAC has some concerns about a generic approval that is not limited to a list of specific airports identified by the operator. DGAC believes that the relevance and efficiency of the crew training and recency conditions depend upon the airports characteristics. Besides, as for condition (b)(2)(viii), considering the variability of airports that may be concerned, it would be difficult for a National Authority to assess and identify all the airports characteristics that may lead to a reduction of the level of safety when combined with reduced required landing distance operations. Therefore, if the possibility of a generic approval is maintained, DGAC suggests that Part-ARO authorises and recommends to the National Authorities to limit this approval to a list of specific airports identified by the operator. response Partially accepted. The conditions required for the prior approval of these operations are meant to be effective independently of the aerodrome because they are mitigating the risks related to having a short runway. However it will be specified that training has to be conducted at aerodromes that are representative of the intended operations. comment 220 comment by: DGAC France CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(i) -- Considering that under standard operations, non-stabilised approach is precluded, the wording “planned operations outside stabilised approach criteria” should be replaced for better clarity and consistency by “particular approaches approved under CAT.OP.MPA.115(a)” as it is written in CAT.POL.A.355(b)(2). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 85 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. comment 244 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) appreciates the agency proposing establishing a mechanism for operators to establish a landing mass on dry runways of 80 percent of the landing distance available (LDA) for business jets operations that comply with CAT.POL.A.255. The 80 percent allowance builds in experience gained in commercial on-demand business aviation operations in the United States in accordance with 14 CFR 135.4, Eligible-On-Demand (EOD) operations which have shown not only to increase operational flexibility but enhance safety. GAMA, however, recommends that the agency update the maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) proposed in the NPA (i.e., 45 360 kg) to align with new business jet products on the market. As the agency knows, there are several new business jet with an MCTOM above 45 360 kg including the Bombardier Global 7000 and 8000 as well as the Gulfstream G650ER (see, rulemaking underway in RMT.0695 for additional background). GAMA recommends that EASA increase the allowable MCTOM to accommodate these new business jets for 80 percent LDA operations. The RMT.0695 draft NPA proposes to increase the MCTOM for non-ETOPS business jet operations to 60 000 kg as the new threshold. GAMA recommends that the agency align the MCTOM in the runway performance regulation to establish a common set of thresholds between the two rules to ensure all business jet operators in Europe can benefit from the increased safety and operational flexibility that the 80 percent LDA runway achieves in concert with the requirements in CAT.POL.A.255. response Partially accepted. The aircraft eligibility for these operations will be changed in order to be established on the basis of certification criteria comment 277 comment by: FNAM The FNAM thanks the EASA for allowing the use of an 80% landing factor for business aviation operators conducted with performance class A aeroplanes. Indeed, this regulatory proposal will allow more flexibility for business operators, facilitate the access to certain regional aerodromes and eliminate a competitive disadvantage for European operators. The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 86 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow:  A simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit  A reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) response Noted. For the part of the comment on CAT.OP.MPA.303, see response to comment 268. comment 339 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the introduction of CAT.POL.A.255. Refer also to commnent number 337 circa the MCTOM of 45360 kg. response Noted. See response to comment 337. comment 350 comment by: US FAA CAT.POL.A.255 (a) and CAT.POL.A.355 (a) Comment summary While this is an operational regulation, the margin with this reduced landing distance factor is directly related to the method of certification used in creating the AFM dry runway landing data. If the parameters used during certification and computation of the AFM dry runway landing distance are consistent with the normal operating environment such as glide slope and rate of sink at touchdown then it is reasonable for the specific airplane may be approved for reduced landing distance operation. If the parameters are not consistent with normal operation, i.e. steeper glide path, higher assumed touchdown rate etc. than operationally reasonable then the specific airplane should not be approved for reduced landing distance operation. Another item which varies between AFM’s is inclusion of slope and OAT. This should also be a consideration when determining if an individual airplane’s AFM is appropriate for a reduced landing distance factor. If there is no slope or OAT accountability in the then the reduced landing distance factor should not be allowed. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 87 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Suggested resolution CAT.POL.A.255 (a) to add the following italicized text: For aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non- scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations and whose AFM states that reduced landing distance operation is acceptable, landing operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) require prior approval by the competent authority. CAT.POL.A.355 (a) to add the following italicized text: (a) Operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway require a AFM states that reduced landing distance operation is acceptable and prior approval by the competent authority. Such approval shall be obtained for each runway on which operations with reduced required landing distance are conducted. response Partially accepted. An aircraft eligibility criterion based on an AFM statement will be introduced in CAT.POL.A.255. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 28 CAT.POL.A.330 comment 104 comment by: CAA Norway Comment: Typo in new (g), (d) should read (f) in two locations. response Accepted. References will be corrected. comment 138 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 28 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways. Comment as for CAT.POL.A.230. We do not agree with the proposal to reduce the required landing distances for aeroplanes not exceeding 45,360 kg or 19 passengers. We do not agree with the proposal because the justification for it is not adequately safety based. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 88 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. See response to comment 234. comment 207 comment by: Embraer S.A. Considering the proposed changes in requirement CAT.POL.A.330, paragraphs (f) and (g) present wrong references, which are related to the previous version. response Accepted. References will be corrected. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 29-30 CAT.POL.A.355 comment 16 comment by: DGAC France In order to avoid any confusion, CAT.POL.A.335(a) should be modified as followed: a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be equal to or exceed the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330(a) multiplied by a factor of 1.15. Indeed, according to CAT.POL.A.355 (6)(iii), the landing distance at dispatch, when the runway is forecasted to be wet, should either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(b) or be at least 115% of the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.330(b) (i.e 1.15*1.25*ALD), whichever is longer. But when there is no data available for the in-flight assessment, CAT.OP.MPA.303(b) implies to use, for wet runway, the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.335 which means the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.330 multiplied by 1.15. Therefore, we might consider that we can use the landing distance required by CAT.POL.A.330(b) multiplied by 1.15 factor. Finally, when applying the “whichever is longer” given in CAT.POL.A.355 (6)(iii), we could end up in comparing the same figure as both the two following possibilities: 1/ CAT.OP.MPA.303(b), i.e CAT.POL.A.335, i.e. 115% of CAT.POL.A.330(b) 2/ 115 % of CAT.POL.A.330(b) would give the same result: 1.15*1.25*ALD. Besides, even if the issue is not exactly the same since CAT.POL.A.303(a) is less confusing, we suggest for an overall consistency, to modify also CAT.POL.A.235(a) as followed: (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (2) response Accepted. comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department 23 (Transportstyrelsen, Luftfartsavdelningen) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 89 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The Swedish Transport Agency question whether the proposed text is necessary or if it should be handled on a derogation basis should it be needed. response Noted. The Agency considers that a Regulation should not be written in such a way that exemptions or derogations would be needed systematically to cope with cases where compliance with one or more requirements cannot be achieved. comment 139 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 29 CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced landing distance operations. Comment as for CAT.POL.A.255. We do not agree with the proposal to reduce the required landing distances for aeroplanes not exceeding 45,360 kg or 19 passengers. We do not agree with the proposal because the justification for it is not adequately safety based. response Noted. See response to comment 234. comment 140 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 29 CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced ..landing distance operations. Paragraph (6)(i), (iii), (iv). ‘forecasted’ should be replaced by ‘forecast’. response Accepted. comment 141 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 29 CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations Steep approaches and short landing operations should be separately and explicitly prohibited, just as they are in CAT.POL.A.255(2)(i) & (ii). The proposed CAT.POL.A.355 text could be understood to mean that short landing operations are only prohibited when combined with certain kinds of approach. If the reduced landing factors are used, steep approaches and short landing operations should all be prohibited because Class B aircraft have lower performance capability and poorer equipment installations compared with Class A. response Not accepted. In accordance with CAT.POL.A.345, in order to conduct steep approach operations, the aircraft must be certified and specific performance shall be provided in the AFM. These specific AFM data already take into account any increase on the landing distance due to steep approach procedures, such as a higher approach speed. Besides, CAT.POL.A.355 proposal requires an efficient control of the touchdown area with a clear identification of the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 90 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses designated area and specific go-around instructions, in case touch down is not achieved within those limits. These measure prevents inaccuracies in the air distance before the touchdown. comment 178 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 30 Paragraph No: CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Comment: The ‘additional’ requirement “operational procedures and instructions are established to ensure that the deceleration devices are correctly used by the flight crew;…” does not add any value to the reduced factored landing procedures. Justification: This aspect of the operation of the aircraft should be standard operating practice throughout the operator’s entire operations, not just when using reduced factor provisions. Consequently, it is not a ‘mitigating measure’ for the purposes of using reduced landing distance factors. A more relevant requirement would be that the devices are functioning before landing. Proposed Text: Amend to read: (7) operational procedures and instructions are established to ensure that: (i) all the equipment affecting landing performance and landing distance is operative before commencing the flight; (ii) the deceleration devices are operable before landing and correctly used by the flight crew; and (iii) landing on contaminated runways is prohibited; response Not accepted. The mitigating measure related to the functionality of aircraft equipment is introduced by not allowing the dispatch of the aircraft with such equipment inoperative and by introducing specific enhanced maintenance programme to increase reliability of those systems. Should such equipment or system become inoperative in-flight the situation will have to be dealt with according to the abnormal/emergency procedures established in the operations manual and to the commander’s judgement. Additional guidance will be provided in this respect. comment 279 comment by: FNAM The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 91 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow:  A simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit  A reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) response Noted. See response to comment 268. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) — 3.1.2. Part-CAT — p. 30-31 CAT.POL.A.420 comment 142 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 30 CAT.POL. A.420(a) En-route .... two engines inoperative. At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate, at standard temperature in still air,............ We do not agree with the change from “all engines long range cruising speed” to “all engines operating at cruising power or thrust”. This seems to undermine that basis of the 90 minute EROPS threshold limit and so reduces safety. By allowing speeds other than long range cruise speed an aircraft can achieve a greater range at the expense of greater fuel usage. If, for example, the long range cruise speed is 270 kts, then following the engine failures the aircraft descends and cruises at 330 kts, 90 minutes will take it further, thereby subverting the intent of the original regulation with no technical justification being offered. There seems no point in writing a regulation and then permitting a ‘get-out’ clause. response Not accepted. The proposed change, while achieving harmonisation with the corresponding FAA rule, in whose context there is no evidence of safety issues related to the application of this criterion, will allow operational flexibility to those operators that are able to substantiate the use of a speed other than the long-range cruising speed to comply with the entire CAT.POL.A.420 rule. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) — CS-25 Book 1 — 3.2.1. p. 31-32 Certification Specifications — CS 25.1591 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 92 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 6 comment by: KLM CS 25.1591 item 4 Not in line with ANNEX 15 amendment 39B (snowtam) Different definitions gives interpretation issues. Item 6.2 Table description not in line snowtam Water must be Standing water Compacted snow and Slush difference based on OAT or dept unknown in snowtam format. OAT not mentioned within snowtam. Makes this table not accessible within the cockpit. Wet (slippery wet) Term not in Annex 6 response Accepted. A consistency check and harmonisation with ICAO terminology will be carried out. comment 227 comment by: ERAA CS-25.1592 p. 32: Widerøe operates all landings on the 830 metre runways as ‘steep approach’ 4.5 degrees from a 35 feet screen height. response Noted. See response to comment 294. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) — CS-25 Book 1 — 3.2.1. p. 32 Certification Specifications — CS 25.1592 comment 54 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Title of CS25.1592 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.1 CS-25 Book 1 2. New CS 25.1592 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Change the title to read: „Landing Performance Information for Time of Arrival Landing Performance assessment and for Operations on Wet Slippery or Contaminated Runways at Time of Takeoff“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The current title does not clearly state that the performance data mandated under this paragraph covers both Landing performance for dispatch to slippery wet and contaminated runways, and TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 93 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Landing performance data for time of arrival for all runway states, including dry and wet. The proposal may be cumbersome, but it is explicit on the intention. If combination of both aspects in a single paragraph is unclear, it could be considered to separate dispatch and in-flight in two sections, but that seems not desirable in terms of consistency with the FAA and the ICAO approach, and in terms of maintaining a single associated AMC. response Partially accepted. The title of CS 25.1592 will be kept, however the applicability will be clearly specified in the first paragraph. comment 55 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : CS25.1592 (a) 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.1 CS-25 Book 1 2. New CS 25.1592 (a) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Change (a) to read: “(a) Information applicable to aeroplanes operated on dry and wet runways for landing performance assessment at time of arrival and and supplementary landing performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on slippery wet runways or runways contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or ice for use both at dispatch and time of arrival must be furnished by the applicant.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The text of subparagraph (a) does not clearly distinguish the applicability of dry and wet runway landing performance under this paragraph from that specified under CS25.125. The proposed text clarifies that dry and wet data as specified here applies only to time of arrival assessments. The proposal also introduces the fact that slippery wet runway performance are covered by this paragraph. response Accepted. The applicability will be clarified. comment 56 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : CS25.1592 (b) 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.1 CS-25 Book 1 2. New CS 25.1592 (b) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Correct wording in CS 25.1592 (b): TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 94 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses “Performance information furnished by the applicant must be contained in the aeroplane flight manual (AFM). (...)“ response Accepted. comment 57 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : CS25.1592 (c) 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.1 CS-25 Book 1 2. New CS 25.1592 (c) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Correct wording in CS 25.1592 (c): “(...) It considers Runway Condition Code (see AMC 25.1592) and optionally runway surface conditions, winds, temperatures, average runway slope, pressure altitude, icing condition, planned final-approach speed, aeroplane mass and configuration, and deceleration devices used“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The term braking action is not defined. More specifically, the AMC states that data should be provided as a function of RWYCC. Furthermore, furnishing data for runway states is optional, while providing it for RWYCC is mandatory. This is clarified by moving the RWYCC first and replacing the slash that could be read as an exclusive “or” with “and optionally”. It is proposed that the definition of RWYCC should be managed by reference to the AMC. response Accepted. comment 58 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : CS25.1592 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.1 CS-25 Book 1 2. New CS 25.1592 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Add a new subparagraph at the end of CS 25.1592 copied from CS 25.1591(c): “(d) The AFM must clearly indicate the conditions and the extent of applicability for each contaminant used in establishing the contaminated runway performance information. It must also state that actual conditions that are different from those used for establishing the contaminated runway performance information may lead to different performance.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The content of CS 25.1591 (c) which is now applicable for takeoff only should be equally valid for landing. In particular, without this paragraph the publication of maximum contaminant depths for landing is no longer mandated. response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 95 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses AMC 25.1592 already explains and takes into account the rationale of the comment. comment 179 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 32, 41, 52 et seq. Paragraph No: CS 25.1592 and associated AMC 25.1592. Comment: As proposed, the time of arrival landing distance proposals should not be applicable to steep approaches. Although no specific mention is made of the landing approach angle in these paragraphs, CS 23.1592 as currently written implies that consideration is only being made to ‘normal’ landing operations and distances, and refers to the methodology used to show compliance with CS 25.125. For example, CS 1592(c) states “The landing distance to be used for landing performance assessment consists of the horizontal distance from the point at which the main gear of the aeroplane is 50 ft above the landing surface to the point where the aeroplane comes to a complete stop. It considers runway surface conditions/braking action, winds, temperatures, average runway slope….”. However, CAT.POL.A.230(b) permits steep approaches with distances based on screenheights of less than 60ft and not less than 35ft. Furthermore, it is understood that the generic factors presented in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA 303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) in Table 1 (page 52) were originally derived from a mathematical analysis based upon normal approach operations, so these should be restricted to those operations using the same criteria. Justification: The derivation of the air distance and thus the overall landing distance will be dependent upon the approach angle used. The generic factors which are to be used in the absence of data provided in accordance with CS 25.1592 must have been shown to be valid for the approach angle to be used. response Accepted. Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added. comment 294 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS CS-25.1592 p. 32: Widerøe operates all landings on the 830 metre runways as ‘steep approach’ 4.5 degrees from a 35 feet screen height. response Noted. A paragraph addressing steep approaches will be added. comment 307 comment by: DGAC France The word "supplementary" should be removed for better clarity since the provision of landing distances data on contaminated runway becomes mandatory with this amendment. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 96 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Not accepted. The term “supplementary” in this context indicates the special status of this data, which is approved, but not demonstrated other than by computation. comment 340 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the requirement for applicants to provide the Landing Distance Assessment performance data. This is essential to assist operators in complying with the new Part CAT requirements. As a note: there are some legacy aeroplane types that may have difficulty amending the performance to fulfil the requirements. response Noted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) — CS-25 Book 2 — 3.2.2. 3.2.2. p. 32-41 Acceptable Means of Compliance — AMC 25.1591 comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department 21 (Transportstyrelsen, Luftfartsavdelningen) Existing CAT.POL.A.205 vs proposed new AMC 25.1591 para 7.3.4 In the existing system with reported rwy friction values there is a possibility to assess the take- off performance with regard to rwy friction. In those parts of Europe where runways are contaminated with ice or compacted snow with shallow depths it would be beneficial if the certification provisions could take credit for the ADR-operators ability to improve the friction of a surface covered by compacted snow or ice, for example by sanding (c.f. PANS-ADR 1.1.3.16, 1.1.3.17). It would also be beneficial if a similar system would be applicable for operators that use aeroplanes for which the manufacturers do not provide data as per AMC 25.1591 para 7.3.4. ---------- AMC 25.1591 Further clarification is needed how to handle a situation when lower than expected RWYCCs are reported. Due to the change in AMC 25.1591 GM1 CAT.POL.A.205 needs to be aligned. response Partially accepted. The concerns expressed in this comment will be addressed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704 by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 59 comment by: AIRBUS TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 97 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses SUBJECT : Frost in AMC 25.1591 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 1. CS 25.1591 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend AMC 25.1591 2.0 to read: „In line with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) standards, a depth of more than 3 mm for contaminant accountability in take-off performance assessments is considered as a reasonable lower threshold. Below this depth of loose contaminant, or in case of a thin layer of frost, the runway is considered to be wet, for which AMC 25.1591 does not apply.“ Move the following definition from AMC 25.1592 to AMC 25.1591 4.0: „Frost Ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is below freezing. Frost differs from ice in that frost crystals grow independently and, therefore, have a more granular texture. Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point of water (0 °C). Note 2:— under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, which is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The intent is to manage frost for takeoff. As a thin layer of frost carries the same penalty as a wet runway, so it is strictly outside the scope of the AMC, but as it is a winter contaminant it seems natural to deal with it in this AMC and provide the statement that it is considered equivalent to wet, along with 3mm or les depth of loose contaminants. This creates a need to include the definition of frost in this AMC. As AMC 25.1592 does not duplicate the definitions already in AMC25.1591, it is thus appropriate to move the text from there. response Accepted. comment 60 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Complete list of contaminants in AMC 25.1591 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 1. CS 25.1591 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend Table 1of AMC 25.1591 5.0 to include: Compacted Snow At or Below outside air 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4 temperature (OAT) -15°C (see Note 4) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 98 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Compacted Snow Above outside air temperature 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4 (OAT) -15°C (see Note 4) Dry Snow over Compacted Snow More than 0.2 Yes Yes 7.2, 7.3, (see Note 3) 10- 7.4 up to 130 Wet Snow over Compacted Snow More than 0.5 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 5- 7.4 up to 30 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: It would be possible to manage all of these contaminants by equivalence with one of the contaminants previously defined, but listing all the reportable contaminants as distinct conditions with clearly associated performance assumptions brings clarity and prevents misinterpretation. response Accepted. comment 61 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Default Wheel Braking Coefficients in AMC 25.1591 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 1. CS 25.1591 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend Table 2of AMC 25.1591 7.3.1 to read: Contaminant Default Wheel Braking Coefficient µ Standing Water and Slush For speeds below 85 % of the hydroplaning speed, 50 % of the wheel braking coefficient determined in accordance with CS 25.109(c), but not greater than 0.16 For speeds at 85 % of the hydroplaning speed and above, 0.05 Wet Snow above 3 mm depth 0.16 Dry Snow above 3 mm depth 0.16 Wet Snow over Compacted 0.16 Snow Dry Snow over Compacted 0.16 Snow Compacted Snow At or Below 0.20 outside air temperature (OAT) -15 °C TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 99 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Compacted Snow Above 0.16 outside air temperature (OAT) -15 °C Ice 0.07 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: It is proposed that the friction coefficient for standing water and slush for takeoff should be the same as that considered for landing in AMC25.1592. It would be possible to manage all of these contaminants by equivalence with one of the contaminants previously defined, but listing all the reportable contaminants as distinct conditions with clearly associated performance assumptions brings clarity and prevents misinterpretation. response Accepted. comment 62 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1591 8.3 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 1. CS 25.1591 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Delete last sentence in first paragraph of 8.3: „This should be presented either as separate data appropriate to a defined runway contaminant or as incremental data based on the AFM normal dry or wet runway information. The take-off distance (TOD) should be determined in accordance with CS 25.113(b) and the take-off run (TOR) in accordance with CS 25.113(c)(2).“ Delete requirement to publish crosswind guidance: „The applicant should provide crosswind guidance for operations on contaminated runways.“ Delete requirement to detail procedures and assumptions in the AFM: “The AFM should provide: the performance data for operations on contaminated runways; definitions of runway surface conditions; and the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data.” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: AMC 25.1591 6.2.1 already states: “Except as modified by the effects of contaminant as derived below, performance assumptions remain unchanged from those used for a wet runway, in accordance with the agreed certification standard. These include accelerate-stop distance definition, time delays, take-off distance definition, engine failure accountability and stopping means other than by wheel brakes (but see paragraph 7.4.3).” This paragraph also includes the provisions for TOD and TOR on wet runway appropriately that were referenced by the addition to 8.3. This addition is thus not necessary. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 100 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Including a requirement to publish crosswind guidance for contaminated runways in the AMC 25.1591 means that such guidance should be published in the AFM. As there is currently no agreed method for producing such guidance, it is mostly based on experience and simulation using assumptions defined by individual manufacturers. It does not seem appropriate to publish such information in the AFM. Alternatively this statement should be amended with “in appropriate documentation” The AFM does not seem to be the appropriate media to carry information such as the procedures and assumptions used to develop contaminated runway data. response Accepted. comment 106 comment by: CAA Norway Comment 4.8, Specially Prepared Winter Runway Proposal 1: CAA-N proposes to delete the term “Specially Prepared Winter Runway» throughout the document, starting with item 4.8, in the Definitions. Rationale 1, Not in compliance with ICAO global reporting format: The term specially prepared winter runway is not in compliance with the new ICAO global reporting format since no runway condition code (RWYCC) can be assigned to the term. This fact is confirmed with the proposed Note 5 to Table 1 in paragraph 5. Contaminant properties to be considered. (Note 5 page 36 of 96) Note 5: No default model is proposed for specially prepared winter runways in this AMC. Such surfaces are specific and treatment may be of variable effectiveness. The procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of operator. It is further confirmed by note to Table 2 in paragraph 7.0 Effects of Contaminant, 7.3 Braking friction (All Contaminants, 7.3.1 Default Values, at page 38 of 96: Note: For a specially prepared winter runway surface no default friction value can be given due to the diversity of conditions that will apply. Proposal 2, NEED FOR EASA TO APPROVE PROCEDURES AND METHODS That EASA (RMT.0296 and RMT.0591) develop a method – compliant to ICAO global reporting format – for upgrading and downgrading of runway condition code (RWYCC) derived from the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) when a dry frozen surface of compacted snow and/or ice has been treated with sand or grit or has been mechanically or chemically treated. Rationale 2: The application of specially prepared winter runway as proposed requires that the State of the Operator; from Note 5 above: The procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of operator. and the State of the aerodrome; extract from proposed new paragraph 7.3.4 Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface, at page 39 of 96: Appropriate procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of aerodrome. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 101 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses approve procedures and methods. This implies that procedures and methods are in need of harmonization across State borders. However, the definition of a specially prepared winter runway calls only for national procedures; (page 34 of 96): A runway, with a dry frozen surface of compacted snow and/or ice which has been treated with sand or grit or has been mechanically or chemically treated to improve runway friction. The runway friction is monitored and reported on a regular basis in accordance with national procedures. Consequently; to become a consistent method there is a need for EASA to approve procedures and methods for specially prepared winter runway, or effectively to develop such procedures and methods that the goal can be achieved by using ICAO compliant terminology and concept to achieve the same purpose, i.e. to have performance credits on specially prepared surfaces without using the term “Specially Prepared Winter Runways. Proposal 3: The need to develop a method for take-off performance calculation, using ICAO compliant terminology, while giving suitable credit to prepared surfaces, reference proposal 2 above: Add procedure to calculate take-off performance from a surface of ice or compact snow with sand, grit or mechanical or chemicals. For the acceleration phase, use No Drag increase. For the deceleration phase, use friction values from Table 1 from AMC 25.1592 for the reported runway condition code (typically 2 or 3). A description of this issue should be written under a new heading/title in para 7.3.4. Rationale 3: Provided that the term “Specially Prepared Winter Runways” is deleted from AMC 25.1591, there is still a need to have take-off data, which takes account of the effect of preparation as outlined above. Unless, a method for giving a performance credit for treating a surface of ice or compact snow with sand, grit or mechanical or chemicals, method using ICAO compliant terms, operational consequences may be large for some operators. response Not accepted. The concept of operations on specially prepared winter runways will be developed in the aerodrome rules, along with the necessary procedures and requirements for their approval. Consequent references and guidance will be added to the rules for air operations. comment 113 comment by: CAA Norway Chapter 7 7.3.1 Table 2 Comment/Proposal Editorial review necessary to ensure all terms used are ICAO Compliant, specifically: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 102 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The text in the first column in Table 2 should be identical with the text in the second column in AMC 25.1592, 6.2 Transition Distance, Table 1 which again should be identical with the text in ICAO PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981) e.g. the text used in ICAO State letter AN 4/27-16/28 dated 5 May 2016, Table 3 – Assigning a runway condition code (RWYCC) and Table 5 – Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM). Minor editorial changes identified post issuing the State letter should be corrected: Column heading: Runway surface condition description Footnote 1: Also applicable for -15 oC Lower outside air temperature 7.3.1 Default Values (Table 2) Comment Default value for COMPACTED SNOW higher than -15 oC outside air temperature or preferably runway surface temperature is not listed. Proposal: This factor (0.16) is found in AMC 25.1592, and should be listed together with the provisions related to different types of ant- skid systems. This is necessary to provide take-off performance data for all relevant conditions. Rationale: In table 2 the Default Wheel Braking Coefficient μ has been changed for all contaminants listed except for COMPACTED SNOW. However, for COMPACTED SNOW temperature has been introduced as a discriminator and a -15 oC (OAT) threshold value has been added. Table 2 has only a default value for COMPACTED SNOW below this value. These values are the minimum conservative ‘default’ values; e.g they represent the effective braking coefficient of an anti-skid controlled braked wheel/tyre. Draft AMC 25.1592 Comment/Proposal – Default Temperature value (- 15 C) for compact snow. Proposal: To initiate work to see if this temperature limit, possibly in conjunction with dew-point spread, may be raised to increase applicability of this Runway Condition Code response Not accepted. The -15 °C criterion is kept as a conservative value until research or supporting data will justify an alternative solution. However flexibility will be provided by the concept of specially prepared winter runways operations developed in RMT.0704. comment 143 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 37 Aquaplaning Speed. It is not correct to say that the aquaplaning “speed is given by 9√P”. The best that can be said is that 9√P has been used in the past to obtain an estimate of the aquaplaning speed. ESDU has researched the origins of this expression and have found that it is an approximation based on one series of tests obtained many decades ago. Also, the origin of the 85% factor could not be substantiated. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 103 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses It is recommended that the following text be deleted from AMC 25.1591 ----------------------------- “For the purposes of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on contaminant drag, the aquaplaning speed, VP, is given by – Vp=9√P where VP is the ground speed in knots and P is the tyre pressure in lb/in2. For the purpose of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on wheel-to-ground friction, the aquaplaning speed VP given above should be factored with a coefficient of 0.85.” ---------------------------------- ESDU methods are already referenced in section 9 of this AMC 25.1591. ESDU has developed a better methodology for the estimation of aquaplaning speeds. The reference to the current method is: ESDU 15003 - Planing of rib tread aircraft tyres ESDU is prepared to create a draft revision of the AMC to reflect current knowledge and provide this to EASA for consideration. Please advise whether EASA would be prepared to consider such a proposal. response Partially accepted. The 0.85 factor is re-instated to account for the hysteresis effect. The new methodology developed by ESDU in the document 05011 has been considered by EASA, however further testing is necessary for its validation. While this process takes place EASA wishes to maintain the reference to the origin of the methods applied in AMC 25.1591 and 1592. comment 144 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 38 Table under paragraph 7.3.1. Default Values The table is headed ‘Default Wheel Braking Coefficient’, but the second line of the first paragraph of text refers to ‘friction values’. “Friction values” is also used in the two notes below the table. The terminology needs to be consistent. The first block of the table says ‘use μ = 0.05’, but the second block from bottom of the table uses 0.07 (for ice); is this difference intentional? The information given in this table is not justified within the document. Below the table it says “(See reference 10)”. This refers to an ESDU Data Item that has been withdrawn in favour of better methodology that provides for a more rational understanding of the effects. Reference 10 should be replaced by: ESDU 05011 - Summary of the model for performance of an aircraft tyre rolling or braking on dry or precipitate contaminated runways. ESDU is prepared to create a draft revision of the AMC to reflect current knowledge and provide this to EASA for consideration. Please advise whether EASA would be prepared to consider such a proposal. response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 104 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The comments on the text and the table will be taken into account. The new methodology developed by ESDU in the document 05011 has been considered by EASA, however further testing is necessary for its validation. While this process takes place EASA wishes to maintain the reference to the origin of the methods applied in AMC 25.1591 and 1592. comment 145 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Para 7.3.3. Use of Ground Friction Measurement Devices. This issue is addressed in “Report in Support of EASA.2011.OP.13 (Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment)”, November 2012, that was produced by ESDU at EASA’s request. ESDU believes that the statement here that no correlation exists between aircraft stopping capability and ground friction measuring devices is not correct. ESDU would welcome the opportunity to assist EASA with further refinements of AMC 25.1591 to reflect current knowledge. response Noted. The EASA rulemaking task RMT.0704 intends to define standards for CFME for both functional and operational measurements, however it was agreed to address this subtask at a more global level (ICAO) where the Aerodrome Panel has tasked the Friction Task Force (FTF) to take over this activity. ESDU contribution to the work of the FTF is welcome. comment 146 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 40 9.0 References. The references in this section are no longer valid because most of the items have been withdrawn. They have been superseded by later methods. The changes are listed in the following table.- NPA 2016-11 Subject Corrected Reference Reference (1) ESDU 83042 Spray, Aquaplaning Speed ESDU 83042, ESDU 15003 (2) ESDU 98001 Skin Friction ESDU 98001 (3) ESDU 90035 Fluid Displacement Drag ESDU 05011, ESDU 10015 Forces (4) ESDU Memo. 97 Drag from forward Spray ESDU 83042, ESDU 15003 (5) ESDU Memo 96 Operation in Slush ESDU 05011 (6) ESDU Memo 95 Spray - impact forces ESDU 83042 (7) NASA TP-2718 Water Spray ESDU 83042, ESDU 15003 (8) AIAA, Vol 36, No.5 G. van Es, Dry Snow ESDU 05011, ESDU 10015, ESDU 11004 (9) NLR TR98165 G. van Es, Dry Snow (10) ESDU 72008 Planing ESDU 15003 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 105 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The references in Section 9 should be changed to: 9 References Sources containing methods for determining the effects of tyre performance and effects on dry, wet and contaminated runways. 1. ESDU 05011. Summary of the model for performance of an aircraft tyre rolling or braking on dry or precipitate contaminated runways. 2. ESDU 10015. Model for performance of a single aircraft tyre rolling or braking on dry and precipitate contaminated runways. 3. ESDU 11004. Decelerating forces on multiple-wheel undercarriages rolling or braking on precipitate contaminated runways 4. ESDU 15003. Planing of rib tread aircraft tyres 5. ESDU 83042. Estimation of spray patterns generated from the sides of aircraft tyres running in water or slush. 6. ESDU 98001. Estimation of airframe skin-friction drag due to impingement of tyre spray. 7. Van Es, G.W.H., ‘Rolling Resistance of Aircraft Tires in Dry Snow’, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Technical Report TR-98165, Amsterdam, 1998. 8. FAA AC 25-31, ‘Take-off Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways’, 22 December 2016. 9. ICAO Doc 10064, ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’ (to be published). ESDU is prepared to create a draft revision of the AMC to reflect current knowledge and provide this to EASA for consideration. Please advise whether EASA would be prepared to consider such a proposal. response Partially accepted. The new methodology developed by ESDU in the document 05011 has been considered by EASA, however further testing is necessary for its validation. While this process takes place EASA wishes to maintain the reference to the origin of the methods applied in AMC 25.1591 and 1592. The withdrawn items will be identified in the list. Some other references to existing documents will be updated to reflect the latest edition. comment 194 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault- Aviation Comment: a. AMC 25.1591 braking coefficients are different from AC 25-31, whereas AMC 25.1592 braking coefficients are consistent with AC 25-32 (as a reminder, AC 25-31 and AC 25-32 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 106 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses braking coefficients are identical). This will create a new set of data different from current 25.1591 and different from AC 25-31. response Not accepted. Some differences with the FAA AC 25-31 are intentional. See also the replies to comment 208 and 248. comment 201 comment by: Thomson Airways 7.3.4. Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface The limitation of ‘effective friction not greater than 0.16’ (7.3.4) is overly restrictive. Assuming this relates to the wheel braking coefficient then this limits the improvement to ‘Medium’. Many specially prepared winter surfaces exhibit a very good braking action, often in excess off wet performance. We would like to propose that effective friction levels of up to 0.20 may be used, operationally in conjunction with reliable friction measuring equipment at the aerodrome concerned. A wheel braking coefficient of 0.20 is the default value assumed for compacted snow cases below -15 degrees C. response Accepted. In line with the methods documented in CS-ADR, the maximum coefficient is increased to 0.20. comment 208 comment by: Embraer S.A. Regarding AMC 25.1591, Embraer understands that not all the changes proposed by EASA should be incorporated in the final version of the AMC. There are also other details that should be addressed by the NPA concerning this AMC. Embraer understands that airplane manufacturers should inform the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data for operation on contaminated runways only if operating procedures are different from those used for dry runways or if manufacturers elect to comply with requirement §25.1591 with assumptions other than those of AMC 25.1591. Furthermore, runway surface definitions are standardized in certification requirements and MoCs and thus need not be presented in the AFM, and could be presented in other operating manual instead. Embraer also understands that EASA should seek to harmonize braking friction coefficients values used for takeoff performance assessment on contaminated runways with those published by the FAA on AC 25.31, in line with EASA’s goal of increasing harmonization with FAA’s rules. Namely, the braking coefficients for runways covered with standing water and ice are different from those of AC 25.31 in the following respects:  Standing water: EASA proposes the use of a single equation for braking coefficient (mBR=f(V)), whereas the FAA proposes the use of requirement §25.109, which considers a set of equations in which mBR=f(V, ptire). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 107 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  Ice: EASA proposes mBR=0.07 whereas the FAA adopts mBR=0.08. Also, in contrast to AC25.31, NPA 2016-11 does not address the case when the runway is covered with compacted snow and the air temperature is above -15°C. response Not accepted. The differences in the wheel braking coefficients have been adopted for the following reasons:  For Slush and Standing Water at takeoff there is no reason to limit the coefficient at low speed to 0.16, as there is no need to maintain a hierarchy in the contaminants as for the RWYCCs at Landing. It would unnecessarily penalize performance.  For ice Cold and Dry, a value of 0.07 was selected as for most aircraft in most conditions it permits the 15% operational margin to cover a degradation of the actual coefficient to 0.05, a value that was observed in in-service accidents and incidents. This would not be the case for 0.08. It is understood that the FAA may harmonize with the EASA value. comment 209 comment by: Embraer S.A. 4.3 - Embraer suggests using the same definition of Wet Snow provided on paragraph 6.3.2 of AC 25.32 for “Item 3.2.2 – 1 – 4.3”. response Not accepted. EASA has adopted the ICAO definitions. comment 210 comment by: Embraer S.A. 4.4 - Embraer suggests using the same definition of Dry Snow provided on paragraph 6.3.1 of AC 25.32 for “Item 3.2.2 – 1 – 4.4”. response Not accepted. EASA has adopted the ICAO definitions. comment 211 comment by: Embraer S.A. 5.1 - (Table 1) - In the “Slippery Wet” row of Table 1, include the reference “(see Note 4)” in the “Range of Depths” column. response Accepted. The reference will be included. comment 228 comment by: ERAA AMC-SUBPART G 2.0 p. 33: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 108 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Is the 3 mm reference to contamination depth or water equivalent depth. We propose to continue the current system with WED. response Noted. See response to comment 297. comment 229 comment by: ERAA P38 7.3.3 Use of Ground friction measurements devices Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that an aerodrome operator may use measured friction coefficient as one of several variables for assessing upgrading and downgrading of the RWYCC. This obviously requires that the aerodrome operator has necessary equipment, knowledge, procedures and training acceptable to the competent authority. Furthermore, the measured friction coefficient and type of measuring device should be included in the remark field of the RCR. The competent authority should establish procedures for approval of friction measuring devices and conditions for use. In example: Friction Measuring Device A is approved for: · Dry snow up to 25mm · Compact snow · Dry ice · Sanded ice Friction Measuring Device B is approved for: · Dry snow up to 25mm · Wet snow up to 10mm · Compact snow · Dry ice · Sanded ice · Wet ice – sanded Etc. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is supporting use of techniques and procedures for improvement of contaminated runways, provided the procedures and methods are approved by the competent authority of the state of the aerodrome. Experience with operation on sanded short field aerodromes is very good. A typical SNOWTAM issued by a reporter for a short field aerodrome situated on the coast of Northern Norway may state 3mm slush on ice, runway sanded, estimated braking action medium or medium to good. Another example is for an aerodrome situated inland with a dryer and colder climate where the sand is fixed to the ice by being heated before application on cold ice. This surface can be TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 109 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses best described as “sand paper”. The corresponding SNOWTAM is issued by the reporter as ice, sanded, estimated braking action medium to good. Below is examples of SNOWTAMS for 10 aerodromes in Northern Norway issued January 4, 2017. >>> ENHV (HONNINGSVAG/VALAN RWY 08/26) <<< SWEN0008 ENHV 01041010 (SNOWTAM 0008 A) ENHV B) 01041010 C) 08 F) 79/79/79 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/89 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/89 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. SAND APPLIED. 50PCT FROZEN RUTS RIDGES ON RWY. >>> ENBS (BATSFJORD RWY 03/21) <<< SWEN0007 ENBS 01040716 (SNOWTAM 0007 A) ENBS B) 01040716 C) 03 F) 479/479/479 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 N) NO R) NO T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. FROZEN SAND APPLIED. DRIFTING SNOW. TWY.A.BRA.4. APRON.A.BRA.4. .TWY.B.BRA.4 .APRON.B.BRA.4. >>> ENVD (VADSO RWY 08/26) <<< SWEN0010 ENVD 01040341 (SNOWTAM 0010 A) ENVD B) 01040341 C) 08 F) 47/47/47 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/47 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/47 T) CONTAMINATION/100/50/50/PERCENT. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY PORTIONS SECN C. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 110 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses >>> ENKR (KIRKENES/HOYBUKTMOEN RWY 06/24) <<< SWEN0028 ENKR 01041142 (SNOWTAM 0028 A) ENKR B) 01041142 C) 06 F) 37/37/37 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) APRON GA APRON LUFTRANS/87 ALL REMAINING APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. FROZEN SAND APPLIED. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENBV (BERLEVAG RWY 06/24) <<< SWEN0008 ENBV 01041146 (SNOWTAM 0008 A) ENBV B) 01041146 C) 06 F) 479/479/479 G) 8/8/8 H) 2/2/2 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. BA TWY 2/ APRON 2. >>> ENHF (HAMMERFEST RWY 05/23) <<< SWEN0018 ENHF 01040911 (SNOWTAM 0018 A) ENHF B) 01040911 C) 05 F) 7/7/7 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/87 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/87 T) CONTAMINATION/10/10/10/PERCENT. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON RUNWAY. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON TAXIWAYS. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON APRONS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENTC (TROMSO/LANGNES RWY 01/19) <<< TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 111 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses SWEN0018 ENTC 01041121 (SNOWTAM 0018 A) ENTC B) 01041121 C) 01 F) 79/79/79 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. FROZEN SAND APPLIED. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. WARM SAND APPLIED. >>> ENDU (BARDUFOSS RWY 10/28) <<< SWEN0012 ENDU 01041348 (SNOWTAM 0012 A) ENDU B) 01041348 C) 10 F) 37/37/37 H) 4/4/4 N) A/37 A OVERRUN E/37 A OVERRUN W/37 B/37 C/37 D/47 G/37 H/47 I/CLSD K/47 L/37 T/47 Y 1/37 Y 2/37 Y 3/37 R) DEICE/37 P 1/37 P 10/47 P 2/37 P 3/47 P 4/47 P 5/47 P 6/37 P 7/47 P 8/47 T) F/50/50/50/PCT. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. RWY SANDED NOT LOOSE. >>> ENMH (MEHAMN RWY 17/35) <<< SWEN0010 ENMH 01040408 (SNOWTAM 0010 A) ENMH B) 01040408 C) 17 F) 87/87/87 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/87 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/87 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 112 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. SAND APPLIED. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENSS (VARDO/SVARTNES RWY 15/33) <<< SWEN0007 ENSS 01040741 (SNOWTAM 0007 A) ENSS B) 01040741 C) 15 F) 7/7/7 G) XX/XX/XX H) 3/3/3 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/78 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/78 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. Extract of contaminant types, estimated friction and sanding for each SNOWTAM and assumed RWYCC as identified by RCAM is presented in the table below: ICAO Contaminant Braking action Treatment RCAM RWYCC ENHV Ice/frozen ruts and ridges Medium-Good Sanded- 1 loose ENBS Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts Good Sanded- Snow on top if and ridges fixed ice = 0 ENVD Dry snow/ice Good/good/medium- Not sanded Snow on top if good ice = 0 ENKR Rime or frost/ice good Sanded- 1 fixed ENBV Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts Medium-poor Not sanded Snow on top if and ridges ice = 0 ENHF 10% Ice Good Not sanded 6 ENTC Ice/frozen ruts and ridges Medium-Good Sanded- 1 fixed ENDU Rime or frost/ice Medium-good Sanded- 1 fixed ENMH Compacted snow/ice Medium-good Sanded 1 or 3 ENSS Ice Medium Not sanded 1 Analysis of these 10 SNOWTAMS clearly illustrates that sanding, and especially sanding techniques in cold weather using warm sand and possibly heaters, are effective for fixation of sand to the ice and that provisions for upgrading of the RWYCC to 4 should be implemented. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 113 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The analysis also illustrates well the challenge of dealing with multiple contaminants. This is discussed further in a comment to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311. The NPA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Table 2 – Association between AIREP and RWYCC describes that braking action medium, corresponding to the proposed RWYCC 3, results in “Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced.” No crew has reported noticeably reduced braking action, nor directional control degradation when operating on these 10 aerodromes at the time the SNOWTAM’s were issued. Hence, it can be assumed that the reported braking action as assessed by the reporter was correct. Consequently, it can be assumed that the RCAM is too conservative when compared to the established procedures for treatment of winter runway surface and reporting that is in force in Norway today. response Noted. See response to comment 297. comment 230 comment by: ERAA AMC-SUBPART G 7.3.4 p. 39: What is meant by ‘effective friction not greater than 0.16’? response Noted. See response to comment 297. comment 248 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig AMC 25.1591 Section 7.3.1 revises the ice value from 0.5 to 0.7 in Table 2. AMC 25.1592 Section 6.2 however, presents an ice value of 0.8 in Table 1. There does not appear to be a physics-based reason why different values are reasonable for different phases of operation. GAMA notes that the TALPA ARC recommended 0.08. GAMA views is essential that the agency achieve harmonisation of the braking coefficients between AMC 25.1591, 25.1592 and AC 25-31, 25-32. Therefore, GAMA recommends a common value for this runway condition and that this value be harmonised with FAA guidance in AC 25-32 at 0.08 for ice; i.e., 0.08 for both takeoff and landing. response Partially accepted. A single value will be provided, which is however considered to be 0.07. Such value is selected as for most aircraft in most conditions it allows the 15% operational margin to cover a degradation of the actual coefficient to 0.05, a value that was observed in in-service accidents TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 114 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses and incidents. This would not be the case for 0.08. It is understood that the FAA may harmonize with the EASA value. comment 254 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The agency states in AMC 25.1591, Section 8.3 that "The applicant should provide crosswind guidance for operations on contaminated runways." The agency, however, provides no additional guidance or information about this issue. GAMA requests that EASA provide guidance on how crosswind guidance on contaminated runway material should be determined and what is acceptable. response Partially accepted. The statement on crosswind guidance is deleted from AMC 25.1591 as there is currently no agreed method for producing such guidance. It is mostly based on experience and simulation using assumptions defined by individual manufacturers. comment comment by: Norwegian Air (Norwegian Air Norway, Norwegian Air International, 257 Norwegian Air UK and Norwegian Air Shuttle) 3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2 AMC 25.1591 7.0 Effects of Contaminant Table 2 should include the same contaminants as table table 1 in AMC 25.1592. It seems that compact snow with temperatures above -15C is missing. Also the comment that runway temperatures can be used if available is not included from the ICAO proposal. There is a general concern about the -15C limit. It seems rather low, with no rationale behind why this limit was picked. In Norway we have experienced that this limit should be closer to -8C. response Not accepted. The -15 °C criterion is kept as a conservative value until research or supporting data will justify an alternative solution. However flexibility will be provided by the concept of specially prepared winter runways operations developed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704. comment 283 comment by: IATA Table 1: IATA Comments: It would be good to know whether this table is in adherence with e.g. ICAO. In general it is advisable to make as much as possible references with ICAO material, in order to ensure global harmonization. Or where EASA material is different from ICAO or FAA it is advisable to explain why it is appropriate to have a difference. response Noted. The table is in line with the ICAO Aeroplane Performance Manual (Doc 10064). comment 297 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 115 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses AMC-SUBPART G 2.0 p. 33: Is the 3 mm reference to contamination depth or water equivalent depth? We propose to continue the current system with WED. P38 7.3.3 Use of Ground friction measurements devices Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that an aerodrome operator may use measured friction coefficient as one of several variables for assessing upgrading and downgrading of the RWYCC. This obviously requires that the aerodrome operator has necessary equipment, knowledge, procedures and training acceptable to the competent authority. Furthermore, the measured friction coefficient and type of measuring device should be included in the remark field of the RCR. The competent authority should establish procedures for approval of friction measuring devices and conditions for use. In example: Friction Measuring Device A is approved for: · Dry snow up to 25mm · Compact snow · Dry ice · Sanded ice Friction Measuring Device B is approved for: · Dry snow up to 25mm · Wet snow up to 10mm · Compact snow · Dry ice · Sanded ice · Wet ice – sanded Etc. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is supporting use of techniques and procedures for improvement of contaminated runways, provided the procedures and methods are approved by the competent authority of the state of the aerodrome. Experience with operation on sanded short field aerodromes is very good. A typical SNOWTAM issued by a reporter for a short field aerodrome situated on the coast of Northern Norway may state 3mm slush on ice, runway sanded, estimated braking action medium or medium to good. Another example is for an aerodrome situated inland with a dryer and colder climate where the sand is fixed to the ice by being heated before application on cold ice. This surface can be best described as “sand paper”. The corresponding SNOWTAM is issued by the reporter as ice, sanded, estimated braking action medium to good. Below is examples of SNOWTAMS for 10 aerodromes in Northern Norway issued January 4, 2017. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 116 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses >>> ENHV (HONNINGSVAG/VALAN RWY 08/26) <<< SWEN0008 ENHV 01041010 (SNOWTAM 0008 A) ENHV B) 01041010 C) 08 F) 79/79/79 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/89 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/89 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. SAND APPLIED. 50PCT FROZEN RUTS RIDGES ON RWY >>> ENBS (BATSFJORD RWY 03/21) <<< SWEN0007 ENBS 01040716 (SNOWTAM 0007 A) ENBS B) 01040716 C) 03 F) 479/479/479 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 N) NO R) NO T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. FROZEN SAND APPLIED. DRIFTING SNOW. TWY.A.BRA.4. APRON.A.BRA.4. .TWY.B.BRA.4 .APRON.B.BRA.4. >>> ENVD (VADSO RWY 08/26) <<< SWEN0010 ENVD 01040341 (SNOWTAM 0010 A) ENVD B) 01040341 C) 08 F) 47/47/47 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/47 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/47 T) CONTAMINATION/100/50/50/PERCENT. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY PORTIONS SECN C. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. >>> ENKR (KIRKENES/HOYBUKTMOEN RWY 06/24) <<< SWEN0028 ENKR 01041142 (SNOWTAM 0028 A) ENKR B) 01041142 C) 06 F) 37/37/37 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 117 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) APRON GA APRON LUFTRANS/87 ALL REMAINING APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. FROZEN SAND APPLIED. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENBV (BERLEVAG RWY 06/24) <<< SWEN0008 ENBV 01041146 (SNOWTAM 0008 A) ENBV B) 01041146 C) 06 F) 479/479/479 G) 8/8/8 H) 2/2/2 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. BA TWY 2/ APRON 2. >>> ENHF (HAMMERFEST RWY 05/23) <<< SWEN0018 ENHF 01040911 (SNOWTAM 0018 A) ENHF B) 01040911 C) 05 F) 7/7/7 G) XX/XX/XX H) 5/5/5 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/87 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/87 T) CONTAMINATION/10/10/10/PERCENT. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON RUNWAY. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON TAXIWAYS. PATCHY CONTAMINANT ON APRONS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENTC (TROMSO/LANGNES RWY 01/19) <<< SWEN0018 ENTC 01041121 (SNOWTAM 0018 A) ENTC B) 01041121 C) 01 F) 79/79/79 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/479 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/479 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 118 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses FROZEN SAND APPLIED. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. SLIPPERY THRESHOLDS. WARM SAND APPLIED. >>> ENDU (BARDUFOSS RWY 10/28) <<< SWEN0012 ENDU 01041348 (SNOWTAM 0012 A) ENDU B) 01041348 C) 10 F) 37/37/37 H) 4/4/4 N) A/37 A OVERRUN E/37 A OVERRUN W/37 B/37 C/37 D/47 G/37 H/47 I/CLSD K/47 L/37 T/47 Y 1/37 Y 2/37 Y 3/37 R) DEICE/37 P 1/37 P 10/47 P 2/37 P 3/47 P 4/47 P 5/47 P 6/37 P 7/47 P 8/47 T) F/50/50/50/PCT. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON RUNWAY. APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. RWY SANDED NOT LOOSE. >>> ENMH (MEHAMN RWY 17/35) <<< SWEN0010 ENMH 01040408 (SNOWTAM 0010 A) ENMH B) 01040408 C) 17 F) 87/87/87 G) XX/XX/XX H) 4/4/4 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/87 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/87 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. SAND APPLIED. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON TAXIWAYS. SLIPPERY PORTIONS ON APRONS. ALL APRONS SANDED. TAXIWAYS SANDED. >>> ENSS (VARDO/SVARTNES RWY 15/33) <<< SWEN0007 ENSS 01040741 (SNOWTAM 0007 A) ENSS B) 01040741 C) 15 F) 7/7/7 G) XX/XX/XX H) 3/3/3 N) ALL REPORTED TWYS/78 R) ALL REPORTED APRONS/78 T) CONTAMINATION/100/100/100/PERCENT. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 119 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Extract of contaminant types, estimated friction and sanding for each SNOWTAM and assumed RWYCC as identified by RCAM is presented in the table below: ICAO Contaminant Braking action Treatment RCAM RWYCC ENHV Ice/frozen ruts and ridges Medium-Good Sanded- 1 loose ENBS Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts Good Sanded- Snow on top if and ridges fixed ice = 0 ENVD Dry snow/ice Good/good/medium- Not sanded Snow on top if good ice = 0 ENKR Rime or frost/ice good Sanded- 1 fixed ENBV Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts Medium-poor Not sanded Snow on top if and ridges ice = 0 ENHF 10% Ice Good Not sanded 6 ENTC Ice/frozen ruts and ridges Medium-Good Sanded- 1 fixed ENDU Rime or frost/ice Medium-good Sanded- 1 fixed ENMH Compacted snow/ice Medium-good Sanded 1 or 3 ENSS Ice Medium Not sanded 1 Analysis of these 10 SNOWTAMS clearly illustrates that sanding, and especially sanding techniques in cold weather using warm sand and possibly heaters, are effective for fixation of sand to the ice and that provisions for upgrading of the RWYCC to 4 should be implemented. The analysis also illustrates well the challenge of dealing with multiple contaminants. This is discussed further in a comment to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311. The NPA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Table 2 – Association between AIREP and RWYCC describes that braking action medium, corresponding to the proposed RWYCC 3, results in “Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced.” No crew has reported noticeably reduced braking action, nor directional control degradation when operating on these 10 aerodromes at the time the SNOWTAM’s were issued. Hence, it can be assumed that the reported braking action as assessed by the reporter was correct. Consequently, it can be assumed that the RCAM is too conservative when compared to the established procedures for treatment of winter runway surface and reporting that is in force in Norway today. AMC-SUBPART G 7.3.4 p. 39: Question to EASA? TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 120 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses What is meant by ‘effective friction not greater than 0.16’? response Partially accepted. The concerns expressed in the comment and the possibility to upgrade RWYCC will be dealt with in the aerodrome rules where the rulemaking task RMT.0704 is introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. ‘effective friction not greater than 0.16’ means the assumption that is made, in the relevant paragraph of AMC CS25-1592 on the provision of performance data, for the actual braking action encountered on specially prepared winter runways. comment 309 comment by: DGAC France The term Special Prepared Winter Runway is not an ICAO term and is not defined properly. These conditions shall be accounted for in the process for assessing the RWYCC of the runway and do not be left at the discretion of the aircraft operator which has no mean to check the relevance or recency of a “special prepared winter runway”. DGAC considers that the current definition can bring confusion and should be developed in a set of procedures describing what an aerodrome operator has to provide to demonstrate significant improvement of friction relevant for aircraft/aeroplane operations on compacted snow and ice surfaces that have been treated with sand or gravel in such a way that a significant improvement of friction may be demonstrated. This pertains to aerodrome regulations not to aircraft operations Besides, this concern involves more than one State, which implies that at least EASA needs to have procedures in place for an implementation on a regional basis. The reference should for this reason not be national procedures, but EASA or preferably ICAO procedures to achieve to implement one consistent method within EASA. Hence all paragraphs relating to “special prepared Winter Runway” should be deleted because they are not relevant for this regulation. response Not accepted. The concept of operations on specially prepared winter runways will be developed in the aerodrome rules by the rulemaking task RMT.0704, along with the necessary procedures and requirements for their approval. Consequent references and guidance will be added to the rules for air operations. comment 313 comment by: Textron Aviation Pg. 37 - using 50% of the reported contaminant depth when determining both the acceleration and the stop portion of the accelerate-stop distance. This will result in a conservative computation of the resultant take-off distance... TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 121 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses While it is recognized that this statement was taken from FAA AC 25-31, it is not entirely correct. Taking account of less than the full contaminant drag will not always result in a conservative computation of takeoff distance. Takeoff performance on contaminated runways can often be limited by the accelerate-go distance which is greatly affected by the presence of contaminant drag, particularly following engine failure. Not properly accounting for contaminant drag can result in published takeoff performance for conditions in which acceleration to VLOF cannot be achieved. This is likely a much greater concern with small aircraft that sit lose to the ground than it is for large airliners. response Accepted. The wording will be clarified to reflect the comment. comment 328 comment by: Bombardier 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2, AMC 25.1591 Amendment, section 7.1 EASA defines a new criteria for the calculation of slush drag on takeoff: 100% of reported depth on the acceleration portion but 50% only on the deceleration portion. BA always used 100% reported depth for both acceleration and stopping portions of the takeoff. During the TALPA ARC, it was determined that this approach was acceptable considering the low probability of engine failure at V1 on takeoff. BA requests EASA to reconsider this position based on the TALPA ARC position. response Not accepted. Section 7.1 of the AMC 25.1591 explains the reasons why the use of 100% of the reported contaminant depth may not be reliable enough. However, the new standard will apply only to new designs. comment 329 comment by: Bombardier 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2, AMC 25.1591 Amendment, section 7.1.1 BA understands that EASA want to standardize the aquaplaning speed with the (landing) AC25-32 standard but this now forces new takeoff performance models. BA asks that the previous factor of 1.0 (instead of 0.85) remains applicable for takeoff calculations as they proved to be acceptable in service. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 122 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Not accepted. The aquaplaning speed is used for two purposes in the derivation of performance data for runways covered by fluid contaminants:  For the determination of the speed above which the contaminant drag is reduced. This affects both the acceleration (go) and the deceleration (stop). The assumption of a factor of 1.0 on the aquaplaning speed is thus conservative for this aspect, as the reduction of drag is assumed to occur at a higher speeds.  For the determination of the speed above which the wheel to ground friction coefficient drops to the aquaplaning value of 0.05. For the determination of this speed, a factor of 0.85 is suggested to account for the fact that the speed of dropping out of aquaplaning during deceleration is typically below the speed of aquaplaning onset during acceleration, as calculated by the formula 9√P. Such an adjustment was initially considered in JAA AMJ25X1591 (point 3.5 a.) and then dropped out of the AMC25.1591 adopted at amendment 2 of CS25 without an exhaustive justification in the NPA 25G-334. It is then proposed in the NPA 2016-11 to reinstate this factor in order to appropriately account for the hysteresis effect. comment 330 comment by: Bombardier 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2, AMC 25.1591 Amendment, section 7.3.1 New takeoff performance braking coefficient models will change all takeoff performance on contaminated runways. BA understands that EASA want to standardize the AC25-32 (landing) braking coefficients. BA asks that the previous braking coefficients remain applicable for takeoff calculations as they proved to be acceptable in service. response Not accepted. The new standards will apply only to new designs. comment 341 comment by: NetJets Europe NetJets supports the revised definitions to ensure consistency across the industry and to ensure that applicants all use the response Noted. comment 353 comment by: US FAA Comment summary Paragraph before table refers to friction values. Should be wheel braking coefficients. Suggested resolution TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 123 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Change ‘friction values’ to ‘wheel braking coefficient values” response Accepted. comment 360 comment by: US FAA Comment summary Definitions/Runway surface condition descriptors There have been 3 recent regulatory efforts on the reporting of runway conditions: FAA, ICAO, EASA. All three use slightly different runway surface definitions/descriptions. None of these differences are significant and do not add value to any of the products. Suggested resolution We recommend that EASA, ICAO, and FAA work together to harmonize on one set of runway surface definitions/descriptors. response Noted. EASA has been working to align as much as possible with the new ICAO standards in the pursuit of global harmonisation. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) — CS-25 Book 2 — 3.2.2. 3.2.2. p. 41-49 Acceptable Means of Compliance — AMC 25.1592 comment 63 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Title of AMC 25.1592 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend title of the AMC 25.1592: „The Derivation and Methodology of Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment on Slippery Wet and Contaminated Runways at Dispatch and on all Runway Conditions at Time of Arrival“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: In line with the proposal to clarify the title of CS25.1592, this title brings clarity regarding the scope of this AMC. response Accepted. Clarifications will be also added in the text of the AMC. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 124 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 64 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Purpose of AMC 25.1592 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 1.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend AMC 25.1592 1.0: „(...) before flight when planning to land on runways that are slippery wet or contaminated by standing water, slush, snow, ice or other contaminants; and” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Clarify the scope of this AMC response Accepted. comment 65 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Limitations of Data 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 2.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Add excerpt form last paragraphs from original AMC 25.1591 2.0 to end of AMC 25.1592 2.0: „(...) It is intended that the use of aeroplane performance data for contaminated runway conditions produced in accordance with CS 25.1592 should include recommendations associated with the operational use of the data. Where possible, this operational guidance should be provided by the applicant or its production co-ordinated with the applicant to ensure that its use remains valid. Operators are expected to make careful and conservative judgments in selecting the appropriate performance data to use for operations on contaminated runways. Particular attention should be paid to the presence of any contaminant in the critical high speed portion of the runway. In considering the maximum depth of runway contaminants it may be necessary to take account of the maximum depth for which the engine air intakes have been shown to be free of ingesting hazardous quantities of water in accordance with CS 25.1091(d)(2).” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Whenever the applicant chooses to provide data for contaminant type and depth, the information in these paragraphs is applicable. In any case, depth limits for loose contaminants apply for landing, whether performance is published for contaminants or for RWYCCs. response Accepted. comment 66 comment by: AIRBUS TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 125 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Definitions 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 4.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Consequent to the movement of the definition of frost and the change to the definition of RWCC suggested for AIROPS, change 4.0: „In addition to those terms defined in AMC 25.1591 above, the following runway conditions should be considered. 4.1 Frost Ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is below freezing. Frost differs from ice in that frost crystals grow independently and, therefore, have a more granular texture. Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point of water (0 °C). Note 2:— under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, which is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. 4.2 Runway Condition Code (RWYCC) A number that describes the effect of the runway surface condition(s) on aeroplane deceleration performance and lateral control. Note: the purpose of RWYCC is to permit an operational aeroplane landing performance calculation by the flight crew. Procedures for the determination of the runway condition code are described in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Consequential changes. response Accepted. comment 67 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Assumptions 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 5.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Align text regarding conservative wind accountability in AMC 25.1592 5.0 with the text in CS25.105(d) and CS25.125(f): “(...) The effect of each of the parameters affecting landing distance should be provided, by taking into account the following: (...) operational correction factors for winds within the established operational limits of the aeroplane, for not more than 50 % of nominal wind components along the take-off path opposite to the direction of landing, and not less than 150 % of nominal wind components along the take-off path in the direction of landing; TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 126 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses (...)” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The text proposed in the NPA for conservative wind accountability could be misread to mean that the operational envelope should be restricted rather than that winds for the entire envelope be covered with conservative factors. response Accepted. comment 68 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Icing conditions 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 5.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Reformulate: „(...) icing conditions, if required to provide the landing distances required under CS 25.125 (a)(2)applies. in icing conditions“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Simplify and clarify. response Accepted. comment 69 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 6.0 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 6.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend paragraph in AMC 25.1592 6.0 below Figure 1: “The landing distance for dispatch on contaminated runways and time-of-arrival landing performance assessment may be determined analytically from the landing performance model developed to show compliance with CS 25.125. For the purposes of determining the landing distance for dispatch on contaminated runways and time-of-arrival assessments, the model should be modified as described in the following sections.“ Move the next paragraph to the end of section 5.0: “Changes in the aeroplane’s configuration, speed, power, and thrust used to determine the landing distance for dispatch and time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should be made using procedures established for operation in service. These procedures should: be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill; use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 127 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses include allowance for any time delays that may reasonably be expected in service (see Section 6.2. below).” Delete last paragraph of 6.0: „The procedures and assumptions used to develop the operational landing distances should be documented in the AFM.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The section 6.0 is fully applicable both to the landing distances to be used at dispatch and to those to be used at time of arrival. This must be stated in the paragraph. The reference to operational procedures does not describe how to derive the landing distances and as such is more closely assimilated to the basic assumptions discussed in section 5.0. The requirement to document the procedures in the AFM is already in section 8.3 and is thus redundant with that section. response Accepted. comment 70 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 6.1 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 6.1 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Remove specific reference to time of arrival in AMC 25.1952 6.1: „(...) However, the air distance determined under CS 25.125 may not be appropriate for use when making time-of-arrival operational landing performance assessments. The air distances determined under CS 25.125 may be shorter than the distance that the average pilot is likely to achieve in normal operations. (...) Unless the air distance used for compliance with CS 25.125 is representative of an average pilot flying in normal operations (see flight test demonstration below), the air distance used for operational time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should be determined analytically as the distance traversed over a time period of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the landing threshold, also referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP).“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The discussion of the airborne distance in AC25-32 from which this is taken focuses on the time-of-arrival assessment, but the distance described in this AMC is intended to be used for both dispatch on contaminated or slippery wet runway and at time of arrival. The use of the qualifier “operational” may include dispatch, and captures the opposition with the certification methods used to determine the distance in compliance with CS 25.125. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 128 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 71 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Table 1 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 6.2 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend Table 1 under AMC 25.1592 6.2: 1 — Ice 0.07 "2" 0 — Wet ice Not applicable (no operations in RWYCC = 0 — Water on top of compacted conditions) snow — Dry snow or wet snow over ice — Heavy frost of noticeable depth 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The default friction coefficient for RWYCC 1 (Ice) is inconsistent with the one defined in AMC 25.1591 Table 2. It is understood that it should read 0.07 for both cases. In line with the note 2 of the definition of frost, it is proposed to primarily classify the condition of heavy frost as RWYCC 0. This is consistent with the definition in FAA AC1505200- 30D: “1.12.9 Frost consists of ice crystals formed from airborne moisture that condenses on a surface whose temperature is below freezing. Frost differs from ice in that the frost crystals grow independently and therefore have a more granular texture. Note: Heavy frost that has noticeable depth may have friction qualities similar to ice and downgrading the runway condition code accordingly should be considered. If driving a vehicle over the frost does not result in tire tracks down to bare pavement, the frost should be considered to have sufficient depth to consider a downgrade of the runway condition code.” response Accepted. comment 72 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 6.3 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 6.3 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Change the second paragraph under AMC 25.1592 6.3: “(...) The calculation of the final stopping configuration distance should be based on the braking coefficient associated with the runway surface condition or Runway Condition Code (RWYCC), including the effect of hydroplaning, if applicable. (...)” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 129 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The term “pilot braking action report” is not defined. Furthermore it may not be desirable to give the impression that it is acceptable to base a performance assessment on only a pilot report, potentially even to upgrade from the basic assessment made by the aerodrome personnel. response Accepted. comment 73 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Contaminant Drag 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 7.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Add another bullet point to the list of reasons under AMC 25.1592 7.0 why applying the reported depth directly in the performance assessment may be optimistic: “(...) Contaminated conditions are reported from 25% coverage in one third. Total coverage of the runway with significant depths of contaminant may thus be as little as just above 8%. (...)” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The reasons given under 7.0 for not using more than 50% of the reported depth for the computation all assume an even depth over the length and width to be used, but that is not systematically given. In the scenario proposed in this new reason, even 50% of the depth would be an optimistic assumption response Accepted. comment 74 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 Table 2 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 7.0 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Delete column of maximum depth: “(...) Loose contaminant Maximum depth Specific gravity Standing Water 15 mm 1.0 Slush 15 mm 0.85 Dry Snow 130 mm 0.2 Wet Snow 30 mm 0.5 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 130 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Table 2 — Maximum depth and Specific gravity of loose contaminants (...)” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: There is no reason to limit contaminant depth at landing below a value that would be demonstrated to be acceptable under CS 25.1583(k), since there is no issue with acceleration. response Accepted. comment 75 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 8.1 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 8.1 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend first paragraph under AMC 25.1592 8.1: “Performance information for dry, wet, slippery wet and contaminated runways, derived in accordance with Sections 5.0–7.0 of this AMC, should be accompanied by appropriate statements (...)” Delete last sentence of first bullet under AMC 25.1592 8.1: „(...) operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow, ice or other contaminants implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and, therefore, to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during landing since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based; where possible, every effort should be made to ensure that the runway surface is cleared of any significant contamination; (...)” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Performance information developed under this AC applies to all of these runway conditions. The correct clearing of the runway is not under the direct responsibility or control of the operator or the flight crew and thus it is not useful to state in the AFM. This sentence should be removed. response Accepted. comment 76 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : AMC 25.1592 8.3 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2 2. New CS 25.1592 8.3 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 131 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Delete last bullet under AMC 25.1592 8.3: “Performance information for dry, wet, slippery wet and contaminated runways, derived in accordance with Sections 5.0–7.0 of this AMC, should be accompanied by appropriate statements (...)” Delete last sentence of first bullet under AMC 25.1592 8.1: „(...) definitions of runway surface conditions; and the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data. (...)” Delete first sentence in last paragraph under AMC 25.1592 8.3: „The AFM should state that operations are prohibited on runways with contaminant depths greater than those for which data is provided. Instructions for use of the data should be provided in the appropriate documentation.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The AFM does not seem to be the appropriate media to carry information such as the procedures and assumptions used to develop landing performance data. There is no reason to limit contaminant depth at landing below a value that would be demonstrated to be acceptable under CS 25.1583(k), since there is no issue with acceleration. response Accepted. comment 111 comment by: Conrad Reference: New AMC 25.1592 4.0 Definitions 4.2 Runway condition code (RWYCC) Suggested Change: A number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition report to be used in the runway condition report (RCR), describing the level of deceleration performance that can be achieved. See Section 6.2 of this AMC for the classification of runway conditions. Note: the purpose of RWYCC is to permit an operational aeroplane landing performance calculation by the flight crew. Procedures for the determination of the runway condition code are described in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’. Rationale: (same as in my comment for 3.1.1. Definitions - (103b) Runway condition code (RWYCC)) The proposed definition is not correct and the added Note does not help much. The current wording states that the RWYCC describes the “runway surface condition”. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 132 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses However, “runway surface condition” is a well defined term (defined in the subsequent section (103d)), meaning the actual descriptive condition of a runway, like slippery when wet, slush, ice, etc. Thus, the current wording insinuates, that the RWYCC describes directly the descriptive condition. This, however is not the case, for two reasons: 1. one RWYCC can correlate to multiple runway surface conditions, and 2. the RWYCC, due to down/up-grading, might not match the actual runway surface condition at all The runway contaminant type and depth (i.e. "runway surface condition") can give a RWYCC, but a RWYCC can never give contaminant type and depth. The RCAM can and must not be read backwards! However, the proposed definition of the RWYCC insinuates that backward reading was possible. response Accepted. See also response to comment 109. comment 114 comment by: CAA Norway AMC 25.1592 Comment 1, Applicability. Clarification is needed as for the applicability to steep approach and short landing operations. Rationale: For these types of operations, a tight control of speed and profile is necessary to en ensure safe operations. For example, a long transition segment is not compatible with steep approaches. Comment 2, Default values, Compacted snow. CAA Norway proposes to challenge the temperature limit of -15 C to consider compacted snow to be considered as RWYCC 3. We propose to introduce the Temperature – Dew-point spread as an additional parameter to temperature. Rationale We are of the opinion that the 20 % reduction in friction value (from 0.20 to 0.16) for this contaminant is significant and should be properly justified. We cannot see such a justification. Consequently, we propose that more work is performed in to provide provided such justification and to investigate whether the discriminating temperature of – 15 C could be raised, possibly in combination with a relative humidity parameter, for example dew-point spread. This, because practical experience, not only from aviation, indicates that a high relative humidity makes for a more slippery surface than a low relative humidity regardless of temperature. More work is needed on this issue response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 133 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Comment 1 is accepted. Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added in CS-25. Comment 2 is not accepted. The -15 °C criterion is kept as a conservative value until research or supporting data will justify an alternative solution. However flexibility will be provided by the concept of specially prepared winter runways operations developed in RMT.0704. comment 115 comment by: CAA Norway Attachment #2 Chapter 6 Comment/proposal: 6.2 Transition Distance, last sentence within brackets at page 45 of 96 delete pilot-reported braking action and insert reported RWYCC; corrected text to read: (see Table 1 below for the wheel braking coefficient of the full braking configuration of each runway surface condition and reported RWYCC). Rationale: Table 1, first column lists RWYCC. These are not the pilot-reported braking action AIREP. Consequently, the text proposed is not consistent with the Table 1 that it refers to. Comment/proposal: AMC 25.1592 6.2 Transition Distance, Table 1, second column; keep text in heading, replace text where not compliant with text used in the PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981) as written in ICAO State letter AN 4/27-16/28 dated 5 May 2016, Table 3 – Assigning a runway condition code (RWYCC) and Table 5 – Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM), footnote 1 included. Footnote 1 is also applicable the text -15 oC and Lower air temperature and should be inserted. Rationale: Second column in Table 1 – Correlation between wheel braking coefficient and RWYCC is not ICAO global reporting format compliant. To be compliant and also for consistency purposes to avoid confusion the text used in the column should mirror the text written in PANS- Aerodromes (Doc 9981) e.g. the text used in ICAO State letter AN 4/27-16/28 dated 5 May 2016, Table 3 – Assigning a runway condition code (RWYCC) and Table 5 – Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM). Minor editorial changes identified post issuing the State letter is identified in the comment above. Comment/Proposal AMC 25.1592 6.2 Transition Distance, Table 1, footnote 3. The hydroplaning speed referred to VP = 9√���� (the mathematical formula is not visual in the comment field. Please see the attached file to view the complete formula), where VP is the ground speed in kt and P is the tire pressure in lb/in2 represent the classical hydroplaning speed equation. This equation, known as Horne’s equation after Walter B. Horne, a researcher at NASA who proposed it in 1963, is representative for hydroplaning speed of a cross-ply tire and not representative for the hydroplaning speed for modern aeroplane tyres. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 134 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The 15-year-old report the NLR-TP-2001-216 - Safety aspects of aircraft performance on wet and contaminated runways G.W.H. van Es, A.L.C. Roelen, E.A.C. Kruijsen and M.K.H. Giesberts document that hydroplaning speed for a radial tire is about 27 per cent lower than for a cross- ply tire of the same pressure. Footnote 3 should identify this significant difference in hydroplaning speed as accurately as current knowledge allows. Rationale: A difference in hydroplaning speed of 27 per cent is considered significant. For safety reasons this difference, adjusted for knowledge gained since the report was published in 2001, should be reflected in footnote 3. response Accepted. comment 148 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 41 AMC 25.1592 1.0 Purpose The text in the existing, published AMC 25.1591, para 2.0 (Technical Limitations of data) contains information that is relevant to the landing case, but it has been omitted in the drafting of 25.1592. i.e. Should the following be included in AMC 25.1592? “Provided it is recognised that the observation and reporting of the type and depth of contaminants (water, slush, dry snow and wet snow) is limited in terms of the accuracy and timeliness with which it can be made and relayed to the flight crew. Furthermore, shallow depths of contaminants do not generally reduce wheel braking friction below that of a wet runway, except in unfavourable circumstances for which lower than expected runway condition codes (RWYCCs) are reported (see AMC 25.1592). In line with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) standards, a depth of more than 3 mm for contaminant accountability in LANDING performance assessments is considered as a reasonable lower threshold. Below this depth, the runway is considered to be wet, for which AMC 25.1591 does not apply.” response Not accepted. The mentioned text does not apply as wet runway performance is within the scope of AMC 25.1592. However it is correct to mention in the applicability paragraph that, similarly to AMC 25.1591, when data are provided for contaminant type and depth, the information in these paragraphs is applicable. In any case, depth limits for loose contaminants apply for landing, whether performance is published for contaminants or for RWYCCs. comment 149 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 41 AMC 25.1592 2.0 Applicability of data. 2nd sentence TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 135 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Replace “....assessments may be different than the landing.....” with “......assessments may be different to the landing.....” The word “only” should be removed from the final sentence. The information in the AMC is not limited to contaminated surfaces only. response Partially accepted. The first comments is accepted. The second is not accepted because, data of AMC 25.1592 for contaminated runways are intended for use both at dispatch and at time of arrival, while data for dry and wet runways are intended only for use at time of arrival. comment 150 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 42 AMC 25.1592 4.1 Frost. Frost is considered here for landing. Why does it not appear in AMC 25.1591 for take-off? response Accepted. It will be added. comment 151 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 43 AMC 25.1592 6.0 Derivation of Landing Distance. This appears to reproduce some of the information from CS25.125 and FAA AC25-7 (Flight Test Guide), but deviates from it by being less specific. For example, the certification rules are very specific about time delays between crew actions, but here the use of terms such as ‘operations in service’ and ‘crews of average skill’ suggest something different. If this is intentional the differences should be clarified. If this is not intended to be different, then care is needed to be entirely consistent with the certification rules. response Not accepted. The intent of this text, taken from FAA AC 25-32 paragraph 8.1.3, is to ensure that the distances published for the in-flight landing performance assessment can be achieved consistently by trained airline pilots with normal approach guidance and aiming points. The text in CS25.125 indicates that the distances established under that paragraph are representative of those achieved by airline pilots in operations: “(3) Changes in configuration, power or thrust, and speed, must be made in accordance with the established procedures for service operation. (4) The landing must be made without excessive vertical acceleration, tendency to bounce, nose over or ground loop. (5) The landings may not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.” The flight test guide however allows test flights in conditions that are more challenging than in standard operations, to be used as a basis for establishing the AFM landing distances. The differences between CS 25.125 and AMC 25.1592 paragraph 6.0 are meant to highlight that in particular the airborne distance included in the distances at time of landing should be TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 136 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses consistent with the way the aircraft is actually flown in service. How this can be achieved is detailed in the following paragraphs, highlighting in particular that, airborne distances resulting from the application of the parametric method described in AC25-7C are not appropriate for the in-flight assessment. comment 153 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 46 AMC 25.1592 Table 1 – RWYCC 1. Why is the wheel braking coefficient here 0.08, when AMC25.1591 uses either 0.05 or 0.07? response Accepted. Values will be harmonised at 0.07. See also reply to comment 248. comment 154 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 46 AMC 25.1592 Note 2. Whilst the coefficients of 0.625 and 0.375 appear broadly reasonable, where do they come from? What is the supporting evidence for them? response Noted. The coefficients are derived from the relationships of default anti-skid efficiencies for these systems in AMC 25.109. comment 155 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 47 AMC 25.1592 6.3 Final Stopping ...Distance. The runway condition code (RWYCC) splits wheel braking coefficient into six, presumably conservative, values. For any particular landing the braking coefficient to use is determined by the airport or a pilot. This seems logical, provided that the correlation between any coded wheel braking coefficient and an actual aircraft capability is correctly understood by the aircraft manufacturer. There is no guidance on how this might be achieved. The understanding and methods vary significantly between different OEMs. What documentation has been used to establish the conservatism of the scheduled values? TALPA-ARC presents something that at first glance appears to be a completely satisfactory closed loop system, when in fact it is heavily dependent on interpretive analysis that is not mandated by regulation. There is a general weakness in this regulatory area, in that there are no regulations governing any aspect of performance data reduction and analysis and presentation, which historically have been agreed to various different standards by a regulatory authority and the individual aircraft manufacturer. response Noted. The methods used by OEMs to build the performance model used for determining landing performance data are subject to review by EASA in the type certification process. These include a number of conservatisms which are also introduced in the computation of the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 137 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses landing distance at time of arrival. While methods may differ between OEMs, this is no different from what is commonly being done in the determination of other existing performance limitations such as the Accelerate-Stop-Distance (ASD). comment 195 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassaul-Aviation Page 45 text: “If the air distance is based on a time of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the runway threshold, this air distance is considered valid for downhill runway slopes up to 2 %” Comment: This statement differs with paragraph 8.2.7 of AC 25-32 which considers that 7s/0.98 air distance is valid for downhill runway slopes up to 1 %. Dassault supports EASA proposition which simplifies implementation of TALPA. response Noted. comment 212 comment by: Embraer S.A. Embraer concurs with EASA concerns regarding the need for a time-of-arrival reassessment of landing performance. However, Embraer understands that addressing these concerns in AMC §25.1592 simultaneously with flight-planning issues is not the most suitable approach. Embraer understands a better approach would be to split the two scenarios (flight-planning and time-of-arrival) into two different requirements with their corresponding AMCs:  the proposed requirement §25.1592, dealing only with landing on contaminated runways for flight planning;  a separate requirement, §25.XXXX, addressing EASA concerns regarding time-of- arrival landing performance assessment; this proposed requirement and its AMC would refer to other requirements (§25.109, §25.125, §25.1592) as necessary. As EASA is also pursuing harmonization with FAA rules, NPA 2016-11 should also discuss the applicability of its methods to autoland and low-visibility scenarios, as the FAA has done in paragraph 8.2.6 of its AC 25.32. response Partially accepted. The applicability of AMC.25.1592 will be clarified as being valid at time of arrival for dry and wet runways and in all cases (dispatch and time of arrival) for contaminated runways, but it is preferred to keep all the information for landing in the same AMC. comment 213 comment by: Embraer S.A. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 138 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 6.0 - Embraer suggests to amend the last sentence as follow: “If the procedures and assumptions required to attain the performance data are different that the usual for dry runway, they must be presented in AFM.” response Partially accepted. The sentence will be deleted as it is out of the AFM scope. comment 214 comment by: Embraer S.A. 8.2 - Embraer suggests to amend the first sentence as follow: "In addition to performance information appropriate to operating on a contaminated runway, the AFM should also include recommended procedures associated with this performance information if such procedures are specific to the aeroplane.” response Accepted. comment 215 comment by: Embraer S.A. 8.3 - In item 8.3 of AMC 25.1592, the following paragraph generated doubts: “Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, e.g. greater than 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant depths within the range of the contaminant depths provided.”  Interpretation 1: the intent of the item would be to require AFM to clearly correlate each set of data to the associated contaminant depth. If this is so, we suggest to change the wording to "Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, e.g. greater than 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 mm, then the AFM should clearly correlate each set of data to the associated contaminant depth".  Interpretation 2: the intent of the item would be to require AFM to present guidance on how to obtain data associated to contaminant depths between two figures. E.G.: AFM presents data for 3 and 6 mm and operator wants to define data for 4.5 mm. If this is so, we suggest to change the wording to "Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, e.g. greater than 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant depths that falls within two values of the contaminant depths provided". Embraer also suggests to amend the sentence “the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data” as follow: “If the procedures and assumptions required to attain the performance data are different that the usual for dry runway, they must be presented in AFM.” response Accepted. The intent of point 8.3 is the one described in Option 1 in the comment. A suitable wording will be used to clarify this intent. Regarding the last suggestion of the comment, the mentioned sentence will be deleted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 139 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 231 comment by: ERAA AMC 25.1592 2.0 p. 41 and 5.0 p. 42: Is factoring assumed for landing distance calculation? Widerøe operates all landings on the 830 metre runways as ‘steep approach’ 4.5 degrees from a 35 ft screen height. Many of the assumptions should be adjusted to reflect this type of landing, including screen height, air distance, transition distance and full braking distance. response Noted. See response to comment 299. comment 232 comment by: ERAA Table 1, p. 46: What is meant by 0.20 and 0.16? How does this correlate to mu measured by surface friction tester? response Noted. See response to comment 299. comment 233 comment by: ERAA Table 1, p. 46, RwyCC: The proposed RwyCC Table is under some conditions both more liberal and more conservative than current practice in Norway. It is more liberal with rime and wet snow; it suggests that wet snow has same friction as dry snow at e.g. OAT -13 degrees C. This is too coarse, as it may be too liberal for wet snow and too restrictive with dry snow. The home page for the world renowned ski wax brand SWIX illustrates well what is known to most people accustomed to winter conditions. SWIX is in fact producing 8 different ski grip waxes for temperatures ranging from 0 degrees to -30 degrees. Sand has a demonstrable effect to increase friction and Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that the friction characteristics for compacted snow is studied in more detail before setting hard limits for friction coefficients. The TALPA ARC takes the following condition into consideration when assessing the RWYCC: · Contamination · Type · Depth · Temperature · Coverage Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that more variables are put into the equation when the runway conditions are assessed and the RWYCC assigned. As a minimum should the following variables be considered: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 140 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses · Contamination · Type · Depth · Coverage · Use of sand · Use of frozen sand · Use of chemicals · Runway surface temperature · Air temperature · Dew points temperature - See comments under RIA. response Noted. See response to comment 299. comment 242 comment by: Thomson Airways 6.1 Air Distance Time must be made available for the aircraft manufacturers to provide operators with the necessary performance calculation tools to enable accurate compliance with the proposed landing performance factors. response Noted. The certification standards are intended to be available to manufacturers sufficiently in advance of the entry into force of the operational requirements. comment 245 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes that the data basis for dry runway time of arrival landing performance is different from what is shown in CS 25.125. The manufacturer certifying two different sets of landing performance could be a potential source of confusion for operators and would be an additional burden for the OEM that does not seem to have been considered fully in the analysis. The development and maintenance of two different sets of dry runway landing performance will require separate AFMSs and databases which will add unnecessary complexity and cost for what is considered a minimal increase of safety given the existing dry runway dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.230. GAMA recommends that the agency limit the proposed required time of arrival assessments to non-dry runways only as there should be sufficient margin from dispatch requirements in CAT.POL.A.235. response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 141 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The current standard for landing distance on dry runways at time of dispatch is not suitable for in-fight checks at time of arrival. This unfortunately leads to two different data sets for dry and wet runways. However it should be noted that the operational requirement for in- flight check at time of arrival, for the case of dry runways may be limited to simply confirm the dispatch calculation. comment 248 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig AMC 25.1591 Section 7.3.1 revises the ice value from 0.5 to 0.7 in Table 2. AMC 25.1592 Section 6.2 however, presents an ice value of 0.8 in Table 1. There does not appear to be a physics-based reason why different values are reasonable for different phases of operation. GAMA notes that the TALPA ARC recommended 0.08. GAMA views is essential that the agency achieve harmonisation of the braking coefficients between AMC 25.1591, 25.1592 and AC 25-31, 25-32. Therefore, GAMA recommends a common value for this runway condition and that this value be harmonised with FAA guidance in AC 25-32 at 0.08 for ice; i.e., 0.08 for both takeoff and landing. response Partially accepted. A single value will be provided, which is however set at 0.07. Such value is selected because, for most aircraft types in most conditions, it allows the 15% operational margin to cover a degradation of the actual coefficient to 0.05, a value that was observed in in-service accidents and incidents. This would not be the case for 0.08. It is understood that the FAA may harmonize with the EASA value. comment 249 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The agency in AMC 25.1592 Section 6.1 provides guidance on air distance and seems to infer mandatory use of 7 seconds and 0.98 Vref. GAMA recommends that AMC 25.1592 permit landing air distances based on flight test data that has been shown to comply with CS 25.101(f)(h) and therefore determined in accordance with procedures established by the applicant for operation in service and are able to be consistently executed by crews of average skills, and do not exceed sink rates specified in method 2 of AC 25-7C air distance methodology. response Accepted. The mentioned paragraph of the AMC 25.1592 provides: “Unless the air distance used for compliance with CS 25.125 is representative of an average pilot flying in normal operations (see flight test demonstration below), the air distance used for operational landing performance assessments should be determined analytically […]” This means that using a demonstrated airborne distance in line with the comment is acceptable in line with the FAA AC25-32. comment 250 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 142 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The agency states in note 1 to Table 1 in AMC 25.1592 that a 90 percent of the flight-test based dry runway braking coefficient of friction be used unless it can be shown that testing was based on operationally representative amounts of rubber contamination and paint stripes on the runway. GAMA notes that the term "operationally representative" is subjective. (As an example, will photographic evidence be required of the flight test touchdown zone and with subsequent area percentage of rubber contamination analysis?) Additionally, the 90 percent factor seems subjective and no justification was provided in the NPA for the factor. (Except for listing AC 25-32 in the reference section.) Finally, the manufacturer certifying two different sets of landing performance data places an additional burden on the OEM that does not seem to be fully considered in the analysis. GAMA recommends that EASA not create an additional burden on the manufacturer by forcing the second set of data and risk causing confusion among operators by providing two sets of dry landing data. response Not accepted. The note is in line with TALPA ARC proposals reflected in the ICAO doc 10064 (APM) and the FAA AC 25-32. The additional burden is limited since a specific dataset must be produced to account for realistic air distance, slope and temperature anyway. comment 251 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA notes that AMC 25.1592 appears to be missing a section that addresses credit for reverse thrust which exists in FAA AC 25-32 (see section 10). GAMA recommends that the agency update AMC 25.1592 to include a section that provides credit for reverse thrust to ensure that the guidance material is harmonised with FAA AC 25- 32. response Noted. Concerns on the use of reverse credit for the determination of the landing distance at time of arrival have been raised at Certification level. The Agency will engage on a specific consultation with OEMs on this issue, to determine under which conditions this may be possible. comment 252 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig AMC 25.1592, Section 7.0, Table 2 shows the contaminant maximum depth as 15 mm for slush and standing water. GAMA notes that this value is not harmonised with AC 25-32, Section 9.3, which lists the contaminant depth as "1/2 inch (13 mm)". GAMA recommends that AMC 25.1592 and AC 25-32 be harmonised. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 143 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Partially accepted. The contaminant depth values are removed from the table. See also the rationale of comment 74. comment comment by: Norwegian Air (Norwegian Air Norway, Norwegian Air International, 258 Norwegian Air UK and Norwegian Air Shuttle) 3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2 AMC 25.1592 6.0 Derivation of Landing Distance It should be included in a note in table 1 that runway temperature may be used when available. There is a general concern about the -15C limit for compact snow. It seems rather low, with no rationale behind why this limit was picked. In Norway we have experienced that this limit should be closer to -8C. It will have a negative impact on regularity if the -15C limit is introduced. We have operated for many years with my 0.2 on compact snow with no temperature limit. It is therefore difficult to explain why the sudden decrease to 0.16 for temperatures between -16C and –8C. On the other hand, we have experience that show that poor braking is often associated with moist low-level atmospheric conditions. We think it is strange that the RCAM do not cater for relative humidity. response Not accepted. The -15 °C criterion is kept as a conservative value until research or supporting data will justify an alternative solution. However flexibility will be provided by the concept of specially prepared winter runways developed in RMT.0704. comment 261 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA disagrees with the agency's proposal to require a single prescribed air time and touchdown speed ratio AMC 25.1592, Section 6.1, because it is not reflective of an aeroplane's capabilities. Additionally, disallowing / not properly accounting for runway slope effects unnecessarily complicates the computations, so that the final data is not reflective of a physics-based evaluation. We also note that this is not a conservative approach to establishing runway performance. Allowing the proposed method to be applicable for downhill slopes in magnitudes up to 2 percent is non-conservative and not in agreement with FAA AC 25-32 which only permits in magnitudes up to 1 percent. GAMA recommends that the agency revise AMC 25.1592 to permit manufacturers to compute and schedule the effects of runway slope on landing air distance regardless of slope magnitude and direction rather than use a single prescribed air time and speed ratio. The air distance time from 50 ft above the landing surface and touchdown speed ratio should both be allowed to be determined based on flight testing, provided that the applicant shows that it complies with CS 25.101(f)(h), and is not based on the parametric air distance model in FAA AC 25-7C. response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 144 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The 7 seconds airborne time is an allowance for an operational airborne distance that is adapted to the aeroplane capabilities via the approach speed. As such it does not necessarily have to be physically realistic, but rather represent an average achievable distance in line operations. The effect of slope on the airborne distance is not purely geometric. The reason for neglecting the slope effect is that, except for automatic landing, the pilot will aim for the touchdown zone and thus should achieve relatively consistent airborne distances within the usual range of slopes for which aircraft are certified (i.e. for -2% to +2%). The intent of extending the slope range from that specified in the FAA AC 25-32 was precisely to reduce the burden on the OEMs, as no method for accounting for higher slopes is provided in the AC or the AMC. For autoland, specific airborne distances accounting for slope are applied. comment 287 comment by: IATA 9 Reference 11. ICAO Doc 10064: Aeroplane Performance Manual EASA is encouraged to revise the NPA when the ICAO Doc 10064 will be published and ensure global harmonization, where applicable. response Accepted. comment 288 comment by: IATA AMC 25.1592 The Derivation and Methodology of Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment at Dispatch and at Time of Arrival 4.0 Definitions 4.2 Runway Condition Code (RWYCC) IATA Comments: See comment on the definition of RWYCC in the Definition section, point 3.1.1 response Accepted. See also response to comment 274. comment 299 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS AMC 25.1592 2.0 p. 41 and 5.0 p. 42: Is factoring assumed for landing distance calculation? Widerøe operates all landings on the 830 metre runways as ‘steep approach’ 4.5 degrees from a 35 ft screen height. Many of the assumptions should be adjusted to reflect this type of landing, including screen height, air distance, transition distance and full braking distance. Table 1, p. 46: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 145 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Question to EASA: What is meant by 0.20 and 0.16? How does this correlate to mu measured by surface friction tester? Table 1, p. 46, RwyCC: The proposed RwyCC Table is under some conditions both more liberal and more conservative than current practice in Norway. It is more liberal with rime and wet snow; it suggests that wet snow has same friction as dry snow at e.g. OAT -13 degrees C. This is too coarse, as it may be too liberal for wet snow and too restrictive with dry snow. The home page for the world renowned ski wax brand SWIX illustrates well what is known to most people accustomed to winter conditions. SWIX is in fact producing 8 different ski grip waxes for temperatures ranging from 0 degrees to -30 degrees. Sand has a demonstrable effect to increase friction and Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that the friction characteristics for compacted snow is studied in more detail before setting hard limits for friction coefficients. Th TALPA ARC takes the following condition into consideration when assessing the RWYCC: · Contamination · Type · Depth · Temperature · Coverage Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that more variables are put into the equation when the runway conditions are assessed and the RWYCC assigned. As a minimum should the following variables be considered: · Contamination · Type · Depth · Coverage · Use of sand · Use of frozen sand · Use of chemicals · Runway surface temperature · Air temperature · Dew points temperature - See comments under RIA. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 146 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added in CS-25. The possibility to upgrade RWYCC will be dealt with in the aerodrome rules where the rulemaking task RMT.0704 is introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 314 comment by: Textron Aviation 2.0 Applicability of Data The Purpose of this AMC clearly states that the intent is to provide information, guidance, recommendations, and acceptable means on compliance in the production of landing performance information for use: - before flight during flight planning, and - at the time of arrival. The highlighted text contradicts this purpose, stating that these methods are only for time- of-arrival data, and then goes so far as to speculate on the basis of data that was provided for dispatch purposes. It is true that various manufacturers have provided varying forms of contaminated data in the past, and based on different assumptions, but it is not appropriate here to dismiss all of that data as being inappropriate for use during time-of-arrival. It is also not appropriate to discourage applicants from using this guidance as the basis for dispatch data. Recommend that these highlighted statements be deleted. response Not accepted. The AMC allows data for slippery wet runways and contaminated runways to be the same for dispatch and in-flight purposes. Additionally, CS 25.1592 is applicable to new designs only. The use of existing data is dealt with in the rules for air operations comment 315 comment by: Textron Aviation 6.1 Air Distance It is recognized that some OEMs have historically provided aggressive air distances as part of 25.125 certification, knowing that their operators would be applying large dispatch factors in accordance with operational rules. However, some manufacturers of smaller aircraft have historically calculated realistic air distances, determined from test data flown in accordance with AFM procedures and with full accountability of speed, temperature, and runway slope, because their customers/operators are not required to apply any dispatch factors. Such air distance methodology should remain acceptable. response Noted. AMC 25.1592 states that the air distance is applicable “Unless the air distances used for compliance with CS25.125 is representative of an average pilot flying in normal operation…” These methodologies remain acceptable. comment 316 comment by: Textron Aviation TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 147 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 6.1 Air Distance - the touchdown rate of descent should be in the range of 1-4 ft per sec. This touchdown requirement was taken from FAA AC 25-32. However, this touchdown requirement was not recommended by the TALPA ARC. It was added by the FAA following conclusion of the TALPA ARC, without ARC input or technical discussion. The TALPA ARC recommendation was to allow air distance methodology derived from flight test data flown in accordance with AFM procedures, and which complies with 25.101 and existing AC 25-7C guidance. response Noted. A too high touchdown rate of descent is one of the reasons why the expected air distance may not be achievable in normal line operations. This is why for the determination of the air distance for landing performance data to be used at the time of arrival a specific range is recommended. comment 317 comment by: Textron Aviation Table 1 6 - Dry -90% of certified value used to comply with CS 25.125 Recent discussions within the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group discussing Task 9 (wet runway stopping performance) have indicated that this requirement is not likely to be limiting, as the dry dispatch requirement is much more likely to drive requirements for dry runway performance. Recommend additional discussion or perhaps the deletion of this item. Creation of additional dry data based on slightly different assumptions will require a large effort in terms of time and financial resources, and having two sets of dry data will be confusing to operators and flight planners. These negative issues far outweigh any benefit, as this data is not likely to limit operations or have any impact to safety. response Not accepted. It is true that for dispatch purposes CS 25.125 will drive the requirements for landing. However, for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival, which may be for an unplanned airport/runway/weather conditions, the demonstrated friction for a dry runway may not be conservative, which justifies this reduced friction value. comment 331 comment by: Bombardier 3.2.2 CS-25 Book 2, New AMC 25.1592, section 6.1 BA requests EASA to justify why it is acceptable not to correct for runway slope effect on air distance, for downslopes up to -2%, if using the 7 seconds and 98% speed decay air distance models. AC25-32 recommends a correction from -1% to -2% (but unfortunately provides no methodology). The FAA AC 91-79A specifies that downward slope of -1% would increase landing distance by 10%: BA determined that this is equivalent to an increase of 23% of air distance for every 1% downslope on all BA airplane models. Assuming that the pilot does not correct the airplane TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 148 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses trajectory during the air distance segment (such as adjusting the flight path by lowering the nose to meet a specified touchdown point), it is estimated that the air distance must be increased to account for the effect of downward slope. BA recommends EASA to review the BA methodology for applicability for downslope effect on air distance. response Not accepted. The effect of slope on the landing distance is taken into account in the determination of the ground roll, but the airborne distance is independent of slope. The limitation of this airborne distance to a range of ±1% was originally justified by purely geometrical considerations. However, the pilot will aim for the touchdown zone on the runway independent of the runway slope. This operational airborne distance allowance is thus considered adequate for the usual range for which aircraft are certified, i.e. ±2%. comment 342 comment by: NetJets Europe 6.0 - DErivation of Landing distance: NetJets notes the RWYCC – we feel this is workable within EASA environment and locations where this standard is or will be used however, NetJets would like to highlight that for locations where this standard is not used, the current data with the contamination tyoe and depth or braking action may still be required. response Noted. The runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) allows to determine the applicable RWYCC for a given contaminant type and depth. comment 354 comment by: US FAA 4.1 Frost Comment summary Note 2:— under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, which is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. Suggested resolution Verify this note is consistent with the instructions for the airport to report the surface. response Accepted. The same definitions are adopted in the aerodrome rules amended by the rulemaking task RMT.0704. Consistency will be ensured. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 149 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 355 comment by: US FAA 6.1 third para Comment summary …. at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the landing threshold, also referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP). The above phrase “also referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP)” can be interpreted as 98% of the recommended speed over the landing threshold is the final-approach speed (VAPP). Suggested resolution Change to the following. …. at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the landing threshold. The recommended speed over the landing threshold may also be referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP). response Accepted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.1. Definitions — p. 49 GM13 Annex I Definitions comment 216 comment by: Embraer S.A. Embraer understands that EASA is planning to harmonize with FAA rules, so we suggest using the same definition of Contaminated Runway provided on paragraph 6.3 of AC 25.32. response Not accepted. EASA has adopted the ICAO definitions. comment 306 comment by: Aer Lingus It is a common occurrance what when a contaminated runway is cleared by the airport authority (e.g. by sweeping/brushing and/or the application of chemicals) they do not do so to the full runway width (e.g. only a 40m wide strip on a 45m wide runway may be cleared.) Can GM13 for Contaminated Runways be expanded to provide guidance to operators in this regard? Specifically, can a runway which has been cleared in this way, be considered to no longer be contaminated? (on the basis of the "width being used" reference in the definition.) response Accepted. Guidance will be added on the operational use of the runway. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 150 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 325 comment by: Ryanair This definition is more restrictive than the previous definition and the added restriction is unwarranted. The current proposal suggests that 1/12th of a runway qualifies as contaminated versus 1/4th under previous regulation. response Not accepted. The new reporting format leads to an assumption of dry runway below the coverage threshold where previously the operator would have calculated with a wet runway assumption. This reduces the margins available in operations. To ensure that the existing margins are sufficient for (unreported) worse case contamination of the runway, the reporting threshold had to be reduced to 25% of one third. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.1. Definitions — p. 49 GM14 Annex I Definitions comment 77 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Area intended to be used 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.1 Definitions 2. New GM14 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: This GM should be applicable to WET RUNWAY as well. Amend GM14: “The ‘area intended to be used’ means the area of the runway that is part of the take-off run available (TORA), accelerate stop distance available (ASDA) or landing distance available (LDA) declared in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) or by notice to airmen (NOTAM).” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The ASDA is not necessarily contained within the TORA. response Accepted. The definition will be amended and made applicable to dry and wet runways. comment 116 comment by: CAA Norway GM14 Annex 1 Definitions DRY RUNWAY Comment: Why is ASDA not included? If the conditions on the stopway (if provided) is signifcantly less than on the runway, the possibility of a rejected take-off overrun onto the runway strip/RESA seems to be increased. response Accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 151 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The definition will be amended. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.2. Part-ORO — p. 50 GM1 ORO.MLR.100 comment comment by: Norwegian Air (Norwegian Air Norway, Norwegian Air International, 259 Norwegian Air UK and Norwegian Air Shuttle) GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL (OM) When publishing operational crosswind limitations in Part B of the OM in accordance with AMC3 ORO.MLR.100, operators should consider: (a) the following manufacturer’s information: (1) values published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the aircraft flight manual (AFM); (2) maximum demonstrated crosswind values, when more limiting values are not published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the AFM; (3) gust values; and (4) additional guidance or recommendations; (b) operational experience; and (c) operating-environment factors such as: (5) runway width; (6) runway surface condition; and (7) prevailing weather conditions. We recommend to delete (2) above. Maximum demonstrated crosswind values should not be considered as limiting. By putting this in, operators may be required by the regulator to alter their crosswind limitation to the maximum demonstrated value, if this is lower than the manufacturers recommendation in the FCTM. The crosswind information in both the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) are considered guidelines, not limitations. The AFM statement is simply that--a statement that the maximum crosswind that was demonstrated is xx KT but it is not a crosswind limitation. Note that statement is not in the Limitations section of the AFM, but in Section 4 (performance) of the AFM. The maximum demonstrated takeoff and landing crosswinds published in the AFM are merely the maximums that manufacturers could find during its certification flight testing of the aircraft. It is a regulatory requirement to publish these values in the AFM even though they are typically not considered limiting. During airplane certification flight testing, it can be very difficult to find crosswinds of sufficient magnitude to be considered limiting. Essentially, the manufacturer has to accept the actual crosswind that existed at the time of the certification testing, and it is this maximum demonstrated crosswind that gets published in the AFM. If a higher or lower maximum crosswind would have been found during the testing, then the AFM- published value would have been higher or lower. The crosswind guideline values published in the FCTM are meant to be more operationally useful. They are guidelines based on piloted simulator evaluations, flight test data, and engineering analysis. They are usually, but not always, different from the maximum demonstrated crosswind shown in the AFM because the AFM values are merely the maximums that happened to be found during certification testing. They could therefore be lower than the maximum demonstrated value. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 152 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The FCTM values are provided as guidance on crosswind values that manufacturer test pilots believe can be handled without exceptional piloting skills for the runway conditions stated. The guidelines are provided to assist operators in establishing their own crosswind policies. Operators should consider these published guidelines, runway conditions, and their flight crew and operational experience to determine their own crosswind policies. For example, an operator who routinely operates in high crosswind conditions may consider publishing higher values because their crews are experienced in handling high crosswinds. Another airline may want to use the values as published because they do not routinely encounter higher crosswinds. response Not accepted. The intent of the GM is to draw the attention of operators on the information provided by OEMs that needs to be considered when establishing crosswind limitations. Furthermore, the maximum demonstrated crosswind values need to be considered in the absence of more limiting values in the “Limitations” section of the AFM. Other material as provided in the FCTM or other OEM documents needs to be considered as well as per point (4) of the GM. The operational experience is of course another important element to consider as per point (b) of the GM. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 51 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 comment 234 comment by: ERAA New AMC1.CAT.OP.MPA.303 p. 51, and Table 1 p. 52: These LDF’s are not compatible with a steep approach concept. To our knowledge, the underlying simulations were based on approach angles up to 3.5 degrees. For our operation on 830 metre runways, Widerøe uses a steep approach concept with 4.5 degrees and 35 ft screen height, and the LDF’s are not appropriate for this type of operation. - The LDF’s seem prohibitive. Also, it is noted that LDF 1.67 is used for Turboprop instead of 1.43. Turboprop aircraft generally operate at lower speeds and energy. This means higher traction, and lower inertia when decelerating. The propellers in disc or reverse are very effective and efficient brakes compared with turbojet thrust reversers. We are deeply concerned that aircraft manufacturers will not provide performance data that will give acceptable landing mass on contaminated runways. response Noted. See response to comment 300. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 51-52 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) comment 18 comment by: DGAC France The explanatory note indicates that the proposed new AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 “is based on the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32”. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 153 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Yet, this FAA AC “provides guidance and standardized methods […] when developing landing performance data for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments for transport category airplanes” But the EASA LDFs are not explicited in the FAA AC 25-32. Moreover this NPA does not provide any details about the flight tests and the hypothesis to determine LDFs. In addition, the economic impact of ICAO amendments in paragraph 4.5.4 of the RIA is only based on : - Airbus and Embraer figures, but relevant data for performance are already existing for these aeroplanes, - Class B and Class C aeroplanes, but they are not concerned by LDFs, - IATA survey saying that in-flight assessment of the landing distance is generally made, but without information about the methods or factors used. Therefore, DGAC France asks for a rationale about LDFs determination, impact assessment and the consequences for the operators of performance class A aeroplanes without relevant data performances. Without these information, DGAC France is not in position to support the proposed LDFs. response Partially accepted. The factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations)  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and  12 sample flight conditions The resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. Though not explicitly mentioned in the AC 25-32, they are proposed for use in the FAA order 8900 when OEM data developed in accordance with AC 25-32 are not available. They are also recommended by the ICAO Aeroplane Performance Manual (Doc. 10064). As regards the impact assessment, EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. The economic assessment of the RIA will be revised to take into account this aspect and alternatives to the generic factors will be offered to comply with the new rule. comment 78 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Landing Distance Assumption and Procedures 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.3 Part-CAT 3. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Append to AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a): “The OM should state the the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data.“ TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 154 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The AFM is not the appropriate place for the procedures and assumptions used in developing the data, but the information relevant to the flight crew on what aspects are necessary to achieve the published distances should be included in the OM. response Accepted. comment 79 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Landing Distance Factors 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.3 Part-CAT 3. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (b)(2) 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend Table 1 under AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(b)(2): Turbojet with all reversers operating 1.67 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Clarify that these factors assume that all installed reversers are operative. response Accepted. comment 88 comment by: Stefan See my previous comments, LDR was in the past normally associated to the landing distance at the planning stage. It seems that there is no consistency in the terminology used. LDR is not defined anywhere but then is cited in this paragraph. response Not accepted. “Required” landing distance is self-defined as being that required by the rules. comment 89 comment by: Stefan (4) They may not be conservative for all configurations in case of unfavourable combinations of these parameters, so what has to be done? We accept the situation of flying with a downslope of -2%, ISA +20 and a gust correction of +20kts? Manufacturer should provide some guidance. response Not accepted. The factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations)  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 155 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  12 sample flight conditions And with the conditions mentioned in the comment. They have been accepted as the resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. comment 117 comment by: CAA Norway AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes Paragraph (a) Comment: Reference comment to AMC 25.1592. Applicability, including the factors in Table 1, with respect to steep approaches and short landing operations, reference CAT.POL.A 245, 250, 345 and 350. must be clarified. Rationale: It would seem inappropriate to uses AMC 25.1592 as a requirement related to steep approach and short landing operations, where, for example, the transition time would be significantly shorter than for a normal approach (3 – 3,5 degrees approach angle) These types of operation require a tighter control of speed and profile than normal approaches, and availability of approved data for landing distance at the estimated time of arrival for landing distance assessment may be even less readily available than for normal operation, see comments to paragraph b) below. Further, the reason for having these types of operations is, in many cases, a clear public interest in sustaining both scheduled operations with performance class A and air ambulance flights with performance class B aeroplanes to aerodromes where an extension of declared distances are either physically or economically extremely difficult, and where operations under present rules have not shown any safety issues related landing overruns during normal operations. (In Norway we have this situation with more than 500.000 landing operations over the last couple of decades.) Paragraph (b) Comment: This paragraph is the cause of serious concerns and need to be improved and/or supplemented by further guidance material. Rationale: There is a serious concern that few manufacturers will provide relevant data developed and approved according to AMC 25.1592 or equivalent, for aircraft types which are already in service. Aeroplanes required to be operated in Performance class A comprises not only aeroplanes from Airbus, Boeing and Embraer as mentioned in the RIA, but also a large variety of multi engine jets and turboprops manufactured by other companies worldwide. There are also some turboprops which normally operates in performance Class B, but because of seating configuration have to be operated in performance class A. These may not have any performance information related to operation on contaminated runways. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 156 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Further, the aeroplane types required to be operated in performance class A has very large span of max certified landing mass, from below 12500 lbs (5700 kg) and up to several 100.000 lbs/kg, and similarly a very wide span of approach speed, ranging from PANS OPS CAT A to D inclusive. At the time of writing, we have no, or few firm indications as to how these aeroplane types will be supported. As a matter of fact, there are signals that data developed and approved in accordance with AMC 25.1592 will not be provided, unless there is a serious customer demand. It is not difficult to see that cost, especially for aeroplane types certified to earlier standards might be quite expensive, at least for the smaller operators. A consequence will be that a large number of operators have to apply paragraph (b) in the AMC. Subparagraph (b) describes one possibility (or is it two?): (1) Correction factors may be applied to the certified landing distances on dry runways published in the AFM for turbojet-powered and turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes (2) For this purpose, the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 may be used. At the time of writing, we read this as follows: a) Unless an Alternative Means of Compliance has been approved, the LDFs from Table 1 have to be used. b) The operator may develop correction factors other than those in Table 1, without the need for an AltMoc. We need a clarification of this question. Proposals: Proposal a) We propose that proper guidance material is developed to aid operators to develop correction factors other than the ones listed in Table 1, whether an alternative means of compliance is required or not. Rationale For some aeroplane types there exist approved or advisory material related to operation on contaminated runways. At least some has been developed in accordance with the present AMC 25.1591. Guidance is needed on how to apply these data when developing correction factors other than the ones in Table 1. Proposal b) If a set of generic Landing Distance Factors (LDFs) shall be published, ref the current Table 1, operators would need a more sophisticated approach. Consequently, it is suggested that the following principles should be followed: - At least two sets of factors should be provided, one for PANS OPS CAT A/B and one set for CAT C/D aeroplanes. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 157 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses - Unfactored landing distance, DRY, for the appropriate runway pressure altitude, temperature and adjusted for slope and Head/Tailwind should be the starting point. - A minimum Vref increment of 5 kts is acceptable as a baseline, 20 kts seems to be too much for PANS OPS Cat A/B aeroplanes. - The 15 % margin must be taken into account. (Which figure is the baseline onto which 15% shall be added?) Rationale We can foresee that operators need a more sophisticated set of performance data than what can be achieved by simply applying the LDFs from Table 1. Reasons are listed below: - Slope is a known property of the landing runway. As credit for upslope may not be given, but penalty for downslope obviously must be taken into account, this could/should be done in the same manner as aerodrome elevation and aerodrome temperature. These properties are known at the time when the in-flight assessment shall take place. Information in one AFM indicates that a downslope of 1 % implies a 30 % increase in the unfactored landing distance on a level runway, whereas a 2 % downslope implies a 100 % increase. It should be noted than ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 contains a design limit of 1 % slope for runways with Code number 3 and 4, and 2% for runways with Code number 1 and 2. Thus it would be unusual to find runways with LDA much above 1500 meters with slope greater than 1. Thus a single correction factor for slope seems to possibly incur unnecessary penalties. - Vref increment, planned Vref increment should be assessed and briefed at the same time as the inflight landing distance assessment takes place (around top of descent). For PANS OPS CAT A/B aeroplanes, it is considered unlikely that a planned Vref increment would be more than 10 kts. If a 5 kts Vref increment is used as baseline, separate correction factors based on Vref increments of 10, 15 and, at least for PANS OPS CAT C/D aeroplanes 20 kts should be available. As any Vref increment will increase the landing distance, it seems that using a single correction factor for Vref increment will possibly incur unnecessary penalties. The NPA document itself contains no explanation on how these LDFs were developed, apart from the Notes to the table and, to some extent subparagraph (b)(4), which identifies the considerations taken account of. - Temperature. This is taken account of directly together with aerodrome elevation, and is estimated to be accurate as long as reported value at the time of assessment is used, and no further factoring should be necessary. - Head/Tailwind. This should be taken account of as usual (max 50 % of headwind, at least 150 % of tailwind). Reported values at the time of assessment is used, and no further factoring should be necessary. It is noted that at least one manufacturer strongly discourages tailwind landings on a contaminated runway. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 158 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Question: How has it been developed, and what is the applicability range with respect to factors as aeroplane size (landing mass), approach speed (Pans Ops Category), approach angle (Max 3.5 or greater), does it apply to steep approach etc) Comments to Table 1: Re Note 2: Question 1 How is the figure 1.67 for turboprops landing on a RWYCC 6 arrived at? Compared to turbo jets, the factor of 1.67 is used which is consistent with the figure in CAT.POL.A. 230. An explanation is required why the figure is not 1.43. Question 2 Who determines whether a turboprop is “modern with adequate disking drag” or not? Whereas a number of PT 6 powered turboprops may not have the same properties in ground idle as for example a DHC 8, the drag effect is distinctly noticeable, and it seems to be an overreaction to have use LDFs for turbojets, no reverse. Subparagraph (b) (3). Comment/Question: At least two manufacturers require that the unfactored landing distance on a level runway is corrected for slope before further use, shall the LDFs be multiplied with the unfactored landing distance on a level runway or on the distance corrected for slope? Subparagraph (b) (4). Comment/Question: Based on the arguments listed earlier with respect to temperature, slope and approach speed increments, we question whether these LDFs are equally applicable to PANS OPS CAT A/B aeroplanes as to the faster, and usually heavier PANS OPS CAT C/D aeroplanes. response Partially accepted. On the comment on paragraph (a): Assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches will be added in CS-25. On the comment on paragraph (b): The generic factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations)  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and  12 sample flight conditions They have been accepted as the resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. For such cases alternatives to the generic factors will be offered. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 159 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 156 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 52 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a). In flight check. Table 1 - LDFs Factors applied to dry runway data when landing with varying RWYCCs. How are these factors derived and substantiated? response Noted. The factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations)  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and  12 sample flight conditions The resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. comment 180 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 51 Paragraph No: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes (b)(2). Comment: Whilst it is the longer term objective that Class A aeroplanes will have type- specific data produced in accordance with CS25.1592, the intention of (b)(1) and (2) should be that in the absence of such data the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 should be used, since these have been developed from a suitably rigorous analysis. Hence, the current wording “…the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 below may be used…” infers that other factors may possibly be applied, but it is not clear from where an alternative source of factors could be obtained. Justification: In the absence of type-specific time of arrival for landing distance data, the factors that should be used must be appropriate and suitably derived. Proposed Text: (2) For this purpose, the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 below may should be used response Partially accepted. EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data that are compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives based on existing manufacturer data will be offered for those cases. comment 246 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 160 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses GAMA notes that an enroute check of landing distance at time of arrival is an operational requirement per CAT.OP.MPA.303. Operational requirements are different than the airworthiness certification standards which are dependent on the type certification basis of an airplane model for applicability. Therefore, it is understood that this operational requirement to provide performance information in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent, is applicable to both existing models where CS 25.1592 is not part of the certification basis, as well as future models, where CS 25.1592 is part of the model's certification basis. It is a significant burden for an OEM to generate and certify new performance information as well as a departure from the intent of AC 25-32 where existing, approved data would remain accepted. Furthermore, some ongoing certification programs have specific wet runway Certification Review Items (CRI) applied to them which are not consistent with AMC 25.1592 which would result in increased burden. Data created in accordance with prior amendments of 25.1591, or in accordance with wet runway CRIs, should remain acceptable. GAMA requests that EASA confirm that existing Smooth Wet Runway CRI is considered an acceptable data basis for providing wet runway operational material as an alternative to CS 25.1592/AMC 25.1592. Additionally, GAMA requests that EASA allow existing time of arrival performance information to remain as is and require the proposed data standards for new certification models only. response Accepted. EASA recognises the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 253 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig AMC1.CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1), Table 1 provides Landing Distance Factors (LDFs), but no background is provided for how these factors were determined for different types of aeroplanes. One of the footnotes indicates that the factors include effects of 15 percent safety margin, increased ambient temperatures, a range of runway slopes, and increased approach speeds. GAMA recommends that EASA provide additional background and rationale for how these factors were established. response Accepted. The factors have been established during the work of the TALPA ARC as the result of a Monte Carlo statistical analysis of operational landing distances on different runway surfaces, based on the use of:  5 sample FAR 25 turbojet types (in 6 landing configurations) TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 161 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  3 sample FAR 25 turboprop types (in 8 landing configurations), and  12 sample flight conditions The resulting factors being those with a 99% reliability. This background will be explained in the Opinion. comment 271 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The proposal seems to not address large, multi-engine turboprop aeroplanes in its current structure. As the agency knows, Performance Class A includes a number of aeroplane types that were not certified to 14 CFR Part 25 or CS-25 airworthiness standards including these turboprop aeroplanes. The agency recognizes that for Performance Class B and C aeroplanes, data may not be currently available, because no relevant airworthiness standard exists. The agency will recall that the TALPA ARC, in which it participated, recognized this situation and noted that many of its recommendations for Part/CS-25 would not translate well to small Part/CS-23 aeroplanes. The TALPA ARC recommended that in the absence of a specific identified safety issue, the requirement for a time of arrival assessment should be made applicable only to multi-engine turbojets and large (commuter category) turboprops and not applicable to small turboprop aeroplanes. GAMA recommends that the agency limit the applicability of CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) to a subset of Performance Class A aeroplanes, specifically multi-engine turbojets aeroplanes and turboprop powered aeroplanes with a MCTOM exceeding 8 616 kg and more than 19 passengers. response Accepted. The applicability of the requirement to Performance Class A aeroplanes will be tailored in line with the comment. comment 275 comment by: FNAM Attachment #3 The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 162 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses - a simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit - a reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) 1/ Over conservative factors defined in the AMC1 Regarding the AMC1, the FNAM would like some clarification regarding the meaning of “or equivalent” in the sentence “in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent”. Indeed, it should be confirmed that airplanes certified before the release of the AMC 25.1592 and airplanes certified before the release of CS 25 (e.g. JAR 25 certification or catch-up of previous national certifications) are deemed to be equivalent. Besides, some factors described in the AMC1 are a misfit (cf. table in Annex 1):  For dry runways, there is no case where there is no demonstrated Landing Distance. Therefore, the FNAM is wondering why for a RWYCC of 6, the LDF is equal to 1.67 whereas the corresponding factor to apply in-flight defined in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 is equal to 1.15. There are inconsistencies between the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and its AMC1.  Moreover, on wet runways, the factors described in the AMC1 are outliers and not consistent with the spirit of the AirOps regulation. Indeed, if we apply the data certified in the AFM (1.15.LDDry for most old certified aircrafts) the factor that needs to be applied is equal to (1.15)2, which means 1.32, and not 2.6. Equally, if there is no certified data on wet runway condition, the FNAM does not understand the discrepancy between the 2.6 factor described in this AMC1 and the application of CAT.POL.A.235 that requires a wet factor of 1.15 on which CAT.OP.MPA.303 supplement another safety margin of 1.15. This equals to the same (1.15)2, which means 1.32, total factor.  In other cases, some factors seems to be outliers since they are far too complex to implement and lead to inapplicable landing distances. 2/ Additional workload for pilots at a critical phase of flight This measure may appear dangerous for flight safety because it brings an additional workload for pilots at a critical moment: the approach preparation. Indeed, with an unusual representation for pilots, they are required to do 2 complex calculations which are not matching the usual Charts presentation in the AFM and the FCOM, when such Charts exist, which is not the case for most old generation airplanes:  Ensure that 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA or LDF.LDDemonstrated on dry runway ≤ LDA  Compute the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 163 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses In practice, this is unrealistic and may cause critical over workload in the cockpit during the approach. 3/ Measure only conceived for modern turbojets If this measure concerns all performance class A aeroplanes, it seems to have only been conceived for modern turbojets such as A320, B737-800, etc. It clearly does not take into account turbopropellers such as Beech1900 nor old ones such as Fokker 50, ATR 42-500 old generation. This measure does not take into account old Business Aviation turbojets such as the Falcon 50. First, these aircrafts do not have devices allowing the computation of performance landing distance assessment. Secondly, for most old airplanes, the certified data contained in the AFM do not include landing distances for wet / contaminated runways, requiring the use of the LDFs which have been demonstrated to be over conservative. As a conclusion, if modern turbojets may not be impacted by this new constraint, no RIA has been made to measure the impact on smaller / older aircrafts, including old turbojets. 4/ Current status of the regulation Until now, the logic has been to ensure first at dispatch that the demonstrated certified landing distance, depending on the runway condition, the altitude, the wind, the temperature, was below 0.6.LDA (Landing Distance Available) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes or 0.7.LDA for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes with the following particularity for wet runways: in the absence of demonstrated data, the landing distance chosen on a wet runway is the landing distance necessary on a dry runway increased by 15%. Then during the flight, the commander, already taking into account ICAO recommendations, has to ensure that the landing weight satisfies all the constraints depending on the real conditions such as:  The demonstrated landing distance is below the LDA  The go-around limitation during the approach is taken into account  Etc. In essence, at dispatch, the landing distance depending on the conditions at the estimated time of arrival has to be below 0.6.LDA or 0.7.LDA. This condition was taken into account in the accessibility of an adequate aerodrome during pre-flight planning. 5/ New additional constraints on landing distance through the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 The IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 adds additional constraints before the approach phase. The commander shall ensure that: At the estimated time of arrival weather conditions 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA When demonstrated landing distances (LDDemonstrated) do exist for the expected conditions, the landing distance to be taken into account is therefore 1.15.LDDemonstrated. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 164 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses If this data is not available, the landing distance to be taken into account is LDF.LDDemonstrated with LDF the landing distance factor defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1). Besides, in addition to the above, the commander shall compute during the approach preparation, the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing. To that extend, the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 requires 2 complex calculations during a critical phase of flight, while not requested before in flight. NB : More, this 1.15 factor appears confusing, as similar to the 1.15 factor required at dispatch in case of wet / contaminated runway when demonstrated landing distances for such conditions are not available. 6/ Margin added to already existing margins The implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 is adding a margin on already existing margins. Indeed:  A minima, with this new requirement, the commander has to add, in real conditions, a 15% margin on the certified landing distance, whereas the certified landing distances are already taking into account safety margins  The regulation EU n° 139/2014 (IR-ADR) applying to aerodromes, is already imposing RESA to prevent runway excursions 7/ Complex computing methodology The method to compute landing distances described in the IR.CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is complex and may appear dangerous. Indeed:  The logic to compute the constraint on the runway length necessary at dispatch: LD ≤ k.LDA (with k a factor) is contrary to the new constraint on the necessary runway length, in real conditions, computing method: k’.LD ≤ LDA (with k’ a factor) which is source of error  This computing method may appear dangerous because it does not match the operating practices. Indeed, usually, the commander computes the maximum operational landing weight depending on all the constraints, among which the runway length, the landing distance, the go-around limitation during the approach, etc. on an aggregated basis, and he makes sure that the real landing weight is below this computed mass Thus, this new intermediate calculation, described in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is not matching current operational practices and is not a usual representation for pilots. 8/ No impact assessment conducted whereas it is necessary This measure is ludicrous. No impact assessment on this new measure has been conducted regarding: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 165 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  The old generation airplanes for which the performance information for landing distance assessment are not available in the AFM  The runway lengths computed according to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA. 303 (a) (b)(1) and (c)(1)  The number of runway excursions that would have been avoided if this measure, which leads in most of the cases to distances much longer than most of the existing runways, had been implemented 9/ Lack of common sense This measure is contrary to common sense. Indeed, if in-flight the conditions taken into account at dispatch are not satisfied anymore, what should the commander do? Does he have to divert to a smaller and with reduced facilities aerodrome? Besides, current requirements are already compliant with the ICAO recommendations. No ICAO requirement is asking for in- flight additional margins, and above all, with such an absurd methodology. Furthermore, this measure creates discrepancies between European operators and the other ones without knowing what will happen for TCO holders: it is reasonable to think that TCO holders will unlikely propose alternative means of compliance warranting the same level of safety. 10/ Conclusion For all these reasons, as stated above: The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. response Noted. See response to comment 270. comment 300 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS New AMC1.CAT.OP.MPA.303 p. 51, and Table 1 p. 52: These LDF’s are not compatible with a steep approach concept. To our knowledge, the underlying simulations were based on approach angles up to 3.5 degrees. For our operation on 830 metre runways, Widerøe uses a steep approach concept with 4.5 degrees and 35 ft screen height, and the LDF’s are not appropriate for this type of operation. - The LDF’s seem prohibitive. Also, it is noted that LDF 1.67 is used for Turboprop instead of 1.43. Turboprop aircraft generally operate at lower speeds and energy. This means higher traction, and lower inertia when decelerating. The propellers in disc or reverse are very effective and efficient brakes compared with turbojet thrust reversers. We are deeply concerned that aircraft TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 166 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses manufacturers will not provide performance data that will give acceptable landing mass on contaminated runways. response Accepted. The concerns expressed in this comment will be addressed by adding assumptions to derive landing distances in case of steep approaches. comment 308 comment by: DGAC France When there is no data available for the in-flight assessment, the use of the factors (LDFs) raises an important issue that needs to be addressed: in most cases, these factors are more constraining than the dispatch ones. Therefore, a runway that was legal at dispatch may become too short according to time of arrival criteria immediately after take-off. As a consequence, the probability to divert is critically increased and the relevance of dispatch checks in those cases may really be questioned. Besides, it is very likely that operators who are concerned by this issue will apply for alternative means of compliance that will be really difficult for a National Authority to assess at an operational level. response Accepted. Alternatives to the generic factors will be offered to comply with the new rule so to avoid undue penalization of certain aircraft. More generally, even when non using the generic factors to determine the landing distance at time of landing, it may happen that, in marginal cases, with particularly unfavourable combinations of runway length and runway surface conditions it is already possible at the time of dispatch to foresee that the landing distance determined in flight will be longer than the one determined with dispatch criteria. For such cases appropriate guidance will be developed. comment 318 comment by: Textron Aviation 3. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) is added as follows: (a) ...or equivalent, and included in the operations manual (OM). Suggest stating that data previously provided to comply with JAR/CS 25.1591 or related ops rules is considered to be equivalent. response Accepted. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. comment 319 comment by: Textron Aviation Note 2: these LDFs apply only to modern turboprops with efficient disking drag. For older turboprops without adequate disking drag, use the Turbojet, No Reverse LDFs. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 167 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses It is not clear how to distinguish a modern turboprop with efficient disking drag, from an older turboprop without adequate disking drag. It is not clear how to determine if a disking drag is efficient or not adequate. These qualifiers leave too much to interpretation. Examples of existing airplanes might be helpful. response Noted. The concept of disking drag and its use in landing performance considerations is defined in CS-23. Relevant information for each aircraft type is published in the AFM. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 53-54 GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 comment 13 comment by: Landauer Aviation Consulting Ltd "ASSESSMENT BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA When the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a PFC, the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival may be done by confirming that the runway meets the criteria used for dispatch." Suggest that "carried out" or "made" are better than "done". response Accepted. comment 80 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Consideration of MEL/CDL/in-flight failures 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.3 Part-CAT 4. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend paragraph (h) under GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303: “(...) planned use of available and operable aeroplane ground deceleration devices.” 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: The impact of any MEL, CDL or in-flight system failures on aeroplane ground deceleration devices should be considered. response Accepted. comment 81 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Autobrake usage 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 168 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3.3.3 Part-CAT 4. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend the paragraph AUTOBRAKE USAGE under GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303: „(...) For operations when the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a porous friction course (PFC), if the manual braking distance provides at least 15 % safety margin, then the braking technique may include a combination of autobrakes and manual braking even if the selected autobrake landing data does not provide a 15 % safety margin.“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Clarification. response Accepted. comment 82 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Time of Arrival Assessment based on Dispatch Criteria 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.3 Part-CAT 4. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Amend the paragraph ASSESSMENT BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA under GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303: „When the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a PFC, the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival may be done by confirming that the assumptions used for dispatch remain applicable at time of arrival. (...)“ 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: Extend the statement to all assumptions on the conditions expected to be encountered on arrival at time of dispatch. response Accepted. However it’s necessary to check whether this proposal should be at AMC. comment 90 comment by: Stefan criteria used for dispatch, is it intended before the flight? In case of in flight replanning to a different airport than at the dispatch stage (pre-flight), what conditions should be applied? response Noted. Dispatch criteria are those established in CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POL.A.235. comment 91 comment by: Stefan TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 169 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses See my previous comments, in this chapter "operational landing distance calculations" are introduced. What is the operational landing distance? It is not defined anywhere. There is no consistency in the terminology used and this creates room for interpretation and generally confusion. response Accepted. A definition of “landing distance at time of arrival” will be introduced and terminology used in the rules will be revised consistently. comment 118 comment by: CAA Norway GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes TIMELINESS General Comment: For practical purposes, the operator will need to provide flight crews with a quick reference tool in order to avoid using unreliable or unsafe data. TIMELINESS No comment. RUNWAY CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS Proposal: Insert new (d) as follows (d) Other elements in the Runway Condition Report, which may cover the following issues: - width of runway to which the RWYCCs apply if less than published width; - reduced runway length; - drifting snow on the runway; - loose sand on the runway; - chemical treatment on the runway; - snowbanks on the runway; - snowbanks on taxiway; - snowbanks adjacent to the runway; - taxiway conditions; - apron conditions; - State approved and published use of measured friction coefficient; - plain language remarks. Rationale: This information is included, as applicable, in the Runway Condition Report in order to enhance situational awareness. Consequently, it would be prudent to consider this information at this time in order to obtain a more complete picture of the situation on the ground. (Source PANS AERODROMES) ASESSEMENT BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA. Comment/Question/Proposal It is noted the term “grooved” and “PFC” are defined in ICAO Annex 6 Part I, but are not used elsewhere in the Annex. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 170 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Question: Are these defined in CS25 It is proposed, as an important task, to relate pavement characteristics to drainage capacity instead of certain specific treatment or manufacturing techniques. This would require current status to be established with respect to macrotexture on runways in order to establish a datum. This task should be performed/monitored by ICAO as it should be supported by overarching performance-based SARPs across relevant Annex’ and PANS. response Partially accepted. On the general comment, all information in the operations manual has to be provided in a manner that is easy to use and observes human factor principles as required by ORO.MLR.100(k). On the comment on “RUNWAY CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS”, relevant information will be added to the GM. On the third comment EASA will monitor any ICAO development on runways having improved friction characteristics. comment 157 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 53 3.3.3 – Part – CAT 4 – New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 Autobrake Usage – Why is it permissible to select an auto-brake setting that does not guarantee stopping on a surface that has recently become wet, particularly if operating with reduced landing distance factors? Surely it is better to select a high brake setting to ensure a stopping capability and to reduce the deceleration when it becomes clear that the runway length is adequate. This is certainly preferable to increasing braking when running out of runway. Operating rules should not be written to address a lack of variability in autobrake characteristics on specific types. response Noted. The intent of the GM is to avoid selection of unduly high autobrake settings that would increase brake temperature and wear which can lead to failures in carbon brakes. Furthermore, unnecessarily high settings are a significant operational constraint for turnaround times that are not necessarily justified by a safety benefit. comment 158 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 53 3.3.3 – Part – CAT 4 – New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 Assessment Based on Dispatch Criteria – As set out in our comment made about Page 13 – Paragraph 2.4.4 – CAT.POL.A.255, it is likely that the proposed landing distance factors will give very little margin when using ‘normal’ landing technique on a dry runway. If the runway is wet a longer distance will be required to stop. The NPA does not supply any justification for giving credit for grooved or PFC surfaces in combination with reduced landing distance factors. response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 171 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The use of reduced required landing distance in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255 is not supposed to be cumulated with any performance credit for grooved or PFC wet runways. When dispatching a flight to a forecast wet runway, an additional check is required against the criteria for landing distance at time of arrival established in CAT.OP.MPA.303. comment 181 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 53 Paragraph No: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 Autobrake Usage and Assessment Based on Dispatch Criteria Comment: It is not clear why it is permissible to accept an auto-brake standard that does not guarantee stopping on a surface that has become wet since despatch, particularly if one is operating with reduced landing distance factors. The dispatch data may already have taken some credit for a grooved or PFC surface. Justification: There does not appear to be any justification provided (e.g. in the NLR Safety Study) for giving credit for grooved or PFC surfaces. The proposals would benefit from the provision of this information. response Noted. The intent of the GM is to avoid selection of unduly high autobrake settings that would increase brake temperature and wear which can lead to failures in carbon brakes. Furthermore, unnecessarily high settings are a significant operational constraint for turnaround times that are not necessarily justified by a safety benefit. comment 182 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 53 Paragraph No: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes TIMELINESS Comment: The paragraph concerning assessment based on dispatch criteria state that “When the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a PFC, the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival may be done by confirming that the runway meets the criteria used for dispatch. The required landing distance for dry runways determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the time-of-arrival landing distance calculation on a dry runway, which includes specific allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation.” would benefit from further justification. Justification: This statement should be substantiated before it is applied in combination with the reduced landing distance factor. response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 172 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The use of reduced required landing distance in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255/355 is not supposed to be cumulated with any performance credit for grooved or PFC wet runways. When dispatching a flight to a forecast wet runway, an additional check is required against the criteria for landing distance at time of arrival established in CAT.OP.MPA.303. The GM will be clarified to this extent. comment 235 comment by: ERAA P53 GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival The NPA is assuming that all flights are sufficiently long in time and distance that there is a cruise, or top of descend segment, allowing time for landing performance assessment. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS operates 15 city pair combinations with a great circle distance of less than 60NM, and the shortest city pair combination has a typical flight time of only 8 minutes. For such flights the company has established procedures for calculation of destination landing performance before departure so that the sterile cockpit concept, below 10000feet, is not compromised. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest a revision of the text that allow for performance assessment being conducted in non-critical phases of flight. response Noted. See response to comment 301. comment 243 comment by: Thomson Airways GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival - aeroplanes 1. This text could result in the Commander of a succeeding aeroplane on final approach being forced into a difficult quick decision based on a very subjective pilot report of braking action. The pilot making the report could also be very inexperienced at reporting braking actions. The aeroplane types and braking characteristics could also be very different. Thomaon Airways' proposed text: ‘GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 - The assessment is initially performed when landing weather and runway condition repo rts are obtained, usually around top of descent. The assessment should includes consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics can be tolerated to ensure a safe landing so that a quick decision is made just prior to landing if the preceding aircraft provides a pilot advisory report of braking action (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action.’ response Not accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 173 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The concern expressed in the comment is understood, however, as a matter of fact a pilot report from the preceding aircraft may be obtained just prior to landing and therefore the flight crew should be prepared to deal with it at that moment. The GM is meant to make sure that the flight crew is prepared to this eventuality by having done the relevant considerations beforehand. These elements should be anyway addressed by proper training. comment 260 comment by: Tom Wike What is the definition of "efficient disking drag"? Will a list of applicable aircraft types and propeller systems be provided? response Noted. The concept of disking drag and its use in landing performance considerations is defined in CS-23. A list cannot be provided as relevant information for each aircraft type is published in the AFM. comment 276 comment by: FNAM Attachment #4 The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow: - a simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit - a reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) 1/ Over conservative factors defined in the AMC1 Regarding the AMC1, the FNAM would like some clarification regarding the meaning of “or equivalent” in the sentence “in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent”. Indeed, it should be confirmed that airplanes certified before the release of the AMC 25.1592 and airplanes certified before the release of CS 25 (e.g. JAR 25 certification or catch-up of previous national certifications) are deemed to be equivalent. Besides, some factors described in the AMC1 are a misfit (cf. table in Annex 1): TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 174 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  For dry runways, there is no case where there is no demonstrated Landing Distance. Therefore, the FNAM is wondering why for a RWYCC of 6, the LDF is equal to 1.67 whereas the corresponding factor to apply in-flight defined in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 is equal to 1.15. There are inconsistencies between the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and its AMC1.  Moreover, on wet runways, the factors described in the AMC1 are outliers and not consistent with the spirit of the AirOps regulation. Indeed, if we apply the data certified in the AFM (1.15.LDDry for most old certified aircrafts) the factor that needs to be applied is equal to (1.15)2, which means 1.32, and not 2.6. Equally, if there is no certified data on wet runway condition, the FNAM does not understand the discrepancy between the 2.6 factor described in this AMC1 and the application of CAT.POL.A.235 that requires a wet factor of 1.15 on which CAT.OP.MPA.303 supplement another safety margin of 1.15. This equals to the same (1.15)2, which means 1.32, total factor.  In other cases, some factors seems to be outliers since they are far too complex to implement and lead to inapplicable landing distances. 2/ Additional workload for pilots at a critical phase of flight This measure may appear dangerous for flight safety because it brings an additional workload for pilots at a critical moment: the approach preparation. Indeed, with an unusual representation for pilots, they are required to do 2 complex calculations which are not matching the usual Charts presentation in the AFM and the FCOM, when such Charts exist, which is not the case for most old generation airplanes:  Ensure that 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA or LDF.LDDemonstrated on dry runway ≤ LDA  Compute the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing In practice, this is unrealistic and may cause critical over workload in the cockpit during the approach. 3/ Measure only conceived for modern turbojets If this measure concerns all performance class A aeroplanes, it seems to have only been conceived for modern turbojets such as A320, B737-800, etc. It clearly does not take into account turbopropellers such as Beech1900 nor old ones such as Fokker 50, ATR 42-500 old generation. This measure does not take into account old Business Aviation turbojets such as the Falcon 50. First, these aircrafts do not have devices allowing the computation of performance landing distance assessment. Secondly, for most old airplanes, the certified data contained in the AFM do not include landing distances for wet / contaminated runways, requiring the use of the LDFs which have been demonstrated to be over conservative. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 175 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses As a conclusion, if modern turbojets may not be impacted by this new constraint, no RIA has been made to measure the impact on smaller / older aircrafts, including old turbojets. 4/ Current status of the regulation Until now, the logic has been to ensure first at dispatch that the demonstrated certified landing distance, depending on the runway condition, the altitude, the wind, the temperature, was below 0.6.LDA (Landing Distance Available) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes or 0.7.LDA for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes with the following particularity for wet runways: in the absence of demonstrated data, the landing distance chosen on a wet runway is the landing distance necessary on a dry runway increased by 15%. Then during the flight, the commander, already taking into account ICAO recommendations, has to ensure that the landing weight satisfies all the constraints depending on the real conditions such as:  The demonstrated landing distance is below the LDA  The go-around limitation during the approach is taken into account  Etc. In essence, at dispatch, the landing distance depending on the conditions at the estimated time of arrival has to be below 0.6.LDA or 0.7.LDA. This condition was taken into account in the accessibility of an adequate aerodrome during pre-flight planning. 5/ New additional constraints on landing distance through the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 The IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 adds additional constraints before the approach phase. The commander shall ensure that: At the estimated time of arrival weather conditions 1.15.LDDemonstrated ≤ LDA When demonstrated landing distances (LDDemonstrated) do exist for the expected conditions, the landing distance to be taken into account is therefore 1.15.LDDemonstrated. If this data is not available, the landing distance to be taken into account is LDF.LDDemonstrated with LDF the landing distance factor defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1). Besides, in addition to the above, the commander shall compute during the approach preparation, the most unfavorable runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing. To that extend, the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 requires 2 complex calculations during a critical phase of flight, while not requested before in flight. NB : More, this 1.15 factor appears confusing, as similar to the 1.15 factor required at dispatch in case of wet / contaminated runway when demonstrated landing distances for such conditions are not available. 6/ Margin added to already existing margins The implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 is adding a margin on already existing margins. Indeed: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 176 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses  A minima, with this new requirement, the commander has to add, in real conditions, a 15% margin on the certified landing distance, whereas the certified landing distances are already taking into account safety margins  The regulation EU n° 139/2014 (IR-ADR) applying to aerodromes, is already imposing RESA to prevent runway excursions 7/ Complex computing methodology The method to compute landing distances described in the IR.CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is complex and may appear dangerous. Indeed:  The logic to compute the constraint on the runway length necessary at dispatch: LD ≤ k.LDA (with k a factor) is contrary to the new constraint on the necessary runway length, in real conditions, computing method: k’.LD ≤ LDA (with k’ a factor) which is source of error  This computing method may appear dangerous because it does not match the operating practices. Indeed, usually, the commander computes the maximum operational landing weight depending on all the constraints, among which the runway length, the landing distance, the go-around limitation during the approach, etc. on an aggregated basis, and he makes sure that the real landing weight is below this computed mass Thus, this new intermediate calculation, described in the IR CAT.OP.MPA.303 and in its AMC1 is not matching current operational practices and is not a usual representation for pilots. 8/ No impact assessment conducted whereas it is necessary This measure is ludicrous. No impact assessment on this new measure has been conducted regarding:  The old generation airplanes for which the performance information for landing distance assessment are not available in the AFM  The runway lengths computed according to the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA. 303 (a) (b)(1) and (c)(1)  The number of runway excursions that would have been avoided if this measure, which leads in most of the cases to distances much longer than most of the existing runways, had been implemented 9/ Lack of common sense This measure is contrary to common sense. Indeed, if in-flight the conditions taken into account at dispatch are not satisfied anymore, what should the commander do? Does he have to divert to a smaller and with reduced facilities aerodrome? Besides, current requirements TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 177 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses are already compliant with the ICAO recommendations. No ICAO requirement is asking for in- flight additional margins, and above all, with such an absurd methodology. Furthermore, this measure creates discrepancies between European operators and the other ones without knowing what will happen for TCO holders: it is reasonable to think that TCO holders will unlikely propose alternative means of compliance warranting the same level of safety. 10/ Conclusion For all these reasons, as stated above: The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. response Noted. See response to comment 270. comment 301 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS P53 GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival The NPA is assuming that all flights are sufficiently long in time and distance that there is a cruise, or top of descend segment, allowing time for landing performance assessment. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS operates 15 city pair combinations with a great circle distance of less than 60NM, and the shortest city pair combination has a typical flight time of only 8 minutes. For such flights the company has established procedures for calculation of destination landing performance before departure so that the sterile cockpit concept, below 10000feet, is not compromised. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest a revision of the text that allow for performance assessment being conducted in non-critical phases of flight. response Accepted. Guidance will be provided for short flights. comment 324 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The agency provides guidance material for autobrake usage for time of arrival landing distance assessment. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 178 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses GAMA requests that EASA justify the use of a lower safety margin for combination of manual and autobraking when sufficient safety margins are available with manual braking. The AMC1 indicates it is not intended to force a higher level of autobraking to an unreasonable level when a 15 percent safety margin exists using manual braking. response Noted. Limiting autobrake selection to the availability of a 15% margin may push operators to use unnecessarily higher autobrake settings than required, or even manual braking, especially when only a few low deceleration settings are available on the aircraft. This increases the brake temperatures systematically, leading to risk of brake oxidation and failure. It was thus accepted that in some cases the flight crew may need to override the autobrakes with strong manual braking, but most of the time they will be able to manage the stop smoothly and with a limited number of brake applications. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 54-56 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 comment 14 comment by: Landauer Aviation Consulting Ltd GENERAL "......Pilot reports of runway braking action should be done in the format of......" Suggest that "done" is superfluous and the sentence reads better as "......Pilot reports of runway braking action should be done in the format of....." response Accepted. comment 119 comment by: CAA Norway AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting GENERAL Comment/Proposal 1: Suggest this to be split into one AMC covering the format of the report itself and the training requirements, and a GM explaining the system, background and aerodrome handling of the RWCC Rationale: The AMC in its present for contains both the ways and means of complying with reporting requirements in CAT.OP.MPA.311 and explanation/training material related to the format, ways and means used by the aerodrome staff to assess and report runway conditions Comment 2: Table I is not consistent with the ICAO concept/definitions Proposal: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 179 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Replace the existing Table 1 and footnotes with the following: Table 1 – Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT*. Runway Surface Surface Condition Condition Depth Notes RWYCC Descriptor Includes wet or contaminated Dry Dry n/a below 25% coverage in each 6 runway third Damp 5 (any visible moisture) Wet Wet 3mm or 5 less Slippery Wet Wet ‘Slippery wet’ runway 3 Compacted At or below OAT*-15°C 4 Any Snow Above OAT* -15°C 3 3mm or 5 less More Including when any depth occurs Dry Snow than 3mm on top of Compacted Snow 3 Up to 100mm Any On top of Ice 02) Frost1) Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3mm or 5 less Slush More Contaminated than 3mm 2 Up to 15mm 3mm or 5 less More Standing Water than 3mm 2 Up to 15mm Any On top of Ice 02) Wet Ice Any 02) 3mm or 5 less Wet Snow More Including when any depth occurs 3 than 3mm on top of Compacted Snow TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 180 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Up to 30mm Any On top of Ice 02) *Runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. Notes: 1) Under certain conditions frost can cause the surface to become very slippery. 2) Operations in conditions where Less Than Poor Braking Action prevails are prohibited. Rationale: For consistency purposes and in order to be compliant with the defined concept of the ICAO global reporting format following changes is proposed: · Insert a footnote where OAT occurs (three locations) - *Runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. (ICAO compliant) · Move text Damp (any visible dampness) to fourth column and insert Wet (ICAO compliant – Damp is not a descriptor – Wet is a descriptor) · Insert Dry in second column (Consistency – Dry is a descriptor) · Insert Wet in second column and ‘slippery wet’ runway in fourth column. (Wet is a descriptor) Comment 3, Table 2, Note 1. Proposal: Proposed to delete existing note and replace it with two notes. The second note is strictly speaking not needed as the table it refers do not relate to measured friction coefficients. Note 1: Flight crew should not upgrade a reported RWYCC. Such a decision cannot be taken by a flight crew on approach. Such an upgrade can only be performed by aerodrome personnel as it must be supported by all other observations to them. Note 2: Reported friction coefficients poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability/landing performance. If a friction coefficient is reported it can only be used if it is part of a method approved and harmonized by the State of the Operator and the State of the Aerodrome. Rationale: The main aim of this note is that the pilot should not do any upgrade. For this reason it is proposed to replace Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must be supported by all other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability/landing performance. with the following new Note: Note 1: Flight crew should not upgrade a reported RWYCC. Such a decision cannot be taken by a flight crew on approach. Such an upgrade can only be performed by aerodrome personnel as it must be supported by all other observations to them. The Table which the note refers to, do not have any reference to friction measuring devices. For that reason there should not be necessary to mention ‘measured friction values’. Such values are not reported unless it is part of a State specific approved method. However, if it is TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 181 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses of importance to have an alert with respect to ‘measured friction values’ a Note 2 could be considered: Note 2: Reported friction coefficients poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability/landing performance. If a friction coefficient is reported it can only be used if it is part of a method approved and harmonized by the State of the Operator and the State of the Aerodrome. response Partially accepted. On comment 1: Guidance on reporting will be separated from guidance on flight crew training. On comment 2: The table will be crosschecked against ICAO source documents. On comment 3: The note will be clarified. comment 236 comment by: ERAA New AMC1.CAT.OP.MPA.311 p. 54 and Table 1 p. 55 and Table 2 p. 56: We strongly support the option for aerodrome personnel to upgrade the reported RwyCC based on mu measurements approved by the state. Comparing with note on this AMC on page 11, it is unclear whether mu measurements can be used to upgrade. In our view, and based on our experience, it should be possible for aerodrome personnel to upgrade, and also to RwyCC 4. This RwyCC is - at it stands in the NPA - unduly restrictive, and should be redefined to cover higher temperatures also; dew point spread may form part of the definition. response Noted. The possibility to upgrade a RWYCC will be contemplated by the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be introduced by the rulemaking task RMT.0704 and will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 237 comment by: ERAA P54 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS support the statement in Note1: “the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome.” Provided use of approved winter surface treatment procedures, monitored by approved friction measuring device, and assessed by trained personnel according to established and approved procedures a reporter should be allowed to upgrade the RCAM RWYCC to the following proposed highest RWYCC: · Wet runway – RWYCC4 · Dry snow – RWYCC 4 · Wet snow - RWYCC 4 · Compacted snow temp warmer than – 14C - RWYCC 4 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 182 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses · More than 3mm water - RWYCC 4 · More than 3mm slush - RWYCC 4 · Ice - RWYCC 2 · Ice – RWYCC 3 if sanded with loose sand · Ice - RWYCC 4 if runway is prepared with fixed sand · Wet ice - RWYCC 1 · Water on top of compacted snow - RWYCC 2 · Dry or wet snow over ice - RWYCC 4 response Noted. See response to comment 302. comment 238 comment by: ERAA Question to EASA: The NPA does not state how measurements of contaminants at 3mm or less can be measured. According to the Norwegian AIP AD 1.2 Snow Plan the intervals for reporting of depth are as follows: · Dry snow – 8mm · Wet snow – 6mm · Slush – 3mm Hence, whenever there is dry snow less than 8mm it will be reported as 8mm, for wet snow the reported depth will be 6mm. This implies that for wet or dry snow the runway will always be reported as contaminated according to the RCAM regardless of actual depth. Will EASA provide IR, AMC and GM for aerodrome operators describing methods and procedures safeguarding reliable measurements of depth for all type of contaminants? response Noted. See response to comment 302. comment 266 comment by: AIR FRANCE The AMC could be written in a more operational way. The requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.311 asks the pilot to report when braking actions is not as good as reported. So the knowledge of the braking action reported should be the first concern of this AMC but it is going there in an indirect way. The braking action will not be stated in the SNOWTAMS and the Runway State group in the METAR will not be issued. PANS-ATM amendment according to SL30 is requesting ATC to provide on frequency the RWYCC. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 183 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Therefore the flight crew will have the information of the RWYCC and possibly not an explicit Braking Action statement. As it is now, in the AMC there is no clear and upfront correlation between the reported RWYCC with the Braking Action. The AMC should start with a clear statement of the correlation between RWYCC and Braking action, which will be what the pilot will be using as a reference to decide if the one encountered is worse. A suggested text for the beginning of the AMC could be: “The braking action is correlated to the RWYCC as per following table: RWYCC Braking Description Action 6 N/A 5 GOOD Braking deceleration is normal for the wheel braking effort applied AND directional control is normal. 4 GOOD TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between good and MEDIUM medium. 3 MEDIUM Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced. 2 MEDIUM TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between medium POOR and poor. 1 POOR Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is significantly reduced. 0 LESS THAN Braking deceleration is minimal to non-existent for the wheel POOR braking effort applied OR directional control is uncertain. Whenever the braking action encountered is less than the reported, an AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, containing as applicable: Good to medium braking action as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” Medium braking action as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” Medium to poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” Poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” “ Less than poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR”” response Accepted. The intent of the comment is agreed. The proposed text will be crosschecked against ICAO terminology for adoption. comment 290 comment by: IATA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting GENERAL IATA Comments: The requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.311 asks the pilot to report when braking actions is not as good as reported. So the knowledge of the braking action reported should be the first concern TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 184 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses of this AMC but it is going there in an indirect way. The braking action will not be stated in the SNOWTAMS and the Runway State group in the METAR will not be issued. PANS-ATM amendment according to SL30 is requesting ATC to provide on frequency the RWYCC. Therefore the flight crew will have the information of the RWYCC and possibly not an explicit Braking Action statement. As it is now, in the AMC there is no clear and upfront correlation between the reported RWYCC with the Braking Action. The AMC should start with a clear statement of the correlation between RWYCC and Braking action, which will be what the pilot will be using as a reference to decide if the one encountered is worse. A suggested text for the beginning of the AMC could be: “The braking action is correlated to the RWYCC as per following table: RWYCC Braking Description Action 6 N/A 5 GOOD Braking deceleration is normal for the wheel braking effort applied AND directional control is normal. 4 GOOD TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between good and MEDIUM medium. 3 MEDIUM Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced. 2 MEDIUM TO Braking deceleration OR directional control is between medium POOR and poor. 1 POOR Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is significantly reduced. 0 LESS THAN Braking deceleration is minimal to non-existent for the wheel POOR braking effort applied OR directional control is uncertain. Whenever the braking action encountered is less than the reported, an AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, containing as applicable: Good to medium braking action as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” Medium braking action as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” Medium to poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” Poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” “ Less than poor braking action as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR”” TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 185 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. See response to comment 266. comment 291 comment by: IATA AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting GENERAL IATA Comments: See comment on the RCR in the definitions section. The RCR should be described, maybe in a GM. Also the references to the ICAO documents (9981 and 4444) should be developed and the contents inserted in the EASA AMCs or GM. response Accepted. See response to comment 282. comment 302 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS Attachments #5 #6 . P54 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS support the statement in Note1: “the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome.” Provided use of approved winter surface treatment procedures, monitored by approved friction measuring device, and assessed by trained personnel according to established and approved procedures a reporter should be allowed to upgrade the RCAM RWYCC to the following proposed highest RWYCC: · Wet runway – RWYCC4 · Dry snow – RWYCC 4 · Wet snow - RWYCC 4 · Compacted snow temp warmer than – 14C - RWYCC 4 · More than 3mm water - RWYCC 4 · More than 3mm slush - RWYCC 4 · Ice - RWYCC 2 · Ice – RWYCC 3 if sanded with loose sand · Ice - RWYCC 4 if runway is prepared with fixed sand · Wet ice - RWYCC 1 · Water on top of compacted snow - RWYCC 2 · Dry or wet snow over ice - RWYCC 4 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 186 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Question to EASA: The NPA does not state how measurements of contaminants at 3mm or less can be measured. According to the Norwegian AIP AD 1.2 Snow Plan the intervals for reporting of depth are as follows: · Dry snow – 8mm · Wet snow – 6mm · Slush – 3mm Hence, whenever there is dry snow less than 8mm it will be reported as 8mm, for wet snow the reported depth will be 6mm. This implies that for wet or dry snow the runway will always be reported as contaminated according to the RCAM regardless of actual depth. Will EASA provide IR, AMC and GM for aerodrome operators describing methods and procedures safeguarding reliable measurements of depth for all type of contaminants? Question to EASA: The NPA excerpt of the RCAM states that contamination on top of ice shall be reported as RWYCC 0. According to the Norwegian AIP AD 1.2 Snow Plan the following combinations of contaminants are allowed: · Wet/ice · Wet/compacted snow · Wet/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/ice · Frost/compacted snow · Frost/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/ice · Dry snow/compacted snow · Dry snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet snow/ice · Wet snow/compacted snow · Wet snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet snow/ice/frozen ruts and ridges TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 187 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses · Wet snow/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/ice · Slush/compacted snow · Slush/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Ice/compacted snow · Ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Ice/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges Will EASA provide IR, AMC and GM for aerodrome operators describing methods and procedures safeguarding reliable assessment of various types of contaminants? Is it only the contaminant on top that will be reported? What if part or the runway is bare and dry, some part contaminated by dry ice and finally some part of the runway contaminated with ice underneath dry snow? Will it be reported by RCAM as RWYCC 0? Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is suggesting provisions for upgrading as stated above. The Table 2 - Association between AIREP and RWYCC was briefly commented upon in point 7.3.4 Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS would like to emphasize that RWYCC issued according to RCAM without justified upgrade may introduce a significant mismatch between the pilots anticipated deceleration and actual observed deceleration. Whenever a runway is specially prepared it should be upgraded based on approved procedures to minimize the discrepancy between the reported RWYCC and the deceleration felt by the flight crew. A scientific study called “The IRIS runway model - A decision support model for assessing runway conditions” produced by by Alex Klein-Paste, Associate professor at NTNU, dept of Civil and Transport Engineering, is enclosed. The report studied 27219 SNOWTAM reports to identify the performance of the TALPA matrix versus actual assessments performed by reporters at Norwegian aerodromes and the proposed scifientific model for runway assessment called IRIS. The report identified the following interesting data: · TALPA assessed the braking action for 55% of runways as less than medium · Reporters reported nearly 90% of runways with braking action as medium or better · The IRIS model assessed the braking action for 85% of runways as medium or better However, when upgrading the TALPA RWYCC according to ICAO methodology the TALPA RWYCC was more aligned with the figures as when using IRIS methodology. Furthermore, when evaluating the data by collection of PIREPS the report concluded that the RWYCC assigned by reporters is more in line with the PIREPS than both the TALPA and IRIS assigned RWYCC. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 188 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The conclusion is that the IRIS model outperforms both the TALPA and ICAO model, including upgrade, but that the model need further improvement. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS has performed more than 700000 landings with the DASH-8 on short field aerodromes, 800-1199m, and has never experienced runway overruns due to erroneous or incorrect runway condition assessment and reporting. The crew reports an average of 3000 occurrence reports every year and there are no reports related to mismatch between reported runway conditions and breaking action and actual observed braking action. In fact, the anti-skid is hardly ever activated, and in these few instances the reported friction values are reported as poor or medium-poor and the flight crew is clearly aware that the runway surface is slippery. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that EASA provides IR, AMC and GM for scientific models for preparation of winter surface runways, assessment and reporting that ensure correlation between reported RWYCC and actual observed and experienced braking action. Alternatively, the IR, AMC and GM must allow continuation of the already established and well performing regime that is in force today. response Partially accepted. The concerns expressed in the comment and the possibility to upgrade RWYCC will be dealt with in the aerodrome rules, where the rulemaking task RMT.0704 is introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 56-57 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 comment 239 comment by: ERAA Question to EASA: The NPA excerpt of the RCAM states that contamination on top of ice shall be reported as RWYCC 0. According to the Norwegian AIP AD 1.2 Snow Plan the following combinations of contaminants are allowed: · Wet/ice · Wet/compacted snow TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 189 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses · Wet/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/ice · Frost/compacted snow · Frost/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Frost/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/ice · Dry snow/compacted snow · Dry snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Dry snow/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet snow/ice · Wet snow/compacted snow · Wet snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet snow/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Wet snow/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/ice · Slush/compacted snow · Slush/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Slush/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Ice/compacted snow · Ice/frozen ruts and ridges · Ice/compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges · Compacted snow/frozen ruts and ridges Will EASA provide IR, AMC and GM for aerodrome operators describing methods and procedures safeguarding reliable assessment of various types of contaminants? Is it only the contaminant on top that will be reported? What if part or the runway is bare and dry, some part contaminated by dry ice and finally some part of the runway contaminated with ice underneath dry snow? Will it be reported by RCAM as RWYCC 0? Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS is suggesting provisions for upgrading as stated above. The Table 2 - Association between AIREP and RWYCC was briefly commented upon in point 7.3.4 Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS would like to emphasize that RWYCC issued according to RCAM without justified upgrade may introduce a significant mismatch between the pilots anticipated deceleration and actual observed deceleration. Whenever a runway is specially prepared it should be upgraded based on approved procedures to minimize the discrepancy between the reported RWYCC and the deceleration felt by the flight crew. A scientific study called “The IRIS runway model - A decision support model for assessing runway conditions” produced by by Alex Klein-Paste, Associate professor at NTNU, dept of Civil and Transport Engineering, is enclosed. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 190 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The report studied 27219 SNOWTAM reports to identify the performance of the TALPA matrix versus actual assessments performed by reporters at Norwegian aerodromes and the proposed scifientific model for runway assessment called IRIS. The report identified the following interesting data: · TALPA assessed the braking action for 55% of runways as less than medium · Reporters reported nearly 90% of runways with braking action as medium or better · The IRIS model assessed the braking action for 85% of runways as medium or better However, when upgrading the TALPA RWYCC according to ICAO methodology the TALPA RWYCC was more aligned with the figures as when using IRIS methodology. Furthermore, when evaluating the data by collection of PIREPS the report concluded that the RWYCC assigned by reporters is more in line with the PIREPS than both the TALPA and IRIS assigned RWYCC. The conclusion is that the IRIS model outperforms both the TALPA and ICAO model, including upgrade, but that the model need further improvement. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS has performed more than 700000 landings with the DASH-8 on short field aerodromes, 800-1199m, and has never experienced runway overruns due to erroneous or incorrect runway condition assessment and reporting. The crew reports an average of 3000 occurrence reports every year and there are no reports related to mismatch between reported runway conditions and breaking action and actual observed braking action. In fact, the anti-skid is hardly ever activated, and in these few instances the reported friction values are reported as poor or medium-poor and the flight crew is clearly aware that the runway surface is slippery. Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS suggest that EASA provides IR, AMC and GM for scientific models for preparation of winter surface runways, assessment and reporting that ensure correlation between reported RWYCC and actual observed and experienced braking action. Alternatively, the IR, AMC and GM must allow continuation of the already established and well performing regime that is in force today. response Noted. See response to comment 302. comment 320 comment by: Textron Aviation 6. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 is amended as follows: WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA The TALPA ARC recognized that landing performance data has been provided for existing airplanes in various forms, such as based on braking action or contaminant type and depth, and significant effort was spent on the RCAM to allow operators to use this existing data to make a time-of-arrival assessment. The TALPA ARC recommendations, as well as AC25-32, TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 191 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses state that data already provided for existing airplanes in order to comply with JAR/CS 25.1591 or related Ops rules should be acceptable for this assessment. CAT.POL.A.200 also recognizes that the AFM may not contain approved performance data for takeoff or landing on wet or contaminated runways, and makes allowance for the use of other data. Recommend that the advisory material be clarified such that existing data supplied to comply with 25.1951 or related Ops rules is acceptable for already-certified aircraft. response Accepted. Alternatives will be developed for those cases. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 57 GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 comment 240 comment by: ERAA GM1.CAT.POL.A.200 p. 57: Does the reference for ‘Applicable standards for the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival’ refer to the requirement for 15% margin? response Noted. See response to comment 304. comment 280 comment by: FNAM The FNAM is asking for the removal of the implementing rule CAT.OP.MPA.303 and all its AMC and GM. Moreover, regarding the IR CAT.OP.MPA.300, the FNAM is asking for the removal of the reference to paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.303 in order to ensure consistency. Besides, we suggest that the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 remains as it was written before the modifications brought by this NPA. Generally speaking, the FNAM is asking for the removal of all references to paragraph CAT OP.MPA.303 and its AMC and GM that have been added through this NPA. Furthermore, in order to document the impact of such a measure on the various activities of all the stakeholders potentially impacted by this new requirement, the FNAM is asking for a 3 months’ extension of the period of consultation of this NPA so that all concerned operators may develop their own arguments. This additional period of consultation would allow:  A simplification of the methodology described in the AMC1 so that it can be applicable in the cockpit  A reevaluation of the Landing Distance Factors (LDF) which seem pulled out of the hat (contrary to what was stipulated in the explanatory note of this NPA, the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 192 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses factors defined in the AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 (a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) are not explicited in the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32) response Noted. See response to comment 268. comment 304 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS GM1.CAT.POL.A.200 p. 57: Question to EASA: Does the reference for ‘Applicable standards for the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival’ refer to the requirement for 15% margin? response Noted. Applicable standards in this context means the certification standards, in accordance with performance data have to be provided, for the purpose of determining the landing distance at time of arrival. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 57 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 comment 83 comment by: AIRBUS SUBJECT : Considerations for Landing Performance at Dispatch 1. PARAGRAPH / SECTION THE COMMENT IS RELATED TO: 3.3.3 Part-CAT 8. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 2. PROPOSED TEXT / COMMENT: Insert paragraph under AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230: The following considerations may impact landing distance calculations: (a) The following considerations may impact landing distance calculations: (a) aerodrome elevation; (b) wind; (c ) aeroplane mass and configuration; (d) approach ground speed at threshold; (e) eventual adjustments to the landing distance, such as autoland; and (f) available and operable aeroplane ground deceleration devices. (...)" 3. RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 193 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses In line with the required assumptions for computation of the time of arrival performance, the assumptions for computation at dispatch should be explicit. It is proposed to continue to assume that slope and temperature effects are covered by dispatch factors, but it is also proposed to specify the use of the expected operational approach speed at threshold and consideration for any MEL or CDL items affecting deceleration devices. response Partially accepted. The text of CAT.POL.A.230 will be completely re-drafted for consistency with other requirements and will take into account some of the suggestions. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 58 GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) comment 33 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) The GM is related to the wrong passage of the rule. It should be named "GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a)". response Accepted. The reference to the paragraph number will be corrected. comment comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation 35 law) 1. The exclusion of "holiday charter" is not justifiable. If an aircraft is chartered for business purpose the operator is (if having an approval) allowed to perform a reduced required distance landing, but if the same operator with the same crew and the same aircraft are performing a flight for another purpose (namely for recreational purpose of the passengers = holiday charter), the operator should no longer be allowed to perform such a flight. This "purpose of the flight"-oriented distinction is not objective. 2. I guess it was intended to exempt holiday-charters carried out by airline operators; but in this case it should be clarified that CAT.POL.A.255 still is applicable to holiday-charter flights carried out by business-jet operators. response Not accepted. The definition of holyday charter re-called in this GM is already existing and used in Reg. (EU) 965/2012 and it does not apply to business jet operators. comment 244 ❖ comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) appreciates the agency proposing establishing a mechanism for operators to establish a landing mass on dry runways of 80 percent of the landing distance available (LDA) for business jets operations that comply with CAT.POL.A.255. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 194 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The 80 percent allowance builds in experience gained in commercial on-demand business aviation operations in the United States in accordance with 14 CFR 135.4, Eligible-On-Demand (EOD) operations which have shown not only to increase operational flexibility but enhance safety. GAMA, however, recommends that the agency update the maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) proposed in the NPA (i.e., 45 360 kg) to align with new business jet products on the market. As the agency knows, there are several new business jet with an MCTOM above 45 360 kg including the Bombardier Global 7000 and 8000 as well as the Gulfstream G650ER (see, rulemaking underway in RMT.0695 for additional background). GAMA recommends that EASA increase the allowable MCTOM to accommodate these new business jets for 80 percent LDA operations. The RMT.0695 draft NPA proposes to increase the MCTOM for non-ETOPS business jet operations to 60 000 kg as the new threshold. GAMA recommends that the agency align the MCTOM in the runway performance regulation to establish a common set of thresholds between the two rules to ensure all business jet operators in Europe can benefit from the increased safety and operational flexibility that the 80 percent LDA runway achieves in concert with the requirements in CAT.POL.A.255. response Partially accepted. The aircraft eligibility for these operations will be changed in order to be established on the basis of certification criteria comment 351 comment by: US FAA New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(a) is added as follows: Comment summary Current part 25 certification methods offers options as to air distance certification methods. One method is based on a calculation simulating a 3.5 degree glidepath and 8 ft/s touchdown rate. Both are more aggressive than the normal airport approach guidance and the operational landing training. Applying the reduced landing distance factor of 1.25 [ 1/0.8] to an AFM distance based on a very aggressive air distance definition reduces the effective margin from an operational landing air distance as defined in FAA AC 121.195 (d)-1a, OPERATIONAL LANDING DISTANCES FOR WET RUNWAYS; TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES from the current 35 to 45% based on a 1.67 factor to 8 to 15% based on a 1.25 factor. Whereas applying the 1.25 factor to an AFM distance based on normal airport approach guidance and operational landing training maintains the intended 25% margin based on stopping within 80% of the available landing distances. Currently at least one business jet manufacturer offers AFMs based on both methods of air distance definition. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 195 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses A second manufacturer of business jets has the parametric method of air distance definition based on 3.5 degree glide path and 8 ft/s touchdown rate applied to older models but a more operationally representative method applied to recently certified models. As to OAT and slope accountability, AFM’s which do not account for OAT or slope further reduces the margins when operating to airfields with temperatures greater than ISA and downhill slope. Suggested resolution Insert the following: New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations: CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations must have an AFM statement indicating the airplane is eligible to use the reduced required landing distances. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations: CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations must have an AFM statement indicating the airplane is eligible to use the reduced required landing distances. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations: CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations must have an AFM statement indicating the airplane is eligible to use the reduced required landing distances. response Accepted. An aircraft eligibility criterion based on an AFM statement will be added. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 58 GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) ) comment 37 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) In the related GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) it should be clarified that the risk assessment has to be performed if there is a deviation from CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2). In such a case the risk assessment might be restricted to the deviations from conditions of (b)(2). response Not accepted. The proposal is already clear in this respect as it gives an “or” condition between the two paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 196 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 58 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) comment 92 comment by: Stefan In a risk assessment I would suggest to add also a clear reference to realistic duty hours and fatigue of the pilots. As well known, fatigue is frequently cited as a contributing factor to accidents and serious incidents, not including this in a risk assessment would be partial. When defining realistic, please refer also to the accident investigation of the F-GLFA Falcon where crew was on board of the aircraft 3,5hrs before the flight even if the EU FTL were considering only 30 minutes (statement of MAK). response Not accepted. Fatigue may be of course a contributing factor to any incident or accident, however it is out of the scope of the present rulemaking task and is appropriately dealt with in ORO.FTL. comment 96 comment by: Stefan It would be advisable also to specifically state in the AMC the need to reassess and in case review the stable approach criteria in the risk assessment since, as per NLR study, this is a critical factor. response Noted. Stabilised approach criteria are defined in CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) which will be referenced to for better clarity. However approaches outside these criteria and other special approaches, as mentioned in the rule, are excluded. comment 112 comment by: Stefan Another comment on the risk assessment. There is no mention that the risk assessment shall include quantitative analysis that demonstrates for example the compliance of the operator to the stabilized approach criteria and touchdown point, how the stabilized approach have been defined and risk assessed, etc. The mainstream in the industry at the moment is to provide a nice bow-tie and the risk assessment is completed. What are the numbers behind, before getting the approval the operator should demonstrate and prove based on data that the barriers/mitigations identified in the risk assessment are effective and that the safety performance achieved is according to the safety target set. Would be acceptable for the approval if for example the rate of the unstable approaches is not known (0 reports received) or 20% of all flights performed are unstable (based on the FDM) but it is nicely described in the OM that pilots has to be stable and land on the touchdown point and the relevant training has been performed? Would strongly suggest that this risk assessment should at least include a retrospective analysis of company data with reference to the safety performance about unstable approach and long landings. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 197 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. The analysis of operator’s performance and occurrence reports related to unstable approaches and long landings will be recommended in the risk assessment. comment 120 comment by: CAA Norway AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations RISK ASSESSMENT Comment: Reference should be made to AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations, ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS Rationale: While the AMC in item f) lists “aerodrome characteristics”, this encompass a multitude of elements, some of which are covered in AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii). The proposal is intended to ensure that the content of AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) is considered during the risk assessment process. response Not accepted. The requirement to consider aerodrome characteristics is already clearly stated at the level of implementing rule. comment 183 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 58 Paragraph No: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations RISK ASSESSMENT Comment: The risk assessment must include quantitative evidence of the current level of safety. Justification: To demonstrate that an equivalent level of safety is achievable, it is necessary to establish first the current level of safety. This requires quantitative data which only an FDM programme can deliver. Proposed Text: Add new sub-para (k), as follows: RISK ASSESSMENT The risk assessment required by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) should include at least the following elements: (a) flight crew qualification in terms of training, checking and recency; (b) flight crew composition; (c) runway surface conditions; (d) dispatch criteria; (e) weather conditions and limitations; (f) aerodrome characteristics; TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 198 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses (g) aeroplane characteristics and limitations; (h) aeroplane equipment and systems affecting landing performance; (i) aeroplane performance data; and (j) operating procedures and operating minima. (k) quantitative Safety Performance Indicators relevant for the risk of runway excursions extracted from the operator’s FDM programme. response Partially accepted. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of more general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it should be used also for the purposes of CAT.POL.A.255. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, alternative means for data collection will be considered and the analysis of operator’s performance in relation to unstable approaches and long landings will be included in the risk assessment. comment 196 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Page 58 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1)(e) Comment: The risk assessment should emphasize the crosswind condition for the weather conditions and limitations part. response Accepted. Crosswind will be mentioned in the AMC. comment 359 comment by: US FAA Comment summary List of conditions (a) through (j) does not include approach guidance unless you consider it covered by (f) aerodrome characteristics Suggested resolution Add an item to the list: ( ) Available approach guidance response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 199 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Approach guidance is included under aerodrome characteristics. This will be further explained at GM level. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 59-62 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) comment 41 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii): It should be clarified that NCC-operations have to be considered as a "similar type of operation". response Not accepted. There is no landing factor required for NCC operations therefore the entire concept of reduced required landing distance approval is not applicable to such operations comment 45 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) Recurrent Training and Checking: Please clarify that a recency in "real operation" substitutes the landings required during annual training. response Accepted. comment 197 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation Page 60 FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING Comment: There are no requirements for the trainers, we recommand that: * FSTD training should be performed with a SFI * Flight training should be performed with a TRI or a Line Training Captain previously trained by a TRI response Not accepted. The qualification of the trainers is covered in ORO.FC.145. comment 198 comment by: Dassault-Aviation Dassault-Aviation TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 200 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page 60 FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING Comment: Crosswind could be challenging for reduced required landing distance operations, we recommand including approaches and landings with crosswind exercises in the pilot training response Accepted. Crosswind will be included in the training. comment 356 comment by: US FAA Comment summary (c) Flight crew with previous increased reduced required landing distance operations experience of a similar type of operation with another EU operator, may undertake the following: The word “increased” appears to have been retained in error. Suggested resolution Remove the word “increased” from this item. response Accepted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 62 GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) comment comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation 42 law) 1. What does it mean if a FDM is "recommended" in a GM? If it is required, put it in the rule. If EASA wants to have operators established such a FDM: put it in an AMC. But do not put in a GM and do not word it as a recommendation, because this is not something to better understand the rule itself (which is the purpose of a GM). 2. FDM is not something to monitor the flight crew but the operation of the aircraft. In this sense this GM goes beyond the rule itself (which is – from a legal point of view – not permitted). response Accepted. FDM will be recommended at AMC level. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 201 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 93 comment by: Stefan I am not sure what method alternative to FDM (see further note) can be used. Voluntary reporting would probably be inadeauate to define a trend. FDM should be binding and not just reccomended if an equivalent level of safety and monitoring is required: also NLR in the study provided considers FDM as a "solid mitigating factor". response Not accepted. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of more general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it should be used also for the purposes of CAT.POL.A.255. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, alternative means for data collection will be considered. comment 94 comment by: Stefan Even FDM with older generation aircraft could be quite ineffective. Consider an aircraft with 64/128 wps, position is barely recorded. Why not instead proposing the use of a form similar to the CATIII landing forms, where touchdown position and deviation from the vertical/horizontal profile at the minima are recorded by crew? This in addition to the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting on the unstable approaches supported mandatorily by FDM could be a more effective solution to be included in the regulation as GM. response Partially accepted. Alternative means for data collection will be considered. comment 184 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 62 Paragraph No: GM1 CAT. POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced requried landing distance operations MONITORING Comment: The FDM programme should be a mandatory method to monitor risk, rather than optional. Justification: FDM is the only effective tool to provide early warning about degradation of safety margins for runway excursions. Proposed Text: Amend to read: (a) Reduced required landing distance operations should be continuously monitored by the operator to detect any undesirable trends before they become hazardous. (b) A flight data monitoring (FDM) programme, as required by ORO.AOC.130, is an acceptable method to monitor operational risks related to reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 202 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses (c) Although ORO.AOC.130 requires FDM only for aeroplanes with a maximum certified take- off mass (MCTOM) of more than 27 000 kg, FDM is recommended for all operators conducting reduced required landing distance operations. (b) The operator’s flight data monitoring (FDM) programme should be explicitly configured to monitor SPIs relevant to the risk of runway excursions. Detailed guidance material is available on the EOFDM working group deliverables. response Partially accepted. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of more general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it should be used also for the purposes of CAT.POL.A.255. Moreover it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, the text proposed will be adopted for the cases where FDM is used. comment 221 comment by: DGAC France DGAC has some concerns about the relevance of the training and recency conditions that are not related to specific and identified airports. DGAC believes that the efficiency of such a training and recency considerations depends upon the airports characteristics. At least, DGAC recommends to specify in this AMC that the FSTD training and/or flight training shall be performed at an aerodrome that is representative of such operations and considered as the most critical by the operator. In addition, DGAC considers that operating an aerodrome under reduced required landing distance operations represents an additional complexity that must be taken into account in the categorisation of the aerodrome by the operator. In any case, DGAC believes that, for each aerodrome operated under the reduced required landing distance operations and categorised as C, the FSTD training and/or flight training and recent experience requirements developed in this AMC shall be met. response Accepted. Training at aerodromes representative of the intended operations will be specified in the AMC. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 62 GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) comment 19 comment by: DGAC France It could be necessary to include the ALAP definition and meaning at either AMC level or within the definition section. response Partially accepted. Guidance on the ALAP will be expanded. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 203 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 43 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) 1. Please determine in an AMC what you exactly expect from the ALAP. 2. Please clarify that this ALAP is just a part of the dispatch (and not of the flight watch) process. It "sounds" as if there was a special programme to be established by the operator whereas in fact there are simply 4 items to be checked during dispatch. response Accepted. Clarifications on the intent and the content of the ALAP will be provided. comment 185 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 62 Paragraph No: GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP) Comment: It’s not clear how and when the aerodrome critical data referred to here is meant to be used. If this data is meant to be used for dispatch purposes, this should be stated more clearly. Justification: Ambiguous text. response Partially accepted. This guidance is intended for dispatch purposes. The GM will be anyway expanded to include additional information and clarifications. comment 357 comment by: US FAA GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) Comment summary In item (b) as called out, one item for consideration is runway surface condition. This would typically be taken as wet or contaminated (contaminated not allowed) however there should be conscious recognition that a wet runway surface may be significantly degraded because of poor airport maintenance. Suggested resolution (b) runway surface condition including notice of a slippery when wet surface characteristic. response Accepted. Runway maintenance status will be mentioned. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 204 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 63 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) comment 159 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 63 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255 (b)(2)(v) – Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations – Equipment affecting landing performance There does not appear to be any requirement to ensure that a critical piece of equipment or system is available in flight prior to landing. With such a significant reduction in margins, the reduced capability is much more significant. response Noted. The mitigating measure related to the functionality of aircraft equipment is introduced by not allowing the dispatch of the aircraft with such equipment inoperative. Should such equipment or system become inoperative in-flight the situation will have to be dealt with according to the abnormal/emergency procedures established in the operations manual and to the commander’s judgement. Additional guidance will be provided in this respect. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 63 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) comment 352 comment by: US FAA New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(a) is added as follows: Comment summary Current part 25 certification methods offers options as to air distance certification methods. One method is based on a calculation simulating a 3.5 degree glidepath and 8 ft/s touchdown rate. Both are more aggressive than the normal airport approach guidance and the operational landing training. Applying the reduced landing distance factor of 1.25 [ 1/0.8] to an AFM distance based on a very aggressive air distance definition reduces the effective margin from an operational landing air distance as defined in FAA AC 121.195 (d)-1a, OPERATIONAL LANDING DISTANCES FOR WET RUNWAYS; TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES from the current 35 to 45% based on a 1.67 factor to 8 to 15% based on a 1.25 factor. Whereas applying the 1.25 factor to an AFM distance based on normal airport approach guidance and operational landing training maintains the intended 25% margin based on stopping within 80% of the available landing distances. Currently at least one business jet manufacturer offers AFMs based on both methods of air distance definition. A second manufacturer of business jets has the parametric method of air distance definition based on 3.5 degree glide path and 8 ft/s touchdown rate applied to older models but a more operationally representative method applied to recently certified models. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 205 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses As to OAT and slope accountability, AFM’s which do not account for OAT or slope further reduces the margins when operating to airfields with temperatures greater than ISA and downhill slope. Suggested resolution Insert the following: New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255 (a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations is predicated on the AFM dry runway landing distance being based on operationally reasonable parameters and AFM data for slope and OAT as well as the other normal parameters. The AFM should have a positive statement saying this airplane’s AFM performance qualifies for Reduced Landing Distance operation. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(a) is added as follows: AMC1 CAT.POL.355(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations is predicated on the AFM dry runway landing distance being based on operationally reasonable parameters and AFM data for slope and OAT as well as the other normal parameters. The AFM should have a positive statement saying this airplane’s AFM performance qualifies for Reduced Landing Distance operation. response Partially accepted. An aircraft eligibility criterion based on an AFM statement will be introduced in CAT.POL.A.255. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 63 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) comment 46 comment by: Joachim J. Janezic (Institute for Austrian and International Aviation law) 1. Please specify what an "approved source" exactly is. Is this for example the aerodrome operator? The competent authority for oversight? Or is it any provider of Aeronautical Information? 2. Again please see our comments on steep approaches above. response Partially accepted. 1. The nature of the source for aerodrome information will be clarified. 2. Steep approach operations, are not intended to be combined with reduced required landing distance operations. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 206 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses comment 97 comment by: Stefan Point c) is nice but quite unachievable when operations are performed outside known and documented airports? Russia and Africa just to mention a couple of area where such info are frequently not available (sometimes not even adequate charts are available). In this case Google Earth is the only source, would be this considered acceptable?? Hopefully not.. It should be clarified by Regulation that, if any of these info are not available from a CERTIFIED provider (if any, please do not considering the OACI Type A charts because these do not provide enough details and by the way they are not always available on the web), the operations should not be performed. If no certified provider is available providing such info simply remove this requirement because not achievable. response Accepted. The nature of the source for aerodrome information will be clarified. comment 147 comment by: CAA Norway AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS Comment 1. Consider developing a GM covering aerodrome issues of relevance to this concept. Rationale: There are more aerodrome elements which should be considered than those covered by this AMC. A GM related to this would be in line with the AMC/GM combination that is proposed for “Crosswind limitations in the Operations Manual, ref GM 1, ORO.MLR.100 in this NPA. Comment 2: Item (c), should specially mention the length of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) Rationale: On a number of airports, the RESA is shorter than optimum. This because the requirements, CS-ADR-DSN C.215 reads: (a) Length of RESA A runway end safety area should extend from the end of a runway strip to a distance of at least 90 m and, as far as practicable, extend to a distance of: (1) 240 m where the code number is 3 or 4 and (2) 120 m where the code number is 1 or 2 and the runway is an instrument one; The term «as far as practicable» means that shorter RESAs than 240/120 m may be seen as being compliant. However, this will necessarily mean a reduced safety buffer. Since the probability of a landing overrun intuitively seems to be increased with the application of this concept (allowing an 80 % instead of 60% rule, the combination of this rule and short RESA should be carefully considered. Ref Comment 1, this is an issue which could better handled in the proposed GM. response Partially accepted. The consideration of the RESA length will be added to paragraph (c). TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 207 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 66 GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) comment 160 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 66 GM1 CAT.POL.A.355 (b)(7)(i) – Approval of Reduced Required Landing Distance Operations – Equipment affecting landing performance There does not appear to be any requirement to ensure that a critical piece of equipment or system is available in flight prior to landing. With such a significant reduction in margins, the reduced capability is much more significant. response Noted. See response to comment 159. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 67 GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) comment 161 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 67 - GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations CORRECT USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES “Flight crew should use full reverse when landing irrespectively of any....” It should be “irrespective” not “irrespectively” response Accepted. 3. Proposed amendments — 3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) — 3.3.3. Part-CAT — p. 67 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) comment 152 comment by: CAA Norway AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS Comment 1. Consider developing a GM covering aerodrome issues of relevance to this concept. Rationale: There are more aerodrome elements which should be considered than those covered by this AMC. A GM related to this would be in line with the AMC/GM combination that is proposed for “Crosswind limitations in the Operations Manual, ref GM 1, ORO.MLR.100 in this NPA. Comment 2: TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 208 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Item (c), should specially mention the length of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) Rationale: On a number of airports, the RESA is shorter than optimum. This because the requirements, CS-ADR-DSN C.215 reads: (a) Length of RESA A runway end safety area should extend from the end of a runway strip to a distance of at least 90 m and, as far as practicable, extend to a distance of: (1) 240 m where the code number is 3 or 4 and (2) 120 m where the code number is 1 or 2 and the runway is an instrument one; The term «as far as practicable» means that shorter RESAs than 240/120 m may be seen as being compliant. However, this will necessarily mean a reduced safety buffer. Since the probability of a landing overrun intuitively seems to be increased with the application of this concept (allowing an 80 % instead of 60% rule, the combination of this rule and short RESA should be carefully considered. Ref Comment 1, this is an issue which could better handled in the proposed GM. response Partially accepted. The consideration of the RESA length will be added to paragraph (c). 4. RIA p. 68-93 comment 25 comment by: Gabriel Arroyo · According to the NPA explanatory Notes the RG considered the possibility to require an approval of the operator’s crosswind limits by the CA but was discarded “as the definition of operational crosswind limits is either based on manufacturer’s approved data in the AFM or manufacturer’s advisory data provided in other documents. Thus, an additional approval by the CA is not considered necessary. It was then decided to provide only guidance to operators on how to use the information available from manufacturers to establish crosswind limits in the OM and to relate such limits to the runway surface conditions”. This guidance material asks the operator to self-evaluate its operational experience and to asses the impact of environment factors for establishing cross wind limitations. We wonder if all the operators will be mature enough as to produce a fair judgment about their possibilities. We think that a matter of such impact should be submitted to the approval of CA. response Not accepted. The intent of the GM is to explain which elements to consider in establishing crosswind limits in the OM. The CAs could be in the same situation of the operators when dealing with such issues, as the best knowledge is with the OEMs. This is the reason why, after discussions with OEMs and CAAs, EASA did not consider appropriate to require an approval for such crosswind limitations in the OM. comment 30 comment by: safe-runway.GmbH TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 209 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A aeroplanes SAFETY IMPACT Safety impact should be altered to +3 Motivation When an aircraft operator wants the 80% landing factor possibility, a considerable number of additional requirements are to be adhered to. These additional measures will ONLY in during the 80% landings factor operations; result in a neutral safety impact. Especially the provisions (GM1.CAT.POL.A.255) such as ALAP, crew monitoring via FDM and crew training will not only be beneficial for 80% operations, but will also improve the overall performance during all routine day-to-day operations. Better trained, checked and monitored crews will reduce the likely hood of runway excursions and enhance the overall level of safety during operations the CAT.POL.A 230 (1) and (2) also during routine operations. Therefore should the safety impact of option 1 of reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A airplanes (page 93) be altered to a +3. (not +5 since it is expected that not all operators will apply for the 80% landing factors IMPACT ON BETTER REGULATION AND HARMONISATION Impact on better regulations and harmonisation +5 (provided the FAA will be prepared to harmonise with the more modern EASA regulation) Motivation NPA 2016-11 comes 16 years after the FAA 80% landing factors agreement. In these 16 years the viewpoints on runway safety and runway excursions have evolved and matured. The same applies to crew training, operators SMS, FDM and technological innovations reducing the risk (likelihood AND severity) of runway overruns. These updated insights are incorporated in NPA 2016-11. Thus it is indeed better regulation. Improved harmonization is also achieved, although the FAA is lagging behind in these modern developments. If the FAA would indicate an intend to harmonize with the modern EASA NPA 2016-11, than the impact on better regulations and harmonization should be altered to +5. response Not accepted. Comment on safety value: The final score for directly affected operators is considered neutral, also as a result of the model which shows that, until the threshold of the 80 % factor, mitigating measures allow achieving an equivalent level of safety. However the Opinion will include monitoring of the effectiveness of the new rules. On this basis an overall positive impact may be demonstrated in the future. Comment on harmonisation: The score already shows a quite positive impact. The value of +5 would not reflect the results of the analysis. comment 110 comment by: Stefan The mitigating factor proposed by NLR in their comprehensive study are very pertinent. I can definitely concur on the effectiveness of such measures if fully applied by front-line TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 210 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses personnel. Unfortunately, the study of the Human Factors, CRM and generally the change of culture and of mind-set required to the personnel is something that is not immediate, as well known to any industry. Requirements listed by regulation will be satisfied, pilots trained and from one day to the other, approach with reduced factor will be allowed associated to 15% factor for the in-flight assessment to runways previously not operated by flight crews. Pilots do not want to fly unstable approach but this does happen frequently and go around are not always performed for very valid reasons from the HF and CRM point of view, unfortunately some of these end up with a runway excursion sometimes with fatalities: go around are not performed even if these consequence are well known. Pilots that are used to float to make a soft landing for their boss since years (and that like any other passengers are saying “good pilot, he/she did a very smooth landing”, or exactly the opposite when the landing is firm..), even if super trained and with a high level of experience, will end up sometimes to revert to their habits to perform the soft landing like they did on the previous day on a 3 Km runway. It is quite a big change, as also stated by NLR, an improvement of the performance is required and this will not be immediate unfortunately (page 19 of the study). I am sure that long discussion have been already done and the decision to limit to a certain category of aircraft is clearly associated to reduce the possible consequences (read number of fatalities) but I am, at the moment, a little bit sceptical about the outcome of this new policy (someone would say that I am resisting to the change). Then, it is a little bit sad that in this case, instead of pushing the EU policy worldwide (including to US), we decrease the requirements and EU adopts FAA standard. response Noted. Harmonisation with the FAA regulatory system is pursued in general and is beneficial for industry and regulators at all levels. The particular case of reduced required landing distance carries the additional benefit or reducing a competitive disadvantage for European operators. comment 162 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 73, Figure 1. The way the data is plotted is unnecessarily confusing!!! Why are the results for aircraft in the range 27,001 to 272,000kg plotted to the left of those for aircraft in the range 5,701 to 27,000kg? Also, why is the data presented at above and below 272,000 kg when the threshold to be justified in the proposed rule is 45,360 kg? response Accepted. The third column should indeed be considered between the current first and second ones. Furthermore, this part of the RIA is related to the implementation of the ICAO standards for runway condition assessment/reporting and for the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival, which apllkies to all aircraft, hence the data analysed cover a large spectrum of mass. comment 163 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 76, 4.1.1. Reduced Required Landing Distance....... TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 211 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses In this section it is admitted that this change is proposed for commercial reasons, not to produce a safety benefit. It is also stated that the change of landing distance factor alone would reduce safety margins, but that this reduction is negated by the applied mitigations. But the fact that the use of the proposed factors and mitigations is not permitted for larger, heavier aeroplanes is an admission that the level of safety is not maintained. This should be made clear. response Partially accepted. The mass threshold will be replaced by an AFM eligibility statement. comment 164 comment by: ESDU, IHS Markit Page 85 onwards RIA – risk analysis and mitigating measures Reduced required landing distances for certain CAT operations. We consider that the mitigation measures proposed to compensate for the reduced factors are weak and will not achieve what is claimed. The discussion of potential problems is not comprehensive. The discussion for Class A aircraft makes no reference to the accuracy of the approach speed (Vref) and does not associate “long landings” with approaching too fast. To expand on this it is worth discussing the issues with respect to Performance Class B aircraft as this RIA appears to be more comprehensive for this class of aeroplane. Consider the first threat - touchdown outside the required zone or at the wrong speed. The first declared prevention control states that a stable approach is achieved using propeller controls which may assist in slowing down, but this is not a valid technique for maintaining a stable approach. (It is certainly not available for turbofan powered aeroplanes). The second prevention control is to ensure accurate flare and touchdown by monitoring of the touchdown area. The implication of this phrase is that there is external monitoring of the touchdown point, but this only helps with respect to post incident analysis. The subsequent text makes reference to the use of external references such as a taxiway or specific paint marks on the runway but major runways have touchdown zones marked on them anyway so this is not an additional control. It also raises the question of how one sees the external references in the dark! There does not appear to be a declared prevention control that presents any enhanced flight path guidance and there is no proper discussion of speed control, which is potentially critical when it comes to floating and the resulting extended flare. Associated with this is the use of automatic speed control and that automated systems tend to require additional speed margins (e.g. VREF + 5kts) even for aircraft with sophisticated autopilots and auto-throttles. Less sophisticated machines have less capable automatic systems that must be disengaged at the final stages due to their ‘minimum heights for use’. In addition, turbofans do not give rapid energy changes so speed control may suffer. The third control proposed is instructions for ‘go around / balked landing’, but there is no related text to explain how any safety benefit is to be achieved by this means. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 212 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses The risk assessment does not address the increased risks associated with control loss in the go-around, which is particularly relevant if the approach is being flown at the minimum approach speed. The fourth prevention control proposed is to restrict the operations to VMC. This may help with landing accuracy, but it should be noted that VMC does not mean a crystal clear day so the claimed advantages may not be clear cut. Also, as noted above, monitoring of the touchdown area will be impaired at night, so should this restriction in fact be to ‘Day VMC only’? It has to be questioned whether operators will respect this restriction. If the destination is forecast to be VMC at dispatch, but visibility reduces whilst the flight is in progress, will the crew of an aeroplane that is equipped to land in IMC divert to another aerodrome? So to summarise, three of the most important factors, speed control, flight path guidance and potential loss of control in a go-around from a low airspeed are not addressed. The mitigations associated with the threat of incorrect or invalid calculations of Landing Distance Required are also considered to be weak. What is meant by the first prevention control - “no tailwinds forecasted”? In most cases the forecast wind only determines the direction of landing. It takes no account of variations in wind direction during the approach. In particular, some airfields exhibit tailwinds down the approach, but a headwind close to the ground. The resulting wind change does not assist with respect to a stable approach. The second prevention control is also confusing. Does it mean that one can never land on a contaminated surface in case there is an erroneous landing distance calculation? It should be noted that CAT.POL.A.255 (b)(2)(iv)(c) states that ‘no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival’ which is not the blanket prohibition claimed in the table on page 87. The next threat is ‘unanticipated’ failure of a stopping device. The control measures include enhanced maintenance programmes and restrictions on MEL items, but the airworthiness requirements only require reliability for such devices of the order of 1 failure per thousand hours. It is inherent in the design requirements that there is no protection against a failure in flight or unexpected failure to deploy on landing, regardless of the maintenance schedule. The current reliability already assumes system checks before each flight. It is unclear if this is what is being referred to here, or if there is a proposal for a more comprehensive procedure. For example, thrust reverser checks are already carried out on departure to comply with the existing reliability requirements, so are there to be additional checks to enhance reliability? If not, then this is not a mitigation measure. No statistical analysis is presented that deals with the probability of an overrun and there is no explanation of what is meant by operational checks of braking devices. It should be recognised that within aircraft certification it is a system design objective to ensure that thrust reversers cannot deploy in flight (this is made mandatory by rules that resulted from the Lauda Air accident); consequently there will be many system failure modes that may prevent intentional deployment during landing. The final threat listed is the incorrect deployment or non-deployment of stopping devices. The first prevention control is to make immediate and maximum use of braking devices mandatory. This may increase the exposure to loss of control should deployment occur too early or if asymmetric deployment occurs. It has been demonstrated that TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 213 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses asymmetric propeller reverse combined with maximum braking can result in loss of directional control. If follows that the second prevention control is only valid if it can be, and is, applied symmetrically. The additional control measures for all threats are crew training, checking, qualifications, experience and recency. The same crew complement is proposed as was previously required for turbojet powered aircraft. Additional training on simulators is unlikely to enhance the crew skills significantly as business jet simulators rarely have limiting runways modelled (the European certified airfields for many of these simulation devices include Heathrow, Gatwick and Amsterdam) and contaminated runway modelling is generally not consistent with the TALPA ARC matrix. Crew qualification does not rebalance the risk as experience and recency is mandatory for any current operations. We conclude that this risk assessment does not appear to be a valid safety reasoning for reducing the landing distance factors and that the declared controls do not appear to be effective in many real cases. response Partially accepted. As regards the achievement of stable approaches by using propeller controls, it is considered that at the lowest flight idle, propellers generate a significant drag that allows a better control of the final approach speed than turbofans on jet aircraft. Nevertheless, this consideration is not really part of the mitigating measures developed in CAT.POL.A.355. As regards the control of the touchdown zone, this is not an external monitoring but a systematic check carried out by the flight crew during the approach and landing to ensure that touchdown is performed within the designated area. Indeed, the operator should clearly identify the end of the touchdown area beyond which a go-around must be performed by the flight crew. Therefore, if an efficient control of the touchdown area is implemented, it may be considered that there is no more inaccuracy in the air distance before the touchdown. As regards the restriction to operations in VMC, it will be changed to “day VMC” as suggested by the comment. As regards the forecast conditions for the runway, an explicit prohibition to operate on contaminated runways will be added, as suggested by the comment. As regards the reliability of deceleration devices, additional maintenance instructions, such as more frequent checks, especially of the reverse system, should be established by the operator, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, in order to enhance the reliability of these systems. As regards flight crew training, for performance class B aeroplanes the training will be aerodrome specific. comment 186 comment by: UK CAA TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 214 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Page No: 70 Paragraph No: Last paragraph - NLR Safety Assessment. Comment: The NLR Safety Assessment does not provide sufficient assurance that the reduced 80% factor will provide the equivalent level of safety as required by the intent of the proposals. The justification for the 80% factor in the NLR Safety Assessment places much reliance on deceleration means other than wheel brakes as mitigating measures for the increased risks of an overrun, i.e. reversers and ground spoilers, yet the NPA does not introduce any requirement for these to be fitted to candidate aircraft. The fitment of spoilers and thrust reversers together with prohibitions on tailwind landings and landing on contaminated runways are quantifiable mitigating measures that can be assessed and demonstrated. However, the other mitigating measures relating to enhanced crew training concerning the importance of stabilized approaches, go-arounds, correct 50’ height crossing speed, avoiding floating, fast or long landings, timely use of brakes and reverse etc are dependent on crew performance, and unless quantifiable assessments of the improvements necessary to achieve the same level of safety as for normal operations are available, should not be counted as a mitigating measure. The Study itself states “It will prove more challenging to implement stabilized approaches, go-arounds, correct 50’ height crossing speed, avoiding floating, fast or long landings, timely use of brakes and reverses etc. as mitigating measures. All these items are dependent on human, crew performance. Only stating in an operational manual that e.g. “a correct approach and landing must be applied when using a higher landing factor” would be correct but at the same time be insufficient”. It is suggested therefore that the proposals should reassess the 80% value to one which is supported by those mitigating measures which are quantifiable, namely to require the availability of retardation devises other than wheel brakes and prohibition on tailwind landings and landing on contaminated runways. If further reduction is sought, then quantifiable, measurable improvements in crew approach and landing criteria should be demonstrated, to values which justify that the existing operational safety margins are unnecessary, before any further reduction of landing distance factor could be granted. Justification: Better evidence needs to be provided for any reduction in landing distance margins. response Partially accepted. A number of quantifiable measures, as suggested in the comment will be included in the proposed rules for reduced required landing distance operations. Namely, operations on contaminated runways, tailwind and special approaches outside of stabilised criteria will be prohibited. The mitigating measure related to the functionality of deceleration devices is introduced by not allowing the dispatch of the aircraft with such equipment inoperative Should such equipment or system become inoperative in-flight the situation will have to be dealt with TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 215 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses according to the abnormal/emergency procedures established in the operations manual and to the commander’s judgement. Additional guidance will be provided in this respect. comment 187 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 92 Paragraph No: 4.5.6 - Impact on ‘better regulation’ and harmonisation - Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes. Comment: It is not clear why there is a need for harmonisation with the FAA’s Reduced required landing distance provisions for Class A eligible on-demand operations, for example with regard to competition between EU and US operators. Justification: The extent of the commercial competition between EU and US operators should be made in addition to the need for harmonisation at regulatory level. response Noted. Harmonisation with the FAA regulatory system is pursued in general and is beneficial for industry and regulators at all levels. The particular case of reduced required landing distance carries the additional benefit or reducing a competitive disadvantage for European operators. This will be reflected in the economic criteria of the RIA. comment 241 comment by: ERAA REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (RIA) 4.5.4 p. 90: In the RIA it is stated that ‘considering the voluntary implementation of the changes proposed by this Option [1] has started, the cost for operators is considered small’. For aerodromes that are ‘becoming unusable due to the increased landing distance’ the economic impact is ‘very low’. These conclusions are mildly put very surprising. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS is of the opinion that the proposed NPA may have the effect of making winter landing operations impossible. The proposed regulation may very well be prohibitive. We are concerned that performance material developed by manufacturers will be very restrictive. The Landing Distance Factors offered in Table 1 of the AMC are prohibitive, and are not applicable for steep approach as operated by Widerøe, using 4.5 degrees from a 35 ft screen height. We are also concerned that manufacturers will be reluctant to develop ‘approved’ performance data for contaminated runway. Furthermore, we are concerned that there can be a significant cost asscoaited with development of revised performance data, much too high to be borne by one operator. This is particularly true if a new test flight campaign needs to be undertaken. - Preliminary data supplied by one turboprop manufacturer are not usable because they are too coarse. Furthermore, we are concerned that the performance documentation for a turbopropeller aircraft may be relatively more restrictive than for a turbojet aircraft. Turbopropeller aircraft TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 216 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses operate at significantly lower speeds and energy during takeoff and landing. This means higher traction and less kinetic energy when decelerating. In addition, the propellers are extremely effective and efficient brakes compared to turbojet thrust reversers. For Widerøe’s operation, which is routinely performance-limited on 830 metre runways, there is a definite probability that many flights will be cancelled or overfly destination as a consequence of introducing RwyCC and RCAM as proposed. For this Public Service Obligation operation along the Norwegian coast with Dash-8 turboprops, there is a clear public interest that operations should continue largely as today. Widerøe would therefore strongy suggest that flexibility could be be applied for an operation where the State of the aerodrome has determined that there is a public interest and operational necessisty for the operation, and where there are physical limitations relating to extending the runway. This would be along the lines that apply for e.g. short landing operations (CAT.POL.A.250 (b)(2)) or aerodrome operating minima (CAT.OP.MPA.115 (b)(2)(ii)). In Norway there are winter conditions for more than half of the year. The weather is characterized by frontal activity on the coast. Transportation of mild moist air gives rise to frequent showers of snow. As a consequence, Norway has developed very good routines and practices with respect to runway preparation and friction assessment. In Widerøe’s operation - with approximately 700.000 landings with Dash-8 on 830 meter runways - we have had no incidents where aircraft have rolled beyond the departure end of runway. As an example of the well-established routines for safe winter operations, see below tables for the issuance of SNOWTAMS in Norway: SNOWTAMS issued by ANSP AVINOR versus Europe and the world – total number for year 2012/2013 Issued SNOWTAM’s 1st half 2012 2nd half 2012 1st half 2013 World Wide - total 55305 28312 51617 Europe – EAD -ESI Clients - total 20505 13679 21793 Norway - total 19524 12832 19732 Norway versus the world 35,3% 45,3% 38,2% Norway versus Europe 95,2% 93,8% 90,5% SNOWTAMS issued by ANSP AVINOR for Short Field Aerodromes – number for year 2015 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 217 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Number of ICAO Navn SNOWTAM ENBL Førde/Bringeland 510 ENBN Brønnøy 366 ENBS Båtsfjord 419 ENBV Berlevåg 377 ENFG Fagernes 218 ENFL Florø 242 ENHF Hammerfest 1186 ENHK Hasvik 322 ENHV Honningsvåg 363 ENLK Leknes 609 ENMH Mehamn 567 ENML Molde 785 ENMS Mosjøen 502 ENNK Narvik 476 ENNM Namsos 441 ENOV Ørsta/Volda 382 ENRA Røssvoll 404 ENRM Rørvik/Ryum 311 ENRS Røst 314 ENSB Longyear 692 ENSD Sandane 232 ENSG Sogndal 537 ENSH Svolvær 446 ENSK Skagen 459 ENSO Stord/Sørstokken 108 ENSR Sørkjosen 384 ENSS Svartnes 423 ENST Stokka 274 ENVD Vadsø 863 Total number of SNOWTAM 2015 – Short Field Aerodromes 13212 We propose that a state may introduce national arrangements for the regulation of winter operations, not least for a specialized operation with a public interest. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 218 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses response Noted. See response to comment 305. comment 255 comment by: General Aviation Manufacturers Association / Hennig GAMA appreciates the agency undertaking a Regulatory Impact Analysis in support of the NPA 2016-11 rulemaking. The economic impact, however, identified in section 4.5.4 has not adequately captured the costs associated with requiring a time of arrival assessment based on AMC 25.1592 or equivalent. (We assume equivalent is AC 25-32, but ideally also existing data created to show compliance with 25.1591 for existing aeroplanes to minimize cost.) Some OEMs have produce new data based on the work of the TALPA ARC, but it is not necessarily aligned with AC 25-32. Furthermore, older aeroplane models have not yet been updated to provide this data. Updating the performance data for these models will be a significant burden on the OEM, especially if guidance is remains unharmonised between the AMC and AC material. Finally, the RIA seems to be lacking in consideration of the impact on small aeroplane OEMs and smaller operators. As an example, the social impact seems not to have fully considered the impact of time of arrival assessment could have to further restrict operations at small airfields, particularly those served by Part/CS-23 aeroplanes that do not have this data. GAMA recommends that the agency re-assess the economic impact based on our comments and, as part of the finalisation of the regulation and associated guidance, work to minimise and ideally eliminate areas where there is divergent guidance. response Accepted. The updated RIA in the Opinion will include further assessment of the impact on OEMs, especially those of CS-23 aircraft. comment 305 comment by: Wideroe Flyveselskap AS REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (RIA) 4.5.4 p. 90: In the RIA it is stated that ‘considering the voluntary implementation of the changes proposed by this Option [1] has started, the cost for operators is considered small’. For aerodromes that are ‘becoming unusable due to the increased landing distance’ the economic impact is ‘very low’. These conclusions are mildly put very surprising. Widerøe’s Flyveselskap AS is of the opinion that the proposed NPA may have the effect of making winter landing operations impossible. The proposed regulation may very well be prohibitive. We are concerned that performance material developed by manufacturers will be very restrictive. The Landing Distance Factors offered in Table 1 of the AMC are prohibitive, and are not applicable for steep approach as operated by Widerøe, using 4.5 degrees from a 35 ft screen height. We are also concerned that manufacturers will be reluctant to develop TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 219 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses ‘approved’ performance data for contaminated runway. Furthermore, we are concerned that there can be a significant cost asscoaited with development of revised performance data, much too high to be borne by one operator. This is particularly true if a new test flight campaign needs to be undertaken. - Preliminary data supplied by one turboprop manufacturer are not usable because they are too coarse. Furthermore, we are concerned that the performance documentation for a turbopropeller aircraft may be relatively more restrictive than for a turbojet aircraft. Turbopropeller aircraft operate at significantly lower speeds and energy during takeoff and landing. This means higher traction and less kinetic energy when decelerating. In addition, the propellers are extremely effective and efficient brakes compared to turbojet thrust reversers. For Widerøe’s operation, which is routinely performance-limited on 830 metre runways, there is a definite probability that many flights will be cancelled or overfly destination as a consequence of introducing RwyCC and RCAM as proposed. For this Public Service Obligation operation along the Norwegian coast with Dash-8 turboprops, there is a clear public interest that operations should continue largely as today. Widerøe would therefore strongy suggest that flexibility could be be applied for an operation where the State of the aerodrome has determined that there is a public interest and operational necessisty for the operation, and where there are physical limitations relating to extending the runway. This would be along the lines that apply for e.g. short landing operations (CAT.POL.A.250 (b)(2)) or aerodrome operating minima (CAT.OP.MPA.115 (b)(2)(ii)). In Norway there are winter conditions for more than half of the year. The weather is characterized by frontal activity on the coast. Transportation of mild moist air gives rise to frequent showers of snow. As a consequence, Norway has developed very good routines and practices with respect to runway preparation and friction assessment. In Widerøe’s operation - with approximately 700.000 landings with Dash-8 on 830 meter runways - we have had no incidents where aircraft have rolled beyond the departure end of runway. As an example of the well-established routines for safe winter operations, see below tables for the issuance of SNOWTAMS in Norway: SNOWTAMS issued by ANSP AVINOR versus Europe and the world – total number for year 2012/2013 Issued SNOWTAM’s 1st half 2012 2nd half 2012 1st half 2013 World Wide - total 55305 28312 51617 Europe – EAD -ESI Clients - total 20505 13679 21793 Norway - total 19524 12832 19732 Norway versus the world 35,3% 45,3% 38,2% Norway versus Europe 95,2% 93,8% 90,5% SNOWTAMS issued by ANSP AVINOR for Short Field Aerodromes – number for year 2015 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 220 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses Number of ICAO Navn SNOWTAM ENBL Førde/Bringeland 510 ENBN Brønnøy 366 ENBS Båtsfjord 419 ENBV Berlevåg 377 ENFG Fagernes 218 ENFL Florø 242 ENHF Hammerfest 1186 ENHK Hasvik 322 ENHV Honningsvåg 363 ENLK Leknes 609 ENMH Mehamn 567 ENML Molde 785 ENMS Mosjøen 502 ENNK Narvik 476 ENNM Namsos 441 ENOV Ørsta/Volda 382 ENRA Røssvoll 404 ENRM Rørvik/Ryum 311 ENRS Røst 314 ENSB Longyear 692 ENSD Sandane 232 ENSG Sogndal 537 ENSH Svolvær 446 ENSK Skagen 459 ENSO Stord/Sørstokken 108 ENSR Sørkjosen 384 ENSS Svartnes 423 ENST Stokka 274 ENVD Vadsø 863 Total number of SNOWTAM 2015 – Short Field Aerodromes 13212 We propose that a state may introduce national arrangements for the regulation of winter operations, not least for a specialized operation with a public interest. response Partially accepted. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 221 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses With regard to the generic factors, EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. For such cases alternatives to the generic factors will be offered. With regard to the possibility of upgrading the runway codes, the concerns expressed in this comment will be addressed in the rulemaking task RMT.0704 by introducing the concept of operations on “specially prepared winter runways”, which will be referenced appropriately in the Regulation for air operations. comment 321 comment by: Textron Aviation 4.5.3 Social Impact Option 1 - No social impact is expected through this Option. This aspect needs more discussion. If the time-of-arrival assessment and associated data methodology is required for all Performance Class A aircraft, it is very possible that operations will be reduced or restricted from a number of smaller airfields serviced by small aircraft in conditions where safe operations are taking place today. response Noted. The aspects related to the costs of arrival assessment are reflected in the economic impacts. Furthermore the agency does not consider that the arrival assessment element will lead to an important reduction or restriction of operations. However EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. The economic assessment of the RIA will be revised to take into account this aspect and alternatives to the generic factors will be offered to comply with the new rule. comment 322 comment by: Textron Aviation 4.5.4 Ecomonic impact Several large aeroplane manufacturers, among which Airbus, Boeing and Embraer... There is a significant concern from many of the manufacturers of small Performance Class A aircraft related to the cost of providing this performance data for existing aircraft. Application to existing aircraft would be contrary to the TALPA ARC recommendations, as would application to smaller aircraft not certified under Part 25 airworthiness requirements. response Noted. Further to additional information received, the RIA will include in the Opinion further analyses the economic impact on providing performance data for existing aircraft. comment 323 comment by: Textron Aviation 4.5.4 Economic impact TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 222 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 2. Individual comments and responses As regards the cost for aerodromes becoming unusable due to the increased landing distance... The analysis done for environmental impact is apparently based largely on Airbus data, and likely does not accurately reflect impact to operations of small aircraft into small fields. The economic impact to these locations caused by increased diversions, while small compared to large commercial airline revues, are nonetheless significant to the locations affected. response Noted. The aspects related to the costs of arrival assessment are reflected in the economic impacts. Furthermore the agency does not consider that the arrival assessment element will lead to an important reduction or restriction of operations. However EASA acknowledges the difficulty for certain aircraft types to be provided with performance data compliant with the new proposed standard of CS 25.1592 and the fact the in certain cases the generic factors may be too penalising. Alternatives to the generic factors will be offered to comply with the new rule and this is understood to be beneficial also in terms of operations continuity at small fields. comment 358 comment by: US FAA Comment summary “In the analysis, 13 occurrences were identified, out of which 5 were classified as accidents and 9 as serious incidents.” 13 occurrences were identified and put on the graphic however 5 accidents/9 serious incidents add up to 14. Suggested resolution Reduce 5 or 9 by 1 as appropriate to add up to 13. response Accepted. Indeed the correct figure is 13 occurrences out of which 8 serious incidents and 5 accidents. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 223 of 224 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2016-11 3. Appendix A — Attachments 3. Appendix A — Attachments Annex 1.pdf Attachment #1 to comment #270 Comment and proposal with rationale to AMC 25.1592 6.2 Transition Distance Table 1, footnote 3.pdf Attachment #2 to comment #115 Annex 1.pdf Attachment #3 to comment #275 Annex 1.pdf Attachment #4 to comment #276 IRIS Runway Model.pdf Attachment #5 to comment #302 5.3_IRIS_runway_model_(Alex_Klein_Paste_NTNU)_2016.pdf Attachment #6 to comment #302 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 224 of 224 An agency of the European Union European Union Aviation Safety Agency Comment-Response Document 2017-15 Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 RELATED NPA: 2017-15 — RMT.0695 — 21.2.2019 Table of contents 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 2 2. Individual comments and responses 4 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation 23 comments were submitted by 10 commenters, including 6 EU NAAs and 2 aircraft manufacturers. 7 of these comments were either directly expressing the support of the commenter to the proposals or stating that the commenter had no comment. Comments per category of commentators NAA 18 (78.3%) Manufacturers 3 (13%) Operator associations 1 (4.35%) Others 1 (4.35%) The comment which proposed the most significant change questioned the use of a weight threshold as an eligibility criteria for non-ETOPS operations and proposed to rather rely only on the low occupancy criteria. Although not part of the analysed options of the regulatory impact assessment (RIA), the possibility to remove the weight threshold was discussed in the NPA 2017-15. The discussion envisaged to rely on the current low occupancy criteria (MOPSC of 19 or less) and as well on a criterion defining the type of operation (i.e. non-scheduled). The issue highlighted by this comment is the fact that there is currently no adequate definition of commercial business jet operations. The JAA times considered that the weight threshold together with the low occupancy criterion was adequate. However, it is now clear that in some specific cases these criteria are not appropriate and create a level playing field issue for some operators. As explained in the related comment, some operations having similar characteristics with the same aeroplane type would have to comply with different requirements. For example, the A318 is certified with different MCTOM variants, below and above 60.000 kg; when used in business operations, some A318 variants would therefore be able to operate in the non-ETOPS category, whereas the other heavier variants would not be eligible for non-ETOPS operations. As stated in NPA 2017-15, option 1 (‘Amend the non-ETOPS operation MCTOM threshold and remove the type design considerations for 120–180-minute operations’) was considered to be the one with the most positive impact and at the same time the simplest one. The impacts of the possibility to remove the weight threshold were expected to be similar to the identified option 1 and therefore this possibility had not been selected as one of the options to be considered in the impact assessment. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 1. Summary of the outcome of the consultation Based on this comment, and as it is considered that the non-ETOPS operations should only be applicable to non-scheduled operations, the use of a dual criterion, low occupancy and ‘non-scheduled’ operations was initially found to be adequate to characterise business jet operations. Going one step further, it is considered that the low occupancy criteria could be used as the only criteria, as it is considered that scheduled operations with an aeroplane above 45360 kg with an MOPSC of 19 or less is unrealistic. Therefore, the initial proposal has been amended by removing the weight threshold for non-ETOPS operations. Statistics on the comments received In summary, 43 % of the comments were accepted or partially accepted by EASA, and 35 % of the comments were noted, since they were supportive of the NPA or the commenter had no comment on the proposals. Only 22 % of the comments received were not accepted. Acceptance of comments 5, 22% 7, 30% 3, 13% 8, 35% Accepted Partially accepted Noted Not accepted TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses 2. Individual comments and responses In responding to comments, the following standard terminology has been applied to state EASA’s position: (a) Accepted — EASA agrees with the comment and any proposed amendment is wholly transferred to the revised text. (b) Partially accepted — EASA either partially agrees with the comment, or agrees with it but the proposed amendment is only partially transferred to the revised text. (c) Noted — EASA acknowledges the comment, but no change to the existing text is considered to be necessary. (d) Not accepted — The comment or the proposed amendment is not agreed by EASA. (General Comments) - comment comment by: Swedish Transport Agency, Civil Aviation Department (Transportstyrelsen, 11 Luftfartsavdelningen) The Swedish Transport Agency support the proposal. response Noted. Thanks you for your feedback. comment 12 comment by: UK CAA General Comment The UK CAA appreciates the considerable amount of effort that has gone into providing such a comprehensive summary of the issues and reasons for change. This helped considerably in understanding the rationale and principles intended with the proposed changes. response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. comment 14 comment by: AIRBUS While we agree with the intent of this NPA, we disagree with the approach chosen which is continuing to use mass as a regulatory discriminator for this particular subject. We therefore propose to remove entirely the MCTOM limitation in the proposed amendments, and keep only the maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 20 or more as regulatory discriminator. This approach: - Would have no adverse safety impact. As detailed in section 4.4.1 of the NPA, the existing safety risk models are independent from the MCTOM. Therefore, as with the proposed TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses increase of the MCTOM, removing the MCTOM criteria is expected to have no effect with respect to safety risk. - Ensures that it will not be necessary to revise again the related regulation for a further increase of the MCTOM criteria to account for future weight increase of concerned “business jets”. - Would avoid to creates a distortion between “on demand” operators of aircraft with MCTOM below or above 60,000kg. For instance, an A318 in a “business jet” configuration, i.e. with 19 seats or less, has weight variants below 60,000 kg and above 60,000 kg. It means that with the current NPA proposal, an operator of an A318 with 19 seats or less and a MCTOM of less than 60,000 kg would be able to operate without ETOPS approval up to 180 min diversion time, while another operator with the same aircraft type and 19 seats limitation, but with a MCTOM slightly above 60,000 kg would have to get an ETOPS operational approval for any flights beyond 60 min. This situation would have a negative economic impact on the concerned operators without any safety benefits as said above. Therefore our proposal to remove entirely the MCTOM criteria would allow to fully achieving one of the objective of the NPA (ref section 4.2) which is to “ensure a level playing field for CAT operators of aeroplanes with an MOPSC below 19 and, therefore, avoid an undue burden on European CAT operators of business jet aeroplanes”. As explained in the NPA, the background for initially lifting the ETOPS threshold from 60 min to 180 min was primarily based on the low occupancy of aircraft involved in on-demand operations. The MCTOM criteria was introduced initially to further characterize these aircraft and separate them from aircraft involved in scheduled operations. However, this MCTOM differentiation is no more meaningful, as there are nowadays aircraft with MCTOM above 60,000 kg and with low occupancy that are involved in on-demand operations. It shall be noted also that there are aircraft with a MCTOM lower than 60,000 kg but with more than 19 passengers that are involved in scheduled operations, including ETOPS operations (within 120 min or 180 min). Removing the MCTOM limitation would not change this situation. It further shows that the relevant discriminator is the number of occupants, and not the MCTOM. Furthermore, for obvious economic reasons, it is unlikely that an operator will perform scheduled operations with an aircraft with a MCTOM higher than 60,000 kg but with less than 19 passengers, and there is no reason why removing the MCTOM limitation would change this situation. As a result, the removal of the MCTOM would also have no impact on OEM strategy versus the need for an ETOPS type certification: - Should the airplane be intended to be used on routes beyond 60 min diversion time, and with more than 19 passengers, an ETOPS type certification would then be required regardless of its MCTOM. - Should the airplane be certified to carry 19 passengers or less, an ETOPS type certification would then not be required regardless of its MCTOM. The mass-based threshold is therefore of no added value in providing the clear definition needed for type design, as only the passenger discriminant is relevant in this case. Last but not least, the removal of the MCTOM would also ensure a greater harmonization with other major EDTO standards and regulations, such as those from ICAO, FAA and Transport Canada. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses As a conclusion and based on the above listed arguments, it is proposed to remove entirely all references to an MCTOM limitation in the proposed amendments, and to keep only the MOPSC of 19 or less as the regulatory discriminator for the applicability of non-ETOPS operations with Class A aeroplanes. response Accepted. The resulting text has been amended by removing the mass threshold and relying only on the low occupancy criteria. comment 16 comment by: Danish Aviation Association ES-DAA appreciates the proposals in this NPA 2017-15, which seem very reasonable and progressive. We support the objective to harmonising the applicability of non-ETOPS operation requirements for the affected aeroplanes operated by European-based commercial air transport (CAT) operators with similar CAT operators in other parts of the world, including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. We agree to the proposal to increase the current non-ETOPS operation mass threshold from 45 360 to 60 000 kg in order to accommodate growth of this market segment and to remove the specific type design approval for non-ETOPS operations between 120 and 180 minutes. It is also our assessment that the proposed amendments will maintain the current level of safety for the affected aeroplanes, while allowing for increased European harmonisation with other regulatory jurisdictions and avoiding undue costs for aeroplane manufacturers and operators. Best Regards Dan Banja Secretary-General, Vice chair ECOGAS & Member of EASA GA.COM response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. comment 18 comment by: Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA), Switzerland The Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA) would like to thank the Agency for the good work and the opportunity to comment on this draft NPA. response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. comment 21 comment by: EUROCONTROL The EUROCONTROL Agency welcomes the publication of EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-15. It also thanks EASA for the opportunity that has been given to submit comments. In addition, despite the fact that it has no comments to make on the NPA, the EUROCONTROL Agency would like to confirm that it will read with interest the TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses comments from stakeholders, if any received by EASA, and the responses given to them by EASA in its future comment-response document (CRD). response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. comment 22 comment by: Gulfstream Aerospace Gulfstream understands the subject NPA proposes to increase the current non-ETOPS operation mass threshold from 45 360 to 60 000 kg in order to accommodate growth of this market segment and to remove the specific type design approval for non-ETOPS operations between 120 and 180 minutes. The proposed amendments will maintain the current level of safety for the affected aircraft models, while allowing for increased European harmonization with other regulatory jurisdictions, and reduced costs for aircraft manufacturers and operators. This NPA would essentially harmonize FAA and EASA ETOPS airworthiness requirements and Gulfstream fully supports the new rule implementation. Gulfstream recommends a provision with instructions be added to the new rule to address how existing airworthiness approvals would be superseded with this rule change. Under some current 180-minute EASA airworthiness approvals, aircraft manufacturers are responsible for continued airworthiness and operators are responsible for continued surveillance. Presumably, these existing approvals would be updated with appropriate EASA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) revisions to remove those on-going requirements. Further clarification should be added to the new rule with specific instructions as to how the appropriate EASA TCDS revisions and operator approvals would be updated to remove the current requirements. response Partially accepted. The Agency does not consider necessary to introduce a specific provisions related to the already granted 180 mn non-ETOPS type design approvals. However, in order to ensure a level playing field, the Agency proposes to amend the related type certificate data sheet (TCDS) of the related aeroplane by removing a current condition on the TCDS for the conduct of the 180 mn non-ETOPS operations linked with a specific modification to be fitted on the aeroplane. comment 23 comment by: Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation General comment: Gulfstream appreciates and fully supports this rule change effort. To ensure a consistent transition, Gulfstream recommends adding instructions to address how existing ETOPS approvals under the type certificate would be superseded with this rule change. Presumably, these existing approvals would be updated with appropriate EASA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) revisions to remove those on-going requirements. Further clarification is recommended with specific instructions as to how the appropriate EASA TCDS revisions and applicable operator approvals would be updated to remove the current requirements. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. In order to ensure a level playing field, the Agency proposes to amend the related type certificate data sheet (TCDS) of the related aeroplane by removing a current condition on the TCDS for the conduct of the 180 mn non-ETOPS operations linked with a specific modification to be fitted on the aeroplane. Executive summary p. 1 comment 17 comment by: Luftfahrt-Bundesamt LBA has no comments on NPA 2017-15. response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. 3.2. Draft AMC and GM (Draft EASA decision), 3.2.1 AMC/GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) p. 9-14 comment 1 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) : DGAC France suggests adding an additional condition before the actual paragraph (a) such as: (a) Aeroplanes should be certified to CS25 or equivalent (e.g. FAR25). Rationale : With the proposed changes in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d), the approval referred to in CAT.OP.MPA (a)(2) can be issued for CS25 AND CS23 aeroplanes while we understand that the NPA does not provide any rationale (in particular paragraph 4.1.4) for such approval with CS23 aeroplanes. Indeed all conditions that aeroplanes should be certified to CS25 (or equivalent) and type design considerations are considered to be deleted and so the CS25 type design certification is no longer a compulsory prerequisite. But this NPA does not provide any rationale to extend CAT.OP.MPA (a)(2) approval to CS23 aeroplanes and anyway, DGAC France does not support this extension to CS23 aeroplanes. response Accepted. The resulting text of the AMC has been amended accordingly. comment 2 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) : DGAC France suggests modifying the new paragraph (g)(4) as follows: ERA aerodrome(s): the operator should ensure that ERA aerodromes are available for the intended route, within the distance flown in 180 minutes based upon the OEI cruising speed, which is a speed within the certified limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator within TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses the certified limits of the aeroplane and approved by the competent authority, confirming that, […]. Rationale: This proposal clarifies the sentence without modifying its meaning. response Not accepted. The paragraph (g)(4) is aligned with the current wording of AMC20-6. Therefore it is considered that, for consistency reasons, it is preferable to keep the current alignment even if the meaning of the sentence would not be change by the proposed change. comment 3 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d): DGAC France suggests modifying the new paragraph (g)(4) as follows: ERA aerodrome(s): […] and approved by the competent authority, confirming that, based on the available meteorological information, the weather conditions at ERA aerodromes are at or above the applicable minima for the applicable the period of time, in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.185. for which the aerodrome(s) may be used. Rationale: In the draft AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d), the Table 1 “Planning minima” is deleted. DGAC understands that the applicable planning minima and period of time to be considered for ERA aerodromes will then be the minima and period from CAT.OP.MPA.185 (c). If this interpretation is correct, DGAC suggests adding a reference to CAT.OP.MPA.185 (c) in the new paragraph (g) (4). This would avoid any wrong interpretation, in particular concerning the period of time to be considered for the availability of the ERA aerodrome. In addition DGAC France would like to point out that a difference currently exists between the definitions of the period to be considered, in:  CAT.OP.MPA.140 (current (h)(4)): period of time during which the aerodrome may be used,  CAT.OP.MPA.185 (c) : period commencing one hour before and ending one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome,  AMC 20-6 rev. 2 App. 5: period commencing at the earliest potential time of landing and ending one hour after the latest nominated time of use of that aerodrome. response Accepted. The resulting text has been amended accordingly. Regarding the possible discrepancy contained in AMC20-6, the Agency has taken note of the possible issue, which will be addressed in the scope of another rulemaking task RMT.0577 specifically dealing with EDTO. comment 4 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) : The Table 1 “Planning minima” is deleted. We point out that this NPA does not provide any rationale for this reduction of margin. Rationale: In the draft AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d), the Table 1 “Planning minima” is deleted. As described in our previous remark (#3), DGAC understands that the applicable planning minima and period of time to be considered for ERA aerodromes will then be the minima and period from CAT.OP.MPA.185 (c). If this interpretation is correct, and then the minima and period to be considered are from CAT.OP.MPA.185 (c), we note that, in certain situation, these items are less limitative than the current applicable minima. response Noted. The table 1 “planning minima” of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) was removed as it was not consistent with CAT.OP.MPA.185 and in addition it was expected to be completely revised in the frame of the AWO rulemaking task (RMT.0379). comment 5 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) DGAC France suggests modifying the new paragraph (g) "Dispatch/flight planning rules" as follows: […] (1) Fuel and oil supply: an aeroplane should not be dispatched for releasing an aeroplane on an extended range flight unless, the operators should ensure that it carries sufficient fuel and oil to meet comply with the applicable operational requirements and any additional fuel that may be reserves determined in accordance with the following: […] Rationale: This proposal clarifies the sentence without modifying its meaning and add consistency with AMC 20-6 response Accepted. The resulting text has been amended accordingly. comment 6 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) : DGAC France suggests modifying the new paragraph (g) as follows: (g)(1)(i) Critical fuel scenario: In establishing the critical fuel reserves, the applicant is to determine the fuel necessary to fly to the most critical point of the route and execute a diversion to the critical point is the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome assuming a simultaneous failure of an engine and the cabin air pressurisation system. [...] Rationale: The definition of the critical point in this paragraph should be clarified since it is misleading. Indeed, the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome may be at the beginning of the flight, where the fuel on board is sufficient to reach the alternate without additional fuel. In this case, the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome is not the critical point. This proposals adds also consistency with AMC 20-6 TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses response Accepted. The resulting text has been amended accordingly. comment 7 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department Paragraph (g)(1)(i) Critical fuel scenario: […] For those aeroplanes that are type certified to operate above flight level 450, the critical point is the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome assuming an engine failure. The operator should carry additional fuel for the worst case fuel burn condition (one engine vs two engines operating) if this is greater than the additional fuel calculated in accordance with the fuel requirements in CAT.OP.MPA, as follows: Question: Why are the potential constraints on the flight level related to the quantity of oxygen to be carried not taken into account for aeroplanes certified to operate above FL450? If this constraint should be taken into account, then the sub-paragraph (i)(A)(c) is redundant with (i)(A)(b) and might be deleted. response Accepted. The provisions for operations above FL450 were initial stemming from JAR OPS 1 and in any case are not considered any more consistent taking into account the current certification specifications. The resulting text has been amended accordingly. comment 8 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department DGAC France suggests modifying the actual paragraph (h)(1)(i)(A) as follows: fly from the critical point to an alternate aerodrome: a) at 10 000 ft; or b) at 25 000 ft or the single-engine ceiling, whichever is lower, provided that all occupants can be supplied with and use oxygen for the time required to fly from the critical point to an alternate aerodrome; or [...] response Not accepted. A list of conditions may only include one ‘or’. comment 9 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) DGAC France suggests modifying the actual paragraph (h)(1)(i)(B) as follows: descend and hold there for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) above aerodrome elevation for 15 minutes in international standard atmosphere (ISA) conditions; and Rationale: This proposal harmonises the sentence with AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) without modifying its meaning. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses response Partially accepted. The intent being to ensure alignment with the current wording of AMC20-6, only the proposed changes which were increasing alignment were transposed in the resulting text. comment 10 comment by: DGAC Deputy Head of aircraft and operations rulemaking department AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) DGAC France suggests listing in new paragraph (e) the aeroplane’s significant systems to be inspected during the pre-departure check. response Accepted. A definition of what is meant by ‘significant systems’ in the context of non-ETOPS operations has been introduced in a new guidance material (GM) together with a non-exhaustive list of such systems provided as an example. comment 13 comment by: UK CAA Page No: 9 Paragraph No: 3.2.1 (a) Comment: Page 9, item 3.2.1, requires the relevant information to be written in the operations manual. Some of the current information proposed for deletion could be usefully retained to ensure that competence and experience are taken into account. Justification: This would ensure that while the aircraft is not necessarily ETOPS, the operator at least has an idea what is involved and the crew are adequately trained – this latter is covered in (d). Proposed Text: Amend to read: “(a) For operations between 120 and 180 minutes due account should be taken of the aircraft’s design and capabilities and the operator’s experience related to such operations.” response Not accepted. As stated in NPA 2017-15, during the last 15 years, no accidents or incidents during non- ETOPS operations have been attributed to power plant malfunction or failures, nor to critical aeroplane components or systems. Based on this and taking into account also the fact that the current provisions do not contain any specific guidance on what constitute an adequate experience, it is considered that there is no need for a criteria on the experience of the operator on such operations. In any case, 120-180 mn non-ETOPS operations remain subject to the competent authority approval, which has to thoroughly assess the operator’s application for such operations. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses comment 15 comment by: Transport Malta - Civil Aviation Directorate Airworthiness and Maintenance requirements should be included in Part-M requirements and AMC and not in Part-CAT. The NPA approach means more fragmentation of requirements in airworthiness for the industry and NAAs working in the field of Airworthiness, creating more difficulty in training of personnel, managing safety oversight having to refer to different documents. This will also create even more cross-domain confusion. response Not accepted. Maintenance considerations are already part of other SPA requirements in Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 as in any case Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 does not consider specific types of operations. comment 20 comment by: Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA), Switzerland Maintenance program in accordance with Annex 1 Part M shall amend the respective changes. Flight crew training, Pre-departure check, MEL, and Dispatch flight planning rules. This will ensure the airworthiness as well as safe operation of the aircraft. Comment FOCA: if the option 1 were to be amended, this would have an impact with the regulation laid down in the Subpart SEC as noted in the text below. The manufacturer would need to be advised in relation to the type design changes, weight factor MTOM and CAT operation would need to be reviewed for the Subpart SEC Security. ORO.SEC.100 Flight crew compartment security – aeroplanes. (a) In an aeroplane which is equipped with a flight crew compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked and the means shall be provided by which the cabin crew can notify the flight crew in the event of a suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin (b) All passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 45 500 kg, or with a MOPSC of more than 60 engaged in the commercial transportation of passengers, shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station and designed to meet the applicable airworthiness requirement. (c) In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door in accordance with point (b) above: (1) This door shall be closed prior to engine start for take-off and will be locked when required by security procedures or by the pilot in command until engine shut down after landing , except when deemed necessary for authorized persons to access or egress in compliance with national civil aviation security programs; and (2) Means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the entire door area outside the flight compartment to identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behavior or potential threat. response Not accepted. The current MCTOM threshold used in ORO.SEC.100 is not linked at all with the non-ETOPS MCTOM threshold. The purpose behind is totally different and therefore if one changes, it is considered that there is no reason to amend the other one. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 14 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019 — CRD to NPA 2017-15 2. Individual comments and responses 4. Impact assessment (IA) p. 16-34 comment 19 comment by: Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA), Switzerland FOCA recommends that option 1 is the appropriate option to implement and to comply with the new regulation requirements. Amending the non-ETOPS operation MCTOM threshold with removing the type design considerations proposed in option 1, is an appropriate method of leaving the operator with a higher playing field in respects to their operations. Amending the weight to 60 000 kg gives a wide range in the threshold for the newer aircraft models types being presently manufactured. In terms of safety, should have no effect. From an airworthiness perspective there is no effect to the requirements. Environment shall be taken into consideration and the option 1 provides that advantage. To ensure the safety of design with the non-ETOPS approval all criteria changes should be met. response Noted. Thank you for your feedback. TE.RPRO.00064-005 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 14 An agency of the European Union EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, XXX […](2019) XXX draft EASA Opinion No 02/2019 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/... of XXX amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 as regards requirements for aeroplane performance, alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders, in-flight recording for light aircraft, and non-ETOPS operations with performance class A aeroplanes that have a maximum operational passenger seating configuration of 19 or less EN EN  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/… of XXX amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 as regards requirements for aeroplane performance, alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders, in-flight recording for light aircraft, and non-ETOPS operations with performance class A aeroplanes that have a maximum operational passenger seating configuration of 19 or less THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (1), and in particular Article 31 thereof, Whereas: (1) Operators and personnel that are involved in the operation of aircraft, as well as their competent authorities, shall comply with the relevant essential requirements for air operations set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. (2) The requirements related to the different types of operations shall be proportionate to the scale and scope of a particular operation, as well as to the complexity of and the risk involved in that operation. (3) Investigations of accidents indicate that the standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting are not harmonised, and have shown that this fact as a significant contributing factor to runways excursions, in particular when the runway is wet or contaminated. (4) The standards for aeroplane performance calculations do not cover adequately all conditions on wet and contaminated runways in relation to the method used for assessing and reporting the runway surface condition. (5) ICAO has consequently amended a number of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in several of its annexes and has produced extensive guidance material in order to establish a globally harmonised reporting format for runway surface conditions, airworthiness standards on performance data necessary for the assessment of the landing distance for aeroplanes at the time of landing, and operational provisions for the flight crew on landing performance calculations and runway condition reporting. ( 1) OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1. EN 1 EN  (6) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (2) needs therefore to be amended, including the definitions of the new terms used, to implement the applicable ICAO SARPs on runway surface condition assessment and reporting and aeroplane performance requirements. In order to achieve the objective of the global harmonisation intended by ICAO, the amended requirements need to enter into force on 5 November 2020 at the latest, which is the date set by ICAO. (7) Furthermore, the need for operational flexibility has been identified for certain commercial air transport operations with regard to the required landing distance. Certain performance class A and performance class B aeroplanes are allowed in other regulatory systems to land within 80 % of the landing distance available on the intended runway, provided that they are granted a prior approval from the competent authority and that they fulfil a number of risk-mitigating conditions. Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs to be amended in this regard as well to define the conditions under which these operations may be conducted, while attaining a level of safety that is equivalent to that attained by the existing requirements for landing performance. The relevant administrative form for operational approvals needs also to be amended to include these operations. (8) Current certification standards for aircraft do not require an alternate power source for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and their associated cockpit-mounted area microphones to be part of the initial design of the aircraft. Investigation of accidents indicates that in some instances CVRs could have kept recording useful information after the interruption of normal power if an alternate power source had been installed. (9) Furthermore, ICAO Annex 6 Part I contains SARPs which require that ‘all aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 27 000 kg for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued on or after 1 January 2018 should be provided with an alternate power source […], that powers at least one CVR’. (10) In order to align with those ICAO Standards and to respond to safety investigation findings, Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs to be amended to require an alternate power source for CVRs and their associated cockpit-mounted area microphones. (11) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs to be amended to implement the applicable ICAO Annex 6 SARPs on in-flight recording systems for certain light aeroplanes and helicopters that are used for commercial operations. (12) Observing the principle of proportionality and risk hierarchy as regards air operations with light aircraft, the extension of the ‘flight recorder’ concept to include lightweight recording equipment should facilitate the fitment of new aircraft with in-flight recording equipment that is appropriate to the size and complexity of such aircraft, as well as the type of the intended operations. (13) The requirements on the handling of flight recorder recordings for aeroplanes and helicopters that are used for commercial operations should be consistent with the requirements for aeroplanes and helicopters that are used for non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft, hence the need to amend Annex VI (Part-NCC) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. ( 2) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1) EN 2 EN  (14) The objective of the new requirements is to increase the safety of operations by improving the monitoring and management of operations of light aircraft and acquiring better data for purposes of continuing airworthiness of these products. The objective of these new requirements is also to enable a more accurate identification of the causes of accidents that involve light aircraft, thus leading to a better hazard identification and prevention of future occurrences. (15) ICAO SARPs ensure that certain passenger-carrying aeroplanes above a certain mass limit used in commercial air transport are equipped with an approved secure flight crew compartment door. (16) ICAO SARPs have been amended by changing the mass limits that require a secure flight crew compartment door and thus Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs to be amended accordingly to ensure harmonisation of the rules for air operations and a level playing field between European and third-country air operators. (17) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 defines eligibility criteria for the conduct of operations of performance class A aeroplanes over a route that contains a point further to a distance beyond 60 minutes and up to 120 minutes at the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) cruising speed from an adequate aerodrome without an ETOPS approval (non- ETOPS operations), based on the maximum operating passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) and on the maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM). (18) Furthermore, turbojet-powered aeroplanes that meet these criteria may be operated at a distance between 120 and 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome with an approval from the competent authority and provided that the aeroplane has been granted a type design approval for such operations. (19) Several aircraft manufacturers have designed or are designing turbojet-powered aeroplanes with an MCTOM above the current MCTOM threshold for non-ETOPS operations. (20) The current provisions distort competition among air taxi operators of aeroplanes that are below or above the current MCTOM threshold as no other major regulatory body has imposed an MCTOM threshold for non-ETOPS operations or a type design requirement for 120–180-minute non-ETOPS operations. (21) EASA has prepared draft implementing rules and submitted them with Opinion No 02/2019 (3) to the European Commission in accordance with Article 75(2)(b) and (c) and Article 76(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. (22) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the committee established by Article 127 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Amendments to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: ( 3) https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions EN 3 EN  1. Annexes I (Definitions), II (Part-ARO), III (Part-ORO), IV (Part-CAT), VI (Part- NCC), VII (Part-NCO) and VIII (Part-SPO) are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 Date of entry into force and application 1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. 2. However, the following points of Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as amended by this Regulation, shall apply from 5 November 2020: – point CAT.OP.MPA.300, – point CAT.OP.MPA.301, – point CAT.OP.MPA.303, – point CAT.OP.MPA.311, – point CAT.POL.A.105(d), – point CAT.POL.A.255, and – point CAT.POL.A.355. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, For the Commission The President […] EN 4 EN European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations RELATED NPA/CRD: 2016-11 — RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) Recorders installation and maintenance thereof — certification aspects: alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders RELATED NPA/CRD: 2018-03 — RMT.0249 (MDM.051) In-flight recording for light aircraft RELATED NPA/CRD: 2017-03 — RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) Non-ETOPS operations with performance class A aeroplanes with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration of 19 or less RELATED NPA/CRD: 2017-15 — RMT.0695 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of this Opinion is to: — improve the availability of data that is recorded by cockpit voice recorders (CVRs); — address the need for in-flight recording for light aircraft further to 12 safety recommendations (SRs) addressed to EASA and the recently adopted ICAO Standards on the matter; — ensure a level playing field for the commercial operation of certain categories of aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval over routes that contain a point further from an adequate aerodrome than the distance flown in 60 minutes at one-engine-inoperative cruising speed (‘non-ETOPS operations’); it also addresses the recently adopted ICAO Standards for the installation of reinforced cockpit doors; — improve safety in relation to runway surface condition reporting and in-flight assessment of landing performance further to SRs and the recently adopted ICAO Standards; and — ensure a level playing field in relation to the required landing distance for certain categories of commercially operated aeroplanes. This Opinion proposes to: — mandate the carriage of lightweight flight recorders for certain categories of light aircraft that are commercially operated and to promote the voluntary installation of such recorders on other aircraft; — remove the current mass threshold for ‘non-ETOPS’ operations, the type design requirement for the 120–180-minute non-ETOPS operations with turbojet aeroplanes, and increase the mass limit requiring a reinforced cockpit door for certain categories of aeroplanes; — require the installation of an alternate power supply of the CVRs and associated cockpit-mounted area microphone installed on certain large aeroplanes; — introduce standards for runway surface condition reporting, landing performance at time of arrival as well as a reduced required landing distance for CAT operations with certain categories of aeroplanes. The proposed amendments are expected to: — increase safety and ensure alignment with ICAO with regard to in-flight recording; — maintain the current level of safety for non-ETOPS operations, while allowing Europe to achieve harmonisation with other regulatory systems; — increase the current level of safety in relation to aeroplane performance, and ensure alignment with ICAO and better harmonisation with the FAA on the matter. Action area: Runway safety; aircraft tracking, rescue operations and accident investigation; Affected rules: Annex I (Definitions), Annex II (Part-ARO), Annex III (Part-ORO), Annex IV (Part-CAT), Annex VI (Part-NCC), Annex VII (Part-NCO) and Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 Affected stakeholders: Aeroplane operators; air operators (CAT); production organisation approval (POA) holders; competent authorities Driver: Safety; level playing field Rulemaking group: RMT.0296: Yes; RMT.0249: No; RMT.0271/0272: Yes; RMT.0695: SLRT Group Impact assessment: RMT.0296 and RMT.0271/0272: full; RMT.0249 and RMT.0695: light Rulemaking Procedure: Standard RMT.0296: 9.6.2015 30.9.2016 RMT.0249: 27.1.2016 27.3.2018 21.2.2019 2021/Q1 2021/Q1 RMT.0271/0272: 25.7.2014 3.4.2017 RMT.0695: 15.12.2015 25.9.2017 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this Opinion ............................................................................................................... 3 1.1. How this Opinion was developed ..................................................................................................... 3 1.2. The next steps ................................................................................................................................... 5 2. In summary — why and what................................................................................................ 6 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale ....................................................................... 6 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ........................................................................................... 9 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals .............................................................. 10 2.4. What are the stakeholders’ views — outcome of the consultation ............................................... 20 2.5. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals ................................................. 22 2.6. How we monitor and evaluate the rules ........................................................................................ 25 3. References ......................................................................................................................... 28 3.1. Affected regulations ....................................................................................................................... 28 3.2. Related decisions ............................................................................................................................ 28 3.3. Other reference documents ........................................................................................................... 29 4. Appendices......................................................................................................................... 31 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 1. About this Opinion 1. About this Opinion 1.1. How this Opinion was developed The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this Opinion in line with Regulation (EU) 2018/11391 (‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS)3 under rulemaking tasks RMT.0249 (MDM.051), RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)), RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)), and RMT.0695. The scope and timescales of each task were defined in the related ToRs4. The draft text of this Opinion has been developed: — for RMT.0249 (MDM.051): by EASA. All interested parties were consulted through NPA 2018-035,6. 5 comments were received from interested parties, including industry and national aviation authorities (NAAs). EASA has addressed and responded to the comments received on the NPA regarding the proposed amendments to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/20127. The comments received and EASA’s responses to them are presented in Comment-Response Document (CRD) 2018-038 and are summarised in Section 2.4 below; — for RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)): by EASA based on the input of the RMT.0271 (MDM.073) Rulemaking Group (RMG). All interested parties were consulted through NPA 2017-039,10. 108 comments were received from interested parties, including industry, NAAs, air accident investigation authorities, aircraft and equipment manufacturers, and airline and pilot associations. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1535612134845&uri=CELEX:32018R1139). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management-board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18- 2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications?publication_type%5B%5D=2467 4 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/terms-of-reference-and-group-compositions/tor-rmt0249-mdm051 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/terms-of-reference-and-group-compositions/tor-rmt0271-0272-mdm073-b https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/terms-of-reference-and-group-compositions/tor-rmt0296-ops008a https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/terms-of-reference-and-group-compositions/tor-rmt0695 5 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-03 6 In accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure. 7 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1). 8 http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents 9 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2017-03 10 In accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 1. About this Opinion EASA has addressed and responded to the comments received on the NPA with the support of the RMT.0271 Review Group (RG). The comments received and EASA’s responses to them are presented in CRD 2017-0311 and are summarised in Section 2.4 below. — for RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)): by EASA based on the input of the RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) Rulemaking Group (RMG). All interested parties were consulted through NPA 2016-1112,13. 357 comments were received from interested parties, NAAs, aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers and organisations. EASA has addressed and responded to the comments received on the NPA with the support of the RMT.0296 RG. The comments received and EASA’s responses to them are presented in CRD 2016-1114 and are summarised in Section 2.4 below; — for RMT.0695: This RMT has been outsourced to a stakeholder-led rulemaking task (SLRT) group in accordance with EASA’s Rulemaking Procedure. EASA uses SLRTs to address industry-driven issues that cannot be prioritised as part of EASA’s rulemaking programmes due to resource constraints. The outsourcing of this RMT is supported by the limited applicability of the proposed amendments. All interested parties were consulted through NPA 2017-1515,16. 23 comments were received from interested parties, including industry and NAAs. Based on the proposals of the SLRT group, EASA has addressed and responded to the comments received on the NPA. The comments received and the EASA responses to them are presented in CRD 2017-1517 and are summarised in Section 2.4 below. The final text of this Opinion and the draft regulation has been developed as follows: — for RMT.0249 (MDM.051): by EASA; — for RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)): by EASA based on the input of the RMT.0271 RG; — for RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)): by EASA based on the input of the RMT.0296 RG; — for RMT.0695: by EASA based on the input of the SLRT group. 11 http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents 12 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2016-11 13 In accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure. 14 http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents 15 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2017-15 16 In accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure. 17 http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 1. About this Opinion The draft rule text proposed by EASA is published on the EASA website18. The major milestones of this rulemaking activity are presented on the title page. 1.2. The next steps This Opinion contains the proposed amendments to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and their potential impacts. It is submitted to the European Commission to be used as a technical basis in order to prepare an EU regulation. The decision that contains the related certification specifications (CS), acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) will be published by EASA when the related regulation is adopted by the European Commission/European Parliament and the Council. EASA published the draft text for the related ED Decision that contains AMC and GM for information purposes only. The final decision that amends the AMC & GM will be published by EASA once the European Commission has adopted the related regulation. 18 http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what 2. In summary — why and what 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale RMT.0249 (MDM.051) ‘Alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs)’ Safety investigation authorities found during the investigations of accidents that CVRs had been depowered prematurely while they could have kept recording useful information, provided that an alternate power source had been installed. They addressed safety recommendations (SRs) to EASA on the issue of CVR/flight data recorder (FDR) functions being disabled after an interruption of normal power. The following SRs were considered during this RMT: SR CAND-1999-003: ‘As of 01 January 2005, for all aircraft equipped with CVRs having a recording capacity of at least two hours, a dedicated independent power supply be required to be installed adjacent or integral to the CVR, to power the CVR and the cockpit area microphone for a period of 10 minutes whenever normal aircraft power sources to the CVR are interrupted.’ (Accident to McDonnell Douglas MD11, registered HB-IWF, on 02 September 1998) SR UNKG-2005-075: ‘For newly manufactured aircraft, the European Aviation Safety Agency should require that the cockpit voice recorder and cockpit area microphone are provided with an independent 10 minute back-up power source, to which the cockpit voice recorder and cockpit area microphone are switched automatically, in the event that normal power is interrupted.’ (Serious incident on an Airbus A320-214, registered G-BXKD, on 15 January 2005) ICAO Annex 6 Part I, in its Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) requires that ‘all aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 27 000 kg for which the individual certificate of airworthiness (CofA) is first issued on or after 1 January 2018 should be provided with an alternate power source, as defined in 6.3.2.4.1, that powers at least one CVR’. RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) ‘In-flight recording for light aircraft’ In the context of this RMT, the following terms are used: — ‘light aeroplane’ means an aeroplane of a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 5 700 kg or less; — ‘light helicopter’ means a helicopter of an MCTOM of 3 175 kg or less; — ‘light aircraft’ means a light aeroplane, a light helicopter, a balloon or a sailplane. Since 2010, accidents and serious incidents that occur over the territory of an EASA Member State (MS) must be subject to safety investigation. However, almost all categories of light aircraft fall outside the scope of current requirements to carry flight recorders. In the absence of data on the aircraft condition and operation, it can be very difficult to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to an accident or a serious incident — knowing the sequence of events though is essential for defining actions in order to prevent future occurrences. This is why the recently adopted Standards in ICAO Annex 6 prescribe, for some categories of light aeroplanes and helicopters operated for commercial air transport (CAT), the carriage of in-flight recording equipment. In addition, 12 SRs related to in-flight recording for light aeroplanes and helicopters were addressed to EASA by safety investigation authorities. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what Four systematic studies of safety investigation reports were conducted by EASA in order to assess the expected benefit of in-flight recording for preventing accidents through facilitation of safety investigations (refer to NPA 2017-03, Appendix E19). The conclusion of these studies is that in-flight recording brings moderate benefit when considering light aircraft, so that requirements applicable to all kinds of light aircraft would not be proportionate. Hence, rulemaking should be focused on those light aircraft that are used for commercial operations and are capable of transporting several passengers. Besides rulemaking, the potential safety benefit of facilitating and promoting voluntary installation of in-flight recording equipment was also identified. RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) ‘Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations’ Investigations of accidents indicate that the standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting are not harmonised and have recognised this fact as a significant contributing factor to runways excursions, in particular when the runway is wet or contaminated. The standards for aeroplane performance calculations do not cover adequately all conditions on wet and contaminated runways in relation to the method used for assessing and reporting the runway surface condition. ICAO has consequently amended a number of SARPs in several of its annexes, namely Annex 6, 8, 14 and 15, and has produced extensive guidance material in order to establish a globally harmonised reporting format for runway surface condition, airworthiness standards on performance data necessary for the assessment of the landing distance for aeroplanes at the time of landing, and operational provisions for the flight crew on landing performance calculations and runway condition reporting. Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs therefore to be amended to implement the applicable ICAO SARPs on runway surface condition assessment and reporting and aeroplane performance requirements. Furthermore, a need for operational flexibility has been identified in certain CAT operations with regard to the required landing distance. Certain performance class A and class B aeroplanes are allowed in other regulatory systems to land within 80 % of the landing distance available on the intended runway, provided that they are granted a prior approval from the competent authority and that they fulfil a number of risk-mitigating conditions. Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 needs to be amended in this regard as well to define the conditions under which these operations may be conducted, while attaining a level of safety that is equivalent to that attained by the existing requirements for landing performance. Other miscellaneous amendments are necessary to clarify the applicability and use of crosswind limitations, and improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency. This Opinion also responds to the following SRs addressed to EASA: — EAPPRE, Ref.: 3.7.1; — EAPPRE, Ref.: 3.7.3; and 19 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2017-03 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — SR NORW-2011-011. The details of the responses to each SR may be found in Section 2.3 of the NPA 2016-11. RMT.0695 ‘Non-ETOPS operations’ The requirements for performance class A aeroplanes with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less to conduct ETOPS operations were developed by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in parallel with the US Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) in the mid-1990s. The MCTOM threshold and the diversion time threshold at which ETOPS approval is required for operators of such aeroplanes are today specified in CAT.OP.MPA.140 of Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. The current 45 360 kg applicability mass threshold affects primarily turbojet aeroplanes, as there is currently no civilian turboprop aeroplane with MCTOM close to or above 45 360 kg operated in CAT in Europe. This threshold was established based on an analysis of business aeroplanes produced in the mid-1990s, but today several manufacturers develop intercontinental turbojet aeroplanes for business travel, i.e. ‘business jets’, that have an MCTOM in excess of 45 360 kg. While the operation of these aeroplanes is unchanged from similar aeroplanes with an MCTOM at or below the current threshold, the additional mass would require these operators to obtain an ETOPS approval for the same routes, when operating in CAT. — This 45 360 kg threshold, therefore, distorts the level playing field since it introduces an additional burden on CAT operators of twin-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM at or above 45 360 kg and an MOPSC of 19 or less, in relation to CAT operators of similar aeroplanes but with an MCTOM below 45 360 kg. — In addition, there is also a harmonisation issue as no such mass threshold is defined in the regulatory frameworks of the FAA or Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA). Furthermore, the FAA and TCCA regulatory provisions do not require a specific type design approval for non- ETOPS operations whereas CAT.OP.MPA does require one for 120–180-minute non-ETOPS operations with performance class A aeroplanes with an MOPSC of 19 or less and an MCTOM less than 45 360 kg. Indeed, the FAA in its 14 CFR Part 135 accommodates non-ETOPS operations below 180 minutes with such aeroplanes and for on-demand operations, while no such alleviation exists for other types of CAT operations that fall under FAA Part 121. Similarly, the TCCA requirement for an approval to conduct ETOPS operations with two-engined aeroplanes is only applicable to aeroplanes with an MOPSC of 20 or more. Neither is such a mass threshold defined in Amendment 38 to ICAO Annex 6 Part I, which renamed ETOPS to ‘extended diversion time operations (EDTO)’ and introduced significant technical changes to the concept. The ICAO provisions require only the Contracting States to the Chicago Convention to define a threshold time per aeroplane type, above which an EDTO approval would be required, and guidance to Contracting States is provided for the establishment of this threshold time. It is worth noting that this threshold time may be specific to the particular aeroplane type and/or operator. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what In the context of this RMT, EASA also decided to consider Amendment 4320 to ICAO Annex 6 Part I, adopted by the ICAO Council in 2018. This Amendment contains a standard to increase the mass threshold above which a reinforced secure cockpit door is required for passenger-carrying aeroplanes used in CAT operations. The new standard allows aeroplanes that have an MOPSC of 19 seats or less and an MCTOM above 45 500 kg, but less than 54 500 kg, to operate without a reinforced cockpit door. 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 1 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Section 2.1. The specific objectives of this proposal are, therefore: — for RMT.0249 (MDM.051): to increase the robustness of CVRs following the loss of their power supply; — for RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)):  to enhance the identification and prevention of safety issues that affect light aircraft by means of data recorded in flight;  to achieve better harmonisation with the ICAO Standards in Annex 6, Parts I, II and III;  to produce a proportionate regulation which takes into account the General Aviation Road Map; and  to identify avenues other than rulemaking for the installation of in-flight recording equipment; — for RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)):  to reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor;  to achieve better harmonisation with ICAO Standards in Annex 6, Parts I and II;  to provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance; and  to contribute to the global harmonisation of regional, notably the FAA, and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in support of CAT operations; — for RMT.0695: to determine how the European regulatory framework needs to be updated in order to accommodate new business jet aeroplanes that are operated by European CAT operators in the 180-minute non-ETOPS operation category, in order to: 20 See ICAO State Letter AN 11/1.1.32-17/66 (EASA reference SL 2018/12) of 29 May 2017. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what o increase harmonisation with the regulatory framework of other major aviation authorities for the operation of these aeroplanes and, therefore, ensure a level playing field between EU and third-country operators; and o ensure a level playing field among CAT operators of aeroplanes with an MOPSC below 19, and avoid an undue burden on European CAT operators of business jet aeroplanes, and to allow CAT operations of passenger-carrying aeroplanes that have an MOPSC of 19 seats or less and an MCTOM above 45 500 kg, but less than 54 500 kg, without a reinforced cockpit door. 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals RMT.0249 (MDM.051) ‘Alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs)’ This Opinion proposes to introduce a provision in point CAT.IDE.A.185 of Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 to require an alternate power source for CVRs and cockpit- mounted area microphones of newly manufactured aeroplanes with an MCTOM of over 27 000 kg. RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) ‘In-flight recording for light aircraft’ New concepts and definitions The term ‘flight recorder’ was implicitly used in the rules for air operations to designate crash- protected flight recorders that are required to be carried on-board large aircraft, such as the flight data recorder (FDR) or the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Crash-protected flight recorders are capable of withstanding very severe crash conditions and they can record a wealth of data from multiple sensors and sources. However, in the recent amendments to ICAO Annex 6, the term ‘flight recorder’ encompasses lightweight equipment as well, which meets less demanding crash-protection requirements and records a smaller set of data. Hence, the definition of ‘flight recorder’ is introduced for clarification in Annex I (Definitions) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. This definition complies with the concept used in ICAO Annex 6. It is also consistent with the definition of a flight recorder in Regulation (EU) No 996/201021. As a consequence, the provisions applicable to the preservation of the recordings after an accident or a serious incident (CAT.GEN.MPA.105(a)(10), CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a), NCC.GEN.106(a)(9), NCC.GEN.145(a), SPO.GEN.107(a)(9), and SPO.GEN.145(a)) become de facto applicable to the recordings of lightweight flight recorders as well. In addition, definitions for ‘flight data recorder’ and ‘cockpit voice recorder’ are introduced in order to provide a clear understanding of these types of flight recorders and avoid confusion with lightweight flight recorders. New recording requirements for commercial operations with light aeroplanes and light helicopters New requirements are added to Annex IV (Part-CAT: points CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191) and Annex VIII (Part-SPO: points SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. They require that aeroplanes and helicopters that: 21 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35). TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — are used for commercial operations; — are manufactured on or after the date of entry into force of the amending regulation + 3 years; — are not specified by the current flight data recorder carriage requirements (points CAT.IDE.A.190, CAT.IDE.H.190, SPO.IDE.A.145, SPO.IDE.H.145); and — have an MOPSC of more than 9 (for aeroplanes) or are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more (for aeroplanes and helicopters), be equipped with a flight recorder, which may be either crash-protected or lightweight. They also require that the flight recorder record flight data or images that are sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. Indeed, lightweight flight recorder models available on the market record, as a minimum, images of the aircraft instruments, or 3D-position and acceleration data provided by dedicated GNSS receiver and accelerometric sensors; in both cases, the recorded information is sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. A minimum recording duration of 5 hours is required in order to ensure that the flight recorder is capable of recording a complete flight in most cases. Indeed, the majority of aeroplane and helicopter models to which the proposed rules apply have a flight endurance of less than 5 hours, and even those models with an endurance that exceeds 5 hours seldom perform commercial flights of such a long duration. The flight recorder is required to have an automatic start-and-stop logic in order to ensure recording as soon as the aeroplane is capable of moving under its own power. In practice, it is sufficient for the flight recorder to be capable of detecting when an aircraft engine delivers power. If the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a function must be provided which can be operated by the commander in order to modify the image or audio recordings so that they cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques. This is to allow the flight crew to protect their privacy by making the image or audio recordings inaccessible using normal techniques after an uneventful flight. The decision to activate this function is to be made by the commander because they are responsible for the preservation of flight recorder recordings (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.105). However, this function does not erase recorded data: it can still be retrieved using special techniques that are available to equipment manufacturers and/or safety investigation authorities. This is consistent with the specifications of ED-155 for the recording of images (refer to ED-155, Part III ‘Airborne Image Recording Systems’, paragraph III-2.1.11) and also prescribed by a standard22 adopted in Appendix 8 of ICAO Annex 6 Part I (Eleventh Edition, Amendment 43, applicable on 8 November 2018). Continued serviceability of the flight recorder Paragraph (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and paragraph (b) of SPO.GEN.145 are amended in order to address the continued serviceability of the flight recorder, which is required by the new CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146, and SPO.IDE.H.146. 22 ‘for aeroplanes for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued on or after 1 January 2023, a flight crew-operated erase function shall be provided on the flight deck which, when activated, modifies the recording of a CVR and AIR so that it cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques. The installation shall be designed to prevent activation during flight. In addition, the probability of an inadvertent activation of an erase function during an accident shall also be minimized.’ TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what Indeed, experience with crash-protected flight recorders installed on large aircraft has shown that without rules, the continued serviceability of the flight recorders is not addressed consistently. The instructions for continued serviceability vary — in particular, they do not always include inspection of the recorded data (i.e. checking that the values of flight parameters are reasonable and consistent with each other, and that images are of sufficient quality to be able to read instrument indications). In addition, since a flight recorder failure has no effect on the safe conduct of the flight, maintaining it serviceable it is not considered to be a priority if it is not required by law. In summary, two kinds of checks are expected to be performed on lightweight flight recorders: — inspection of the recording to check the quality and completeness of the recorded data (already applicable to crash-protected flight recorders and required for lightweight flight recorders); and — daily use of the means for preflight check of the flight recorders for proper operation (already applicable to crash-protected flight recorders and required for lightweight flight recorders). The changes in paragraph (b) also clarify that the requirements apply only to flight recorders which are required to be installed, not to those which are installed on a voluntary basis. Voluntary installation of recording equipment should entail minimum operational constraints and maintenance costs of installed equipment, regardless of the type of operations performed as per NPA 2017-03, Section 4.5.1, Option A.1: ‘4) The operational constraints and maintenance cost of installed equipment should be as low as possible. A fit-and-forget approach should be made possible. The equipment should also not be required to be maintained serviceable when it is installed on a voluntary basis, as this would work against promotion. This in return may affect the availability and consequently the safety benefits of the equipment.’ Paragraph (d) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and paragraph (d) of SPO.GEN.145 are amended to include lightweight flight recorders in the requirement to keep and maintain documentation needed to convert recorded data into parameters expressed in engineering units. The same changes have been made also to the related requirements in Annex VI (Part-NCC), namely point NCC.GEN.145, in order to cover the situations in which the same aircraft is used for both NCC and CAT and/or SPO operations. Protection of image and audio recordings from a flight recorder Since compliance with CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 may be achieved by recording images of the flight crew compartment, and since crew members may appear entirely or partly on these images, the framework for the protection of image recordings was modified. Requirements regarding the handling of audio and image recordings Paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and paragraph (f) of SPO.GEN.145 have been amended in order to address the protection of such image recordings. In addition, since a lightweight flight recorder might be capable of recording audio in the flight crew compartment, all audio recordings from a flight recorder (and not only CVR recordings) are now within the scope of paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and paragraph (f) of SPO.GEN.145. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what Rules to frame the handling of image and audio recordings are as laid down in Standard 6.1 of Appendix 3 to ICAO Annex 19 (Second Edition, applicable on 7 November 2019): ‘States shall, through national laws and regulations, provide specific measures of protection regarding the confidentiality and access by the public to ambient workplace recordings.’ In addition, a Standard23 that restricts the use of audio and airborne image recordings was included in Chapter 3 of ICAO Annex 6 Part I (Eleventh Edition, Amendment 43, applicable on 8 November 2018) and Part II (Tenth Edition, Amendment 36, applicable on 8 November 2018). The proposed requirements in paragraphs (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of points CAT.GEN.MPA.195, NCC.GEN.145 and SPO.GEN.145 respectively implement this ICAO Standard for airborne image recordings. Hence, the following principles are proposed: — If images of the flight crew compartment contain parts of the bodies of crew members, they could be considered personal data. In that case, European operators will have to comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/67924 on General Data Protection (applicable from 25 May 2018). Therefore, reference to this Regulation is added, besides the reference to Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, in paragraph (f) to each of the above-mentioned points. — Audio and images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder may not be used for purposes other than:  those stipulated in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010;  maintaining or improving safety; or  ensuring flight recorder serviceability. — When audio and images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are used for maintaining or improving safety, then:  a procedure for the handling of audio and/or image recordings shall be in place; and  all crew members concerned shall give their prior consent. — When audio and/or images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are used for ensuring the serviceability of this flight recorder,  the operator shall ensure the privacy of these audio and/or image recordings (except if there is no body part of crew members visible on the images); and  these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring flight recorder serviceability. 23 Text of this ICAO Standard: ‘As of November 2019, States shall not allow the use of recordings or transcripts of CVR, CARS, Class A AIR and Class A AIRS for purposes other than the investigation of an accident or incident as per Annex 13 except where the recordings or transcripts: a) are related to a safety-related event identified in the context of a safety management system; are restricted to the relevant portions of a de-identified transcript of the recording; and are subject to the protections accorded by Annex 19; b) are sought for use in criminal proceedings not related to an event involving an accident or incident investigation and are subject to the protections accorded by Annex 19; or c) are used for inspections of flight recorder systems as provided in Section 7 of Appendix 8.’ 24 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&qid=1487864197230&from=EN). TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what In that case, it is not practical to request each time the prior consent of the crew. However, if such a recording is inspected for serviceability purposes, it shall not be disclosed or used for other purposes. The same changes have been made also to the related rules for non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (paragraph (f) of NCC.GEN.145) in order to cover the situations in which the same aircraft is used for both NCC and CAT and/or SPO operations. Since the protection of audio and image recordings introduced in paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and of SPO.GEN.145 are relevant for all types of operation, the gap between the different annexes applicable to CAT, SPO and NCC operations had to be bridged. Note: Paragraphs (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195, NCC.GEN.145 and SPO.GEN.145 respectively only address images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder. Hence, images of other parts of the aircraft are not within the scope of these paragraphs. In addition, images captured ‘at the back’ of electronic flight instrument displays (reproducing an exact copy of the information presented on the display) are not within their scope either. Also, images that are recorded by a portable electronic device (PED) or a system of the aircraft which is not a flight recorder are not within their scope either. Function to erase image and audio recordings New points CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.191, SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 require that if the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, a function must be provided that would enable the commander to modify the recording after an uneventful flight, in a way that renders the recording impossible to be replayed or copied, as a measure to protect crew privacy. See also Section 2.3.1.2. Promotion of in-flight recording The retained options include promoting the benefit of recording flight parameters, images and audio in the flight crew compartment, and promoting voluntary installation of recording equipment on all light aeroplanes and helicopters. It is expected that these promotional activities will contribute to increasing the number of operators and aircraft owners that voluntarily install in-flight recording equipment. Appendix D of NPA 2017-03 presents the potential benefits that could be promoted to industry and identifies factors that may limit the effectiveness of any future promotion activity. RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) ‘Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations’ This Opinion proposes the following amendments to several annexes of Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012. Annex I ‘Definitions’ The definitions of ‘dry runway’, ‘wet runway’ and ‘contaminated runway’ are amended in accordance with the definitions introduced in ICAO Annex 6 and 14. The definition of ‘damp runway’ is deleted as this condition is now included in the definition of ‘wet runway’. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what The following new definitions are added to support the proposed runway surface condition assessment and reporting system: — ‘runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’; — ‘runway condition report (RCR)’; — ‘runway condition code (RWYCC)’; — ‘runway surface condition(s)’; — ‘landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA)’; — ‘runway surface descriptors’; — ‘slippery wet runway’; — ‘specially prepared winter runway’. Annex II (Part-ARO) In Appendix II, note 20 to the OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS form (EASA FORM 139) is amended to include under the listed items the approval for reduced required landing distance operations in order to be consistent with the proposed new CAT.POL.A.255 and CAT.POL.A.355 that regulate such operations. Annex IV (Part-CAT) A requirement for a specific in-flight assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) is added to CAT.OP.MPA.300 in accordance with ICAO Annex 6. For clarity reasons, the following amendments are also proposed: — The rule previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters is split in two different requirements. The content of the new CAT.OP.MPA.301 applicable to helicopters only has not been changed compared to the current rule. — The details of the in-flight assessment of the LDTA are proposed in a new dedicated rule because the current CAT.OP.MPA.300 serves also other purposes than checking the landing distances, such as checking the weather minima. In this regard, it should be noted that said rule is being revised for other reasons under the ongoing RMT.0379 ‘All-weather operations (AWO)’. However, no conflict exists with the amendment proposed in this Opinion. The details of the new requirement on the assessment of the LDTA are developed in new CAT.OP.MPA.303. In particular, a different approach is taken for various categories of aeroplanes as follows: — Performance class A aeroplanes: the TALPA ARC recommends the application of a 15 % factor to the landing distance determined in accordance with performance data for the LDTA. However, further to comments to NPA 2016-11, the applicability was restricted to those aeroplanes that are certified in accordance with CS-25 or CS-23 at level 4/‘High speed’. — Performance class B and class C aeroplanes: TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what in consideration of the fact that in many cases data from the manufacturer may not be available for this category of aeroplanes as no relevant airworthiness standards may exist, the proposed new rule allows, as a minimum, to ensure that the landing distance calculated at the time of landing, based on actual conditions, is at least in accordance with the criteria applicable at dispatch. It is also clarified that when approved performance data contained in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) is insufficient for the purpose of assessing the LDTA, it may be supplemented with other data. Moreover, the operator has to specify in the operations manual (OM) the data and the assumptions made for the purpose of assessing the LDTA. New CAT.OP.MPA.311 is proposed, in accordance with ICAO Annex 6, for the commander to report the braking action experienced during landing if it is not as expected from previous reports. In CAT.POL.A.105 ‘General’, paragraph (d) on damp runways is deleted for consistency with the changes introduced in the definitions, and the following paragraph (e) is renumbered to (d) accordingly. In CAT.POL.A.215 ‘En-route — one-engine-inoperative (OEI)’, further to taking into account proposal 6 of the JAA NPA-OPS 47, rule references are corrected and some text clarifications are introduced. Moreover, a new paragraph is added as the current rule assumes the availability of en route OEI net flight path data for performance class A aeroplanes. However, this is not always the case. Most notably, airworthiness standards applicable to commuter category aeroplanes (CS-23 or equivalent) do not require this information to be provided in the AFM. To address this disparity, it is necessary to specify the appropriate margin that should be applied to the OEI gross en route flight path data for performance class A aeroplanes. Accordingly, the OEI net flight path margins specified in CS-25 for two-, three- and four-engined aeroplanes are added. In CAT.POL.A.220 ‘En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative’, further to the proposal of the JAA NPA-OPS 47, the following changes are introduced: — the use of ‘long range cruising speed’ is replaced with ‘cruising power’, thus harmonising with the corresponding Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121 requirement. This change will allow for more flexibility for operators who would be able to substantiate the use of a speed other than the long-range cruising speed to comply with the rule; and — text clarifications are introduced and rule references are added; it should be noted that the reference to CAT.POL.A.235 is restricted to wet runways only (compared to the JAA proposal). CAT.POL.A.230 ‘Landing — dry runways’ is amended to: — include the existence of reduced required landing distance operations as per proposed new CAT.POL.A.255; — specify in paragraph (d)(2) that when corrections are provided in the AFM, they shall be taken into account in the computation of the landing distance; — amend paragraph (f) on alternates because the original intent of this requirement was to cater for a rare and unique set of circumstances, which is better addressed by an exemption or a derogation than a general rule, and because this paragraph is partly superseded by the in-flight check part by the proposed new CAT.OP.MPA.303; however, EASA considers that an alleviation TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what for alternates is necessary for operations on contaminated runways and a proposal is made in this regard. CAT.POL.A.235 ‘Landing — wet and contaminated runways’ is amended to: — take into account the conclusions on wet runways of the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG), a working group which reports to the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. When specific performance data is provided in the AFM for wet runways, they shall be used in lieu of the application of the 15 % factor to the data for dry runways; — clarify the requirement on performance credit for runways that have improving friction characteristics (such as grooved runways, PFC runways, or other existing or future technologies); — include a specific requirement for ‘specially prepared winter runways’, which is consistent with the proposal made by RMT.0704 ‘Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting’ in the aerodromes domain (see NPA 2018-14 ‘Runway safety’25); — include a reference to the appropriate paragraph of the new CAT.POL.A.255; — clarify the requirements on alternate aerodromes in relation to the changes made in CAT.POL.A.230, and allow for some flexibility when dispatching on contaminated runways. CAT.POL.A.250 ‘Approval of short landing operations’ is amended to specify that, further to the new type of operations introduced into CAT.POL.A.255, short-landing operations cannot be conducted in combination with reduced required landing distance operations. A new requirement ‘CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations’ is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance class A aeroplanes. These operations are only allowed for non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations of aeroplanes that have an AFM eligibility statement and an MOPSC of 19, and require a prior approval by the CA. The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, which in turn reduces the required landing distance. The intent of this new requirement is to achieve proportionality of the rules for business aviation operations and harmonisation with the corresponding US requirement, under a set of conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of NPA 2016-11, attain a level of safety that is equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230. The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas: — operational conditions; — flight crew; — aerodrome conditions; and — aeroplane characteristics and performance. As regards aircraft eligibility, when the factors required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, are the basis to demonstrate compliance with certification standards, the aeroplane should not be operated with reduced required landing distances, hence the need for AFM statement of eligibility. 25 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-14 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what As regards the assessment of aerodrome conditions, it should be noted that when the runway is forecast to be wet, a further check of the landing distance is required for the following reason: the landing distance calculated in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways at dispatch needs to be increased by 1.15 for the case of a wet runway. This distance is obtained as follows: Wet LD = 1.15 × 1.25 × ALD where: — ‘Wet LD’ is the required landing distance for wet runways; — ‘1.15’ is the corrective factor for wet runways; — ‘1.25’ is the factor that results from the use of 80 % of the LDA; and — ‘ALD’ is the actual landing distance for the aeroplane type that results from the AFM data for dry runways. However, a comparison with the landing distance required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 was carried out for a number of performance class A aeroplane types, which showed that the landing distances based on CAT.OP.MPA.303 may be longer or shorter than the Wet LDs depending on the aeroplane type, number of operative reversers, and other assumptions made during the certification of the aeroplane. These differences for certain performance class A aeroplane types may lead to the situation where the Wet LD for reduced required landing distance operations is systematically shorter than the one calculated in-flight due to the use of the 80 % landing factor. To avoid this situation, a requirement is proposed to compare at the time of dispatch the Wet LD with the distance calculated in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303, and use the longer of the two. Nevertheless, the requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 to check again the landing distance in- flight against the latest information available at the time of arrival remains valid. CAT.POL.A.330 and CAT.POL.A.335 are amended consistently with CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POLA.235 A new requirement ‘CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations’ is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance class B aeroplanes. These operations are allowed for specific runways at aerodromes where the public interest and operational necessity have been determined by the state of the aerodrome, and require a prior approval by the CA. The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, which in turn reduces the required landing distance. The intent of the rule is to achieve proportionality of the rules for small CAT operators under a set of conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of NPA 2016-11, are considered to attain a level of safety that is equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330. The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas: — operational conditions; — flight crew; — aerodrome conditions; and TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — aeroplane characteristics and performance. Compared to the corresponding rule for performance class A aeroplanes, the requirements on training are simplified; however, further limitations are proposed on the control of the touchdown area, and operations are restricted to visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only. The changes introduced into CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47 are also introduced in CAT.POL.A.415 ‘En-route — OEI’ for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes. The changes introduced in CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47 are also introduced in CAT.POL.A.420 ‘En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative’ for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes. CAT.POL.A.430 and CAT.POL.A.435 are amended consistently with CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POLA.235 Annex VI (Part-NCC) For clarity reasons, NCC.OP.225, previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters, is split in two different requirements for each aircraft category. No content changes are introduced at rule level as the need to carry out a specific in-flight assessment of the LDTA on aeroplanes in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 will be developed at AMC level in a way that is proportionate to the intended operations. Annex VII (Part-NCO) For clarity reasons, NCO.OP.205, previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters, is split in two different requirements for each aircraft category. No content changes are introduced at rule level as the need to carry out a specific in-flight assessment of the LDTA on aeroplanes in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 will be developed at AMC level in a way proportionate that is to the intended operations. Annex VIII (Part-SPO) For clarity reasons, SPO.OP.210, previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters, is split in two different requirements for each aircraft category. No content changes are introduced at rule level as the need to carry out a specific in-flight assessment of the LDTA on aeroplanes in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 will be developed at AMC level in a way that is proportionate to the intended operations. RMT.0695 ‘Non-ETOPS operations’ This Opinion proposes the amendment of Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 to accommodate new business jet aeroplanes currently under development by several aeroplane manufacturers. Through this amendment, the current 45 360 kg MCTOM threshold is removed for non-ETOPS CAT operations of performance class A aeroplanes26 with an MOPSC of 19 or less. As a result, all performance class A aeroplanes with an MOPSC of 19 or less will be allowed to operate with 120-minute diversion times without an ETOPS approval, or, subject to approval by the competent authority, up to 180-minute diversion times for turbojet aeroplanes. In addition, the amendment will clarify operational considerations and will remove the type design considerations 26 In accordance with Annex I (Definitions) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, ‘“performance class A aeroplanes” means multi- engined aeroplanes powered by turbo-propeller engines with an MOPSC of more than nine or a maximum take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg, and all multi-engined turbo-jet powered aeroplanes;’. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what related to 120–180-minute non-ETOPS operations with turbojet aeroplanes, therefore removing the need for aeroplane manufacturers to apply for this specific type design approval. The following specific amendments are therefore proposed: — to remove the mass threshold in CAT.OP.MPA.140(a); and — to remove the type design requirement in CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) ‘Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval’. This Opinion further proposes to amend point ORO.SEC.100 of Annex III (Part-ORO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 to allow CAT operations of aeroplanes that carry passengers without a reinforced secured cockpit door, whenever the aeroplane used for CAT operations has an MOPSC of 19 or less and an MCTOM above 45 500kg, but lower than 54 500 kg. 2.4. What are the stakeholders’ views — outcome of the consultation RMT.0249 (MDM.051) ‘Alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs)’ The proposal to amend Annex IV (Part-CAT) to include requirements on alternate power supply was published in NPA 2018-03. The NPA received in total 61 comments, out of which only 5 where on the proposal to amend Annex IV (Part-CAT). For instance, Airbus wished to ensure that EASA would also recognise the content of an FAA Issue Paper ELOS (Equivalent Level of Safety) on ‘independent power source’, as otherwise some of their designs could be impacted and therefore the economic impact mentioned in the NPA may not be negligible. EASA considers that the content of the proposed AMC 25.1457 (now also referred to in a new GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT), CAT.IDE.A.185(i) for better clarity) authorises design solutions like the ones accepted via the FAA ELOS. Overall, the proposed rule and AMC/GM have been slightly changed to better align them with the FAA rules and CS-25 text, improve some wording, or remove unnecessary guidance. CRD 2018-03, being largely unrelated to the said amendment of Annex IV (Part-CAT), will not be published as an appendix to this Opinion. It will be, however, published separately and shall be available on the EASA website. RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) ‘In-flight recording for light aircraft’ 108 comments were received to NPA 2017-03 from 20 commentators, of which 7 NAAs, 3 aircraft manufacturers, 1 equipment manufacturer, 1 pilot association, 2 operator associations, 1 balloon federation, and other categories of commentators. The main topics of these comments included mandating flight recorders for commercial SPO, mandating audio recording, protection of privacy of the flight crew, promoting voluntary installation of recording equipment on balloons, and minimum recording duration of lightweight flight recorders. The comments led to minor changes to the text of the draft rules published with the NPA. For a more detailed overview and for the responses to the comments, please consult CRD 2017-03, published as Appendix 2 to this Opinion. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) ‘Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations’ 357 comments were received to NPA 2016-11 from 39 commentators, of which 8 NAAs (including EU MSs and the FAA), manufacturers, aircraft operators, organisations, and individuals. Comments were submitted to all parts of the NPA and they were mixed in nature, ranging from support to the proposed amendments, to proposals for changes or improvements and, in some cases, expressing disagreement. The majority of the commentators focused on the following topics: Comments on the proposal for a global reporting format of runway surface conditions and in-flight assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) Overall, there were some general comments requesting consistency and synchronisation of the entry into force of the air operations and the aerodromes rules, better harmonisation with the ICAO definitions of the terms used, and extension of the proposal to non-commercial operations. Generally, EASA and the RMT.0296 RG agreed with those general comments. On the definitions, it was decided to adopt the exact ICAO definitions for the purpose of global harmonisation. As regards consistency with the relevant aerodromes rules, which are an essential part of this global effort, the RMT.0296 RG worked in close coordination with the other EASA RMT.0704 RMG, by having cross-participation to both groups of certain members and constantly updating each other on the respective work done. The applicability dates of both sets of rules are intended to be in line with the ICAO target, which is November 2020. The need to extend the proposal to non-commercial operations was acknowledged by EASA and agreed by the RMT.0296 RG. The necessary provisions will be added in a proportionate manner to the scope of those operations. Several stakeholders highlighted the difficulty for certain categories of aircraft to comply with the new proposed standards for landing performance at the time of arrival. Particularly smaller aircraft or older aircraft designs may not have the required performance data and therefore the use of the generic corrective factors may not allow to continue their operation. This was already envisaged at NPA level and alleviations were introduced for performance class B and class C aeroplanes, but further to the comments, even within performance class A aeroplanes some alleviations were introduced, along with the possibility to use other existing performance data. To this respect, also the RIA will be revised. As regards the generic corrective factors, they were developed by the TALPA ARC and endorsed in the ICAO Doc 10064 ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’, therefore they will be kept as a baseline option. Another issue that was raised by certain stakeholders, namely from those countries that are typically exposed to cold weather and heavy runway contamination, is the difficulty to comply with the proposal in challenging environments (short runways, heavy runway contamination, steep approaches, etc.) which may lead in some cases, with the use of the new runway condition codes (RCCs), to stop operations. These commentators proposed to introduce the possibility, for those aerodromes that have sufficient capabilities, to upgrade the RCCs under given conditions. Such proposal is more suitable for inclusion in the aerodromes rules, where the concept of ‘specially prepared winter runways’ will be developed and then referenced in the air operations rules. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what Comments on the proposal to use a reduced required landing distance (80 % landing factor) This proposal, while supported by a considerable number of stakeholders, attracted the most controversial comments. Particularly some stakeholders opposed the justification for the proposal and questioned the mass threshold that defines its applicability. The reasons for the proposal on reduced required landing distances are clearly explained in the RIA of NPA 2016-11 with regard to business aviation operations and the need for harmonisation with the corresponding US rules. Such operations have been conducted in the US over the last 10 years with a satisfactory safety record. Considering that the conditions proposed by EASA to conduct the said operations are more restrictive than those in the US, the safety level is expected to remain at the same level or to even improve. As regards aircraft eligibility for the said operations, the mass threshold will be changed to an AFM eligibility statement. Other comments requested to make mandatory the use of flight data monitoring (FDM) in order to obtain the approval for such operations. The aircraft categories for which FDM is mandatory are established in ORO.AOC.130 on the basis of general criteria which are not meant to be revised by this proposal. When FDM is available, it is recommended to be used also for the purposes of reduced required landing distance operations. Moreover, it is recommended to be used on a voluntary basis also when it is not required by ORO.AOC.130. However, when FDM is not available, alternative means for data collection will be considered. RMT.0695 ‘Non-ETOPS operations’ 23 comments were submitted by 10 commentators, including 6 EU NAAs and 2 aircraft manufacturers. All the comments supported the general approach. One of the most significant comments was questioning the use of a weight threshold as an adequate criterion for non-ETOPS operations. A summary of the comments on the NPA, as well as the responses to individual comments, is included in CRD 2017-15. The revised draft AMC/GM are also included in the CRD. The outcome of the consultation of the proposed AMC/GM will be available in the explanatory note to the decision that will be issued following the adoption of the amending regulation, which will be based on the present Opinion. With regard to the proposal on reinforced cockpit doors, MSs and the Commission were consulted during the drafting of the reply to the two relevant ICAO State Letters, and they widely supported the proposal. 2.5. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals RMT.0249 (MDM.051) ‘Alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs)’ An alternate power source for the CVR and its dedicated sensor (the cockpit-mounted area microphone) can, in some cases, provide for a prolonged recording, and therefore help in better understanding the circumstances that led to an accident, or how the accident developed and how the TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what situation was managed by the flight crew. The proposal partially transposes into Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 the SARPs of ICAO Annex 6, Part I, and is harmonised with the FAA requirements. The related economic impact is expected to be negligible. Indeed, current designs of newly manufactured aeroplanes would need to be modified. However, this is mitigated by the fact that aeroplane designers are already required to comply with the equivalent FAA air operation requirements to have an alternate power source. Therefore, redesign efforts have already been made by most of the manufacturers. RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) ‘In-flight recording for light aircraft’ The full impact assessment that was developed in NPA 2017-03 included aeroplanes, helicopters and balloons used for commercial operations (CAT and SPO). Considering proportionality and cost, it was not found to be appropriate to develop options for sailplanes. Four options were considered for aeroplanes and helicopters, among which Option A.4 was chosen for the development of the rules, because it had a significant positive safety impact while limiting the economic impact and the impact on general aviation. Option A.4 is a combination of the following two other options: — Option A.1: To promote the recording of flight parameters, audio and/or a view of the instrument panel for all models of light aeroplanes and light helicopters and for all types of operation, both commercial and non-commercial (no change to the rules); and — Option A.3: To require carriage of a flight recorder for some categories of light aeroplanes and light helicopters, when they are used for commercial operations (refer to Section 2.3 of this Opinion). Regarding balloons, a post-NPA assessment conducted by the EASA Balloon Collaborative Analysis Group (Balloon-CAG) of the benefit of Option B.1 (promote the fitment of balloons with means to record trajectory parameters and images from the basket interior) concluded that this is low priority for balloons. Therefore, EASA does not intend to implement Option B.1, unless new data or a need expressed by stakeholders require reconsideration. However, the impact assessment of the options regarding balloons in NPA 2017-03 is considered to be still valid. For the detailed impact assessment, please consult Chapter 4 of NPA 2017-03. RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) ‘Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations’ For two of the issues addressed by NPA 2016-11, namely: — miscellaneous amendments to improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency; and — crosswind limitations, a RIA was not considered to be necessary. The other two issues, namely: — implementation of ICAO amendments (which includes standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting, airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at time of arrival, and in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival); and TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — reduced required landing distance for performance class A and class B aeroplane operations, which have different starting points and drivers, have been considered under two separate RIAs. Implementation of ICAO amendments Along with the baseline option (Option 0 ‘No changes’), another option was considered: — implement the ICAO amendments. The impacts of the two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 of NPA 2016-11. Option 1 has been selected as the most appropriate one for the following reasons: — it is expected to provide the highest safety benefit; — it allows full alignment of the EU rules with the adopted ICAO SARPs; and — it achieves a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules. However, further to the comments received on NPA 2016-11, it was acknowledged that certain categories of aeroplanes that fall within performance class A may have the same difficulties to obtain performance data for the assessment of the LDTA of performance class B and class C aeroplanes. Particularly smaller aeroplanes and older aircraft designs. For these cases, alleviations have been introduced either in terms of allowing at time of arrival the use of performance data for the time of dispatch or by allowing the AFM data to be supplemented by other data. Furthermore, for aeroplanes that are certified in accordance with CS-23 or equivalent, the original requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 for the LDTA assessment has been restricted to a specific subset, namely to CS-23 certified aeroplanes at certification Level 4 and with performance level ‘High speed’. These aeroplanes have similar performance characteristics to CS-25 certified aeroplanes, thus making possible the use of the guidance for CS-25 certified aeroplanes in order to develop the performance data for the assessment of the LDTA. As regards the cost of developing the AFM data for the assessment of the LDTA for CS-23 certified aeroplanes, GAMA conducted a survey among OEMs which showed a significant increase in cost, ranging from 50 to 100 % depending on the aeroplane model, for those aeroplanes that have a traditional paper-based AFM. However, it should be noted that the majority of currently in-production aeroplanes have transitioned to digital AFM data. Said economic impact is further mitigated by the restricted subset of aeroplanes for which data for the assessment of the LDTA is required. As regards the impact on non-commercial operations, it is considered to be minimal as no new implementing rules will be proposed. Reduced required landing distance for performance class A and class B aeroplane operations Along with the baseline option (Option 0 ‘No changes’), another option was considered: — introduce the possibility to use a landing factor of 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) for performance class A and class B aeroplanes under defined conditions and with the approval of the competent authority (CA). The impacts of these two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 of NPA 2016-11. Option 1 has been selected as the most appropriate one because while it maintains the same level of safety as with the current rules, it is expected to achieve the following additional benefits: TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — to have a medium positive social impact; — to have a medium positive economic impact; — to render EU rules more proportionate; and — to achieve a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules. As regards the safety impact of the reduced landing distance proposal, further evidence was indicated by GAMA that resulted from an accident data review done in the US for eligible on-demand operations (EOD) conducted under FAA Part 135 and showed no runway excursions involving an EOD operation being cited in the probable cause or factors. Data was obtained from the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and covered a time frame of 10 years, from the entry into force of the EOD rule in 2003 until 2013. A total of 337 runway excursions were recorded and none was associated by the safety investigation to the application of the EOD rule. Considering that the conditions proposed by EASA to conduct the said operations are more restrictive than those in force in the US, the safety level is expected to remain the same or to even improve. RMT.0695 ‘Non-ETOPS operations’ The comments received on NPA 2017-15 have been duly considered by EASA in the preparation of this Opinion. In this respect, EASA proposes with this Opinion clearer eligibility criteria for non-ETOPS operations, which are expected to ensure a level playing field in this area. In addition, positive economic impacts and a higher regulatory harmonisation with other major regulatory authorities are expected with the removal of the type design requirements for 120–180- minute non-ETOPS operations. 2.6. How we monitor and evaluate the rules Monitoring and evaluation is a continuous and systematic process of data collection and analysis about the implementation and effectiveness of a rule or activity. It generates factual information for future impact assessments and helps to identify implementation problems. RMT.0249 (MDM.051) ‘Alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs)’ With regard to this proposal, given the basic nature of the proposal itself and the general consensus on it, EASA does not envisage the need for monitoring and evaluation. RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) ‘In-flight recording for light aircraft’ The options retained by the impact assessment of NPA 2017-03 are: — safety promotion: promoting the voluntary installation of in-flight recording equipment (Option A.1); and — equipment requirements: mandating the carriage of lightweight flight recorders (Option A.3). Monitoring implementation With regard to the first category of options (safety promotion), it is proposed to monitor their impact by means of a survey to be conducted 3 years after initiating safety promotion in order to check: TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what — how many stakeholders have been reached by the safety promotion activities; — what are the most and the least convincing arguments of the safety promotion material; and — how many stakeholders have decided to install in-flight recording equipment following safety promotion activities. With regard to the second category of options (equipment requirements), monitoring is achieved through regular oversight activities performed by the NAAs and by EASA. Evaluating the effectiveness of options (after implementation) All retained options serve the common objective to increase the overall ratio of light aeroplanes and light helicopters which are fitted with in-flight recording equipment. The evaluation should consist in assessing whether the increase of the level of equipment has contributed to enhancing safety for light aircraft, either directly (by making the use of light aircraft safer and better monitored by operators, flight schools, aero clubs, etc.) or indirectly (by facilitating more in-depth investigations and the identification of more effective corrective actions). Hence, it is proposed to check whether: — the carriage of in-flight recording equipment makes the day-to-day use of light aeroplanes and light helicopters safer; and — the investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving light aeroplanes and light helicopters can identify causes (otherwise unknown or not well understood) thanks to in-flight recording equipment, and determine corrective actions with more significant influence on the prevention of future accidents. TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 2. In summary — why and what RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) ‘Review of the aeroplane performance requirements for air operations’ and RMT.0695 ‘Non-ETOPS operations’ With regard to these proposals, EASA suggests to monitor the following: Indicator When it will be How it will be Who will be in monitored monitored charge of the monitoring Findings from Annually Via standardisation EASA standardisation inspection inspections Flight Standards reports regarding non- Directorate compliance with the results Authorities’/organisations’ Annually Via internal database EASA requests for, and EASA Flight Standards opinion on, flexibility Directorate provisions under Article 71 of the Basic Regulation Number of AltMoCs issued Annually Via internal database EASA with regard to: Flight Standards — non-ETOPS operations Directorate rules — runway global reporting format and related performance calculations — the use of reduced required landing distance In addition, monitoring will be performed in terms of collecting and analysing data from different available sources through several tools (e.g. surveys). The responsible actors (e.g. MSs, NAAs, operators, etc.) for collecting and providing the data will be specified in the implementation phase. In addition, the proposal might be subject to evaluation in order to judge how effective the adopted rules have been, or are, taking into account the predictions made in the impact assessment. The evaluation will provide an evidence-based judgement of the extent to which the proposal has been effective and efficient, consistent, and has achieved EU added value. The decision whether an evaluation will be necessary will be taken based also on the monitoring results. Cologne, 21 February 2019 Patrick KY Executive Director TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 3. References 3. References 3.1. Affected regulations — Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1), as last amended 3.2. Related decisions — Decision N° 2012/015/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24th October 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — ‘Guidance Material to Annex I — Definitions’ — Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2’ — Decision 2014/015/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2’ — Decision N° 2013/021/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft — ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC’ — Decision 2014/016/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-NCO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2013/022/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCO — Issue 2’ — Decision 2014/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-SPO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-SPO’ — Decision No. 2003/12/RM of the Executive Director of the Agency of 5 November 2003 on general acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness of products, parts and appliances (« AMC-20 ») — AMC 20-6 ‘Extended Range Operation with Two-Engine Aeroplanes ETOPS Certification and Operation’, as last amended by Decision 2010/012/R of 16 December 2010 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 3. References 3.3. Other reference documents — JAA NPA-OPS 47 — Aeroplane Performance — SR UNKG-2008-076 — Aircraft Accident Report 1/2009, Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), UK Department for Transport, 9 January 2009 — SR NORW-2011-011 — Report SL 2011/10, Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions, Vol II — Main Report, Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN), May 2011 — European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE), Released Edition 1.0, January 2013 — IATA Safety Report 2014, 51st Edition, April 2015 — Research Project EASA.2011/08 NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection (Report no. NLR- CR-2012-143) — Eurocontrol — ‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in 2012’ — STATFOR Briefing 167 — Research Project EASA.2008/4 — Runway Friction Characteristics Measurement And Aircraft Braking (RuFAB), final report, March 2010 — EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No 2014-20 — Aeroplane Operations in Crosswind Conditions, 23 June 2014 — EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No 2018-0220 — Runway Surface Condition Reporting — Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121 — Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 135 — Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91K — FAA AC No. 25-32 — Landing Performance Data for Time of Arrival Landing Performance Assessments — FAA AC No. 25-31— Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways — ICAO Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Operation of Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes, 10th Edition, July 2016 — ICAO Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Operation of Aircraft, Part II — International General Aviation — Aeroplanes, 9th Edition, July 2016 — ICAO Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Airworthiness of Aircraft, 11th Edition, July 2010. — ICAO Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations, 7th Edition, July 2016 — ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.1.55-15/30 of 29 May 2015 — ICAO State Letter AN 3/5.10-16/29 of 6 April 2015 — ICAO State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12 of 8 April 2016 — ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.2.26-16/19 of 5 April 2016 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 3. References — ICAO Doc 9981 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Aerodromes — ICAO Doc 4444 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Air Traffic Management (ATM) — ICAO Circular 329 ‘Runway Surface Condition Assessment, Measurement and Reporting’ — Australian Government, Civil Aviation Authority, Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 82.0, Air Operators’ Certificates – applications for certificates and general requirements, dated 21 November 2012 taking into account amendments up to Civil Aviation Order 82.0 Amendment Instrument 2012 (No. 2) — Canadian Aviation Regulations, Part VII — Commercial Air Services, current to July 22, 2014  Subpart 3 — Air Taxi Operations  Subpart 4 — Commuter Operations  Subpart 5 — Airline Operations — Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, Civil Aviation Rules  Part 121, Air Operations – Large Aeroplanes, CAA consolidation current as of 1 April 2014  Part 125, Air Operations – Medium Aeroplanes, CAA consolidation current as of 1 April 2014 — Robert E. Breiling Associates Inc., Business Turbine Aircraft Accidents Involving Extended Range Operations 1964 – 6 Mos. 1996 for National Business Aircraft Association Inc., July 1996 — Robert E. Breiling Associates Inc., Business Turbine Aircraft Accidents Involving Extended Range Operations 1996 through 2013 for Bombardier Aerospace, September, 2014 TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 31 An agency of the European Union  European Union Aviation Safety Agency Opinion No 02/2019 4. Appendices 4. Appendices — Appendix 1 to Opinion No 02/2019: Draft AMC & GM to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0249 (MDM.051) [separate document] — Appendix 2 to Opinion No 02/2019: CRD 2017-03 (RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) [separate document] — Appendix 3 to Opinion No 02/2019: Draft AMC & GM to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) & RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b)) [separate document] — Appendix 4 to Opinion No 02/2019: CRD 2016-11 (RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) [separate document] — Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019: Draft AMC & GM to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) [separate document] — Appendix 6 to Opinion No 02/2019: CRD 2017-15 (RMT.0695) [separate document] — Appendix 7 to Opinion No 02/2019: Draft AMC & GM to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0695 [separate document] TE.RPRO.00036-008 © European Union Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 31 An agency of the European Union Appendix 1 to Opinion No 02/2019 Draft Annex X to draft Decision 201X/XXX/R Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0249 (MDM.051) The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: 1. deleted text is struck through; 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Page 1 of 2  Appendix 1 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX IV COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS [PART-CAT] SUBPART D INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT SECTION 1 Aeroplanes AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.185 Cockpit voice recorder (...) (c) if required to be installed, the alternate power source should provide electrical power to operate both the CVR and the cockpit-mounted area microphone for at least 10 ± 1 minutes. GM1 CAT.IDE.A.185(i) Cockpit voice recorder ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE Guidance on alternate power source can be found in EASA, ‘Certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes’, CS-25, Book 2, AMC-Subpart F, AMC 25.1457. AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.200 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder (...) (b) when two flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders are installed and an alternate power source is required for the CVR function, it is acceptable to provide this alternate power source only to the cockpit area microphone and to one recorder. This recorder should, when practicable, be the one located closer to the flight crew compartment. Page 2 of 2 ANNEX Draft Annex to draft Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) …/… amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 as regards requirements for aeroplane performance, alternate power supply for cockpit voice recorders, in-flight recording for light aircraft, and non-ETOPS operations with performance class A aeroplanes that have a maximum operational passenger seating configuration of 19 or less A. Annex I (Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. the following point (22a) is inserted: ‘(22a) “cockpit voice recorder (CVR)” means a crash-protected flight recorder that uses a combination of microphones and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the flight crew compartment and communications to, from and between the flight crew members;’; 2. point (25) is replaced by the following: ‘(25) “contaminated runway” means a runway of which a significant portion of its surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the substances listed under the runway surface condition descriptors;’; 3. point (32) ‘damp runway’ is deleted; 4. point (42) is replaced by the following: ‘(42) “dry runway” means a runway whose surface is free of visible moisture and not contaminated within the area intended to be used;’; 5. the following point (49a) is inserted: ‘(49a) “flight data recorder (FDR)” means a crash-protected flight recorder that uses a combination of data providers to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of the aircraft;’; 6. the following point (49b) is inserted: ‘(49b) “flight recorder” means any type of recorder that is installed on the aircraft for the purpose of facilitating accident/incident safety investigations;’; 7. the following point (70a) is inserted: ‘(70a) “landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA)” means a landing distance that is achievable in normal operations based on landing performance data and associated procedures determined for the prevailing conditions at the time of landing;’; 8. the following point (103c) is inserted: ‘(103c) “runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)” means a matrix that allows the assessment of the runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed runway surface condition(s) and pilot report of braking action;’; 9. the following point (103d) is inserted: 1  ‘(103d) “runway condition code (RWYCC)” means a number to be used in the runway condition report (RCR) that describes the effect of the runway surface conditions(s) on aeroplane deceleration performance and lateral control;’; 10. the following point (103e) is inserted: ‘(103e) “runway condition report (RCR)” means a comprehensive standardised report relating to runway surface conditions and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance;’; 11. the following point (103f) is inserted: ‘(103f) “runway surface condition(s)” means a description of the condition(s) of the runway surface used in the runway condition report (RCR) which establishes the basis for the determination of the runway condition code for aeroplane performance purposes;’; 12. the following point (103g) is inserted: ‘(103g) “runway surface condition descriptors” means one of the following elements on the surface of the runway: (a) “compacted snow”: snow that has been compacted into a solid mass such that aeroplane tires, at operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without significant further compaction or rutting of the surface; (b) “dry snow”: snow from which a snowball cannot readily be made; (c) “frost”: ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is at or below freezing; frost differs from ice in that frost crystals grow independently and, therefore, have a more granular texture; (d) “ice”: water that has frozen, or compacted snow that has transitioned into ice, in cold and dry conditions; (e) “slush”: snow that is so water-saturated that water will drain from it when a handful is picked up or will splatter if stepped on forcefully; (f) “standing water”: water of depth greater than 3 mm; (g) “wet ice”: ice with water on top of it or ice that is melting; (h) “wet snow”: snow that contains enough water to be able to make a well- compacted, solid snowball, but water will not squeeze out;’; 13. the following point (107a) is inserted: ‘(107a) “slippery wet runway” means a wet runway whose surface friction characteristics, for a significant portion of it, have been determined to be degraded;’; 14. the following point (107b) is inserted: ‘(107b) “specially prepared winter runway” means a runway with a dry frozen surface of compacted snow and/or ice which has been treated with sand or grit or has been mechanically treated to improve runway friction;’; 15. point (128) is replaced by the following: ‘(128) “wet runway” means a runway whose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm deep within the area intended to be used;’ 2 B. Annex II (Part-ARO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. Appendix II is replaced by the following: ‘Appendix II OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS (subject to the approved conditions in the operations manual) Issuing Authority Contact Details Telephone(1): ___________________; Fax: ___________________; E-mail: ___________________ AOC(2): Operator Name(3): Date(4): Signature: Dba Trading Name Operations Specifications #: Aircraft Model(5): Registration Marks(6): Types of operations: Commercial operations ☐ Passengers ☐ Cargo ☐Others(7): _______________ Area of operation(8): Special Limitations(9): Specific Approvals: Yes No Specification(10) Remarks Dangerous Goods ☐ ☐ Low Visibility Operations CAT(11).... Take-off RVR(12): m Approach and Landing ☐ ☐ DA/H: ft RVR: m RVSM(13) ☐ N/A ☐ ☐ Maximum Diversion ETOPS(14) ☐ N/A ☐ ☐ Time(15): min. Complex navigation specifications ☐ ☐ (17) for PBN operations(16) Minimum navigation performance ☐ ☐ specification 3 Operations of single-engined (18) turbine aeroplane at night or in ☐ ☐ IMC (SET-IMC) Helicopter operations with the aid ☐ ☐ of night vision imaging systems Helicopter hoist operations ☐ Helicopter emergency medical ☐ ☐ service operations Helicopter offshore operations ☐ ☐ Cabin crew training(19) ☐ ☐ Issue of CC attestation(20) ☐ ☐ Use of type B EFB applications ☐ ☐ (21) Continuing airworthiness ☐ ☐ (22) Others(23) (1) Telephone and fax contact details of the competent authority, including the country code. Email to be provided if available. (2) Insertion of associated air operator certificate (AOC) number. (3) Insertion of the operator’s registered name and the operator’s trading name, if different. Insert ‘Dba’ before the trading name (for ‘Doing business as’). (4) Issue date of the operations specifications (dd-mm-yyyy) and signature of the competent authority representative. (5) Insertion of ICAO designation of the aircraft make, model and series, or master series, if a series has been designated (e.g. Boeing-737-3K2 or Boeing-777-232). (6) Either the registration marks are listed in the operations specifications or in the operations manual. In the latter case, the related operations specifications must make a reference to the related page in the operations manual. In case not all specific approvals apply to the aircraft model, the registration marks of the aircraft may be entered in the remark column to the related specific approval. (7) Other type of transportation to be specified (e.g. emergency medical service). (8) Listing of geographical area(s) of authorised operation (by geographical coordinates or specific routes, flight information region, or national or regional boundaries). (9) Listing of applicable special limitations (e.g. VFR only, Day only, etc.). 4 (10) List in this column the most permissive criteria for each approval or the approval type (with appropriate criteria). (11) Insertion of applicable precision approach category: LTS CAT I, CAT II, OTS CAT II, CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB or CAT IIIC. Insertion of minimum runway visual range (RVR) in meters and decision height (DH) in feet. One line is used per listed approach category. (12) Insertion of approved minimum take-off RVR in metres. One line per approval may be used if different approvals are granted. (13) The ‘Not Applicable (N/A) box may be checked only if the aircraft maximum ceiling is below FL290. (14) Extended range operations (ETOPS) currently applies only to two-engined aircraft. Therefore, the not applicable (N/A) box may be checked if the aircraft model has less or more than two engines. (15) The threshold distance may also be listed (in NM), as well as the engine type. (16) Performance-based navigation (PBN): one line is used for each complex PBN specific approval (e.g. RNP AR APCH), with appropriate limitations listed in the ‘Specifications’ and/or ‘Remarks’ columns. Procedure-specific approvals of specific RNP AR APCH procedures may be listed in the operations specifications or in the operations manual. In the latter case, the related operations specifications must have a reference to the related page in the operations manual. (17) Specify if the specific approval is limited to certain runway ends and/or aerodromes. (18) Insertion of the particular airframe/engine combination. (19) Approval to conduct the training course and examination to be completed by applicants for a cabin crew attestation as specified in Annex V (Part-CC) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011. (20) Approval to issue cabin crew attestations as specified in Annex V (Part-CC) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011. (21) Insertion of the list of type B EFB applications together with the reference of the EFB hardware (for portable EFBs). Either this list is contained in the operations specifications or in the operations manual. In the latter case, the related operations specifications must make a reference to the related page in the operations manual. (22) The name of the person/organisation responsible for ensuring that the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is maintained and a reference to the regulation that requires the work, i.e. Subpart G of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. (23) Other approvals or data may be entered here, using one line (or one multi-line block) per authorisation (e.g. short landing operations, steep approach operations, reduced required landing distance, helicopter operations to/from a public interest site, helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area, helicopter operations without a safe forced landing capability, operations with increased bank angles, maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval). EASA FORM 139 Issue 6’ 5 C. Annex III (Part-ORO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. point ORO.SEC.100 is replaced by the following: ‘ORO.SEC.100 Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes (a) In an aeroplane which is equipped with a secure flight crew compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked, and means shall be provided by which the cabin crew can notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. (b) All passenger-carrying aeroplanes that are engaged in the commercial transportation of passengers shall be equipped with an approved secure flight crew compartment door that is capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station and designed to meet the applicable airworthiness requirements, when they fall within any of the following categories: (1) aeroplanes with an MCTOM that exceeds 54 500 kg; (2) aeroplanes with an MCTOM that exceeds 45 500 kg and have an MOPSC of more than 19; or (3) aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 60. (c) In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a secure flight crew compartment door in accordance with point (b) above: (1) this door shall be closed prior to engine start for take-off and shall be locked when required so by security procedures or by the pilot-in-command until engine shutdown after landing, except when deemed to be necessary for authorised persons to access or egress in compliance with national civil aviation security programmes; and (2) means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to identify persons that request to enter and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.’ D. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. point CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.GEN.MPA.195 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (a) Following an accident, a serious incident or an occurrence identified by the investigating authority, the operator of an aircraft shall preserve the original recorded data of the flight recorders for a period of 60 days or until otherwise directed by the investigating authority. (b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of the recordings to ensure the continued serviceability of the flight recorders which are required to be carried. (c) The operator shall ensure that the recordings of flight parameters and data link communication messages required to be recorded on flight recorders are preserved, except that, for the purpose of testing and maintaining these flight recorders, up to 1 hour of the oldest recorded data at the time of testing may be erased. 6  (d) The operator shall keep and maintain up to date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert raw flight data into flight parameters expressed in engineering units. (e) The operator shall make available any flight recorder recordings that have been preserved, if so determined by the competent authority. (f) Without prejudice to Regulations (EU) No 996/2010 (1) and (EU) 2016/679 (2): (1) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, audio recordings from a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such audio recordings and of their transcript is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) such audio recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (1a) When inspecting flight recorder audio recordings to ensuring flight recorder serviceability, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these audio recordings and that they shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring flight recorder serviceability. (2) Flight parameters or data link messages recorded by a flight recorder shall not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an incident which is subject to mandatory reporting, unless such recordings are: (i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; or (ii) de-identified; or (iii) disclosed under secure procedures. (3) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such image recordings is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) such image recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (3a) When images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then: (i) these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring flight recorder serviceability; and (1) Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35). (2) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 7  (ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these images.’; 2. in point CAT.OP.MPA140, point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) Unless approved by the competent authority in accordance with Subpart F of Annex V (Part-SPA), the operator shall not operate a two-engined aeroplane over a route that contains a point further from an adequate aerodrome, under standard conditions in still air, than the distance defined in the appropriate subparagraph below for that type of aeroplane: (1) for performance class A aeroplanes with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 20 or more, the distance flown in 60 minutes at the one- engine-inoperative (OEI) cruising speed determined in accordance with (b); (2) for performance class A aeroplanes with an MOPSC of 19 or less, the distance flown in 120 minutes or, subject to approval by the competent authority, up to 180 minutes for turbojet aeroplanes, at the OEI cruise speed determined in accordance with (b); (3) for performance class B or C aeroplanes: (i) the distance flown in 120 minutes at the OEI cruise speed determined in accordance with (b); or (ii) 300 NM, whichever is less.’; 3. in point CAT.OP.MPA140, point (d) is replaced by the following: ‘(d) To obtain the approval referred to in (a)(2), the operator shall provide evidence that: (1) procedures have been established for flight planning and dispatch; (2) specific maintenance instructions and procedures to ensure the intended levels of continued airworthiness and reliability of the aeroplane including its engines have been established and included in the operator’s aircraft maintenance programme in accordance with Annex I (Part-M) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, including: (i) an engine oil consumption programme; and (ii) an engine condition monitoring programme;’; 4. point CAT.OP.MPA.300 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall: (a) be satisfied that, according to the information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM); and (b) carry out a landing distance assessment in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303.’; 5. the following point CAT.OP.MPA.301 is inserted: ‘CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters 8  Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that according to the information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM).’; 6. the following point CAT.OP.MPA.303 is inserted: ‘CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at time of arrival — aeroplanes (a) For performance class A aeroplanes that are certified: (1) in accordance with CS-25 or equivalent; or (2) in accordance with CS-23 at level 4 with performance level “High speed” or equivalent, no approach to land shall be continued unless the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA). (b) For performance class A aeroplanes other than those referred to in (a), no approach to land shall be continued unless: (1) the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA; or (2) if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.235, as applicable. (c) For performance class B aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless: (1) the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA; or (2) if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330 or CAT.POL.A.335, as applicable. (d) For performance class C aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless: (1) the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA; or (2) if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430 or CAT.POL.A.435, as applicable. 9  (e) Performance information for the assessment of the LDTA shall be based on approved data contained in the AFM. When approved data contained in the AFM are insufficient in respect of the assessment of the LDTA, they shall be supplemented with other data which are either determined in accordance with the applicable certification standards for aeroplanes or determined by the Agency. (f) The operator shall specify in the OM the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA and the assumptions made for its development, including other data that, in accordance with (e), may be used to supplement that contained in the AFM.’; 7. the following point CAT.OP.MPA.311 is inserted: ‘CAT.OP.MPA.311 Reporting on runway braking action Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as that reported by the aerodrome operator in the runway condition report (RCR), the commander shall notify the air traffic services (ATS) by means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable.’; 9. in point CAT.POL.A.105, points (d) and (e) are replaced by the following point (d): ‘(d) The operator shall take account of charting accuracy when assessing the take-off requirements of the applicable chapters.’; 10. in point CAT.POL.A.215, points (b), (c) and (d) are replaced by the following: ‘(b) The gradient of the en-route net flight path shall be positive at least 1 000 ft above all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track. (c) The en-route net flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue flight from the cruising altitude to an aerodrome where a landing can be made in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.235, as appropriate. The en-route net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track, taking into account the following elements: (1) the engine is assumed to fail at the most critical point along the route; (2) account is taken of the effects of winds on the flight path; (3) fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reserves as per CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used; and (4) the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure shall meet the following criteria: (i) the performance requirements for the expected landing mass are met; and (ii) weather reports and/or forecasts and runway condition reports indicate that a safe landing can be accomplished at the estimated time of landing; and (5) if the AFM does not contain en-route net flight path data, the gross OEI en-route flight path shall be reduced by a climb gradient of 1.1 % for two-engined 10  aeroplanes, 1.4 % for three-engined aeroplanes, and 1.6 % for four-engined aeroplanes. (d) The operator shall increase the width margins of (b) and (c) to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNAV 5.’; 11. point CAT.POL.A.220 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.220 En route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative (a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane that has three or more engines be for more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate, at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the requirements of CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.235(a), as applicable, for the expected landing mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (f). (b) The two-engines-inoperative en-route net flight path data shall allow the aeroplane to continue the flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, from the point where two engines are assumed to fail simultaneously to an aerodrome at which it is possible to land and come to a complete stop when using the prescribed procedure for a landing with two engines inoperative. The en-route net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track. At altitudes and in meteorological conditions that require ice protection systems to be operable, the effect of their use on the en-route net flight path data shall be taken into account. If the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNAV 5, the operator shall increase the width margin given above to 18.5 km (10 NM). (c) The two engines shall be assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is operated for more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate, at standard temperature in still air, away from the aerodrome specified in (a) above. (d) The net flight path shall have a positive gradient at 1 500 ft above the aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made after the failure of two engines. (e) Fuel jettisoning shall be permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the required fuel reserves of (f) below, if a safe procedure is used. (f) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at least 1 500 ft directly over the landing area and thereafter to fly for 15 minutes at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate.’; 12. point CAT.POL.A.230 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways (a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall allow a full-stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold: (1) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes, within 60 % of the landing distance available (LDA); 11  (2) for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes, within 70 % of the LDA; and (3) by way of derogation from (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, for aeroplanes that are approved for reduced landing distance operations under CAT.POL.A.255, within 80 % of the LDA. (b) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in accordance with (a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and shall comply with CAT.POL.A.245. (c) For short landing operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in accordance with (a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, and shall comply with CAT.POL.A.250. (d) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take into account both of the following: (1) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind component; and (2) corrections as provided in the AFM. (e) For dispatching the aeroplane, it shall be assumed that: (1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and (2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned, considering the probable wind speed and direction, the ground-handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. (f) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall be only dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that allows full compliance with one of the following: (1) CAT.POL.A.230 (a) to (d) if the runway at the estimated time of arrival is dry; or (2) CAT.POL.A.235(a) to (d) if the runway at the estimated time of arrival is wet or contaminated.’; 13. point CAT.POL.A.235 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be one of the following distances: (1) a landing distance provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable; or (2) if a landing distance is not provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable; or (3) a landing distance shorter than that required by (a)(2), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, if the runway has specific friction-improving characteristics and the AFM includes specific additional information for landing distance on that runway type; or 12  (4) by way of derogation from (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) above, for aeroplanes that are approved for reduced landing distance operations under CAT.POL.A.255, the landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v)(B). (b) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be contaminated, the LDA shall be: (1) at least the landing distance determined in accordance with (a), or at least 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data or equivalent, whichever is greater; or (2) on specially prepared winter runways, a landing distance shorter than that required by (b)(1), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.235(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways. Such landing distance shall be at least 115% of the landing distance contained in the AFM. (c) By way of derogation from (b) above, the increment of 15 % needs not to be applied if it is already included in the approved landing distance data or equivalent. (d) For (a) and (b) above, the criteria of CAT.POL.A.230(b) to (d) shall apply accordingly. (e) For dispatching the aeroplane, it shall be assumed that: (1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and (2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned, considering the probable wind speed and direction, the ground-handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. (f) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(1) above for a destination aerodrome where the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be contaminated and where a landing depends upon a specific wind component, the aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated. (g) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(2) for the destination aerodrome where the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet or contaminated, the aeroplane shall be only dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated. (h) For (f) and (g) above, the designated alternate aerodrome(s) shall allow compliance with: (1) CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (d) if the runway at the estimated time of arrival is dry; or (2) CAT.POL.A.235(a) to (d) if the runway at the estimated time of arrival is wet or contaminated.’; 14. in point CAT.POL.A.250, point (b)(12) is replaced by the following: ‘(12) reduced required landing distance operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255 are prohibited; and (13) additional conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations.’; 13 15. the following point CAT.POL.A.255 is inserted: ‘CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations (a) For aeroplanes that have an MOPSC of 19 or less and have an eligibility statement in the AFM, and are used in non-scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations, landing with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full-stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) requires prior approval by the competent authority. (b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that: (1) a risk assessment has been conducted to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, is achieved; or (2) all of the following conditions are met: (i) special-approach procedures, such as steep approaches, planned screen heights higher than 60 ft or lower than 35 ft, low-visibility operations, approaches outside stabilised approach criteria approved under CAT.OP.MPA.115(a), are prohibited; (ii) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 are prohibited; (iii) landing on contaminated runways is prohibited; (iv) an adequate training, checking and monitoring process for the flight crew is established; (v) an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure that the following conditions are met: (A) no tailwind is forecast at the expected time of arrival; (B) if the runway is forecast to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) or (b) as applicable, or shall be 115 % of the landing distance determined for dry runways, whichever is longer; (C) no forecast contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; and (D) no forecast adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; (vi) all the equipment that affects landing performance is operative before commencing the flight; (vii) the flight crew is composed of at least two qualified and trained pilots that have recency in reduced required landing distance operations; (viii) based on the prevailing conditions for the intended flight, the commander shall make the final decision to conduct reduced required landing distance operations and may decide not to do so when he or she considers this to be in the interest of safety; and (ix) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority that has certified the aerodrome, taking into account orographic characteristics of 14  the approach area, available approach aids, missed-approach and balked- landing considerations.’; 16. point CAT.POL.A.330 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways (a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall allow a full-stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 70 % of the LDA. (b) By way of derogation from (a) above, the landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome may allow a full-stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 80 % of the LDA when CAT.POL.A.355 is complied with. (c) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take all of the following into account: (1) the altitude at the aerodrome; (2) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind component; (3) the type of runway surface; and (4) the runway slope in the direction of landing. (d) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in accordance with (a) based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and comply with CAT.POL.A.345. (e) For short landing operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in accordance with (a) and comply with CAT.POL.A.350. (f) For dispatching the aeroplane, it shall be assumed that: (1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and (2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned considering the probable wind speed and direction, the ground-handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. (g) If the operator is unable to comply with (f)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall only be dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that permits full compliance with (a) to (f).’; 17. point CAT.POL.A.335 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.335 Landing — wet and contaminated runways (a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be: (1) a landing distance provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.330; or 15  (2) if a landing distance is not provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330(a); or (3) a landing distance shorter than that required by (a)(2), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.330(a), as applicable, if the runway has specific friction improving characteristics and the AFM includes specific additional information for landing distance on that runway type; or (4) by way of derogation from (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) above, for aeroplanes that are approved for reduced landing distance operations under CAT.POL.A.355, the landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(iii). (b) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be contaminated, the landing distance shall not exceed the LDA. The operator shall specify in the operations manual the landing distance data to be applied.’; 18. in point CAT.POL.A.415, points (d) and (e) are replaced by the following: ‘(d) The width margins of (a) shall be increased to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNAV 5. (e) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reserves as per CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used.’; 19. the following point CAT.POL.A.355 is inserted: ‘CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations (a) Operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane that allows a full-stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA) require prior approval by the competent authority. Such approval shall be obtained for each runway on which operations with reduced required landing distance are conducted. (b) To obtain the approval, a risk assessment shall be conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) is achieved, and at least the following conditions are met: (1) the State of the aerodrome has determined a public interest and operational necessity for the operation, either due to the remoteness of the aerodrome or to physical limitations relating to the extension of the runway; (2) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.350 and approaches outside stabilised approach criteria approved under CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) are prohibited; (3) landing on contaminated runways is prohibited; (4) a specific control procedure of the touchdown area is defined in the operations manual (OM) and implemented; this procedure shall include adequate go-around and balked-landing instructions when touchdown in the defined area cannot be achieved; (5) an adequate aerodrome training and checking programme for the flight crew is established; 16  (6) the flight crew is qualified and has recency in reduced required landing distance operations at the aerodrome concerned; (7) an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure that the following conditions are met: (i) no tailwind is forecast at the expected time of arrival; (iii) if the runway is forecast to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303(c), or shall be 115 % of the landing distance determined for dry runways, whichever is longer; (ii) no forecast contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; and (iv) no forecast adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival; (8) operational procedures are established to ensure that: (i) all the equipment that affects landing performance and landing distance is operative before commencing the flight; and (ii) deceleration devices are correctly used by the flight crew; (9) specific maintenance instructions and operational procedures are established for the aeroplane’s deceleration devices to enhance the reliability of these systems; (10) the final approach and landing are conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only; and (11) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority that has certified the aerodrome, taking into account orographic characteristics of the approach area, available approach aids, missed-approach and balked-landing considerations.’; 20. point CAT.POL.A.420 is replaced by the following: ‘CAT.POL.A.420 En route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative (a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane that has three or more engines be for more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the requirements of CAT.POL.A.430, as applicable, for the expected landing mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (e). (b) The two-engines-inoperative flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue the flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, clearing all obstacles within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track by a vertical interval of at least 2 000 ft, to an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable for the expected landing mass are met. (c) The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is operated for more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate, at standard temperature in still air, away from the aerodrome specified in (a) above. 17  (d) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at an altitude of a least 450 m (1 500 ft) directly over the landing area and thereafter to fly for 15 minutes at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate. (e) The available rate of climb of the aeroplane shall be taken to be 150 ft per minute less than that specified. (f) The width margins of (b) shall be increased to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does not meet at least RNAV 5. (g) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the required fuel reserves as per (d) above if a safe procedure is used.’; 21. in point CAT.POL.A.430, point (a)(4) is replaced by the following: ‘(4) the runway slope in the direction of landing.’; 22. in point CAT.POL.A.435, point (a) is replaced by the following: ‘(a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be: (1) a landing distance provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.430; or (2) if a landing distance is not provided in the AFM for use on wet runways at time of dispatch, at least 115 % of the required landing distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430.’; 23. in point CAT.IDE.A.185, the following point (i) is added: ‘(i) Aeroplanes with an MCTOM of over 27 000 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication + 3 years] shall be equipped with an alternate power source to which the CVR and the cockpit-mounted area microphone are switched automatically in the event that all other power to the CVR is interrupted.’; 24. the following point CAT.IDE.A.191 is inserted: ‘CAT.IDE.A.191 Lightweight flight recorder (a) Turbine-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9 shall be equipped with a flight recorder if both of the following conditions are met: (1) they are not within the scope of point CAT.IDE.A.190(a); and (2) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the amending regulation + 3 years]. (b) The flight recorder shall record, by means of flight data or images, information that is sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. (c) The flight recorder shall be capable of retaining the flight data and the images recorded during at least the preceding 5 hours. 18  (d) The flight recorder shall automatically start to record prior to the aeroplane being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the aeroplane is no longer capable of moving under its own power. (e) If the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a function shall be provided which can be operated by the commander and which modifies image and audio recordings made before the operation of this function, so that these recordings cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.’; 25. the following point CAT.IDE.H.191 is inserted: ‘CAT.IDE.H.191 Lightweight flight recorder (a) Turbine-engined helicopters with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more shall be equipped with a flight recorder if both of the following conditions are met: (1) they are not within the scope of point CAT.IDE.H.190(a); and (2) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the amending regulation + 3 years]. (b) The flight recorder shall record, by means of flight data or images, information that is sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. (c) The flight recorder shall be capable of retaining the flight data and the images recorded during at least the preceding 5 hours. (d) The flight recorder shall automatically start to record prior to the helicopter being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the helicopter is no longer capable of moving under its own power. (e) If the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a function shall be provided which can be operated by the commander and which modifies image and audio recordings made before the operation of this function, so that these recordings cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.’ E. Annex VI (Part-NCC) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. point NCC.GEN.145 is replaced by the following: ‘NCC.GEN.145 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (a) Following an accident, a serious incident or an occurrence identified by the investigating authority, the operator of an aircraft shall preserve the original recorded data of the flight recorders for a period of 60 days or until otherwise directed by the investigating authority. (b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of recordings to ensure the continued serviceability of the flight recorders which are required to be carried. (c) The operator shall ensure that the recordings of flight parameters and data link communication messages required to be recorded on flight recorders are preserved, except that, for the purpose of testing and maintaining these flight recorders, up to 1 hour of the oldest recorded data at the time of testing may be erased. 19  (d) The operator shall keep and maintain up to date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert raw flight data into flight parameters expressed in engineering units. (e) The operator shall make available any flight recorder recordings that have been preserved, if so determined by the competent authority. (f) By way of derogation from Regulations (EU) No 996/2010 and (EU) 2016/679: (1) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, audio recordings from a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such audio recordings and of their transcript is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) such audio recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (1a) When flight recorder audio recordings are inspected for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these audio recordings and they shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring flight recorder serviceability. (2) Flight parameters or data link messages recorded by a flight recorder shall not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an incident which is subject to mandatory reporting, unless such recordings are: (i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; (ii) de-identified; or (iii) disclosed under secure procedures. (3) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such image recordings is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) such image recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (3a) When images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then: (i) these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring flight recorder serviceability; and (ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these images.’; 2. point NCC.OP.225 is replaced by the following: ‘NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and 20  the condition of the runway intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’; 3. the following point NCC.OP.226 is inserted: ‘NCC.OP.226 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’ 21 F. Annex VII (Part-NCO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. point NCO.OP.205 is replaced by the following: ‘NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the of the runway intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’; 2. the following point NCO.OP.206 is inserted: ‘NCO.OP.206 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’ G. Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is amended as follows: 1. point SPO.GEN.145 is replaced by the following: ‘SPO.GEN.145 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (a) Following an accident, a serious incident or an occurrence identified by the investigating authority, the operator of an aircraft shall preserve the original recorded data of the flight recorders for a period of 60 days or until otherwise directed by the investigating authority. (b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of recordings to ensure the continued serviceability of the flight recorders which are required to be carried. (c) The operator shall ensure that the recordings of flight parameters and data link communication messages required to be recorded on flight recorders are preserved, except that, for the purpose of testing and maintaining these flight recorders, up to 1 hour of the oldest recorded data at the time of testing may be erased. (d) The operator shall keep and maintain up to date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert raw flight data into flight parameters expressed in engineering units. (e) The operator shall make available any flight recorder recordings that have been preserved, if so determined by the competent authority. (f) By way of derogation from Regulations (EU) No 996/2010 and (EU) 2016/679, and except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability: (1) flight recorder audio recordings shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such audio recordings and of their transcript is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and 22  (iii) such audio recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (1a) When flight recorder audio recordings are inspected for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these audio recordings and they shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring flight recorder serviceability. (2) Flight parameters or data link messages recorded by a flight recorder shall not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an incident that is subject to mandatory reporting, unless such recordings are: (i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; (ii) de-identified; or (iii) disclosed under secure procedures. (3) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless: (i) a procedure related to the handling of such image recordings is in place; (ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and (iii) such image recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety. (3a) When images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then: (i) these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring flight recorder serviceability; and (ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these images.’; 2. point SPO.OP.210 is replaced by the following: ‘SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the runway intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’; 3. the following point SPO.OP.211 is inserted: ‘SPO.OP.211 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.’; 4. the following point SPO.IDE.A.146 is inserted: ‘SPO.IDE.A.146 Lightweight flight recorder 23  (a) Turbine-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9 shall be equipped with a flight recorder if the following conditions are met: (1) they are not within the scope of point SPO.IDE.A.145(a); (2) they are used for commercial operations; and (3) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the amending regulation + 3 years]. (b) The flight recorder shall record, by means of flight data or images, information that is sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. (c) The flight recorder shall be capable of retaining the flight data and the images recorded during at least the preceding 5 hours. (d) The flight recorder shall automatically start to record prior to the aeroplane being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the aeroplane is no longer capable of moving under its own power. (e) If the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a function shall be provided which can be operated by the pilot-in-command and which modifies image and audio recordings made before the operation of this function, so that these recordings cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.’; 5. the following point SPO.IDE.H.146 is inserted: ‘SPO.IDE.H.146 Lightweight flight recorder (a) Turbine-engined helicopters with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more shall be equipped with a flight recorder if the following conditions are met: (1) they are within the scope of point SPO.IDE.H.145(a); (2) they are used for commercial operations; and (3) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the amending regulation + 3 years]. (b) The flight recorder shall record, by means of flight data or images, information that is sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed. (c) The flight recorder shall be capable of retaining the flight data and the images recorded during at least the preceding 5 hours. (d) The flight recorder shall automatically start to record prior to the helicopter being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the helicopter is no longer capable of moving under its own power. (e) If the flight recorder records images or audio of the flight crew compartment, then a function shall be provided which can be operated by the pilot-in-command and which modifies image and audio recordings made before the operation of this function, so that these recordings cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.’ 24 Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Draft Annex X to draft Decision 201X/XXX/R Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 related to RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: 1. deleted text is struck through; 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; and 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Page 1 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII GM2 Annex I Definitions ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in the Annexes to this Regulation: AIREP air-report (…) ALAP aerodrome landing analysis programme (…) ALD actual landing distance (…) LDF landing distance factor (…) LDTA landing distance at time of arrival (…) PFC porous friction course (…) RCAM runway condition assessment matrix (…) RCR runway condition report (…) RWYCC runway condition code (…) GM17 Annex I Definitions CONTAMINATED RUNWAY As the runway condition is reported in runway thirds, a significant portion of the runway surface area is more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface area within the required length and width being used. The runway length being used in this context is the physical length of runway available, typically from the start of the Take Off Run Available (TORA) in one direction to the start of the TORA in the opposite direction. When the runway is shortened by NOTAM, for example due to works, or the aerodrome operator is not able to clear the full length of the runway and closes part of it for operations, the length being used is that declared in the NOTAM or the “Cleared Length” in the Runway Condition Report. Page 2 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The runway width being used in this context is the physical width of the runway (between the runway edge lights), or the “Cleared Width” if reported in the Runway Condition Report. It is not intended that 25% coverage is reported when contaminants affect only the runway edges after runway cleaning. Runway inspectors are instructed to focus on the area around the wheel tracks when reporting contaminant type, coverage and depth. GM18 Annex I Definitions DRY RUNWAY/WET RUNWAY The ‘area intended to be used’ means the area of the runway that is part of the take-off run available (TORA), accelerate and stop distance available (ASDA) or landing distance available (LDA) declared in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) or by notice to airmen (NOTAM). GM19 Annex I Definitions RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION(S) (a) The runway surface conditions used in the runway condition report establish the performance requirements among the aerodrome operator, aeroplane manufacturer and aeroplane operator. (b) Aircraft de-icing chemicals and other contaminants are also reported but are not included in the list of runway surface condition descriptors because their effect on runway surface friction characteristics and the runway condition code cannot be evaluated in a standardised manner. GM20 Annex I Definitions RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION DESCRIPTORS - GENERAL The runways surface condition descriptors are used solely in the context of the runway condition report and are not intended to supersede or replace any existing World Meteorological Organization (WMO) definitions. RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION DESCRIPTORS - FROST (a) Freezing refers the freezing point of water (0 °C). (b) Under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, and it is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’. RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION DESCRIPTORS – STANDING WATER Running water of depth greater than 3 mm is reported as ‘standing water’ by convention. RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION DESCRIPTORS – WET ICE Freezing precipitation can lead to runway conditions associated with wet ice from an aeroplane performance point of view. Wet ice can cause the surface to become very slippery. It is then reported appropriately as reduced braking action. Page 3 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM21 Annex I Definitions LANDING DISTANCE AT TIME OF ARRIVAL The landing distance data to be used for a landing performance assessment at time of arrival allow to establish an operationally achievable landing distance from 50ft above runway threshold to full stop that takes into account AFM procedures for final approach and landing and is provided as a function of the main influence parameters such as aeroplane mass and configuration, pressure altitude, wind, outside air temperature, runway slope and approach speed increments. It may be provided for use of automation such as autobrakes and autoland and may account for reverse thrust use. As the landing distance at time of arrival is the unfactored minimum landing distance achievable for the assumed conditions, an appropriate margin should be applied to this distance to determine the minimum LDA necessary for a safe stop. GM22 Annex I Definitions SLIPPERY WET RUNWAY (a) The surface friction characteristics of the runway are considered to be degraded when friction values are below the minimum friction level. (b) A portion of runway in the order of 100 m long may be considered significant. Page 4 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX III ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS [PART-ORO] SUBPART GEN GENERAL REQUIREMENTS GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from the competent authority as specified in the applicable Implementing Rules: (…) (n) performance: (1) increased bank angles at take-off (for performance class A aeroplanes); (2) short landing operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); (3) steep approach operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); (4) reduced required landing distance operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); (…) SUBPART MLR MANUALS, LOGS AND RECORDS GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL (OM) When publishing operational crosswind limitations in Part B of the OM in accordance with AMC3 ORO.MLR.100, operators should consider: (a) the following manufacturer’s information: (1) values published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the AFM; (2) maximum demonstrated crosswind values, when more limiting values are not published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the AFM; (3) gust values; and (4) additional guidance or recommendations; Page 5 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (b) operational experience; and (c) operating-environment factors such as: (1) runway width; (2) runway surface condition; and (3) prevailing weather conditions. Page 6 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX IV COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS [PART-CAT] SUBPART B Operating procedures SECTION 1 - Motor-powered aircraft AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300(a) Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT (a) The in-flight determination of the landing distance assessment should be based on the latest available meteorological weather report orand runway statecondition report (RCR), preferably not more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time. (b) The assessment should be initially carried out when weather report and RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure. (c) When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing, if the flight crew of the preceding aircraft landing at the same runway provides a special air- report (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action. (d) The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.300(a) Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes WIND DATA The information on wind contained in METAR/SPECI/ATIS reports (average of a 10 minute period) should be the basis for the landing performance calculations, while instant wind information reported by the Tower should be monitored during the approach to ensure that the wind speed does not exceed the assumptions made for landing performance calculations. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE FATO Page 7 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The in-flight determination of the FATO suitability for a safe approach, landing or missed approach should be based on the latest available meteorological or runway condition report, preferably no more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes GENERAL The assessment of the LDTA begins with the acquisition of the latest available weather information and the RCR. The information provided in the RCR is divided in two sections: (a) The “aircraft performance” section which contains information that is directly relevant in a performance computation (b) The “situational awareness” section which contains information that the flight crew should be aware of for a safe operation, but which does not have a direct impact on the performance assessment. The “aircraft performance” section of the RCR includes a runway condition code (RWYCC), the contaminant type, depth and coverage for each third of the runway. The determination of the RWYCC is based on the use of the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM), however, the presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way that is relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the RCAM standard would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment. It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to assess the RWYCC. Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to carry out the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT). Page 8 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT Runway surface Surface condition Depth Notes RWYCC condition descriptor Including wet or contaminated Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6 each runway third Damp (any visible 5 Wet dampness) Wet 3 mm or less 5 Slippery wet 3 At or below OAT – 15 °C 4 Compacted snow Any Above OAT – 15 °C 3 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 100 mm Any On top of ice 02 Frost1 Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3 mm or less 5 More than Slush 3 mm up to 2 Contaminated 15 mm 3 mm or less 5 More than Standing water 3 mm up to 2 15 mm Any On top of ice 02 Wet ice Any 02 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 30 mm Any On top of ice 02 Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery. Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited. Note 3: runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. A primary assessment may have to be downgraded by the aerodrome operator based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. Upgrading a RWYCC 5, 4, 3 or 2 determined by the aerodrome operator from the observed contaminant type is not allowed. Page 9 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 A RWYCC 1 or 0 maybe be upgraded by the aerodrome operator to a maximum of RWYCC 3. The reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. When the aerodrome operator is approved for operations on specially prepared winter runways, in accordance with Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014, the RWYCC of a runway that is contaminated with compacted snow or ice, may be upgraded to RWYCC 4 upon a specific treatment of the runway. In such cases, the reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. Performance information for the assessment of the LDTA correlates the aircraft performance with the RWYCC contained in the RCR, hence the calculation will be based on the RWYCC of the intended runway of landing. ASSESSMENT OF THE LDTA BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA (a) The required landing distance for dry runways determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the assessment of the LDTA on a dry runway, as it includes allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation; (b) The required landing distance for wet runways with specific friction improving characteristics determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.235(a)(3), also contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the assessment of the LDTA on such runways, as it includes allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation; (c) When at time of arrival the runway is dry or is a wet runway with specific friction improving characteristics and the overall conditions, including weather at the aerodrome and runway condition, have been confirmed as not changed significantly compared to the time of dispatch, the assessment of the LDTA may be carried out by confirming that the assumptions made at time of dispatch are still valid. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes RCR, RWYCC and RCAM A detailed description of the RCR format and content, the RWYCC and the RCAM may be found in Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014. Further guidance may be found in the following documents: (a) ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’; (b) ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’; (c) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at time of arrival — aeroplanes RUNWAY CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS When available for the portion of the runway that will be used for landing, the following elements are relevant for consideration: (a) runway condition code (RWYCC); (b) expected runway conditions (contaminant type and depth); Page 10 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (c) other information contained in the RCR related to the following elements: (1) width of the runway to which the RWYCC apply if less than the published runway width; (2) reduced runway length; (3) drifting snow on the runway; (4) loose sand on the runway; (5) chemical treatment on the runway; (6) snowbanks on the runway; (7) snowbanks on taxiways; (8) snowbanks adjacent to the runway; (9) taxiway conditions; (10) apron conditions; (11) State approved and published use of measured friction coefficient; (12) plain language remarks; (d) pilot air-report (AIREP) of braking action. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS The following elements may impact landing distance calculations: (a) runway slope; (b) aerodrome elevation; (c) wind; (d) temperature; (e) aeroplane mass and configuration; (f) approach speed at threshold; (g) eventual adjustments to the landing distance, such as autoland; and (h) planned use of available and operative aeroplane ground deceleration devices. AUTOBRAKE USAGE While autobrakes are a part of the aeroplane’s landing configuration, the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival is not intended to force a selection of a higher than reasonable autobrake level. For operations when the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a porous friction course (PFC), if the manual braking distance provides at least 15 % safety margin, then the braking technique may include a combination of autobrakes and manual braking even if the selected autobrake landing data does not provide a 15 % safety margin. GENERAL Background information and further guidance on the in-flight check of the LDTA may be found in the ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. Page 11 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(e) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA – APPROVED DATA Approved data for the assessment of LDTA contained in the AFM should be developed in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent. PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA – SUPPLEMENTARY DATA When approved data for the assessment of LDTA contained in the AFM is insufficient, the content of the AFM may be supplemented with one of the following set of data, provided by the aircraft manufacturer or the type certificate holder (TCH) or an organization approved under Part-21 and having the relevant privileges in the scope of its organization approval: (a) Data for the assessment of LDTA produced for aeroplanes not having CS-25.1592 or equivalent in their certification basis. Such data may be presented in terms of runway surface conditions, pilot-reported braking actions, or both, and should include at least: (13) an operational airborne distance; (14) the range of braking actions as related to the RWYCC; (15) the effect of speed increments over threshold; (16) the effect of temperature; and (17) the effect of runway slope; When data are provided only in terms of pilot-reported braking actions, instructions should be provided on how to use such data to carry out an assessment of the LDTA in terms of a runway surface condition description; (b) Data developed in compliance with FAA AC 25-32; (c) AFM data for wet runways at time of dispatch; (d) Data for contaminated runways developed in compliance with CS 25.1591 at Amendment 2 or later; PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA – DATA DETERMINED BY THE AGENCY When there are no data available for the assessment of LDTA, performance information for the assessment of LDTA may be determined by applying the following method: (a) Correction factors may be applied to the certified landing distances on dry runway published in the AFM for turbojet-powered aeroplanes and turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes. (b) For this purpose, the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 below may be used: Page 12 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — LDFs Runway condition 6 5 4 3 2 1 code (RWYCC) Braking Good to Medium Dry Good Medium Poor action medium to poor Runway descriptio Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 n Turbojet without 1.67 2.6 2.8 3.2 4.0 5.1 reverse Turbojet with all 1.67 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4 reversers operating Turboprop (see 1.67 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.9 Note 2) Note 1: runway descriptions may be found in the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) for each RWYCC or braking action. Note 2: these LDFs apply only to modern turboprops with efficient disking drag. For older turboprops without adequate disking drag, use the Turbojet, No Reverse LDFs. Note 3: the LDFs can apply to any type of anti-skid system, i.e. fully-modulating, quasi-modulating or on-off system. (1) To find the required landing distance (RLD) multiply the AFM (dry, unfactored) landing distance by the applicable LDFs from Table 1 above for the runway conditions existing at time of arrival. If the AFM landing distances are presented as factored landing distances, then that data needs to be adjusted to remove the applicable dispatch factors applied to that data. (2) The LDFs given in Table 1 above include a 15 % safety margin and an air distance representative of normal operational practices. They account for variations of temperature up to international standard atmosphere (ISA) + 20 °C, runway slopes between –2 % and +2 %, and an average approach speed increment of 5 up to 20 kt. They may not be conservative for all configurations in case of unfavourable combinations of these parameters. Page 13 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Reporting on runway braking action GENERAL The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for providing accurate braking action reports. The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR resulting from the observed runway surface conditions. ATC passes these braking action reports both to the subsequent aeroplane landing at the same runway and to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the Runway Condition Code (RWYCC). During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals. Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition is not deteriorating below the assigned RCR. Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’. The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking action and the RWYCC. Table 1 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC AIREP Description RWYCC (braking action) N/A 6 Braking deceleration is normal for the GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5 directional control is normal. Braking deceleration OR directional control GOOD TO MEDIUM 4 is between good and medium. Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3 directional control is noticeably reduced. Braking deceleration OR directional control MEDIUM TO POOR 2 is between medium and poor. Braking deceleration is significantly reduced POOR for the wheel braking effort applied OR 1 directional control is significantly reduced. Braking deceleration is minimal to non- LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort applied 0 OR directional control is uncertain. Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight Page 14 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 crew on the approach as it must be supported by other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability and landing performance. An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable: (a) Good braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD” (b) Good to medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” (c) Medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” (d) Medium to poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” (e) Poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” (f) Less than poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR” In some cases the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between “Good” and “Less than Poor” may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to report on a more coarse scale of “Good”, “Medium” and “Poor”. Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported by the aerodrome operator in the RCR, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC code currently in effect for the portion of the runway concerned. When the experienced braking action is is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is also relevant to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the arodrome operator in order to upgrade the RCR. If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If the flight crew have reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the commander should be able to amend such report. An braking action AIREP of “Less Than Poor” leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the runway condition. An air safety report (ASR) should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 & CAT.OP.MPA.311 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes & Reporting on runway braking action FLIGHT CREW TRAINING Flight crew should be trained on the the use of the RCR, on the use of performance data for the assessment of the LDTA and on reporting braking action using the AIREP format. The training should include face-to-face parts with an instructor and not only self-study items. A training syllabus should include, in addition to the requirements of Subpart FC of Annex III (ORO.FC), at least the following elements: (a) General Page 15 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (1) Contamination (i) Definition (ii) Contaminants which cause increased drag thus affecting acceleration, and contaminants causing reduced braking action affecting deceleration (iii) Slippery when wet condition. (2) Contaminated Runway (i) Runway surface condition descriptors (ii) Operational Observations with Friction Devices (iii) Operator´s policy on the usage of: A. Reduced takeoff thrust B. Reports by runway thirds (iv) Stopway (3) Runway Condition Codes (i) RCAM A. Differences between those published for aerodromes and flight crew B. Format in use C. The use of runway friction measurements D. The use of temperature* E. RWYCC F. Downgrade/Upgrade Criteria G. Difference between a calculation and an assessment (ii) Braking action (iii) Use of aircraft wind limit diagram with contamination (4) Runway Condition Report (i) Availability (ii) Validity (iii) Performance and situational awareness (iv) Decoding (v) Situational awareness (5) Aeroplane control in takeoff and landing (i) Lateral control A. Windcock effect B. Effect of reversers C. Cornering forces D. Crosswind limitations,(including operations when cleared runway width is less than published (ii) Longitudinal control A. V1 correction in correlation with minimum control speed on ground B. Aquaplaning C. Anti-skid D. Autobrake (6) Takeoff distance Page 16 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (i) Acceleration and deceleration (ii) Takeoff performance limitations (iii) Takeoff distance models (iv) Factors affecting TO distance (v) Why to use the type and depth of contaminant instead of Runway Condition Code (vi) Safety margins (7) Landing distance (i) Distance at time of arrival model (ii) Factors affecting landing distance (iii) Safety margins (8) Exceptions (i) States that do not comply with ICAO standards for RCR and assessment of the LDTA (b) Flight planning (1) Dispatch/in-flight conditions (2) MEL/CDL items affecting takeoff and landing performance (3) Operator´s policy on variable wind and gusts (4) Landing performance at destination and alternates (i) Selection of alternates if an a erorome is not available due to runway conditions A. En-route B. Destination alternates (ii) Number (iii) Runway condition (c) Takeoff (1) Runway selection (2) Takeoff from a wet or contaminated runway (d) In-flight (1) Landing distance (i) Distance at time of arrival calculations A. Considerations for flight crew B. Operator´s policy (ii) Factors affecting landing distance (iii) Runway selection for landing (iv) Safety margins (2) Use of aircraft systems (i) Brakes/autobrakes (ii) Difference between friction limited braking and different modes of autobrakes (iii) Reversers Page 17 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (e) Landing techniques (1) Flight crew procedures and flying techniques when landing on length limited runway (f) Safety considerations (1) Types of errors possible (2) Mindfulness principles necessary for high reliability (g) Documentation and Records (h) AIREPs (1) Assessment of braking action (2) Terminology (3) Automated/aircraft–generated braking action reports, if applicable (4) Air safety reports, if flight safety has been endangered due to insufficient braking action Page 18 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Subpart C Aircraft performance and operating limitations Section 1 — Aeroplanes Chapter 2 Performance class A AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA If the performance data have been determined on the basis of a measured runway friction coefficient, the operator should use a procedure correlating the measured runway friction coefficient and the effective braking coefficient of friction of the aeroplane type over the required speed range for the existing runway conditions. The determination of take-off performance data for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. The determination of landing performance data should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. The RWYCC is reported through a runway condition report (RCR) in the SNOWTAM format in accordance with ICAO Annex 15. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 & CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — dry runways & Landing – wet and contaminated runways FACTORING OF AUTOMATIC LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA In those cases where the landing requires the use of an automatic landing system, and the distance published in the AFM includes safety margins equivalent to those contained in CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1), CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) and CAT.POL.A.235, the landing mass of the aeroplane should be the lesser of: (a) the landing mass determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1), CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) or CAT.POL.A.235, as appropriate; or (b) the landing mass determined for the automatic landing distance for the appropriate surface condition, as given in the AFM or equivalent document. Increments due to system features such as beam location or elevations, or procedures such as use of overspeed, should also be included. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways LANDING MASS CAT.POL.A.230 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the destination and alternate aerodromes: (a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 60 %, 70 %, or 780 % (as applicable) of the landing distance available (LDA) on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum Page 19 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded. (b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind, or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on this lesser mass. (c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230(a) Landing – dry runways ALTERNATE AERODROMES The alternate aerodromes for which the landing mass is required to be determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 are: (a) destination alternate aerodromes; (b) fuel en-route alternate (ERA) aerodromes; and (c) re-dispatch or re-clearance aerodromes. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230(d)(2) Landing – dry runways AFM LANDING PERFORMANCE CORRECTIONS Landing performance data is provided in the AFM at least for the certified range of pressure altitudes and for runway slope. AFM data may include other influence parameters such as, but not limited to, temperature. The effect of speed increments over threshold should also be accounted for when these increments are required by the applicable AFM procedures, such as autoland or steep approach. GM1 CAT.POL.A.235(a) and (b) Landing – wet and contaminated runways DISPATCH CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARGINAL CASES The landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 may, in some cases, and in particular on wet or contaminated runways, exceed the landing distance considered at time of dispatch. The requirements for dispatch remain unchanged, however, when the conditions at time of arrival are expected to be marginal, it is a good practice to carry out at time of dispatch a preliminary calculation of the LDTA. GM1 CAT.POL.A.235(a)(1) Landing – wet and contaminated runways AFM LANDING DISTANCES FOR WET RUNWAYS Specific landing distances provided in the AFM for wet runways, unless otherwise indicated, include a safety factor, which renders not necessary the application of the 15% safety factor used in CAT.POL.A.235(a)(2). This implies that the AFM distance may be presented as factored distance. These distances may be longer or shorter than those resulting from CAT.POL.A.235(a)(2), but when provided they are intended as a replacement of CAT.POL.A.235(a)(2) and mandatory for use at the time of dispatch. Page 20 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.235(a)(3) Landing – wet and contaminated runways RUNWAYS WITH FRICTION IMPROVING CHARACTERISTICS (a) Materials or construction techniques meant to improve the friction characteristics of a runway may be grooved runways, runways treated with porous friction course (PFC) or other materials or techniques for which the AFM provides specific performance data. (b) Before taking the AFM performance credit for such runways, the operator should verify that the runways intended to be operated on are maintained to the extent necessary to ensure the expected improved friction characteristics. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 & CAT.POL.A.235 Landing – dry runways & Landing – wet and contaminated runways WORKFLOW OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF DISPATCH - GENERAL  Altitude  Temperature  temperature CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.225 CAT.POL.A.235 Dispatch Landing Mass Requirements Landing Mass Requirements (not related to runway condition) (related to runway condition) Approach Climb Limit Landing Climb Limit OEI Missed Approach Climb Limit Dispatch Landing Mass Page 21 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 WORKFLOW OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF DISPATCH – RUNWAY SUITABILITY CHECK CAT.POL.A.230(e) and CAT.POL.A.235(e) For landing distance Check: Check: assessment at time of - Most favourable - Most likely runway to dispatch: runway be assigned - at no wind - at probable wind If unable to comply CAT.POL.A.230(f) Dry runway Dispatch not allowed 1 alternate aerodrome required CAT.POL.A.235(g) Wet runway Dispatch not allowed 1 alternate aerodrome required CAT.POL.A.235(f) CAT.POL.A.235(g) Contaminated 2 alternate 1 alternate runway aerodromes required aerodrome required CAT.POL.A.230 (f) and CAT.POL.A.235 (h) Alternate aerodromes shall permit full compliance with:  CAT.POL.A.230 (a) to (d) for dry runways  CAT.POL.A.235 (a) to (d) for wet or contaminated runways Page 22 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 WORKFLOW OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF DISPATCH – DRY RUNWAYS CAT.POL.A.230 CAT.POL.A.230 (a) CAT.POL.A.230 (d) The landing distance shall be within:  Factored Wind  60% of LDA for turbojets  Corrections as  70% of LDA for turbopropellers provided in the  80% of LDA for eligible aeroplanes AFM with prior approval CAT.POL.A.230 (b) Consider steep approach if applicable, as per CAT.POL.A.245 CAT.POL.A.230 (c) Consider short landing operations if applicable, as per CAT.POL.A.250 Landing mass for dry runway Page 23 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 WORKFLOW OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF DISPATCH – WET RUNWAYS (*): CAT.POL.A.235 (a) (*) for aeroplanes eligible for reduced required landing distance operations refer to CAT.POL.A.255 (b)(2)(v)(B) Specific yes AFM Wet RWY Data? CAT.POL.A.235 (a)(1) The greater of: CAT.POL.A.235 (d) no  Dry RWY landing distance (as per  Factored Wind CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1) or (a)(2), as  Corrections if applicable)) provided in AFM CAT.POL.A.235 (a)(2)  Specific AFM wet landing distance data mandatory for dispatch.  Steep approach as  115% of the landing distance per for dry runways (as per Or CAT.POL.A.245, if CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.235 (a)(3) applicable (a)(2), as applicable) The greater of:  Short landing  Dry RWY landing distance (CAT.POL.A.230 operations as per (a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable) CAT.POL.A.250, if  Specific AFM wet landing distance data for applicable runways with friction improving characteristics. Landing mass for wet runway Page 24 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 WORKFLOW OF THE LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF DISPATCH – CONTAMINATED RUNWAYS CAT.POL.A.235 (b) Specific AFM data for yes specially prepared winter runways? CAT.POL.A.235 (d) no  Factored Wind CAT.POL.A.235 (b)(1) CAT.POL.A.235 (b)(2)  Corrections if provided in AFM The greater of: On a specially prepared winter  Steep approach as  Wet RWY landing distance runway the greater of: per (CAT.POL.A.235(a))  Wet RWY landing distance CAT.POL.A.245, if  115% of approved (CAT.POL.A.235(a)) applicable contaminated landing  115% of specific AFM distance data or equivalent contaminated landing  Short landing distance data operations as per CAT.POL.A.250, if applicable. Landing Mass Cont Runway GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 & CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — dry runways & Landing – wet and contaminated runways LANDING DISTANCES AND CORRECTIVE FACTORS The AFM provides performance data for landing distance for the full range of conditions that may be encountered in service. This distance , commonly refrred to as the actual landing distance (ALD), is the distance from the position on the runway of the screen height to the point where the aeroplane comes to a full stop on a dry runway. The determination of the ALD is based on the assumption that the landing is performed in accordance with the conditions and the procedures set out in the AFM on the basis of the apllicable certification standards. As a matter of fact any particular landing may be different from the landing technique that is assumed in the AFM for certification purposes. The aircraft may approach the runway faster and/or higher than assumed; the aircraft may touchdown further along the runway than the optimum point; the actual winds and other weather factors may be different to those assumed in the calculation of the ALD; and Page 25 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 maximum braking may not be always achievable. For this reason the Landing Distance Available (LDA) is required by CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POL.A.235 to be longer than the ALD. The margins by which the LDA shall exceed the ALD on dry runways, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230, are shown in the following Table 1: Table 1 — Corrective factors for dry runways Aeroplane category Required Margin (dry runway) Resulting factor (dry runway) Turbojet-powered aeroplanes ALD < 60% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.67 x ALD Turbopropeller-powered ALD < 70% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.43 x ALD aeroplanes Aeroplanes approved under ALD < 80% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.25 X ALD CAT.POL.A.255 If the runway is wet and the AFM does not provide specific performance data for use on wet runways, a further increase of 15% of the landing distance on dry runways has to be applied, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.235 or CAT.POL.A.255 as applicable, as shown in the following Table 2: Table 2 — Corrective factors for wet runways Aeroplane category Resulting factor (wet runway) Turbojet-powered aeroplanes LDA = at least 1.15 x 1.67 x ALD = 1.92 x ALD Turbopropeller-powered LDA = at least 1.15 x 1.43 x ALD = 1.64 x ALD aeroplanes Aeroplanes approved under LDA is the longer of: CAT.POL.A.255  1.15 x 1.25 X ALD = 1.44 x ALD  the LDTA resulting from CAT.OP.MPA.303 However, for aeroplanes that are approved under CAT.POL.A.255, when landing on wet runways, CAT.POL.A.255 further requires to apply the longer of the landing distance resulting from the above table and the landing distance resulting from the application of CAT.OP.MPA.303(a). GM1 CAT.POL.A.245(a) Approval of steep approach operations SCREEN HEIGHT For the purpose of steep approach operations, the screen height is the reference height above the runway surface, typically above the runway threshold, from which the landing distance is measured. The screen height is set at 50 ft for normal operations and at another value between 60 ft and 30 ft for steep approach operations. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AEROPLANE ELIGIBILITY Page 26 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The AFM should state whether the aeroplane is eligible for operations with reduced required landing distance. When the factors required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, have been used for compliance with certification standards the aeroplane should not be operated with reduced required landing distance. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AEROPLANE ELIGIBILITY Whether the factors required by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or (a)(2), as applicable, have been used for compliance with certification standards, such as but not limited to CS 25.1309 or equivalent, during the certifation process of an eroplane, may only be declared by the manufacturer. Furthermore, certification methods offers options for the determination of air distance during landing. One method is based on a calculation simulating a 3.5 degree glide path and 8 ft/s touchdown rate. This is more demanding than what can be achieved with the normal airport approach guidance and operational landing training. Applying the reduced landing distance factor of 1.25 to an AFM landing distance based on the said method reduces the effective margin from an operational landing air distance from the current [35% to 45%] based on a 1.67 factor to [8 to 15%] based on the use of 80% of the LDA. Whereas applying the 1.25 factor to an AFM distance based on normal airport approach guidance and operational landing training ensures a 25% margin based on the use of 80% of the LDA. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(a) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations NON-SCHEDULED ON-DEMAND COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT) OPERATIONS For the purpose of reduced required landing distance operations, non scheduled on-demand CAT operations are those CAT operations conducted upon request of the customer. Non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations do not include holiday charters, i.e. charter flights that are part of a holiday travel package. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as applicable, may be achieved when conducting reduced required landing distance operations if mitigating measures are established and implemented. Such measures should address flight crew, aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and operations. It is, however, essential that all conditions established are adhered to as it is the combination of said conditions that achieves the intended level of safety. The operator should in fact also consider the interrelation of the various mitigating measures. The mitigating measures may be determined by the operator by using a risk assessment or by fulfilling all the conditions established under CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2). An operator willing to establish a set of conditions different from those under CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2) needs to demonstrate to the competent authority the equivalent level of safety through a risk assessment. Page 27 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The risk assessment required by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) should include at least the following elements: (a) flight crew qualification in terms of training, checking and recency; (b) flight crew composition; (c) runway surface conditions; (d) dispatch criteria; (e) weather conditions and limitations, including crosswind; (f) aerodrome characteristics, including available approach guidance; (g) aeroplane characteristics and limitations; (h) aeroplane equipment and systems affecting landing performance; (i) aeroplane performance data; (j) operating procedures and operating minima; and (k) analysis of operators’sperformance and occurrence reports related to unstable approaches and long landings The competent authority may require other mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the operator. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations GENERAL (a) The operator should ensure that flight crew training programmes for reduced required landing distance operations include ground training, flight simulation training device (FSTD), and/or flight training. (b) Flight crew with no reduced required landing distance operations experience should have completed the full training programme of (a) above. (c) Flight crew with previous increased reduced required landing distance operations experience of a similar type of operation with another EU operator, may undertake the following: (1) an abbreviated ground training course if operating an aircraft of a type or class different from that of the aircraft on which the previous reduced required landing distance operations experience was gained; (2) an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course if operating the same type or class and variant of the same aircraft type or class on which the previous reduced required landing distance operations experience was gained; this course should include at least the provisions of the conversion training contained in this AMC; the operator may reduce the number of approaches/landings required by the conversion training if the type/class or the variant of the aircraft type or class has the same or similar operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics as the previously operated aircraft type or class. Page 28 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (d) Flight crew with reduced required landing distance operations experience with the operator may undertake an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course according to the following conditions: (1) when changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the content of the conversion training; (2) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has the same or similar operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics, as the previously operated aircraft type or class, a difference course or familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course’s purposes; and (3) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has significantly different operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance characteristics, the abbreviated course should include the content of the conversion training. GROUND TRAINING (a) The initial ground training course for reduced required landing distance operations should include at least the following: (1) operational procedures and limitations, including flight preparation and planning; (2) characteristics of the runway visual aids and runway markings; (3) aircraft performance related to reduced required landing distance operations, including: (i) aircraft-specific decelerating devices and equipment; (ii) items that increase the aircraft landing distance, e.g. excess speed at touchdown, threshold crossing height, delayed brake application, delayed spoiler/speed brake or thrust reverser application; and (iii) runway surface conditions; (4) in-flight assessment of landing performance, including maximum landing masses and runway conditions; (5) stabilised approach criteria; (6) correct vertical flight path after the DA/MDA; (7) correct flare, touchdown and braking techniques; (8) touchdown within the appropriate touchdown zone; (9) recognition of failure of aircraft equipment affecting aircraft performance, and action to be taken in that event; (10) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the activation of deceleration devices; (11) go-around/balked-landing criteria and decision-making; Page 29 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (12) selection of precision approaches versus non-precision approaches if both are available; and (13) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain reduced required landing distance operations, including aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) procedures. FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING (a) FSTD and/or flight training should at least be required for the commander and any other pilot flying for landing when performing reduced required landing distance operations. (b) FSTD and/or flight training for reduced required landing distance operations should include checks of equipment functionality, both on the ground and in-flight. (c) Initial reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of two approaches and landings to include at least the following exercises which may be combined: (1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass; (2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach; (3) a landing on a wet runway; (4) a landing with crosswind (5) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and (6) a go-around/balked landing. (d) Special emphasis should be given to the following items: (1) in-flight assessment of landing performance; (2) stabilised approach, recognition of an unstable approach and, consequentially, a go- around; (3) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the activation of deceleration devices; (4) timely and correct activation of deceleration devices; (5) correct flare technique; and (6) landing within the appropriate touchdown zone. CONVERSION TRAINING Flight crew members should complete the following reduced required landing distance operations training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which reduced required landing distance operations will be conducted. (a) Ground training, taking into account the flight crew member’s increased landing factor operations experience. (b) FSTD training and/or flight training. RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING Page 30 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (a) The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the normal recurrent training and operator’s proficiency checks, the pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with reduced required landing distance operations are adequate. (b) The items of the ground training should cover a 3-year period. (c) An annual reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of two approaches and landings so that it includes at least the following exercises which may be combined: (1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass; (2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach; (3) a landing on a wet runway; (4) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and (5) a go-around/balked landing. (6) Operations in crosswind conditions FLIGHT CREW QUALIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE (a) Flight crew qualification and experience are specific to the operator and type of aircraft operated. (b) The operator should ensure that each flight crew member successfully completes the specified FSTD and/or flight training before conducting reduced required landing distance operations. (c) The operator should ensure that no inexperienced flight crew members, as defined in AMC1.ORO.FC.200(a), perform an approach and landing with reduced required landing distance operations. AMC2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations MONITORING (a) Reduced required landing distance operations should be continuously monitored by the operator to detect any undesirable trends before they become hazardous. (b) A flight data monitoring (FDM) programme, as required by ORO.AOC.130, is an acceptable method to monitor operational risks related to reduced required landing distance operations. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations GENERAL Flight crew training should be conducted preferably at aerodromes representative of the intended operations. A FSTD generic aerodrome with the same characteristics of an aerodrome requiring the reduced required landing distance is also acceptable for the initial and recurrent training. GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations MONITORING Page 31 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Although ORO.AOC.130 requires FDM only for aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of more than 27 000 kg, FDM may be used voluntarily on aeroplanes having smaller MCTOM. It is recommended for all operators conducting reduced required landing distance operations. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP) The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any further increase of the landing distance. Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance: landing (ground-) speed and deceleration capability. Related factors to consider should include at least the following elements: (a) Airport facilities Consideration should bebgiven to the services are available at the airport. Services such as communications, maintenance, and fueling may have an impact on operations to and from that airport, though not directly related to landing distance. The availability of adequate RFFF and medical services should be also taken into account. It is worth to consider also whether the aerodrome is only meeting ICAO and national standards or ICAO recommendations as well. (b) Topography Terrain around the aerodrome should be considered. High, fast-rising terrain may require special approach or decisiosn points, missed approach or balked landing procedures and may impact performance requirements. Aerodromes located on top of hilly terrain or downwind of mountainous terrain may occasionally experience conditions of windshear and gusts. Such conditions are particularly relevant during the landing maneuver, particularly during the flare, and may increase landing distance. (c) Runway conditions Runway characteristics, such as unknown slope and surface composition, can cause the actual landing distance to be longer than the calculated landing distance. Braking action always impacts the landing distance required as it deteriorates. To this regard, consideration should be given to the maintenance status of the runway, as a wet runway surface may be significantly degraded due to poor airport maintenance. (d) Airport or Area weather Some aerodromes may not have current weather reports and forecast available for flight planning. Others may have automated observations for operational use. Others may depend on the weather forecast of a nearby aerodrome. Area forecasts are also valuable in evaluating weather conditions for a particular operation. Comparing forecasted conditions to current conditions provoides insight upcoming changes as weather systems move and forecasts are updated. Longer flight segments may lean more heavily on the forecast for the estimated time of arrival (ETA), as current conditions may change significantly as weather systems move. (e) Adverse weather Page 32 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Adverse weather conditions include but are not restricted to thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes, moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant. Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in a considerable tailwind component. (f) Runway safety margins Displaced thresholds, airport construction, and temporary obstacles (such as cranes and drawbridges) may impact runway length available for landing. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) must be consulted during the flight preparation. Another safety margin is the size and adequacy of the runway strip and runway end safety area (RESA). A well designed and maintained runway strip and RESA decreases the risk of damaging the aircraft in case of a runway excursion. ICAO annex 14 provides the SARPS to this regards. Consideration should be given to those aerodroems barely meeting these ICAO SARPS or when the bearing ratio’s are below the design and maintenance criteria as indicated in ICAO doc 9157 – Aerodroem Design Manual. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid, autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing distance operations. GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Should any equipment affecting landing performance become inoperative during reduced required landing distance operations, the failure will be dealt with in accordance with the abnormal /emergency procedures established in the OM and, based on the prevailing conditions for the remainder of the flight, the commander will decide upon the discontinuation of the planned operation of reduced required landing distance. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations RECENCY Flight crew conducting reduced landing distance operations should have a recency in said operations of at least two landings, either in actual operations or in an FSTD, performed within the validity period of the operator proficiency check (OPC). Page 33 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(ix) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS (a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that: (1) the aerodrome information is obtained from a reliable source; (2) any change reducing landing distances that has been declared by the aerodrome operator has been taken into account; and (3) no steep approaches, screen heights lower than 35 ft or higher than 60 ft, operations outside the stabilised approach criteria, or low-visibility operations are required at the aerodrome where reduced required landing distance operations are conducted. (b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account. (c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment beyond the runway strip, the length of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) and the effectiveness of any other mitigation measures that may be in place to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun. Page 34 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Chapter 3 Performance class B AMC1 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION (…) (a) The determination of take-off performance data for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS (a) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturers, the variable affecting the landing performance and the associated factor that should be applied to the AFM data are shown in the table below. It should be applied in addition to the operational factors as prescribed in CAT.POL.A.330 (a) and CAT.POL.A.330(b). (…) GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways LANDING MASS CAT.POL.A.330 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the destination and alternate aerodromes. (a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 70 % or 80 %, as applicable, of the LDA on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded. (…) GM1 CAT.POL.A.330(a) Landing – dry runways ALTERNATE AERODROMES The alternate aerodromes for which the landing mass is required to be determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330 are: (a) destination alternate aerodromes; (b) fuel en-route alternate (ERA) aerodromes; and (c) re-dispatch or re-clearance aerodromes. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.335 Landing – wet and contaimanted runways WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA Page 35 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The determination of landing performance data should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. The RWYCC is reported through a runway condition report (RCR) in the SNOWTAM format in accordance with ICAO Annex 15. GM1 CAT.POL.A.335(a) and (b) Landing – wet and contaminated runways DISPATCH CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARGINAL CASES The landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 may, in some cases, and in particular on wet or contaminated runways, exceed the landing distance considered at time of dispatch. The requirements for dispatch remain unchanged, however, when the conditions at time of arrival are expected to be marginal, it is a good practice to carry out at time of dispatch a preliminary calculation of the LDTA. GM1 CAT.POL.A.335(a)(1) Landing – wet and contaminated runways AFM LANDING DISTANCES FOR WET RUNWAYS Specific landing distances provided in the AFM for wet runways, unless otherwise indicated, include a safety factor, which renders not necessary the application of the 15% safety factor used in CAT.POL.A.335(a)(2). This implies that the AFM distance may be presented as factored distance. These distances may be longer or shorter than those resulting from CAT.POL.A.335(a)(2), but when provided they are intended as a replacement of CAT.POL.A.335(a)(2) and mandatory for use at the time of dispatch. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.335(a)(3) Landing – wet and contaminated runways RUNWAYS WITH FRICTION IMPROVING CHARACTERISTICS (a) Materials or construction techniques meant to improve the friction characteristics of a runway may be grooved runways, runways treated with porous friction course (PFC) or other materials or techniques for which the AFM provides specific performance data. (b) Before taking the AFM performance credit for such runways, the operator should verify that the runways intended to be operated on are maintained to the extent necessary to ensure the expected improved friction characteristics. GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 & CAT.POL.A.335 Landing — dry runways & Landing – wet and contaminated runways LANDING DISTANCES AND CORRECTIVE FACTORS The AFM provides performance data for landing distance for the full range of conditions that may be encountered in service. This distance , commonly refrred to as the actual landing distance (ALD), is the distance from the position on the runway of the screen height to the point where the aeroplane comes to a full stop on a dry runway. Page 36 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The determination of the ALD is based on the assumption that the landing is performed in accordance with the conditions and the procedures set out in the AFM on the basis of the apllicable certification standards. As a matter of fact any particular landing may be different from the landing technique that is assumed in the AFM for certification purposes. The aircraft may approach the runway faster and/or higher than assumed; the aircraft may touchdown further along the runway than the optimum point; the actual winds and other weather factors may be different to those assumed in the calculation of the ALD; and maximum braking may not be always achievable. For this reason the Landing Distance Available (LDA) is required by CAT.POL.A.330 and CAT.POL.A.335 to be longer than the ALD. The margins by which the LDA shall exceed the ALD on dry runways, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330 are shown in the following Table 1: Table 1 — Corrective factors for dry runways Aeroplane category Required Margin (dry runway) Resulting factor (dry runway) All aeroplanes ALD < 70% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.43 x ALD Aeroplanes approved under ALD < 80% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.25 X ALD CAT.POL.A.355 If the runway is wet and the AFM does not provide specific performance data for use on wet runways, a further increase of 15% of the landing distance on dry runways has to be applied, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.335 or CAT.POL.A.355 as applicable, as shown in the following Table 2: Table 2 — Corrective factors for wet runways Aeroplane category Resulting factor (wet runway) All aeroplanes LDA = at least 1.15 x 1.43 x ALD = 1.64 x ALD LDA is the longer of: Aeroplanes approved under  1.15 x 1.25 X ALD = 1.44 x ALD CAT.POL.A.355  the LDTA resulting from CAT.OP.MPA.303 However, for aeroplanes approved under CAT.POL.A.355 and landing on wet runways, CAT.POL.A.355 further requires to apply the longer of the landing distance resulting from the above table and the landing distance resulting from the application of CAT.OP.MPA.303(b). GM1 CAT.POL.A.345(a) Approval of steep approach operations SCREEN HEIGHT For the purpose of steep approach operations, the screen height is the reference height above the runway surface, typically above the runway threshold, from which the landing distance is measured. The screen height is set at 50 ft for normal operations and at another value between 60 ft and 30 ft for steep approach operations. Page 37 of 64 Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Page 38 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) may be achieved when conducting reduced required landing distance operations if mitigating measures are established and implemented. Such measures should address flight crew, aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and operations. It is, however, essential that all conditions established are adhered to as it is the combination of said conditions that achieves the intended level of safety. The operator should in fact also consider the interrelation of the various mitigating measures. The competent authority may require other mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the operator. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations CONTROL OF THE TOUCHDOWN AREA The control of the touchdown area may be ensured by using external references visible from the flight crew compartment. The end of the designated touchdown area should be clearly identified with a ground reference point beyond which a go-around is required. Adequate go-around and balked landing instructions should be established in the operations manual (OM). A written and/or pictorial description of the procedure should be provided for crew use. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(5) and (b)(6) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations TYPE EXPERIENCE The operator should specify in the OM the minimum pilot’s experience on the aircraft type or class used to conduct such operations. TRAINING PROGRAMME (a) Initial training (1) The aerodrome training programme shall include ground and flight training with a suitably qualified instructor. (2) Flight training should be carried out on the runway of the intended operations, and should include a suitable number of: (i) approaches and landings; and (ii) missed approach/balked landings. (3) When performing approaches and landings, particular emphasis should be placed on: (i) stabilised approach criteria; (ii) accuracy of flare and touchdown; (iii) positive identification of the ground reference point controlling the touchdown area; and (iv) correct use of deceleration devices. Page 39 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (4) These exercises should be conducted in accordance with the specific control procedure of the touchdown area established by the operator, and should enable the flight crew to identify the external visual references and the designated touchdown area. (b) Recurrent training The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the recurrent training and checking programme required by Subpart FC of Annex III (Part-ORO) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with this particular operation, for which the pilot is authorised by the operator, are verified. RECENCY The operator should define in the OM appropriate recent-experience requirements to ensure that the pilot’s ability to perform an approach to and landing on the intended runway is maintained. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP) The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any further increase of the landing distance. Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance: landing (ground-) speed and deceleration capability. Related factors to consider should include at least the following elements: (g) Airport facilities Consideration should bebgiven to the services are available at the airport. Services such as communications, maintenance, and fueling may have an impact on operations to and from that airport, though not directly related to landing distance. The availability of adequate RFFF and medical services should be also taken into account. It is worth to consider also whether the aerodrome is only meeting ICAO and national standards or ICAO recommendations as well. (h) Topography Terrain around the aerodrome should be considered. High, fast-rising terrain may require special approach or decisiosn points, missed approach or balked landing procedures and may impact performance requirements. Aerodromes located on top of hilly terrain or downwind of mountainous terrain may occasionally experience conditions of windshear and gusts. Such conditions are particularly relevant during the landing maneuver, particularly during the flare, and may increase landing distance. (i) Runway conditions Runway characteristics, such as unknown slope and surface composition, can cause the actual landing distance to be longer than the calculated landing distance. Braking action always impacts the landing distance required as it deteriorates. To this regard, consideration should be given to the maintenance status of the runway, as a wet runway surface may be significantly degraded due to poor airport maintenance. (j) Airport or Area weather Page 40 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Some aerodromes may not have current weather reports and forecast available for flight planning. Others may have automated observations for operational use. Others may depend on the weather forecast of a nearby aerodrome. Area forecasts are also valuable in evaluating weather conditions for a particular operation. Comparing forecasted conditions to current conditions provoides insight upcoming changes as weather systems move and forecasts are updated. Longer flight segments may lean more heavily on the forecast for the estimated time of arrival (ETA), as current conditions may change significantly as weather systems move. (k) Adverse weather Adverse weather conditions include but are not restricted to thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes, moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant. Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in a considerable tailwind component. (l) Runway safety margins Displaced thresholds, airport construction, and temporary obstacles (such as cranes and drawbridges) may impact runway length available for landing. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) must be consulted during the flight preparation. Another safety margin is the size and adequacy of the runway strip and runway end safety area (RESA). A well designed and maintained runway strip and RESA decreases the risk of damaging the aircraft in case of a runway excursion. ICAO annex 14 provides the SARPS to this regards. Consideration should be given to those aerodroems barely meeting these ICAO SARPS or when the bearing ratio’s are below the design and maintenance criteria as indicated in ICAO doc 9157 – Aerodroem Design Manual. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid, autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing distance operations. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE Should any equipment affecting landing performance become inoperative during reduced required landing distance operations, the failure will be dealt with in accordance with the abnormal /emergency procedures established in the OM and, based on the prevailing conditions for the Page 41 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 remainder of the flight, the commander will decide upon the discontinuation of the planned operation of reduced required landing distance. GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations CORRECT USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES Flight crew should use full reverse when landing, irrespective of any noise-related restriction on its use, unless this affects the controllability of the aircraft. The use of all stopping devices, including reverse thrust, should commence immediately after touchdown without any delay. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(9) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS Additional maintenance instructions, such as, but not limited to, more frequent checks for the aircraft’s deceleration devices, especially for the reverse system, should be established by the operator in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, and be included in the operator’s maintenance programme in accordance with Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES The operator should establish procedures for the flight crew to check before take-off the correct deployment of the deceleration devices, such as the reverse system. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(11) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS (a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that: (1) the aerodrome information is obtained from an reliable source; and (2) any change reducing landing distances declared by the aerodrome operator has been taken into account. (b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account. (c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment beyond the runway strip, the length of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) and the effectiveness of any other mitigation measures that may be in place to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun. Page 42 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Chapter 4 Performance class C AMC3 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION The determination of take-off performance data for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. GM1 CAT.POL.A.430(a) Landing – dry runways ALTERNATE AERODROMES The alternate aerodromes for which the landing mass is required to be determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430 are: (a) destination alternate aerodromes; (b) fuel en-route alternate (ERA) aerodromes; and (c) re-dispatch or re-clearance aerodromes. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.435 Landing – wet and contaimanted runways WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA The determination of landing performance data should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. The RWYCC is reported through a runway condition report (RCR) in the SNOWTAM format in accordance with ICAO Annex 15. GM1 CAT.POL.A.435(a) and (b) Landing – wet and contaminated runways DISPATCH CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARGINAL CASES The landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 may, in some cases, and in particular on wet or contaminated runways, exceed the landing distance considered at time of dispatch. The requirements for dispatch remain unchanged, however, when the conditions at time of arrival are expected to be marginal, it is a good practice to carry out at time of dispatch a preliminary calculation of the LDTA. GM1 CAT.POL.A.435(a)(1) Landing – wet and contaminated runways AFM LANDING DISTANCES FOR WET RUNWAYS Specific landing distances provided in the AFM for wet runways, unless otherwise indicated, include a safety factor, which renders not necessary the application of the 15% safety factor used in CAT.POL.A.435(a)(2). This implies that the AFM distance may be presented as factored distance. These distances may be longer or shorter than those resulting from CAT.POL.A.435(a)(2), but when provided they are intended as a replacement of CAT.POL.A.435(a)(2) and mandatory for use at the time of dispatch. Page 43 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 CAT.POL.A.430 & CAT.POL.A.435 Landing — dry runways & Landing – wet and contaminated runways LANDING DISTANCES AND CORRECTIVE FACTORS The AFM provides performance data for landing distance for the full range of conditions that may be encountered in service. This distance , commonly refrred to as the actual landing distance (ALD), is the distance from the position on the runway of the screen height to the point where the aeroplane comes to a full stop on a dry runway. The determination of the ALD is based on the assumption that the landing is performed in accordance with the conditions and the procedures set out in the AFM on the basis of the apllicable certification standards. As a matter of fact any particular landing may be different from the landing technique that is assumed in the AFM for certification purposes. The aircraft may approach the runway faster and/or higher than assumed; the aircraft may touchdown further along the runway than the optimum point; the actual winds and other weather factors may be different to those assumed in the calculation of the ALD; and maximum braking may not be always achievable. For this reason the Landing Distance Available (LDA) is required by CAT.POL.A.430 and CAT.POL.A.435 to be longer than the ALD. The margins by which the LDA shall exceed the ALD on dry runways, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430, are shown in the following Table 1: Table 1 — Corrective factors for dry runways Aeroplane category Required Margin (dry runway) Resulting factor (dry runway) All aeroplanes ALD < 70% of the LDA LDA = at least 1.43 x ALD If the runway is wet and the AFM does not provide specific performance data for use on wet runways, a further increase of 15% of the landing distance on dry runways has to be applied, in accordance with CAT.POL.A.435, as shown in the following Table 2: Table 2 — Corrective factors for wet runways Aeroplane category Resulting factor (wet runway) All aeroplanes LDA = at least 1.15 x 1.43 x ALD = 1.64 x ALD Page 44 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX VI NON-COMMERCIAL AIR OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT [PART-NCC] SUBPART B OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AMC1 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE/FATO SUITABILITY (a) The in-flight determination of the landing distance/FATO should be based on the latest available meteorological weather report orand runway statecondition report (RCR). (b) An assessment should be initially carried out when weather report and RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure. (c) When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing, if the flight crew of the preceding aircraft landing at the same runway provides a special air- report (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action. (d) The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable. (e) The in-flight determination of the landing distance should be done is such way that either: (1) the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA); or (2) if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the landing distance determined at the time of dispatch. (f) If performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is available, it should be based on approved data contained in the AFM, or on other data tha is either determined in accordance with the applicable certification standards for aeroplanes or determined by the Agency. (g) Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported by the aerodrome operator in the runway condition report (RCR), the pilot-in- command should notify the air traffic services (ATS) by means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable. Page 45 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 GM1 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE The assessment of the LDTA begins with the acquisition of the latest available weather information and the RCR. The information provided in the RCR is divided in two sections: (a) The “aircraft performance” section which contains information that is directly relevant in a performance computation (b) The “situational awareness” section which contains information that the flight crew should be aware of for a safe operation, but which does not have a direct impact on the performance assessment. The “aircraft performance” section of the RCR includes a runway condition code (RWYCC), the contaminant type, depth and coverage for each third of the runway. The determination of the RWYCC is based on the use of the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM), however, the presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way that is relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the RCAM standard would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment. It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to assess the RWYCC. Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to carry out the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT). Page 46 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT Runway surface Surface condition Depth Notes RWYCC condition descriptor Including wet or contaminated Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6 each runway third Damp (any visible 5 Wet dampness) Wet 3 mm or less 5 Slippery wet 3 At or below OAT – 15 °C 4 Compacted snow Any Above OAT – 15 °C 3 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 100 mm Any On top of ice 02 Frost1 Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3 mm or less 5 More than Slush 3 mm up to 2 Contaminated 15 mm 3 mm or less 5 More than Standing water 3 mm up to 2 15 mm Any On top of ice 02 Wet ice Any 02 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 30 mm Any On top of ice 02 Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery. Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited. Note 3: runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. A primary assessment may have to be downgraded by the aerodrome operator based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. Upgrading a RWYCC 5, 4, 3 or 2 determined by the aerodrome operator from the observed contaminant type is not allowed. Page 47 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 A RWYCC 1 or 0 maybe be upgraded by the aerodrome operator to a maximum of RWYCC 3. The reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. When the aerodrome operator is approved for operations on specially prepared winter runways, in accordance with Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014, the RWYCC of a runway that is contaminated with compacted snow or ice, may be upgraded to RWYCC 4 upon a specific treatment of the runway. In such cases, the reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. GM2 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes RCR, RWYCC and RCAM A detailed description of the RCR format and content, the RWYCC and the RCAM may be found in Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014. Further guidance may be found in the following documents: (a) ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’; (b) ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’; (c) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM3 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA Guidance on performance information for the assessment of the LDTA may be found in: (a) AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(e) of Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; (b) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM4 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes REPORTING ON RUNWAY BRAKING ACTION The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for providing accurate braking action reports. The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR resulting from the observed runway surface conditions. ATC passes these braking action reports both to the subsequent aeroplane landing at the same runway and to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the Runway Condition Code (RWYCC). During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals. Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition is not deteriorating below the assigned RCR. Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’. Page 48 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking action and the RWYCC. Table 1 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC AIREP Description RWYCC (braking action) N/A 6 Braking deceleration is normal for the GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5 directional control is normal. Braking deceleration OR directional control GOOD TO MEDIUM 4 is between good and medium. Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3 directional control is noticeably reduced. Braking deceleration OR directional control MEDIUM TO POOR 2 is between medium and poor. Braking deceleration is significantly reduced POOR for the wheel braking effort applied OR 1 directional control is significantly reduced. Braking deceleration is minimal to non- LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort applied 0 OR directional control is uncertain. Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must be supported by other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability and landing performance. An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable: (a) Good braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD” (b) Good to medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” (c) Medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” (d) Medium to poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” (e) Poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” (f) Less than poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR” In some cases the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between “Good” and “Less than Poor” may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to report on a more coarse scale of “Good”, “Medium” and “Poor”. Page 49 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported by the aerodrome operator, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC code currently in effect for that portion of the runway. When they match up, the AIREP provides both the pilot and the airport operator additional confidence in the reported runway codes. Also when the experienced braking action is is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is important to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the arodrome operator in order to upgrade the RCR. If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If the flight crew have reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the commander should be able to amend such report. An braking action AIREP of “Less Than Poor” leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the runway condition. An air safety report (ASR) should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action. GM5 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes FLIGHT CREW TRAINING Flight crew should be trained on the the use of the RCR, on the use of performance data for the assessment of the LDTA, if available, and on reporting braking action using the AIREP format. Guidance to develop the content of the training may be found in: (a) AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 & CAT.OP.MPA.311, of Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as applicable to the intended operations; (b) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. AMC1 NCC.OP.226 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters FATO SUITABILITY The in-flight determination of the FATO suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report. Page 50 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 SUBPART C AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND OPERATING LIMITATIONS GM1 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during take-off or landing, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for the pilot-in-command is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a take-off or landing, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any further safety measures he/she considers justified under the prevailing conditions. The excess runway length available including the criticality of the overrun area should also be considered. The determination of take-off performance data for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. GM1 NCC.POL.135 Landing – aeroplanes WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA The determination of landing performance data should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. The RWYCC is reported through a runway condition report (RCR) in the SNOWTAM format in accordance with ICAO Annex 15. Page 51 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX VII NON-COMMERCIAL AIR OPERATIONS WITH OTHER-THAN COMPLEX MOTOR- POWERED AIRCRAFT [PART-NCO] SUBPART B OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AMC1 NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE/FATO SUITABILITY (a) The in-flight determination of the landing distance/FATO should be based on the latest available meteorological weather report orand runway statecondition report (RCR). (b) An assessment should be initially carried out when weather report and RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure. (c) When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing, if the flight crew of the preceding aircraft landing at the same runway provides a special air- report (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action. (d) The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable. (e) The in-flight determination of the landing distance should ensure that the aeroplane performance information allows a safe landing on the intended runway taking into account the runway condition code (RWYCC) reported in the RCR. (f) Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported by the aerodrome operator in the runway condition report (RCR), the pilot-in- command should notify the air traffic services (ATS) by means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable. GM1 NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE The assessment of the landing distance begins with the acquisition of the latest available weather information and the RCR. The information provided in the RCR is divided in two sections: (a) The “aircraft performance” section which contains information that is directly relevant in a performance computation Page 52 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 (b) The “situational awareness” section which contains information that the flight crew should be aware of for a safe operation, but which does not have a direct impact on the performance assessment. The “aircraft performance” section of the RCR includes a runway condition code (RWYCC), the contaminant type, depth and coverage for each third of the runway. The determination of the RWYCC is based on the use of the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM), however, the presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way that is relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the RCAM standard would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment. It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to assess the RWYCC. Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to carry out the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT). Page 53 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT Runway surface Surface condition Depth Notes RWYCC condition descriptor Including wet or contaminated Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6 each runway third Damp (any visible 5 Wet dampness) Wet 3 mm or less 5 Slippery wet 3 At or below OAT – 15 °C 4 Compacted snow Any Above OAT – 15 °C 3 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 100 mm Any On top of ice 02 Frost1 Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3 mm or less 5 More than Slush 3 mm up to 2 Contaminated 15 mm 3 mm or less 5 More than Standing water 3 mm up to 2 15 mm Any On top of ice 02 Wet ice Any 02 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 30 mm Any On top of ice 02 Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery. Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited. Note 3: runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. A primary assessment may have to be downgraded by the aerodrome operator based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. Upgrading a RWYCC 5, 4, 3 or 2 determined by the aerodrome operator from the observed contaminant type is not allowed. Page 54 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 A RWYCC 1 or 0 maybe be upgraded by the aerodrome operator to a maximum of RWYCC 3. The reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. When the aerodrome operator is approved for operations on specially prepared winter runways, in accordance with Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014, the RWYCC of a runway that is contaminated with compacted snow or ice, may be upgraded to RWYCC 4 upon a specific treatment of the runway. In such cases, the reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. GM2 NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes RCR, RWYCC and RCAM A detailed description of the RCR format and content, the RWYCC and the RCAM may be found in Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014. Further guidance may be found in the following documents: (a) ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’; (b) ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’; (c) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM3 NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes REPORTING ON RUNWAY BRAKING ACTION The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for providing accurate braking action reports. The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR resulting from the observed runway surface conditions. ATC passes these braking action reports both to the subsequent aeroplane landing at the same runway and to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the Runway Condition Code (RWYCC). During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals. Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition is not deteriorating below the assigned RCR. Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’. The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking action and the RWYCC. Page 55 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC AIREP Description RWYCC (braking action) N/A 6 Braking deceleration is normal for the GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5 directional control is normal. Braking deceleration OR directional control GOOD TO MEDIUM 4 is between good and medium. Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3 directional control is noticeably reduced. Braking deceleration OR directional control MEDIUM TO POOR 2 is between medium and poor. Braking deceleration is significantly reduced POOR for the wheel braking effort applied OR 1 directional control is significantly reduced. Braking deceleration is minimal to non- LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort applied 0 OR directional control is uncertain. Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must be supported by other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability and landing performance. An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable: (a) Good braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD” (b) Good to medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” (c) Medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” (d) Medium to poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” (e) Poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” (f) Less than poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR” In some cases the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between “Good” and “Less than Poor” may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to report on a more coarse scale of “Good”, “Medium” and “Poor”. Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported by the aerodrome operator, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC code currently in effect for that portion of the runway. Page 56 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 When they match up, the AIREP provides both the pilot and the airport operator additional confidence in the reported runway codes. Also when the experienced braking action is is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is important to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the arodrome operator in order to upgrade the RCR. If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If the flight crew have reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the commander should be able to amend such report. An braking action AIREP of “Less Than Poor” leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the runway condition. An air safety report (ASR) should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action. GM4 NCO.OP.205 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes FLIGHT CREW TRAINING Flight crew should be trained on the the use of the RCR, on the assessment of the landing distance, and on reporting braking action using the AIREP format. Guidance to develop the content of the training may be found in: (a) AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 & CAT.OP.MPA.311, of Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as applicable to the intended operations; (b) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. AMC1 NCO.OP.206 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters FATO SUITABILITY The in-flight determination of the FATO suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report. Page 57 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 ANNEX VIII SPECIALISED OPERATIONS [Part-SPO] SUBPART B GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AMC1 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE/FATO SUITABILITY (a) The in-flight determination of the landing distance/FATO should be based on the latest available meteorological weather report orand runway statecondition report (RCR). (b) An assessment should be initially carried out when weather report and RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure. (c) When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing, if the flight crew of the preceding aircraft landing at the same runway provides a special air- report (AIREP) of worse than expected braking action. (d) The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable. (e) For complex motor-powered aeroplanes, the in-flight determination of the landing distance should be done is such way that either: (1) the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA); or (2) if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the landing distance determined at the time of dispatch. (f) For complex motor-powered aeroplanes, if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is available, it should be based on approved data contained in the AFM, or on other data tha is either determined in accordance with the applicable certification standards for aeroplanes or determined by the Agency. (g) For other-than complex motor-powered aeroplanes, the in-flight determination of the landing distance should ensure that the aeroplane performance information allows a safe landing on Page 58 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 the intended runway taking into account the runway condition code (RWYCC) reported in the RCR. (h) Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported by the aerodrome operator in the runway condition report (RCR), the pilot-in- command should notify the air traffic services (ATS) by means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable. GM1 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes LANDING DISTANCE The assessment of the Landing distance begins with the acquisition of the latest available weather information and the RCR. The information provided in the RCR is divided in two sections: (a) The “aircraft performance” section which contains information that is directly relevant in a performance computation (b) The “situational awareness” section which contains information that the flight crew should be aware of for a safe operation, but which does not have a direct impact on the performance assessment. The “aircraft performance” section of the RCR includes a runway condition code (RWYCC), the contaminant type, depth and coverage for each third of the runway. The determination of the RWYCC is based on the use of the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM), however, the presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way that is relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the RCAM standard would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment. It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to assess the RWYCC. Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to carry out the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT). Page 59 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported contaminant type and depth and OAT Runway surface Surface condition Depth Notes RWYCC condition descriptor Including wet or contaminated Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6 each runway third Damp (any visible 5 Wet dampness) Wet 3 mm or less 5 Slippery wet 3 At or below OAT – 15 °C 4 Compacted snow Any Above OAT – 15 °C 3 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 100 mm Any On top of ice 02 Frost1 Any 5 Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1 3 mm or less 5 More than Slush 3 mm up to 2 Contaminated 15 mm 3 mm or less 5 More than Standing water 3 mm up to 2 15 mm Any On top of ice 02 Wet ice Any 02 3 mm or less 5 More than Including when any depth occurs Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3 30 mm Any On top of ice 02 Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery. Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited. Note 3: runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available. A primary assessment may have to be downgraded by the aerodrome operator based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. Upgrading a RWYCC 5, 4, 3 or 2 determined by the aerodrome operator from the observed contaminant type is not allowed. Page 60 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 A RWYCC 1 or 0 maybe be upgraded by the aerodrome operator to a maximum of RWYCC 3. The reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. When the aerodrome operator is approved for operations on specially prepared winter runways, in accordance with Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014, the RWYCC of a runway that is contaminated with compacted snow or ice, may be upgraded to RWYCC 4 upon a specific treatment of the runway. In such cases, the reason for the upgrade will be specified in the “situational awareness” section of the RCR. GM2 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes RCR, RWYCC and RCAM A detailed description of the RCR format and content, the RWYCC and the RCAM may be found in Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) 139/2014. Further guidance may be found in the following documents: (a) ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’; (b) ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’; (c) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM3 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — complex moto-powered aeroplanes PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA Guidance on performance information for the assessment of the LDTA may be found in: (a) AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(e) of Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; (b) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. GM4 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes REPORTING ON RUNWAY BRAKING ACTION The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for providing accurate braking action reports. The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR resulting from the observed runway surface conditions. ATC passes these braking action reports both to the subsequent aeroplane landing at the same runway and to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the Runway Condition Code (RWYCC). During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals. Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition is not deteriorating below the assigned RCR. Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS ATM’. Page 61 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking action and the RWYCC. Table 1 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC AIREP Description RWYCC (braking action) N/A 6 Braking deceleration is normal for the GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5 directional control is normal. Braking deceleration OR directional control GOOD TO MEDIUM 4 is between good and medium. Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3 directional control is noticeably reduced. Braking deceleration OR directional control MEDIUM TO POOR 2 is between medium and poor. Braking deceleration is significantly reduced POOR for the wheel braking effort applied OR 1 directional control is significantly reduced. Braking deceleration is minimal to non- LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort applied 0 OR directional control is uncertain. Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must be supported by other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft braking capability and landing performance. An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable: (a) Good braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD” (b) Good to medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM” (c) Medium braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM” (d) Medium to poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR” (e) Poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION POOR” (f) Less than poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR” In some cases the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between “Good” and “Less than Poor” may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to report on a more coarse scale of “Good”, “Medium” and “Poor”. Page 62 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported by the aerodrome operator, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC code currently in effect for that portion of the runway. When they match up, the AIREP provides both the pilot and the airport operator additional confidence in the reported runway codes. Also when the experienced braking action is is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is important to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the arodrome operator in order to upgrade the RCR. If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If the flight crew have reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the commander should be able to amend such report. An braking action AIREP of “Less Than Poor” leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the runway condition. An air safety report (ASR) should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action. GM5 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes FLIGHT CREW TRAINING Flight crew should be trained on: (a) the the use of the RCR; (b) the assessment of the landing distance: (c) for complex motor-powered aeroplanes only, on the use of performance data for the assessment of the LDTA, if available: (d) on reporting braking action using the AIREP format. Guidance to develop the content of the training may be found in: (a) AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 & CAT.OP.MPA.311, of Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as applicable to the intended operations; (b) ICAO Doc 10064 – Aeroplane Performance Manual. AMC1 SPO.OP.211 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters FATO SUITABILITY The in-flight determination of the FATO suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report. Page 63 of 64  Appendix 5 to Opinion No 02/2019 SUBPART C AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND OPERATING LIMITATIONS GM1 SPO.POL.130(a)(4) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during take-off or landing, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for the pilot-in-command is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a take-off or landing, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any further safety measures he/she considers justified under the prevailing conditions. The excess runway length available including the criticality of the overrun area should also be considered. The determination of take-off performance data for wet and contaminated runways should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth. GM1 SPO.POL.140 Landing – complex motor-powered aeroplanes WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA The determination of landing performance data should be based on information provided in the operations manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’. The RWYCC is reported through a runway condition report (RCR) in the SNOWTAM format in accordance with ICAO Annex 15. Page 64 of 64